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IN THI S I S S U E

- . F E D E R A L RESERVE BANK of CLEVELAND

“Fannie M a e ” In
The Secondary M ortgage M a r k e l........... 2
Notes on Fed eral Reserve Pu blicatio ns.. • . 9

/luycut t</63

D airy Farm er Indebtedness........................... 10

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNM A) acts as a middleman in bringing together buyers and sellers
of government-insured mortgages. Mortgage companies which originate over three-fifths of these home loans are
the most important sellers of mortgages to the FNMA. In contrast, life insurance companies, mutual savings banks,
savings and loan associations, and commercial banks, are all important secondary holders of government insured
mortgages.


S ou r c e of d a t a : F e d e r a l


HOLDERS
BUYERS FROM FNM A

MORTGAGE
COMPANIES
COMMERCIAL
BANKS

SA V IN G S and LOAN
AS SOCIATIO NS

MUTUAL SA VIN GS
BANKS

INSURANCE
COMPANIES
D ecem b er 31, 1962

H o u s i n g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , V e t e r a n s ’ A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d F e d e r a l N a t i o n a l M o r t g a g e A s s o c ia ti o n .

“Fannie Mae” In The Secondary
Mortgage Market
markets involve the resale of
financial instruments after their original
issue. The markets vary in size, type of in­
strument traded, and nature of the buyers
and sellers. Financial lending institutions
have been active in certain markets for a
number of reasons. For example, by means
of a secondary market, lending institutions
can increase their liquidity, i.e., their ability
to convert different kinds of assets into cash
quickly and without large capital losses.
eco n d a r y

S

A secondary market for particular invest­
ments enhances their marketability in that
the securities can compete more equitably for
available funds with other types of invest­
ments which also have existing secondary
markets. U. S. Government securities and
corporate bonds, for example, have wellestablished secondary markets. These securi­
ties are traded through a nation-wide net­
work of brokers and dealers who make mar­
kets by quoting a bid price at which securities
will be purchased and an offering price at
which they will be sold.
The residential mortgage market, which
constitutes the largest single demand for
funds in the capital market, has no similarlyorganized secondary market. Basically, this
is because lending to home builders and buy­
ers is inherently a highly individualized proc­
ess, unlike lending to the U.S. Government
and to corporations. Home construction and
purchase are financed by conventional credit
and by mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration and the Veterans’
Administration. Since there are wide varia­
2



tions in both the credit-worthiness of mort­
gage borrowers and their loan collateral, con­
ventional mortgages (which comprise the bulk
of home mortgage credit) are financed pri­
marily by lending institutions in local areas.
An organized secondary market for these
mortgages has not developed largely because
of the individualized nature of the loan
agreements.
On the other hand, the financing of government-insured mortgages (which comprise twofifths of total residential credit outstanding)
contrasts markedly with the financing of con­
ventional mortgages. FHA-insured and VAguaranteed mortgages must meet certain
standards defined by law, thereby imparting
a measure of uniformity or homogeneity to
the securities. This uniformity enhances the
trading of government-insured mortgages
among investors beyond the local area in
which the loans originate.
Although there is no network of dealers
making a market for FHA-insured and VAguaranteed mortgages, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FN M A ), a constitu­
ent agency of the Housing and Home Finance
Agency, provides a secondary market facility
for trading government-insured mortgages.
The FNMA, or “ Fannie Mae” as the agency
is facetiously called, was initially chartered
in 1938 to support the F H A program which
was started four years earlier. Subsequent
recharterings in 1948 and in 1954 attempted
to define the function of the FNMA more
adequately in terms of the needs of govern­
mental housing programs. Thus, support of

the V A mortgage program was added to its
functions in 1948. From 1948 to 1954 Fannie
Mae purchased government-insured mortgages
primarily in order to support special housing
programs of the F H A and VA.
The most recent reorganization of Fannie
Mae stemmed from the Housing Act of 1954.
The principal objective as it now exists is to
provide a secondary market facility for mak­
ing government-insured mortgages more liq­
uid. This purpose is to be accomplished by
buying government-insured mortgages when
mortgage funds in general are scarce and,
alternatively, selling from the FNMA port­
folio when there is a demand for mortgage
investments. In addition, through “ buy and
sell” activity, Fannie Mae attempts to effect
transfers of mortgage funds from areas where
capital is plentiful, e.g., the Northeastern
section of the country, to capital-short areas,
e.g., the Western section of the United States.
In the initial years following the most re­
cent reorganization, a number of comments
and criticisms arose concerning the ability of
Fannie Mae to implement its principal objec­
tive of a secondary mortgage market. In view
of the fact that in those years Fannie Mae
seldom sold mortgages, many observers main­
tained that the Association was actually a
primary or long-term lender rather than the
force behind an effective secondary market
for trading mortgages among institutions.
Secondly, critics held that, given the frame­
work within which the FNMA operated, its
activity was inherently conflicting with gen­
eral credit policy and thus with overall sta­
bility in the economy. Finally, doubts were
expressed as to whether Fannie Mae would
become entirely privately-owned and financed
according to the means established in the
charter.
An understanding of these issues in light
of the recent operations of Fannie Mae and
the factors which influence these operations
may provide perspective for an appraisal of
current trends. Recent activity of the FNMA
has shown a pattern which is in marked con­
trast to the period immediately following the




reorganization of 1954. This activity, more­
over, suggests that Fannie Mae has become a
stronger force in the home mortgage market
than was originally anticipated.

A Secondary Market Facility
As shown in the chart on the cover, the
FNMA acts as a middleman in bringing to­
gether buyers and sellers of existing mort­
gages. The principal types of lending institu­
tions which sell mortgages to Fannie Mae are
basically different from the principal buyers
of mortgages. Mortgage companies which
originate over three-fifths of governmentinsured home loans are the most important
sellers of mortgages to Fannie Mae. The rela­
tive role of mortgage companies has doubled
since 1956; prior to this time commercial
banks were more important originators o f
government-insured mortgages.(1)
By making regular surveys of market trans­
actions, FNMA attempts to establish its pur­
chase prices on mortgages within the range
of market prices. The announced schedules o f
prices vary according to the state in which
the property is located, the contract rate on
the mortgage, and the amount of borrower
equity. Until late in 1962 Fannie Mae pur­
chased only newly-originated mortgages which
were insured by the F H A or guaranteed by
the V A less than four months earlier. In
order to increase the volume of mortgage
purchases, however, Fannie Mae currently
purchases government-insured mortgages that
have been originated anv time after August,,
1954.
When Fannie Mae purchases a mortgage,
it requires the seller to pay a marketing fee
equal to 0.5 percent of the unpaid principal
amount of the mortgage. In addition, the
( i ) The role played by mortgage companies illustrates the
specialization that has occurred in real estate financing since
the establishment of the secondary market operations of the
F N M A . The practice of “ warehousing” mortgages has devel­
oped, whereby commercial banks make short-term loans tomortgage companies on the security of government-insured
mortgages. Individual mortgage companies then accumulate
mortgages until the combined volume is large enough to be
sold as a unit to large investors such as life insurance com­
panies or mutual savings banks. In this way, mortgage com­
panies act as correspondents in originating and servicing
mortgages for subsequent resale to other large investors. The
intermediate financing is provided by the commercial banks.

3

C h a ri I .
P rio r to 1961 a c tiv ity of the FN M A took the form prim arily of m ortgage pu rch ases. Since
the beginning o f 1961, h o w ev er, the volume of m ortgage sales has in cre a se d and the
FN M A has been a net se lle r of m ortgages during th ree diffe re n t perio ds.

S o u rc e of

seller is required to purchase common stock
in Fannie Mae equal to 1 or 2 percent of the
amount of mortgage, depending on the cur­
rent FNM A decision. These fees and stock
purchase requirements make the amount re­
ceived in selling mortgages to FNMA slightly
less than sellers obtain by dealing directly
with secondary holders of government-insured
mortgages. Thus, the Association is not in
direct competition with other mortgage lend­
ing institutions, but stands ready to buy
when needed.
Fannie Mae does not sell directly to poten­
tial buyers of mortgages. Sales are effected
through numerous d i s t r i b u t o r s located
throughout the country. The distributors or
mortgage dealers order large units of mort­
gages from FNMA and in turn resell the
mortgages to their customers. Therefore,
Fannie Mae does not know the identity of the
specific purchasers.(2) Life insurance com­
4




panies, mutual savings banks, savings and
loan associations, and commercial banks are
all important secondary holders of government-insured mortgages.
When Fannie Mae acts as a middleman in
the exchange of government-insured mort­
gages between originators and buyers, its
purchases and sales tend to cancel over sev­
eral years time. As shown in Chart 1, nearly
all activity of Fannie Mae during 1955-57
took the form of mortgage purchases. More­
over, mortgage sales were relatively unim­
portant before 1961, with the exception of
mid-1958. Consequently, the mortgage port­
folios resulting from secondary market oper­
ations expanded to a high of nearly $2.8
(2) On the cover chart the percentage distribution of origi­
nators of government-insured mortgages is the same as the
percentage distribution of sellers of mortgages to the F N M A .
Although there is no distribution available of mortgage buy­
ers from the agents of F N M A , it is assumed that this dis­
tribution is the same as the percentage distribution of hold­
ers of government-insured mortgages, as reported by F H A
and V A .

billion at the end of 1960. Since the beginning
of 1961, Fannie Mae has alternately been a
net buyer and a net seller of mortgages. As
a result, the mortgage portfolio at mid-1963
was near the level of mid-1959.
The unusually large volume of mortgage
sales by Fannie Mae during the first half of
1963 was due in part to the demands from
commercial banks, savings and loan associ­
ations, and mutual savings banks. These insti­
tutions have sought higher-yielding invest­
ments, particularly in view of the relatively
high interest rates being paid to savers for
the use of their funds.

The Volume of Purchase and Sale Activity
Since 1961 the volume of purchases and
sales of mortgages by Fannie Mae has in­
creased. The major reason for the larger vol­
ume has been a closer correspondence in the
timing of fluctuations in the housing indus­
try with general credit conditions. During
this period the housing industry has clearly
been a procyclical influence in general busi­
ness activity; that is, the expansion in resi­
dential construction and its financing have
paralleled the expansion in general business
conditions. In marked contrast, in the imme­
diate postwar period, residential construction
and its financing had been countercyclical;
that is, surges in building usually began dur­
ing periods o f economic recession and then
moved sideways or declined as the rest of the
economy reached levels of high prosperity.
Government-insured mortgages contributed
importantly to the earlier countercyclical be­
havior of mortgages largely because the inter­
est rate ceiling on FHA-insured and VAguaranteed credit (coupled with the inflexi­
bility of the discount and premium system)
made such credit attractive during recessions
but comparatively less attractive during busi­
ness expansion when other interest rates were
rising faster. Thus, it can be seen that the
need for a secondary market for governmentinsured mortgages was not imperative during
periods when the housing industry was
countercyclical due to the fact that the sup­
5




ply of mortgages was increased at a time
when idle funds were seeking attractive in­
vestment outlets. As the countercyclical stim­
ulus of the housing industry has declined, the
need for Fannie Mae’s services to insulate
the volume of government-insured mortgages
from general credit conditions has increased.
The seesaw pattern of activity in purchases
and sales since the beginning of 1961 is un­
usual when compared with earlier periods of
FNMA activity. Nevertheless, the recent ac­
tivity is not uncommon to the functions of a
secondary market facility. It seems clear that
since 1961 the FNMA has no longer been a
primary investor in government-insured mort­
gages, but rather the pivot in an active sec­
ondary market. In fact, during recent years
Fannie Mae has effected substantial shifts
among lending institutions in holdings of
government-insured mortgages.

The Timing of Purchase and Sale Activity
General credit conditions have influenced
the timing of Fannie Mae activity as a net
buyer or net seller of mortgages, in addition
to the volume of the agency’s activities. Chart
2 shows the effects of the general availabil­
ity of credit on FNMA activity. Increases in
the mortgage portfolios of FNM A indicate
periods when Fannie Mae was a net purchaser
of mortgages, while decreases indicate periods
as a net seller. The volume of free, or net bor­
rowed, reserves of the member banks of the
Federal Reserve System reflects changes in
the rate of growth of total credit.
The chart shows that periods of increasing
mortgage portfolio (or net buyer position)
have corresponded closely to periods of net
borrowed reserves in the commercial banking
system. Furthermore, periods of a declining
inventory (or net seller position) have corre­
sponded, although not to the same degree, to
periods of free reserves. Thus, during periods
of monetary restraint when funds are rela­
tively scarce, Fannie Mae has been a net
buyer of mortgages and, alternatively, when
funds are relatively ample, the FNMA has
been a net seller of mortgages. This has tend-

respon ded clo se ly to p erio d s of m onetary re stra in t, as re
b o r r o w e d r . , . r » o , o f the c o m m e r c ia l
mg m ortgage inventory (o r a net se lle r p o sitio n l have
c re d it ea se as re fle cte d in the volume of fre e re se rv e s.
r—

.......... ....... -I--------------- —

—

f ... ------------- i—

..... ...... 1------------------------- j.

..................

l io n s of d o ll a r s

FN M A M O RTG A G E PORTF'

FREE RESERVES

NET BO RRO W ED RESERVES
19 5 5

195 6
■

S o u r c e of d a t a :

19 5 7

1958

1959

196'

i
■
£ ■
'■
i'# ;:-®
F N M A a n d B o a r d o f G o v e r n o r s of t he f e d e r a l R e s e r v e S y s t e m

ed to insulate the mortgage market from
sharp changes in the total supply of credit.
There is strong evidence, moreover, that
general credit conditions are more important
determinants of the timing in activity of
Fannie Mae than are any adjustments made
by Fannie Mae in prices, fees, and stock pur­
chase requirements. The FNMA, for example,
can make changes in the schedules of prices
it will pay sellers of mortgages and of prices
which the Association will charge mortgage
buyers. To sellers of mortgages, the FNMA
can also adjust the various marketing fees
and the percentage amount of common stock
which the Association requires the sellers to
purchase. Use of these marketing adjust­
ments, however, must be made within the
legally-prescribed restriction that the opera­
tions of the FNMA be self-supporting.
Since yields on mortgages tend to rise with
6




other interest rates during periods of mone­
tary restraint, the prices charged buyers of
mortgages from the FNMA portfolios cannot
be decreased in order to increase mortgage
sales, unless losses are incurred. On the other
hand, during periods of ample funds, the
prices that the FNM A pays sellers of mort­
gages cannot be lowered in order to decrease
purchases because the relatively high yield
to the FNMA would make it more difficult to
resell at a later time without incurring a loss.
Despite the fact that the timing of Fannie
Mae activity is influenced more by general
credit policy than by adjustments in prices,
fees, and stock purchase requirements, the
FNMA has not provided funds at rates below
those available in other money and capital
markets. General credit policy is concerned
with the total supply of credit. The allocation
of this supply among competing uses is de­

Chari 3.

termined largely by the market on the basis
of relative prices or yields. The operations of
the FNMA have been conducted within this
framework.

Sources of Funds and Their Cost
The reorganization of FNM A in 1954
established the secondary market facility as
a mixed-ownership corporation which would
eventually become owned by and financed en­
tirely from private sources of funds. Fannie
Mae is unique in that the Association is the
only governmental agency which issues com­
mon stock. Common stock is issued to sellers
of mortgages to the FNMA through the re­
quirement that the sellers in turn subscribe
to common stock in an amount equal to 1 or
2 percent of the amount of mortgages sold.
The amount of common stock issued through
such stock purchase requirements has grown
to over $100 million in mid-1963, or about
one-third of the total equity of Fannie Mae.
The U. S. Treasury holds the remaining
equity, or about $200 million in preferred
stock.
Although the equity of Fannie Mae is rela­
tively small in relation to its total funds, as
shown in Chart 3, this amount o f capital
provides the leverage for the sale of deben­
tures and notes in the private capital market.
Private borrowings, the largest source of
funds to the FNMA, have grown rapidly and
have comprised more than four-fifths of total
funds of the FNMA since 1956. Under its
charter, Fannie Mae is permitted to borrow
up to ten times the amount of its capital and
surplus. Since the FNMA potential borrow­
ing authority is over $3 billion and the
amount of debentures and notes outstanding
was less than $2 billion in June 1963, there
is currently a considerable margin between
the borrowing authority and the amount of
outstanding indebtedness. During periods of
a continuously large volume of mortgage pur­
chases, however, Fannie Mae has had to issue
preferred stock to the Treasury in order to
increase its borrowing authority.
Most of the early issues of borrowings were
in the intermediate- and long-term maturity




1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

S o u rc e o f < jolo: FNM A.

Sin ce 7 9 5 6 notes and d ebentu res issued to the
public have been the m ajor so u rce o f funds fo r the
seco n d a ry m arket o peratio ns of the FN M A .

range. Since the beginning of 1960, however,
Fannie Mae has also issued short-term notes
of one to nine months maturity. These short­
term notes have at times comprised as much
as 15 percent of total borrowings from the
public. The use of short-term credit has the
advantage of permitting a more flexible
amount of borrowing, in that the notes enable
a closer timing of borrowing maturities with
the use of funds to purchase mortgages. Then,
when the mortgages have been sold and the
funds are no longer needed, the notes will be
retired. The retirement of short- and inter­
mediate-term notes was particularly impor­
tant during the first half of 1963 when there
was a relatively large volume of mortgage
sales. Fannie Mae has not borrowed in the
short-term market since the end of 1962. Fur­
thermore, intermediate issues have not been
refunded during this period.
of

Interest rates affect virtually every aspect
Fannie Mae’s operation, and interest
7

Ch art 4.

The small differential between 90-day issues
of FNMA notes and similar issues of the U. S.
Treasury indicate the comparatively favor­
able credit standing of FNM A among money
market instruments. The short-term rate of
the FNMA, for example, is approximately the
same as the rate charged for bankers’ accept­
ance borrowers.

T OF FUND

FHA M O RTG AG ES

FNMA BONDS

FNMA NOTE5

TREASURY BILLS
(91-d a y )

1960
So u rce of d a ta :

1961

1962

19 6 3

FH A , F N M A , a n d U.S. T re a s u r y D eportm en t.

The in terest rate s on FN M A notes and debentures
indicate the relative c o sts o f these funds as
com pared with the ra te on FH A m o rtg a g e s, i.e..
the major so u rce of income to F N M A .

charges constitute both the major source of
income and the largest expense. Chart 4
shows the relative prices and costs of the
agency’s important sources of income and
expense. The major source of income is the
return on F H A mortgages. The rate on such
mortgages is the price Fannie Mae pays to
the sellers of mortgages.<3) Since the FH A
rate is also the rate charged against buyers
of mortgages from the FNMA portfolio, the
profit or loss on operations is obtained in part
through differentials in the F H A rate from
the time of purchase to the time of sale of
mortgages.
In addition, the relative profitability of
F N M A ’s operations depends on the differen­
tial between the income received and the costs
of borrowing. The two interest rates of the
FNMA on the chart indicate the costs of bor­
rowing short- and intermediate-term funds.
(3) The F H A mortgage rate is based on average bid prices
for 25-year mortgages at the prevailing contractual interest
rate.

8




Another source of income to FNMA is the
various marketing fees charged against sellers
of mortgages. Marketing fees have so far been
of relatively minor importance to total in­
come and, therefore, to profits. The periods
of largest profits of the FNMA have occurred
during periods of general recession in busi­
ness activity when there has been a relatively
large volume of mortgage sales. This is prob­
ably due to the fact that while interest rates
in general are relatively low during reces­
sionary periods, mortgage rates do not fluctu­
ate as much as other interest rates. Therefore,
the differential between interest received as
income and interest paid as a cost of borrow­
ing widens during periods of general reces­
sion in business activity. In recent years
FNMA earnings (after provision for income
taxes) have ranged between 7 and 13 percent
of total income.
Although the FNMA has succeeded in be­
coming almost entirely privately-financed in
terms of obtaining nearly all its funds from
private sources, the Association is a long way
from becoming entirely privately-owned. The
Treasury still retains the major part of
FNMA equity. This is somewhat surprising
in view of the comparatively favorable ac­
ceptance of the common stock by the invest­
ing public. Since the common stock is issued
through stock purchase requirements, it is not
sold initially on an auction basis. Fannie
Mae, however, places no restriction on second­
ary transfers of its common stock, therefore
sellers of mortgages to the FNMA can pro­
ceed to dispose of the stock through the overthe-counter market.
Dividends on the common stock have ad­
vanced continuously from a monthly rate of
$.18 a share in 1956 to $.30 a share in the first

half of 1963. The increases in dividends cou­
pled with the growing interest in the stock
have steadily improved its resale value. Thus,
the bid price on the over-the-counter market
has increased from about $50 a share in the
beginning of 1956 to about $90 a share in
June 1963. The average annual yield of the
common stock, however, has decreased from
4.3 percent in 1956 to 4.0 percent during the
first half of 1963.

Despite the comparatively favorable mar­
ket performance of the common stock, Fannie
Mae has had to add Treasury capital from
time to time in order to be able to increase
mortgage purchases. The need to add Treas­
ury capital, particularly during periods of a
heavy volume of mortgage purchases, sug­
gests that a higher rate of stock subscription
may be necessary if the Association eventu­
ally is to become privately-owned.

Notes on Federal Reserve Publications
Among the articles recently published in the monthly
publications of other Federal Reserve Banks are:
“ Gold, the Balance of Payments, and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, June, 1963.
“ The Current Dialogue on Financial Developments,”
Bank of Kansas City, May-June, 1963.

Federal Reserve

“ Conversations on International Finance,” Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, August, 1963.
“ Certificates of Deposit,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June, 1963.
“ Today’s Mild-Mannered Inventories,” Federal Reserve Bank of Phila­
delphia, July, 1963.
“ U. S. Balance-of-Payments Deficits in Perspective,”
Bank of St. Louis, July, 1963.

Federal Reserve

Recently published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System:
“ Monetary Developments, First H alf ’63” and “ Measures of Member
Bank Reserves,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 1963.
“ Recent Changes in Liquidity,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1963.
“ Farm Debt As Related to Value of Sales,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Feb­
ruary, 1963.




9

Dairy Farmer Indebtedness
on
fa r m
debt
collected in the
Sample Survey of Agriculture by the
Bureau of the Census in Autumn of 1960
showed that nearly three-fourths of the dairy
farmers in the nation reported having some
debt.(1) Recent analysis of the data collected
indicates that debt on dairy farms totaled
nearly $3.1 billion, as shown in Table I. Op­
erators with debt accounted for 87 percent
of the total; the remainder of the debt repre­
sented credit outstanding to landlords of
dairy farms. The average debt per farm was
$10,559.

D

a ta

Dairy Farms Lead in Proportion
With Debt
As shown in Table II, among those farms
reporting debt, the amount per farm was
somewhat smaller for dairy farms than for
several of the other types of farms. In con­
trast, the percentage of dairy farms report­
ing debt was higher than for most other
types of farms.
In examining only dairy farm operators
the same pattern emerges, operators with
debt constituted nearly three-quarters o f all
dairy farmers in contrast to about 60 percent
of the operators of cotton and tobacco farms,
as shown in Chart 1.
The ratio of debt to total net cash income
and the ratio of debt to value of land and
buildings owned by dairy farmers were also
higher than those for most other types of
farm operators (see Chart 2 ) . (2) Thus, it ap­
pears that the use of borrowed funds was not
(1)S ee the Appendix for a further explanation of the sur­
vey and Tables I through V .
(2) Total net cash income represents farm cash receipts plus
off-farm income m inus cash expenses. D ata did not permit
allowance for non-money income furnished by farm s, net
change in inventories, or for depreciation of buildings and
equipment.

10




only more widespread among dairy farmers
at the time of this survey, but they were
using somewhat more credit in relation to
total net cash income and value of land and
buildings owned, as compared with most
other types of farm operations.
One of the reasons why dairy farmers were
somewhat more heavily indebted may be the
rather general conversion from can to bulk
handling of milk, a development that began
in the early 1950’s. The number of farms
reporting bulk tank installations increased
tenfold from 1954 to 1960.(3) In addition, the
installation of bulk milk handling equipment
has often served as the initial step in a series
of developments leading to an enlargement
of the dairy enterprise.

Source of Real Estate Credit
Individuals were the most important source
of major real estate credit for dairy farmers.
Individuals who extended credit secured by
farm mortgages and land purchase contracts,
accounted for about 35 percent of the total
major real estate credit outstanding to oper­
ators of dairy farms.
The survey results revealed that commer­
cial and savings banks were the most impor­
tant institutional source of major real estate
credit (see Chart 3). Bank holdings of dairy
farm major real estate debt accounted for 21
percent of the total. The second ranking in­
stitutional source of major real estate credit
were the Federal Land Banks. They provided
about one-fifth of the major real estate credit
outstanding in 1960. Other prominent insti­
tutional lenders included the Farmers’ Home
Administration and life insurance companies.
(3) From data
Association.

assembled

by

the

D airy

Industry

Supply

C h a rt 1.

FARM OPERATOR DEBT
by Major Type of Farm
1960
AVERAGE INDEBTEDNESS PER FARM OPERATOR

PERCENT OF OPERATORS WITH INDEBTEDNESS

100 %

$ 1 0 ,0 0 0

75%

Source of data

$ 1 5 ,0 0 0

I

U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Sources of Non-Real-Estate Credit
Commercial and savings banks also ac­
counted for 31 percent of total non-realestate and related credit outstanding to dairy
farm operators at the time of the survey. The
other principal non-real-estate lending group
was the Production Credit Associations. These
institutions accounted for over one-fifth of
the total.
Merchants and dealers supplied approxi­
mately one-fifth of the non-real-estate and
related credit outstanding. The amount ex­
tended by individuals other than merchants
and dealers was equal to about 13 percent of
the total. Information as to purposes for
which individuals may extend such credit is
limited but it may be presumed to include
credit granted by some sellers of dairy stock,
and intra-family lending. Some non-realestate credit was also provided by insurance




companies and the Farmers’ Home Admin­
istration.

Types of Credit
Considering the type of indebtedness re­
ported, operators of dairy farms held more
major real estate than non-real-estate and
related debt. Of the total amount of debt out­
standing, about 57 percent was in the major
real estate category and the remainder, or 43
percent, was classified as non-real-estate and
related credit. The proportion of major real
estate credit used by dairy farmers, however,
did not appear to be quite as high as that
reported for most of the other types of com­
mercial farms.

Operators With and Without Debt
As would be expected, the survey shows
that operators with debt operated somewhat
11

C h a rt 2.

FARM DEBT RATIOS
by Major Type of Farm
I960
RATIO
3

TOTAL DEBT os a MULTIPLE OF TOTAL NET CASH INCOME

52 head in contrast with 41 head on the farms
of operators without debt.

Operators With Major Real Estate Debt
Nearly two-fifths of dairy farm operators
reported major real estate debt in the fall
of 1960.(4) Operators of these farms (as
shown in Table IV ) had an average total
debt of $13,803, as compared with an average
total debt of $1,998 for dairy farm operators
without major real estate debt.
As logic would dictate, the average size of
farm, the dollar value of land and buildings,
and the net cash income per farm for the op­
erators with major real estate debt was larger
than for those operators without such debt.

Operators With Non-Real-Estate Debt
R A T IO

> k

1.0

TOTAL DEBT as a MULTIPLE OF VALUE OF LAND and BUILDINGS
0 .5

0

IT

T !

T T T_____ L

N O T E : Total debt has been expressed as a multiple of total
net cash income of the operator and his family,
and as
a multiple of the value of land and build­
ings owned by the farm operator.
Source of da ta : U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census.

larger farms than those without debt (see
Table III). The operators with debt both
owned and rented more land. As a conse­
quence, the value of land and buildings per
farm was also higher for the operators with
debt.
Debt, as a multiple of total net cash in­
come, was somewhat above the average indi­
cated for indebted operators of all farms (see
Chart 2). Only livestock farms had a higher
ratio of debt to total net cash income. More­
over, the debt in relation to the value of land
and buildings owned, at 39 percent of the
value, was also higher than for other types
of farms.
In keeping with the larger average size
of the farms of operators with debt was the
larger size of the dairy herd. The number
of cattle and calves on these farms averaged
12




More than three-fifths of dairy farmers
reported non-real-estate and related debt at
the time of the survey (see Table I V) . These
farmers had an average total debt per farm
of $9,612. In this instance, the total debt was
about equally divided between major real
estate and non-real-estate and related debt.

Debt in Relation to Age of Operator
A fairly consistent pattern emerges when
debt is related to the age of the operator.
Well over 80 percent of the operators under
35 years of age had debt as against only 50
percent for those 55 years and over, as shown
in Table V. The proportion of the operators
35 to 54 years of age who had debt was some­
what lower than for those under 35 years,
but well above those of 55 years and over.
The picture is relatively similar when the
average debt per farm is considered. The op­
erators in the younger age group had the
highest average debt per farm. In fact, their
(4) M ajor real estate debt is defined so as to exclude real
estate-secured debt owed to production credit associations
and to merchants and dealers. It includes all real estatesecured debt to Federal Land B anks, life insurance com­
panies, and individuals from whom the farm was purchased.
Debt owed to the Farm ers’ Hom e Adm inistration, banks,
other institutions, or individuals other than those from
whom part or all of the farm w as purchased was included
only if it w as the largest, or the only, real estate debt owed
by the borrowers.
Non-real-estate and related debt consisted of all debt other
than m ajor real estate. This classification w as designed to
avoid including as m ajor real estate debt loans primarily
secured by non-real-estate assets but which also had real
estate as supplementary security.

C h a rt 3.

SOURCES OF CREDIT FOR DAIRY FARM OPERATORS
1960

T O TA L DEBT

M A JO R REAL ESTATE DEBT

N O N -R E A L-E S T A T E D E B T *

/
NONINSTITUT10NAI

34.1%

OTHER
INSTITUTIONAL

OTHER
INSTITUTIONAL

402%

$2,663,000,000

$1,515,000,000

$1,148,000,000
% MAJOR REAL
ESTATE DEBT

Commercial and Savings Banks

20 . 8 %

% NON-REALESTATE DEBT*

30.9%

Federal lan d Banks
Farmers Home Administration
Insurance Companies
Other Institutions
Production Credit Associations
Miscellaneous

Individuals — form w as purchased:
Under mortgage
Under land purchase contract
Other individuals
Merchant and Dealer

Source of data: U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
* Includes related debt.
N o te: M ay not be additive due to rounding.

average debt of $12,579 was more than twice
the average debt per farm for those in the
55 years and over category. The operators in
the 35 to 54 year age group had somewhat
smaller average debt than the group under
35 years, but substantially more than those
55 years and over.




The relatively heavy indebtedness of the
younger operators of dairy farms reflects the
comparatively low equity that many oper­
ators have in their farm business during the
initial stages of its development. It may also
reflect the increased willingness of some lend­
ers to extend credit to operators who presum13

ably have a greater number of years of pro­
ductive life in which to repay borrowed funds.

Debt in Relation to Size of Farm
Just as larger manufacturing firms usual­
ly require larger amounts of borrowed capital
than smaller manufacturing firms, it seems
that a close correlation also exists between the
size of farm and the average indebtedness of
dairy farm operators. The operators of farms

of 99 acres and under had an average debt of
about $5,000. The amount of debt per farm
was nearly twice as large for the operators
whose farms ranged from 100 acres to 499
acres. For operators of farms consisting of
500 acres and over, the average debt was
$23,000. However, it would appear that the
debt per acre tends to decline as the size of
the farm increases. A similar relationship be­
tween indebtedness and value of land and
buildings was revealed by survey results.

APPENDIX
The estimates presented here are based on
unpublished data collected from a sample of
farms in the United States (exclusive of
Alaska and Hawaii) in Autumn, 1960. A
stratified random sampling procedure was
used which allowed heavier sampling rates
for farms with higher values of farm prod­
ucts sold. A more detailed description of the
sample appears in Part 5, Volume V, “ I960
Sample Survey of Agriculture,” o f the re­
ports of the 1959 Census of Agriculture,
published by the Bureau of the Census.
For comprehensive definitions of such
terms as farm, farm operator, economic class,
off-farm income, type o f farm, and value of
products sold, see TJ. S. Census o f Agricul­

ture, 1959, Volume II, General Report, Sta­
tistics by Subjects— Introduction and Chap­
ter II.
A listing of the items reported as debt as
well as a more detailed technical explanation
appears as part of “ A New Look at the Farm
Debt Picture,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, De­
cember 1962. Included in this explanation are
the reasons for differences between the esti­
mates of debt of farm operators and farm
landlords in the 1960 Survey and those made
by other agencies on the basis of other sur­
veys. It also includes a discussion of the sta­
tistical reliability of estimates obtained in
the 1960 Survey and measures of sampling
errors.

Table I
TOTAL DEBT OF DAIRY FARMS
Amount of Debt
Number
Reporting

Percent
of Total

Total

Per Reporting
Unit

(000,000)

(000)
All dairy f a r m s ....................................

398

100

$3,075

$ 7,705

Farms with d e b t .....................................
Farms without d e b t ............................

291
107

73
27

3,075

10,559

Operators with d e b t ............................
Operators without d e b t ........................

282
116

70.8
29.2

2,663

9,456

Landlords with d e b t ............................

66

n.a.

412

6,246

n.a. — N ot Available.

14



Table II
DEBT OF DAIRY FARMS AND OTHER COMMERCIAL FARMS
Farms With Debt

Type of Farm

Amount of Debt

Percent of
All Farms of
Specified Type

Number
Reporting
(000)

Total

Average per
Farm Re­
porting Debt

(000,000)

D a i r y .....................................................
General and o t h e r ................................
Cash g r a i n .............................................
L ivestock .................................................
C o tto n .....................................................
Tobacco .................................................
M iscellaneous........................................

291
310
293
365
137
133
n.a.

73.0
72.5
71.0
65.4
62.5
61.1
n.a.

$ 3,075
3,519
3,683
5,910
1,125
524
224

$10,559
11,371
12,551
16,193
8,204
3,940
n.a.

All commercial( a ) ................................

1,529

67.5

18,061

11,810

n.a. — Not Available.
(a ) The number and proportion of commercial farm s using credit sometime during the year w as probably
higher than the survey indicated since the questionnaires were completed near the end of the year when
m any farm ers may have repaid credit used in producing some crops and certain classes of livestock.

Table III
CHARACTERISTICS OF DAIRY FARM OPERATORS
WITH DEBT AND WITHOUT DEBT— 1960
All
Operators

Operators
With Debt

Operators
Without Debt

Number of Operators ( 0 0 0 ) ....................

398

282

116

Average number of acres
O p e r a t e d .................................................
O w n e d .....................................................
R e n t e d .....................................................

212
154
58

225
161
65

182
138
44

Average value of land and
buildings (dollars)
O p e r a t e d .................................................
O w n e d .....................................................
R e n t e d .....................................................

$33,770
23,199
10,572

$35,467
24,511
10,956

$29,662
20,021
9,642

Average net cash income (dollars)
Total w .....................................................
F a r m .........................................................
O f f - f a r m .................................................

$ 4,441
3,034
1,407

$ 4,520
3,146
1,375

$ 4,248
2,762
1,486

Average total debt ( d o l la r s ) ....................
Major real estate....................................
Non-real estate and related debt . . .

$ 6,692
3,806
2,886

$ 9,456
5,378
4,078

___
----

Debt as a multiple of:
Total net cash income ........................
Value of land and buildings owned . .

1.50
.29

2.10
.39

-----

Number of cattle and calves per farm . .

49

52

41

Average age of op era tor............................

48

46

54

(a ) Net cash income from sale of farm products plus net cash income from off-farm sources.




15

Tabic IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF DAIRY FARM OPERATORS WITH AND WITHOUT
MAJOR REAL ESTATE AND NON-REAL ESTATE AND RELATED DEBT
Dairy Farm Operators
With Major
Real Estate
Debt

With NonWithout Major
Real-Estate
Real Estate
and
Debt
Related Debt

Without NonReal-Estate
and
Related Debt

Number Dairy Farms (0 0 0 ) ................

158

240

247

151

Average number of acres
O perated.............................................
O w n e d .................................................
R en ted .................................................

239
196
43

195
125
70

231
158
73

182
146
36

Average value of land and
buildings (dollars)
O p erated .............................................
O w n e d .................................................
R en ted .................................................

$37,902
31,538
6,364

$31,042
17,696
13,346

$35,856
23,729
12,127

$30,367
22,318
8,049

Average total net cash income (dollars)
T ota l(a).................................................
Farm.....................................................
O ff-fa r m ............................................

$ 4,911
3,347
1,564

$ 4,131

$ 4,562
3,118
1,444

$ 4,243
2,896
1,347

Average total debt (d olla rs)................
Major real estate................................
Non-real-estate and related debt . .

$13,803
9,571
4,231

$ 1,998

$ 9,612
4,957
4,655

$ 1,928
1,928

Debt as multiple o f:
Total net cash i n c o m e ....................
Value of land and buildings owned .
Average age of operator........................

2,827
1,304

1,998

2.80
.44
45

.48
.11

.45
.09

2.10
.40

50

45

53

(a ) N et cash income from sale of farm products plus net cash income from off-farm sources.

Table V
DAIRY FARM DEBT
BY AGE OF OPERATOR— 1960
All
Ages
Number of operators ( 0 0 0 ) ............................
Number of operators with debt (000) . . . .
Percent o f operators with d e b t ....................
Average total debt (dollars)............................
Major real e s t a t e ........................................
Non-real-estate and related d e b t ................
Debt as a multiple of:
Total net cash i n c o m e ................................
Value of land and buildings owned . . .




398
282
70.9%
$9,456
5,378
4,078
2.10
.39

Under
35 Years
51
44
86.3%
$12,579
7,338
5,241

3.20
.72

Age 35 to
54 Years

55 Years
and Over

206
158
76.7%

115
60
52.2%

$9,828
5,421
4,406

2.00
.40

$5,504
3,218
2; 286

1.30
.18

Age Not
Reported
26
20
76.9%
$11,446
7,183
4,263
2.50
.52