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M A Y 1967 IN THIS I SSUE M onetary Policy in a Changing W orld . FEDERAL RESERVE . 2 C ap ital Spending Plans in C levelan d and Northeastern O hio . . 10 Agricultural Loans at Com mercial Banks in the Fourth District . 14 BANK OF CLEVELAND ECONOMIC REVIEW MONETARY POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD by W. B ra d d o c k H ickm an, President F e d e ra l R eserve Bank o f C le v e la n d Talk d e liv e re d b y P resid en t H ickm an as p a rt o f the series " D istinguished Lectu res on B anking an d M o n e ta ry P o lic y " at The O h io S ta te U n iversity, C olu m b u s, O h io , M a y 3 , 1967. The view s e x p re sse d a re M r. H ickm an's a n d do not n ecessa rily re fle c t those o f the F e d e ra l R eserve S ystem . MONETARY POLICY AND UNCERTAINTY seem to b e the p rin cip al so u rces an d ca u s e s of the errors. Let us start with the co n v en tion al w isdom I am d elighted io b e with you io d ay , and a s it is d escrib ed in the elem e n ta ry textbooks. honored io p a riic ip a le in the serie s of "D is T here is tod ay alm ost com p lete a g reem en t tinguished L ectu res on Bankin g an d M one that m o n etary p o licy an d fisca l p o licy sh a re ta ry P o lic y ." M y topic tod ay is "M o n etary the sa m e g en e ra l o b je ctiv e s: to help the eco n P olicy in a C h an g in g W o rld ." M ore p recisely , om y a ch ie v e eco n om ic grow th without in fla it should b e c a lle d "M o n etary an d F isc a l tion and with re a so n a b le eguilibrium in the P olicy in a C h an g in g W o rld ," sin ce the one in tern atio n al b a la n c e of p ay m en ts. The text can n o t b e d iscu ssed without the other; but books tell us further, that an ap p rop riate m ix I w ill try to em phasize m onetary p o licy and of m o n etary an d fisca l p o licy is n eed ed io thus conform m ore clo sely to the title of the a ch ie v e th ese o b jectiv e s. O n som e o cca sio n s, lectu res. I sh a ll touch briefly an d inform ally it m a y b e d esira b le to h a v e a little m ore fiscal on the elem e n ta ry textbook theory of fiscal p o licy and a little le ss m o n etary p o licy , and an d m o n etary p o licy and in d icate som e of on som e o cca sio n s, the rev erse. But the point the problem s that a rise w hen w e attem p t to is that the sta te of the eco n om y is assu m ed ap p ly pure theory in a world of u n certain ty to b e know n with alm ost com p lete certain ty , an d ch a n g e. I sh a ll then review the record so that th ere is v irtu ally no u n certain ty ab o u t of recen t y e a rs and point out som e of the the ap p rop riate econ om ic p o licy mix. errors that I think h a v e a ctu a lly b ee n m ad e A num ber of problem s a rise w hen w e a t in this a re a . And finally, I sh a ll id entify w hat tem pt io ap p ly textbook theory in p ra ctice , Digitized for 2 FRASER MAY 1 9 6 7 due la rg e ly lo the difficulty of pred iciing A nother illu stration of a n exo g en o u s — and econ om ic ev en ls. The econom y — in stead of u n p red ictab le — in flu en ce on the eco n om y is m oving a lo n g a ste a d y path a t a co n stan t the fa ct that w e a re fa ce d this y e a r with m an y ra te co n stan tly m ajo r la b o r n eg o tiation s an d the p o ssib ility ch a n g in g rate, w hich is difficult to fo recast of w ork stop p ag es. T h ese, too, h a v e serious a cc u ra te ly . This is not re a lly surprising sin ce unknow n im p licatio n s for the p a c e an d di the p rin cip al p a ra m e te rs of the econ om ic s y s rection of econ om ic a ctiv ity in 1967. A nother tem a re not re a lly sta b le, econ om ic relatio n com p lex of fa cto rs — p a rtly exo g en o u s and ships a re not fu lly understood, and u nex p a rtly en d o g en o u s— h a s to do w ith con su m er p ected d evelopm en ts affect the sy stem at spending p lan s. G iv en the u n certa in ties of variou s tim es an d in variou s w ay s. A s a V ietn am an d p o ssib le la b o r stop p ages, a s g en e ra l m atter, ra te s of growth of population w ell a s the current low er le v el of the structure ch a n g e d eter of in terest ra te s an d the u n certain cou rse of with d isp o sa b le p e rso n a l incom e, it is difficult to in n ovation s; an d con su m ers' attitud es and predict how co n su m ers w ill b e h a v e in the ta s te s shift e rra tica lly . M ost im portantly of m onths a h ea d . A n y or a ll of th ese fa cto rs of m ined grow th — m oves over tim e; production at a te ch n o lo g ically functions ch a n g e all, F ed eral spending and taxin g a re d eter could e a s ily an d a p p re cia b ly ch a n g e the m ined in part b y so cial, political, an d in ter fu tu re co u rse of the eco n om y in 1967, a s w ell n a tio n a l co n sid eratio n s and on ly in part b y a s the ap p rop riate m ix of m o n etary an d fisca l w hat would b e good econom ics. po licy to d a y . The b a s ic p roblem of an ap p ro p riately co This type of u n certain ty is in d eed unfortu ord inated m o n etary an d fiscal p o licy is to nate, alth ough u n certain ty is a b a s ic fa ct of d eterm ine the co u rse of the eco n om y over life. P olicy m a k ers must assu m e, on the b a s is a finite period a h ea d . If the period is a s long of the b est e v id e n c e a v a ila b le , ih a i the e c o n a s a y e a r and a h alf (as in the P resid en t's om y w ill b e h a v e in a ce rta in fash io n over a a n n u a l budget, for exam p le), this is a n ex finite period, an d form u late a n ap p rop riate trem ely difficult jo b w hen you co n sid er the p o licy m ix for th at finite period. If econ om ic kinds of ex o g en o u s fa cto rs a t work. To illu s conditions a lter u n ex p ected ly during the p e trate: the step-up of our d efen se effort in riod of the fo reca st, w hat w a s o n ce ju d g ed to V ietn am h ad m ajo r influ en ces on dom estic b e ap p rop riate p o licy w ill b eco m e in ap propri econ om ic activ ity in the seco n d h alf of 1965 ate. The in flexibility an d rigidity of the p o licy and in a ll of 1966 (influences that w ere la rg e mix — p a rticu la rly the fisca l a sp e cts of that ly m issed in the stan d ard fo recasts m ad e at p o licy — c re a te the crux of th e difficulty. the b eg in n in g of both y ears). W h at is in store W h ile m o n etary p o licy c a n ad a p t guickly, for 1967? F ran kly, I do not know . Bui I do fisca l p o licy can n ot. The in flexibility an d know that with the future m agn itu d e and rigidity of fisca l p o licy w ere c le a r ly d em on duration of our m ilitary effort unspecified, strated during the seco n d h alf of 1965 an d the th ere is a w ide m arg in for error in a n y fore first h alf of 1966, w hen fisca l p o licy w as loo c a st of econ om ic a ctiv ity in the period ah ead . ex p a n sio n a ry w hile the eco n om y w a s o v er 3 ECONOMIC REVIEW h eatin g , and during la te 1966, w hen fiscal effects on the eco n om y a re still unresolved. p o licy w as in a d e q u a tely ex p an sio n ary w hile The lead -lag relatio n sh ip s of ch a n g e s in b a n k the econom y w as cooling off. The b a s ic p rob reserv es, the m oney stock, b a n k credit, and lem of fiscal p o licy is the inflexibility of the in terest ra te s a re not fully understood. For F ed era l budget o n ce form ulated, an d the exam p le, tight m on ey in 1966, h a s had , and slow n ess with w hich it ca n b e reform u lated w ill continue to h a v e, u n ev en effects on v a r under our existin g institutional arran g em en ts. ious secto rs of the eco n om y in 1967 an d p er M o n etary p o licy a lso h a s its problem s, but h a p s beyon d , an d the am ount an d tim ing of th ey a re not the sa m e problem s a s those of th ese effects a re u nresolved . The u n certain ty fisca l policy. Both ty p es of p o licy rest on fa l a sso cia te d with v a ria b le tim e la g s an d im lib le fo reca sts, but, fortu nately, m o n etary p a cts a re pro b lem s that a re, of co u rse, not p o licy is not rigid an d inflexible. To the unique to m o n etary p olicy. F isc a l p o licy also co n trary , it is ex trem ely resp on sive and a c h a s distributed effects on v ariou s secto rs of com m od ative. G iv en the right inform ation, the econ om y, an d the m agn itu d es of th ese m o n etary p o licy c a n b e ad ju sted qu ickly to effects a re not know n. For ex am p le, the ch a n g in g econom ic circu m stan ces, a s a ttest elim in ation of the 7 p ercen t in v estm en t tax ed b y the shift that occurred last N ovem ber. credit in O cto b er 1966 (just a t the w rong tim e, A lthough p o licy m ak ers look a h e a d a s far a s it turned out) h a s had, an d w ill continu e a s the horizon perm its, p olicy c a n b e reform to h a v e, pronounced effects on the am ount u lated a t in terv als a s short a s the periods an d tim ing of p lan t an d equipm ent exp en d i b e tw e e n m e e tin g s of the F ed era l O p e n M ar tu re s in 1967, the extent of w hich c a n on ly ket C om m ittee. This flexibility is m uch g reater b e ap proxim ated . In addition, I do not know th an that of fisca l p olicy, w here the o p era w hat the effects of the resto ratio n of the in tion al la g m a y b e a s m uch a s a y e a r and a vestm en t tax cred it w ill b e in 1967 — or in h alf, from Ja n u a ry through the end of the 1968, or beyond . next fisca l y ea r, w hich is the current plan n in g period for the F ed e ra l budget. O n ly one thing, b a se d on in v arian t h istori c a l ex p e rie n ce , is re a lly clea r. If the eco n The re lativ e flexibility of the F ed era l R e om y o v erh ea ts la ter this y ea r, the o v erh e a t serv e S y ste m p artly reflects the fa ct that it ing w ill b e b lam ed on m o n etary p olicy, no is not com m itted to a pu blished fo recast, and m atter w hat fisca l p o licy m a y b e or m a y h a v e p a rtly the fa ct that it is an ind epen d ent b een . It w ill b e said that w e o v errea cted to a g e n c y within, but not of, the G overnm ent. re ce s sio n a ry fe a rs in la te 1966 an d e a rly W ithin the Sy stem , a sm all group of peop le 1967. O n the other hand , if the eco n om y w ere (FOM C) — with and to s a g further, w e w ill b e b la m ed for e x c e s in terests — m eets frequ en tly to d iscu ss e c o siv ely tight m on ey in 1966 or the fa ct that nom ic d evelop m en ts an d must m ak e a p olicy w e u n d erreacted in 1967, in d ep en d ently of d ecision the n atu re of fisca l p olicy. The rule is: h ead s, at d iverse each back g ro u n d s m eeting. N evertheless, d esp ite tim elin ess an d flexibility of m o n etary m o n etary p o licy lo ses; tails, fisca l p o licy p olicy, m an y b a sic qu estions reg ard in g its wins. H opefully, in the rem ain d er of m y talk 4 FRASER Digitized for MAY 1 9 6 7 I w ill b e a b le to rise a b o v e Ihe p erp etu al ap prop riate. From mid-1965 until mid-1966, sq u a b b le about the resp ectiv e ro les of m one ih e eco n om y w as ch a ra cte riz ed b y e x c e ssiv e tary an d fisca l p olicy, and sh ed som e light a g g re g a te d em an d re la tiv e io ih e n atio n 's on the p ra c tica l difficulties of the F ed era l c a p a c ity to produce. The resu lts w ere im R eserv e S y stem a s it attem p ts to conduct b a la n c e s an d d isioriions in v ariou s secto rs m o n etary p o licy on the b a sis of ih e in form a of ih e econ om y, an d a g e n e ra l in flatio n ary tion a v a ila b le . Lei us therefore turn io a o v erh eatin g. In mid-1965, a cc e le ra te d d efen se review of econ om ic d evelopm ents sin ce the spending for V ietn am w as su perim posed on last recessio n , and the role of p u blic p olicy rap id ly rising b u sin ess expen d itu res for fixed in that period. p lan t and equipm ent. In v en tory spending also exp an d ed rapid ly, both for d efen se pur ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1961 p o ses an d other u ses. (P a ren th eiica lly , a s I w ill d iscu ss later, our inform ation on d efen se In ih e long b u sin ess exp an sio n sin ce ea rly spending an d in ven tory in vestm en t w as 1961, ihe econ om y h a s b ee n ch aracterized hig h ly in a d e q u a te a i that iim e.) O p eratin g b y three distinct period s of econ om ic growth, ra te s in m an y lin es b e g a n to ex c e e d desired with a different mix of m on etary and fiscal lev els, an d la b o r sh o rta g es ap p eared . A fter p o licy in e a c h period. B etw een the c y c lic a l y e a rs of v irtu al sta b ility , unit la b o r co sts trough in F eb ru ary 1961 and m id-1965, ih e b e g a n to rise rapid ly, profit m arg in s fell, and eco n om y a d v an ce d a i a re m a rk a b ly w ell- in flatio n ary p ressu res a cc e le ra te d . Betw een b a la n c e d an d n o n in flaiio n ary p a c e . R e a l GNP the seco n d q u arter of 1965 an d ih e third q u ar rose a i a high a v e r a g e rate of abo u t 5.5 p er ter of 1966, re a l GNP ro se a i a sa tisfa cto ry 5.5 cen t, an d ih e GNP deflator rose a t a re la tiv ely p ercen t a n n u a l rate, but the GNP p rice d e low a v e ra g e a n n u a l ra te of abou t 1.4 p ercen t flator in crea sed a t a 2.9 p ercen t a n n u a l rate, a y ea r. In a n effort io clo se ih e g ap b etw een abou t tw ice the in c re a s e of the ea rlie r period. ihe eco n o m y 's p o ten tial and a c tu a l output, The su rge in eco n om ic a ctiv ity g en era ted both m o n etary an d fisca l p o licy w ere e x p a n enorm ous d em an d s for funds, w hich could sio n a ry throughout the period. Around ih e noi b e satisfied without a n e x c e ssiv e e x p a n tim e of ih e reduction in p erso n al and corp o sion of credit. A s in flatio n ary p ressu res in ra te in com e ta x e s in F eb ru ary crea se d , the F ed e ra l R eserv e S y ste m b e c a m e 1964, re a l econ om ic grow th a cc e le ra te d but without a le ss acco m m o d ativ e, ih e grow th of b a n k n o tice a b le a cc e le ra tio n in prices. The F ed e ra l cred ii sla ck en ed , an d ih e en tire co n stellatio n R eserv e S y stem m aintain ed a n acco m m o d a of in terest ra te s b e g a n to m ove up. The in tive m o n etary po licy , w hich provided ih e c r e a s e in the d iscouni ra te from 4 p ercen t to m on ey an d credit need ed io support en larg ed 4V2 p ercen t in D ecem b er 1965, alth ough at spending by b u sin esses, consu m ers, and governm ent. first h ig h ly unpopular, g a in ed grudging sup port from inform ed qu arters w hen ii b e c a m e During e a c h of the next two periods, ih e ap p a ren t ih a t ih e A d m inistration w as not go mix of m o n eiary and fiscal p o licy w as le ss in g io a sk for a n ap p rop riate co n tra cy clic a l 5 ECONOMIC REVIEW in c re a se in in com e tax es. The log ic support m on ey supply in crea sed , an d in terest ra tes ing e a rlier fisca l m easu res to in v ig o rate a declined . la g g in g eco n om y now arg u ed for the re v erse F is c a l p o licy b e g a n to p la y a n ap p rop riate fisca l policy, but this w as not to b e the ca se . co n tra cy clic a l role e a rly in 1967. The A dm in D espite token fisca l m easu res, su ch a s the istration re le a s e d funds that h ad b ee n w ith p a rtia l resto ratio n of previou sly red u ced ex held from the h ig h w ay program , m ad e m ore cise ta x e s and a c c e le ra te d incom e tax w ith m o rtg ag e funds a v a ila b le through FNMA, holdings, the m ajo r burden of restrain t fell sp eed ed up v etera n s ' dividend p ay m en ts, on m o n etary p olicy. an d in M arch c a lle d for im m ed iate re in sta te This, a s it turned out, had m an y unfortu m ent of the 7 p ercen t in vestm en t tax credit. n a te co n seg u en ces. For exam p le, a s m one The e x iste n ce of m od eratin g ten d en cies in ta ry p o licy b e c a m e p ro g ressiv ely tighter, and the eco n om y w a s reconfirm ed b y the F ed era l in terest ra te s so ared to the hig h est le v els in R eserv e S y ste m in M arch w hen reserv e re- 40 y e a rs, sav in g s that norm ally flow through guirem ents on ce rta in tim e d eposits w ere n o n b an k deposit-type institutions w ere di reduced, an d a g a in in April, w hen the dis verted d irectly into hig her yield in g m oney count ra te w as cut from AV2 p ercen t to 4 p er m ark et in vestm en ts. S in ce d eposit-type in sti cent. From the third g u arter of 1966 to the tutions n o rm ally su pply the bulk of funds for first g u arter of 1967, r e a l GNP ro se a t a so m e re sid en tial construction, the m o rtg ag e m ar w hat m ore subdued ra te of 2.3 p ercen t but k et w as serio u sly sgueezed . The result w as a the p rice d eflator continu ed to rise at a high sh arp d eclin e in housing starts an d in re si a n n u a l ra te of 2.8 percen t, alth ough other d en tial construction. m ajo r p rice in d exes show ed m od eratin g ten d en cies. The third period b e g a n in the fa ll of 1966 w hen it b e c a m e ap p aren t to the F ed era l D espite the re cen tly im proved mix of m on e R eserv e that the o v erh eated eco n om y w as ta ry an d fisca l p o licy , the n atio n 's re a l e c o b eg in n in g to co o l off. W h ile p rices w ere still nom ic grow th w ill b e sm a ll in 1967, jud ged rising, the p a c e of the private secto r slow ed, b y recen t stan d ard s. B u sin ess in vestm en t in an d in d u strial production b e g a n to level. new plan t an d eguipm ent is ed g in g down, M oreover, just a s econ om ic activ ity b e g a n inventory accu m u la tio n h a s b e e n reduced , to m o d erate in O cto b er 1966, fisca l p o licy an d until recen tly , con su m er spending h a s took a restrictiv e step with the su spension b ee n sluggish . The b a s ic guestion of the m o of the 7 p ercen t tax cred it on b u sin ess in v est m ent, from the point of view of m o n etary m ent an d a c c e le ra te d d ep reciatio n allo w policy, is w h eth er our sta n c e is about right, a n ce s. The bu rden o n ce a g a in w as on m one or w h ether w e should e a s e further or tighten. ta ry p olicy, w hich turned p ro g ressiv ely e a sie r W h a te v er p o licy is ad opted , our b a s ic g o a l b eg in n in g in N ovem ber. A fter a short period rem ain s the sa m e a s it h a s a lw a y s b e e n — of hesitation, b a n k reserv e s b e g a n to grow to a ch ie v e rapid ly, b an k credit exp an d ed sh arp ly , the nom ic growth. 6 FRASER Digitized for b a la n c e d n on in flation ary eco MAY 1 9 6 7 LESSONS OF RECENT EXPERIENCE step would b e to d evelop b etter u nd erstan d In m y brief review of econom ic d evelop ing an d a g reem en t a s to w hich bu dget co n m ents sin ce the last recessio n , I d elin eated a cep t is most ap p rop riate for p o licy p lan n in g long period from 1961 to mid-1965 w hen the purposes. The p resen t sy stem of m ultiple eco n om y en jo y e d stea d y grow th an d sta b le bu d g ets is con fusin g to the la y m a n , an d lend s p rices, an d two short periods, m id-1965 to itself to m an ip u lation to show a surplu s— or m id-1966, w hen grow th w as sa tisfa cto ry but a sm a ll deficit — in w h atev er bu dget h a p p rices spurted, an d mid-1966 to the p resent, pen s to b e in fav or a t the m om ent. A s a w hen grow th sla ck e n e d w hile p rices co n form er C h airm an of the C ou n cil of E conom ic tinued to rise. A ll of us c a n tak e pride in the A d visers re cen tly pointed out, w e a re oper record a s a w hole, but it could h a v e b ee n atin g in a kind of "fis c a l fo g ” that could b e better, g iv en b etter inform ation, d eep er in hig h ly d an gerous. F ortu n ately, the P resid ent sights, and m ore app rop riate m ixes of m one p la n s soon to esta b lish a b ip a rtisa n group ta ry an d fisca l p olicy. Let us s e e w hat co n to study bu dget p ro cesse s, with a view to structive step s should b e tak en to im prove w ard s reform an d im provem ent. I p erso n a lly public p o licy in the future. First, it is im p erative that w e find som e w ay think a ls o that som e w a y m ust b e found to provide for sp eed ier ad ju stm en ts in the tax of redu cing the inflexibility and resulting un sy stem tim elin ess of fisca l p olicy. Part of the trouble P erh ap s a n in d epend ent a g e n c y m ight b e to ch a n g in g econ om ic conditions. lies in the budget m aking p ro cess itself. given the pow er to ad ju st ta x e s upw ard or F ed era l bu dg ets a re b a se d on sp ecific, one- dow nw ard a s n eed ed w ithin a sm a ll p er shot fo reca sts of w hat the eco n om y w ill b e c e n ta g e ran g e, su b je ct to review an d revision like over the next 18 m onths; a g a in st this b y C on g ress or the E xecu tive. A dm ittedly, backg rou n d , receip ts a re estim ated , la x pol the p ra c tica l p o litical difficulties of a n y such ic y p lanned , an d spending pro jected . If the p lan a re enorm ous, but the p o ten tial e c o fo reca st is w rong, a s it alm ost a lw a y s is for nom ic b en efits a re ev en g reater. a n y 18-month period, estim ates of incom e Seco n d , m o n etary p o licy a lso is in need w ill b e w rong, an d spending p lan s an d tax of som e im provem ent, p a rticu la rly in the p o licy will b e in ap p rop riate for econ om ic a r e a of m easu rin g tim e la g s an d im pact. stab ilization an d growth. The difficulty is that F ran kly, I think m o n etary p o licy h a s b ee n F ed e ra l program s for spending an d taxin g quite good sin ce e a rly 1960. T h ere now seem s ta k e m an y m onths to p la ce in train, g ain to b e g e n e ra l a p p ro v a l am on g econ om ists m om entum in the p ro cess, and can n o t e a sily of the tim elin ess an d direction, if not the m a g b e reversed , o n ce started. nitudes, of recen t m o n etary p o licy ch a n g es, O n e p ra c tica l solution would b e to provide alth ough th ere is co n sid era b ly le ss a g r e e for the reg u lar p u blicatio n of revised q u arter m ent, a s I h a v e in d icated , on w hether w e ly bu dgets, sim ilar to those the B ureau of tend to o v ersta y our position. A lso, m an y the Budget w ill provide this y e a r to the Joint criticize us for not d esig n atin g one p articu lar E conom ic C om m ittee. A nother constructive econ om ic lim e serie s a s the m ajo r m o n etary 7 ECONOMIC REVIEW v a ria b le . Should it b e Professor Brunner's com bin ed m an u factu rin g an d trad e in v en "c re d ii b a s e ,'' P rofessor F ried m an's ''b ro a d ” tories now la g s the even t b y abou t two m on ey supply, or the F ed eral R eserv e's own m onths. This m e a n s th at tod ay w e know b rain child, ''th e b an k credit p ro x y ''? som ething about w hat h ap p en ed to in v en F ran k ly , I do not know the answ er, and tories in F eb ru a ry , but su b seq u en t d evelo p doubt that an y o n e else does. In p ra ctice , the m ents rem ain shrouded in m y stery. This is F ed era l O p en M arket C om m ittee looks at a ll not on ly b a d b y itself, but the e a rly re le a s e s kinds of v a ria b le s and tries to acco u n t for on in ven tories a re su b je ct to su b sta n tia l rev i sign ifican t ch a n g e sion, due ch iefly to difficulties in ob tain in g v ariatio n s in ra te s of am o n g them . Econom etric m od els h a v e a re lia b le inform ation on m an u factu rin g an d w ay of in d icatin g that one or an o th er of a set reta il stocks. The sa m e difficulties ca rry over of v a ria b le s is the m ost im portant v a ria b le into the GNP statistics. To illu strate, in Ja n u to b e consid ered, but the se le cte d v a ria b le a ry an d e a rly F eb ru a ry , the F ed e ra l O p en h a s a d iscon certing w ay of ch an g in g , d epend M arket C om m ittee o p erated on the assu m p ing upon the m odel and tim e period consid tion th at b u sin ess in v en tories h ad in c re a s e d ered. In part, this p ro b ab ly reflects inherent b y $14.4 billion in the fourth qu arter of 1966, sta tistic a l p roblem s a sso cia te d with econom ic on ly to lea rn a t the end of F eb ru a ry that m odel building, for exam p le, the high d eg ree inventory in vestm en t h ad b e e n $2 b illion of in terco rrelaiio n b etw een the dependent higher, im plying a m uch m ore sev ere in v en v a ria b le s in the m odel, se ria l co rrelatio n , in tory ad ju stm en t later on. co rrect assu m ption s about the distribution In addition to a c c u r a c y an d tim elin ess, w e of error term s, and so forth. In part, I su sp ect n eed to im prove the co v e ra g e of our statistics. that it a lso reflects the fa ct that econom ic re C onsider, for exam p le, the im portant influ lation ship s a re too com plex and in terrelated e n c e of ch a n g e s in liquid a ss e t holdings of to b e rep resen ted b y a n y sing le tim e series, b u sin esses an d con su m ers on sa v in g s flows, or a n y sin g le set of v a ria b le s. In a n y event, the m on ey stock, an d so u rces of co m m ercial the F ed era l R eserv e Sy stem is k een ly a w a re b a n k funds. W e re ly h ere on q u arterly FTC- of the g a p s in its k now led ge an d is sin cerely SEC estim a tes of " c a s h ," "U. S. G overnm ent trying to fill them. s e cu rities," an d "o th e r" liquid a sse ts, rath er A s a third step in im proving pu blic p o licy th an on m ore p recise an d m ean in gfu l c a te in g en eral, w e d esp erately need to im prove gories (now alm ost to tally u n a v a ila b le to us) our inform ation system , by o b tain in g m ore of su ch item s a s co rp orate hold ings of Euro a cc u ra te an d tim ely statistics, b y im proving dollars, tim e ce rtifica tes of deposit, foreign co v e ra g e , an d b y filling som e of the g ap s in T rea su ry bills, an d so forth, a ll of g rea t co n our k now ledge. C onsider, for exam p le, bu si cern to the m o n etary authorities. n ess inven tory investm ent, w hich p la y s a A third m ajo r inform ation p roblem in volves m ajo r role in ex p lain in g c y c lic a l sw ings in the g a p s in our know led ge. A m ajo r in form a eco n om ic activ ity g en erated in the private tion g ap re la te s to d efen se spending. A s m en sector. P u blication of m onthly statistics on tioned ea rlier, the huge an d la rg e ly u n ex Digitized for 8 FRASER MAY 1 9 6 7 peeled su rge in d efen se spending ih a i b e g a n the fisca l p ro cesse s of the G overn m en t itself. in la ie 1965 g en era ted far-reach in g reactio n s U n less an d until h igh -level pu blic officials in ih e econ om y, ih e effects of w hich a re still recogn ize the d a n g ers involved, no d ep art with us. U ndoubtedly, if m onetary an d fiscal m ent of ih e G overn m en t w ill re ce iv e a d e p o licy m ak ers h ad b ee n fully a w a re of d e q u ate v elopm ents then, step s would h a v e b ee n things a s d a ta co llectio n or d a ta p ro cessin g , approp riation s for su ch m u ndane ta k en e a rlier to restrain them , an d le ss re w hich a re so n e c e ss a r y for efficient p o licy straint would h a v e b e e n need ed la te r on. The m aking. It is in co n ce iv a b le th at the g rea test fa ct is, how ever, that k ey v a ria b le s relatin g nation in ih e world, with a G ro ss N ational to d efen se spending a re alm ost im p ossible to Product of over $750 billion, an d with F ed e ra l predict, an d im p o ssible to obtain ev en w ithin G overn m en t o u tlay s of ov er $150 billion a ih e v ariou s a g e n c ie s of the G overn m ent it y ea r, spen ds on ly $125 m illion on its F ed era l self. U nfortunately, th ese u nexp ected e s c a la sta tistica l program s. S u rely , w e need to im tions an d d e-escalatio n s in d efen se spending p rove the q u ality an d tim elin ess of our e c o c a n do serious harm to the dom estic eco n nom ic inform ation, ev en if it m e a n s spending om y, u nless offset b y ap p rop riate pu blic pol m ore m oney. icy. At least, im portant p o licy m ak ing groups T h ese then, in b ro ad brush, a re the e le su ch a s the C ou ncil of Econom ic A d visers and m ents n eed ed for a b etter mix of m o n etary the F ed era l O pen M arket C om m ittee should an d fisca l p o licy in the future: first, a m ore b e inform ed, to the extent possible, of m ajo r flexib le fisca l p olicy, p a rticu la rly a m ore flex shifts in d efen se spending, ev en if su ch infor ib le tax po licy ; secon d , a n im proved th eoreti m ation must b e w ithheld from the pu blic on c a l b a s is for m o n etary p o licy ; an d third, grounds of n atio n al security. If this ty p e of b etter d a ta for the p o licy m ak er in su ch im inform ation portant a re a s a s liquid a sse ts, b u sin ess in is not a v a ila b le , then step s should b e tak en to develop it b y the appro ven tories, an d d efen se spending. W e, of p riate a g e n cie s. cou rse, a lso need to im prove our econ om ic In g en eral, I su sp ect that the root of the fo reca sts. This is som eth in g io w hich w e ca n difficulty in o b tain in g a d eq u a te an d tim ely a ll contribu te — in ih e u niversities, in G ov inform ation g o e s b a c k io our old b u gabo o , ernm ent, an d in bu sin ess. 9 ECONOMIC REVIEW CAPITAL SPENDING PLANS IN CLEVELAND AND NORTHEASTERN OHIO M an u factu rin g firm s in the four-county tiv en ess of the sa m p le .1 C le v e la n d m e tr o p o lita n a re a ex p ect total sp en d ing for new p lan t and eguipm ent in 1967 CLEVELAND AREA to b e 27 p ercen t larg e r th an in 1966, with a The ex p ected 27-percent in c re a s e in this slight reduction in the ra te of c a p ita l spend y e a r's c a p ita l spen din g b y C lev e la n d m an u ing in d ic a t e d fo r 1968. T h ese p la n s w ere fa ctu rers (see T a b le I) co n sid era b ly ex c e e d s re v ea led in a su rv ey of ca p ita l spendin g in n a tio n a l ex p ecta tio n s for 1967, a s re v e a le d n o rth eastern O hio ta k en in M arch 1967. b y the m ost recen t n ation w id e su rv ey s. At This y e a r's su rv ey of ca p ita l spending the sa m e tim e the 27-percent in c re a s e rep re differs from ea rlie r su rv ey s b y the F ed era l sen ts on ly ab o u t h alf a s la rg e a rise a s h ad R eserv e B ank of C lev elan d . In a n attem pt to b e e n an ticip a ted a t the tim e of the previous red u ce dup lication and, at the sa m e tim e, su rv ey b y this B an k in the fa ll of 1966. The to im prove the u sefu ln ess of the results, this dow nw ard rev ision in spen din g p la n s for B a n k 's sem ian n u al su rv ey of the C lev e lan d 1967 u nd ou btedly reflects ch a n g e s in the a r e a w as com bin ed with the a n n u a l su rvey ev a lu a tio n of the n ear-term econ om ic outlook of the eight-county n o rth eastern O hio a re a b etw een the two su rv ey d ates. prev iou sly con du cted by C h a m b er of C om m erce the and C lev elan d the G rea ter The g en e ra l p attern of in c re a se d spending in 1967 an d red u ced spending in 1968 in the C lev e lan d G row th Board. G rea ter g eo g rap h ic c o v e ra g e w as acco m p an ied b y a la rg e in c r e a s e in the num ber of p articip atin g firms; a ll m an u factu rin g estab lish m en ts in 1 Questionnaires mailed to prospeclive participanls above a certain size were similar to those used by this Bank in previous surveys. A much abbreviated form, however, the w as sent to the large number of smaller firms newly eight-county a re a , re g a rd less of size, w ere included in the survey. As a result, only the percentages invited to co o p e rate in the survey. W h ile this of year-to-year changes in spending and the proportions resu lted in a low er resp o n se rate, the e x of total spending for structures and for machinery, re spectively, are based on all returns. All other findings p an d ed su rvey g re a tly in crea sed the num ber reflect only that portion of the respondents completing of resp o n ses and im proved the re p re se n ta the full-size questionnaire. 10 MAY 1 9 6 7 TABLE I sizable increase in 1968. Capital Spending by Manufacturing Firms Cleveland Metropolitan Area (Spring 1967 Survey) The im p act of ex p ected industry ch a n g e s in c a p ita l spen din g on to tal c a p ita l in v est m ent in the C lev e la n d a r e a is, of cou rse, Year-to-Year Percent Changes p roportionate to the am ount of spen din g b y 1966 (actual) to 19 6 7 (planned) 19 6 7 (planned) to 1968 (planned) Durable g o o d s .................... + 31% — Stone, clay, and glass . + 33 — 34 Primary metals . . . . + 65 + 2 . + 15 .................... — 2 + — 11 6 Fabricated metals Machinery . 4% the ind u stries involved. A s a n ex am p le, the ex p ected 30-percent redu ction in this y e a r's spen din g b y the ch e m ic a l industry rep resen ts m an y m ore d ollars th an the 33-percent in cr e a s e in the ston e, c la y , an d g la s s industry. + 17 — 26 G en e ra lly , to tal c a p ita l spen din g in the Transportation equipment + 23 — 9 In stru m e n ts .................... — 16 + 128 C lev e la n d a r e a is d eterm ined la rg e ly b y the Other durables* . . . + 50 — 21 Nondurable goods . . . + 9 — 6 F o o d .................................. — 13 — 11 A p p a re l............................. + 27 — 88 turing ind u stries (27 percen t) an d for the Paper and paper products +400 — 64 d u r a b le g o o d s c o m p o n e n t (31 p ercent) in Printing and publishing . + 12 + 2 C h e m ic a ls ........................ — 30 + 59 Electrical equipment . . Rubber and plastics . . + 73 — 14 Other nondurablesf . . — 27 + 29 T O T A L .................................. + 27% — 4% d u rab le goods secto r, a s show n b y the n ea rly id en tica l p ercen t c h a n g e s for a ll m a n u fa c Table I. The la tter com ponent a cco u n ts for ov er 80 p ercen t of ex p ected to tal spen din g in 1967, with a lm ost on e-half com in g from the prim ary m e ta ls ind u stry a lo n e an d the * Includes ordnance, lumber, furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing. other h alf from tran sp o rtatio n equipm ent, ■f Includes textiles, petroleum products, leather. m a ch in ery , e le c tric a l equipm ent, an d fa b ri S o u rc e : ca te d m etals, in that order. In co n trast, the F e d e r a l R e se rv e B a n k o f C le v e la n d C lev ela n d a r e a holds true for the d u rable re la tiv e ly sm a ll n o n d u rable good s sector, and n on d u rable good s sectors, a s w ell a s for w h ere the ch e m ic a l industry ou tran ks a ll about h alf the ind ivid u al ind u stries show n o th ers in size of this y e a r's ex p ected spen d in T a b le I. A few industries ex p ect spending ing, ex e rts re la tiv e ly le ss in flu en ce on the to rise in both 1967 an d 1968. The group in a r e a 's to tal spending. clu d es the prim ary m etals, fa b ric a te d m etals, A bout on e out of ev e ry five d o llars of new an d printing an d pu blishing ind u stries that ca p ita l in vestm en t b y a ll m an u factu rin g in prev iou sly reported redu ced spen ding in 1966 dustries in the a r e a w ill b e for new structu res a s co m p ared with 1965. O ther ind u stries ex in 1967 (see T a b le II). A s usual, ind ivid u al in pect to red u ce spending in 1967 an d a g a in in dustries v a ry w id ely a s to the proportions of 1968; th ey inclu de the m ach in ery an d the spen din g for structu res a s a g a in st m ach in ery . food ind u stries w here spending in 1966 w as The proportion of spen din g ea rm a rk ed for high co m p ared w ith 1965. The ch e m ic a l in ex p an sio n of fa cilitie s — ab o u t 60 p ercen t, a s dustry, w hich ex p ects redu ced spending in show n in T a b le II — is low er th a n the 67 1967 from a high 1966 level, a n ticip a te s a p ercen t in d icated in la st O cto b e r's su rvey. 11 ECONOMIC REVIEW This p ro b a b ly reflects som ew hat le ss p res p ercen t in the la test su rvey. T hat a v ery high su re on c a p a c ity now th an last fall, w hen proportion of rep lies w ere m ark ed " le s s th an alm ost h alf of the rep lies show ed "le s s than a d e q u a te " in the printing an d p u blish in g in a d e q u a te " c a p a city , in co n trast to on ly 30 dustry, su g g ests c a p a c ity sh o rta g es in som e a re a s. TABLE II Capital Spending by Manufacturing Firms Cleveland Metropolitan Area (Spring 1967 Survey) A pp roxim ately 90 p ercen t of the d ollar am ounts to b e spent for new p lan t an d equip m ent in 1967 an d 1968 w ill b e fin an ced in tern ally , a slig h tly la rg e r p ercen t th an indi Percent Distribution of Total Spending by Type* (Between Structures and Equipment and Between ca ted in the previous su rvey. H ow ever, the Expansion and Replacement) proportion of firm s ex p ectin g to fin a n ce this Structures')" 1966 Durable goods 25% 1967 19% Expansion^ y e a r's spending en tirely from in tern al so u rces 1968 1966 1967 1968 — 80 p ercen t of th ose rep ly in g — is slig h tly 23% 61% 63% 58% sm a ller th an show n for eith er 1966 or 1968. Stone, clay, and glass 22 13 19 43 59 63 Primary metals 16 12 32 73 80 83 Fabricated metals 29 24 32 56 38 44 Machinery 32 26 16 57 46 37 Electrical equipment 48 38 35 60 72 68 19 12 6 53 47 45 Instruments 9 7 5 77 74 72 T otal ca p ita l spending in the n o rth eastern O hio a r e a is la rg e ly d eterm in ed b y the ind u s trial p attern s of the two m etropolitan a r e a s — Transportation e q u ip m e n t NORTHEASTERN OHIO AREA C lev ela n d an d A kron— inclu d ed in the eight- Other durables § 18 33 6 79 77 88 cou nty group, w hich con tribu te 70 p ercen t Nondurable goods 30 32 30 59 65 67 an d 20 p ercen t, resp ectiv ely , of n o rth east Food 44 30 26 Apparel 74 67 14 Paper and paper products 41 60 18 -0 72 -0 92 -0 -0 - C lev ela n d a re a , w hich a cco u n ts for about n.a. n.a. n.a. Printing and publishing 25 22 25 55 70 58 Chemicals 26 22 51 63 62 83 Rubber and plastics 28 8 4 77 91 94 14 12 45 21% 24% 61% Other nondurables# TOTAL 9 26% ern O h io 's m an u factu rin g em ploym ent. The 2 63% * Based only upon returns in which these breakdowns were supplied. f Spending for equipment equals 100 percent less the percentage shown for structures. t Spending for replacement equals 100 percent less the percentage shown for expansion. § Includes ordnance, lumber, furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing. # Includes textiles, petroleum products, leather. three-fourths of new c a p ita l in vestm en t ex p ected b y reporting m a n u factu rers, c le a rly d om in ates the spending p attern for the en tire eight counties. This is p a rticu la rly evid en t in 36 the 60% h e a v ily co n cen tra ted in the C lev e la n d a re a . d u rab le goods industries, w hich a re A co m p ariso n of the d a ta in T a b le s I an d III show s that p ercen t ch a n g e s in spending p la n s for the d u rab le good s group a s a w hole a re v irtu ally the sa m e for the en tire north e a stern O hio a r e a an d for the C lev ela n d portion. A m ong com ponent industries, y ear- n.a. Not available. to-year ch a n g e s in spen din g a re of sim ilar Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland size in som e in sta n ce s an d m ove in the sa m e 12FRASER Digitized for MAY 1 96 7 TABLE III on ly 15 p ercen t of total spen din g in a ll m an Capital Spending by Manufacturing Firms and Utilities Northeastern Ohio (Eight Counties) (Spring 1967 Survey) u factu rin g industries. Year-to-Year Percent Changes 196 6 (actual) to 19 6 7 (planned) M a n u factu rers in the A kron a r e a exp ect, on a v e ra g e , to spend 15 p ercen t le ss for new p lan t an d equipm ent in 1967 th an la st y e a r an d to ra ise the lev el of spen din g b y 2 p er 1967 (plannei to 1 968 (plannei cen t in 1968. The reported to tals a re h ea v ily in fluenced b y spending p la n s of the rubber industry, w hich in clu d e a 22-percent red u c Durable g o o d s .................... + 31% — Stone, clay, and glass . + 31 — 20 Primary metals . . . . + 71 + 3 + — 11 4 + 3 g a in in 1968. The ch e m ica l industry, ranking — 6 seco n d in the A kron a r e a in the am ount of + 17 — 25 Transportation equipment + 29 — 15 In s tr u m e n ts .................... — 17 Other durables* Fabricated metals Machinery . . .................... Electrical equipment . Nondurable goods . 5% tion in spen din g in 1967 an d a 10-percent spending p lan n ed for 1967, show s in cre a s e s + 35 in 1967 and 1968 of 18 p ercen t an d 7 percen t, . . . + 26 — 19 resp ectiv ely . Together, the ru bber an d ch em . . — 10 + 6 . F o o d .................................. — 41 — 15 ic a l industries acco u n t for over 70 percen t A p p a rel............................. + 22 — 87 of a ll new p lan t an d equipm ent spending Paper and paper products +255 — 60 Printing and publishing . — 2 + 8 C h e m ic a ls ........................ — 21 + 35 co n trast, the d u rab le goods sector, w here Rubber and plastics . . — 16 + 6 Other nondurablesf • • redu ced spending is ex p ected in both 1967 27 — 27 + TOTAL MANUFACTURING + 17% — 2% U T IL IT IE S ............................. + 12% + 27% * Includes ordnance, lumber, furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing, reported b y A kron a r e a m an u factu rers. In and 1968, con tribu tes le ss th an one-fourth of to tal spending in the a re a . For the en tire n o r th e a s te r n O h io a r e a , t Includes textiles, petroleum products, leather. ch a n g e s in spen din g b y the la rg e ly Akron- Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland b a se d n on d urable goods ind u stries an d b y the C lev elan d -d om in ated d u rab le good s in d irection in a ll in stan ce s, a s b etw een C lev e dustries a re p a rtly offsetting. A s a result, total land and the en tire a re a . spending b y a ll m an u factu rin g firm s in the Sp en d ing p lan s for the eight cou nties in eight cou n ties is ex p ected to rise in 1967 b y the n on d u rable goods sector, how ever, b e a r 17 p ercen t an d in 1968 to d eclin e b y 2 p ercen t the stam p of the A kron a re a , w here 40 p er (see T a b le III). cen t of n o rth eastern O hio's em ploym ent in Public utilities in the en tire n o rth eastern n on d u rable goods m anu factu ring is located . O hio a r e a p la n to in c re a s e their ca p ita l O ne-half of a ll c a p ita l spending b y those spending b y 12 p ercen t in 1967 an d b y a industries in the com bin ed eight cou nties is further 27 p ercen t in 1968, a s show n in T a b le reported from the A kron a re a , in co n trast to III. 13 ECONOMIC REVIEW AGRICULTURAL LOANS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT A num ber of in teresting fa cts regard in g At m id y ear 1966, abou t 60 p ercen t of a ll farm the u se of b an k cred it b y farm o p erato rs in o p erato rs in ih e D istrict w ere using b an k ih e Fourth D istrict em erg e from the n atio n credit, a m uch la rg e r proportion th an ten w ide ag ricu ltu ral lo an su rvey condu cted b y y e a rs ea rlie r w hen on ly abou t 40 percen t ih e F ed e ra l R eserv e Sy stem a s of June 30, w ere in d ebt to D istrict b a n k s. In terestin gly, 1966.1 W h ere ap prop riate, th ese fa cts are ih e num ber of borrow ers in 1966 — 111,462 — co m p ared w ith the results of the previous w as a ctu a lly 17,500 le ss th an ten y e a rs ea rlier a g ricu ltu ral lo an su rvey conducted in 1956.2 due ch iefly io a d eclin e in ih e num ber of farm s. In addition to a la rg e r proportion of 1 The d ala discussed in this article are derived from a stratified random sample of 110 Fourth District insured commercial banks, which w as part of a nationwide sur vey on bank financing of agriculture. Each bank reported detailed information on a sample of farm loans in addi tion to several other items of information. The sample banks were stratified by size, as measured by dollar volume of farm loans outstanding. Each of ihe respondent farm ers using b a n k credit, the am ount of debt per borrow er w as la rg e r in 1966 th an in 1956. Total a g ricu ltu ral lo a n s at D istrict b a n k s a s of Jun e 30, 1966, am ounted to $484 million, or 71 p ercen t m ore th an ien y e a rs earlier. banks reported on all farm borrowers with $100,000 or The $484 m illion of a g ricu ltu ral lo an s in more of debt outstanding and on from 20 to 50 additional cluded 163,599 lo an s a v e ra g in g $2,956 ea ch . farm borrowers within a designated alphabetical seg M an y borrow ers h ad m ore th an one b a n k ment. The data were expanded to represent the total of all farm loans reported by all District banks on the Report of Condition as of the same date. Results of the nationwide survey on bank financing of agriculture will be presented in the Federal R eserve Bulletin. - See "Bank Loans to Agriculture," Monthly Business loan, an d the a v e r a g e am ount outstand ing per borrow er w as $4,399. The a v e r a g e size of lo an w as abou t tw ice ih e m agn itu d e of ten y e a rs ea rlier. The grow th of ag ricu ltu ra l lo an s a t D istrict b a n k s o ccu rred la rg e ly from ih e resou rces Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, December, of ih e ind ivid ual b a n k s. The 1966 su rv ey indi 1956. ca ted that during ih e 12 m onths end ed June Digitized for14 FRASER MAY 1 9 6 7 30, 1966, Ihere w ere only 72 loans, totalin g g ory (not show n in tab le). In 1966 the group $2.7 m illion, that b a n k s in the D istrict w ere with the la rg e st num ber of b orrow ers (30,054) u n a b le to acco m m o d ate b e c a u se the size of w as in the $2,000 to $4,999 ra n g e; ten y e a rs individual lo an s ex ceed e d the b a n k 's le g a l earlier, the group w ith the la rg e st num ber lending limit to one borrow er. U n acco m w as in the under $500 ca te g o ry (not show n m odated lo an s during the 12-month period in table). A s a ls o show n in T a b le I, a s the am ounted to 0.04 p ercen t and 0.56 percent, d ollar am ount of d ebt per borrow er in crea sed , resp ectiv ely , of the num ber and d ollar vo l the num ber of notes p er borrow er a lso in um e of ag ricu ltu ral lo an s outstanding a s of crea se d . Thus, w hile the num ber of borrow ers m id y ear 1966. The u naccom m od ated lo an s and the num ber of lo a n s w ere re a so n a b ly w ere p ro b ab ly h and led to som e extent b y clo se in the sm a ller d ebt ca teg o rie s, borrow particip atio n ers in the la rg e r d ebt groupings held a n in loan s. The su rvey in d icated that, a s of June 30, 1966, there w ere 28 p artici cre a sin g ly la rg e r num ber of notes. p ation lo an s (totaling $2.5 million) originated A s would b e exp ected , the a v e ra g e ef b y reporting b an k s an d 20 p articip atio n lo an s fectiv e in terest ra te on a g ricu ltu ra l loan s (totaling $431,000) originated b y corresp ond d eclin ed a s the am ount of b a n k d ebt per ent b an k s. borrow er rose. In the sm a lle st d ebt ca teg o ry The growth in ag ricu ltu ral lo an s a t District (under $500), the a v e r a g e effectiv e in terest b a n k s b etw een 1956 and 1966 w as a cc o m rate w as 7.6 p ercen t; in the la rg e st d ebt c a te p an ied b y a m ore th an two-fold in c re a se in gory ($100,000 an d over), the a v e r a g e rate a g ricu ltu ral lo an s outstand ing b y other insti w as 5.4 percen t. For a ll ca teg o rie s, the a v tutional le n d ers.3 In con trast, the dollar vol e ra g e effectiv e in terest ra te a s of Jun e 30, um e of lo an s b y ind ivid u als for ag ricu ltu ral 1966, w as 6.4 percen t, w hich com p ared with pu rposes reg istered a m od erate d eclin e dur 5.7 p ercen t ten y e a rs ea rlier. ing the sa m e period. OUTSTANDING BANK DEBT OF BORROWER MAJOR PURPOSE OF LOAN A s of June 30, 1966, the volum e of lo an s to The am ount of d ebt per borrow er a t Fourth p u rch a se farm re a l e sta te w as co n sid era b ly D istrict b a n k s ro se su b stan tially b etw een la rg e r th an for a n y other m a jo r purpose, a c 1956 an d 1966. A s show n in T a b le I, the la rg counting for 41.5 p ercen t of a ll a g ricu ltu ral est volum e of d ebt w as in the ca teg o ry loan s, an d w as so m ew h at h ig h er th an a w here outstanding d ebt ran g ed from $10,000 d eca d e ea rlier. B ank lo an s for in term ed iate to $24,999; ten y e a rs earlier, the la rg e st vol term in vestm en ts, su ch a s p u rch a se s of farm um e of debt w as in the $2,000 to $4,999 c a te m ach in ery , au to s an d other con su m er dur 3 Corollary studies of the experience of other institutional a b le s, im provem ent of lan d an d bu ildings, lenders to farm operators, including the several agencies an d other livestock , ran k ed next. T ak en to of the Farm Credit Administration and life insurance com panies, are in progress; findings are to be reported by geth er, th ese lo an s a cco u n ted for 29.8 p ercen t the Economic Research Service of the Department of of to tal loan s, or slig h tly le ss th an in the Agriculture. ea rlie r period. 15 ECONOMIC REVIEW TABLE I Fourth District Agricultural Loans Total Debt Per Borrower June 30, 1966 Number of Borrowers Number of Loans Outstanding Average (thousands of dollars) Effective Interest Rate Under $ 5 0 0 ................................................................................................. 19,776 21 ,3 5 2 5 ,1 9 9 7 .6 % $ 5 0 0 — $9 9 9 ................................................................................................. 14,421 16,892 9 ,822 7.0 7.0 $ $ 1 ,0 0 0 — $ 1 ,9 9 9 ....................................................................................... 18,380 23,1 1 8 25 ,1 6 2 $ 2 ,0 0 0 — $ 4 ,9 9 9 ....................................................................................... 30 ,0 5 4 45 ,4 5 8 9 5,892 6.5 $ 5 ,0 0 0 — $ 9 ,9 9 9 ....................................................................................... 16,543 29,651 1 14,324 6.4 $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 — $ 2 4 ,9 9 9 .................................................................................. 10,164 2 2 ,4 4 8 153,5 8 6 6.2 $ 2 5 ,0 0 0 — $ 4 9 ,9 9 9 .................................................................................. 1,814 3 ,919 5 9 ,3 1 5 6.1 $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 — $ 9 9 ,9 9 9 .................................................................................. 293 670 17,385 6.1 $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 and o v e r .................................................................................. 18 92 2 ,975 5.4 111,462 163,5 9 9 $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 Total ............................................................................................................... 6 .4 % Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System The proportion of b a n k credit em p loy ed in of a g ricu ltu ra l lo an s at D istrict b a n k s w as fin an cin g cu rrent op eratin g ex p e n ses w as to borrow ers with a net w orth of $25,000 to g re a te r in m id-1966 th an ten y e a rs earlier. $99,999 (T ab le III). L oan s in th at ca te g o ry Loan s to co n so lid ate and re p a y debts, a s a cco u n ted for 45 p ercen t of the to tal volum e, w ell a s lo an s for m iscellan eo u s purposes, and abou t one-third of a ll borrow ers. The rep resen ted a sm aller proportion of the total next la rg est ca te g o ry w as the group w ith a (in num bers and outstandings) in 1966 than net w orth of $10,000 to $24,999, follow ed b y in 1956. the group with a net w orth of under $10,000. A s T a b le II show s, the a v e r a g e size of The sm a llest group inclu d ed b orrow ers with lo a n s to p u rch ase farm re a l e sta te w as larg er a net worth of ov er $100,000. The two la rg e st th an for a n y other purpose, an d lo an s to groups, w hen com bin ed , a cco u n ted for 55 p u rch ase au to s and consu m er d u rab les w ere p ercen t of the lo an volum e an d 36 p ercen t the sm allest. of the borrow ers. The a v e ra g e effectiv e in terest ra te ran g ed The a v e r a g e am ount o utstan d ing p er b or from 6.1 p ercen t on lo an s to p u rch ase feed er row er v aried in direct relatio n to net worth. liv estock and re a l e s ta te to 8.8 p ercen t on Borrow ers with a n et w orth of over $100,000 lo an s for au tos an d consu m er d u rables. The h ad the la rg e st a v e r a g e am ount of b a n k effectiv e ra te on lo an s to fin an ce cu rrent e x d ebt an d th o se with a net worth of le ss th an p e n se s w as 6.3 p ercen t, an d interm ed iate $10,000, the sm allest. in vestm ents, 7.1 p ercen t. LOANS BY AGE OF BORROWER LOANS BY NET WORTH OF BORROWER The la rg e st proportion (num ber an d am ount) 16 Borrow ers 45 y e a rs an d over h ad ih e la rg est am ount of b a n k debt, a s show n in T a b le III, acco u n tin g for 54 p ercen t of the volum e TABLE II M ajor Purpose of Fourth District Agricultural Loans June 30, 1966 and June 30, 1956 Number of Loans June 30, 1966 Feed er livestock................................... Current operating and family living expenses 8,591 June 30, 1966 5 .2 % June 3 0 , 1956 3 .8 % Outstanding (thousands of dollars) June 30, 1 966 $ 26,721 Distribution June 3 0 , 1 9 6 6 5 .5 % June 3 0 , 1956 4 .2 % Average Original Size June 30, 1966 Average Effective Interest Rate June 30, 1966 $ 3 ,1 1 0 6 .1 % 51 ,975 31.8 29.5 6 4 ,5 1 7 13.4 10.3 1,241 6.4 All current e x p e n s e s ......................... 60,5 6 6 37.0 33.3 9 1 ,2 3 8 18.9 14.5 1,506 6.3 O ther liv e s t o c k ................................... 7 ,934 4.9 5.2 21,351 4.4 5.6 2,691 6.2 M a c h in e r y ............................................. 30,981 18.9 19.8 6 5 ,5 2 8 13.6 13.6 2 ,115 6.9 Autos and consumer durables . 11,942 7.3 7.4 13,242 2.7 3.6 1,109 8.8 Improvement of land and buildings 10,264 6.3 6.7 4 4 ,0 7 3 9.1 8.7 4 ,2 9 4 6.3 7.1 . . . . All intermediate investments . . . . Purchase farm real estate . . . . Consolidate and p a y debts . . T o t a l ...................................................... . 61,121 37.4 39.1 1 44,194 29.8 31.5 2 ,35 9 2 8,1 0 8 17.2 15.1 200,561 41 .5 38.3 7 ,13 5 6.1 5,775 3.5 5.9 2 5 ,6 9 2 5.3 8.1 4 ,4 4 9 6.3 8,028 4.9 6.6 2 1 ,9 7 6 4.5 7.6 2 ,7 4 6 6.6 1 0 0 .0 % 1 0 0 .0 % 1 0 0 .0 % 10 0 .0 % 163,599 $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland $ 2 ,9 5 6 6 .4 % ECONOMIC REVIEW TABLE III Fourth District Agricultural Loans Characteristics of Borrowers June 30, 1966 Number of Borrowers Percent Outstanding (thousands Percent Average Outstanding Distribution of dollars) Distribution Per Borrower $ 5 3 ,345 Net Worth of Borrower 26,359 2 3 .6 % $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 — $ 2 4 ,9 9 9 ................................................. 33,219 29.8 1 27,252 26.3 3,831 $ 2 5 ,0 0 0 — $ 9 9 ,9 9 9 ................................................ 36,188 32.4 2 1 6 ,2 5 0 44 .7 5 ,976 12,911 Under $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .......................................................... 1 1 .0 % $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 and o v e r ................................................ 3,734 3.5 4 8 ,2 1 0 10.0 Not r e p o r t e d ............................................................... 11,963 10.7 38,604 8.0 T o t a l ............................................................................. 111,462 1 0 0 .0 % $4 8 3 ,6 6 2 $ 68,313 $ 2 ,0 2 4 3 ,2 2 7 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 ,3 3 9 1 4 .9 % $ 4 ,5 6 4 Age of Borrower Under 35 y e a r s .......................................................... 14,967 1 4 .1 % 35-44 y e a r s ............................................................... 29,299 27.6 1 43,497 31.3 4 5 years and o v e r ..................................................... 61,715 58.2 246,171 53.8 T o t a l .............................................................................. 105,981 10 0 .0 % $457,981 1 0 0 .0 % Proprietorship............................................................... 105,981 9 5 .1 % $457,981 C o r p o r a t io n ............................................................... 271 4,898 3 ,989 $ 4,321 Type of Enterprise 0.2 9 4 .7 % $4,321 6,102 1.3 22,5 5 3 26,9 6 3 P artn ersh ip .................................................................... 125 0.1 3,373 0.7 Not r e p o r t e d ............................................................... 5,085 4.6 16,206 3.3 T o t a l ............................................................................. 111,462 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 83,662 1 0 0 .0 % 3,187 $ 4 ,339 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 58 p ercent of the borrow ers. The group larg est proportion of ban k loan s, 94.7 percent. from 35 to 44 y e a rs of a g e acco u n ted for 31 Loans to corp orate farm s am ounted to only percent of the dollar volum e and 28 percen t 1 p ercent of the total, but the a v e r a g e am ount of the loans. T ak en together, the two a g e per borrow er — $22,553 — w as co n sid erab ly groups (35 to 44 an d 45 and over) acco u n ted larg er than for individual proprietorships. for over four-fifths of both the loan volum e Partn erships acco u n ted for a n even sm aller an d num ber of borrow ers. Borrow ers under 35 proportion, but the a v e r a g e am ount per bo r constituted the sm a llest group using ban k row er w as larg er th an for a n y other group. credit, with 15 p ercent of the lo an volum e and 14 percen t of the borrow ers. Borrow ers 45 y e a rs of a g e and over had a sm aller a v e ra g e MATURITY OF LOANS A v erag e loan m aturity w as som ew hat am ount of b an k debt than those in either the longer in m id-1966 than a d eca d e earlier, re under 35 or 35 to 44 groups, p resu m ab ly b e flecting ih e fa ct that farm re a l esta te lo an s ca u se m ore of the form er w ere a t a sta g e acco u n ted for a larg er proportion of the total. w here they w ere not a g g re ssiv e ly seek in g The shift in m aturity structure resulted from funds to expand their operations. in c re a s e s in the num ber an d d ollar am ount of Individual proprietors acco u n ted for the Digitized for 18 FRASER lo an s with a m aturity of eight m onths or m ore, TABLE IV Maturity and Security of Fourth District Agricultural Loans June 30, 1966 and June 30, 1956 Number of Loans June 30, 1966 Distribution _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ June 30, 1966 June 30, 1956 Outstanding Percent (thousands Distribution of dollars) — June 30, 1966 June 3 0 , 1 9 6 6 June 30, 1956 Average Original Size June 3 0 , 1966 Average Effective Interest Rate June 30, 1966 $ 3,681 6 .0 % Maturity 5 -7 months........................................ 8 -1 0 m o n th s................................... 23,685 1 4 .5 % 13,916 8.5 39,055 23.9 11% AO 4 y $ 6 7 ,0 1 6 1 3 .8 % 16,269 3.4 7 4 ,8 1 8 15.5 15% 28 1,218 6.1 1,986 6.1 1,552 6.1 2 ,9 8 6 6.2 6,739 4.1 10,079 2.1 2 8,172 17.2 7 5 ,8 9 5 15.7 14-29 months................................... 14,406 8.8 2 3 ,8 5 8 4.9 2 ,215 8.0 3 y e a r s ............................................. 12,045 7.4 31 ,2 0 6 6.5 3 ,648 7.7 5,768 3.5 2 6 ,3 2 8 5.4 6,121 7.1 6 -10 y e a r s ................................... 10,576 6.5 6 5 ,954 13.6 8 ,809 6.3 11 years or m o r e ......................... 9,239 5.6 9 2 ,2 4 0 19.1 12,708 6.1 1A 29 11 11 45 163,599 1 0 0 .0 % 100% $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 1 0 0 .0 % 100% $ 3,655 7 4 ,1 3 5 4 5 .3 % 40% $ 1 2 0 ,0 8 8 2 4 .8 % 25% $ 1,620 Security U n s e c u r e d ........................................ Secured Endorsed........................................ 9,312 5.7 16 13,390 2.8 7 1,483 Chattel mortgage, etc. . . . 38,412 23.5 20 80,7 8 2 16.7 14 2 ,103 Real estate mortgage . . 3 9 ,946 24.4 21 2 6 2 ,2 8 3 54.2 51 6 ,5 6 6 All o th e r ............................................. 1,795 1.1 3 7,1 2 0 1.5 3 1 0 0 .0 % 100% 1 0 0 .0 % 100% . 163,599 $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 Sources; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 3 ,9 6 7 $ 2,956 6 .4 % ECONOMIC REVIEW and redu ction s in Ihose with a m aturity of tel deed of trust, or con d ition al s a le s con tract). sev en m onths or less, a s show n in T a b le IV. This secu rity acco u n ted for 17 p ercen t of The num ber of d em and lo an s w as re lativ ely the d ollar volum e of lo an s o utstan d ing and g re a te r in 1966 but the d ollar volum e w as n e a rly one-fourth of the to tal num ber of loan s. m o d erately less. E xcept for d em and lo an s A m ong secu red lo an s, en d orsed lo a n s w ere an d lo an s with m aturities of 10 m onths or the sm a llest in a v e r a g e size an d re a l esta te , less, the effectiv e in terest rate w as low est for the the lo an s of lon gest m aturity (11 y e a rs or slig h tly la rg e r th an en d orsed loans. la rg est. U n secu red lo a n s w ere on ly m ore). The p red om in an ce of secu red re a l e s ta te lo an s in the latter ca teg o ry p ro b ab ly AMOUNT OF ORIGINAL NOTE a cco u n ted for this pattern. The 8.0 percen t A s show n in T a b le V, m ore th an 90 percen t effectiv e interest ra te for lo an s with a m atu of the lo an s w ere for a n o rig in al am ount of rity of 14 to 29 m onths and the 7.7 p ercen t rate le ss th an $10,000. O f the le ss th an 10 percen t on 3-y ear lo an s p ro b ab ly c a n b e attributed of the lo an s that w ere in e x c e s s of $10,000, to the re la tiv e ly high proportion of auto an d the bulk fell b etw een $10,000 an d $25,000. con su m er d u rab le lo an s that fa ll w ithin those In term s of d ollar volum e, abou t 85 p ercen t of m aturity categ o rie s. the lo an s w ere for a n o rig in al am ount of le ss th an $25,000. In k eep in g with the u su al re la SECURITY OF LOANS tionship b etw een in terest ra te s an d size of The u se of re a l e sta te an d ch a tte l m ort loan, the a v e r a g e effectiv e ra te of in terest g a g e s a s secu rity g ain ed in re lativ e im por d eclin ed a s the o rig in al am ount of the note ta n c e in crea sed . b etw een 1956 and 1966. This w as ev id en ced b y in crea sed proportions (both n um ber and d ollar volum e) of lo an s secu red b y th e se two ty p es of secu rity (see T a b le IV). METHOD OF REPAYMENT AND INTEREST CHARGE In contrast, there w as a d eclin e in the num ber A bout 54 p ercen t of the d ollar volum e an d an d dollar volum e of end orsed lo an s and 35 p ercen t of the num ber of lo a n s provided lo a n s with other ty p es of security. U nsecu red for rep ay m en t in in stalm en ts, a s in d icated lo a n s rep resen ted about the sa m e proportion in T a b le V. The in terest c h a rg e on m ost of of to tal dollar volum e in m id-1966 a s ten y e a rs th ese lo a n s w as on the outstand ing b a la n c e , ea rlier. with the a v e r a g e effectiv e ra te of 6.1 p ercen t R e a l e sta te m o rtg ag es w ere the most com m on ty p e of secu rity reported in the su rvey, on ly slig h tly h igh er th an on sin g le p ay m en t loan s. acco u n tin g for 54 p ercen t of the to tal dollar S in g le p ay m en t lo a n s a cco u n ted for n ea rly volum e of lo an s outstand ing in 1966, a m od two-thirds of the num ber of lo an s, but rep re e ra te ly la rg e r proportion th an in 1956. Next sen ted on ly 46 p ercen t of the volum e; reflect in re lativ e im p o rtan ce w as the ch a tte l m ort ing the fa ct that the a v e r a g e o rig in al size of g a g e (including the clo sely a sso cia te d se cu sin g le p ay m en t lo an s w as abou t one-third rity a g reem en t and fin an cial statem en t, c h a t the size of in stalm en t loan s. S in g le p ay m en t 0 TABLE V Characteristics of Fourth District A gricultural Loans June 30, 1966 Number o f Loans Percent Distribution Outstanding (thousands of dollars) Percent Distribution A verag e O riginal Size A ve rag e Effective Interest Rat Size o f Loan .................................................................................................... 1 4 ,9 3 8 9 .1 % 2 ,0 5 6 0 .4 % 145 6 .4 % $250— $499 .............................................................................................. 1 5 ,3 4 7 9.4 4 ,8 7 5 1.0 346 6 .9 $500— $999 .............................................................................................. 2 5 ,6 3 5 15.7 15,028 3.1 671 6.9 Under $ 2 5 0 $ $ $ 1 ,0 0 0 — $ 1 ,9 9 9 ........................................................................................ 3 0 ,6 6 4 18.7 3 5 ,3 1 8 7 .3 1,340 6.8 $ 2 ,0 0 0 — $ 4 ,9 9 9 ........................................................................................ 4 0 ,7 7 8 24 .9 1 0 0 ,4 1 9 20 .8 3,05 3 6.6 $ 5 ,0 0 0 — $ 9 ,9 9 9 ........................................................................................ 2 0 ,8 7 9 12.8 1 0 9 ,2 7 7 2 2 .6 6,58 3 6.3 $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 — $ 2 4 ,9 9 9 .................................................................................. 12,761 7 .8 1 4 3 ,4 5 6 2 9 .7 1 4,139 6.2 6.1 $ 2 5 ,0 0 0 — $ 4 9 ,9 9 9 .................................................................................. 2 ,31 4 1.4 5 8 ,3 5 4 12.1 3 1 ,7 0 5 $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 — $ 9 9 ,9 9 9 ................................................................................... 266 13 ,8 1 0 2.8 57,1 66 6.1 $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 and o v e r ................................................................................... 6 0.2 * 1,069 0.2 2 0 5 ,9 1 7 5.2 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 6 .4 % 4 6 .1 % $ 2 ,3 5 6 1 6 3 ,5 9 9 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 6 4 .5 % $ 2 2 3 ,0 3 0 Method of Repayment and Interest Charge Single p a y m e n t............................................................................................... 10 5 ,4 9 2 6 .0 % 5 8 ,1 0 8 3 5 .5 2 6 0 ,6 3 2 5 3 .9 6 ,0 1 4 ....................................................................... 4 0 ,2 0 2 2 4 .6 2 3 4 ,9 1 5 4 8 .6 7 ,7 5 5 6.1 Add o n .......................................................................................................... 15 ,5 6 0 9 .5 19,346 4 .0 1,876 11.6 3,62 2 13.9 Outstanding balance 1.4 6,371 D iscount.......................................................................................................... 2 ,34 6 Total ...................................................................................................................... 16 3 ,5 9 9 1 0 0 .0 % 4 .0 % — 4 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 401 0 .2 % 5 .0 % — 5 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 5 ,44 5 3.3 4 1 ,0 2 0 8.5 10,606 6 .0 % — 6 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 1 2 8 ,7 3 4 7 8 .7 4 0 3 ,3 4 8 8 3 .4 3 ,7 7 6 6.1 7 .0 % — 7 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 10,022 6.1 9 ,18 9 1.9 1,031 7.1 8.3 $ 4 8 3 ,6 2 2 1.3 7 .9 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 6 .4 % 0 .9 % $ 1 5 ,2 8 2 4 .6 % Effective Interest Rate $ 4 ,23 2 5.5 8 .0 % — 8 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 2 ,07 4 1.3 1,695 0 .3 1,023 9 .0 % — 9 . 9 % .............................................................................................. 1,693 1.0 2 ,73 9 0.6 2,781 9.5 1 0 .0 % — 1 0 . 9 % ........................................................................................ 1,090 0 .7 1,652 0 .3 2,351 10.7 1 1 .0 % — 1 1 . 9 % ........................................................................................ 8 ,22 6 5 .0 12 ,0 7 5 2.5 2,161 11.5 1 2 .0 % — 1 2 . 9 % ........................................................................................ 1 ,854 1.1 2,421 0.5 1,722 12.6 1 3 .0 % — 1 4 . 9 % ........................................................................................ 2,49 4 1.5 2,231 0.5 1,354 13.7 2,54 2 18.4 1 5 .0 % and o v e r ........................................................................................ 1 ,566 Total ...................................................................................................................... 1 6 3 ,5 9 9 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 10 ,1 4 0 6 .2 % * 1 1,043 2 .3 % * $ 1,405 1.0 3 ,05 9 0 .6 6 .4 % Origin of Purchased Loans Merchant or d e a l e r ................................................................................... O t h e r f ................................................................................................................ 79 2 43 8 .9 % 3,86 4 12.8 3 ,80 4 6.3 Not p u r c h a s e d .............................................................................................. 153,381 9 3 .8 Total ...................................................................................................................... 1 6 3 ,5 9 9 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 6 .4 % 16 1 ,2 9 2 9 8 .6 % $ 4 7 8 ,1 3 3 9 8 .9 % $ 3,65 4 6 .4 % 4 7 2 ,3 7 6 9 7 .7 Repayment Status Not o v e r d u e .................................................................................................... Note is overdue ........................................................................................ 2 ,3 0 7 1.4 5 ,5 2 9 1.1 3,76 5 6.1 6 .7 Number of days overdue: 4-32 d a y s ..................................................................................................... 621 0.4 1,226 0.2 2,37 3 33-92 d a y s ............................................................................................... 417 0.2 1,76 7 0 .4 5 ,12 8 6.2 93 or more d a y s ................................................................................... 1,269 0.8 2,53 6 0 .5 3,99 8 5 .7 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 5 1 ,2 7 2 3 1 .3 % $ 1 4 1 ,5 2 5 4 0 ,4 7 3 2 4 .7 1 1 3 ,0 6 7 1 0 ,7 9 9 6.6 2 8 ,4 5 8 5 ,31 4 3.2 13 ,3 3 6 5 ,48 5 3.4 15,122 Note not re n e w e d ........................................................................................ 11 2 ,1 4 2 68 .6 3 4 1 ,9 9 0 Not re p o rte d .................................................................................................... 185 0.1 147 Total ...................................................................................................................... 1 6 3 ,5 9 9 1 6 3 ,5 5 9 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 2 9 .3 % $ 3,14 8 6 .4 % Renewal Status U np lan ne d .................................................................................................... Due to low income ....................................................................... 1 0 0 .0 % $ 4 8 3 ,6 6 2 2 3 .4 6 .3 % 3 ,1 8 7 6.1 5 .9 3,001 7 .0 2.8 2,74 0 6 .6 3.1 3,25 4 7 .3 7 0 .7 * 3,89 2 6.4 845 6 .0 1 0 0 .0 % $ 3 ,65 5 6 .4 % *Less than 0 .0 5 % . ^Includes a small number of loans purchased from insurance companies. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 21 ECONOMIC REVIEW lo an s h ad low er a v e ra g e effectiv e interest p u rch ased , som e of w hich w ere from insu r ra te s th an in stalm en t loans. The a v e ra g e e f a n c e co m p an ies, a v e ra g e d slig h tly la rg e r fectiv e in terest ra te on in stalm ent lo an s of 7.9 th an th ose not p u rch ased . The a v e r a g e effec p ercen t reflects the influence of "a d d o n ” and tive in terest ra te of p u rch a sed n otes — 8.9 "d isco u n t" rates, w hich w ere a p p lic a b le to p ercen t — w as m ore th an one-third h ig h er about 5 p ercen t of the dollar volum e of loans, th an that on n otes not p u rch ased . an d w ere used m ostly on lo an s that w ere m uch sm aller in a v e r a g e size th an in stalm en t lo an s, on w hich interest w as ch arg e d on the ou tstand ing b a la n c e . REPAYMENT STATUS The re la tiv ely high le v el of farm incom e during 1966 a p p a ren tly contribu ted to a co m p a ra tiv e ly low p e rce n ta g e of overd u e lo an s EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE a s of m id-1966. A s show n in T a b le V, only The effectiv e in terest rate for a ll ag ricu l 1.1 p ercen t of the d ollar volum e an d 1.4 p er tu ral lo an s at D istrict b a n k s a s of Jun e 30, cen t of the num ber w ere reported overdue at 1966, a v e ra g e d 6.4 p ercen t in co n trast to a the tim e of the lo an su rvey. T h ese w ere m uch corresp ond ing ra te of 6.7 p ercen t in the sm a ller proportions th an in 1956, w hen the nation. A s in d icated in Table V, a la rg e pro am ount of lo an s overd u e w a s 5.1 p ercen t of portion of the lo an s (93 percen t of d o llar vol o utstan d ings an d 2.8 p ercen t of the num ber. um e an d 82 p ercen t of the num ber) h ad an A s in 1956, m ost overd u e notes h ad b e e n o v er a v e r a g e effectiv e ra te of 6.1 p ercen t or less. due for 33 d a y s or m ore at the tim e of the The h ig h er a v e r a g e ra le for a ll lo an s w as s u rv e y . a cco u n ted for b y high rates on a re lativ ely The o rig in al size of overd u e n otes a v e ra g e d sm a ll proportion of loans, ran g in g up to 15 som ew h at la rg e r th an n otes not overdue, p ercen t an d higher for the 1 p ercen t of the su g g estin g th at th ere w ere a sign ifican t num lo a n s with the h ig h est rates. O n ly about 7 b er of secu red re a l e sta te lo a n s am o n g o v er p ercen t of the d ollar volum e carried effectiv e due notes. Su ch lo a n s a re u su ally som ew h at ra te s a v e ra g in g a b o v e 6.1 p ercen t. la rg e r th an other lo an s an d p ro b a b ly a cco u n t for the slig h tly low er a v e r a g e effectiv e in ter ORIGIN OF PURCHASED NOTES est ra te in d icated for overd u e loan s. V irtu ally a ll of the p u rch ased notes held b y D istrict b a n k s in m id-1966 w ere from m er RENEWAL STATUS ch a n ts an d d ea lers sellin g equipm ent and R en ew a l of lo a n s d oes not n e c e ss a rily im su pplies to farm ers, with n e a rly 90 percen t ply th at the borrow er h a s found it im p o ssib le for in term ed iate term investm ents. The notes to m eet o rig in al term s. In fact, re n ew a l m a y p u rch ased from m erch an ts and d ealers, a s b e part of a p la n to exten d rep a y m en t over show n in T a b le V, rep resen ted 2.3 p ercen t a period of lim e b ey o n d th at for w hich the of the d ollar volum e of a ll farm lo an s and note is o rig in a lly draw n, an d in v o lv es a re w ere m uch sm aller in o rig in al size th an notes n ew al u nd erstan d in g b etw ee n borrow er and that w ere not pu rch ased . The other notes lend er at the tim e th e lo an is gran ted . About Digitized for 22 FRASER MAY 1 9 6 7 four ouf of five of the 51,272 ren ew ed loans size of th ese lo a n s w a s so m ew h at le ss th an at D istrict b a n k s in m id-1966 w ere plann ed p lan n ed re n ew a ls an d the a v e r a g e effectiv e ren ew a ls, a s in d icated in T a b le V. L oan s that in terest rate w a s high er. N early h alf of the w ere ren ew ed on a p lan n ed b a sis rep resen ted u np lan n ed re n ew a ls w ere due to low incom e abou t 23 p ercen t of the d ollar volum e and of the borrow er. 25 p ercen t of the num ber of a ll loan s. The A bout 70 p ercen t of the lo a n s o utstan d ing a v e r a g e size of th ese lo an s w as som ew hat a s of June 30, 1966, h ad not b e e n ren ew ed , a la rg e r th an lo an s ren ew ed on a n unp lanned figure not m uch different from ten y e a rs e a r b a sis, and a v e r a g e effectiv e in terest rate lier, w hen abou t two-thirds w ere reported a s low er. not renew ed . The o rig in a l am ount of the lo an s w as la rg e r th a n for a n y other group in this U nplanned re n ew a ls rep resen ted abou t 6 p ercen t of the d ollar volum e. The o rigin al classifica tio n , but the a v e r a g e effectiv e in terest ra te w as the sa m e a s for a ll loan s. 23 Fourth Federal Reserve District