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In I s issu e : E c o n o m e tric M o d e ls : T h e y 1 9 7 1 S ay fo r M is s is s ip p i in h a t T h e y 1 9 7 0 : P a d d lin g D is tric t B a n k in g D is tric t B u s in e s s W N o te s C o n d itio n s A re a n d A g a in s t th e W h a t C u rre n t E c o n o m W h a t T W h a t T e h h t r i c M e r e e y y A S a o y d a f o e n l s : d r 1 9 7 1 b y F re d e ric k R. S tro b e l and W illia m D. Toal D u rin g th e past ten years, e c o n o m ic fo re ca stin g , and w ith it th e use o f m o d e ls o f th e e c o n o m y , has gain ed co n s id e ra b le p o p u la rity b u t n o t th e a tte n tio n it deserves. For tho se u n fa m ilia r w ith th e c o n c e p t o f e c o n o m e tric m o d e l b u ild in g , th is a rtic le exp la ins h o w m o d e ls are c o n s tru c te d and h o w th e y are used. O th e r readers m ay be in te re ste d in th e d iffe re n t a p pro ache s each o f th e fiv e selected m o d e ls take, e sp e cia lly in th e d e ta ils p re sen te d in th e A p p e n d ix . M o s t readers w ill be in te re ste d in w h a t th e m o d e ls say a b o u t 1971's e c o n o m ic o u tlo o k . What Is Econometrics? Theory, the Starting Point of Prediction. In o rd e r to u n d e rsta n d e c o n o m e tric s and e c o n o m e t r i c m o d e l s / it is necessary to lo o k b rie fly at e c o n o m ic th e o ry , e s p e c ia lly w ith regard to p re d ic ta b ility . E co n o m e trics m ig h t best be d e s c rib e d as a b le n d o f e c o n o m ic th e o ry , statistics, and m a th e m a tics de sig n e d to test th e o re tic a l re la tio n sh ip s c o n c e rn in g th e e c o n o m y . The sta tistica l and m a th e m a tica l te ch n iq u e s used in e c o n o m e tric s w ill g e n e ra lly te st to w h a t de gre e a given th e o ry h o ld s tru e o r to w h a t e x te n t it can be re je cte d . E con om ic th e o ry , since it is c o n c e rn e d w ith th e a ctio n s o f an e c o n o m y , is co n c e rn e d w ith th e actio ns o f p e o p le , o fte n , m illio n s o f th e m . T he task o f th e o ry , th e n , is to d e te rm in e w h e th e r th e a ctio n s o f these p e o p le fo llo w * a co n siste n t o r p re d ic ta b le p a tte rn . T he key e le m e n t, here, is p re d ic ta b ility . W h ile p e o p le m ay n o t alw ays act ra tio n a lly (as e vid e n c e d b y sales o f p ro d u c ts th a t are k n o w n to be h a rm fu l to on e's h e a lth ), th e y w ill g e n e ra lly act p re d ic ta b ly . Let us lo o k at a p ro b le m th a t m ig h t face an e c o n o m e tric ia n in p re d ic tin g e c o n o m ic b e h a v io r. T he e c o n o m e tric ia n w a nts to fo re ca st a u to m o b ile sales f o r ne xt year. T o d o th is he m ust establish a p re d ic ta b le re la tio n s h ip , based xSee G lossary for ita licized w o rds. R e v ie w , Vol. LVl, No. 3. Free subscription and additional copies available upon request to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank o f Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. M o n th ly M O N T H L Y R E V IE W on theory, drawn from the past, and applied to the future. This application of past predictable relationships to the future is the essence of econometric forecasting. His economic theory tells him that the amount people as a group spend on automobiles depends upon their income. He is reasonably confident that personal income is going to rise by a certain amount next year. Thus, he would expect, on the basis of theory, that automobile sales would also be greater. But is this theory correct and, if it is, how much should he expect sales to rise? To answer these questions, the econometrician might go back to the experience of the last 20 years. Using data on income and sales, he might determine by statistical testing that during the last 20 years, individuals as a group spent 11 percent of their income for automobiles. The theory that automobile sales are related to income seems to be correct, and he has a predictable, numerical figure expressing that relationship. But his statistical testing also showed him that in not every one of the 20 years did the individuals as a group spend 11 percent of their income for automobiles. Some years they spent much more; and in others, much less. Apparently, something else besides income influenced sales. To try to find what that something else is, the econometrician once more seeks the help of economic theory. According to economic theory, he might find that individuals also consider interest rates and automobile prices along with income when they buy automobiles. O nce more he puts data for past years through statistical tests and finds that automobile purchases do tend to decrease as interest rates increase and to decrease as automobile prices increase. The statistical tests support the theory and give him additional predictable relationships. As a result, he knows that his success in forecasting automobile sales is going to depend on knowing not only what happens to income but also on what interest rates and prices are going to be. At this point the econometrician has reached his first goal in the forecasting process. He has established what can be called a fu n c tio n a l re la tio n sh ip between several sets of economic facts (often called e c o n o m ic v a riables). A functional relationship is commonly expressed in the form of an equation, as in the example below. In our example, the equation for auto sales might take the following linear form: S = al + bP + cR Where S = Value of auto sales, billions of 1958 dollars. F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A By a functional relationship, we mean that interest rates, prices, and personal income determine the amount of automobile purchases. Moreover, the relationship or equation can be quantified as seen in the next example. In quantifying the example, values are assigned to a, b, and c based upon statistical observation of auto sales data in relation to personal income, auto prices, and interest rate data. The hypothetical equation might then appear as follows: S = .111 - .0015 P - .05R W here a = .11; b = .0015; and c — - .05 This would mean that an increase in personal income would be translated into increased sales of automobiles in the amount of .11 times the change in the level of personal income. However, since the signs are negative, increases in the second and third terms tend to reduce the volume of auto sales. Thus, the econometrician can now predict the value of future auto sales, if he knows the future levels of personal income, interest rates, and automobile prices. Problems of Prediction. The econometrician must be sure that he has tested and developed a cause and effect (functional) relationship. That is, c o rre la tio n between two or more sets of data may have no cause and effect relationship. As one writer puts it ". . . take the figures that show the suicide rate to be at its maximum in June. Do suicides produce June brides— or do June weddings precipitate suicides of the jilted?"2 Neither is very likely. This line of thinking is known as spurious correlation. (It is simply the - D arrel Huff, H o w to Lie w ith Statistics, W . W . N orton an d C o ., N e w Y o rk , 1954. I = The level of personal income. P = The price index for automobiles. R = The average interest rate charged on auto loans. a,b,c, = The amounts that personal income, auto prices, and auto loan interest rates, respectively, affect auto sales. The values a, b, and c are called coefficients and are given numerical values. 43 a ssu m ptio n th a t a statistica l re la tio n s h ip exists b e tw e e n tw o sets o f data even w h e n th e re is no lo g ica l reason fo r th e re la tio n s h ip . O b v io u s ly , if th e re is no lo g ica l reason fo r th e c o rre la tio n o f data, th e re la tio n s h ip m ay be u n re lia b le fo r p re d ic tiv e purposes. Thus, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n sh o u ld base his re la tio n sh ip s n o t o n ly o n statistica l measures b u t also o n e c o n o m ic th e o ry.) E x o g e n o u s forces pose a second p ro b le m . In a n a tio n o r re g io n , m an y un usu al events o c c u r th a t are u n c e rta in as to tim e o f o cc u rre n c e and as to th e m a g n itu d e o f th e ir effects. Such factors c o m p lic a te th e e c o n o m e tric ia n 's fo re c a s tin g p ro b lem . Som e exam ples are w a r, ea rth qu ake s, o r a sud de n, u n e xp e cte d change in co n su m e r pre fe ren ces o r a ttitu d e s. The e c o n o m e tric ia n m ust, th e re fo re , be ca re fu l to exa m in e his p re d ic tiv e assu m ptio ns and m ake th e best possible ju d g m e n t c o n c e rn in g th e course o f fu tu re exogenous forces. Som e o f these forces, such as G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g , are ro u g h ly p re d ic ta b le . O th e r exo ge no us forces, such as ea rth qu ake s, are la rg e ly o u t o f th e realm o f hu m an fo re s ig h t, le t a lo n e th a t o f th e e c o n o m e tric ia n . In d e v e lo p in g his p re d ic tiv e re la tio n sh ip s, the e c o n o m e tric ia n is also c o n fro n te d w ith the p ro b le m s o f com p le te n e ss and in te ra c tio n . In refere nce to th e exa m p le c o n c e rn in g a u to sales, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n m ust be sure th a t w h a t he in clu d e s makes th e re la tio n s h ip as c o m p le te as feasible. He had p re v io u s ly fo u n d th a t a u to sales w e re re la te d to th e levels o f in c o m e , in te re st rates, and a u to m o b ile prices. H o w e ve r, a fte r fu rth e r e xa m in in g these e s tim a te d re la tio n sh ip s, suppose he fin d s a s ig n ific a n t p o rtio n o f a u to sales are u n e xp la in e d by th e th re e variables. U p o n in v e s tig a tio n , he fin d s th a t th e level o f rap id tra n sit fares can also in flu e n c e th e a m o u n t o f a u to sales in a given g e o g ra p h ic area. In c lu d in g this n e w e c o n o m ic v a ria b le , he fin d s he can a c c o u n t fo r m o st o f th e u n e x p la in e d p o rtio n o f his p re d ic tiv e re la tio n s h ip . If th e re are no o th e r variab les th a t s ig n ific a n tly a ffe c t a u to sales, he has solved his p ro b le m o f com p le te ness. H a vin g so lve d th e p ro b le m o f com p le te ness, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n is n o w faced w ith o b ta in in g fu tu re data o n personal in co m e , prices, in te re st rates, and tra n s it fares. H o w is he to o b ta in these data? This c o n fro n ts h im w ith th e in te ra c tio n p ro b le m . In te re st rates and a u to prices m ay n o t as re a d ily le n d them selves to e x p la n a tio n by a fu n c tio n a l (cause and e ffe ct) re la tio n s h ip . In o th e r w o rd s , because o f th e d iffic u ltie s in p re d ic tin g m o ve m e n ts in a u to prices and in te re st rates, it is ve ry hard to establish th e necessary e q ua tion (s) fo r each va ria b le . H ence, a ju d g m e n ta l assu m p tio n m ust be m ade a b o u t fu tu re values o f these variables. H o w e ve r, assume he can establish fu n c tio n a l re la tio n s h ip s o r e q u a tio n s to foreca st tra n s it fares 44 and personal in co m e . He m ig h t n o te th a t ra p id tra n sit fares are tie d to th e w a ge levels o f tra n sit w o rke rs. But, by d e fin itio n , w ages are o n e p o rtio n o f personal in co m e . F urther, personal in c o m e is p a rtia lly d e te rm in e d by a u to m o b ile sales, w h ic h , basically, he was try in g to fo re ca st in th e firs t place. Because o f this, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n needs a d d itio n a l fu n c tio n a l re la tio n s h ip s to foreca st tra n sit fares, tra n s it wages, and also personal in co m e . Som e o f these re la tio n s h ip s are in te rre la te d — thus, th e in te ra c tio n p ro b le m . A u to sales, w h ic h he was o rig in a lly try in g to foreca st, a ffe c t personal in c o m e ; b u t as w e said, personal in c o m e levels a ffe c t w a ge rates in mass tra n sit, and, co n s e q u e n tly , tra n s it fares. T ra n sit fares, as m e n tio n e d above, p a rtia lly a ffe c t a u to sales. A t this p o in t, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n exclaim s, “ H o ld it! I need an e c o n o m e tric m o d e l!" Econometric Models and Prediction. It can easily be seen, th e n , th a t p re d ic tio n can be a gre ater p ro b le m than it seems. T he e c o n o m e tric ia n in itia lly set up o n e fu n c tio n a l re la tio n s h ip to fo re ca st a u to sales. This re la tio n s h ip o r e q u a tio n , w h ic h is, in fa ct, a s in g le -e q u a tio n e c o n o m e tric m o d e l, show s h o w ce rta in " i n d e p e n d e n t " v a r ia b le s — personal in c o m e , a u to prices, in te re s t rates, and tra n s it fares— a ffe c t a u to sales— th e " d e p e n d e n t " v a ria b le . In th e process, he fo u n d it necessary to p re d ic t ce rta in in d e p e n d e n t va ria b le s; thus, o th e r e q u a tio n s w e re necessary. For exa m ple, he fo u n d fu tu re tra n s it fares m u st be p re d ic te d . T h e re fo re , he ne ed ed an a d d itio n a l e q u a tio n th a t stated th a t tra n s it fares w e re p a rtia lly d e te rm in e d by the level o f tra n s it w o rk e rs ' wages. T his w h o le system o f e q u a tio n s, w h e n c o m p le te d , is ca lle d a "th e o re tic a l e c o n o m ic m o d e l." W h e n s ta tis tic a lly tested and given n u m e ric a l values, th e th e o re tic a l m o d e l becom es th e " e c o n o m e tr ic m o d e l." This e c o n o m e tric m o d e l can usu ally, th e n , be solved fo r the va ria b le th a t th e e c o n o m e tric ia n is try in g to fo re ca st; in th e pre sen t case, th e v a ria b le is a u to sales. T h o u g h th e e c o n o m e tric ia n a tte m p ts to e xp la in a n u m b e r o f variab les in th e m o d e l— e.g., a u to sales, personal in c o m e , and tra n s it fares— he m ust s till c o n s id e r som e variab les as o u ts id e th e realm o f the m o d e l's e x p la n a to ry p o w e r— e.g., a u to prices and in te re s t rates. T hose va ria b le s e x p la in e d in side th e m o d e l are te rm e d " e n d o g e n o u s v a r i a b l e s ; " those d e te rm in e d o u ts id e th e m o d e l are re fe rre d to as " e x o g e n o u s v a r i a b l e s W h a t d e te rm in e s w h e th e r a v a ria b le is exo ge no us o r endo ge nou s? O n c e again, w e m u st c o m e back to o u r n o tio n o f p re d ic ta b ility . If a v a ria b le is re a d ily p re d ic ta b le , it m o st lik e ly w ill be en d o g e n o u s. O th e r va ria b le s m ust be d e te rm in e d o u ts id e th e m o d e l. For exa m p le , a v a ria b le such as G o v e rn m e n t s p e n d in g in m o st m o d e ls w ill be exogenous because its exact a m o u n t is s u b je c t M O N T H L Y R E V IE W to m an y u n c e rta in forces such as th e de cisio ns o f Congress. The e c o n o m e tric ia n is a b le to foreca st au to sales a fte r he has m ade a ssu m ptio ns a b o u t th e fu tu re values o f th e exogenous va riab les— in o u r exa m ple, a u to prices and in te re s t rates. H o w e ve r, th e e c o n o m e tric ia n m ust be aw are th a t his fo re ca st is based on an e c o n o m e tric m o d e l th a t is o n ly an a p p ro x im a tio n o f e c o n o m ic re a lity. T here are tw o basic reasons fo r th is : First, th e m o d e l m ay y ie ld an an sw e r based u p o n re la tio n ships th a t, w h ile on th e average are accurate, m ay n o t alw ays h o ld tru e fo r any in d iv id u a l p re d ic tio n p e rio d . Second, in p re d ic tin g th e exogenous variab les, an e rro r in ju d g m e n t m ig h t be m ade. For exa m ple, th e fu tu re level o f in te re st rates m ay be u n d e re stim a te d . In te re st rates c o u ld tu rn o u t to be s ig n ific a n tly h ig h e r than e xp ected and, thus, cause o u r m o d e l to ove rsta te th e level o f fu tu re a u to sales. Prediction and the Identification Problem. C o n s tru c tin g statistica l tests and p ro p e rly re s tric tin g th e th e o re tic a l re la tio n sh ip s to q u a n tify the e c o n o m e tric m o d e l can o fte n stu m p th e e c o n o m e tric ia n . These tasks are necessary if a n u m e ric a l fo re ca st o f a u to sales (or any o th e r variab le) is to be m ade. A ssu m in g th e e c o n o m e tric ia n has data fo r all th e variab les he w ishes to co n sid e r, he is s till faced w ith s o lv in g the id e n t i f i c a t io n p r o b l e m . From a mass o f data on a u to c o n s u m p tio n and personal in c o m e , a lo n g w ith data o n a u to prices and in te re st rates, he m ust screen o u t th e c o rre c t n u m e ric a l va lu e re fle c tin g th e e ffe c t o f personal in c o m e on a u to c o n s u m p tio n . For exa m ple, if a u to sales had increased by 20 p e rc e n t d u rin g th e last fiv e years and at th e same tim e b o th personal in c o m e and tra n s it rates had increased, h o w m u ch o f th e increase in sales is to be a ttrib u te d to each o f these variables? As on e can re a d ily see, th e task o f id e n tify in g th e q u a n tita tiv e re la tio n sh ip s o f the e c o n o m e tric m o d e l w o u ld , in m ost cases, n o t be easy. Practical Uses of Econometric Models Who Uses the Models and Why? D e sp ite m any d iffic u ltie s in v o lv e d in th e c o n s tru c tio n o f e c o n o m e tric m od els, th e ir use has spread ra p id ly in th e last decade. T oda y, th e y w ill be fo u n d in m an y facets o f in d u s try , g o v e rn m e n t, and e d u ca tio n , in b o th p ra ctica l and th e o re tic a l a p p lic a tions. The p re vio u s sectio n d e scrib e d th e m o d e ls as b e in g b u ilt a ro u n d a th e o ry o f e c o n o m ic p re d ic tio n . Thus, a firm m ig h t use m o d e ls to p re d ic t th e n u m b e r o f c o lo r T V sales next year. G o v e rn m e n t e co n o m ists m ay w ish to p re d ic t th e u n F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A e m p lo y m e n t rate ne xt year. A co lle g e pro fe ssor c o u ld use m o d e ls to teach e c o n o m ic th e o ry and h o w it m ay be used to p re d ic t e c o n o m ic a c tiv ity in th e real w o rld . In a d d itio n to fo re ca stin g , a n o th e r im p o rta n t use o f e c o n o m e tric m od els is s im u la t io n . W h ile fo re c a s tin g asks the q u e s tio n " w h a t w ill? " s im u la tio n asks " w h a t if? " For exam ple, th e g o v e rn m e n t e c o n o m is t tries to estim a te th e 1971 u n e m p lo y m e n t rate based on his best assum ptions o f exogenous e c o n o m ic variab les, such as G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g o r in te re st rates. He asks, "W h a t w ill th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate be if G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g and in te re s t rates are such and such, w h ic h I th in k th e y w ill be ? " In con tra st, a s im u la tio n te c h n iq u e w o u ld vary the assum ptions a b o u t G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g and in te re st rates. T he e c o n o m is t w o u ld the n ask, " W h a t if G o v e rn m e n t s p e n d in g w e re 10 p e rc e n t higher? W o u ld u n e m p lo y m e n t fa ll, and b y h o w m u c h ? " He can, th e re fo re , vary his assum ptions on in te re st rates and G o v e rn m e n t spe nd ing , a rriv in g at as m an y p ro je c te d u n e m p lo y m e n t rates as the n u m b e r o f tim es he v a rie d his assum ptions. He m ay the n pre sen t a list o f a lte rna tives to G o v e rn m e n t p o lic y m akers w h o w ill in flu e n c e th e levels o f G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g and in te re st rates. In fact, th e use o f e c o n o m e tric m od els to sim u la te th e e c o n o m ic o u tc o m e o f p o lic y d e c i sions has b e co m e an im p o rta n t to o l o f the G o v e rn m e n t p o lic y m aker. Models Examined in This Article. The fiv e e c o n o m e tric m o d e ls e xa m in e d in this a rtic le pre sen t a m ix tu re o f th e va rio u s types o f m o d e ls in c u rre n t use. The list o f m od els and th e ir uses d e scrib e d here is by no means exhaustive. The m od els chosen are som e o f th e b e tte r k n o w n m od els, o rg a n iz e d and o p e ra te d by a m ix o f p riva te , g o ve rn m e n ta l, and e d u c a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s ; all had sh o w n accuracy in several e a rlie r forecasts fo r 1970. F u rth e rm o re , th e m o d e ls' th e o re tic a l approaches in c lu d e som e d ive rsity. C o n sid e r also th e d iv e rs ity o f o rg a n iza tio n s and the purposes fo r w h ic h th e fiv e m o d e ls are used. T he W h a rto n and M ic h ig a n m od els w e re d e v e lo p e d by e co n o m ists at e d u c a tio n a l in s titu tio n s . The Data Resources m o d e l was d e v e lo p e d by e co n o m ists esse ntia lly w o rk in g w ith in th e fra m e w o rk o f a p riv a te c o rp o ra tio n . A ll th re e o f these m od els em p ha size changes in real factors— such as c o n s u m p tio n , in ve stm e n t, and G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g — as th e p rim e m overs o f e c o n o m ic a c tiv ity .3 These large m o d e ls p ro v id e d e ta ile d 3Real factors as the p rim e m o vers o f the e co n o m y w o u ld b e m o re o ften stressed b y e co n o m ists w h o w o u ld generally d e scrib e th em selves as Keynesians o r n eo -K eyn esia ns. T h o se e co n o m ists w h o w o u ld 45 e c o n o m ic in fo rm a tio n to subscribers w h o w o u ld in c lu d e in th e ir ranks e d u c a tio n a l in s titu tio n s , banks, m a n u fa c tu rin g c o rp o ra tio n s , retailers, and g o v e rn m e n t agencies. T he St. Louis m o d e l was d e v e lo p e d at th e Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis and places heavy em phasis o n m o n e ta ry factors as th e p rim e m o v e r o f e c o n o m ic a c tiv ity . The St. Louis sta ff e co n o m ists m ake e c o n o m ic forecasts and s im u la tio n s using th e m o d e l, b u t th e ir forecasts are n o t o ffic ia l forecasts o f th e Federal Reserve System. T he RCA m o d e l, w h ic h also u tiliz e s a M o n e ta ris t th e o re tic a l a p p ro a ch , was d e v e lo p e d by RCA and is g e n e ra lly u tiliz e d by the firm in fo re c a s tin g d e m a n d fo r its p ro d u cts. In a d d itio n to these m od els, th e re are m any oth ers in use th a t p ro v id e s im ila r e c o n o m ic in fo rm a tio n to aid th e businessm an, e d u ca to r, o r G o v e rn m e n t p o lic y m a ke r in th e d e cisio n m a k in g process. A t this p o in t, it m ig h t be h e lp fu l to the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f e c o n o m e tric m o d e ls to exa m in e a p a rtic u la r p ro b le m o f e c o n o m ic u n c e rta in ty — na m ely, th e p re d ic tio n o f th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate— and to lo o k at h o w each o f th e selected m od els handles th is p ro b le m . For a m o re d e ta ile d d e s c rip tio n o f th e m o d e ls and h o w th e y ap pro ach m o n e ta ry p o lic y , fiscal p o lic y , and p ric e m o v e m e n t p ro b le m s , the in te re ste d reader m ay tu rn to the A p p e n d ix . Predicting Unemployment. A re a d in g o f th e press re ce n tly w o u ld leave little d o u b t in the m in d s o f m o st observers th a t th e re is a great deal o f u n c e rta in ty a b o u t th e forecasts o f th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate fo r 1971. Let us lo o k at the approaches to this p ro b le m by th e m o d e ls d is cussed in this a rticle . The "G ap" Models: Data Resources, St. Louis, RCA. These th re e m o d e ls p re d ic t th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate b a sica lly by re la tin g th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate to th e d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n actual o u tp u t o r Gross N a tio n a l P ro d u ct (GNP) and p o t e n t ia l o u t p u t . This fa ilu re o f th e e c o n o m y to p e rfo rm at its p o te n tia l level is ca lle d a " g a p ." The gre ater th e gap, th e h ig h e r th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate. This re la tio n s h ip (e q u a tio n ) req uire s a p re d ic tio n o f b o th actu al and p o te n tia l G NP in o rd e r to p la ce changes in the su p p ly o f m o n e y as the p rim e m o v e r o f e c o n o m ic activity w o u ld fall into the " M o n eta rist" s c h o o l o f thought. For a discu ssion o f the m a jo r p o in ts o f view of both the Keynesian and M o n eta rist sc h o o ls , se e W illiam N. C o x , 111, " T h e M o n e y S u p p ly C o n tro v e rsy ," M o n th ly R e v ie w , Federal R e serv e Bank of Atlanta, Jun e 7969. 46 m ake a fo re ca st o f th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate. The actual GNP fo re ca st w ill be d e te rm in e d w ith in each o f th e th re e m od els. P o te n tia l GNP is exogenous in each m o d e l. Thus, care m u st be taken in d e v e lo p in g th e best p o ssib le fo re ca st o f p o te n tia l G N P .4 Factors c o m m o n ly co n s id e re d in e s tim a tin g a n a tio n 's p o te n tia l o u tp u t are th e g ro w th o f th e la b o r fo rc e , th e a c c u m u la tio n o f ca p ita l e q u ip m e n t, and te c h n o lo g ic a l progress. The Michigan Model's Growth Rate Equation The u n e m p lo y m e n t rate is p ro je c te d in th e M ic h ig a n M o d e l by firs t p re d ic tin g th e e m p lo y m e n t rate. E m p lo y m e n t is s p e c ifie d to be re la te d to th e rate o f g ro w th o f real o u tp u t (GNP) in th e c u rre n t and p re vio u s p e rio d , o u tp u t p e r m a n -h o u r, and g ro w th in the la b o r fo rce . Basically, th e m o d e l req uire s th a t GNP a d ju ste d fo r p ric e changes g ro w at a 3 .9 -p e rc e n t rate p e r year. If th e g ro w th rate is less than this, u n e m p lo y m e n t w ill increase. T he u n e m p lo y m e n t rate fo r a d u lt m ales (ove r 20 years o ld ) is firs t c o m p u te d . T hen , this is exp an de d to a to ta l u n e m p lo y m e n t rate on th e basis o f the a d u lt m ale u n e m p lo y m e n t rate's re la tio n s h ip to th e to ta l u n e m p lo y m e n t rate. Wharton's Labor Market Section T he d e te rm in a tio n o f th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate in this m o d e l starts w ith th e d e te rm in a tio n o f e m p lo y m e n t in th e la b o r m a rk e t sector. H ere, s u p p ly and d e m a n d forces are e stim a te d to d e te rm in e th e va rio u s levels o f fa rm , m a n u fa c tu rin g , and n o n m a n u fa c tu rin g e m p lo y m e n t. A n u n e m p lo y m e n t rate is the n c o m p u te d . This m o d e l also co n ta in s a la b o r f o r c e p a r t ic ip a t io n ra te e q u a tio n , w h ic h show s p e o p le d ro p p in g o u t o f th e la b o r fo rc e as th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate rises. This w o u ld te n d to d a m p e n in creases in th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate.5 Back to the Uncertainty Problem Just as p re vio u s u n e m p lo y m e n t rate forecasts have e rre d, so th e forecasts o f th e m o d e ls discussed are s u b je c t to u n c e rta in ty . W hy? W e 4T h e tw o so u rce s for this figure are the St. Lou is Fed era l R eserve Bank's estim ates o f p o te n tia l C N P an d the estim ates m a de b y the P residen t's C o u n c il o f E c o n o m ic A dvisers. r,Th e im p o rta n ce o f labor fo rce participa tion is that if a p e rso n d ro p s o u t o f the labor fo rce , i.e., he sto p s lo o kin g for a jo b , h e is n o lo n g er c o u n te d am on g the u n e m p lo y e d ; this ten ds to re d u c e the u n e m p lo y m en t rate. M O N T H L Y R E V IE W have seen in p re vio u s sectio ns h o w u n c e rta in ty can e n te r a forecast. For exa m ple, co n s id e r th e G ap M o d e ls. Here, an a ssu m p tio n was m ade a b o u t th e fu tu re values o f p o te n tia l o u tp u t. Since this assu m p tio n m ig h t n o t c o m p le te ly c o n fo rm to the fu tu re , an e le m e n t o f u n c e rta in ty enters th e fo re ca st o f u n e m p lo y m e n t rates. F u rth e rm o re , th o u g h th e g ro w th o f actual o u tp u t is p ro je c te d w ith in th e m o d e l, it, to o , is su b je c t to e rro r. For instance, actual o u tp u t g ro w th is based on assum ptions, such as th e level o f G o v e rn m e n t s p e n d in g o r ta xa tio n , w h ic h m ig h t n o t h o ld tru e because o f d iffic u lty in p re d ic tin g C ong ressio na l a ctio n . M o re o v e r, a lth o u g h th e e q u a tio n s o f th e m o d e l are, on th e average, q u ite accurate, th e y m ay s till e rr fo r any sin gle fo re cast. S im ila r ele m e n ts o f u n c e rta in ty also e n te r th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate forecasts o f the W h a rto n and M ic h ig a n m od els. H o w e ve r, d e sp ite the m o d e ls ' d iffe re n c e s in th e o re tic a l a p p ro a ch , w e sh o u ld n o te th a t th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate forecasts p re sen te d in th e ta b le fa ll w ith in a ra th e r n a rro w range. W e w ill discuss th e d if ferences in these forecasts in the ne xt sectio n. The 1971 Econometric Model Forecasts Discussion of the Forecasts. The ta b le presents th e 1971 forecasts o f th e fiv e m od els. In c o m p a rin g these forecasts, it is h e lp fu l to keep in m in d th e d iffe re n t assu m ptio ns a b o u t exogenous forces and o th e r ele m e n ts on w h ic h th e forecasts are based, as w e ll as th e s tru c tu re o f th e d iffe re n t m o d e ls .6 T he p ro je c tio n s o f GNP (in c u rre n t do lla rs) all fa ll in a ve ry n a rro w range, w ith th e M ic h ig a n m o d e l p ro je c tin g th e lo w e s t an nu al le vel o f GNP and th e St. Louis m o d e l (6 p e rc e n t m o n e y su p p ly g ro w th ) p ro je c tin g th e high est level. The rathe r lo w levels o f G o v e rn m e n t e x p e n d itu re s assum ed in th e M ic h ig a n m o d e l's forecasts p a rtia lly a c c o u n t fo r its lo w GNP. The St. Louis m o d e l (6 percent) forecasts th e h igh est c u rre n t d o lla r GNP. The im p o rta n c e o f m o n e y in th is m o d e l becom es e v id e n t w h e n th e m o n e y s u p p ly g ro w th is lo w e re d to 5 p e rce n t. T hen, th e c u rre n t d o lla r GNP p ro je c tio n o f th is m o d e l becom es lo w e r than th e p ro je c tio n s o f th e o th e r fo u r m od els. It m ig h t also be n o te d th a t th e W h a rto n m o d e l's q u a rte rly p ro je c tio n s s h o w a m o re ra p id increase in c u rre n t d o lla r G NP in th e second q u a rte r than any o th e r m o d e l, b u t th is is fo llo w e d by ra th e r sluggish c T h e forecasts p re se n te d are m ainly for illustrative > p u rp o se s, an d the read er s h o u ld b e aware that later forecasts b y the ab o ve m o d els are con tinu ally b e in g relea sed, w h ich m ight o u tda te those p re se n te d in the table. FE D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A g ro w th d u rin g th e th ird q u a rte r. This can be e xp la in e d by th e W h a rto n m o d e l's a ssu m ptio n o f a six-w e e k steel strike in th e th ird q u a rte r and ra p id in v e n to ry a c c u m u la tio n in th e quarters p re c e d in g th e strike. Both th e RCA and M ic h ig a n m o d e ls also assume in v e n to ry b u ild u p s in th e firs t h a lf o f 1971; h o w e ve r, n e ith e r assumes a strike. P ro je ctio n s o n u n e m p lo y m e n t rates all fa ll w ith in a n a rro w range exce pt fo r th e W h a rto n m o d e l w h ic h p ro je c ts th e lo w e s t rate. The lo w forecasts o f th e W h a rto n m o d e l can be p a rtia lly exp la in e d by th a t m o d e l's la b o r fo rc e p a rtic ip a tio n rate e q u a tio n , w h ic h , as w e have p re v io u s ly m e n tio n e d , w o u ld te n d to d a m pe n increases in th e u n e m p lo y m e n t rate itself. The M ic h ig a n m o d e l p ro je cts th e high est rate. T he th re e o th e r m od els, w h ic h all use a fo rm o f th e GNP gap e q u a tio n to p ro je c t u n e m p lo y m e n t rates, each p ro je c t an an nu al rate o f u n e m p lo y m e n t o f 5.8 p e rce n t in 1971. T here seems to be no consensus a m o n g th e m od els th a t u n e m p lo y m e n t rates w ill be gin d e c lin in g in late 1971, since Data Resources, RCA, and W h a rto n all p re d ic t u n e m p lo y m e n t rates rising in th e fo u rth q u a rte r o f th e year. The b e h a v io r o f prices as ty p ifie d by th e GNP d e fla to r show s forecasts o f q u a rte rly p rice increases (annual rates) v a ry in g fro m 2.3 p e rce n t to 4.5 pe rce n t. Both th e St. Louis and RCA m od els p ro je c t a ta p e rin g -o ff o f p rice increases th ro u g h o u t th e year. The o th e r th re e m od els sh o w an acce le ra tio n o f p ric e increases near m id ye a r, w ith s lig h tly m ild e r advances o c c u rrin g to w a rd yea r-en d. The St. Louis m o d e l, w h ic h p ro je cts th e m ost ra p id p rice increases fo r 1971 as a w h o le , show s prices a d va n cin g at s lig h tly m o re than a 4 -p e rc e n t annu al rate in th e fo u rth q u a rte r. It is w o rth n o tin g th a t b o th th e St. Louis and th e RCA m o d e ls— th e tw o m o n e ta ry m o d e ls— p ro je c t th e largest increases in prices in 1971. The forecasts o f real GNP fo llo w d ire c tly fro m p ro je c tio n s on m o n e y GNP and th e G NP p rice index. M o n e y GNP, w h e n a d ju ste d fo r p ric e changes, equals real GNP. Forecasts o f th e f o l lo w in g c o m p o n e n ts o f GNP— c o n s u m p tio n , in vest m en t, and net e x p o rts 7— are also given fo r som e m odels. Some Implications and Past Results. For m ost categories, th e forecasts o f th e ab ove m od els all fa ll w ith in a n a rro w range. A d e s c rip tio n o f the exp ected b e h a v io r o f th e U. S. e c o n o m y in 1971 fro m th e forecasts m ade by these m od els in late 1970 w o u ld be su m m a rize d as fo llo w s : 7In all m o d e ls, G o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g is d e te rm in e d o u tsid e the m o d e l (exogen ou sly) b a sed u p o n the b est available estim ate. 47 The year 1971 will be one of gradual economic improvement. Real economic growth will resume a postive rate, with the economy expanding at 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent. Housing (residential in vestment in the table) should serve as a major stimulus to the economy. Price increases will be in the neighborhood of 4.0 percent, slowing from 1970's increase of 5.3 percent. However, the labor situation is not expected to improve sig nificantly, with the unemployment rate expected to remain close to 6.0 percent.8 H o w m u ch fa ith sh o u ld o n e have in the accuracy o f th e forecasts? It m ust be k e p t in m in d th a t th e y w e re m ade in late N o v e m b e r and D e c e m b e r 1970. T h e re fo re , to th e e xte n t th a t the assum ptions on w h ic h these forecasts w e re based have changed since th e n , o r w ill change, th e forecasts sh o u ld be m o d ifie d . M a n y u n c e rta in tie s a b o u t 1971 exist. For exa m ple, w ill th e re be a steel strike on A u g u st 1? H o w lo n g w ill it last? H o w w ill Congress resp on d to th e P resident's p ro p o s e d Federal budg et? T he answers to these and o th e r y e t u n k n o w n q u e stio n s m ay m a te ria lly a ffe c t th e e c o n o m y in 1971 and, thus, th e accuracy o f these forecasts. In th e past, th e accuracy o f th e e c o n o m e tric m od els has been at least as g o o d o r b e tte r than th a t o f m any " ju d g m e n ta l" forecasters. F u rth e r m ore , th e records o f th e m o d e ls have sh o w n im p ro v e m e n t, and th e ir va lu e o v e r o th e r types o f forecasts has been in th e ir g re a te r d e ta il. In those years th a t th e m o d e ls w e re o ff, so w e re m ost o f th e " ju d g m e n ta l" e c o n o m ic forecasters. This was because events ha pp e n e d o r e c o n o m ic re la tio n sh ip s changed th a t w e re un forese en by eco n o m ists. Thus, the m o d e ls also missed the m ark, since th e y are, o f course, o f th e e c o n o m is t's design. A n o th e r reason th e m o d e ls m ay e rr is th a t th e y te n d to in flu e n c e p o lic y decisions. For e xa m ple, suppose th a t a set o f forecasts are m ade w h e n th e o u tlo o k fo r th e e c o n o m y is w eak. The forecasts sh o w this and s o m e w h a t in flu e n c e the G o v e rn m e n t in s tim u la tin g th e e c o n o m y . The G o v e rn m e n t's p o lic y is successful; th e e c o n o m y does b e tte r than e xp e cte d ; and th e o rig in a l forecasts tu rn o u t to be, te c h n ic a lly , in c o rre c t. T h e re fo re , an e c o n o m e tric m o d e l m ust be c o n tin u a lly revised and u p d a te d to a c c o u n t fo r G o v e rn m e n ta l p o lic y actio ns, n e w th e o re tic a l d e v e lo p m e n ts , and changes in e c o n o m ic re la tio n ships. Forecasts have to be c o n tin u a lly run and rerun th ro u g h the m od els, since th e degree o f e c o n o m ic u n c e rta in ty a b o u t fu tu re events 8T h ese forecasts sh o u ld not be in terp re ted as official forecasts of the Federal R eserve Bank of Atlanta o r o f the Federal R eserve System . 48 M odel a n d P e rio d M ichigan 1 s t Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Q tr. 4 th Qtr. Y ear D ata R e s o u rc e s, Inc. 1 s t Qtr. 2 n d Q tr. 3rd Q tr. 4 th Qtr. Y ear W harton 1 s t Qtr. 2nd Q tr. 3rd Qtr. 4 th Qtr. Y ear S t. L ouis— 6 % ! 1st Qtr. 2n d Q tr. 3rd Qtr. 4 th Q tr. Y ear St. L ouis— 5 % 2 1 st Qtr. 2 n d Q tr. 3rd Q tr. 4 th Qtr. Y ear RCA— 6% 1 st Qtr. 2 n d Q tr. 3rd Q tr. 4 th Qtr. Y ear Avg. A nn. F o re c a st Ann. R an g e— Low High C u rre n t GNP P ric e C h a n g e (P e rc e n t, A nn. R a te )3 i 1013.4 1034.8 1053.0 1069.5 1042.7 2.3 4.2 2.4 2.9 3.5 1017.8 1039.6 1052.0 1070.8 1045.1 2.7 2.5 4.3 2.8 3.8 1019.7 1044.9 1050.7 1067.3 1045.7 2.6 2.9 3.5 2.9 3.5 1016.1 1032.7 1057.5 1076.7 1045.8 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.4 1015.6 1030.7 1053.2 1069.7 1042.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.4 1013.2 1035.5 1052.9 1071.5 1043.3 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.4 4.2 1044.5 1042.7 1045.8 4.0 3.5 4.4 P e r c e n t a g e s in d ic a te d h e re a n d d ire c tly below in d ic a te p e rc e n ta g e a s s u m p tio n of a n n u a l gro w th ra te of th e m o n e y su p p ly . -O m itte d fro m A verage A nn. F o r e c a s t a n d Low a n d H igh Range3C o m p u te d a s % c h a n g e in GNP im p lic it d e fla to r, 1 9 5 8 = 1 0 0 . d im in is h e s as on e draw s clo se r to th e fo re ca st p e rio d . Summary and Conclusions In sum m a ry, an e x a m in a tio n o f th e forecasts re veals th a t d e sp ite v a ry in g size (in term s o f e q u a tio n s and variables) and th e o re tic a l a p p ro a ch , these m o d e ls te n d to agree. This fa c t o f agree m e n t is, o b v io u s ly , n o p ro o f o f th e v a lid ity o f th e forecasts. The m a jo r va lu e o f th e forecasts is th a t th e y give th e G o v e rn m e n t p o lic y m a ke r o r th e b u s i ness d e cisio n m ake r a d e ta ile d set o f data a b o u t the fu tu re o f th e e c o n o m y th a t w ill p ro v e to be tru e if th e u n d e rly in g th e o ry and a ssu m ptio ns d o M O N T H L Y R E V IE W DESPITE VARYING THEORETICAL APPROACHES, ECONOMETRIC MODELS TEND TO AGREE FOR 1971 (Figures in Billions of Current Dollars Unless Otherwise Noted) R eal G N P4 I Real G N P G row th (P e rc e n t, A nn. R a te )5 C o n su m p tio n T o tal In v e s tm e n t B u sin e s s In v e s tm e n t In v e n to ry In v e s tm e n t (N e t C h an g e ) R e s id e n tia l In v e s tm e n t N et E x p o rts8 U n em p . R ate (P e rc e n t) 735.3 7 43.0 751.6 757.9 7 47.0 9.9 4.2 4.6 3 .4 3.3 643.1 655.6 666.2 676.3 660.3 139.6 143.4 145.6 147.7 144.1 103.1 103.3 103.9 105.1 103.9 2.1 4.7 4.9 4.3 4.0 34.4 35.3 36.8 38.3 36.2 4.2 3.2 5.5 5.3 4.6 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 735.1 746.3 747.3 7 55.4 746.0 8.7 6.2 0.6 4 .4 3.0 643.9 655.2 667.0 677.6 6 6 0.9 139.2 146.6 142.7 145.9 143.6 102.9 103.0 104.1 104.6 103.7 2.0 8.4 2.3 4.3 4.3 34.3 35.2 36.3 37.0 35.7 4.7 5 .0 5.6 5 .9 5.3 5 .9 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.8 739.7 752.3 749.8 756.7 749.6 8.0 6.8 -1.3 3.7 3.4 640.3 653.7 659.6 669.6 655.8 145.1 153.8 147.9 151.0 149.5 104.8 106.3 107.0 105.2 105.8 5.0 9.7 0.7 5.0 5.1 35.3 37.8 40.2 40.8 38.5 4.4 3 .9 4.5 4.7 4.4 5.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.2 733.5 737.7 747.7 753.7 7 43.2 1.8 2.3 5.6 3.3 2.3 n .a. n .a. n .a. n .a. n.a. n .a. n .a. n .a. n .a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n .a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.6 5.8 5 .9 5.8 5.8 733.2 736.3 744.8 749.1 7 40.9 1.6 1.7 4.7 2.3 2.0 n.a. n .a. n .a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.0 5.9 7 32.4 741.1 746.5 7 52.8 743.2 6 .2 4 .8 2 .9 3.4 2.6 638.3 650.6 6 6 4 .8 6 7 5.8 6 5 7.4 n.a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n .a. 104.9 106.9 107.9 108.5 107.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.9 32.7 34.5 35.8 33.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 745.8 743.2 749.6 2.8 2.0 3.4 658.6 655.8 66 0 .9 145.7 143.6 149.5 105.1 103.7 107.1 4.5 4.0 5.1 36.0 33.5 38.5 4.8 4.4 5.3 5.8 5.2 6.1 4C u rre n t d o lla r GNP a d ju s te d to re fle c t p ric e c h a n g e s by u se of GNP im p lic it d e fla to r, 1 9 5 8 = 1 0 0 . “F irst q u a r te r 1971 g ro w th ra te s a re b a se d on e a c h m o d e l’s p ro je c tio n s of th e fo u rth q u a rte r 1970 levels o f real GNP. w h ic h d iffe re d a m o n g th e m o d e ls a t th e tim e of fo re c a s t. “E xp o rts m in u s Im p o rts. DATES OF FORECAST RELEASE: M ichigan a n d W h arto n : N o v e m b er 19, 1970; S t. Louis: D e c e m b e r 14, 1970: D ata R eso u rc e s: D e c e m b e r 15, 1970; a n d RCA C o rp o ra tio n : D e c e m b e r 1970. n o t u n d e rg o radical changes. T he m o d e ls and th e ir forecasts p ro v id e th e d e cisio n m a ke r w ith v a lu a b le to o ls , b o th to sim u la te th e variou s effects o f a lte rn a tiv e p o lic y de cisio n s th a t m ay be u n d e r his c o n tro l and to eva lu a te th e e c o n o m ic effects o f those b e y o n d his c o n tro l. These forecasts can be, and are, c o n tin u a lly u p d a te d as n e w e c o n o m ic facts and events u n fo ld . A re th e 1971 forecasts pre sen te d in this a rtic le accurate? W h ic h on e is th e m o st accurate? A t this p o in t, it is im p o s s ib le to te ll. From w h a t w e k n o w n o w , these forecasts a p pe ar to be reasonable, b u t w h o can be ce rta in w h a t this year w ill bring? N e xt year w e w ill p r in t th e actual data fo r the forecasts p re sen te d here. Y ou be th e ju d g e ! F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A A P P E N D IX A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MODELS In the follow ing descriptions, each model is examined w ith regard to size and design. An overview of each model's treatment of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and price movements is also included. The University of Michigan Model The University of Michigan econometric model (referred to as the DLH-lll) is a small-to-mediumsize model, consisting of 35 equations and eight identities. These formulations are divided among three main blocks: a Supply Block, an Expenditure Block, and an Income Shares Block. Each block 49 describes a particular set of facts about that sector of the economy. Therefore, the Supply Block explains the behavior of wage rates, prices, and productivity, economic facts of life that are inherent in determining the amount and nature of the supply of goods and services. The Expenditure Block develops formulations to account for such major components of GNP as consumer expenditures on automobiles and other durables, business investment in plant and equipment, and residential housing starts. The Income Shares Block contains equations and identities that explain such payments that provide income to individuals or organizations, such as corporate profits, dividends, private wages and salaries, and taxes. In this model, monetary policy is treated in a Keynesian framework by developing an interest rate variable based upon movements in short- and long-term interest rates. This interest rate variable is used to determine those types of spending in the economy that are related to the rate of interest. For example, the model relates the level of Business Fixed Invest ment to the rate of investment in certain previous periods and also to several selected interest rates. An interest rate measure is also considered in deriving an equation for the number of housing starts. Housing starts are, in turn, used w ith tw o other variables (including another interest rate measure) to determine the dollar value of residential construction. The result in the above form ulations w ould be such that when monetary policy is eased by the Federal Reserve, interest rates w ould fall. This w ould increase the quantity of loans demanded for investment and housing needs and, consequently, stimulate expenditures in these areas. On the other hand, a tightening of monetary policy w ould raise interest rates, which would, in turn, discourage spending in these areas. Fiscal policy, the conscious adjustment of taxation and/or expenditure programs by the Government in order to influence economic activity, is incorporated mainly through the technique of including Government expenditures in a definition (identity) of GNP and then making other economic variables partially a function of GNP. Thus, an increase in Government spending, which increases GNP, would tend to increase other economic variables, such as employment, wages and salaries, personal consumption, and several others. Taxation variables are also b u ilt into the model to reflect increased revenues of governmental units that w ould be affected by changes in income. Price movements in the nonfarm sector are based on supply factors such as the level of capacity utilization and expected changes in unit labor costs. Demand factors are considered by including an unemployment variable and by assuming that a low rate of unemployment indicates a higher degree of demand for labor. This leads to higher expected unit labor costs and, thus, to higher prices. The DRI Model of the U. S. Economy The Data Resources model is the largest model of the five presented in this article. There are 109 equations and 133 identities. Monetary policy actions are basically handled in a Keynesian fashion similar to the Michigan model. Various types of interest rate variables are expressed 50 in the model as partial determinants of such items as business investment, residential construction, and state and local spending. Fiscal policy can be simulated w ith the model by varying Government expenditures or taxes. Seven equations are included for this purpose. Price changes are computed by using 8 equations that include separate price index equations for such variables as state and Federal Government purchases and various classifications of personal consumption (durable goods, nondurable goods, etc.). As a commercial model, Data Resources offers its users the access to a Data Bank in which 3,000 business and economic tim e series are stored. Data Resources also maintains an "equation library," and has developed a set of industry equations. The industry equations are designed to provide a bridge between the movements of the broad aggregates called the GNP accounts (investment, consumption, etc.) and a specific industry such as textiles or chemicals. A user could, therefore, estimate his own future sales or production in relation to DRI's forecast of the economy. Wharton EFU Model This model ranks among the large econom etric models. It contains 47 equations and 29 identities. Besides being used for prediction of a large number of economic variables, it is also used for various monetary and fiscal policy simulations. Money's role in the W harton model is surprising. Though the final effect of monetary policy on GNP is about the same as it is in the long run fo r a comparable fiscal policy, the effects in the first year are quite small, because of the lags involved, when compared w ith fiscal policy. In fact, in the model, the long-run effects of a change toward easier monetary policy w ill actually increase the unem ployment rate slightly as businesses find it relatively cheaper to substitute capital for workers. A rapid growth rate of GNP appears to be the main benefit of an expan sionary monetary policy in the W harton model. Accordingly, policy makers, when using the model, w ould tend to emphasize fiscal policy over monetary policy because of its positive em ployment effects. Through simulations this model also analyzes the effects of alternate fiscal policies. However, there is no specific fiscal sector in the model, since taxes and transfers are incorporated into most of the spending equations. Also, Government expenditures for purchases o f goods and services and fo r defense are considered exogenous. The model contains seven price equations plus a price identity to determine the GNP price deflator (the index of price change). However, the manufacturing price equation seems to be the key equation, since manufacturing prices are used along w ith other demandrelated variables to determine all other prices in the model. The manufacturing price equation has as independent variables, unit labor costs and capacity utilization, along w ith lagged values of manufacturing prices. Thus, demand-pull, cost-push, and wageprice spiral influences are present and affect prices. M O N T H L Y R E V IE W The St. Louis Federal Reserve Model This model is what is technically called a re d u c e d form model. In this particular model, the total spending (GNP) equation— the heart of the model— is an equation w ith changes in money stock and changes in "high-em ploym ent Federal expenditures" as the independent as well as the exogenous variables. This equation, though sufficient for predictive purposes is not, because of its summary nature (reduced form), conducive to exact policy simulations. High-employment Federal expenditures are expenditures on goods and services plus transfer payments (mainly unemployment benefits) adjusted to full employment levels. As is well known, the St. Louis model places the greatest emphasis on monetary policy. In this model, it is monetary actions that play the strategic role; fiscal policy actions especially for periods over a year in length have almost no effect on output or prices. However, the exact structure of the money sector and the fiscal sector is impossible to identify because only the reduced form of the model is given. Price changes are transferred through the model by two variables— demand pressure and price expecta tions. Demand pressure is determined by the difference between the change in total spending and the potential change in output— the greater this difference, the greater the demand pressure. Price expectations are determined in the model by past price changes and a measure o f resource utilization— the unemployment rate. Thus, price changes are basically determined by demand forces. However, including the lagged values for demand pressure does tend to pick up the effect of input price changes and the effect of changes in costs of production. similar to the variables in the St. Louis model's price equation. GLOSSARY Coefficient: A numerical or alphabetic symbol placed before a variable; often referred to as a parameter Correlation: The degree to which variables move togeth er; the extent to which movements of the variables are related Dependent Variable: The variable that is determined by the movements of another variable(s) Econometric Model: An equation or system of equations, statistically tested, representing the operations of eco nomic forces in the "real w o rld " Endogenous: Those variables or facts explained w ithin the framework of an economic model Exogenous: Those variables or facts not explained w ith in an economic model but imposed upon the model by outside forces Functional Relationship: A statement of cause and ef fect; that is, a relationship that shows how one or more variables affect another variable Identification Problem: The problem of assigning coef ficient values to the equations of an econometric model by using the correct statistical tests Identity: A statement of de finition; a relationship that holds true at all times Independent Variable: The variable that initiates change; it determines the value of other variables Labor Forces Participation Rate: Ratio of the total labor force (including armed services) to the total noninstitutional population Lagged Values of Variables: Values of variables pertain ing to previous time periods. For example, consumption expenditures today might be related to both today's income and yesterday's income. Yesterday's income is a lagged variable. Potential Output (Potential Gross National Product): RCA Econometric Model The RCA econometric model is a monetary model similar in form to the St. Louis model. However, it is what the authors of the model call an "o utsid e-in " model. It starts w ith an equation that relates GNP to exogenous monetary and fiscal factors (similar to St. Louis total spending equation); it then determines the components of GNP, such as consumption of durables and nondurables and private investment— both residential and business. Also, certain microeconomic variables, such as color TV sales, are estimated for internal use. Overall, the model has 13 equations, 6 identities, and a price-expectation equation. As w ith the St. Louis model, monetary influences are the strongest on current dollar GNP. The RCA spending equation does not have as many lagged terms as the same equation in the St. Louis model; hence, though the immediate effects of monetary and fiscal policy can be determined, the delayed effects of such policies cannot. Again,-the effects of many precise types of fiscal or monetary policies cannot be estimated, since the spending equation is a reduced form equation. The GNP price deflator is determined as a function of expected price changes, changes in GNP, change in potential real GNP, and the gap between potential and real GNP. Therefore, this equation's variables are F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A The value of the final output of goods and services produced in a year if all resources (land, labor, and capital) are fully utilized Reduced Form: An equation relating an endogenous variable to several exogenous and lagged endogenous variables Simulation: The process of imposing various hypothetical conditions on a model in order to observe their effects on certain variables V a ria b le : A quantity that may assume a succession of values, which need not be distinct B IBLIO G R APH Y Anderson, Leonall C., and Carlson, Keith M., "A M one tarist Model for Economic Stabilization," R eview , Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 1970, pp. 7-25. Evans, Michael K., and Klein, Lawrence R., Th e W harton E co n o m e tric Forecastin g M o d e l, Philadelphia: U ni versity of Pennsylvania, 1968. Hymans, Saul H., and Shapiro, Harold T., T h e D H L -Ill Q uarterly Eco n o m e tric M o d e l o f the U. S. E co n o m y , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1970. Morrison, G. R., "A Monetarist Approach to Predicting Business Fixed Investment," Business E co n o m ics, Sep tember 1970, pp. 47-52. Te ch n ica l Sum m ary, Lexington, Massachusetts: Data Re sources, Inc., 1970. 51 M P t h i s s i s s d d l i n g u r r e a e C i p p i i n A g n 1 9 a i n s 7 0 : t t b y W i l l i a m N . C o x , III In a n e a r l ie r a s s e s s m e n t o f M is s is s ip p i's e c o n o m y , w e d e s c r i b e d h o w t h e s t a t e 's i n c r e a s i n g i n d u s t r ia li z a ti o n w a s b r in g i n g w i t h it a n i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n M is s is s ip p i's e c o n o m ic fo rtu n e s a n d th o se of th e n a tio n .1 T h e sa m e a rtic le w e n t o n t o p o i n t o u t t h a t th is w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e fo r t h e s t a t e 's g r o w i n g m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r , m a n y o f w h o s e firm s d e p e n d o n m a r k e t s o u t s i d e t h e s ta te . As g o e s t h e n a t i o n , s o g o e s M ississip p i. O r s o w e m i g h t e x p e c t . For t h e n a ti o n a l e c o n o m y , 1 9 7 0 w a s a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . It w a s a y e a r in w h i c h e m p l o y m e n t a n d i n c o m e a n d p r o d u c t i o n b a r e l y g r e w , e s p e c i a l l y in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e b o o m y e a r s o f t h e la te 1 9 6 0 's . In v i e w o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n M ississip p i a n d t h e n a t i o n , w e w o u l d e x p e c t t o f in d t h a t 1 9 7 0 a ls o c a m e as a l e t d o w n fo r M is s iss ip p i's e c o n o m y . A n d , in fa c t, it w a s . This a s s e s s m e n t o f M is s is s ip p i's 1 9 7 0 e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e s h o u l d b e t e m p e r e d , t h e r e f o r e , b y r e a liz in g w h a t h a p p e n e d n a ti o n a ll y a n d b y r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t M ississip p i h a d t o p a d d l e a g a in s t t h e t h r u s t o f a n a d v e r s e n a t i o n a l c u r r e n t . In d o i n g this, M ississip p i m e t w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e success. 1W illiam N. C o x , III, "M ississip p i: Industrialization Brings In te rd e p e n d e n c e ," M o n th ly R e vie w , Federal R eserve Bank o f Atlanta, M ay 1968. M O N T H L Y R E V IE W M is s is s ip p i’s key e co n o m ic in d ica to rs . . . . . . co m pared favorably w ith the n ation ’s in 1 9 7 0 % G row th, 1969-70 0.0 Nonfarm Employment Farm Employment 2.0 -2.0 *Personal Income 0.0 'U.S. 7.5 y////y/z//tti* V. . . . . ^M is s is s ip p i IQ M anufacturing Payrolls Farm Receipts 3.0 ♦ B ased on 3 q trs . d a ta B e t t e r T h a n N a t io n a l W o rse T h a n U su al M ississipp i p a d d le d su cce ssfully against th e c u rre n t in 1970. A lth o u g h th e state's e c o n o m ic pace was s lo w e r tha n it had been d u rin g th e late Sixties, it, ne vertheless, g e n e ra lly o u tp e rfo rm e d th a t o f th e n a tio n . W h a t happens to n o n fa rm e m p lo y m e n t is o f p rim e im p o rta n c e to M ississipp i because o f the c o n tin u in g need to p ro v id e a d d itio n a l jo b s fo r w o rk e rs c o m in g o ff th e fa rm .2 M o re n o n fa rm jo b s d id b e co m e ava ila b le in 1970— 2 p e rc e n t m o re than in 1969— b u t th e increase was d is a p p o in tin g ly b e lo w th e 4 -p e rc e n t annu al g ro w th re co rd e d in th e 1960's. Even so, M ississip p i's 2 -p e rc e n t g ro w th lo o k e d g o o d w h e n c o m p a re d w ith th e n a tio n a l n o -g ro w th s itu a tio n . In M ississip p i, m a n u fa c tu rin g e m p lo y m e n t a c tu a lly fe ll a b it in 1970, re fle c tin g sm all decreases in b o th d u ra b le and n o n d u ra b le sectors. In th e 2W illiam N. C o x , III, "M ississip p i N onfarm Jobs in the the Sixties: A Sn ea k P rev ie w ," M o n th ly R e v ie w , Federal R eserve Bank of Atlanta, N o v e m b e r 1969. N onfarm jo b s are a p rim e target o f the state's Balance A gricu lture w ith In du stry (B A W I) program . F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A d u ra b le goods secto r, M ississipp i registered o n ly a Vi -p e rc e n t e m p lo y m e n t d e c lin e , w hereas th e n a tio n e xp e rie n ce d a decrease o f pe rce n t. Here again, M ississipp i p a d d le d against an adverse n a tio n a l c u rre n t and, here again, had som e success in d o in g it. In n o n d u ra b le m a n u fa c tu rin g e m p lo y m e n t, the state and th e n a tio n b o th posted d e clin e s o f a b o u t o n e p e rcen t. C o n s tru c tio n p ro v id e d a b ig e m p lo y m e n t b o o st in 1970. Jobs in th a t se cto r g re w a s u rp risin g 6 1 p e rce n t, c o n tra s tin g w ith a n a tio n a l d e c lin e /2 o f 2 V 2 pe rce n t. T w o special factors he lp ed. The G u lf Coast was engaged in p o s t-C a m ille re b u ild in g , and th e re was a bu rst o f a c tiv ity s u rro u n d in g th e In g a lIs -L itto n shipya rd at Pascagoula. A lth o u g h fa rm e m p lo y m e n t in M ississippi d id n o t g ro w d u rin g 1970, th is was b e tte r than the n a tio n 's 2 -p e rc e n t d e c lin e in farm jo b s d u rin g th a t year and th e state's V2 -p e rc e n t d e c lin e in 1969. Farm cash receipts rose o n ce again in 1970, la rge ly because o f n a tio n a l increases in liv e s to c k prices. For a change, a n a tio n a l c u rre n t was flo w in g the rig h t w ay. C ro p receipts ed ge d d o w n s lig h tly , also in lin e w ith th e n a tio n a l m o ve m e n t. Personal in c o m e is a b o u t as g o o d an in d ic a to r o f o ve ra ll e c o n o m ic a c tiv ity as is ava ila ble. In M ississipp i, it rose a b o u t 7 p e rc e n t in 1970, a b o u t equal to the n a tio n a l increase o f 7V2 p e rcen t. The m a n u fa c tu rin g p a y ro ll p o rtio n o u tp a ce d the n a tio n 's , up 2 V2 p e rc e n t fo r M ississipp i and up 1 p e rc e n t fo r th e U. S. 53 A C lo s e r L o o k Let us re tu rn fo r a clo se r lo o k at th e cru cia l ca te g o ry o f n o n fa rm e m p lo y m e n t. M ississip p i's n o n fa rm jo b g ro w th in 1970 (2 pe rcen t) was h ig h e r than th e n a tio n 's (0 p e rce n t). A sta te m e n t o f th is k in d can som e tim es be m is le a d in g , h o w e ve r. If a state p e rfo rm s b e tte r than th e n a tio n does in n o n fa rm jo b g ro w th , it m ay be because jo b g ro w th in all, o r ne arly all, in d u strie s ran ahead o f jo b g ro w th in those in d u strie s n a tio n a lly . B ut th e re m ay be a n o th e r reason; na m ely, th e e m p lo y m e n t m ix is d iffe re n t at th e state level than it is at th e n a tio n a l level. A n extrem e exa m p le serves to illu s tra te this p o in t. S uppose th a t all o f a state's n o n fa rm jo b s are in a sin gle in d u s try . Suppose, to o , th a t n a tio n a lly , to ta l n o n fa rm e m p lo y m e n t gro w s 5 p e rc e n t b u t, th a t in in d u s try X, e m p lo y m e n t a c tu a lly shrinks 10 p e rce n t. T hen if n o n fa rm jo b s in th e state m e re ly h e ld steady, it w o u ld be an im p ressive o ve ra ll p e rfo rm a n c e — im p ressive d e sp ite th e n a tio n 's 5 -p e rc e n t increase in to ta l e m p lo y m e n t. A d m itte d ly , th is exa m p le is fa r-o u t. But m o re s u b tle d is to rtio n s o f th e same so rt are in tro d u c e d w h e n e v e r w e ig n o re sta te -n a tio n a l d iffe re n ce s in e m p lo y m e n t m ix. T he m o re these m ixes d iffe r, th e g re a te r th e p o s s ib ility th a t naive co m p a riso n s w ill p ro v e to be in a ccu ra te . O n e w a y o f a v o id in g th is e m p lo y m e n t-m ix tra p is to m ake in d u s try -b y -in d u s try c o m p a riso n s. T he ta b le does this fo r M ississip p i. It suggests th a t 1970 jo b g ro w th in a lm o s t all o f M ississip p i's in d u strie s o u tp a c e d n a tio n a l g ro w th in those same in du stries. R e tu rn in g to o u r o rig in a l th e m e , w e can say w ith re n e w e d c o n fid e n c e th a t M ississipp i was successful in p a d d lin g against th e cu rre n t. T here is a n o th e r w a y o f a llo w in g fo r d iffe re n c e s in s ta te -n a tio n a l e m p lo y m e n t m ix. W e can fig u re a n o th e r h y p o th e tic a l g ro w th rate fo r n o n fa rm jo b s b y using the in d u s try -b y -in d u s try p e rce n ta g e g ro w th fo r M ississipp i and c o m b in in g it w ith th e e m p lo y m e n t m ix fo r th e U. S. W h e n this is d o n e , w e fin d th a t M ississip p i's n o n fa rm jo b g ro w th w o u ld have been h ig h e r tha n it a c tu a lly was if its e m p lo y m e n t m ix in 1970 had been th e same as th e n a tio n 's . T he hypothetical increase, using th e n a tio n a l jo b m ix, was a b o u t 4 p e rc e n t (co m p a re d w ith an actual increase o f o n ly 2 p e rce n t). In o th e r w o rd s , M ississip p i's past e m p lo y m e n t m ix, w ith its gre a te r c o n c e n tra tio n o f s lo w e r g ro w in g in d u strie s, h a n d ic a p p e d th e state's n o n fa rm e m p lo y m e n t g ro w th in 1970. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT 1969-70 Miss. 1.0 T o ta l E m p lo y m e n t......... 0.0 ............................ Farm 2.0 N o n fa rm .......................... 6.5 C o n s tru c tio n ......... 1.5 M in in g ..................... . . . - 1.0 M a n u fa c tu rin g . . . . . - 0.5 D u ra b le G o o d s . . 3.0 L u m b e r .......... . . . - 6.5 F u rn itu re 2.0 T ra n s p o rta tio n E q u ip m e n t . . . N o n d u ra b le G o o d s ........................ .. - 1.0 F o o d ................ 3.0 A p p a re l ......... ... - 2.0 T ra n s p o rta tio n . . . 3.5 T rade ........................ 2.5 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate. . . 4.0 1.5 Services ................... 2.0 G o v e rn m e n t ......... 54 U.S. 1.0 - 2.0 0.0 - 2.5 0.5 - 3.5 - 5.5 - 4.5 - 5.0 -11.5 - 1.0 0.0 - 2.0 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.0 2.0 M O N T H L Y R E V IE W B e t t e r T h in g s t o C o m e ? It is almost unquestionable that better times are on the way. In retrospect, it seems likely that last year's performance will be viewed as subpar. For 1971, there is a big reason for optimism, since the national economy is now showing signs of responding to more expansive monetary and fiscal policies. Mississippi will not have to fight as strong an adverse current as in 1970. But there are more grounds for optimism than just simple interpolation of our expectations about the national economy. For one thing, reductions in mortgage rates and increases in housing starts, nationally, have a disproportionate effect on Mississippi because of the importance of the state's lumber industry. Some of this stimulus is already materializing. For another thing, the contracts awarded to Ingalls-Litton for 47 ships can be expected to keep the Gulf Coast area humming through 1975. Finally, one can reasonably expect that devastating visits like the one from Hurricane Camille are the exception rather than the rule. I B a n k and Ethel M. Miller, cashier. Capital, $400,000; surplus and other capital funds, $350,000. A n n o u n c e m e n t s THE COLLIER COUNTY BANK FEBRUARY 16, 1971 Naples, Florida FEBRUARY 1, 1971 GULF COAST BANK Abbeville, Louisiana Opened for business as a par-remitting nonmem ber. Opened for business as a nonmember. Officers: Mrs. Mamie B. Tooke, president and chairman; Ward E. Boehner, Jr., executive vice president; and John H. Druffel and Addison B. Miller, vice presidents. Capital, $600,000; surplus and other capital funds, $600,000. FEBRUARY 22, 1971 FEBRUARY 4, 1971 FLORIDA BANK OF COMMERCE BARNETT BANK OF SEMINOLE COUNTY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION Clearwater, Florida Altamonte Springs, Florida Opened for business as a nonmember. Officers: Gordon R. Williams, president; Norman H. Mueller, executive vice president and chief executive officer; O. C. Neal, senior vice presi dent; Reginald S. Wareham, vice president; Opened for business as a member. Officers: George W. Foster, president; Mary Ellen Sicoutry, cashier; and Gwendolyn O. Inness, assistant cashier. Capital, $400,000; surplus and other capital funds, $200,000. F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A 55 B A N K IN G S T A T IS T IC S B illion $ - 27 DEPOSITS - Net Demand* -2 4 11 - 10 /V / — 7.5 -2 1 /V - 14 Loans (net)* -6 .5 - 13 -5 .5 r\j Investments'* — 4.6 -6 i ii ii Ii ii ii ii i iii Ii ii i i i i i i ii iIii ii i i i i ii i Ii •i i ii i J J D J J DJ J D J J 1969 1971 1970 1969 — 4.2 J D J 1970 1971 LATEST MONTH PLOTTED: JANUARY Note: All figures are seasonally adjusted and cover all Sixth District member banks. ‘ Daily average figures **Figures are for the last Wednesday of each month. SIX T H B A D IST R IC T N K I N G N O T E S C H A N G E S IN T E R M LOAN C A T E G O R IE S M illion $ ~ 23 Large Banks - 1968 40 / 1969 / -20 1970 jM I Durable Goods Mfg. Nondurable Goods Mfg. 56 M ining W holesale & Transportation, C onstruction Retail Trade Comm., P. U. - 10 Services M O N T H L Y R E V IE W D IS T R IC T T ER M L E N D IN G T U R N S D O W N D u rin g 1970, business te rm loans at th e larger D is tric t c o m m e rc ia l banks d e c lin e d $29 m illio n — a d ro p o f 3.8 pe rce n t. This sm all d e c lin e contrasts sh a rp ly w ith th e gains in 1969 and 1968— years w h e n te rm le n d in g ad van ced $124 m illio n and $86 m illio n , re sp e ctive ly.1 T erm le n d in g is g e n e ra lly less responsive than s h o rt-te rm le n d in g is to th e shifts in ba nk le n d in g p o lic ie s and changes in th e re la tiv e cost and a v a ila b ility o f c re d it fro m n o n b a n k sources. For exa m ple, a fte r ra p id ly in crea sing d u rin g th e firs t h a lf o f 1969, s h o rt-te rm business loans at large D is t r ic t banks ta p e re d o ff d u rin g th e second ha lf. T erm loans, on th e o th e r hand, d id n o t d e c lin e u n til ea rly 1970, w h e n business de m an ds eased fo r ba nk c re d it in gene ral, thu s e n a b lin g banks to c u t back th e ir te rm loans. Even th o u g h m an y D is tric t bankers m ay have w a n te d to c u t back th e ir te rm loans ea rlie r, a c o n s id e ra b le lag is o fte n in v o lv e d b e fo re p re v io u s ly esta blished lines o f c re d it are d ra w n d o w n by business firm s. Last year's weakness in te rm loans was spread across m ost types o f c o m m e rc ia l and in d u s tria l b o rro w e rs . In p re vio u s years w h e n c o n su m e r s p e n d in g was strong , w h o le sa le rs and retailers m ade c o n s id e ra b le use o f te rm loans. Because sales w e re sluggish last year, h o w e v e r, te rm loans to w h o le sa le rs advanced o n ly s lig h tly , and those to retaile rs d e c lin e d ne arly $14 m illio n . Except fo r m a c h in e ry and tra n s p o rta tio n e q u ip m e n t m a n u fa c tu rin g — c h ie fly in F lo rid a — te rm loan a c tiv ity to d u ra b le goods m a n u fa ctu re rs also fa ile d to in crease. Banks in G eo rg ia and F lo rid a u su a lly p ro v id e th e b u lk p o rtio n o f th e D is tric t's c o n s tru c tio n loans exte n d e d fo r lo n g e r than a o n e -y e a r p e rio d . Last year, th e banks in G e o rg ia sh a rp ly re d u ce d such loans w h ile banks in F lo rid a ad van ced th e ir le n d in g o n ly s lig h tly . Likew ise, at banks in th e G u lf Coast states, the use o f in te rm e d ia te - and lo n g -te rm c re d it fo r the e x p lo ra tio n o f c ru d e p e tro le u m and na tural gas and fo r p e tro le u m re fin in g d e c lin e d — by ne arly $14 m illio n — o v e r th e same p e rio d . Except fo r the d ro p in le n d in g to p e tro le u m refin ers, th e loans to n o n d u ra b le go od s m a n u fa ctu re rs, h o w e v e r, d id n o t change in th e D is tric t. 1io h n M . G o d fre y , "T e rm L e n d in g : A Lagging R e sp o n d e n t to M o n eta ry Restraint," this R e v ie w , June 1970, pp . 80-83. This article sh o u ld also b e c o n su lte d for a m o re co m p le te d e scrip tio n o f the banks in c lu d e d and the d efin ition o f term b u sin ess loans and loan ca te gories. B U S I N E S S T E R M LO A N S 1 1967 i 1968 i 1969 M illion $ i 1970 1971 F lo rid a banks ty p ic a lly a c c o u n t fo r ne arly h a lf o f th e D is tric t's in te rm e d ia te - and lo n g -te rm loans to service typ e businesses. In 1970, h o w e ve r, these banks re p o rte d m o re than a $ 1 2 -m illio n d e c lin e in loans fo r firm s p ro v id in g lo d g in g , am u sem ent, re cre a tio n , and o th e r nonbusiness services. In c o n trast, service loans advanced in A la ba m a, so u th e rn Louisiana, and s o u th e rn M ississippi. The lack o f g ro w th o f te rm loans d u rin g 1970— a year fo llo w in g a p e rio d o f re strictive m o n e ta ry p o lic y — is s im ila r to th e p e rio d fo llo w in g the " c r e d it c ru n c h " o f 1966. T hen, as in 1970, banks d id n o t be gin e xp a n d in g th e ir te rm loans im m e d ia te ly fo llo w in g th e s h ift in m o n e ta ry p o lic y . G e n e ra lly, banks firs t a tte m p t to re b u ild th e ir li q u id ity b e fo re b e in g w illin g to a p p ro ve loans w ith m a tu ritie s ave rag ing th re e -to fiv e years. C o rp o ra te b o rro w e rs w ill w a it u n til business a c tiv ity picks up b e fo re th e y feel c o m p e lle d to seek a d d itio n a l bank c re d it to be used fo r b u ild in g up th e ir w o rk in g ca p ita l and fo r m a kin g a d d itio n s to p la n t and e q u ip m e n t. A fte r th e m o n e ta ry strin g e n cy in 1966, m o re than 18 m o n th s passed b e fo re te rm le n d in g tu rn e d up, thus p ro v id in g som e reason fo r n o t ex p e c tin g a tu rn a ro u n d in te rm le n d in g u n til la te r this year. T here are o th e r factors th a t p o in t to an u p tu rn in te rm le n d in g d u rin g th e la tte r m o n th s o f 1971. T erm loan advances are ty p ic a lly strong est in the last six m o n th s o f th e year. If business a c tiv ity is stro n g and these patterns re o ccu r, the n w e sh o u ld see n o tic e a b le gains in te rm le n d in g at th e larger D is tric t banks d u rin g th e last h a lf o f 1971. JO H N M . GODFREY F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A 57 S ix t h D is t r ic t S t a t is t ic s S e a s o n a lly A d ju ste d (All d ata are in d e xe s, 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = IO O , u n le s s in d ic a te d o th e rw ise .) Latest Month One Two Month Months Ago Ago One TWO Month Months Ago Ago One Year Ago 5.0 40.5 5.5 39.8 5.3 40.2 3.8 40.5 334 244 265 336 240 257 332 233 258 248 356 171 337 124 346 286 353 172 180 172 181 137 87 180 171 181 129 90 180 174 181 130 90 176 178 176 143 84 3.9 41.6 4.2 40.5 4.2 41.3 2.7 40.3 421 300 420 294 408 292 386 259 260 171 262 93 258 129 266 189 Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. 152 136 161 149 49 152 137 160 148 50 152 135 160 145 48 154 145 159 155 49 Jan Jan. 4.0 40.4 4.2 39.5 4.0 39.4 3.0 39.6 Member Bank L o a n s ............................... Jan. Jan. Member Bank D e p o sits ...........................Jan Jan. Bank D ebits**............................................ Jan Jan. 362 257 349 369 252 339 357 252 340 348 230 317 M anufacturing P a y r o l l s ...................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e i p t s ...........................Dec. 230 160 229 167 229 187 218 136 134 132 132 119 134 118 49 134 124 139 137 49 5,4 41.9 42.0 43.2 42.5 304 203 233 298 295 198 221 277 176 214 One Year Ago SIXTH DISTRICT : Month Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work F o rc e J t..................Jan. Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . . . Jan. INCOME AND SPENDING 264 155 143 208 260 129 128 164 261 167 124 175 258 150 321 324 341 338 323 327 305 289 154 152 Nonfarm E m p lo y m e n tt.......................... Jan. Manufacturing ..........................................Jan. 145 145 Nondurable G o o d s .......................... Jan. 136 136 .................................................... Jan. 121 120 Food T e x t i l e s ...............................................Jan. 110 110 Apparel ...............................................Jan. 174 175 P a p e r ....................................................Jan. 127 127 Printing and Publishing . . . Jan. 157 157 C h e m ic a ls ..........................................Jan. 139 141 Durable G o o d s .................................... Jan. 159 159 Lbr., Wood prods., Furn. & Fix. Jan. 108 106 Stone, Clay, and Glass . . . Jan. 131 130 138 138 Primary M e t a ls ............................... Jan. Fabricated M e t a ls ..........................Jan. 173 173 Machinery, Elec. & Nonelec. . Jan. 254 256 Transportation Equipment . . Jan. 186 186 Nonmanufacturing ............................... Jan. 157 155 C o n s tru c tio n .................................... Jan. 143 132 Transp., Comm., & Pub. U tilitiesJan. 135 135 T r a d e .................................................... Jan. 149 147 Fin., ins., and real est.....................Jan. 166 165 S e r v ic e s ...............................................Jan. 175 175 Federal G o vern m ent.....................Jan. 126 125 State and Local Government . Jan. 191 190 Farm Em ploym ent..........................................Jan.57 56 Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work F o rc e lt.....................Jan. 4.6 4.8 r Insured Unemployment (Percent of Cov. E m p .).......................... Jan. 3.0 2.9 Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . . . Jan. 40.7 40.1 Construction C o n tra c ts * .......................... Jan. 214 263 R e s id e n tia l.................................................... Jan. 224 318 All O th e r......................................................... Jan. 205 217 Electric Power Production** . . . . Dec. 165 164 Cotton Consum ption**............................... Dec.102 97 Petrol. Prod, in Coastal La. and Miss.**Jan. 303 309 244 242 Manufacturing P ro d u c tio n ..................... Dec. Nondurable G o o d s .................................... Dec. 210 210r Food ............................................... Dec. 171 170 T e x t i l e s ....................................................Dec. 235 236r ....................................................Dec. 264 264 Apparel P a p e r ......................................................... Dec. 197 198 Printing and Publishing . . . . Dec. 164 166 C h e m ic a ls ...............................................Dec. 267 270 Durable G o o d s ..........................................Dec. 285 281 Lumber and W o o d ..................................Dec. 171 171 r Furniture and F ix t u r e s ..................... Dec. 183 184 Stone, Clay and G l a s s .....................Dec. 171 168 Primary M e t a ls .................................... Dec. 198 196 Fabricated M e t a ls ............................... Dec. 244 242 Nonelectrical Machinery . . . . Dec. 365 340r Electrical M ach in ery.......................... Dec. 626 624 Transportation Equipment . . . Dec. 345 341 152 144 136 120 110 175 126 156 141 158 106 130 138 174 258 179 154 131 134 148 165 175 126 188 54 153 150 138 118 116 176 130 154 143 168 109 134 135 180 265 211 153 146 133 148 161 172 126 181 55 4.8 3.5 3.0 40.3 221 244 202 166 101 311 246 209 169 235 265 196 167 269 291 169 184 169 202 241 358 657 360 2.3 40.3 358 280 424 167 103 232 239 206 162 229 256 203 171 261 280 166 186 172 202 247 361 558 353 . Dec. Instalm ent Credit a t Banks* (Mil. $) 122 202 FINANCE AND BANKING Member Bank L o a n s ............................... Jan. Member Bank D e p o s i t s ...................... Jan. Bank D e b i t s * * ........................................ Jan. 306 210 FLORIDA* INCOME EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION 258 212 301 372 311 362 299 342 289 254 252 204 292 225 186 276 210 289 EMPLOYMENT Nonfarm Employm entt ...................... Jan. M anufacturing ....................................Jan. Nonm anufacturing . . ..................Jan. C o n s t r u c t io n ....................................Jan. Farm E m p lo y m e n t....................................Jan. Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work F o rc e J t.................. Jan. Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . . . Jan. FINANCE AND BANKING Member Bank Loans ................................Jan. Member Bank D e p o sits...........................Jan. Bank D ebits**.................................... . Jan. GEORGIA M anufacturing P a y r o l l s ...................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e i p t s ............................... Jan. EMPLOYMENT FINANCE AND BANKING Loans* 369 305 M anufacturing P a y r o l l s ...................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e ip t s ............................... Dec. Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work Forcelt . . . Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . FINANCE AND BANKING EMPLOYMENT Nonfarm E m p lo y m en tt...........................Jan. M anufacturing ....................................Jan. Nonmanufacturing ...........................Jan. C o n s t r u c t io n ....................................Jan. Farm E m p lo y m en t....................................Jan. Unemployment Rate Jan. (Percent of Work ForceJt . . . Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . . Jan. 12 2 138 132 52 6.5 10 2 135 12 2 49 6 .6 6 .8 FINANCE AND BANKING Bank Debits*/* 201 210 M ISSISSIPPI INCOME Manufacturing P a y r o l l s ...................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e i p t s ...............................Dec. EMPLOYMENT Nonfarm Employmentt . . . . M anufacturing ...................... 58 Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. 233 150 224 114 228 114 228 143 INCOME M anufacturing P a y r o l l s ...................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e i p t s ............................... Dec. 298 142 297 146 297 131 274 118 133 133 134 118 57 132 133 131 99 57 132 133 131 134 127 133 127 57 EMPLOYMENT Nonfarm E m p lo y m en tt...........................Jan. M anufacturing ....................................Jan. N o n m a n u fa c tu rin g ............................... Jan. C o n s t r u c t io n ....................................Jan. Farm E m p lo y m en t....................................Jan. 154 161 151 172 48 152 160 149 160 47 152 160 149 159 46 152 161 148 183 47 . 10 0 53 M O N T H L Y R E V IE W Ons Two Month Months Ago Ago One Year Ago 4.7 40.0 4.5 40.4 5.1 40.0 3.9 40.9 468 307 298 470 305 296 460 301 298 425 277 284 Latest Month Latest Month One TWo Month Months Ago Ago One Year Ago EMPLOYMENT Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work ForceJt . . . . . Jan. Avg. Weekly Hrs. in Mfg. (Hrs.) . . . Jan. 154 154 154 189 58 149 153 147 162 55 149 152 147 157 53 151 157 148 175 59 4. 6 40.3 4. 7 39.9 4. 9 39.6 3. 9 39.9 354 233 294 Nonfarm Employm entt.......................... Manufacturing .................................... Nonmanufacturing............................... C o n s tru c tio n .................................... Farm Em ploym ent.................................... Unemployment Rate (Percent of Work ForceJt . . . . Avg. Weekly Hours in Mfg (Krs.) . . Jan. FINANCE AND BANKING 366 232 283 347 230 277 325 203 262 FINANCE AND BANKING Manufacturing Payrolls .......................... Jan. Farm Cash R e c e ip ts .....................................Dec. 250 124 254 156 247 12 2 . Jan. . Jan. 240 116 •For Sixth District area only; other totals for entire six states “ Daily average basis ^Employment and payroll figures for Florida have been adjusted to new bench mark data. fPreliminary data r-Revised N.A. Not available Sources: Manufacturing production estimated by this Bank; nonfarm, mfg. and nonmfg. emp., mfg. payrolls and hours, and unemp., U.S. Dept, of Labor and cooperating state agencies; cotton consumption, U.S. Bureau of Census; construction contracts, F. W. Dodge Div., McGraw-Hill Information Systems Co.; petrol, prod., U.S. Bureau of Mines; industrial use of elec. power, Fed. Power Comm.; farm cash receipts and farm emp., U .S .D A Other indexes based on data collected by this Bank. All indexes calculated by this Bank. D e b it s to D e m a n d D e p o s it A c c o u n ts In su re d C o m m e rc ia l B a n k s in th e S ix th D istric t (In T h o u s a n d s of D o llars) Percent Change Percent Change Jan. 1970 from Jan. 1971 from Dec. 1970 Jan. 1971 Jan. 1970 Dec. 1970 STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREASt Birmingham . . Gadsden . . . . Huntsville . . . M o b i le ..................... Montgomery . . Tuscaloosa . . . . 2,083,890 73,376 222,143 675,764 409,314 133,040 2,301,729 78,170 247,584 685,712 464,322 141,018 2,011,268 70,472 236,079 672,506 386,720 129,262 Ft. Lauderdale— Hollywood . . Jacksonville . . . Miami ..................... Orlando . . . . Pensacola . . . Tallahassee . . . Tampa—St. Pete. . W. Palm Beach . 1,300,248 1,970,677 . 4,259,391 912,935 310,234 227,769 . 2,607,638 . 779,562 1,219,240 2,256,347 4,708,264 1,015,083 323,472 235,605 2,513,506 778,517 1,282,452 1,980,985 4,041,729 856,716 254,932 193,015 2,496,828 797,560 A l b a n y ..................... A t l a n t a ..................... Augusta . . . . Columbus . . . . Macon ..................... Savannah . . . 132,642 . 7,959,200 348,906 294,466 368,535 360,829 139,921 8,860,144 349,627 334,155 403,731 401,162 124,207 7,708,432 327,949 282,919 332,604 357,495 Baton Rouge . . Lafayette . . . . Lake Charles . . New Orleans . . . 818,632 185,579 182,210 . 3,163,482 821,797 183,502 181,423 3,263,373 165,190 848,208 1,015,360 626,635 1,893,039 Biloxi— Gulfport Jackson . . . . Chattanooga . . Knoxville . . . . Nashville . . . . . - 9 - 6 -10 - 1 - 12 - 6 + 7 -1 3 - 9 -10 + 4 + 4 - 6 + 1 + 6 + 3 + 1 - 0 + 5 + 7 - 4 - 3 + 4 + 0 +22 - 5 + 7 + 3 + 6 + 4 -10 - 0 - 12 - 9 +18 + 4 - 2 -10 + 11 + 1 823,050r 184,699 192,231 2,974,312 - 0 + 1 + 0 - 3 - 0 + 1 - 5 + 6 175,372 1,002,898 158,581 864,755 - 6 -1 5 + 4 - 2 967,578 675,991 2,089,748 871,470 586,013 1,897,973 + 5 - 7 - 9 + 17 + 7 - 0 OTHER CENTERS Anniston ..................... D o t h a n .......................... Selma .......................... 82,280 99,464 50,022 B a r t o w .......................... Bradenton . . . . Brevard County . . Daytona Beach . . Ft. Myers— N. F t Myers . . . 42,252 116,936 242,944 132,733 167,564 83,962 97,772 61,235r 80,379 89,184 50,983 - 2 + 2 -1 8 + 2 +12 - 2 44,734 112,171 260,735 117,367 49,175 114,391 269,981 117,082 - 6 + 4 - 7 + 13 -14 + 2 168,481 146,096 - ’Includes only bank* in the Sixth District portion of the state F E D E R A L R E SE R V E B A N K O F A T L A N T A 1 Jan. 1971 Jan. 1970 -10 + 13 +15 tPartially estimated Dec. 1970 Jan. 1970 Dec. 1969 Jan. 1969 - 1 1 + 7 - 2 +16 - 7 142,031 219,125 60,358 106,681 27,576 603,813 199,376 1,324,278 99,139 117,729 190,555 42,867 105,970 27,811 518,958 211,768 1,343,323 106,736 140,987 62,307 124,563 16,652 85,058 47,302 26,195 28,631 97,017 67,488 165,884 66,985 143,529 20,078 102,292 53,693 25,358 36,248 109,461 75,693 108,258 60,583 112,753 16,749 105,835 44,215 24,036 28,874 96,742 68,774 - 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 . . . . . . 16,175 184,390 8,487 49,728 53,448 17,783 37,948 17,332 178,611 10,471 52,117 50,461 17,469 33,251 18,134 179,255 9,166 44,979 47,715 18,472 35,321 - 7 + 3 -19 - 5 + 6 + 2 +14 - 4 + 7 . . . . 82,403 51,614 78,971 41,565 81,821 55,208 82,676 48,739 58,595 55,295 85,509 45,232 + 1 - 7 - 4 -1 5 +41 - 7 - 8 - 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,914 57,419 35,534 96,473 64,457 38,601 79,896 51,457 26,881 -2 2 - 1 1 - 8 - Bristol ..................... . . Johnson City . . . . . . Kingsport . . . . 100,248 119,151 170,397 113,427 115,135 200,414 94,967 103,101 172,872 - 12 + 6 +16 - 1 Gainesville . . . Lakeland . . . . Monroe County ..................... Ocala St. Augustine . . St. Petersburg . . Sarasota . . . . Tampa ..................... Winter Haven . . . . . . . . . . . . 126,089 . 186,054 . 49,791 . 98,079 . 25,037 . 625,022 . 193,117 . 1,355,608 . 106,689 Athens ..................... Brunswick . . . Dalton ..................... Elberton . . . . Gainesville . . . Griffin ..................... LaGrange . . . . Newnan . . . . Rome ..................... Valdosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abbeville . . . . Alexandria . . . B u n k i e ..................... Hammond . . . New Iberia . . . Plaquemine . . . Thibodaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hattiesburg Meridian . . Natchez . . Pascagoula— Moss Point Vicksburg . . Yazoo City . District Total Alabamat Florida* . Georgia* . Louisiana** Mississippi** Tennessee** * Estimated . . . . . 45,911,505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,302,593 15,692,109 12,024,317 5,477,434 1,923,879 5,491,173 -1 5 -18 - 8 - 9 + 4 - 3 + 2 + 8 - 10 +20 - 9 + 1 - 0 -15 - 7 -13 -17 -17 +30 + 3 - 12 + 7 + 9 - 1 + 0 - 2 + 3 + 3 -1 5 + 10 - 1 -2 0 - 1 1 + 3 - 7 + 11 + 12 6 + 12 +32 48,572,723r 44,263,517r - 5 + 4 5,680,695r 5,201,051 16,410,773 15,232,468 13,153,350 11,485,262 5,286,580r 5,407,682 1,926,278 2,153,311 5,766,912 5,131,878 - 7 - 4 - 9 + 1 + + + + + - 1 1 - 5 2 3 5 4 0 7 r-Revised 59 D is t r ic t B u s in e s s C o n d it io n s The Southeastern economic picture has brightened a bit. Nonfarm employment picked up in January; the gain was fairly evenly shared among different industries and states. Auto sales have strengthened somewhat. However, construction contract dollar volume in January was down from December's un usually high level. The index of farm prices remained depressed. At the banks, weak demand for busi ness loans combined with declining short-term interest rates in February to produce the ninth prime rate cut in less than a year. Preliminary data indicate that nonfarm employ ment rose in three of the four reporting District states in January. O n ly F lo rid a sh o w e d e m p lo y m e n t losses, w ith th e largest de clin e s o c c u rrin g in tra n s p o rta tio n , service, and tra d e e m p lo y m e n t. G eo rg ia , Louisiana, and M ississip p i re co rd e d gains in n o n m a n u fa c tu rin g e m p lo y m e n t. Both m a n u fa c tu rin g e m p lo y m e n t and w e e k ly ho urs ed ge d u p w a rd . Further interest rate reductions occurred in February. E ffe ctive F ebruary 13, th is Bank lo w e re d its d is c o u n t rate by 1 p e rce n t, w h ic h p la ce d th e A c u rre n t rate at 4 - 3 p e rce n t. In th e fo llo w in g w e ek, A m o st D is tric t banks a n n o u n c e d a n o th e r 1 -p e r A ce n t re d u c tio n in th e ir p rim e le n d in g rate, b rin g in g th e cost o f ba nk c re d it m o re in lin e w ith o th e r s h o rt-te rm rates. C o m m e rc ia l and in d u s tria l loan d e m a n d re m a in e d w e ak at th e la rg e r banks, w h ile le n d in g in v o lv in g secu ritie s to bro ke rs, dealers, and o th e rs ad van ced th ro u g h th e firs t p a rt o f February. S tron g in flo w s o f tim e and savings d e posits at m e d iu m - and sm all-size banks sh o w no signs o f le ttin g up. For the first time in five months, unit auto sales for January passed the year-ago level. In January, consum ers d id n o t m ake m o re use o f in s ta lm e n t c re d it at c o m m e rc ia l banks. T he d o lla r v o lu m e d ro p p e d m o re fo r e xte nsio ns o f n e w c re d it tha n fo r repaym ents. H ence, to ta l c o n s u m e r c re d it o u t sta n d in g d e c lin e d s lig h tly . January figures reveal a drop in the dollar volume of both residential and nonresidential construction contract awards. N e verthe less, p re lim in a ry data suggest a c o n tin u a tio n o f large savings in flo w s at D is tric t savings in s titu tio n s in January, p u ttin g fu rth e r d o w n w a rd pressure o n m o rtg a g e rates. M a n y savings and loan associations are b u ild in g u p th e ir liq u id ity p o s itio n s s u b s ta n tia lly and have been b u y in g m o re m ortga ge s fro m o u ts id e th e ir d ire c t le n d in g areas. In spite of freezes that damaged the unharvested crop, citrus prices declined further in January. Prices o f m ilk , eggs, hogs, an d to b a c c o jo in e d th e d o w n w a rd tre n d . B roilers, b e e f ca ttle , vegetables, and gra in crop s e xp e rie n c e d p ric e increases, h o w ever. T his o ffs e t o th e r p ric e d e clin e s and re su lte d in little n e t change in th e ge ne ral a g ric u ltu ra l p ric e level. Severe w in te r w e a th e r c o n trib u te d to in creased e x p e n d itu re s fo r liv e s to c k fee d, re d u c in g p ro fits in th e reg io n. NOTE: Data on which statements are based have been adjusted whenever possible to eliminate seasonal influences. 60 MONTHLY REVIEW March 1971