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M ONTHLY 3 u a m e M k * & /ie IN THIS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of CLEVELAND- u ISSUE Steel in Perspective........................................2 Consumer Credit.............................................9 t963 STEEL IN G O T P R O D U C T IO N 1 8 7 9 -1 9 6 2 .... .. of tons 100 80 60 40 ------ 20 10 ~—--- —— ------- — -- ---- 8 6 — ——— 4 —-— —---- MMMMM.............. . 2 1 18 8 0 1890 19 0 0 1910 1920 19 30 19 4 0 19 5 0 19 6 0 Sources of d a le : American Iron a n d Steel Institute; Fed e ra l Re serve Bank of C le v e la n d . / Steel In Perspective beginning in 1958, in the long-run growth rate which stemmed the annual level of steel ingot output in from that war are minimized. In addition, the U.S. has been somewhat of a disappointuse of the 1909-1961 period allows the sharp ment. While 1955 stands as the all-time record rises in steel output which accompanied the year for steel production, when 117 million two World Wars to be offset by declines in tons of steel ingots were poured, the levels of output during the two subsequent periods of steel output during 1956 and 1957 were fairly demobilization. Finally, the years of the close to that record (115 and 113 million tons, severe depression of the 1930’s fall somewhat respectively). In each of the four years from near the middle of the overall period, so that 1958 through 1961, a particular event or cir the effect of the unusually low levels of steel cumstance explained to some extent the re output during those years does not seriously duced volume of steel output. To illustrate: distort the calculation of the growth rate.(1) recession conditions prevailed during part of 1962 the actual level of steel production 1958; a major steel strike occurred in 1959; wasIn thirteen tons below this trend and another recession cast its shadow over line.(2) Chart Imillion shows estimates of the follow parts of 1960 and 1961. ing four factors which were responsible for During the past three years there were the shortfall in steel output in 1962: (1) some signs that the demand for steel was foreign trade in steel; (2) inventory policy; losing ground to an extent that was not ex (3) subsitute materials; and (4) new prod plained fully by the aforementioned circum ucts and new types of steel. The factor of stances and events. It was not until 1962, foreign trade in steel reflects a deterioration however, that these signs tended to come into in the competitive position of U. S. steel pro sharper focus. During 1962, steel output re ducers vis-a-vis foreign producers; the factor mained sluggish while the economy at large of inventory policy involves the recent tend demonstrated considerable vigor, chalking up ency of steel users to reduce inventory levels; sizeable gains in various business and finan the factor of substitute materials reflects a cial series. Thus, in 1962 there was no re shift in preferences to other basic materials cession and no strike which could have ac by many steel users; and the final factor counted for the fact that steel output was at serves as an indication of the smaller amounts about 98 million tons (or about 67 percent of of steel which are needed to sustain a high capacity). Although emphasis is placed in level of industrial output. (It should be noted this article on steel output in 1962, it should that the factor of inventory policy includes be kept in mind that changes in the factors changes of a technical nature, which are not affecting the level of steel output apparently (1) It is possible to use other time periods to compute the had been stirring in previous years. trend of steel production. However, for the reasons just dis F or t h e p a st fiv e y ea rs, Measuring the Gap The chart on the cover of this issue shows the trend of steel production from 1909 to 1962 (together with annual data for many earlier years). For a number of reasons, the years from 1909 to 1961 are appropriate for use in computing the trend of steel output. The period begins several years before the outbreak of World War I, so that distortions 2 cussed, the period selected is considered to be appropriate for the purposes of this article. (2) Steel ingot output in the U. S. rose an average of 2.66 percent in each year from 1909 to 1961. The trend-level for the year 1909 was computed at 27.71 million tons. Accord ingly, output based on trend would have amounted to 111.4 million tons in 1962, i.e., if the average rate of growth in steel production from 1909 to 1961 is taken as a guideline. The actual output for 1962 amounted to 98.4 million tons, indicating that there was a shortfall of 13 million tons be tween the expected level of output based on trend and the actual performance. The growth rate in steel output was calculated using a com puter program developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The program is designated as “Average Rate of Change — Fit as a Straight Line Trend to Logarithms of the Data” (Least Squares Method). Chart 1. necessarily associated with problems of output PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF growth.) GAP BETWEEN TREND AND ACTUAL STEEL As noted earlier, we PRODUCTION IN 1962 have estimated that steel ingot output in 1962 fell short of a target based on trend by 13 million tons. In attempt ing to quantify the amount of loss which is due to each of the four factors, we have as sumed that the loss due to all of the four factors totals 13 million tons. In figu rin g the loss which may be due to each of the factors, we can find reliable data for the first and second factors, and we can form a fairly good esti mate for the loss due to the third factor. There are no over-all reliable data, however, for the NOTE: Gap caculation for 1962 is based on trend value of 111.4 million tons and an amount of loss due to actual production of 98.4 million tons. the fourth factor. In order to arrive at some estimate for that factor, we have added the from the beginning of this century to 1957 first three factors together and have sub showed a tendency toward a surplus of ex tracted the total from the gap of 13 million ports over imports throughout the period. tons; the resulting residual is the amount Trade during the years immediately preced used for the fourth factor. Let us examine ing and directly following the two World Wars was, of course, distorted due to the each of these four factors in some detail. effects of those wars. Nevertheless, even after Imports Swing to a Plus those periods are allowed for, the average The recent change in the position of the annual surplus of 3.4 million tons during the U. S. from a net exporter to a net importer years 1955-1957 was in line with expectations of steel products has been a major influence based on the long-term trend of U. S. steel on the level of U. S. steel output. We have trade. The trade surplus for those years has estimated that this factor accounted for therefore been used here as a base of compari slightly more than one-half of the 13-million- son with the trade position in 1962. ton gap between the estimated trend value Beginning in 1958 the position of U. S. and the actual level of steel production in steel trade deteriorated steadily, so that by 1962, or a loss in domestic production of (3) Domestic shipments of steel products account for some about 7 million ingot tons.(3) what less than three-quarters of ingot output, and that rela has been used in converting the level of imports The historical trend of U. S. steel trade tionship into the equivalent level of ingot output. 3 Chart 2. U. S. BALANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE IN STEEL PRODUCTS M il li o n s of short ton s +5 ’55 ’56 ’57 '5 8 ’59 ’60 '61 62 ’63 Source of data: American Iron and Steel Institute 1962 the record showed a deficit of 2.1 million tons. The swing from a surplus during 19551957 to a deficit in 1962 represented a deteri oration in demand for 5.5 million tons in the form of steel products, or somewhat more in the form of steel ingots. Using the three-tofour relationship between steel products and ingot output cited in footnote 3, the deficit in 1962 can be interpreted as a loss of about 7 million tons of domestic ingot production for that year. The swing toward deficit in U. S. foreign trade in steel has been associated primarily with the increased availability of foreign steel and with the low prices of foreign steel. Both factors reflect the favorable competitive position of many foreign producers in a wide variety of steel products. It is sobering to note that the loss of U. S. foreign trade in steel occurred at a time when world trade in steel rose sharply, reflecting a world-wide upsurge in demand for steel. World steel trade, which had amounted to only 15.9 mil 4 lion tons in 1950, rose to 42.1 million tons in 1960, and showed further significant gains during the past two years. The rapid development of steel-making facilities in Western Europe and Japan sharply increased the supply of foreign steel which is currently available in the U. S. and other world markets; the present situation stands in marked contrast to conditions of only five years ago, when foreign steel was available in the U. S. only in limited supply. Not only are many foreign steel products readily available in U. S. markets, but many foreign steel products are priced lower than comparable U. S. steel products. For example, the average prices of eight important steel imports fell below prices of comparable U. S. products in January 1958. That price gap widened steadily, until by the end of 1962 it was the largest on record. (Those eight prod ucts accounted for more than 70 percent of the total volume of steel imports during the years 1959-1961, and are used here as being indicative of the general price level of steel imports.(4) Significantly, in recent months there have been selective price cuts of certain U. S. steel products which face continued pressures from imports, in spite of the price rise of certain other steel products which was announced by major steel producers in April of this year.<5) A consequence of the foreign steel situation has been that U. S. producers lost portions of both foreign and domestic markets to foreign producers at a time when an expansion in the U. S trade surplus was especially essential to the continued growth of output of U. S. mills. Steel Inventories Decline The recent net decline in inventories of steel represents a technical adjustment, re flecting the changing relationship between the steel industry and steel users. Conse quently, the decline in inventories does not have the deeper significance that is the case with the other factors. Moreover, the loss of (4) See Monthly Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, July 1962. (5) For the example of staple wire products, see Steel Maga zine, November 5, 1962, p. 125; for the example of pig iron, see Steel Magazine, November 12, 1962, p. 89. steel output due to reduced inventory levels was comparatively small in 1962, amounting to one million tons, or less than one-tenth of the trend-actual gap.(6) In recent years, and particularly in 1962, steel users apparently viewed large stocks of steel products as candidates for reduction whenever and wherever possible. The subsi dence of the inflationary pressures on steel prices has weakened to some extent the in centive to hold large stocks. In fact, from 1958 to 1962, finished steel products showed small but perhaps significant declines in price. In addition, many firms sought to re duce steel stocks to minimum working levels, due to the fact that many steel products were available from steel producers with only a few weeks’ lead-time in recent years; more over, such reduced stocks could be handled with less working capital. In contrast to the recent period of net sub tractions from total steel stocks, it is widely recognized that during the earlier postwar years (1945-1959) there were, on average, small annual additions to stocks. During those years, steel was often difficult to obtain and steel producers usually posted annual price increases. The recent period of net re ductions probably represents an adjustment on the part of users to changed market situ ations for steel. Although such adjustments may continue into the future, it is doubtful whether the magnitude of net inventory re ductions is likely to be an important factor in the long-term growth rate of steel. (It could be conjectured that a trend toward an annual net reduction in steel stocks started in 1960.) («) The figure used here for total steel inventories in 1962 was developed from data from the Department of Commerce, which cover steel inventories held by manufacturers, whole salers and producers from November 1961 to the present. At the end of December 1961, those stocks amounted to 19.8 million tons and dropped to 18.8 million tons one year later. We estimate that stocks were about .3 million tons higher than would otherwise have been expected at the end of De cember 1961, due to the stockpiling which had begun in preparation for a threatened strike, leaving a net annual drop<during 1962 of .7 million tons. Using the three to four relationship of ingots to shipments, we estimate that the drop in steel stocks represented a loss of approximately 1.0 million ingot tons. Although figures from the Department of Com merce do not include data from such nonmanufacturing in dustries as construction and mining, no allowance has been made for those industries in the figures derived here, as trade sources indicate that those industries tend to hold only negligible stocks. Alternative Materials The Department of Commerce has recently estimated that the annual total steel tonnage lost to alternative materials amounted to 2 million tons in recent years.<7) We have esti mated that the figure for 1962 is 2 to 3 mil lion tons, with the additional loss due to a more widespread use of cement in the con struction industry in 1962. The figures which support our estimate are from the Depart ment of Commerce as well as from industry sources. It is important to note that, although the reduction in the demand for steel directly affects the steel industry, the loss does not necessarily represent a one-for-one loss in aggregate demand for products in the econ omy as a whole, due to the substitution of one material for another. In calculating the loss of steel due to alter native materials from 1909 to 1961, we have assumed that the replacement of steel by other products and the replacement of other products by steel balanced each other for the period as a whole. This seems plausible be cause steel products replaced wood, brick, stone, and many other products during the early years of the period, while substitute materials have been replacing steel in later years. This situation suggests that the shift from steel replacing other materials to steel being replaced by other materials involves an over-all reduction in the ability of steel to compete with other materials. In recent years cement has become an im portant competitor with steel in the construc tion industry. The marked rise in the use of prestressed concrete, in preference to the use of structural steel, has dampened the demand for steel in that industry. Although some steel is used in the process of making pre stressed concrete, the amount is considerably less than is the case in steel ribbed buildings. Moreover, recent developments in the tech nique of making concrete indicate that con crete alone can serve as a material for the superstructure of large buildings at a price (7) See Survey of Current Businesi, U. S. Department of Commerce, January 1962. 5 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS FOR ALUMINUM AND STEEL PRODUCTS 1961 ALUMINUM PRODUCTS Consuming Industry or Destination Percent of Total Shipments Building and Construction ......................... 25.1 Transportation ................................................22.0 Consumer Durables ........................................11.5 Electrical Goods ..............................................11.3 Machinery and Equipment ......................... 7.6 Containers and Packaging ........................... 7.1 Miscellaneous .................................................... 8.8 Export ................................................................ 6.6 Total 100.0 Source: Fortune Magazine, November 1962 which is highly competitive with steel in many areas of the nation. The use of aluminum in the construction industry has also expanded rapidly in recent years. In one instance the development of aluminum curtain walls has lightened the weight of several large new commercial build ings by more than thirty percent, as com pared with conventional methods of construc tion. Consequently, smaller amounts of steel framework are needed to support such buildings. In many markets steel and aluminum prod ucts are competing more strenuously with each other than they were a few years ago, particularly in the automobile and container industries. As the accompanying table shows, steel and aluminum compete in nearly identi cal markets, with the construction, trans portation, and container industries, taken to gether, accounting for 58 percent of total steel products and 54 percent of total alumi num products shipped in the U. S. during 1961. Prices of many types of aluminum prod ucts were reduced during 1962, which might add a further dimension to the competition between aluminum and steel products for 6 STEEL PRODUCTS Consuming Industry or Destination Percent of Total Shipments Construction and Contractors’ Products .......................................... .............25.2 Automotive, Rail and Other Transportation ............................. .............22.6 Appliances, Utensils and Cutlery ............... 2.6 Electrical Machinery and Equipment ...................................... ............. 3.0 Machinery, Industrial Equipment and Tools ........................................ ............. 5.7 Containers .......................................... .............10.0 Warehouses and Other Classification .................................. .............28.3 Export .................................................. ............. 2.6 Total 100.0 Source: Annual Statistical Report for 1962, American Iron and Steel Institute markets. In fact, prices of several other principal nonferrous metals also declined dur ing the year, as is shown in Chart 3, while prices of steel products remained nearly firm in 1962. (It is estimated that the selective price rise in steel products announced in April 1963, will boost the over-all average of finished steel products by about 1 percent.) It is not certain that steel products have already sustained the major impact from competitive materials, as is emphasized by the development of new uses of plastics in the automobile industry. Replacement fend ers for older automobiles which are made from a fiberglass type of plastic material, when available in Cleveland, cost 35 percent less than comparable fenders made from steel. Automobile fenders and other items for auto bodies which are not produced in a large vol ume, i.e., less than one-hundred thousand units, are more economically produced from a fiberglass type of material than from steel, due to the fact that considerable less capital equipment is needed in the process of manu facturing fiberglass items. On the other hand, one of the leading man ufacturers of fiberglass recently completed a study which indicated that the manufacture of auto bodies for new ears in large quanti ties is comparatively more expensive than shells made from steel, due to the savings accruing from the techniques of mass produc ing the steel bodies. The study noted, how ever, that if there were substantial reductions in the weight of cars built with a plastic body, the difference in total cost to manufac turers between the two types of cars could be eliminated.(8) Chart 3. Prices of nonferrous metals (mill shapes) have declined more than those of finished steel products since late 1961. IN D E X 1 9 5 7 - 5 9 = 1 0 0 New Products and New Types of Steel From time to time, certain improvements in the quality of steel and/or in the design of products made from steel, have had the ef fect of reducing the volume of steel that goes into each finished-product unit. In recent years, changes in the design of products and an increased use of new types of steel have accelerated in nearly every industry. An example of that development is shown by the railroad engine; in the evolution of its design, massive bulk has given way to com pact efficiency as a means of achieving in creased power. From the early log-burning engines in the Nineteenth century to the enengines which were built during the years immediately preceding World War II, steam locomotives developed more pulling power largely by expanding in size and weight, which, in turn, gave rise to an expanded demand for steel by railroads. However, dur ing the postwar years, nearly every major railroad has replaced the “ iron horses” with diesel locomotives, which can muster approxi mately twice the pulling power per ton of engine weight, and consequently require pro portionately less steel. We have necessarily taken considerable latitude in an attempt to quantify the loss of steel output due to changes in the design of products or to changes in the demand for products made from steel. The figure we have used to reflect such shrinkage in demand for steel in 1962 amounts to a loss of 2 to 3 mil lion tons for the year, and it represents the amount of the gap in steel output remaining (8) See The Economics of Tiberglas Reinforced Plastic in Automotive Bodies, Owens-Corning Piberglas Corporation, Source of data: Wholesale Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics after account is made for all other factors. While such an indirect measure is only an approximation, the fact that steel-consuming industries are using significantly smaller quantities of steel per unit of their own man ufactured product is supported by other gen eral observations. For example, the ratio of steel output to the Federal Reserve index of durable goods manufacturing showed a per sistent tendency to decline from 1955 through 1962, even after allowance for steel imports and net changes of steel stocks. That decline indicates that in recent years, on average, manufacturers of durable goods (which con sume more than two-thirds of all steel pro duced) have used smaller quantities of steel for each unit produced. It is sometimes suggested that the attrition in the demand for steel which is due to im proved products and an expanded use of new types of steel has largely been spent, and that further declines in the uses of steel due to 7 those factors will likely be much more moder ate. That view is supported by the fact that steel shipments to railroads and military equipment manufacturers have been respon sible for a large part of the decline in ship ments to steel users, and since shipments to those two industries have already been re duced to negligible levels, further attrition in the demand for steel is unlikely. Other observers stress, however, that im provements in product design in many indus tries and the development of alloy steels are factors which are likely to continue to depress the demand for steel ingots. The latter view holds that there are major improvements on the drawingboards of designers which will further accelerate the trend toward lighter and stronger products in nearly every major steel-using industry, and that the full effect of such improvements has not yet been felt by steel producers. In the longer run the core of the problem of attrition in the demand for steel may lie mainly in the changed nature of the indus tries of the nation which are rapidly expand ing. It is sometimes maintained that one or more industries which are heavy users of steel must expand rapidly in order to stimulate continued growth of steel output. Such a spur was provided by the automobile indus try in the early years of the 1920’s and by the appliance and the container industries during the years which immediately followed World War II. Currently, however, there are not any rapidly expanding industries which are potential heavy users of steel. Thus there is a serious question as to whether domestic consumption of steel is adequate to sustain a steady and substantial growth of steel output. Reprints of an article entitled “ Federal Reserve Open Market Operations in 1962”, which appears in the April issue of the Fed eral Reserve Bulletin, may be obtained by writing to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland 1, Ohio. 8 Consumer Credit use of short- and intermediate-term ness cycles are compared with one another. credit by consumers in the U. S. has The variations in the behavior of consumer increased substantially in the postwar period.credit in postwar recovery periods have In the 15-year span from 1947 to 1962, totalformed a pattern among themselves, deline consumer credit outstanding at year-end ated in Chart I, which may have significant multiplied fivefold, or from $11.6 billion to implications. $63.4 billion. Apart from any consideration As shown by the chart, which depicts of consumer debt from the standpoint of changes consumer credit outstanding, individual management of personal finances, seasonallyin total adjusted, the first 21 the pattern of consumer credit developments months after the troughduring month of of the warrants attention in many business quarters four postwar recessions, the rate ofeach consumer as an indicator of consumer attitudes.(1) credit expansion has been diminishing Inasmuch as changes in the trend of con each postwar recovery.(2) The largest with per sumer credit reflect the willingness, or lack centage increase took place in the recovery of willingness, of consumers as a group to that followed the earliest postwar re take on debt to purchase goods and services, period cession the smallest percentage increase such changes are important to the purveyors occurredwhile in the most recent expansion period. of goods and services and indirectly to the economy as a whole. In this connection, con (2) The data used in this article have been seasonally ad by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Due to the sumer credit should be considered within the justed adjustment process, these figures will not necessarily match those published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. context of its influence on consumers’ ability seasonal to spend. Chart 1. While the over-all rise in total consumer TOTAL CONSUMER CREDIT IN credit has been extraordinary, the rate of FOUR POSTWAR RECOVERY PERIODS expansion has not been steady throughout the postwar period. As would be expected, cumulative percentage change recessions and subsequent recoveries have had a noticeable impact on the growth trend of consumer credit; indeed, were this not so, the behavior of consumer credit would not merit much attention as an economic barome ter of business activity. But in addition to these recurring interruptions, longer-range, or secular, changes in the behavior of con sumer credit can be discerned when the re covery experiences of the four postwar busi T he Percent c h a n g e (i) Indicative of the attention paid to consumer credit, for example, is the fact that instalment debt is included in the business cycle analyst’s toolkit, being: considered as a “lag ging” series. N u m b e r of months a f t e r e a ch r e c e s s i o n low p oi n t 9 Chart 2. GROWTH OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN POSTWAR YEARS Billions of dol lar s steady, once it got started. The over-all rate of expansion, however, became smaller with each successive recovery. Thus, consumer credit increased a net total of 31 percent dur ing the first 21 months of recovery in the 1949-51 period, 29 percent in the compar able stage of the 1954-56 period, 17 percent in the 1958-60 period, and only 12 percent in the first 21 months of the current recovery. Components of Consumer Credit Although the total amount of consumer credit outstanding has moved upward in each of the postwar recovery periods, the rate of increase has receded each time. Furthermore, the time span between the start of business recovery and the upturn in consumer credit has tended to lengthen in each period. Dur ing the first two postwar recoveries, consumer credit surged upward immediately after the trough months of the recessions, whereas in each of the last two general business recover ies, consumer credit expansion did not occur for six or seven months after the start of the recovery. A further look at the chart shows that con sumer credit exhibited an irregular accelera tion in the 1949-1951 recovery. Expansion was remarkably rapid during the first 11 months of the 21-month period, much slower in the latter 10 months as a whole, with some tailing off occurring in the last four months. In the other three recovery periods the growth of consumer credit was much more 10 As commonly measured, total consumer credit consists of (1) instalment credit and (2) noninstalment credit. Real estate mort gage debt is not included. Noninstalment Credit. Noninstalment credit has shown a steadier but slower rate of growth in the postwar years than has instal ment credit. Consequently, over the period under review it has come to account for a declining share of all consumer credit, and it currently amounts to only about one-fourth of the total. Included in noninstalment credit are such items as single-payment loans, charge accounts, and service credit. Instalment Credit. Instalment credit, the larger and the more volatile by far of the two major subdivisions of consumer credit, con stitutes the chief variable in total consumer credit. It currently accounts for about threefourths of the total and consists of such items as automobile paper, other consumer goods paper, repair and modernization loans, and personal loans. Instalment credit has ex panded less and less with each postwar recov ery, and thus has shown its smallest relative increase in the present recovery period. There have been, however, some important variations in recovery rates among the com ponents of instalment credit, of which the most noteworthy is the relative lag that has developed in automobile paper, the largest single component. As shown in Chart 3, auto paper experienced immediate and vigorous growth in both of the first two postwar recov ery periods. During each of the last two recoveries, however, the amount of automobile paper outstanding continued to decline even after general improvement had begun in the economy as a whole. Moreover, at the end of 21 months of business recovery, the net per centage rise in the volume of auto paper out standing fell short of the corresponding rate of growth of total instalment credit. This lag in auto paper was in sharp contrast to what had happened in the first two postwar recov eries; as shown in the chart, in those periods the rate of increase in auto paper exceeded that of total instalment credit. Instalment Credit and the Business Cycle The diminishing rate of increase in instal ment credit raises a question as to the reli ability of the statistical series as a business indicator, at least in the same manner and to the same extent as formerly. In the earlier postwar recoveries, instal ment credit and the business cycle had a fairly clearcut and positive relationship, the logic of which may be summed up as follows: The repayment terms of instalment credit are inherently suited to the financing of larger items of consumer expenditures, and thus in stalment credit provides a convenient and relatively early barometer of such expendi tures in the aggregate.(3) Those larger ex penditures (and therefore instalment credit) tend to be deferred in recessions, when public confidence is weak and income ceases to ex pand or actually falls off; conversely, they tend to be undertaken more readily in recov ery periods, when public confidence is strong and disposable income is increasing. In the latter two postwar recoveries, instal ment credit has tended to become a ‘‘lagging laggard”, thereby suggesting that the former relationship between consumer instalment credit and the business cycle may have be come somewhat distorted. It is still, however, too early to judge the full implications of this development. (3) Data for aggregate consumer durable expenditures are published as a component of Gross National Product; how ever, G-NP data are available only for quarter-year periods and are necessarily released after a greater time lag than is the case with the monthly consumer instalment credit series. C h a rt 3. CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT and AUTOMOBILE CREDIT IN FOUR POSTWAR RECOVERY PERIODS cu m u la ti v e p e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e 1st. RECOVERY - Nov ’49 to J«l ’51, Intl. +40 +30 INSTALM ENT +20 +10 0 --10 +50 n n n r— " l—1 3 rd R [Cl)V ERY m Miiy ’51 t< J in ’6 ), nt L +40 +30 +20 N STi\l M :N T +10 0 4m * A JT O -10 +50 4 th . R CC YE RY - Ma r ’ 61 to N >v ’ 6! , +40 nt +30 + 20 +10 1N ! L a VII N r •4► * MU 1 U -10 E as ec 0 1 3 at a s ea sotia ly ac i« te i* 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 N u m b e r of months a f t e r e a c h r e c e s s i o n low p oin t 11 FOURTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT ■—
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