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A T L A N T A , G E O R G IA , J A N U A R Y 31, 1953

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F lo o d

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C h a n g i n g S t r u c t u r e o f D i s t r i c t ’s E c o n o m y
B a n k in g a n d C r e d it D e v e l o p m e n t s
F a r m e r s ’ A tte n tio n S h ifts fr o m

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C o n d itio n
D e b its to

of 27

P r o d u c tio n t o P r ic e s

M e m b e r B a n k s in L e a d i n g

I n d iv id u a l B an k A c c o u n ts

D e p a r tm e n t S to r e S a le s a n d I n v e n to r ie s
I n s ta lm e n t C a s h

Loans

R e t a i l F u r n itu r e S t o r e O p e r a t i o n s
W h o le s a le S a le s a n d I n v e n to r ie s

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Indexes:




C o n s tr u c tio n
C o tto n

C o n tr a c ts

C o n s u m p tio n

D e p a r tm e n t S to r e

S a le s a n d

E le c tr ic P o w e r P r o d u c tio n
F u r n itu r e S t o r e

S a le s

G a s o lin e T ax C o lle c tio n s
M a n u fa c tu r in g E m p lo y m e n t
P e tr o le u m

P r o d u c tio n

T u rn o v e r o f D e m a n d D e p o s its

S to c k s

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Riffling the fresh white pages of a new calendar on the
desk— each page a day, and so far each one blank—
almost everyone is inclined to wonder with what kind of
record history will fill those pages by the year’s end. At
the beginning of 1953, this air of wonder is as heavy
upon us as in any past year and differences among ob­
servers as to the shape of the future, it must be confessed,
seem as great as ever. There is, indeed, substantial
unanimity of opinion with regard to the first quarter or
the first half of the year which nearly everyone sees as
another boom period. Beyond that, the predictions, all
tightly hedged and duly qualified with many “ifs,” “ands,”
and “buts,” begin to diverge.
Some observers foresee a fairly serious economic set­
back beginning sometime in the second half of the year.
Others, too, foresee a decline, but put it in 1954, with
only subtle recessionary currents forming beneath the
surface during 1953. Still others think the break may
not come until 1955. There are differences, too, among
observers with respect to the depth and duration of the
predicted decline, some thinking that it will be of only
minor proportions, and others believing that it may be
on the order of the 1938 relapse; some think that it will
be quite brief, while others predict that it may last for
twelve to eighteen months or longer.
Beneath all their differences, however, analysts seem
generally agreed that at some point or other, whether
near or remote, the boom must end. There is disagree­
ment mainly on the timing of the end. The one point of
agreement seems to rest upon a lingering, deep-seated
belief in the dictum that “what goes up must come down”
and also upon the observation that past experience lends
little substance to the hope that the business cycle has
at last been exorcised.
Disagreement among forecasters, although frequently
the object of good-humored, but sometimes angry, chiding
by laymen, is both understandable and excusable. Stare
as deeply as we may into the cauldron of statistics, and
observe as carefully as we may the graphs writhing across
our charts, we still cannot penetrate with assurance the
curtain that separates the past from the future. Figures,
after all, only record what has already happened and do
not carry on their face any necessary implication of what
is yet to come. History has often had a queer way of
making nonsense of the most carefully reasoned predic­
tions based upon the extrapolation of past trends into
the future, and never more so than in the period since
the end of the Second World War.
It was almost universally expected, for example, that
the end of the war would bring with it an economic set­
back of major proportions. What else, indeed, could
reasonably have been expected? The war would leave a



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large part of the civilized world in ruins, and it seemed
unthinkable that the United States could survive as a
lonely island of prosperity in a sea of economic misery.
More than once some mere weakness in the world econ­
omy had been communicated to our own with disastrous
results. What effects could we now expect from a pros­
trate world economy?
At home we had so expanded productive facilities that
the Federal Reserve index of industrial production nearly
doubled between 1940, when it stood at 125, and 1943
when it reached its peak, 239. With the cessation of the
war demand for goods, would not the country be left
with an industrial plant extended far beyond anything
the civilian economy was likely to need?
And what would happen to the demand for goods and
services when Government purchases, which rose from
13.1 billion dollars in 1939 to 96.5 billion in 1944, should
fall off drastically with the war’s end? How could public
purchasing power then be maintained? And if purchasing
power should decline, what incentive would business have
to expand investment in plant and equipment still further?
Then, too, there was the threat of unemployment. In
1940, we had 47.5 million persons engaged in agricultural
and non-agricultural employment. By 1943, under the
stress of war, this figure had risen to 54.5 million, but
had fallen thereafter as the armed forces of the country
were built up to 11.3 million. What would happen when
perhaps ten million young men and women would be
demobilized? In 1940, 8.1 million persons were estimated
to be unemployed. Now, with a larger population, with
a shrunken demand for goods and services, with an over­
extended industrial plant, and with millions of demobilized
veterans in the market for jobs, would not unemployment
make a reappearance on an alarming scale?

The First Wave
With such difficult questions staring them in the face, and
with the apparent answers so obviously gloomy, it is little
wonder that all thinking men viewed the future with con­
siderable trepidation of soul. But the anticipated depres­
sion did not occur. Instead, the nation was almost imme­
diately overwhelmed by a wave of prosperity that began to
rise in 1946, reached its crest in the fall of 1948, and then
subsided in a minor recession that ran on into the last half
of 1949.
The Federal Reserve index of industrial production that
had fallen from its wartime high to 170 in 1946 climbed
to 192 in 1948 and then subsided to 176 in 1949. Busi­
ness expenditures for new plant and equipment that had
amounted to only 8.7 billion dollars in 1945, the last year
of the war, jumped to 14.9 billion in 1946, to 22.1 billion
in 1948, and then dropped back to 19.3 billion in 1949.
• 2

•

The number of job holders rose from 52.8 million in 1945
to 55.2 million in 1946, and reached 59.4 million in 1948
at the crest of the wave. It then declined slightly to 58.7
million in 1949.
Other series similarly reflect this first postwar wave of
prosperity. Personal income rose from 171.9 billion dollars
in 1945 to 177.7 billion in 1946, and then jumped to
209.5 billion in 1948. The year 1949, however, brought
a small decline, lowering the figure to 205.9 billion. Dis­
posable personal income (what is left after tax and non­
tax payments to governmental units) displayed a similar
pattern. In 1945, disposable personal income stood at
151.1 billion dollars, but by 1946 it had climbed to 158.9
billion, and by 1948 to 188.4 billion. The 1949 recession
brought the figure back slightly to 187.2 billion. Expendi­
tures for personal consumption likewise increased from
123.1 billion dollars in 1945 to 146.9 billion in 1946, and
then went on to reach 177.9 billion in 1948. The 1949
recession, however, did not check the rise in this particular
series for, by curtailing its savings and by expanding its
use of credit, the public pushed these expenditures up to
180.6 billion in 1949.
Although coming as a surprise to many, this first post­
war wave of prosperity was indeed welcome. It was, never­
theless, the gloomiest boom on record for it was accom­
panied by a great many misgivings as to its stability. It
seemed too good to be true. When the 1949 recession set
in, misgivings deteriorated into fears that now, at last,
the country was about to tumble into the long-heralded
postwar depression.
Had not business, in the process of reconverting from
war to peace modernized, retooled, refurbished, and ex­
panded its facilities as much as the situation warranted
and probably more so? And did not the 1949 decline in
expenditures for new plant and equipment indicate that
business itself had serious doubts of the ability of future
markets to justify any further expansion? And as for the
consuming public— had not its accumulated demand for
durable and nondurable goods been made good by now?
And had not the public already spent a large part of its
wartime savings and, besides, gone dangerously deep into
debt, consumer credit outstanding rising from 8.7 billion
dollars in 1946, to 11.9 billion in 1947, to 14.4 billion in
1948, and to 16.8 billion in 1949, when everything seemed
about to slide? There was indeed some reason to believe
that the expected postwar “readjustment” (the current
euphemism for “depression”) was already in its initial
stages.

The Second
Again, however, the worst did not happen. In the late
summer and fall of 1949, the index of industrial produc­
tion turned sharply upward and by June 1950, when the
Korean War broke out, stood at 199— higher than the
monthly average for 1948, the peak year of the preceding
boom, when it was 176. From then on it continued to rise,
somewhat irregularly, until it reached a crest at 222 in
February of 1952.
Business expenditures for new plant and equipment,
which had fallen from an annual rate of 21 billion dollars
in the first quarter of 1949 to 17.8 billion in the fourth



quarter, turned about and marched uphill throughout
1950, reaching a total of 20.6 billion for the year. In 1951
the figure continued to climb, quarter by quarter, and for
the year amounted to 26.3 billion. No halting place was
reached until the second quarter of 1952, by which time
expenditures for new plant and equipment were running
at an annual rate of 27.5 billion dollars.
The number of job holders, which declined insignificant­
ly from 59.4 million in 1948 to 58.7 million in 1949, rose
to 60 million in 1950 and to 61 million in 1951. In August
of that year the number reached a peak at 62.6 million, the
highest level ever achieved in our history. A goal of 60
million jobs that had seemed starry-eyed when first sug­
gested at the end of the Second World War now had been
passed by a substantial margin.
Other indicators were similarly swept upward on this
second postwar wave of prosperity. Total personal income
in 1949 had amounted to 205.9 billion dollars, but was
running at an annual rate of 221 billion at the time of the
Korean outbreak in June 1950. For the year 1950 it
amounted to 226.3 billion dollars, for 1951 to 254.1
billion and by June 1952, it was at an annual rate of 266.7
billion. Disposable personal income climbed almost with­
out interruption from 187.2 billion dollars in 1949 to an
annual rate of 231.5 billion in the second quarter of 1952.
In the same period, personal consumption expenditures
rose from 180.6 billion dollars to 214.9 billion, and per­
sonal savings, with numerous ups and downs, from 6.7
billion dollars to 16.5 billion.
All in all, this second wave of postwar prosperity was
as good and better than the first. There were those, of
course, who said that it was merely the result of over­
stimulation resulting from the Korean War, and if it had
not been for that sad event there is no telling where we
might have been. The fact, however, is that the revival
from the 1949 recession was already well under way
before the Korean outbreak occurred. It is true, of course,
that the heavy military expenditures needed to carry on
the war, as well as to build up the strength of ourselves
and of the western world in a global effort to resist the
expansion of Soviet Russia, carried the wave to a higher
crest in terms of dollars than would probably have been
reached in its absence.
There were those, too, who said that this was a “phony”
prosperity built on the insubstantial foundation of inflation.
True, they said, the dollar aggregates were stupendous, but
the dollars themselves were much smaller because of the
rise in prices. The wholesale price index (1947-49 ^
100) had risen from a monthly average of 78.7 in 1946
to 103.1 in 1950, and to 114.8 in 1951. The consumers
price index (1935-39 = 100) had likewise gone from a
monthly average of 139.5 in 1946 to 171.9 in 1950, and
up to 185.6 in 1951. Because of these price rises, there­
fore, it was said that the second wave of postwar prosperity
was largely an illusion.
To the uninstructed observer, however, the thousands
of new factories, large and small, scattered across the face
of the country, seemed real enough, as did the millions of
new tools and machines they housed and with which mil­
lions of additional workers earned fat pay envelopes. A
similar air of reality clung to the nearly six million new

• 3•

dwelling units built or started between the end of the war
and the end of 1951; to the millions of new automobiles
that crowded city streets and open highways; to the mil­
lions of new television sets and other consumer durable
goods; to the new stores, new hospitals, and new churches
in our cities; to improved farm buildings, millions of
pieces of new farm machinery, and fat, sleek herds in
areas that once knew only dreary rural poverty. However
much inflation may have distorted the dollar figures in
which the business situation is customarily depicted, it
was apparent to anyone with eyes that the American
people were living well. They were living better, indeed,
than they had ever lived before— better than any people
in all history had ever lived— and this despite the drain
on the nation’s energy and resources occasioned by war
and defense requirements.

The Third
The second postwar wave of prosperity ended in nothing
more than a hesitation in some of the indexes in the first
half of 1952. The index of industrial production hovered
in the neighborhood of 221 for the first three months but
then fell off rapidly to 193 in July, a decline occasioned
largely by the steel strike. Total business sales see-sawed
uncertainly between 44.8 billion dollars in January and
43.6 billion in August. Personal income remained rela­
tively stable through July, when it was running at an
annual rate of 263.9 billion dollars. Business expenditures
for new plant and equipment remained stationary at 27.5
billion dollars a year in the second and third quarters. Dis­
posable personal income increased in the second quarter
over the first as did expenditures for personal consumption,
but savings declined by nearly a billion dollars a year and
there was a drop in total consumer credit outstanding in
February, March, and April. From March to July, there
was also a sharp drop in exports of merchandise and a
smaller decline in imports. Except for a bulge in June,
July, and August, the wholesale price level was on a down­
ward trend, whereas the consumers price index was ad­
vancing slightly.
In the latter months of 1952, however, a third wave
of prosperity engulfed the country, carrying nearly all
indexes to the highest levels ever reached. Although most
of the figures for this period are still preliminary, they
probably understate rather than overstate the real situation.
The index of industrial production passed 230 by the end
of the year; business expenditures for plant and equip­
ment reached an estimated all-time high annual rate of
28.3 billion dollars in the fourth quarter; total business
sales topped 48 billion dollars in October and probably
increased still further during the remainder of the year;
personal income reached an estimated annual rate of
276.1 billion dollars in October and November and kept
on climbing; disposable personal income was at a record
annual rate of 235.3 billion dollars in the third quarter,
and personal consumption expenditures at a similar high
of 215 billion dollars. By the third quarter, personal
savings had mounted to 20.3 billion dollars a year. Total
consumer credit outstanding reached an all-time high of
22.3 billion dollars in October, and in November bank
loans reached a similar high, at a 62.4 billion dollar



level. Effective management of the nation’s money supply
had meanwhile played an important part in keeping both
the wholesale and the consumers price levels relatively
stable.
In the closing weeks of 1952 and these early weeks of
1953, it is apparent that we have been living through what
someone has called a period of “seething stability.” By
now the most bearish of the bears have nearly all been
converted into at least reluctant bulls. It is difficult, indeed,
to find anyone who foresees serious trouble in 1953, bar­
ring, of course, a worsening of the international situation.

The Last?
Apart from the waste, the tragedy, and the heartbreak of
war, the American people, ever since 1945, have resembled
a carefree vacationer standing at flood tide on the sun­
drenched sands of a Florida beach, tingling with exhilara­
tion at the impact of spume-encrusted breakers riding hard
on each other’s heels, each one greater than the last. But
the man on the beach knows that flood tide does not last
forever, and that sooner or later will come the wave that
marks a turning point. There will be other waves, but they
will lack the force of their predecessors. And, when the
tide has ebbed, the man on the beach knows that beneath
his feet the sands will lie gray and wet and desolate where
once had been the madness of rushing waters. Thus, even
as we thrill to the impact of the wave of economic pros­
perity now roaring over the country, we wonder if this is
the last before the ebbing of the tide.
No reasonable person, of course, could expect the whole
economy to go on expanding indefinitely at its current
rate. The economy is not like a spherical balloon that ex­
pands equally at all points on its surface. On the contrary,
in any major expansion or contraction, the various seg­
ments of the economy are more than likely to share
unequally in the general movement, and some, perhaps,
may not share in it at all. These differences in rates of
change, or even in the direction of the change, necessarily
create within the structure of the economy temporary
dislocations and maladjustments that may take some time
to correct. Such a period of correction, in which the
economy moves to restore a measure of equilibrium among
its parts, usually entails a descent from some previously
achieved high level of activity— some abatement of a pre­
ceding boom. The breaking of any particular wave upon
the shore, however, is not the same thing as the ebbing of
the tide.
The present wave of prosperity, like its predecessors,
may therefore be expected to subside to some degree from
the crest it will probably reach during the first half of
1953. There are many reasons justifying such an expecta­
tion, but they are all related in one way or another to a
waning of the forces unleased by this country’s extraordi­
nary effort to build up its own actual and potential mili­
tary strength, as well as that of its allies, in order to meet
the thrusts of Soviet power in various parts of the world.
But the armed forces of the nation, that had been
allowed to decline to a million and a half or less, have now
been built back to 3.6 million and, barring war, no further
increase is expected. The program of defense plant build­
ing that currently accounts for approximately a quarter
• 4 -

of all capital formation has by now been practically com­
pleted, and already there is talk of putting some plants
in moth-balls. The more vigorous use of indirect credit
controls by the Federal Reserve System has brought with­
in bounds an inflation that for a while threatened to be­
come rampant. Price levels are now stable or falling and
there is therefore less incentive for business to indulge in
excessive forward buying and inventory building, and for
inflationary wage increases to be demanded or granted.
Everywhere the special stimulations arising from this coun­
try’s vast military effort are apparently on the wane.
Into this situation there is now injected the possibility
of a decline in the rate of military expenditures. The
question that now disturbs some observers is, What may
be the impact of such a decline upon the economy if it
should occur? In addition, there is also the possibility
that expenditures for foreign aid may be cut. Together,
these two factors presage some decline in income; some
decline in the demand for goods and services.
Farmers are already beginning to be pinched between
high costs and a decline in world prices for agricultural
commodities resulting from a resumption of agricultural
production abroad. Industry may find itself caught in a
similar squeeze. We have created in this country the largest
and most productive industrial plant in history. Much of
it, however, has been built at the highest cost in history
and can operate profitably only on a basis of high employ­
ment and a high level of spending by the consuming pub­
lic. Burdened by high and inflexible costs, this plant could
conceivably prove vulnerable to declining prices and
shrinking demand.
Another disquieting feature of the present situation is
the size of the country’s debt, both public and private.
The rapid rise in private debt, which now exceeds public
debt by probably better than 50 billion dollars, is partic­
ularly disturbing, and of this the most dangerous segments
are the great volume of consumer credit and of mortgage
indebtedness outstanding. How vulnerable will this debt
prove to be in the face of even a moderate decline in in­
comes and employment, and how serious would be the
repercussions that would be pushed back through the
channels of retail trade to wholesale trade, to manufac­
turers, and to banks, in case this debt should prove insup­
portable?
These are some of the fears that cause people to wonder
if we are about to witness merely the subsiding of a wave,
or if we are not rather about to experience the ebbing of
the tide. Against these fears of the possible effect of a
relatively modest reduction in the rate of military expen­
ditures, however, should be set the amazing performance
of the economy in the face of a 73.2 billion dollar a year
decline in the purchase of goods and services by the Fed­
eral Government between 1944 and 1947.
Allowing for all the differences between the situation
then and now, if the economy could then meet the shock
of a large reduction in Government expenditures with a
wave of prosperity instead of the anticipated depression,
it is reasonable to conclude that it can now absorb the




impact of a much smaller reduction without any wide­
spread bad effects. Although we do not now have the same
backlog of accumulated demand for capital goods, for
consumer goods, and for housing that we had at the end
of the war, there are still many deficits in the civilian
economy to be made up— deficits in schools, highways,
hospitals, and probably still a great deal of residential and
commercial building to take care of the growing popula­
tion.
Moreover, the high rate of obsolescence in both capital
and consumer goods, created by rapid technological
changes incident to the chemical and electronic revolutions
now remaking our lives and by the still more radical
changes that will undoubtedly come with the application
of nuclear fission in industry, will necessitate a high rate
of new investment for years to come. In view of these fac­
tors, to say nothing of the governmentally created safe­
guards against depression that have become structural
parts of our economy, it would seem that the most we
have to fear in the immediate future is some minor sub­
sidence of the wave of prosperity and not the ebb of the
economic tide.
In any case, the tides of high prosperity and deep de­
pression that have swept across the economy in the past
were not like those at sea. They were not caused by some
extra-terrestrial moon. They were not the acts of God, but
of men. They were the composite results of the exercise
by men of the freedom of will with which God endowed
them, and of the freedom of economic choice vouch­
safed to them by the Constitution. They were the results
of the billions of free decisions that make up the warp and
woof of economic life.
This freedom has often been exercised capriciously,
irrationally, irresponsibly, and selfishly. It can, on the
other hand, be exercised seriously, rationally, responsibly,
and with a decent regard to the common good. In free­
dom, therefore, lies both our danger and our hope. If the
economy is looked upon as a battle-ground where freedom
is to be used by individuals, by groups, and by classes
merely to squeeze the maximum selfish advantage from
every situation and, in doing so, to outwit, to defeat, and
to do each other down, then we indeed run the risk of
bringing economic catastrophe down upon our heads.
But the free capitalistic economy is not a battle-ground
even though it is by nature competitive, for conflict and
competition are not the same thing. Since this system rests
upon freedom as its fundamental premise, the most ob­
vious common sense demands that freedom be exercised
by all groups and classes in co-operation with each other,
not in conflict. Only thus can the success, or, indeed, the
survival, of the system be assured. In a world in which
freedom is in jeopardy everywhere, the United States bears
the heavy moral responsibility for making our kind of
economy work. If all of our policies and planning are
directed to that common end, we may preserve both
prosperity and freedom and thereby not have to experi­
ence an ebbing of the tide.
E a r l e

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R a u b e r

C h a n g i n g S t r u c t u r e o f D i s t r i c t ’s E c o n o m y
By almost all measures, 1952 was a prosperous year for
the Sixth District. Income from all types of economic
activity was high, and from many types, higher than in
any preceding year. Payments to individuals during 1952
were estimated by this bank to be between 6 and 8
percent greater than those estimated by the Department
of Commerce for 1951.
A continued high rate of Government expenditures
added substantially to total income. Manufacturing em­
ployment for the year averaged 2 percent higher than in
1951, and increased wage rates added further to total
earnings. By engaging in a large program of plant ex­
pansion, the District’s manufacturing industry helped raise
construction contracts awarded during the year in District
states to over 2.5 billion dollars. Income from trade,
service, and financial activities responded in accordance
with the total income growth.
Although some types of economic activity did not add
significantly to total income growth in 1952, they were
carried on at levels that compare extremely well with
those of preceding years. Agricultural income, as discussed
elsewhere in this issue, was about the same as in the
preceding year and still accounted for about 11 percent
of total District income. There was little gain in the value
of residential contracts awarded in 1952, but the total
still exceeded that for any preceding year except 1950.
Consumer spending and saving reflected the over-all
growth in income. Department stores set a new record in
1952, selling an estimated 658 million dollars worth of
merchandise, 8 percent more than in 1951. Total spend­
ing, however, did not rise in proportion to the total in­
come growth. Consequently, individuals added over a
billion dollars to their long-term savings, another new
postwar record.
Activity of these economic forces was more than strong
enough to offset what might have been influences leading
to lowered income under other circumstances. Declining
prices for many products important to the District’s
economy characterized 1952. Foreign demand for some
of the area’s products was off, as was reflected in decreased
exports through District ports. Moreover, the District’s
two most important manufacturing industries from the
standpoint of numbers employed— textiles and lumber—
operated at comparatively low levels during the year.
The District pattern of a greater-than-national rate of
income growth, established after the beginning of World
War II, still held. Although there have been a few years
during this period when District income has deviated from
this pattern, in the last decade it has tripled, whereas
income payments for the nation have expanded only two
and a half times.
This income growth might be taken as conclusive
evidence that the South, as represented by that part in­
cluded in the Sixth District, is firmly set on a course that
will ultimately lead to a per capita income equal to that
for other parts of the nation. But there are students of
the Southern economy who would point out that this



period of income growth could be termed abnormal. It
was a period when growth was stimulated by the un­
usually high defense expenditures of World War II and
the Korean War. Something more basic is required to
ultimately solve the South’s problems. These students be­
lieve that a change in the structure of the economy is
necessary. Such a change, it is generally agreed, would
involve, among other things, less dependence upon agri­
culture, more industrialization— especially of the type
requiring high capital expenditures per worker, and a
greater ability of the region to supply its own capital.
There may be, consequently, some value when reviewing
the economic events of 1952, to weigh them in the light
of their temporary or continuing influence on the region’s
economic development.
Influence o f G overnm ent sp en d in g on District incom e
still strong
Whether the contribution of Government expenditures is
considered a permanent factor in the South’s development,
of course, depends upon the point of view about future
Government expenditures. As in every other section of
the United States and as has been true for a good many
years, the influence of this item was strongly apparent in
the District during 1952. Government payrolls alone
account for over one-tenth of income in District states;
other Government payments bring the proportion of in­
come from Government sources up to around; 20 percent.
With Government payments representing such a large
part of total income, the 5-percent growth in Government
employment reported for 1952 can have important effects.
Payrolls for 1952 are estimated as about 10 percent greater
than for 1951. Spending on additional facilities at military
installations and state and local government spending on
public works provided the stimulus for other incomecreating activities not classified as Government. An out­
standing example was the contract awarded for an atomic
energy facility plant valued at 464 million dollars.
The question of whether civilian demand would offset
a decline in Government expenditures that would likely
come with a tapering off of the defense program would
be, of course, a national problem. But because of the
greater relative importance of Government payments to
total income, a major cut in expenditures might become
an even more serious District problem. An encouraging
note, however, is that a large part of the growth in District
income in 1952 can be traced directly to factors other
than the expansion in Government expenditures.
M anufacturing em p loym en t e x p a n d s d esp ite low er
te x tile and lum ber activity
That manufacturing contributed more to income growth
in 1952 than Government spending did is evidence that
significant changes have taken place in the economic
structure of the area. In 1952, it was not the extraordi­
narily high defense demands for the products of the
region’s older and more important industries that raised
•

6

•

total manufacturing production; it was the demands for
the products that the newer, and in many cases, expand­
ing, industries were able to supply.
Had not the District’s manufacturing industry changed
in character, there is little doubt that declining prices for
products important to the District economy would have
more seriously affected total manufacturing activity than
they did. In 1952, these wholesale prices continued the
decline started in 1951, which was both longer and more

close of World War II. Although this expansion and that
in other types of manufacturing have not brought dramatic
changes in the District’s economic structure when viewed
year by year, the cumulative change has been substantial.
In 1952, the District was reaping the rewards for invest­
ments made in the preceding postwar years.

M anufacturing Employment and Payrolls

Considered in the light of the basic changes in District
manufacturing, announcements made during 1952 of new
industrial facilities and expansions take on added signifi­
cance. Major projects of private concerns will cost, when
completed, about 435 million dollars. This figure is based
upon a tabulation of data contained in press and Govern­
ment agency reports and from other sources. It excludes
projects of less than one million dollars and those under­
taken by the Government, such as the atomic energy
facility. The tabulation does not include projects an­
nounced during 1951, which in the last half of that year
amounted to 990 million dollars. Obviously, these figures
are not a measure of construction actually started or of
funds expended during the year, since construction of
many facilities may extend over a period of several years.
Most of the new plants have at least two characteristics
in common. They involve large capital investments per
worker; and they will undoubtedly have a high wage scale,
since similar plants are paying higher wages than the
average rates for the District. They thus satisfy the criteria
set up by some students of Southern problems as desirable
characteristics of new industries from the standpoint of
raising Southern incomes. The additional jobs provided by
these plants will be well-paying jobs.
Practically all the 34 new chemical plants, which ac­
count for three-fifths of the proposed expenditures, involve
large capital expenditures. Estimates made by the National
Industrial Conference Board show that at present 16,000
dollars of capital investment are required for each worker
in the chemical and allied products industry in the United

PERCENT

PERCENT

Manufacturing employment grew more in the District than in the
United States, and payrolls expanded faster than employment.

severe than the one starting in 1948 and continuing into
1949. Changes accompanying the decline were also quite
different. In 1949, manufacturing employment averaged
8 percent lower than in 1948; there was no decline in
1952. Total manufacturing payrolls in 1949 were about
30 million dollars lower than in 1948; in 1952 they ex­
ceeded those of the year before.
Falling prices for District products in both 1952 and
1949 reflected declining demands for textiles and lumber,
which meant lower levels of activity in both years. It
was not until after mid-1952, when textile prices began
to advance, that textile workers were added at a greater
than seasonal rate. It was not until November that District
m ills were employing more persons than a year earlier.
District lumber employment averaged about 6 percent
lower in 1952 than in 1951. Following a price advance
in July, a slower rate of decline in employment seemed
apparent, but at the end of the year employment was still
below a year earlier.
Growth in other types of District manufacturing more
than offset the textile and lumber declines. Total manu­
facturing employment continued to grow during the first
half of the year and in the last half rose rapidly to the
highest level since 1945. Some of the growth, of course,
was directly induced by defense production demands, such
as the 3 3-percent yearly increase in average employment
in the number of transportation equipment workers, in­
cluding aircraft employees. Expansion of ordnance pro­
duction also explains some of the 16-percent growth in
fabricated metals employment. Of greater importance,
however, was the expanded employment in the paper and
allied products industry and, during most of the year, in
chemicals and allied products manufacturing.
Both the chemicals and paper industries have consis­
tently been bringing new plants into production since the



Industrial facility exp an sion contributes to basic
changes

A verage Earnings and Hours
PR O D U CT GRO UPS:

AVG.
O

H O U R LY
# 1 .0 0

W AGES
# 2 .0 0

0

$ 1 .0 0

$ 2 .0 0

0

AVG. W E E K L Y H O U R S
10
20
30
40
“ I— '— I
T

PETRO LEU M
P R IM A R Y M E T A L S
TRA N SP O R TA TIO N
PA PER

8

EQUIP.

A L L IE D

C H E M IC A L S
F A B R IC A T E D

a

A L L IE D

M ETA LS

A LL MANUFACTURED
STO N E, CLAY, a

G LA SS

T E X T IL E S
FOOD

a

LU M BER

K IN D R ED
a

WOOD

A PPAREL

0

10

20

_L_
30

40

Incomes from manufacturing in the District also rose, as a result
of longer hours worked and higher w age rates,
•

7

•

States. As a rule, such large capital investment results in
greater productivity and higher earnings per worker. In
the latter part of 1952, for example, chemical and allied
products establishments in the District were paying, on
the average, $1.51 an hour, compared with less than $1.00
an hour in the lowest paid type of manufacturing.
The same general characteristics can be ascribed to the
eight new projects for manufacturing electrical machinery,
equipment, and supplies, which rank second in impor­
tance, measured by cost. These plants will cost approxi­
mately 56 million dollars. Judging from the average hourly
earnings of $1.70 at similar plants throughout the country,
they will undoubtedly provide well-paying jobs.
Other types of manufacturing plants announced during
1952 that require high capital investments and ordinarily
pay high wage rates also include those in the petroleum,
paper, fabricated metals, primary metals, transportation
equipment, and ordnance industries. Similar District plants
are now paying hourly wages ranging from $1.50 to $2.18
compared with the present average of $1.30 for all types
of manufacturing. The proposed plants that are included
in types of manufacturing now paying less than $1.50 an
hour account for only 10 percent of the total announced
expenditures in 1952.
That the ultimate results of the current industrial ex­
pansion will probably be very different from the expansion
of World War II is seen readily from a few comparisons.
In the World War II period, munitions, ships, and aircraft
accounted for 64 percent of the total investment and 98
percent of the new employment. Because of the specialized
nature of these facilities, most of the gains made during
the war were dissipated in the postwar period. Although
basic skills necessary for greater industrialization of the
region were acquired in that period, almost entirely new
investments of approximately the same magnitude were
necessary to replace the jobs lost in these specialized war
plants. It was not until last year, and chiefly because of
these new investments, that total manufacturing employ­
ment regained its wartime level. The present expansion is
for the most part, therefore, of a more permanent nature.
High savings crea te p oten tial investm ent funds
Increasing per capita incomes in the South involves not
only large capital investments for huge industrial plants,
but also many small individual investments in small busi­
nesses which, when taken together, are of major propor­
tion. Most of this capital investment must come from local
sources, and is possible only if individuals living in the
area are able to increase their savings.
Changes in total consumer buying generally followed
the trend of department store sales, which was upward
during the year, although there were some important ex­
ceptions. To a minor degree, the rising trend in consumer
spending was in response to the termination of credit
controls early in May and to the ensuing greater use of
instalment credit. Charge account credit at department
stores probably grew no faster than would be expected on
the basis of expanded sales. Apparently, the greatest in­
fluence on expanded consumer spending was the growth
of income. Spending, however, did not increase as much
as income grew.
Because individuals in the Sixth District did not increase



their spending as much as their incomes grew, they were
able to add substantially to their long-term savings. In the
first half of 1952, savings in the form of time deposits,
savings and loan shares, life insurance equities, and United
States savings bonds grew by almost 600 million dollars,
a sum greater than in any whole year since 1946. Data
for the last half of 1952 will probably show an even
greater advance. Through October, for example, time
deposits at member banks in District states increased 8
percent, and shares in savings and loan associations shot
up 19 per cent. If this increase in long-term savings is in­
dicative of a greater ability of the District to finance its
own economic development, it was extremely significant.
A look a t problem s a h ea d
Although this brief review of Sixth District economic de­
velopments during 1952 has revealed many basic changes
pointing toward continued economic development in the
area, it has also revealed conditions that, if not of imme­
diate concern, merit serious consideration. Many of the
problems that have been characteristic of the District’s
economy in the past still remain.
Advances made during 1952 were made under condi­
tions of extremely high levels of employment for the
nation as a whole. The question of whether the basic
changes in the region’s economic structure are sufficient
to cushion the effects of any adverse change in the national
economy is as yet unanswered by experience. Income
derived from the Government is still a larger component
of total income than either manufacturing or agriculture.
An answer to the question as to the effect of a sharp
decline in Government expenditures on the District’s
economy is therefore of overwhelming importance.
Although the experience of 1952 has proved that there
is less dependence upon agriculture as a source of income
in the District, a substantial decline in agricultural income
could seriously affect the District’s economic activity. A
continuing decline in the export markets of cotton and to­
bacco, for example, or a further decline in cattle prices,
predicted in some quarters, could very seriously affect the
total agricultural income.
Continued industrial expansion in 1952 was in line with
the basic changes generally considered most desirable from
the standpoint of raising income. Manufacturing activity
has become more diversified and less dependent upon the
fortunes of its textile and lumber industries than before.
The new pattern, however, brings with it new problems. If
the program of plant expansion tapers off, for example,
will the new jobs created by the completed program
offset losses from lowered construction activity? Does the
introduction of new types of manufacturing to the District
introduce new and unstable elements, or does greater
diversification mean greater stability?
To pose these questions does not imply that the answers
are necessarily unfavorable, because the District’s develop­
ment since the end of World War II has provided favorable
answers to many equally serious questions. More than
ever before, the District’s economy is probably in a posi­
tion to withstand any shocks that might develop from
national economic changes.
C h a r l e s

• 8

•

T .

T a y l o r

B a n k in g a n d C r e d it D e v e lo p m e n t s

During 1952
During 1952, deposits and loans of Sixth District member
banks reached the highest points on record. Although in­
dustrial production and general business activity in the
nation during 1952 was characterized by “high level sta­
bility,” this term is an inadequate description of District
banking developments. For District member banks, the
year was one of growth. The growth of loans and deposits
at these banks reflected the general expansion both in the
country’s money supply and in the Sixth District’s business
activity, which continued at a greater rate than that expe­
rienced by the nation as a whole.
Two credit developments during 1952 affected both the
District banks and their customers. On the one hand, reg­
ulations on the terms of real estate and consumer credit
were removed during the year. On the other hand, the
monetary authorities did not supply Federal Reserve credit
through the purchase of Government securities as freely
as they had in the past, and a “tighter” money market
came into existence. Although these two developments
added up to more emphasis on general credit controls,
basic monetary policy remained committed to holding the
line against inflation. Taken together, the two credit devel­
opments represented a return to the tradition that a cen­
tral bank exercises control over the volume of credit but
not over its particular use.

Following the slight setbacks in 1946 and again in
1948, deposits in both the District and the United States
continued to expand during 1952. Total deposits of the
360 District member banks increased by 327 million dol­
lars. Relative to total deposits, this was a greater expan­
sion than that occurring in the nation as a whole.
And both business and consum er loans e x p a n d e d
The previous all-time high of total loans extended by
District member banks of 2,036 million dollars reached in
March 1951 was exceeded in seven months of 1952 and
a new record of 2,261 million dollars was established in
December. The record loan expansion during 1952, how­
ever, was confined to the last three quarters of the year;
loans in the early months were somewhat below the yearago level. By December, total loans of District member
banks were 13 percent higher than a year earlier.
P ercen tage Increases in
M em ber Bank D eposits
PERCEN T

PERCEN T

M oney supply increased . . . .
Changes in credit regulation were not achieved without
some further expansion of the money supply during 1952.
The decontrolling of terms on consumer and real estate
loans was followed by a considerable rise in these types
of loans at District member banks. About one-half of the
expansion in member bank loans during the year is assign­
able to these consumer and real estate loan components.
The effects of credit developments during 1952, how­
ever, were not solely in the direction of a further expanded
money supply. The higher cost of borrowing brought
about by the tight money policy undoubtedly acted to
limit the increase in lending. The demand for some types
of loans probably was decreased because the higher inter­
est costs made borrowing unprofitable. Even more im­
portant, the increase in interest rates probably restricted
banks from making some loans they might have made and
undoubtedly caused them to use funds in a different man­
ner than they would have if interest rates had been lower.
At year-end, the “sixty-four dollar question” was, Had
the inflationary threat been abated or was it reappearing?
True, loans were expanding at a greater than seasonal
rate, but nevertheless, the expanded money supply was
not pushing prices upward and commodity and wholesale
prices were actually falling. The relative stability of con­
sumer prices in the face of this divergency between these
indicators added to the enigma.



19481949

19491950

19501951

1951- NOV.
1952 NOV.

Consumer loans rose spectacularly in 1952. They began
to rise in the early months of the year after having re­
mained relatively stable throughout 1951. Perhaps equally
important, however, was the increase in bank loans to
finance companies and to retailers, many of whom were
granting direct credit to their customers. After credit con­
trols were relaxed in May, consumers needed less of a
downpayment to purchase articles on credit, and their
monthly payments were smaller because they could take
a longer period to pay for the articles. The change in credit
terms after the removal of controls was striking. Before
May 1952, the purchaser of a popular-priced washing ma­
chine was required to pay down 15 percent of the pur­
chase price. By the beginning of 1953, the required down­
payment had fallen to around 5 percent or in some cases,
even less. Since more people were able to make the initial
downpayment, credit buying increased.
Removal of controls on real estate credit had somewhat
less effect on the volume of mortgage loans made by banks
• 9

•

in the Sixth District than did removal of controls on con­
sumer credit. Although the amount of mortgage loans in­
creased during 1952, the increase was not particularly
great when the volume of construction during the year is
considered. Two factors probably exerted considerable
influence in holding down the amount of these loans. On
the one hand, some banks were approaching, or had
reached, their legal limit for this type of loan. On the other
Commercial and Consumer Loans of
District W eek ly Reporting Banks
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

hand, the increase in interest rates on Government securi­
ties made mortgage loans less attractive to bankers as
long-term investments. Thus, during 1952 the small growth
in bank real estate loans consisted largely of conventional
rather than VA or FHA guaranteed mortgage loans with
fixed interest rate limits. The average rate of interest
charged on real estate mortgage loans, moreover, increased
during the year. As the year ended, 4 percent mortgage
money was becoming increasingly difficult to find.
Because an increase of one percentage point in the rate
of interest charged on a typical 15-year amortized loan
results in an increase of almost 7 percent in the monthly
carrying charge, the demand for housing loans was prob­
ably affected. Nevertheless, non-farm mortgage lending
reached an all-time high in 1952 for the nation. Banks
and insurance companies, however, were less important
as suppliers of such credit than they had been in late 1950,
and savings and loan associations were increasingly more
important.
Most of the rise in bank loans in the Sixth District dur­
ing 1952 represented increases in loans to business firms,
both manufacturers and distributors. Loans to food, liquor,
and tobacco firms and to metals and metal products com­
panies accounted for a large part of the rise in manufac­
turers loans, judging from the weekly reports on classified
loans made by 22 large banks in the District. Although it
is impossible to determine how the borrowed money was
used, the sharp rise in business loans in the fall coincided
roughly with a substantial increase in manufacturers’ and
distributors’ inventories.

on business loans of over 1,000 dollars extended by lead­
ing banks in Atlanta and New Orleans rose 3 percent.
The smallest rates of increase were, of course, registered
by small loans, customarily made at relatively high interest
rates. Interest rates increased the most on the larger
loans— those which customarily receive the lowest rates.
About 51 percent of the loans for over 200,000 dollars
made in the first 15 days of December 1951 were made for
less than 3 percent, compared with 13 percent of this size
loan for the corresponding period of 1952. Percentage
increases over 1951 in interest rates on business loans
made by reporting banks in Atlanta and New Orleans
were smaller than those occurring at reporting banks in
the entire nation, as measured by reports from banks in
19 cities.
Higher costs of credit to District bank borrowers during
1952, of course, resulted from the supply and demand
situation in the national market for loanable funds. A l­
though commercial banks do not participate extensively
in supplying funds directly to the long-term funds market,
the wide demand for long-term loans did influence the cost
of credit. Business firms borrowed heavily to expand facili­
ties both because of the favorable sales outlook and be­
cause technical features of the tax laws have encouraged
borrowing to finance new construction and equipment.
Demand for home mortgage money continued high, and
borrowing by state and local government more than dou­
bled in 1952, compared with 1951. On top of this* the
Federal Government borrowed more new money than in
any year since 1945. The rate of personal and business
saving, however, did not keep up with the rising demand
for loanable funds. The third-quarter personal saving rate
was down slightly from the corresponding period of 1951.
In addition, business profits were down slightly although
dividend payments actually were up. This meant that busi­
ness firms, in the aggregate, were retaining less of their
profits and needed to borrow more from outside sources
for operational purposes and for expansion of facilities.
Monetary developments during 1952 affected commer­
cial bank lending activity in the short-term markets. These
developments also reacted upon the long-term markets,
not only by affecting certain long-term lenders directly
Excess R eserves and Borrowings
o f District M em ber Banks
M ILLIO N S OF D O LLA R S

M ILLIONS OF D O LLAR S

The cost of credit rose
The rise in volume of loans was apparently accompanied
by an increase in the cost of credit to the borrower. From
December 1951 to December 1952, average interest rates



• 10 •

but by influencing the addition to the money supply by
commercial banks. These monetary developments were
largely the product of Federal Reserve policy.
Federal R eserve Policy p layed a restrictive role
The effects of the famous “March accord” between the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve System in March 1951,
whereby the System changed its policy of supporting Gov­
ernment security prices, were not realized fully until 1952.
As a result of the accord, the prices of some issues of
Government bonds fell below par, and one source of loan­
able funds— the sale of Government bonds to the Federal
Reserve Banks— was restricted. Commercial banks and
other financial institutions could not sell some of their
longer-term issues of Government securities before matur­
ity without the possibility of incurring capital losses and
thus were encouraged to hold on to them until they fell
due. Additional loanable funds could still be obtained
without loss by allowing 90-day Treasury bills to mature.
Banks apparently took advantage of this source of funds,
for bill holdings of District member banks declined during
the year.
The lessened commercial bank demand for Treasury
bills and the negligible changes in Federal Reserve hold­
ings of these instruments resulted in a marked increase in
the yield on Treasury bills, from 1.73 percent in December
1951 to 2.13 percent at the end of the year. Increased
bill issues were another factor. Because Treasury bills
are an alternate outlet for bank funds that might otherwise
be used for prime business loans, it is not surprising to
find that interest rates to business borrowers also rose.
Because of the reluctance of the Federal Reserve to
purchase Government securities, commercial banks as a
group could obtain additional reserves to meet the rising
demand for loans primarily through borrowing from the
Federal Reserve Banks. This they did in increasing
amounts as the year progressed, despite their tradition
against borrowing. The daily average amount of discounts
and advances extended by the Federal Reserve Bank of




Atlanta to member banks reached a peak on December 5,
1952, and was the highest it had been since the 1920’s.
Although much of this borrowing by individual banks was
encouraged by certain tax advantages, it undoubtedly
eased the tight money situation for the banking system
as a whole.
Borrowing by commercial banks added to reserves, upon
which a loan and deposit expansion became possible. But
banks also economized more in the use of reserves. Mem­
ber banks generally keep more deposits with the Federal
Reserve Bank than is required by law. During 1951 and
the early months of 1952, these excess reserves ranged
between 6 and 8 percent of total required reserves of
District banks. Beginning in July 1952, however, the
ratio of excess to required reserves was only slightly over
5 percent. This meant that District banks as a group were
extending credit and experiencing a consequent rise in
deposits at a greater rate than they were adding to reserves
through borrowing or through an inflow of funds into the
area.
Prospects for a continued growth of District bank de­
posits and loans, of course, depend in part upon the spend­
ing plans of consumers, private business, and Government.
Although Federal expenditures for 1953 are already par­
tially determined by the defense program of the previous
administration, the fiscal policies of the new administra­
tion will become an increasingly important influence on
the national economy as the year progresses. In the busi­
ness and consumer sectors of the District economy, it
appears that the impetus of the increase in activity in the
fall and the consequent rise in the demand for loans is
going to carry through into the early months of 1953.
Bank loans normally decline after the first of the year
as loans made to finance Christmas inventories are paid
off. So far in 1953, however, the seasonal decline has
been less than normal in the District. The liquidation of
inventory loans was apparently offset by an increase in
other loans. This appears to be evidence that customers
of banks are optimistic about their prospects for 1953.
T homas R. A tkinson

• 11 •

F a r m e r s ’A t t e n t io n S h if t s f r o m P r o d u c t io n
to P r ic e s
Fortunately for consumers the nation’s farmers continue
to turn in an impressive production record. Output in
1952 was valued at nearly 35 billion dollars, with District
state farmers contributing about 3.7 billion of that enor­
mous total. This achievement represents, in physical
terms, the nation’s largest agricultural production record.
Although dollar value of production is easiest to
comprehend, physical output of the agricultural plant—
the number of pounds, gallons, and bushels— is the
significant thing. Farm production gains of recent years
have placed the American consumer near the pinnacle
of good living. Substantial credit for this must be given
the national drive for ever-increasing output per manhour of labor. Farm output per man-hour has more than
doubled since the mid-1930’s.
In 1 9 5 2 farm ers surpassed their production records
o f th e last ten y ea r s . . . .
National agricultural production has grown about 28
percent since 1940. Within this period crop production
per acre grew 16 percent, while total acreage held
relatively stable. Since 1940, production per animal unit
has gained about 18 percent with total animal units
increasing approximately 11 percent. These figures signi­
fy the American farmer’s progress. As a result, most
Americans are well clothed and most Americans are
well fed. When measured in terms of calories per person,
their diet is second only to that of New Zealanders. This
situation can be credited to an expansion in the knowl­
edge of human nutrition, advances in the techniques of
marketing as well as production, and substantial con­
sumer incomes. Most heartening is the high quality of
our diet; nearly one-half of our total food production
consists of livestock products.
In the last year the nation’s farmers produced about
23 billion pounds of meat, 114 billion pounds of milk,
6 billion dozen eggs, 15 million bales of cotton, 338
million bushels of potatoes, and 1.5 billion pounds of
tobacco. These totals, though hard to grasp, create an
impression of the size of the output obtained from
about 341 million acres of harvested crops in 1952 and,
according to the 1950 census, approximately 620 million
acres of land devoted to pasture.
Farmers in District states have shared in agriculture’s
progress. Their output has increased nearly 18 percent
since 1940, and in 1952 they turned out about 3 billion
pounds of meat, 8 billion pounds of milk, 350 million
dozen eggs, 4.5 million bales of cotton, 300 million
pounds of tobacco, and 840 million pounds of peanuts.
Farm production in the District varies more than in
the nation because of the predominance of cash crops
in District agriculture. Yields of these crops are affected
more by weather and infestations of insects. Meat, milk,



and poultry products have more stability in production
and are a larger proportion of national output. Greater
stability in production is being attained by District farm­
ers, who have increased their output of livestock products
and related crops since 1940 as follows: 47 percent for
eggs, 36 percent for meat, 22 percent for milk, and 17
percent for feed grains. Production accomplishments of
this nature promote the welfare of the Sixth District
economy and enhance the ability of farmers in the
Southeast to contribute to a rising living standard.
Even though th e y fa ced so m e form id ab le ob stacles
Recent agricultural output in the District and elsewhere
has been achieved in the face of some obstacles, notably,
seasonal labor shortages, rising costs, and drought con­
ditions. With a national population of 157 million, it is
difficult to conceive of a farm labor shortage, although,
on the average in 1952, there were only about 11 million
people— counting family workers and hired workers—
employed on farms. In Sixth District states there were
about 4 million; the number has declined about 1.4
percent each year since 1946. This phenomenon — a
growing total population, yet fewer workers in agriculture
— is a pattern common to an industrialized society. A
declining farm population helped aggravate the District’s
farm labor problem in 1952, particularly in respect to
seasonal needs. Other complicating factors have been
the high level of non-farm employment which holds
workers in cities and the defense mobilization which
sucks men into military service and industry.
Production costs in 1952 mounted in agriculture as
well as in industry. Total agricultural production expendi­
tures for the year were at an all-time high— 3 percent
above 1951. District farmers faced a similar rise in costs.
These rises were in part attributable to the use of larger
quantities of production supplies. But higher prices of
labor, fertilizer, and feed costs also helped expand the
total expense bill. Labor’s wrages have been rising for
some time. The trend is still apparent with average
wage rates for picking 100 pounds of seed cotton in
Georgia at $3.05 in 1952 compared with $3.00 in 1951.
Fertilizer costing about $41.50 a ton in 1951 cost $42
in 1952. It is easy to see that trends of this sort threaten
the general prosperity and productiveness of the District
farm business unless further improvement in output per
man-hour is achieved.
Extensive drought in Sixth District states during June
and July 1952 and again in the fall led to concern
about reduced harvests. True, yields of some crops such
as corn were reduced and livestock programs were jeop­
ardized because of damage to summer pasture and fall
pasture seedings, but yields of the money crops of tobac­
co, cotton, and peanuts seemed little affected.
• 12 •

But th ey used som e factors in their favor to
a d v a n ta g e . . . .
At the same time that farmers had to surmount these
obstacles, certain other significant factors were in their
favor. Strong consumer demand, increased production
efficiencies, more cash on hand, and availability of credit
and supplies contributed to the successful 1952 farm
output in the District and the nation. Full employment
prevailed in the nation with only 2 percent of the 63
million workers unemployed at year’s end. The physical
output of these workers grew during the year and in
combination with higher wages resulted in increased in­
come. Supported in 1952 by an addition of about 2 billion
dollars to consumer debt, the total spending stream has
been an unmistakable force in raising farm output.
Productivity is the manager’s watchword whether in
factory or on farm. Output per man-hour and per farm
worker in 1952 was the highest on record. Farm output
per man-hour in Southern states is now some 38 percent
above 1940. Cotton output alone gained about 31 per­
cent during the period. Such impressive gains represent
much more than mechanization of field activities. Chore
time use of electricity must be reckoned in with those
additional tractors, as must the managerial triumphs of
organizing farm enterprises to secure such advantages
as improved labor distribution from season to season
and home-produced cattle feed and of rearranging the
farm business so it represents a full-time job.
With financial assets of deposits and currency, United
States bonds, and investments of about 21 billion dollars
on January 1, 1951, and subsequently, 22 billion on
January 1, 1952, the nation’s farmers, including those of
the Sixth District, possessed a degree of liquidity. This
liquid position facilitated their successful production.
Some farmers could finance production without recourse
to credit— their risk was lessened and they were there­
fore encouraged to undertake new investment for produc­
tive purposes. Others, who needed credit, were able to
present favorable financial statements to bankers when
making their loan applications.
Ability to buy, however, would be of little avail if
supplies were not at hand. In 1952, large supplies were
available as is indicated by the use of fertilizer on farms.
Farmers in Sixth District states used about five million
tons of fertilizer, a gain of 6 percent over 1951. National
production of the three primary plant nutrients— nitrogen,
phosphorous, and potash— was at a record level in 195152. Total feed supplies, which include pasture and hay,
were reduced somewhat by drought conditions, but fort­
unately there was an adequate feed concentrate supply
at 165 million tons in 1952, in contrast with 169 million
tons in 1951 and a long-time average of 161 million tons.
Output of important pesticide items has been higher in
recent years than in earlier periods. In spite of a dis­
ruptive steel strike last year, there was ample farm ma­
chinery in dealers’ hands to supply farmers’ needs. There
was little complaint about the availability of seeds. The
high level of farm production would certainly have been
difficult to attain without each of these items.



And with substantial incom es, th ey w e re a b le to
k eep their d eb ts a t a reason ab le level
Farmers benefit from the taste for high living. This
means they are in a relatively stronger position. Since
heavy demand for farm products held prices high, gross
farm income edged up in the District to about 3.7 billion
dollars at the end of 1952. In spite of rising costs, now
at almost 1.8 billion dollars, net income to farm pro­
prietors in District states was maintained at a level
slightly less than the 1.9 million dollars in 1951. Agri­
cultural income, comprising gross wages and salaries
of farm workers plus net income of farm proprietors,
was 1.7 million dollars in Sixth District states in 1945.
It rose to 2.2 million in 1951, and may well exceed that
in 1952. These are pleasant figures to contemplate. They
exemplify the current agricultural prosperity attained
through high production and high prices.
Beginning in 1940, at a level of 90, the ratio of long­
time debt to net farm income declined appreciably in
the Sixth District, reflecting a marked improvement in
farmers’ ability to pay off their real estate mortgages.
The decline continued through 1948 to a ratio of 25,
but since has gone up to about 32, as a result of rising
long-term debts and somewhat lower net incomes. Farm
mortgage debt held by various lenders in District states
had been constant at about 450 million dollars from the
1930’s to 1946, when it reached a low of about 380
million. Since then, it has been rising and on January 1,
1952, was 661 million. From 1950 on, the rise has been
exceptional— about 60 million dollars each year.
District farmers have also increased their short-term
indebtedness by a sizable amount. Non-real-estate loans
held by commercial banks and Government lending
agencies on January 1, 1941, in District states totaled
about 172 million dollars. By 1952, loans outstanding
had reached a total of 284 million. Of the District nonreal-estate farm debt, all operating banks held 165 mil­
lion dollars, or 58 percent; Federal agencies held the
balance. Individuals held some too, of course, but it is
difficult to determine the amount.
From the standpoint of the liquidity of District farmers,
the rise in non-real-estate debt is not alarming when it
is related to the rise in cash receipts from farming. Cash
receipts increased rapidly after 1940 and the ratio of
short-term debt to cash receipts in the Sixth District
declined from 17 to 7 in 1948, and has since risen to
about 8 because of mounting costs.
District farmers appear to be in a stronger position
with respect to their debt structure than other farmers.
Both long and short-term debt have been moving up at
about the same rate in the District since 1946, whereas
in the United States the advance in short-term debt has
been much more rapid. There does not appear to be an
excessive amount of short-term farm debt in the District.
In sp ite of grow ing doubts and uncertainties, their
future is far from b leak
If consumer purchasing power is maintained at the cur­
rent strength and if the recent decline in export demand
proves to be temporary, farmers in the Sixth District will
• 13

•

be able to hold their favorable position. But recent de­
velopments are bringing lines of concern to their brows.
Farmers’ attention is shifting from production to prices.
Though prospects for peace are dim; though population
is growing each day, thus adding to need; though farm
marketings are down from the fall peak; and though in­
dustry is utilizing lots of raw materials, prices of some
important farm products are sagging. Cotton in November
averaged 34 cents a pound, compared to 41 cents in
November 1951. Beef declined from 26 cents a pound to
19 cents in the same period. On the other hand, prices of
some products have risen. Rice, for example, was worth
about 3 cents a pound more than in November 1951.
Although prices of individual farm commodities moved
in a divergent manner, the index of prices received by
farmers was pulled down during the year by falling prices
for meat animals, cotton, fruit, and corn. In 1951, the
index was at 302; on December 15, 1952, it was 269.
The index of prices paid by farmers in the nation for
1950 was 255 and 281 for 1951, and on December 15,
1952, the index stood at 281. The falling index of receipts
passed the index of costs in 1952. Therein lies a story
familiar to District farmers and others who remember
the historical pattern of rigid costs and fluid receipts.
District farmers’ difficulties relating to high costs are
intensified by the shortage of farm labor which is apt
to become more burdensome as draft boards scrutinize
deferments in their effort to replace military men who
have completed their tours of duty. Many of the veterans
will not return to the farm. With the additional influence
of wage increases in such industries as steel and coal
being felt all along the line, high farm labor rates seem
destined to prevail. High support prices for some farm
products used by industry also tend to inject an inflexi­
bility into the prices of supplies farmers buy and in this
sense farmers have the bull by the tail. Finally, taxes
are a part of the price paid by farmers. Inflation’s off­
spring— high costs and high taxes— are taking the stage.
Many farmers no doubt feel that the chance of relief
from high costs in 1953 is remote.
Being confronted with a current parity ratio of about
96 does not, of course, bring fear to farmers’ hearts, but
when they consider the ratio’s decline from a peak of 122
in October 1946, they are less certain of the future. Ap­
prehensively, they note that in the past agricultural prices
varied much more than output, whereas industrial prices
held relatively steady, compared with industrial output.
Another disquieting event for District farmers is the rise
in marketing charges, which is resulting in lower prices
at the farm.
Gathering clouds over operations of Sixth District
farmers include the uncertain future of some agricultural
exports, the unpredictability of international political de­
cisions that influence the supply and demand situation,
and the seeming abnormality of the weather. Total agri­
cultural exports from the United States in 1952 were
at a record level of about 4 billion dollars, 17 percent
over 1951. Cotton and tobacco exports were valued at
1.2 billion and 325 million dollars, respectively. Con­
siderable credit for the large export surplus since the



early years of World War II must be given to this nation’s
foreign aid programs. Possible further reductions in the
amount of economic aid to foreign nations could cause
exports of some farm products to decline.
Decisions of national governments on policies involving
trade agreements and tariffs naturally affect the business
of many Sixth District farmers. These decisions are
difficult to anticipate. From the point of view of many
farmers, the present is a period of watchful waiting re­
garding questions of tariff changes and trade agreements.
Some farmers can see that a more restrictive tariff and
trade policy would not be to their interests and are,
therefore, uncomfortable about the future.
An unpleasant result of last summer’s drought was
that some farm production loans had to be carried over
by bankers in the District. This may not be extensive, but
it certainly will restrict the flexibility of bankers in financ­
ing production in 1953. A prolonged dry spell during the
fall of 1952 led to speculation on whether a cycle of
dry weather was in the making. If the rainfall in early
months of 1953 is sub-normal, farmers will plan their
1953 farm programs under the influence of a drought
psychology. Future agricultural production is not easy
to determine because long-range weather prediction is
little better than a guess.
It seems certain that if normal weather prevails, Dis­
trict farmers will be able to maintain the high level of
production achieved in 1952. Future prices for some
important farm crops, which represent somewhat more
than a third of the District’s agricultural income, cannot
break sharply unless the present price support law is
changed. Prices of basic commodities will be supported at
90 percent of parity through 1954. Most difficulties for
District farmers will arise out of high-cost operations
and attendant management problems. District farmers
seem to be successfully combating these costs through
efficiencies in farm operation.
Science will play a part in District agriculture during
1953 and beyond. With a relatively fixed land base, the
nation s citizens will have to depend on the findings of
science and the ingenuity of farmers in using those
findings for the diet and supply of clothing envied by
citizens of many other nations. In spite of foreboding
signs seen by District farmers at the end of 1952, their
ability to produce and to obtain credit and supplies, their
reasonably sound financial position, and their desire to
learn better methods provides the District’s agriculture
with strength and resiliency.
A rthur H. Kantner

B a n k A nnouncem ent
On January 2, the First State Bank of Oxford, Oxford, Alabama, opened for business as a member of
the Federal Reserve System. This bank began opera­
tions with a capital stock of $50,000 and surplus and
undivided profits of $25,000. C. Logan Taylor is
President and Cashier and Norman L. Moore, A s­
sistant Cashier.

• 14

•

S ix t h

D is t r ic t

Instalment Cash Loans
No. of
Lenders
ReportLender
____ ing
Federal credit unions............... 35
State credit unions................. IS
Industrial banks..................... 9
Industrial loan companies . . . . 10
Small loan companies............... 33
Commercial banks..................33

Condition of 2 7 M em ber Banks in Leading Cities

Volume
Percent Change
Dec. 1952from
Nov.
Dec.
1952
1951
+ 20
+48

+ 11
+ 22

Outstandings
Percent Change
Dec. 1952from
Dec.
Nov.
1952 1951
+ 28
+1
+ 33
+3
+9
+1
—6
+1
+4
+ 18
+ 25
+3

+20
+21

+9
+ 52
+ 14

—3
+17
+34

Retail Furniture Store O perations
Percent Change
December 1952 from
Nov. 1952
Dec. 1951
+ 52
+ 10
—1
+61
+ 50
+ 11
+ 34
+ 10
+5
+ 13
—11
—3

Number
of Stores
Item______________________ Reporting
Total sales....................................140
Cash sales...................................... 123
Instalment and other credit sales............123
Accounts receivable, end of month . . . . 131
Collections during month..................... 131
Inventories, end of month.................... 95

W h o lesa le S ales and Inventories*
Sales
Percent Change
Dec. 1952from
Dec.
Nov.
Type of
1952
1951
Wholesaler
6
—18 —14
Automobile supplies . . .
3
—6
—7
Electrical—Full-line . .
4
+ 15
+24
“
Wiring supplies
6
+6 + 23
Appliances . .
11
+6 +26
Hardware..................
12
—13
+5
Industrial supplies . . .
5
+ 85
+ 72
Jewelry....................
9
Lumber and bldg. mat’ls .
—11
—0
—21 —11
Plumbing & heating supplies 4
6
Refrigeration equipment .
—33
—2
4
+22
+ 14
Confectionery............
10
+ 14
Drugs and sundries . . .
+3
15
—22
Dry goods ..................
+ 18
41
+4
Groceries—Full-line. . .
+ 13
“
Voluntary group
3
+9
+9
10
“
Specialty lines
—16
+8
11
Tobacco products . . . .
+ 21 + 26
12
Miscellaneous............
+9
+8
Total .......................
172
+ 1 + 15
*Based on U. S. Department of Commerce Figures.
No. of
Firms
Reporting

Inventories
0f
Percent Change
Firms Dec. 31,1952, from
ReportNov. 30 Dec. 31
ing_____ 1952
1951
—5
—1
mn

+ i7
+7
+4
—3
—2
—5
—1

10

33

—5
—9

14
113

—5
—3

+8
+1

—6
—20
—12

+ 11

—12

+2

—1
—

13

+6

—3
—2

Percent Change
Inventories
Dec. 31,1952, from
Nov. 30
Dec. 31
1952
1951
—23
+ 14
—23
+6

1952Place
1951
+9
ALABAMA ............ .
Birmingham . . . . .
+7
+ 18
Montgomery . . . . .
+8
FLORIDA ...............
+8
—i i
+2
Jacksonville . . . . .
+6
—20
+ 11
+6
—10
—6
Orlando...............
+8
__'12
St. Petersburg . . . .
+ 10
+ 12
Tampa . . . . . . .
+ 10
GEORGIA ............... .
+8
—22
+6
Atlanta**........... .
+6
—21
+8
+ 25
Columbus............ .
+8
—is
—i
.
+5
—30
+2
Rome**.............. ,
+8
Savannah** . . . . .
+ 16
LOUISIANA............ .
+ 10
—i i
+ ii
Baton Rouge . . . . .
+9
—26
+6
+9
NewOrleans. . . . .
—12
+ 13
MISSISSIPPI . . . . .
+4
—22
+8
Jackson . . . . . . .
+3
—21
+ 13
Meridian** . . . . .
+4
TENNESSEE........... .
+4
—20
+io
Bristol**............
—2
—29
+3
Bristol-KingsportJohnson City** . . . +97
+6
—2
Chattanooga . . . . . +68
+ 13
+6
Knoxville............ . +95
+ 13
—1
—0
+ 22
Nashville............ . +73
+ 12
+8
—26
+6
DISTRICT............
+ 12
+9
—18
+9
^Includes reports from 122 stores throughout the Sixth Federal Reserve District.
**ln order to permit publication of figures for this city, a special sample has been con­
structed which is not confined exclusively to department stores. Figures for non-depart­
ment stores, however, are not used in computing the District percent changes.
***Increase of over 100 percent.



(In Thousands of Dollars)
Jan. 21
Item___________________ 1953
Loans and investments—
Total....................... 2,962,141
Loans—Net................. 1,219,539
Loans—Gross............... 1,240,709
Commercial, industrial,
and agricultural loans . 709,864
Loans to brokers and
dealers in securities . .
14,111
Other loans for pur­
chasing and carrying
securities..............
37,163
Real estate loans . . . .
96,484
Loans to banks............
9,054
Other loans............... 374,033
Investments—-Total . . . . 1,742,602
Bills, certificates,
and notes..............
760,634
U. S. bonds............... 727,023
Other securities...........
254,945
Reserve with F. R. Banks . . 529,351
Cash in vault.................
48,215
Balances with domestic
239,611
banks......................
Demand deposits adjusted . 2,178,205
Time deposits...............
554,385
U.S. Gov’t deposits. . . .
72,467
Deposits of domestic banks . 722,090
Borrowings..................
20,500

Jan. 16
1952

Dec. 17
1952

Percent Change
Jan. 21,1953, from
Dec. 17 Jan. 16
1952
1952

2,990,120 2,752,521
1,224,051 1,083,484
1,244,748 1,103,407
715,773
12,826

645,703
12,281

35,671
38,962
87,148
96,740
5,447
9,163
371,284 317,157
1,766,069 1,669,037
792,514 813,135
709,505 623,950
264,050 231,952
529,752 542,838
49,944
46,077
240,646 266,133
2,144,819 2,074,884
553,473 533,968
108,782
52,022
708,644 714,513
59,000
19,500

—1

+8
+ 12
+ 10

+ 10

+ 15

—5
—0
—1

+1
+ 66

—1
—0
—0

+ 13

+4

—1

+ 18
+4

+2

+ 17

+1

—3
—0
—3
—0

+ 10

—33

—2
+5
—10
+5
+4
+39

—65

+5

+2
+0
+2

+1

+ 28

D epartm ent Store S ales and Inventories*
Sales
Dec. 1952from
Nov.
Dec.
1952
1951
+66
+ 13
+67
+ 12
+ 30
+61
+7
+ 14
+81
+8
+ 14
+ 19
+66
+ 16
+65
+ 15
+61
+ 12
+58
+ 14
+ 16
+73
+7
+66
+3
+83
+ 15
+69
+ 14
+52
+ 13
+61
+ 16
+50
+ 12
+66
+7
+54
+6
+79
+8
+81
+ 12
***
+6

S t a t is t ic s

Debits to Individual Bank Accounts
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Percent Change
Dec. 1952from
Nov. Dec.
1952
1952 1951
from1951
+ 15 +9
+5
+ 13 +15
+8
+8
+16
+5
+ 11 +3
+1
+13 + 12
+3
+20 +12
+5
+4
+7
+2
+ 18 +14
+1
+28 +20
+9
+ 19 + 17
+7
+39 +25
+ 10
+37 +21
+ 10
+31 +26
+ 12
+ 10 +22
+ 17
+ 17 +23
+ 13
+28 + 19
+7
+36 + 19
+3
+22 + 12
+6
+23 +22
+8
+ 27 +13
+6
+9 +19
+ 15
+ 22 —0
—1
+ 19 + 13
+9
+6
+3
+7
+3 +15
+ 13
+20 + 14
+6
+2
+11 +0
—
8
+ 19
—2
+9 —0
+3
+8 + 10
+5
+20 +27
+ 12
+ 19 +12
+7
+ 15 +9
+ 10
+ 16 +21
+7
+8 + 14
+ 12
+20 + 11
+7
+3
+5
+6
+8 +4
+6
+ 1 +9
+6
+2 —5
+2
+6 + 0
+9
+9 + 12
+3
—1 + 13
+3
+29 + 12
—3
+7 + 11
+6

Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
1952
1952
Place
1951
791,515
910,114
834,972
ALABAMA. .
33,844
29,884
29,403
Anniston . .
498,477
431,199
463,310
Birmingham .
18,102
20,136
19,497
Dothan . .
23,287
23,470
26,350
Gadsden . .
160,346
192,865
172,375
Mobile. . .
97,279
94,347
Montgomery.
101,269
31,418
Tuscaloosa* .
37,173
32,570
1,632,058 1,275,618 1,360,985
FLORIDA . .
373,087
380,593
445,705
Jacksonville .
338,463
525,721
462,478
634,562
Greater Miami*
98,614
75,088
78,516
Orlando . . •
47,483
57,697
52,320
Pensacola. . .
89,672
85,218
105,198
St. Petersburg .
171,641
184,841
220,244
Tampa. . . .
* 70,038
51,332
58,613
West PalmBeach1
GEORGIA . . . 1,936,570 1,586,033 1,727,874
47,569
38,617
39,048
Albany . . . .
Atlanta . . . 1,338,521 1,053,149 1,187,215
96,452
88,738
Augusta . . . 105,339
13,745
11,233
13,756
Brunswick . .
93,663
78,670
83,232
Columbus. . .
5,355
5,505
5,175
Elberton. . .
25,209
25,905
22,572
Gainesville* . .
16,611
13,807
14,607
Griffin* . . .
80,790
89,059
89,479
Macon . . . .
13,009
10,957
14,145
Newnan . . .
26,896
29,412
29,350
Rome* . . . .
128,491
125,421
Savannah . . . 138,201
19,673
16,407
15,494
Valdosta. . .
LOUISIANA . . 1,278*183 1,077,560 1,142,880
42,629
Alexandria* .
49,159
45,281
138,332
119,081
114,617
Baton Rouge .
Lake Charles .
57,000
52,736
49,981
NewOrleans . 1,033a692
863,114
933,001
265,307
258,510
MISSISSIPPI . . 272,178
20,992
19,484
20,200
Hattiesburg . .
179,099
167,253
Jackson . . . 181*738
32,262
31,725
33,916
Meridian. . .
37,186
34,999
37,141
Vicksburg . .
797,131
775,423
TENNESSEE . . 867,796
222,896
195,764
Chattanooga. . 221,688
134,859
155,294
Knoxville . . . 173,841
Nashville. . . 472,267
439,376
424,365
SIXTH DISTRICT
32 Cities. . . 6,457,294 5,443,746 5,710,331 + 19
UNITED STATES
342 Cities . .170,648,000 130,152,000 144,786,000 +31
*Not included in Sixth District totals.

• 15 •

+13

+6

+18

+8

S ix t h
M a n u fa c t u r in g

Employment
Nov.
________________ 1952
UNADJUSTED
District Total . . . . 114
Alabama............ 109
Florida............... 129
Georgia............... 114
Louisiana............114
Mississippi........... 114
Tennessee............112
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
District Total . . . . 114
Alabama............ I l l
Florida............... 130
Georgia............... 113
Louisiana............ 109
Mississippi........... 112
Tennessee............112

D is t r ic t

In d e x e s

1 9 4 7 -4 9 = 1 0 0
C o tto n
C o n s tru c tio n
C o n s u m p tio n * *
C o n tra c ts

Oct.
1952

Nov.
1951

Dec.
1952

Nov.
1952

Dec.
1951

112
108
123r
114
111
113
111

107
97
120
114
105
109
105

107
107

116
114

107
105

107

117

110

127

101

133
107

117
89

112
109
127
112
109
112
110

105
100
120
113
101
107
105

108

112

108

Dec.
1952

Nov.
1952

Dec.
1951

193
176
331
579
267
331

86
202
126
211

181
195
176
84
60
189

184
87

D e p a rtm e n t S to re Sales a n d S to c k s * *
Adjusted
Unadjusted
Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
1952 1952 1951
1952 1952 1951
Year
221p 145
204r
124p
DISTRICT SALES* . . 130p 128r 120
123r
213p 146
124p
195r
Atlanta1........... . 135p 123
110
99r
121
162r
104
180
Baton Rouge . . . . I l l
120r
208
135
115
Birmingham . . . . 129
120
193
119
228
147
124
133
210
Chattanooga . . . . 129
114
114r
189
182
114
133
Jackson ............ . 119
198
112
117
115r
205
123
Jacksonville . . . . 119
121
199
112
115
116
209
Knoxville . . . . . 122
133p
236p 154r 237
Macon............ . 126p 126r 127r
152
Miami............ . 126
137
114
226
206
126
121
115r
116
Nashville . . . . . 124
217
136
203
188
NewOrleans . . . . 123p 121
115
203p 146
118p
Tampa............ . 128
122
115r
141
119
215
193
116
130p
DISTRICT STOCKS* . 145p 136
133
126p 153
*To permit publication of figures for this city, a sample has been constructed that is not
confined to department stores. Such non-department stores are not included in the
District index.
*Does not include data for all of La., Miss., and Tenn. Other totals for entire six states.
**Daily average basis
Sources: Mfg. emp., state depts. of labor; cotton consumption, U. S. Bureau Census;
construction contracts, F. W. Dodge Corp.; gas. tax, state depts. of rev.; furn. sales,
dept, store sales, turnover of dem. dep., FRB Atlanta; petrol, prod., U. S. Bureau of
Mines; elec. power, Fed. Power Comm. Indexes calculated by this Bank.

o Reserve Bank Cities
• Branch Bank Cities

h i District Boundaries
— Branch Territory Boundaries
■jAc Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System




G a s o lin e T a x
C o lle c tio n s

F u rn itu re
S to re S a le s * / * *
Dec.
1952

Nov.
1952

Dec.
1951

Dec.
1952

Nov.
1952

Dec.
1951

142
140
145
140

176
140

146
151
140
151
140
168
138

135
130
128
129
153
156
127

152p
177p
155
I61p
147p
127

129
117
121r

143
160
152
149
128

87

128

139
137
146
140
119
173
129

142
147
144
146
133
152
129

133
128
130
129
151
153
117

109p
120p
123
115p
107p

108r
116
123
115
llOr

102
108
121

91

89

120

112r

111

106
94

O th e r D is tric t In d e x e s
Dec.
1952

Adjusted
Nov.
Dec.
1952 1951

Construction contracts* . . .
Residential..................
Petrol, prod, in Coastal
134
Louisiana and Mississippi**., 144
136
23.4
23.0
Turnover of demand deposits* . 22.6
117.3 121.5 119.4
Nov.
Nov.
Oct.
1952 1952 1951
Mfg. emp. by type
Lbr., wood prod., and furn. .
Paper and allied............
Primary metals..............
Trans, equip................
Elec. power prod.**............
r Revised
p Preliminary

Unadjusted
Nov.
Dec.
1952 1952
312
149
158
149
435
143
139
138
24.2
25.0
••
••
Nov.
Oct.
1952 1952
133
131
114
115
114
111
97
95
130
128
99
101
102
102
148
150
159
159
58
73
238
251

Dec.
1951
167
181
157
129
24.6
••
Nov.
1951
120
113
108
98
129
76
102
126
144
98
186