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Banking insights
Bull m arket in hom es
T he prim e rate revisited
Social security changes necessary

July/August 1977, Volume I, Issue 4
ECONOM IC PERSPECTIVES
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Banking insights
International banking in
the Seventh Federal
Reserve District

3

Bull market in homes

CONTENTS

7

Both starts on new single-family
homes and transactions in existing
homes have been at a record pace in
recent months, with prices increasing
much faster than the general price level.

The prime rate revisited

17

The unusually wide spreads that
have persisted over the last two years
between the prime rate and moneymarket interest rates are now
narrowing.

Social security changes
necessary
The social security system will have
progressively increasing deficits year
after year unless changes are made in
the method of financing, the system for
determining methods, or both.

21

Banking insights
International banking in the Seventh
Federal Reserve District
The postwar period has been one of un­
precedented growth for the United States in
international banking activites. U.S. banks ex­
panded their loans and other claims on
foreigners dramatically: the total reached
$80.7 billion at the end of 1976 from the U.S.based offices. In addition, U.S. banks ex­
panded overseas by establishing branches
worldwide; at the close of 1976 U.S. banks
operated 731 branches in 85 foreign countries
with assets totaling $220 billion.
The expansion of U.S. banks abroad has
been accompanied by a rapid expansion of
activities of foreign banks in the United States.
By the end of 1976 there were 199 foreign
financial institutions operating in the United
States with total assets of $76 billion.

Foreign claims of banks in the
Seventh District 1970-1976*
billion dollars
30
Foreign claims of:
J District offices of foreign banks
M overseas branches of District banks
_] indigenous banks
20

10

International banking activities of
indigenous banks

The rapid rate of growth of international
banking activities in the United States as a
whole was more than matched by the expan-

Foreign offices of Seventh District banks

(by country)
No.
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Cayman Islands
England
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
South Korea
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
Panama
Singapore
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Arab Emirates

TOTAL*
1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976*

9
1
2
8
14
3
5
6
1
3
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
J_

71

*As of December 1976.

*As of December 1976.

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago



3

sion of such activities in the Seventh Federal
Reserve District. In the early postwar years
District banks showed only minimal interest
in international banking, as reflected in their
total claims on foreigners held in that
period—only $100 million at the beginning of
1960. In the early sixties, however, the situa­
tion changed dramatically. Banks began to ex­
pand their foreign loans and to establish
banking facilities abroad. By the end of 1976

District banks' claims on foreigners amounted
to $5.3 billion, and there were 71 branches of
District banks with assets totaling $19.7 billion.
The geographical distribution of assets at the
close of 1976 (by residence of the branches'
customers) showed claims on Europe of $10.4
billion, Latin America and the Caribbean $4.2
billion, Asia $3.3 billion, the United States
$835 million, Africa $471 million, and Canada
$321 million.

Assets of foreign banks in the Seventh District
(b y b a n k )
As of the end of
1975
BRANCHES
Algemene Bank Nederland N.V.
Banca Commerciale Italiana
Bank Leumi Le Israel
Barclays Bank International LTD
BanqueNationalede Paris
Banque De L’lndochine et De Suez
The Chartered Bank
Commerzbank
Credit Lyonnais
DresdnerBank,AG
European Banking Co., LTD
Hong Kong&Shanghai BankingCo.
The International Commercial Bank of China
Korea Exchange Bank
Lloyds Bank International LTD
National Bank of Greece
National Westminster Bank, LTD
The Sanwa Bank, LTD
State Bank of India
The Sumitomo Bank Limited
Swiss Bank Corporation
Union Bank of Bavaria
Union Bank of Switzerland
Subtotal

1976

1Q 1977

(t h o u s a n d d o lla r s )

92,473
221,082
26,793
13,121
63,715
923
2,894
52,952
122,042
22,887
25,157
473
3,803
15,017
49,614
29,201
63,616
177,088
2,336
152,565
158,304
23,256
**

93,276
385,723
47,659
11,555
86,006
24,050
9,100
116,476
333,036
41,297
1,018
7,445
6,340
12,725
30,176
40,376
103,742
177,210
11,115
198,815
326,555
67,220
**

72,654
350,756
30,593
16,018
72,581
27,397
14,897
111,406
404,904
20,380
*

1,319,312

2,130,915

6,281
5,283
17,582
32,708
38,638
143,419
155,891
14,052
204,212
318,129
63,962
2,110
2,123,853

133,006
102,751
235,757

170,913
157,295
328,208

160,063
145,388
305,451

1,555,069

2,459,123

2,429,304

SUBSIDIARIES
Banco Di Roma
First Pacific Bank
Subtotal
GRANDTOTAL

‘ European BankingCom pany closed in March 1977.
“ Union Bank of Switzerland opened in February 1977.

4



Economic Perspectives

Assets and liabilities of foreign banks in Chicago
(b y typ e )

As of the end of
1975
ASSETS

1976

1Q 1977

(m illio n d o lla rs)

Cash, cash items in process of collection, balances with
Federal Reserve, and due from directly related
commercial banks
Stocks, bonds, and other securities
Loans to other than directly related institutions, gross
Due from directly related institutions
Other assets

222.5
30.7
1,106.8
135.9
59.1

628.0
71.2
1,458.0
197.6
104.3

587.7
86.7
1,438.0
233.2
83.1

TOTAL ASSETS*

1,555.1

2,459.1

2,429.3

107.6

113.5

91.2

382.8
295.6
699.4
69.6

622.1
702.1
908.6
112.8

688.1
702.0
852.0
96.0

1,555.1

2,459.1

2,429.3

LIABILITIES
Demand deposits or credit balances due to other
than directly related institutions
Time and savings deposits due to other than
directly related institutions
Borrowings from other than directly related institutions
Due to directly related institutions
Other liabilities, reserves, and capital accounts
TOTAL LIABILITIES, RESERVES, AND
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS*
♦Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Foreign banks in the Seventh District

For many years the presence of foreign
banks in the Midwest was limited to represen­
tative offices that had no legal power to con­
duct any banking business directly. As the in­
ternational activities in the region continued
to expand, the interest of foreign banks in es­
tablishing full banking operations grew.
Flowever, until 1973, none of the five Midwest
states comprising the Seventh Federal
Reserve District had provisions in their bank­
ing laws for the licensing of foreign banking
operations. Finally, in 1973, the Illinois State
Legislature passed the Illinois Foreign Bank­
ing Office Act, which permitted foreign banks
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




to establish branches in Chicago with a full
spectrum of banking functions. Foreign banks
responded aggressively to the opportunity: in
the three years that the act has been in effect,
the number of foreign banks operating in
Chicago has reached 26. Their activities ex­
panded rapidly, and by the end of 1976 their
assets totaled $2.4 billion.
One notable feature about foreign
banks' activities in Chicago has been the ex­
tent of their involvement in “ domestic" bank­
ing. A comparison between the aggregate
assets of the foreign banking institutions in
the Chicago District and those for the United
States as a whole shows commercial and in5

Assets of branches and subsidiaries
of foreign banks in Chicago
total assets $2,459.1 m illion

dustrial loans to parties in the United States
amounted to 32 percent of their total assets, as
compared to 20 percent for all foreign finan­
cial institutions in the country. This suggests a
higher level of participation in the domestic
market by foreign banks in Chicago.
C o n clu sio n

----- all other loans $65.9
------ cash, stocks, bonds, and other securities $73.0
------ due from directly related institutions in U.S. $89.6
------------- due from directly related institutions in foreign
countries $108.0
------------- all other assets $104.3
•As of December 1976.

6




Historically, the Midwest has been an im­
portant center of the nation's international
activities, where a large share of the country's
international trade and investment has
originated. Many years passed before the Dis­
trict banks responded to the challenges and
opportunities presented by this situation. But
once the response was initiated, progress was
rapid. Today, District banks literally span the
globe, providing international banking ser­
vices to their U.S. and foreign customers on a
scale commensurate with their domestic im­
portance. And the expansion of the operation
of foreign banks has added another dimen­
sion to the internationalization of banking in
the Seventh District.
Susan D. Sjo

Economic Perspectives

Bull market in homes
Financial counselors have long advocated
home ownership as a prime investment for
the typical family. The wisdom of this advice
has seldom been demonstrated so con­
clusively as in the past two years. Both starts
on new single-family homes and transactions
in existing homes have been at a record pace
in recent months, and prices have increased
sharply—much faster than the general price
level.
Some real estate analysts have used the
term “ panic buying” to describe the 1977
home market. The home boom has been
universal throughout the nation, but “ panic”
is too strong a term for conditions in most
regions. In April the average price of existing
homes was up 11 percent, nationally, accord­
ing to the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). Home prices in the Seventh Federal
Reserve District average 10 to 11 percent
higher than last year, both for new and ex­
isting homes. In the West, the NAR reports,
prices are up 27 percent from a year ago! Press
accounts have described speculative
purchases of homes in California with
builders holding lotteries to ration limited
output. The surge in home purchases is least
pronounced in the Northeast, among major
regions, with prices up 5 percent from a year
ago.
Speculation in any booming market
carries a threat of an eventual backlash if units
bought for quick profits rather than as long­
term investments are thrown on the market.
While speculative elements doubtless are
present to some extent throughout the na­
tion, these forces do not account for the great
underlying strength in home buying and
building. Solid reasons include: (1) improve­
ment in the overall economy, accompanied
by rising incomes and increased confidence;
(2) rising household formation; (3) the low
level of housing production in the 1974-75
recession; (4) ready availability of mortgage
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




funds; (5) downpayments provided by large
equities in existing properties; (6) an erosion
of the stock of suitable housing in central
cities. As always, most people have a deep-felt
desire for the privacy and other amenitiesof a
house and yard, an attitude that no doubt has
been reinforced by the burgeoning problems
of central cities. About 65 percent of U.S.
dwelling units are owner occupied, up from
less than 45 percent prior to World War II.
Home ownership is particularly prevalent in
the Midwest.
Apartment construction has also in­
creased substantially from the low point of
early 1975. However, the rate of multifamily
starts so far in 1977 has been less than half of
that reached in the peak year of 1972. De­
mand for existing apartments also has in­
creased, as indicated by rapidly rising rents for
desirable units and stronger prices for con­
dominiums. However, potential investors
have remained cautious in making new com­
mitments. Many suffered losses when the
apartment building surge of the early 1970s
led to an overhang of unsold units and
widespread financial distress.
Tw o m illion starts?

One of the most widely publicized
monthly statistical reports is the Census
Bureau's data on housing starts. About the
middle of each month, initial estimates are
released for starts in the previous month and
revisions for earlier months. Data cited usual­
ly are “ seasonally adjusted.” A “ start” occurs
when ground is broken for a foundation.
Single-family homes are usually completed
three to six months after the start. Apartment
projects may take a year or more.
Housing starts fluctuate substantially with
the seasons, especially in the northern states.
For the nation as a whole, starts in the spring
and summer months average about 80 per-

7

Homes lead housing recovery
million units

•Estimated
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census.

cent above the level of the winter months.
Deep frost penetration during the recent
severe winter caused more delays than usual.
As a result, the underlying strength of the
residential construction sector was not clearly
evident until the spring was well advanced.
Most analysts expect housing starts to
total 1.9 to 2.0 million in 1977, up from 1.5
million in 1976 and less than 1.2 million in
1975. The 1975 total was the smallest number
since 1946 when the industry was reviving
after World War II. The all-time peak of 2.4
million was reached in 1972.
An important supplement to conven­
tionally constructed housing is provided by
"mobile homes" or “ manufactured houses"
assembled in factories and transported to
their sites fully equipped and furnished. Most
of these units provide year-round living
quarters. Mobile home shipments rose from a
level of about 100,000 units per year in the ear­
ly 1960s to almost 600,000 in both 1972 and
1973. Shipments then declined sharply,
reaching a low of 210,000 in 1975. Last year saw
a recovery to 250,000, and a further gain is ex­
pected this year.
The slight improvement in mobile home
shipments has been disappointing to analysts
who view these units as a lower cost alter­
native to conventional home ownership. In
1973 mobile homes were almost 22 percent of
8




the combined total of housing starts and
mobile home shipments. In recent months
this proportion has been only about 12 per­
cent. The quality of mobile homes has im­
proved in recent years, partly because weaker
producers have dropped out of the market
and partly because of federally imposed stan­
dards. However, some lenders, particularly
com m ercial banks, suffered losses on
repossessions of mobile homes follow­
ing the 1972-73 boom and have reduced their
activities in this sector. Also, existing mobile
homes have not appreciated in value in re­
cent years in the manner of conventional
homes.
Apartments vs. homes

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, apart­
ment building soared in virtually all large
metropolitan areas. Favorable tax rules on
depreciation attracted investors, and plentiful
funds were available to finance these pro­
jects. Loans from insurance companies, pen­
sion funds, and other institutions were
augmented by those provided by Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs), which were
authorized by federal legislation in 1960 to
pass through earnings to shareholders with­
out taxation. Mutual funds, which invest in
stocks and bonds, were allowed to pass
through earnings untaxed by legislation
enacted in 1940. Another factor encouraging
apartment construction was the growth of the
condominium device under which in­
dividuals purchase their apartments and ob­
tain individual mortgages.
Apartments accounted for 19 percent of
all housing starts in 1959. Comparable data are
not available for earlier years, but various
evidence indicates that the proportion of
multifamily starts had been in the 15 to 20 per­
cent range throughout the 1950s. The propor­
tion of apartments to total starts jumped to 35
percent in the mid-1960s, to 40 percent in
1968, and finally to 45 percent in the years 1969
through 1973.
Single-family and multifamily starts both
declined 13 percent in 1973. The following
year singles declined 22 percent and multis 51
Economic Perspectives

percent. In 1975 home starts were as large as in
1974, but multis dropped another 40 percent
and their proportion of total starts declined to
23 percent, the lowest since 1960. Bell Savings
and Loan Association data for the Chicago
area show this phenomenon to a striking
degree. Apartments dropped from almost 60
percent of all permits for new housing in the
Chicago area in 1971 and 1972to 36 percent in
1975.
The early 1970s saw substantial over­
building of apartments in many areas and the
development of a large overhang of unrented
or unsold units. In the meantime building
costs had increased sharply and interest
charges were heavy. Construction loans com­
monly carried rates of 15 percent or more at
the peak. Many construction loans and
mortgages were defaulted, and the resulting
financial morass is still being worked out.
Month-by-month, however, the picture has
substantially improved.
As the number of vacant apartments has
been reduced, continued increases in real es­
tate values and rising rents have restored
many projects to financial health, thereby en­
couraging promotions of new projects.
From a low point of 270,000 in 1975, mul­
tifamily starts rose to 375,000 last year and
have approached a 500,000 rate in recent
months. This is still only half the 1972 level,
however, while single-family starts are run­
ning 12 percent higher than in 1972. As a
result, the proportion of apartment starts to
the total is unlikely to much exceed 25 per­
cent this year.
The failure of apartment construction to
recover more rapidly is a counter productive
factor in the nation's drive to conserve
energy. Apartment buildings are much more
efficient in using energy either to heat or cool
a given area of living space. Moreover,
apartments are more likely to be located near
shops and public transportation than are
detached houses.
H ouseholds and housing units

Two factors largely determine the
nation's need for new housing units: (1) the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




rate of increase in the number of households,
and (2) the rate at which existing units are
demolished or abandoned. Complicating fac­
tors include net conversions of existing units
and acquisitions of second homes for recrea­
tion or other reasons. To a degree, cause and
effect runs both ways: a growing surplus of
new housing units may encourage both
household formation and also abandonment
of substandard structures.
Official estimates place the number of
households in March 1976 at 73 million
households; the current number probably
approaches 75 million. “ Household," a
broader concept than “ family," includes
single persons or groups of persons, un­
related by blood or marriage, who occupy
housekeeping units (as opposed to transient
or institutional quarters). Nonfamily
households have been growing as a propor­
tion of the total in recent years as young un­
married people have more commonly es­
tablished separate living quarters. The
number of households has doubled since
World War II, while the population has in­
creased by less than 60 percent. In the past
decade households have increased 25 per­
cent, while the population has risen 10
percent.
Net household formations surged in the
years following World War II to1.5million per
year, as marriages delayed by the war took
place, and many families living with relatives
“ undoubled" as the increasing supply of
housing permitted. From 1950 through 1965
household formation averaged less than 1
million annually. The rate increased in the late
1960s and since 1970 has averaged 1.6 million
annually. The Census Bureau's median pro­
jection suggests that household formation
will continue near this rate for the next
decade.
The sharp rise in households relative to
population partly reflects an increasingly
affluent and more independent-minded
society. But, more importantly, it reflects
relative growth in the number of young
adults. Since 1968 the 25-34 age group has in­
creased twice as fast as the population; in the
past five years—four times as fast.
9

The number of housing units demolished
or abandoned as unlivable is not known, but
may exceed a half million per year. Many
demolitions occur as land is cleared for ex­
pressways or urban renewal projects. Aban­
donments have occurred steadily in areas
where farms have been consolidated, mineral
or forest resources have been exhausted, or
an exodus of industry has occurred for other
reasons. Increasingly, abandonment of
dilapidated or burned-out structures in
depressed areas of inner cities has led to
evacuation and eventual demolition of whole
blocks. In New York, Chicago, Detroit, and
other large cities, tens of thousands of hous­
ing units have been abandoned or demolish­
ed in the past 15 years and the pace has
accelerated sharply in the 1970s.

Residential construction
— a volatile sector
billion dollars

Housing and the cycle

Since World War II residential construc­
tion activity usually has moved “ counter
cyclically," leading general business both in
declines and recoveries. Moreover, housing
has traced fluctuations that had no counter­
part in total output, e.g., peaks and subse­
quent declines occurred in 1955 and in 1965
when total activity measured by the gross
national product (GNP) continued its upward
course. The highly cyclical nature of this sec­
tor is further exemplified by the fact that in­
creases and declines have shown far greater
amplitude than general business.
Peaks in residential construction, ad­
justed for price changes, have usually been
reached several quarters before peaks in real
GNP. Leads in recoveries typically have not
been nearly so long, but uptrends in housing
usually have been rapid and a greater source
of strength in the early stages of an expansion
than have business capital expenditures,
which usually gather steam only after mar­
gins of unused capacity have narrowed
significantly.
The cyclical nature of residential con­
struction to a large extent reflects changes in
the availability of mortgage credit. Interest as
a portion of total costs is very important to
housing activity both during construction and
10




SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

in the monthly payments that amortize loans.
When business needs for funds are moderate,
market interest rate patterns encourage in­
flows of funds to the savings and loans and
mutual savings banks, which specialize in
mortgage lending. In such periods,
moreover, commercial banks and insurance
companies are more likely to be attracted to
mortgage investments.
As general business expands and interest
rates rise, the forces that provided ample
funds for housing are reversed. Inflows of
savings to thrift institutions slow down and
may give way to net outflows—as in 1969 and
1973-74. Mortgage commitments become less
available. The problem is compounded by
ceilings on the rates that can be paid on
savings and time accounts, and by state usury
laws applicable to home mortgages. (Usury
ceilings in many states, for example, Illinois,
have been made more flexible by recent
legislation.)
Another factor that may increase the
volatility of housing is the tendency for
government to establish new or expanded
Economic Perspectives

programs when activity is depressed. Such
programs may not become fully effective un­
til a new expansion in building is well under
way.
Although of great importance, a large
and steady flow of mortgage funds at
moderate rates probably would not
guarantee long-term stability in residential
construction. The need for new units rises
fairly steadily year after year, while new units
are provided in waves as new projects are
developed. Partly because of the length of
time required to bring new housing to the
market, especially apartments, there is a
strong tendency to overbuild. After one or
more boom years a backlog of unsold houses
and vacant apartments must be absorbed
before a new expansion can be supported.
The residential construction cycle was
vividly illustrated in the recent recession.
Residential construction, in real terms, peak­
ed in the first quarter of 1973—three quarters
earlier than the peak in real GNP which coin­
cided with the oil embargo. Residential con­
struction bottomed out in the first quarter of
1975 after a two-year decline and a drop of 45
percent. Real GNP also hit its low in the first
quarter of 1975, after a decline of 8 percent.
Since the recession low, both residential con­
struction and real GNP have increased in each
successive quarter.
As a proportion of GNP, residential con­
struction reached a high of 5.3 percent in
1972. In the first quarter of 1975, this ratio had
declined to only 3 percent. In the comeback
the ratio reached 4 percent in the firstquarter
of 1977. It probably increased further in the
second quarter, but remained well below the
1972 level. If apartment construction had ad­
vanced at the same pace as single-family
homes, the 1972 ratio probably would have
been regained by mid-1977.
M ortgage funds am ple

Residential mortgage debt totaled over
$660 billion at the end of 1976, up 12 percent
during the year, with most of the gain in the
second half.Mortgagedebtdoubtlesswill rise
more than 10 percent this year as more new
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




homes and apartmentsarecompleted and the
number of transactions in existing properties
continues at a record pace and at ever-rising
prices.
Total credit market debt owed byall nonfinancial sectors, public and private, now ex­
ceeds $2.6 trillion, having doubled since 1968.
During this period residential mortgages have
increased from less than 24 percent of total
debt to over 25 percent. Despite heavy
borrowings by government and business, the
residential mortgage sector has been able to
increase its share of total funds raised.
Home mortgages on properties with one
to four units (including condominiums)
totaled $559 billion at the start of the year,
compared to $102billion outstandingon mul­
tifamily properties. Home mortgages and
multifamily mortgages have both more than
doubled since 1968. In 1975 and 1976 when
home mortgages increased by over $100
billion or 23 percent, multifamily mortgages
rose by only $2 billion or 2 percent. This
reflected the sharply lower level of multifami­
ly construction, paydowns, or write-offs of ex­
isting loans on apartments, and conversions
of some apartments to individually owned
condominiums. Growth in condominium
ownership continues despite some widely
publicized problems associated with com­
munal operation and maintenance.
The relative shares of home mortgages
and multifamily mortgages that are held by
various groups of lenders vary substantially, as
shown in the accompanying tables. Savings
and loan associations (S&Ls) now hold 47 per­
cent of all home mortgages, up from 42 per­
cent in 1970 and far more than any other
group. Last year S&Ls accounted for 55 per­
cent of the rise. Commercial banks are the se­
cond largest holders of home mortgages with
16 percent, a somewhat larger share than a
decade ago. Mutual savings banks (MSBs)
have 10 percent, down from 15 percent a
decade ago. Slower growth of MSB mortgage
holdings partly reflects the slower growth of
the northeastern region where they are con­
centrated. The share of life insurance com­
panies, once major lenders on home
mortgages, declined from 13 percent in 1966
11

TABLE 1
Holders of home mortgages, one to four units
1966

1968_____________ 1970

1972

1974

1976

(b illio n d o lla rs , y e a r - e n d )

232.9 100.0%

Total
Savings and
loans

97.4

41.8

264.6 100.0%

297.7 100.0% 372.8 100.0% 449.9 100.0%

110.1

124.5

41.8

167.0

42.1

14.1

42.3

14.2

26.8

5.7

201.6

44.8

46.2

12.4

49.2

10.9

53.2

9.5

57.0

15.3

74.8

16.6

87.9

15.7

9.0

22.3

6.0

19.0

4.2

16.1

2.9

23.7

8.0

26.5

7.1

36.8

8.2

40.4

7.2

1.4

0.5

3.0

1.0

10.7

2.9

18.6

4.1

42.0

7.5

30.8

11.6

35.2

11.8

42.9

11.5

49.9

11.1

57.8

10.3

35.6

15.3

39.5

14.9

Commercial banks

32.8

14.1

38.8

14.7

Life insurance
companies

30.2

13.0

29.0

11.0

Government and
related agencies1

10.7

4.6

15.1

.5

0.2

25.7

11.0

Individuals and
others3

261.7

44.8

41.6

Mutual savings
banks

Mortgage pools2

559.3 100.0%
46.8

includes federal, state, and local government agencies, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA),
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC).
^Outstanding principal balances of mortgages backing securities guaranteed by Government National Mortgage
Corporation (G N M A), FHLMC, Farmers Home Administration (FmHA).
includes mortgage companies, noninsured pension funds, state and local retirement funds, real
estate investment trusts, credit unions.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.

TABLE 2
Holders of multi-family mortgages, five or more units
1966

1968_____________ 1970

1972

1974

1976

(b illio n d o lla rs , y e a r - e n d )

Total

48.3 100.0%
21.7

13.8

23.0

20.8

25.2

23.7

23.7

28.1

27.5

7.3

15.1

7.8

13.0

10.9

13.2

12.9

12.9

14.2

13.9

24.9

12.8

26.5

16.0

26.6

17.3

20.9

19.6

19.6

19.2

18.8

2.1

5.1

2.7

5.6

3.3

5.5

5.8

7.0

7.6

7.6

6.3

6.2

2.3

5.6

3.1

6.4

5.6

9.3

9.8

11.9

17.1

17.1

19.4

19.0

11.4

27.6

11.9

24.6

13.6

22.6

18.0

21.8

19.0

19.0

14.8

14.5

8.6

20.8

10.5

6.6

16.0

Life insurance
companies

10.3

Commercial banks
Government and
related agencies1
Individuals and
others2

102.0 100.0%

100.0%

Mutual savings
banks

82.6 100.0%

99.9 100.0%

60.1

41.3 100.0%

Savings and
loans

^ee Table 1.
includes mortgage companies, noninsured pension funds, state and local retirement funds, real
estate investment trusts, mortgage pools.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.

72




Economic Perspectives

Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) data,
to 3 percent currently. The most rapidly grow­
cost $23,000 and carried a 75 percent 25-year,
ing suppliers of home mortgage funds are
6 percent loan. All of these measures in­
"mortgage pools,” which issue securities
creased in the 1960s. In the tight credit period
backed by mortgages. This group, which in­
of 1969-70, mortgage interest rates rose sharp­
cludes securities guaranteed by the Gov­
ly, moving to 8.5 percent or more for a limited
ernment National Mortgage Association
(GNMA), now holds 7.5 percent of all
period. Such rates were unprecedented and
home mortgages, compared to almost none
exceeded usury ceilings in many states. The
10 years ago.
median purchase price of new homes ex­
Savings and loans are also the largest
ceeded $35,000 in 1970, partly because of in­
holders of multifamily mortgages with 28 per­
flation, but also because the average new
cent of the total. Government and related
home was larger and more fully equipped.
agencies, including the Federal National
Home mortgage contract rates dropped
Mortgage Association (FNMA), hold 19 per­
in 1971-72 to about 7.5 percent. In the second
cent, having increased their share sharply in
half of 1974, rates rebounded to a new high of
recent years. Life insurance companies hold
over 9 percent, then receded to 8.75
19 percent, and mutual savings banks 14
percent—a level about maintained through
percent.
the present. Fees raise effective rates to about
Savings and loans, MSBs, and commercial
9 percent. Rates increased moderately in most
areas this spring.
banks reported sharp increases in savings and
The median price of new homes has in­
time deposits in 1976 and early 1977.
Mortgages closed and new loan com­
creased very sharply since 1973, about 10 per­
cent per year, despite some trend toward
mitments reached record highs. In April, for
smaller-sized houses. In addition to rising
example, deposits of insured S&Ls totaled
costs of material and labor, tighter building
$346 billion, up 16 percent from a year ago.
Mortgage loans outstanding were up 17 per­
codes have added further to costs of con­
cent; loans closed and loan commitments
struction. Impediments to the development
outstanding were both up 37 percent. New
of new sites reflecting environmental restricsavings inflows at S&Ls
and MSBs slowed in the
Rates on home mortgages have held near
spring, but remained at a
fairly high level. Also, a
9 percent for two years
large volume of funds is
percent
a v a ila b le from loan
repaym ents, including
advance repayments as
p ro p e rtie s ch an g ed
hands. If savings inflows
do shrink, S&Ls can ex­
pand their borrowings
from Federal Home Loan
Banks and other lenders.
Interest rates and
hom e prices

In the early 1960s the
typical new home carry­
ing a c o n v e n tio n a l
mortgage, according to
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

‘ Rates on conventional new home mortgages, excluding
fees and charges, based on HUD field office surveys.
“ Newly issued Aaa utility bonds.

73

tions and limited access to natural gas, water,
and sewerage facilities have sharply limited
the supply of buildable lots in m any areas, es­
pecially in California, thus causing lot prices
to soar.
In M ay 1977 the average new hom e price
was $52,000. The average loan was $39,400, the
average dow npaym ent 23 percent, and the
average maturity 28 years.
L o n g e r m a tu ritie s redu ce average
monthly am ortization paym ents, but this
tendency has been m ore than offset by higher
interest rates. In 1965 a typical $18,000, 25year, 5.75 percent loan carried m onthly am or­
tization payments (principal and interest) of
$113. Currently, the m onthly paym ent of a
typical $39,000, 30-year, 9 percent loan is $314.
In addition, paym ents for taxes, fuel,
m aintenance, insurance, and utilities have in­
creased at least as fast as hom e prices.
As hom e prices have risen in recent years,
there have been w idespread com plaints that
the typical family, especially a young co up le,
"cannot afford" a single-fam ily hom e— new
or used. H ow ever, families a r e buying hom es
at an am azing pace.

Costs of home ownership have risen
faster than either rents or the
total “ cost of living”
percent, 1967=100

‘ Includes home purchase, mortgage interest, taxes,
insurance, home maintenance and repairs.
“ Estimated
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Consumer Price Index.

14




M edian annual family incom e currently
exceeds $15,000, 50 percent higher than in
1970. FHLBB data show new hom e prices up
som ewhat l e s s than 50 percent in this period.
Since 1965 m edium incom e has increased 120
percent, w hile new hom e prices are up about
110 percent.
M o re fa m ily
in co m e s have been
augmented by a second wage earner in the
past 10 or 15 years, and few er couples have the
expense of rearing children. Dow npaym ents
on new or m ore expensive hom es are often
available from increased equities in hom es
previously purchased as a result of paydowns
on mortgages and inflation.
Federal aids to housing
Until the early 1960s federal activities in
the housing field w ere largely limited to
providing Federal Housing Adm inistration
(FHA) insurance on unsubsidized mortgages,
Veterans Adm inistration (VA) guarantees,
and financing of public housing, usually ad­
ministered by local authorities. In the past 15
years a variety of programs have provided
subsidies to aid hom e o w nership or reduce
the burden of rental payments.
FHA insurance played an im portant role
in reviving the housing industry in the late
1930s after the D epression. VA guarantees
w ere provided after W orld W ar II and aided
many veterans in acquiring hom es on
favorable terms. In recent years the part
played by these unsubsidized governm entbacked mortgage insurance programs has
been relatively small. At the end of 1975 they
accounted for only 11 percent of all
mortgages held by S&Ls. C eilin g rates on
FH A-VA loans, regulations governing the
characteristics of properties financed, and ad­
ministrative delays have discouraged many
lenders from participating actively in these
programs. Increasingly, private m ortgage in­
surance has been substituted for governm ent
insurance on low dow npaym ent loans.
Public housing has never been a large
factor in the total housing picture in the
United States. O n ly about 1.5 percent of all
units now o ccu p ied , including special hous-

Economic Perspectives

Price increases for new housing
have about matched income
gains in recent years. . .

. . . .but income has far
outpaced house prices since
the mid-1950s

percent, 1972=100
175

percent, 1955=100

0 I i i i .......................................................................... ....

i i i l i i

i

1948’50 '52 ’54 ’56 ’58 ’60 ’62 '64 '66 '68 '70 ’72 ’74 ’76
•Estimated.
NOTE: This pair of charts illustrates the importance of the selection of a base year. 1972=100 in the first and
1955=100 in the second, in comparing trends in home prices with other prices and with income.
SOURCES: Bureau of the Census; Bureau of Economic Analysis.

ing for the elderly, are under public
ownership. Only 10,000 public units were
started last year, down from 35,000 in 1970.
While experience with public housing has
varied by project, "high-rise" units erected in
inner cities have generally proved unsatisfac­
tory. Some high-rises of relatively recent con­
struction deteriorated to the point that
demolition was necessary.
A variety of federal rental supplements
have been available since the mid-1960s, es­
pecially under Section 236 of the Federal
Housing Act. In addition, under Section 235,
the FHA has encouraged home ownership
with subsidized insured loans on new homes.
Little or no downpayment is required, and
subsidies reduce monthly payments. Ex­
perience with many "235" loans made in the
late 1960s and early 1970s has been unsatisfac­
tory. The FHA has been forced to foreclose
loans on thousands of abandoned properties.
Mismanagement, fraudulent appraisals, and
shoddy construction, on the one hand,
together with poorly prepared home owners
with no equity to protect, on the other, have
cast a shadow over prospects for subsidized
home ownership programs. The revised 235
program attempted to deal with these
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




problems, for example, by requiring higher
downpayments.
Currently, two federal programs may
provide extensive subsidies for multifamily
renters in the near future. Under Section 8,
enacted in 1974, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) hopes to
provide assistance to 80,000 rental unit hous­
ing starts in the current fiscal year. Section 8
provides federal subsidies to keep rental
payments below 25 percent of adjusted in­
come for families whose income is less than 80
percent of the median for designated areas.
(This implies that 40 percent of all families
might qualify for subsidies.) Another active
program is GNMA's "tandem plan" under
which the agency raises funds at market rates
and buys multifamily mortgages at below
market rates—the difference measuring the
amount of the subsidy.
The full dimension of federal subsidies to
either home owners or renters cannot be
evaluated merely by analyzing programs that
provide aid specifically for housing. Any in­
come from welfare or other benefit programs
can be used for house-related payments, and
this need is often specifically taken into ac­
count in providing such payments.

15

To sustainable levels

In the late spring there were reports that
the explosive bull market in family houses was
tapering off, even in California. For several
months many lenders have been screening
mortgage loan applications more closely to
exclude borrowers who do not intend to oc­
cupy the houses they contract to purchase.
Any slowing in the rate of price rise of homes
would tend to discourage speculators who
desire a quick profit. Mortgage funds con­
tinue to be readily available, meanwhile, with
rates and fees only m oderately higher than at
the start of the year.
Most observers of housing market trends
expect that new home construction will re­
main strong in 1978, although single-family
starts may be somewhat fewer than in 1977. A
further expansion in multifamily construction
is widely expected. Vacancy rates have de­
clined to the lowest level in several years, and
rising rents will justify additional projects.
HUD is reported to be pushing hard for ad­
ditional subsidized housing.

16




Recent higher levels of residential con­
struction have been accompanied by
scattered reports of spot shortages of brick,
cement, insulation, and other building
materials, but nothing critical. Most areas, ac­
cording to Engineering News Record, have
adequate numbers of skilled construction
workers.
Availability of suitable sites for new
residential buildings with access to water,
sewerage, and utility services apparently is the
major factor limiting developments in the
vicinity of metropolitan areas. To a con­
siderable degree the "lot shortage” reflects
stiff new environmental standards and a reac­
tion to the haphazard, poorly planned expan­
sion of some suburban areas in the past 10 to
15 years. For many years to come, public
policy will be challenged by the need to
balance desires to protect and improve the
setting of urban life with requirements for
new living space.
George W. Cloos
William R. Sayre

Economic Perspectives

The prime rate revisited *
The unusually wide spreads that have per­
sisted over the last two years between the
prime rate—the interest rate that banks
charge on loans to their most creditworthy
business customers—and money-market in­
terest rates are now narrowing. Bankers
themselves were the first to focus attention on
the relationship between the prime and openmarket rates. In October 1971 a few moneycenter banks decided to link their prime rates
directly to the cost of open-market funds.
They adopted “ formula prime rates" based
on fixed relationships to the interest rate on
commercial paper—specifically, the average
of quoted dealer rates on paper maturing in
three to four months. Commercial paper is
unsecured promissory notes issued by large
corporations and sold to large-volume in­
vestors. To borrowers the commercial paper
market represents an alternative to bank
loans.
Ever since the advent of the formula
prime, the nexus between the prime rate and
the short-term commercial paper rate has
been the major focal point of prime rate
analysis, even though prime formulas have
never been used at most commercial banks
and have not been applied rigidly and con­
sistently at any bank. Citibank, N.A. (formerly
First National City Bank) in New York, the
originator and major proponent of the for­
mula prime, has stated repeatedly that the
formula is only a guide and that other factors
must also be considered in setting the best
lending rate.
One objective of devising the formula
prime was to deflect attention from the prime
rate as a rate subject to some degree of dis­
*Methods used by banks both historically and in re­
cent years to set the prime rate were surveyed by the
author in "The Prime Rate," B u sin e s s C o n d it io n s , Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (April 1975), pp. 3-12. The pres­
ent discussion highlights prime rate developments occuring since that article appeared.

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




cretionary control by the banks. The Com­
mittee on Interest and Dividends (CID), a part
of the Wage-Price Stabilization Program,
began scrutinizing bank lending rates in 1971.
Some banks felt that changes in their prime
quotations would be easier to justify to all
concerned parties (the C ID , Congress, bank
borrowers, and even other banks) if the
relationship between interest charges on the
best credit-rated bank loans and on an openmarket source of funds for business bor­
rowers was spotlighted.
By publicizing the linkage between
prime and the commercial paper rate,
however, formula-prime banks implicitly deemphasized other factors which are impor­
tant in setting the prime rate. These factors in­
clude interest costs on banks' lendable funds,
interest returns on nonloan assets held by
banks, and expected future growth in bank
loans and deposits.
Form ulas and rate spreads

Citibank's first formula called for setting
its prime rate approximately Vi percentage
point above the rate on three- to four-month
commercial paper subject to weekly review.
Since then, Citibank has exercised con­
siderable latitude in tempering the formula
prime concept to the financial and political
environment—rounding up or down from
the formula, temporarily discontinuing the
formula in 1973, intermittantly ignoring
weekly rate changes implied by the formula,
and revising the formula itself. The current
Citibank formula, and the only one now
publicized nationally, calls for a prime rate
that is VA percentage points above the threeprevious-week average of the 90-119 day,
dealer-placed commercial paper rate. The
present Citibank prime-setting method is the
culmination of four changes in the differen­
tial between the formula prime and the com­
17

mercial paper rate since the CID ended. The
formula spread was increased from Va to 1
percentage point in October 1974, from 1 to
VA percentage point in April 1975, and from
VA to V/2 percentage points in January 1976,
and then was lowered to VA percentage
points in June 1977.
Although other large commercial banks
do not presently issue formula-prime
quotations, some acknowledge that they use
the commercial paper rate as an informal in­
dicator for prime rate revisions. Some banks
also admit to using Citibank's prime as a
benchmark for their own prime rate revisions,
although clearly they do not have a simple
follow-the-leader allegiance to Citibank's
prime. Industry-wide prime quotations have
tended to stay within Va, or at most Vi,
percentage point of Citibank's rate.
Even though prime bank loans and com­
mercial paper are both tailored to borrowers'
needs and are close substitutes for short-term

business financing, a historical spread exists
between the respective rates. The basic
spread depends on differences in ad­
ministrative costs and nonprice lending terms
involved in issuing and servicing each type of
debt contract. Differences in interest cost
calculations—discount method for commer­
cial paper and typically bond-yield method
for prime loans—also contribute to the
spread.
Money-market rates, influencing the
level at which banks set the prime rate, were
relatively stable in 1976 and 1977. As a result,
prime rate revisions in 1976 were less frequent
than in any other year since the introduction
of the formula prime in 1971. During 1976 the
prime rate fluctuated within a narrow band of
VA percentage points, starting the year at or
near 7Va percent and ending 1976 at 6 percent.
In the first five months of 1977, the prime rate
was revised only three times, and between
late-January and mid-May of this year, the

The prime-paper rate spread
percent

78




percent

Economic Perspectives

prime stood at 6V a percent—the longest un­
interrupted duration for an industry-wide
prime rate since 1969.
W hy the w ide spread?

The most noteworthy development in
1976 and 1977, however, has been the widen­
ed margin of the prime rate above the com­
mercial paper rate. Prime rate adjustments
typically lag behind changes in the commer­
cial paper rate, widening the differential
between the rates when the commercial
paper rate falls and narrowing the spread
when the paper rate rises. Such lagged
response was not an important factor in ex­
plaining the wider prime-paper ratedifferentials in 1976 and 1977. For example, the weekly
average paper rate remained at or very near
4V4 percent from mid-January through April
1977 while the prime remained at 6 V 4 percent
industry-wide—a persistent prime-paperrate spread of V /2 percent.
Several partial explanations for the wider
prime-paper rate differential, offered by
bankers and financial observers, have focused
on institutional features of banking.
• The wider spread indicates a return to
the historically higher prime rate margin
over the commercial paper rate.
• Banks have granted some loans at belowprime or “ super-prime” rates in order to
m a in ta in higher advertised prime
quotations while attracting some ad­
ditional loans to “ best” customers.
• Non-rate terms of lending have been
relaxed in lieu of lowering the prime rate,
p a r t ic u la r ly by allowing business
borrowers to “ double count” compen­
sating balances—i.e., use the same non­
interest deposit balances to compensate a
bank for a credit extension and to reim­
burse the bank for nonloan services
provided to the business customer.
• The cost of lending in 1976 and 1977 has
remained relatively high, compared to
open-market rates during this period,
because of higher average costs for
loanable funds attributable to the larger
proportions of their deposits in the form of
time certificates of deposit.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




These reasons may have contributed to
the wider prime-paper rate spread for par­
ticular banks at certain times during 1976 and
1977. Singly or collectively, however, these
reasons do not account for the large industry­
wide differential. The argument concerning
historical spreads has some validity, in the
sense that banks felt somewhat more latitude
to increase margins between the prime rate
and money market rates in the post-CID
period. In earlier periods before the formulaprime era, for example, the prime-to-paperrate spread did exceed 1 percentage point on
occasion. However, there were no counter­
parts to the sustained V /2 percent spread that
appeared in the first half of 1977.
But the major reason cited by the bank­
ing community itself for the high prime-paper
rate spread in 1976 and 1977 has been slack
loan demand and unresponsiveness on the
part of business borrowers to declining bank
loan rates. In economics parlance, banks
perceived that the demand for business loans
in the existing circumstances was highly in­
elastic with respect to the loan rate. Inelastic
demand for loans implies that a bank's total
loan revenue (and, consequently, profits)
would decline if it lowered the prime rate,
since increased revenue resulting from a
greater dollar volume of loans at the lower
rate would be more than offset by the loss of
revenue from a lower per-dollar return
(interest rate) on all loans extended.
The effects on loan revenue resulting
from lowering the prime rate are reinforced
by the multiple functions served by the prime
rate. Revisions in the prime influencea bank's
loan revenue from both prime and nonprime
loans because nonprime loan charges typical­
ly are determined by tying them directly and
formally, or indirectly and informally, to the
prime.
Prime rate changes also influence
revenue from loans contracted by a bank in
earlier time periods, as well as loans made
after a prime change, since both long- and
short-term bank loan rates often are indexed
to the prime. That is, interest charges on these
loans vary up and down with the prime rate
over the duration of the credit contract.
19

"Floating" loan rates of this type have
become increasingly important in recent
years with a greater share of some banks' loan
contracts including this feature and with
many banks increasing the proportion of their
loan portfolios in term loans—longer-term
contracts with rates often linked to prime.
Floating-rate contracts on term and other
loans were probably a major contributing fac­
tor in the recent episode of downward inflex­
ibility of the prime rate.
Linkage to the prime rate of nonprime­
rated and prior-period lending provides com­
mercial banks with an incentive to offer
below-prime-rate loans to some customers in
order to make more new business loans
without lowering returns on other loans that
are linked to officially publicized prime
quotations. This has been a major explanation
accompanying claims that banks have given
below-prime rate concessions.
Banks, however, adamantly deny the
granting of "super-prime" loans in 1976 and
1977, and for good reason. While a bank
might be tempted to experiment with loans at
below-prime rates in order to boost short­
term revenue, a strong disincentive toward
such lending arises from the "customer
relationship"—arrangements built around
bank-customer loyalty whereby a bank
provides a variety of services to its longestablished clientele. If prime-rate loan
customers discovered that some bank
borrowers were receiving even better loan
rates, a bank’s customer relationships would
be placed in extreme jeopardy. Loss of bank
revenue from the exodus of longstanding
customers could far overshadow short-term
gains from below-prime lending.
W hat about next time?

The spread between the prime rate and
commercial paper rate is narrowing as the de­
mand for commercial and industrial loans has
started to recover during the past year. But it is
too early to predict the extent to which the
gap between the two rates will shrink in the

20




months ahead.
Commercial banks may possibly adopt
methods in the future that would permit
more downward flexibility of the prime. For
example, use of proviso clauses governing the
extent of rate flotation in "floating-rate" loan
contracts could increase. Such arrangements
allow the interest rate to vary with the prime
rate over the duration of the bank loan but set
an absolute lower limit on the rate— a point at
which the interest rate ceases to follow the
prime downward.
As an alternative approach commercial
banks could adopt two prime rates—the
regular prime rate on new loan contracts and
a special prime for calculations in floatingrate contracts from earlier time periods—with
the two rates being allowed to deviate from
each other by a specified fraction of a
percentage point, or more. Banks would be
able to thereby lower the prime rate on new
loans, while maintaining the rate used for in­
dexing in earlier loan contracts.
Commercial banks may simply widen the
spread between the prime rate and commer­
cial paper rate in future periods when
economic circumstances warrant such action,
while at the same time engaging in some
public reeducation on the prime rate con­
cept. The irony of the formula prime experi­
ment is that private and public financial
observers may have learned the formula too
well. Another banking lesson in prime-setting
that focuses on other factors besides the com­
mercial paper rate may be necessary.
The formula prime experiment holds a
different and somewhat more general lesson
for commercial bankers. An innovation such
as the formula prime can be a political asset
partly because of its simplicity and direct link
to the money market. But in certain economic
situations the same innovation may become a
political liability due to its over-simplification
of complex banking decisions. In the last
analysis, this message may prove to be the
greatest legacy of the formula prime concept.
Randall C. Merris

Economic Perspectives

Social security changes necessary
According to the most recent estimates of the
trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds, ex­
penditures for old age, survivors,and disabili­
ty benefits will exceed income by about $5.6
billion during 1977. This is substantially higher
than the $3.9 billion deficit that the trustees
forecast one year ago. The trust fund for dis­
ability payments is expected to be exhausted
in 1979, and the trust fund for old age and sur­
vivors benefits in 1983, unless something is
done to increase the income of these funds in
the near future. Furthermore, the problem is
not simply short-ranged and caused by the re­
cent high levels of unemployment and infla­
tion. The social security system will have
progressively increasing deficits year after
year unless changes are made in the method
of financing, the system for determining
benefits, or both. The trustees estimate that
over the next 75 years the average tax rate will
have to be about 75 percent higher than the
rate (including scheduled increases) provided
for by current law to balance revenues and
benefit payments.1
Autom atic benefit increases

Before the 1972 overhaul of the social
security system,* Congress had intermittently
2
passed legislation altering the benefit and tax
schedules. The increases in benefits
generated by this earlier legislation were
significantly larger than the inflation that oc­

curred between changes. Nevertheless, the
income to the trust funds had provided an
ever-increasing balance in the trust fund. In
1972 legislation that provided for an
automatic escalation of benefits determined
by increases in the Consumer Price Index was
passed. At the same time the level of wages
subject to the payroll tax was tied to increases
in the average wage.
Application of the new formula raised
current benefit payments very sharply in the
midst of the recession. At the same time,
although the wage base was also increased,
the rate at which tax receipts were rising
dropped significantly because of the high
levels of unemployment. This immediate im­
pact was not foreseen at the time the legisla­
tion was passed, although some longer-run
shortage of income was anticipated. The 1973
forecast of the trustees expected revenues to
still be running ahead of benefit payments in
1977.
In addition to the short-term financing
problem posed by the continuation of high
unemployment and high inflation, a recent
Supreme Court decision has increased the
benefit payment more rapidly than could
have been expected when the 1972 legislation
was passed. The new ruling awards widowers
the right to claim full dependency benefits
without proof of dependency—a right
previously available only to widows.
T h e long-term problem

’This estimate is for old age, survivors, and disability
programs only. Problems of a long range nature also exist
for the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund if hospital costs
continue to rise at the 15 to 16 percent annual rates ex­
perienced in recent years.
2
While financing problems, over both the short and
long term, beset all aspects of tire social security system,
this discussion is primarily centered on old age and sur­
vivors benefits, which account for about three-quarters
of the total benefits operating with payroll-tax financed
trust funds.

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago



A significant part of the long-term
problem results from the 1972 changes incor­
porating automatic increases in both wage
base and benefits and the way in which
benefits are computed. The payments to each
new retiree are based on an average of the
wages on which taxes were paid. Each time
the base for collecting taxes is raised, the level
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of benefits for future retirees is also raised.
But the levels of benefits for each average
wage level are also raised because of the ad­
justment for the change in the Consumer
Price Index. Thus, while current beneficiaries
have their payments raised in step with infla­
tion, the inflation correction for future
retirees is made twice. This overcompensa­
tion, referred to as "coupling," accounts for
about half of the long-term deficit predicted
by the system trustees.
Another major cause of the projected
deficit lies in the changing age distribution of
the nation's population. Currently, there are
over 100 million persons paying social security
taxes, while 33 million are drawing benefits. If
present trends continue, in 75 years two per­
sons will be paying taxes for each individual
drawing benefits. Although 75 years is a long
time to project population trends, even in the
somewhat shorter period to the year 2000, the
demographics are unfavorable. Most persons
who will have firm attachment to the labor
market in the year 2000 have already been
born, and the vast majority of the bene­
ficiaries who will be receiving payments,
financed by the taxes on the work force of
that day, are also now alive. By that time the
number of workers per beneficiary is going to
drop from today's 3.1 level to about 2.6. Even
if there were no change in benefits from
today's levels, the tax rate needed to keep the
system on a "pay as you go" basis will have to
be about 20 percent higher than the present
rate.
The President's program

President Carter has proposed a series of
eight changes in the social security program
aimed at solving both the short- and long­
term financing problems. Two of these eight
changes will act to decrease the rate at which
benefit costs increase. The most important is
"decoupling," or eliminating the double ad­
justment of future benefits for inflation,
which would be accomplished by adjusting
future benefits for wage increases only. The
other change would be to narrow the
eligibility for claiming benefits based on a

22



deceased spouse's earnings to the claimant
who had the lower earnings of the two, rather
than having eligibility independent of the
claimant's earnings, as is now the case.
Another proposed change would
transfer part of the currently scheduled in­
creases in payroll taxes (1978 and 1981) from
the Hospital Trust Fund, for which these in­
creases are now earmarked, to the Old Age
and Survivors and the Disability Trust Funds.
This shift assumes that the rate of growth of
costs for payroll-tax financed Medicare costs
will be slowed significantly in future years.
Of the five remaining proposed changes,
four are direct tax increases. The most signifi­
cant of these changes would require the
employer to pay taxes on the entire wage
rather than on the same wage base paid by the
employee. The increase would be introduced
in steps, reaching the full payroll level in 1981,
and providing about 60 percent of the $50
billion of total funds which would be raised in
the 1978-82 period if the President's proposals
were adopted.
The other tax changes that are proposed
include increases in the wage base by an
average of $300 per year from 1979 through
1985 in addition to the automatic increases
that will result from operation of the 1972 act.
This procedure will raise the wage base to
about $30,300 per year as compared to $27,900
without the added increase.
Another proposal is to raise the tax paid
by self-employed individuals from 7.0 to 7.5
percent. Prior to the 1972 act self-employed
persons paid a 50 percent higher tax rate than
did wage and salaried workers. This change
would restore that ratio to the historic level.
The remaining tax increase is to advance
the effective date of a tax rate increase of 1
percent (on both employer and employee)
which is now scheduled for the year 2011.
One-quarter of the increase would become
effective in 1985, the balance in 1990.
C orrecting for the recession

The remaining Presidential proposal to
modify the funding of the social security
system is to augment social security receipts
Economic Perspectives

with general revenue funds when the un­
employment rate is about 6 percent. The trust
funds would be credited with an amount
equal to the difference between what was ac­
tually paid and the estimated payments if un­
employment were actually at 6 percent. This
new funding, called the "counter-cyclical
financing method," would make transfers in
1978,1979, and 1980 based on the unemploy­
ment rates for 1975 through 1978. The Ad­
ministration is currently asking that this
method be enacted temporarily, suggesting
that it be made permanent if a review in 1978
proves the method sound.
C ongressional reaction

Leading members of Congress have
generally agreed on the need for a prompt
program to insure financing of the social

Digitized Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
for FRASER


security system. Virtually all who have com­
mented have recognized the necessity of
"d e co u p lin g " wage- and price-related
benefit adjustments. Reaction to the other
proposals has been mixed, and while some
changes in the social security financing struc­
ture seem certain within the next year, they
could be in directions significantly different
from the President’s proposal. Most adverse
Congressional reaction has centered on the
counter-cyclical financing from general
revenues. Significant opposition to any move
away from a fully self-supporting social
security system seems to exist. Several
Senators and Representatives have indicated
they would view such a move as a change
from an insurance system toward a welfare
system of benefit payments.
M o rton

B. M ille n s o n

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