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y eview Busin Covering financial, industrial and a g ricu ltu ra l co n d itio n s Cleveland/ Ohio, June 30, 1944 Vol. 26 Fifth War Loan Fourth Federal Reserve District Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland FINANCIAL With the Fifth War Loan Drive past the halfway mark, it is apparent that participation by individuals has fallen somewhat short of ex pectations. News of the invasion and other favorable military announcements in recent weeks up to this point have not resulted in increased subscriptions, as many had expected. While the actual dollars and cents goal may yet be achieved, strenuous efforts will be required to reach it. The $519,000,000 quota assigned to the fourth district, for sales to individuals, is nearly 20 percent larger than the $435,000,000 obtained from similar sources in the January-February Drive. On the other hand, it is a shade less than the $531,000,000 subscriptions received from noncorporate buyers in the Third Drive nine months ago. The goal assigned to individuals is reasonable and justi fiable. The accompanying table suggests that in several important respects the aggregate ability to buy is greater now than in any previous drive. National Income, Time Deposits, and Note Circulation (In millions of dollars) Subscriptions by Individuals Drive (4th District) First .................. $169 329 Second ............. Third ............... 531 Fourth ............. 435 Fifth ............... 519* '“ 'Quota. f Estimated. National Income Payments $130,000 140,000 146,000 153,000 155,000} Time Deposits (4th District Reporting Banks) $730 795 840 882 940 Federal Reserve Notes in Circulation (4th District) $1,092 1,191 1,367 1,506 1,655 For example, on a national basis, individuals are cur rently receiving income in the form of wages, salaries, etc., at the rate of $106 for each $100 earned or received last September and October. Presumably, the fourth dis trict has fared as well as the country in this regard. On the strength of that evidence, aggregate purchases by individuals should be showing an increase over Third Drive totals without requiring additional sales effort. Obvious ly, the tendency to lag cannot be excused on the grounds that current national income after taxes is on the de cline, for there has been no appreciable change in revenue legislation in the interim. No. 9 Not all subscriptions, of course, are paid for out of current receipts. In many instances, purchases of war bonds are financed out of accumulated funds. The rela tive magnitude of such savings, whether in the form of cash holdings or deposits at banks, therefore, is also of significance in appraising the results of the I Lth Drive to date. The accompanying tabulation discloses that potential pur chasing power of this particular type was likewise more abundant at the beginning of the present War Loan than ever before. At weekly reporting banks alone, time de posits were $100,000,000 higher than last autumn. For all banks of this district the increment may be nearer $150,000,000. Thus, it cannot be argued that purchases made during earlier drives have depleted individuals’ savings reservoir. There has been no impairment of ability to buy on this score. Further evidence that the obstacles encountered in this drive have been largely of a psychological nature can be found in the trend of savings bond redemptions since D-day. Instead of abating in response to dramatic de velopments abroad, redemptions have continued at rela tively high levels, which points to the conclusion that many actual or potential investors are not influenced by the need for continued sacrifice, but give precedence to other motives. Perhaps the least favorable aspect of the Fifth Drive is the almost complete absence of effect upon the volume of hand-to-hand currency in circulation. This still rap idly growing block of purchasing power continues to be virtually immune to patriotic appeal. On June 12, there were nearly $300,000,000 more fourth district Federal reserve notes outstanding than last September, when the Third Drive was launched. Moreover, the increase since Pearl Harbor has been over 125 percent, or $920,000,000 — an amount which dwarfs sales to individuals during the current campaign. A sustained reversal of the flow of hand-to-hand cur rency back into the banking system would be most salutary in several ways. It would indicate that black market activities were receding. It would suggest that less cash were being used for evasion of taxes and price regulations. It would reflect increased confidence in the Government’s 2 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW fiscal policy. It would eliminate the largest single factor responsible for constant inflationary expansion of Federal reserve credit. This accumulation of superfluous currency is both a challenge and an opportunity. Neither this nor any fu ture war loan drive can be termed genuinely successful unless more of this idle— or worse than idle— money is transferred into war bonds. Recent Deposit Trends Demand deposits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations hit a new all-time high in the fourth district on the eve of the Fifth War Loan, according to data supplied week ly by reporting member banks. The former peak, estab lished in September 1943, was broken on three successive reporting dates beginning with May 31. Time deposits likewise reached new high ground through twelve consecutive advances in weekly totals. From the close of the Fourth Drive in mid-February to the beginning of the Fifth, time deposits at weekly re porting banks payable to individuals, partnerships, and corporations increased nearly 5V2 percent. These increases in time and demand deposits of indi viduals and business enterprises were a direct result of continued expenditure of funds raised in the Fourth War Loan. Government deposits at weekly reporting banks hit a nine-month low on June 7, the Treasury’s work ing balance having dropped considerably below the point reached just before the January-February Drive for funds. Loans contrast to the trend in checking and savings account balances, bank loans of nearly every kind have been declining in recent months. Commercial, industrial, and agricultural borrowers have been repaying loans faster than new loans of this type were being made, with the result that the total of such credit outstand ing is now but slightly above the wartime low of June 30, 1943. There also has been a further contraction in loans on securities to brokers and others, some of which had been outstanding since the Third Drive when speculative bor rowing for the purpose of buying and carrying Govern ment securities was most noticeable. Investments During the period between drives, reporting member banks as a whole disposed of onethird of their Treasury bill holdings, partly by sale to the reserve bank under repurchase option, and partly by not replacing bills at maturity. This rather substantial liquidation of 91-day bills ap parently was prompted by one of two motives. In some cases, realized funds were invested in certificates of in debtedness on which the return is one-half percent higher than on Treasury bills. Reporting member banks increased their portfolio of certificates of indebtedness by 16 per cent between drives. In other instances, the need for cash reserves was a dominant factor. Conversion of Government deposits, exempt from reserve requirements, into privately-owned deposits subject to full legal requirements caused a rise in required reserves of over $100,000,000 (13 percent) from late February to early June. During the current drive, requirements are declining again, as deposits of individuals, corporations, etc., are converted into credits in war loan accounts. MANUFACTURING AND MINING Fourth district business activity continued at high levels during May and the first weeks of June, even though ad justments were necessitated by a revision of emphasis in the war program. Cancelations and cutbacks in some lines have been replaced on operating schedules by other materiel required by a constantly changing military pic ture. In the main, the shift has been toward heavy ar tillery and shells, heavy long-range planes, and a reem phasis on tank production. Utilization of students has re lieved the employment situation somewhat, especially in civilian goods lines. A more cautious attitude on the part of war goods producers is evident with respect to the need for additional employees, and also concerning the ordering of raw materials and inventory positions. Reflecting these shifts, the steel industry operated at 98.5 percent capacity throughout May and continued at approximately that rate in the third week of June. Pro duction in the fourth district has been at slightly lower levels, due principally to the necessity of relining fur naces and making other general repairs on equipment now very definitely showing the strain of capacity op eration over long periods of time. Ingot production for the month totaled 7,680,000 net tons, an increase over both the preceding month and the same month last year. Pig iron production in May totaled 5,343,000 net tons, with some idle capacity reported in the industry. This is due chiefly to the curtailed operations in some of the larger foundries where manpower problems limit opera tions to an approximate 50 percent of capacity. Iron ore shipments from Lake Superior mines totaled 12,114,211 gross tons, a gain of 10.4 percent over April. Cumulative shipments for the year to June 1 totaled 17,402,290 tons, an increase of 34.6 percent over the total to the same date in 1943, when the lake shipping season opened much later than this year owing to bad weather. Bituminous coal shipments to June 1 equaled 13,492,000 tons, an increase of 33.3 percent over 1943 shipments to the same date. Fourth district bituminous coal production reached a new all-time high, with May output totaling 21,450,000 tons; national production totaled 55,200,000 net tons in the same month. Although the bituminous industry is producing at record levels, consumption also has reached new highs. Consumers have not been able to build up coal reserves; in fact, industries have been digging into their stocks over the past year without being able to re place the needed coal. Inventories of bituminous coal in the hands of consumers are approximately 52,000,000 tons, or 25,000,000 tons less than a year ago. The new manpower regulations, known as the “Priority Referral System,” scheduled to take effect on July 1 may have far-reaching effect on many industries devoted to pro duction of civilian goods. Manufacturers of pottery and china in the fourth district anticipate a continuation of the acute manpower shortage that has limited operations to approximately 80 percent of capacity for several months past. An “overwhelming volume of orders” and a “totally inadequate labor supply” is the report from the larger companies in this field. Many plants are at least a year 3 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW behind in shipments and several are refusing to accept new orders from any source. Preliminary estimates of machine tool shipments for May (covering 95 percent of the industry) totaled $39,000,000. New orders for the month totaled $57,300,000, the second consecutive month for over a year in which new orders have exceeded shipments. Cancelations of orders totaled $1,500,000, bringing the total backlog of orders to $177,300,000 worth of machine tools. The revival in the machine tool market is one indication of a revision of emphasis in the war program. Shipments which had de clined steadily since March 1943 must now be maintained at or must exceed present rates, if the needs of the new heavy artillery and other military programs are to be met. Manufacturers continue to report a shortage of skilled ma chine tool builders. The raw material situation remains critical in the paper board industry. Although Government allocation of pulp for the third quarter has not yet been announced, a further diminution in supply is anticipated, with consequent de cline in supply and quality of paper board. Production of pulp and paper continues under the control of WPB and distribution of finished products is on a strict quota basis. Industry and Full Employment The term “full employment” probably constitutes our most popular current economic shibboleth. Like most such terms, an ex act and invariable definition is difficult. In general, it means that work will be available for all who desire to work at the approximate level of their abili ties. This does not mean, of course, that every employ able person will be continuously at work. It must be re membered that labor is mobile in a dynamic democracy and desires considerable freedom of occupational choice. Therefore, transitional unemployment and seasonal unem ployment will always characterize our economy. The ex tent of this “frictional” unemployment has been estimated at two or three million, as a minimum, in a total post-war labor force estimated by various authorities to be 56 to 58 million, excluding the armed forces. Although this force is slightly less than the present total labor force, it should be recognized that full employment has definite ness only when related to the social customs and institu tional arrangements which determine both the size of the labor force and its disposition. Thus, retirement ages, minimum wages, years of schooling, age of en trance into gainful employment, as well as the social and economic forces of necessity, legislation, and union ization— all have a part in shaping a concept of full em ployment. In addition, “unemployables,” a somewhat flex ible word in itself, do not constitute a part of the labor force; therefore, they are not a part of the problem of full employment. There is a current tendency to think of full employment as the highest employment figure ever attained or as some ratio, generally 48-52 percent, of our total population ten years of age or older. There is an even more dangerous and questionable inclination to assume that it is die re sponsibly of industry, and manufacturing industry is gen erally implied, to supply full employment. In no .accepted definition of the word “industry” is this possible. Indeed, manufacturing employment likely will continue the de cline already apparent into the foreseeable future. It is obvious from an examination of the accompanying table that manufacturing is but one of the many employment sources in an economy as large and diverse as our own. Distribution of Labor Force (In millions) Total Labor Force ........................ Armed Forces ............................. Unemployed ............................... Employed ................................... Agriculture ............................. Construction .......................... Financial ................................. Government .......................... Manufacturing ...................... Mining ................................... Trade ...................................... Transportation ........................ Other, including proprietors. . 1940 53.3 0.3 8.0 45.0 8.5 1.3 4.2 4.1 10.4 0.9 6.8 2.9 5.9 1941 53.3 1.3 6.0 46.0 7.6 1.9 4.4 4.3 12.1 0.9 7.0 3.1 4.7 -M arch 1942 56.1 2.7 3.2 50.2 7.7 1.8 4.5 4.8 14.2 1.0 7.3 3.3 5.6 1943 60.1 7.8 1.1 51.2 7.2 1.5 4.1 5.9 16.7 0.9 6.9 3.5 4.5 1944 62.2 10.8 0.9 50.5 6.9 0.7 4.1 5.9 16.5 0.9 6.9 3.7 4.9 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Census. The concept of industry’s responsibility for full em ployment undoubtedly wells from the idea that industry is the prime creator of wealth and is in a strategic posi tion of determining all the other aspects of business vol ume. Actually, however, it is to the distributive trades, the professions, the service industries, agriculture, recre ation, and the arts that the great proportion of our em ployables must turn for job opportunities. If this is not recognized and a considerable effort made to spread such an understanding to the public, industry spokesmen who glibly talk of “industry rising to its responsibility to provide full employment” will but succeed in setting industry and themselves up as targets for those who promise the res toration of economic security to the unemployed. One lesson of the depression, it must be remembered, is that in the face of extended unemployment individuals become demoralized and willingly support such proposals. It is partly on this basis that mass unemployment cannot be politically tolerated or, from the viewpoint of private busi ness, economically accepted. Therefore, it would appear wiser for business leaders to talk about full employment as an objective of our entire economy. It might not be remiss to point out in this connection that it cannot be the most immediate objective for business operation under democratic capi talism. It is, rather, a result of the immediate objective of business, which is to produce goods and services which will be demanded by consumers at a profit to the sup pliers. Private business cannot long supply jobs except under these conditions, despite lip service to “the new responsibility of industry to provide full employment.” While an effort is being made to educate business and the public concerning full employment, it might be well to think of the post-war objective as “reasonable full employment,” possibly 95 percent of our labor force, or the prevention of mass unemployment which would mean employment at something less than the 95 percent figure. The reality o f our past employment history would seem to make this position both necessary and tenable. Synthetic Rubber Following publication of the Baruch Committee report on September 10, 1942, the United States settled on a program under which the bulk of synthetic rubber production was to be GR-S, orig inally called Buna S rubber after the name popularized in Germany. The chief considerations leading to the adop 4 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW tion of this unified program were: pressure of time, the shortage of steel and other critical materials for the build ing of plants, plentiful supplies of raw materials, and the knowledge and experience already acquired in working with the Buna S type synthetic. GR-S rubber is manu factured from two substances, butadiene and styrene. The major portion of each is obtained from petroleum, although there are other sources from which they can be manufac tured. The urgency of war demands necessitated the util ization of alcohol manufactured from grain in the produc tion of butadiene and for this reason the estimated cost of producing GR-S synthetic has fluctuated between 40 and 60 cents per pound. The cost of synthetic rubber to manu facturers has been pegged at 18.5 cents by the Office of Price Administration, the difference being absorbed by governmental subsidy. It is estimated that ultimately butadiene and styrene may each be produced at about eight cents per pound. Such a production cost would re sult in the production of synthetic rubber at approximately 15.5 cents per pound. This would compare favorably with pre-war prices of crude rubber, which averaged 17.2 cents per pound from 1937 to 1939. One of the chief considerations in the selection of GR-S type synthetic for the national program was the knowledge that it could be mixed with natural rubber and could be used to recap tires of natural rubber. However, it was known that GR-S possessed many disadvantages. It has low energy resilience and tires built of this synthetic heat up when flexed at high speed. For this reason, it has been necessary to mix GR-S with varying amounts of crude rubber in building large tires. Another difficulty is the low cut and tear resistance of GR-S; once a cut appears, it grows rapidly, ending the useful life of the tire. GR-S rubber has been difficult to handle and has required more milling and processing than natural rubber. This has been due in part to the lack of tackiness of the synthetic and consequently more machine time has been required. This increase in time “cost” has been estimated at 15 to 25 percent in passenger car tire fabrication and would in dicate a need for expansion in machine facilities if pre war production records for tire fabrication are to be equaled. However, it should be emphasized that the “know how” in dealing with natural crude has developed over a period of 30 years, while experience with the new synthetics in mass production is but three to four years old. It is hoped that, as a result of present intensive re search, methods of handling GR-S can be brought to their maximum efficiency. The increased machine time required in milling syn thetic and the tremendous expansion in military consump tion account for the erection of fabricating plants and purchase of equipment totaling $75,000,000. This pro gram, now well under way, involves the construction of two new fabricating plants and extensive additions to machine equipment in the rubber plants already existing in Akron, Los Angeles, and other places. The B. F. Good rich Company has opened a new tire plant at Miami, Ok lahoma, and General Tire and Rubber Company has opened one at Waco, Texas. Undoubtedly, proximity to raw material supplies was a deciding factor in selecting the location of plants, but it is also apparent that the tire industry continues a policy of decentralization character istic of the last 20 years. The two major problems confronting tire producers to day are an anticipated bottleneck in the production of carbon black (used more extensively with synthetic rub ber) and an acute shortage of expert tire builders. The anticipated shortage of carbon black is a result of manu facturers’ reluctance to plan permanent expansion in view of their belief that in the post-war years natural crude rubber might supplant the use of synthetics in the major fields of rubber consumption. Manpower problems have beset all industry during the last two years and defy easy and immediate solution. The War Department has announced the furloughing of expert tire builders back to their jobs, but until this ac tion alleviates the tight labor situation, the tire industry continues its policy of “upgrading” tire builders. Thus, male employees are transferred to large truck and bus tire machines, and are replaced by women machine op erators in smaller-tire building. Improvement in the rub ber industry’s absenteeism record would alleviate the man power problem somewhat. Currently, it is averaging about ten percent. As new tire building facilities become available (the $75,000,000 program will reach its peak in late 1944 and the first few months of 1945), manpower will determine whether the industry will produce the 22,000,000 units called for in Rubber Director Dewey’s latest estimate of civilian tire production for this year. Since February, passenger car tire production has to taled slightly more than 1,000,000 per month. Rubber Director Dewey anticipates a production of 15,000,000 units in the last half of the year, bringing the total year ly production to 22,000,000, plus or minus ten percent depending upon the trend of military requirements throughout the balance of the year. A total of 17,200,000 passenger car tires from all sources (new synthetic, prePearl Harbor, and reclaim) was available in 1943. In 1942, only 4,700,000 tires were released. National con sumption totaled approximately 50,000,000 tires annually prior to the war and the starvation diet of the last three years should tax tire-producing facilities for several post war years. Military and civilian demand for large tires is estimated at 25,000,000 units, approximately five times greater than pre-war needs. Because of current shortages in tire build ing equipment and expert tire builders, it is estimated that production for the year will not exceed 18,000,000 units. Production for the first half of this year has av eraged little over 1,000,000 tires per month. Military requirements will probably continue to take precedent over civilian needs and more recapping and tire conservation programs are anticipated in this line. The future of the synthetic rubber industry is viewed with optimism by experts in the field. Anticipating the pent-up demand for rubber products after the war, both for the replacement of outworn articles and a wide mar ket for the countless new products that can now be made from these new materials, observers predict a need for maximum production of both synthetic and natural crude for several years after the war. With a firm market as sured for several years to come, it is felt that, with con tinued research progress, synthetics may be in a position to compete on a price and quality basis with crude rub ber. The effects of such a development on international trade would be far-reaching. The ultimate handling of the problem will be but one of many such adjustments which must be made in the post-war world. 5 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW TRADE Retail There was a slight increase in the proportion of credit business to total dollar department store sales since the beginning of this year, which would in dicate that the increasing tendency to pay cash for mer chandise at retail stores in the fourth district was sub siding somewhat. As shown on the accompanying chart, accounts outstanding at 48 department stores on May 31, 1944, were five percent larger than they were at the end of May last year, this being the first time in many months that retailers reported a year-to-year increase. Regular 30-day accounts receivable were 12 percent larger this year than last, but instalment accounts were down 17 percent. This difference is explained largely by the fact that articles usually bought on an instalment basis are scarce or not available at all, while there is a better sup ply of the type of merchandise usually paid for within 30 days. Moreover, the restrictions imposed on short-term accounts by Regulation W generally did not prove to be as great a departure from the previous buying habits of many consumers as did the regulations on instalment ac counts. Although total receivables were larger this May 31 than last, they were down considerably from the level of two years ago. Moreover, the increase in accounts outstanding was much smaller than that for sales. Accompanying the advance in accounts receivable was a year-to-year gain of one percent in collections. Although the collection ratios for last month failed to reach the peaks established in November 1943, they were at a high level and showed considerable improvement over those of two years ago. Approximately 65 percent of the regular 30-day accounts payable to reporting stores on last May 1 were collected during the month, compared with 63 per cent a year ago and 51 percent during May 1942. The instalment collection ratio was 35 percent last month. Two years ago it was 24 percent, and in pre-war years it ran around 18 percent. D EP A R TM EN T STO R E C R E D IT FOURTH D IS TR IC T ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE Although the largest portion of department store sales continued to be transacted on a cash basis, the impor tance of such sales decreased during the past several months. In May 1944, cash sales accounted for 53 per cent of the total, compared with 56 percent last January, The remainder of sales last month was four percent in stalment and 43 percent regular charge. This division of sales was practically the same as that reported for May 1943. Several factors help to explain this increasing tendency to defer payment for goods purchased. One of these was the fact that buyers have become more accustomed to the limitations of Regulation W, especially insofar as they affect regular credit purchases. These restrictions in many cases have not changed greatly the manner in which consumers previously purchased goods. Then, too, possibly the decline in department store credit is reach ing its limit. With weather generally favorable for summer buying, department store sales during May this year were the largest for any similar period on record. This was the third consecutive month that an all-time peak in sales was established. The increase over May 1943 was 19 percent, the largest such year-to-year gain that merchants experienced for some time. The increases among the re porting centers of the district showed considerable varia tion, ranging from 12 percent in Springfield to 28 per cent in Wheeling. Sales in Akron were up 13 percent, Cleveland 17 percent, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati 22 per cent, and Toledo 23 percent. During the two-week pe riod ended June 17 this year, sales at all reporting stores in the fourth district were at the same level as those of the corresponding weeks of 1943, reflecting the large volume of sales that stores experienced during June a year ago, when the expiration of the first shoe-rationing coupon stimulated business in general. Wholesale The dollar volume of sales last month at 196 firms in the fourth district was eight percent larger than that reported for May 1943, according to data received from the Department of Commerce. Firms sell ing automotive supplies, paints, clothing, farm supplies, and meats experienced year-to-year gains in excess of 20 percent. Smaller increases were reported for sales of drugs, dry goods, groceries, tobacco, and paper, while firms selling electrical goods, furniture, metals, and hard ware sold less merchandise this May than last. AGRICULTURE 1942 Wheat Winter wheat forecasts have improved another 52 million bushels during the month of May, according to the estimates made by the Crop Reporting Board of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. On June 1, a crop of 714 million bushels was indicated, an increase of 35 percent over last year’s crop. This, together with a prospective 321 million bushel spring wheat crop, gives promise of a total 1944 crop of over a billion bushels, possibly the largest crop ever harvested in this country. The previous record was in 1915 when the crop was 1,009 million bushels. The 1942 crop was 974 million bushels. June 1 indications for the 1944 wheat crop are given 6 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW below for the States of the Fourth Federal Reserve Dis trict: Increase 1944 over 1943 Winter Spring Total Winter Harvest (Thousands of bushels) (Percent) Ohio ........................ 45,990 6,732 Kentucky ............... Pennsylvania ......... 18,983 West Virginia......... 1,716 22 162 46,012 6,732 19,145 1,716 74 73 43 63 The principal factor in this year’s prospective record crop is the occurrence of near-record yields per acre for both winter and spring wheat in the same year. The United States average yield on June 1 was indicated at 17.4 bushels, as compared with 15.6 for 1943. The Ohio yield was indicated at 22.5 bushels, six bushels above last year’s short crop. Increases of three bushels per acre are expected in yields in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Oats A near-average oats crop of about 1,193,000,000 bushels was all that could be expected on June 1 because acreage and yield were still uncertain. This would be four percent above 1943 and 16 percent above the 1933-42 average. Though acreage planted in oats fell below intended acreages in some important oatsproducing states, recent warm weather and abundance of sunshine, together with favorable moisture conditions, resulted in overcoming some of the handicap of a late start. Below are the June 1 indications for fourth district States and the average for 1933-42: Ohio ............................. Kentucky .................... Pennsylvania ............. West Virginia............. Hog Corn Ratio 1944 1933-42 Estimate Average (Thousands of bushels) 42,620 2,070 27,621 2,000 40,351 1,416 25,912 1,721 The hog-corn ratio is the term that reflects the number of bushels of com which is equal in price to 100 pounds of hog at current farm prices. Corn and hog producers use it as a guide in de termining whether it is more profitable to sell their corn, or to feed it to hogs and then sell the hog.,. Bureau of Agricultural Economics figures for the years 1923-1942 show that the hog-com ratio for the United States averaged 11.8. This means that 11.8 bushels of corn were equal in price to 100 pounds of live hog during that period. If one accepts this figure of 11.8, when the ratio is larger than 11.8 it is more profitable to feed corn to hogs than it was during the base period, if other costs have not changed. Young hogs generally will be fed to maturity even in the face of an unfavorable swing in the hog-corn ratio, but the weights at which they are sold will vary. A high hog-com ratio encourages feeding to heavier weights. With the exception of a few months, the hog-corn ratio has been falling since its peak in October 1942, when it stood at 18.2. Since December 1943, it has been below the average of 11.8. In May 1944, the ratio was at its lowest point since December 1940 and stood at 11.0, as compared with 13.4 for May a year ago. The Ohio hogcorn ratio has followed the same trend as that of the United States, but it has been from one-half to one bushel higher than the United States average for the past year and a half. In May 1944, the Ohio ratio was 11.5. This low ratio during the last six months indicates that the hog-corn situation has changed from one where it was highly profitable to feed com to hogs to a situation where feeding is less profitable. On January 1, 1944, there were 14 percent more hogs on farms than a year ago, while corn stocks at the same time were 13 percent under last year. The relatively short supply of feed in prospect for the foreseeable future undoubtedly is encouraging a con siderable decline in livestock numbers. Faced with the necessity of stretching limited feed sup plies, the United States Department of Agriculture early last fall asked farmers to produce fewer hogs in 1944 and to market them at lighter weights. The large production of hogs in 1943, coupled with a less favorable feed ratio and marketings at lower weights, resulted in such heavy deliveries at major stockyards that there was great diffi culty in handling them. In three large stockyards in the Fourth Federal Reserve District, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, receipts for the first four months of 1944 were 146, 41, and 48 percent above receipts for the first four months last year, respectively. For the same period, total hog slaughter at all federally-inspected plants was 52 percent larger than a year ago. As a result of heavy marketings, the likelihood of a less favorable feed situation, and lower goals for 1944, the Government estimates that 9,269,000 sows farrowed this spring, a 23 percent decrease from the same period of 1943. Despite the smaller supply of corn relative to the larger number of hogs, it is estimated that there is sufficient corn to meet requirements if it were properly distributed. The problem has been one of getting com raisers, par ticularly in the surplus-producing areas, to sell their grain. There is apparent reluctance to do this for two reasons: the shortage of all types of animal feed led farmers to expect that the ceiling prices on corn might be increased later to the disadvantage to those who sell now; at the same time they wanted to be sure that they would have ample supplies to feed their own hogs. Government agencies cooperated in meeting the short feed situation by various actions relating to hogs and com. The programs of the Office of Price Administration and the War Food Administration are particularly impor tant. The OPA encouraged the marketing of lighter hogs by setting maximum prices discriminating against heavierweight classes. Present OPA ceilings, however, have be come rather meaningless in the face of a market price con sistently lower than the prices set. The War Food Ad- 7 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW ministration, for its part, beginning on January 27 set sup port prices that were favorable to light hogs and penal ized heavier hogs. The present support price of $13.75 on hogs weighing 180-270 pounds is said to have caused buyers, besieged with heavy offerings, to refuse to pur chase hogs in the support price weights. In some in stances, this may have forced the feeding of additional scarce com to hogs in order to get them beyond the sup port price weights so that the competitive market would absorb them. The basic policy of the Government seems to be aimed at maintaining present com ceilings and re ducing hog prices to corn price levels. Fourth District Business Indexes (1935-39=100) Bank Debits (24 cities).............................. Commercial Failures (N um ber)............... ” ” (Liabilities)............. Sales— Life Insurance (O. and P a .)......... ” — Department Stores (97 firm s)........... ” — Wholesale Drugs (8 firm s)........... ” — ” Dry Goods (4 firm s). . ” — ” Groceries (44 firm s). . ” — ” Hardware (31 firm s).. ” Building Contracts (T o ta l)............................. ” (Residential)................... Production— Coal (O., W. Pa., E. K y .). . . . ” — Cement (O., W. Pa., E. K y.)** ” — Elec. Power (O., Pa., K y .) * * .. ” — Petroleum (O., Pa., K y .) * * .. . ” — S h oes.. . . ; .................................. * Per individual unit operated. ** April May 1944 200 14 9 112 178 127 172 150 175 167 155 161 60 48 171 65 187 93 88 M ay 1943 182 24 20 98 154 113 155 130 184 153 158 158 108 130 151 115 179 99 82 M ay 1942 160 79 35 74 137 95 146 107 198 139 136 153 254 172 153 137 159 102 106 May 1941 140 97 36 103 139 89 132 105 167 126 122 129 260 326 138 143 135 94 105 M ay 1940 110 117 77 96 114 88 106 97 106 98 99 110 140 210 112 106 118 103 7S Debits to Individual Accounts Wholesale and Retail Trade (1944 compared with 1943) Percentage Increase or Decrease SALES SALES STOCKS May first S May 1944 months 1944 D E P A R T M E N T STORES (97) A kron.......................................... ..................... +13 — 2 — 1 Canton............................................................. + 17 + 2 a Cincinnati........................................................ + 22 + 8 + 15 C leveland......................................................... + 17 + 1 + 5 Colum bus......................................................... + 27 "t" i Erie................................................................... +18 + 4 + 2 Pittsburgh....................................................... +22 + 7 + 12 Springfield....................................................... + 12 + 3 a T oled o............................................................... +23 +10 +21 Wheeling.......................................................... + 28 + 15 +35 Youngstown.................................................... +23 +10 a Other Cities.................................................... + 3 5 D istrict............................................................. +19 + 5 +11 W E A R IN G A P P A R E L (15) C anton............................................................. +38 +12 + 1 Cincinnati........................................................ +34 — 2 a Cleveland......................................................... + 35 + 13 + 22 Pittsburgh....................................................... +49 + ^8 Other Cities.................................................... + 22 — 3 -* + 1 District............................................................. +34 + 9 +16 F U R N IT U R E (76) „ , _ C anton............................................................. + 35 + 15 — 9 Cincinnati........................................................ -0 10 28 Cleveland......................................................... — 2 8 36 Columbus......................................................... — 2 -0 — 26 D ayton............................................................. — 21 29 a Pittsburgh....................................................... + 17 — 1 T oledo............................................................... + 4 + 3 _ -0 Other Cities.................................................... — 1 J 18 District............................................................. + 4 — 4 — 29 CH AIN STORES* , . Drugs— District (5 )...................................... — 2 + 1 a Groceries— District ( 4 ) ................................ + 10 + 6 a W HOLESALE T R A D E ** Automotive Supplies (9 )............................. +27 + 23 + 3 Beer (3 )........... ...................................... +10 + 6 a Clothing and Furnishings (4 ) ................... + 23 J a Confectionery (4 ) .......................................... — 2 + 13 a Drugs and Drug Sundries ( 8 ) .................. +12 i j Dry Goods (4 ). ................. ......................... +11 -0 Electrical Goods (1 8 ).................................. — 10 9 -0 Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (7 ).............. +19 + 2 a Furniture & House Furnishings (3 ).......... -—13 a a Grocery Group (4 4 )..................................... + 15 + 9 + 24 Total Hardware Group (3 1 )..................... ■ 5 —" 5 + 8 General Hardware (1 0 )........................... + 1 + 5 + 5 Industrial Supplies (1 2 ).......................... — 19 — }3 + 9 Plumbing & Heating Supplies (9 ). . . . + 9 — 10 +39 Jewelry ( 5 ) ...................................................... + 9 + 2 _ -0 Lumber and Building Materials (4 )......... + 10 a Machinery, Equip. & Sup. (exc. Elect.) (5) — 21 a 2Z Meats and Meat Products (4 ) ................... + 32 +20 + 38 Metals (3 ) ....................................................... — 7 a a Paints and Varnishes (5 )............................ + 21 ,1 5 a Paper and its Products (6 ).......................... +16 + 17 a Tobacco and its Products (1 6 )................. + 6 + 1 +13 Miscellaneous (1 0 )........................................ + 5 + 7 + 31 District— All Wholesale Trade ( 1 9 6 ) .. .. + 8 + 5 +16 * Per individual Unit operated. ** Wholesale data compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. a N ot available. Figures in parentheses indicate numberof firmsreporting sales. ... +* 13 M ay 1944 176,411 16,194 74,062 Cincinnati. . . . 550,329 1,288,524 293,853 Covington22,572 N ew p ort.. . 137,110 59,854 6,097 11,756 Greensburg... 19,004 4,753 H om estead... 25,594 26,114 8,184 19,696 18,950 M iddletow n.. 14,148 Oil C ity ......... Pittsburgh. . . . 1,273,916 11,220 Portsmouth. . 16,003 30,484 Springfield. . . 13,376 Steubenville.. 246,866 23,510 41,139 80,874 Youngstow n.. 12,069 4,522,662 (Thousands of Dollars) change Jan.-May 1944 from 1943 885,349 + 8.1 84,770 + 1 4 .0 385,500 + 9 .4 2,940,580 + 3 .6 + 16.9 6,272,091 1,585,345 — 1.8 Jan.-M ay 1943 813,416 68,243 351,478 2,823,190 5,376,226 1,405,733 119,427 719,416 313,114 30,238 60,041 98,181 23,784 206,390 130,651 43,172 98,512 99,861 74,992 6,497,983 54,941 82,669 161,679 65,986 1,298,823 115,952 199,957 413,093 62,315 23,124,812 110,721 676,112 281,596 24,354 50,032 98,560 21,662 183,497 117,858 33,076 82,738 96,247 77,867 5,811,463 47,658 71,025 149,229 62,095 1,152,609 116,211 185,908 386,847 61,081 20,736,732 % — 2 .6 — 0.1 + 6 .5 + 2 0 .5 + 15.3 -0 + 9 .2 — 1.6 + 2 0 .5 + 2 0 .3 + 2 1 .7 — 7 .2 — 12.6 + 12.2 + 12.3 + 1 6 .0 + 2.9 + 14.3 + 10.7 + 3.1 + 11.2 + 0.1 + 0 .6 + 9 .9 % change from 1943 + 8.8 + 2 4 .2 + 9 .7 + 4 .2 + 1 6 .7 +12.8 + 7.9 + 6 .4 +11.2 + 2 4 .2 +20.0 — 0 .4 + 9 .8 + 1 2 .5 + 1 0 .9 + 3 0 .5 + 19.1 + 3 .8 — 3.7 +11.8 + 1 5 .3 + 1 6 .4 + 8.3 + 6.3 + 1 2 .7 — 0 .2 + 7 .6 + 6.8 + 2.0 + 11.5 Fourth District Business Statistics (000 omitted) M ay change Jan.-M ay % chanj Fourth District Unless from 19‘ 1944 1944 1 :rom 1943 Otherwise Specified 22,709,000 + 10 Bank Debits— 24 cities............. 34,441,000 + 11 Savings Deposits— end of month: 39 Banks O. and W. Pa............ 31, ,010,871 + 19 Life Insurance Sales: 466,584 + 14 94,352 Ohio and P a .............................. + 14 Retail Sales: 188,923 43,860 Dept. Stores— 97 firms............$ + 19 + 5 8,866 +34 Wearing Apparel— 15 firms.. 1,893 + 9 — 4 12,949 3,652 Furniture— /6 firms................. + 4 63,384 — 46 — 44 14,630 Building Contracts— T o ta l. . . . Building Contracts— — 61 3,746 — 63 16,746 — Residential. 3 Commercial Failures— — 50 — 54 749 Liabilities. . . . 135 37 — 64 — 44 Commercial Failures— Number. 9 Production: 26,425 Pig Iron— U. S........ Net tons 5,343 + 4 + 3 37,837 7,680 Steel Ingot— U. S ....N e t tons + 3 + 2 Bituminous Coal— O., W. Pa., 99,571 E. K y....................... Net tons 21,450 + 14 + 6 Cement— O., W. Pa., W. Va. .............................................Bbls. 1,839b — 51 539a — 43 Elec. Power— O., Pa., Ky. 12,007b ......................... Thous. K.W .H . 2,848a + 5 + 9 8,500b — 1 Petroleum— O., Pa., K y .. . Bbls. 2,059a — 6 c c + 7 + 2 Bituminous Coal Shipments: 7,049 +30 13,492 +33 Lake Erie Ports...........Net tons April, b January-April. c Confidential. *0 V 3 .3 3 3 3 8 THE MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW Summary of National Business Conditions By the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Industrial activity and employment declined slightly further in May. Value of retail trade was maintained in May and the first three weeks of June and com modity prices showed little change. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION Federal Reserve index. Monthly figures, latest shown is for May 1944. INCOME PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS Based on Department of Commerce estimates. Wages and salaries include military pay. Monthly figures raised to annual rates, latest shown are for April 1944. MEMBER BANKS IN LEADING CITIES 1 1 j N jS V L - U.S. G V O ’T ECURITIE8 ______ IS ss " - *\ p T U S G V DEPOSITS . O 1939 !940 1941 j 1942 1943 1944 Demand deposits (adjusted) exclude U. S. Government and interbank deposits and collec tion items. Government securities include direct and guaranteed issues. Wednesday figures, latest shown are for June 14, 1944. MEMBER BANK RESERVES AND RELATED ITEMS Wednesday figures, latest shown are for June 14, 1944. Industrial production Industrial production continued to decline in May and the Board’s seasonally adjusted index was 237 per cent of the 1935-39 average as compared with 239 in April. Small declines in output of metal products and nondurable goods accounted for most of the decrease in the total index. Steel production was maintained at a high rate. Supplies of aluminum and magnesium continued to exceed military requirements after further curtailment of output in May, and relaxation of restrictions on the use of these metals in civilian products was announced on June 18. Activity in munitions industries declined slightly in May. Aircraft production was at approximately the same daily average rate as in the preceding month. Deliveries of merchant ships declined somewhat from the April rate, reflecting curtailment of Liberty ship construction; the number of Victory ships delivered rose further in May. Output of lumber and of stone, clay, and glass products declined further in May. Additional Federal control was established over lumber consumption, effec tive in the third quarter, in order to assure supplies for essential requirements. Production of most nondurable goods was likewise somewhat lower in May than in April. Cotton consumption declined 6 per cent from the rate prevailing earlier this year to a level 16 per cent below May 1943. Output of manufactured dairy products showed a large seasonal rise in May while manufacture of most other food products declined somewhat, after allowance for seasonal changes. Output of crude petroleum and coal continued to rise and iron ore production reached an exceptionally high level for this season of the year. Distribution Department store sales in May were maintained at the April level, and the Board’s seasonally adjusted index, as recently revised, was 173 per cent of the 1935-39 average. During the first half of June sales continued at about the April-May rate and were 4 per cent larger than in the corresponding period last year. Railroad freight traffic was maintained at a high level during May. Commodity prices Wholesale commodity prices continued to show little change in May and the early part of June. Retail prices showed a further slight increase in May. The wholesale price index and the cost of living index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics were both at the same level as they were in May 1943. Agriculture Crop prospects on June 1 were better than on the same date in the last 10 years except 1942. The total wheat crop appeared likely to exceed a billion bushels as compared with a harvest of 836 million bushels in 1943 and 974 million in 1942. Prospects for other grains, however, were not as favorable and, with grain stocks reduced, it is expected that total supplies available to meet food, feed, and industrial needs will continue short. In recent months the feed situation has been eased by generally good condition of the hay crops and pastures. Bank credit In the five months from the beginning of the Fourth War Loan Drive to the beginning of the Fifth Drive, Federal Reserve Bank holdings o f U. S. Government securities increased by more than 3 billion dollars. Member bank borrowings at Federal Reserve Banks also increased somewhat during the period, and at times ex ceeded 200 million dollars for the first time in more than a decade. These addi tions to Reserve Bank credit supplied the market with funds to meet a growth of nearly 2 billion dollars in money in circulation, an increase of 700 million in mem ber bank required reserves, and a loss of gold of 700 million. Excess reserves, which declined to as low as 600 million dollars during the period, amounted to 1.1 billion on June 14. During the Drive, purchases of Government securities by businesses and in dividuals will shift deposits to reserve-exempt Government war-loan accounts and reduce the amount of reserves that member banks are required to hold. This will result in some further increase in excess reserves and some repurchases of Govern ment securities by member banks from the Reserve Banks. Government security holdings at reporting banks declined by close to 2 billion dollars between mid-February and mid-June, following an increase of around 3 billion during the Fourth Drive. Loans to brokers and dealers in securities, which by the end of May had declined well below their early January levels, increased somewhat in the first two weeks of June preparatory tn the Drive. Other loans for handling Government securities are close to their pre-Fourth Drive level. Again in the Fifth Drive, as in the previous one, borrowings for speculative purchases will be discouraged.
@FedFRASER