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Volatility has been the hallmark of the silver market ever since the U.S. Government ended its prolonged price-stabilization efforts in mid1967. Against the background of a strong long-term uptrend, short-run price movements have been exceed ingly erratic, largely because of the dominant influence of speculative factors rather than industrial supply/ demand considerations. During the period in question, trading increased dramatically on the New York, Chi cago and London exchanges. From the original base of $1.29 an ounce, prices doubled between mid-1967 and mid-1968, only to lose all of that gain by late 1971. Prices then soared to a stratospheric $6.70 an ounce in the speculative orgy of early 1974 before retreating to the present level of $4.64 an ounce. Over the years, investment analysts have formulated careful analyses of expected market trends, only to watch their forecasts rendered in valid by unforeseen political and financial developments. During one especially perverse period (1968 71), speculators sustained severe losses when prices headed down ward in the face of earlier bullish predictions. Yet this cautionary les son was all but forgotten during the recent speculative outburst, when silver fever reached a higher pitch than at any time since the discovery of the Comstock lode. Initial price surge Massive price fluctuations began to develop in July 1967, when the U.S. Treasury halted unlimited sales to Digitizfed for FR A SER domestic industrial users at the old monetary value of $1.29 an ounce, and announced that it would sell its remaining silver stocks in small weekly amounts at the going market price. Within a year, prices in New York jumped to $2.56 an ounce, largely because of the reaction of consumers and speculators to the widely-heralded gap between new mine production and industrial de mand, but also because of the speculation generated by worldwide monetary uncertainties. Throughout the preceding decade, world mine production had lagged far behind industrial demand, so that the difference had to be cov ered mainly by sales of silver from the U.S. Treasury— roughly 2 billion ounces in all. As these supplies dwindled and the Treasury's even tual withdrawal from the market be came increasingly certain, silver users and investors concluded that a silver shortage would be almost inevitable. Their belief was sup ported by the effects of new silver legislation, which set off a rush by silver-certificate holders to turn in their paper money for silver by a mid-1968 deadline, and by the ef fects of a nine-month-long copper strike, which forced the shutdown of nonferrous metals refineries and seriously reduced the normal refin ery supplies of silver. Upward pressures on prices were exacerbated by the worldwide cur rency turmoil of 1967-68, which culminated in a flight from the de valued British pound and the weak(continued on page 2) Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, nor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. ening American dollar into precious metals. British and American cit izens could not legally own gold, but they could hold silver, so many turned to the gleaming white metal as a safe store of value. Slump— then speculative boom Surprisingly, however, prices then turned around and declined for the next 31 years, in the face of con /2 tinued production deficits, pro longed worldwide inflation, and the continued weakness of the dollar. Indeed, prices continued to decline even after the cessation of Treasury silver sales in November 1970 and the devaluation of the dollar in Aug ust 1971. At the low point (Novem ber 1971), prices were only slightly above the $1.25 floor at which the Treasury would have had to buy newly mined domestic metal under the terms of the Coinage Act of 1965. A sluggish economy contributed to this market weakness, as U.S. in dustrial demand fell almost 5 per cent annually (to 129 million ounces) between 1969 and 1971. More importantly, market partic ipants belatedly began to realize that the Treasury's withdrawal from the market would not necessarily create a physical shortage of the metal. Industrial and investor stocks had grown rapidly as the Treasury's stocks had run off, and these private holdings as well as an expanded Digitized for FR A SER supply of scrap metal were available to meet industrial needs at relatively low prices. These and other factors helped cre ate a wave of speculative liquidation which fed upon itself with each new failure of the market to live up to price expectations. Many silvermarket speculators, like their coun terparts in the stock market, had bought on margin during the earlier boom, sometimes with margins as low as 20 percent. Frequently, dur ing the 1970 stock-market plunge, stockholders were forced to sell their silver holdings as well as other assets to meet margin calls, and the resultant decline in silver prices then led to margin calls in that market. The 1972-73 economic boom led to a brisk recovery in the silver market. Prices soared to $3.28 an ounce by late 1973, largely on the basis of a 23-percent annual increase in U.S. consumption over the 1971 -73 pe riod. But the price rise also was fueled by the heavy demands of speculators seeking protection against an assortment of fears— of universal commodity inflation, of dollar devaluation, and finally, of the Arab oil embargo. The embargo and the related upsurge in oilimport prices pushed prices upward even in the face of the rising strength of the dollar. Silver prices soared nonetheless, because the petroleum-crisis impact on world wide inflation and balance-of-payments problems created a distrust of currencies which sent speculators fleeing towards precious metals. The result was a speculative bubble which brought about a peak quota tion of $6.70 an ounce in late Feb ruary 1974. But with the suspension of the embargo, prices slumped within several weeks' time from $6.70 to $4.98, and after a brief re covery, dropped further this week to $4.64 an ounce. Bubble bursting? Is the bubble again bursting, as it did during the 1968-71 period? Cer tainly the fundamentals— industrial consumption and mine production — do not appear to support the re cent stratospheric level of prices. Total industrial consumption in the non-Communist world, which rose about 15 percent annually (to 463 million ounces) between 1971 and 1973, should decline moderately this year as a consequence of both a sluggish world economy and soar ing prices. But silver mine produc tion, which grew only 2 percent annually over the 1971-73 period (to 249 million ounces) should now rise at a somewhat faster pace, as the higher prices prevailing for both silver and other nonferrous metals stimulate increased production from mines producing silver either di rectly or as a byproduct. Even more importantly, higher prices should stimulate an increased supply from secondary sources— melted coin and scrap, private Digitized for FR A SER hoards and government stocks. The melting of 90-percent silver coins is now increasing, in view of the faster rise in silver prices than in coin futures. (Earlier, silver coins could be sold at a premium on the futures market, thus acting as a deterrent to coin melting.) Scrap recovery is re sponding to higher prices in the same fashion; for example, leading to a greater use of microfilm for X-ray negatives as a means of con serving expensive silver. Higher prices, along with economic difficulties, may entice India to part with some of its legendary hoard of perhaps 3 billion ounces of silver. The Indian government has recently lifted its silver export ban, so the flow of metal from private holdings should rise well above the estimated 26 million ounces smuggled out of that country last year. Another pos sible source of supply is the U.S. strategic stockpile, should Congress authorize the sale of 117 million ounces from that source. All of these factors suggest a down turn in silver prices this year. But as in the past, their impact could be offset by monetary uncertainties, worldwide inflationary pressures, and other influences favoring an up surge in speculative demand. After all, silver's past history has shown that psychology is often a more potent influence on prices than basic supply and demand factors. Yvonne Levy © 3) O uo}SumsE/v\ •M •uo§3JO •epBAaN . oijepi Bjfi U EM EH • e | U J0 p | E 3 • E U O Z jJ v ZSL ON llWHSd aivd dDvisod s n 1IVW SSV13 1SHH BANKING DATA—TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT (Dollar amounts in millions) Loan gross adjusted and investments* Loans gross adjusted— Securities loans Commercial and industrial Real estate Consumer instalment U.S. Treasury securities Other Securities Deposits (less cash items)— total* Demand deposits adjusted U.S. Government deposits Time deposits— total* Savings Other time I.P.C. State and political subdivisions (Large negotiable CD's) Weekly Averages of Daily Figures Amount Outstanding 3 /2 7 /7 4 Change from 3 /2 0 /7 4 + + 80,138 61,195 1,051 21,774 18,698 9,121 5,817 13,126 75,022 21,633 701 51,502 18,141 24,671 6,303 11,559 Change from year ago Dollar Percent + 8,386 + 7,304 - 332 + 2,212 + 3,064 + 9 77 - 531 + 1,613 + 5,155 + 810 650 + 4,831 - 193 + 5,394 - 216 + 3,210 539 726 — 82 + 236 412 + 4 154 — 33 + 522 + 197 — 57 + 405 + 177 + 267 — 44 + 241 + 11.69 + 13.55 — 24.01 + 11.31 + 19.60 + 12.00 8.36 + 14.01 + 7.38 + 3.89 — 48.11 + 10.35 1.05 + 27.98 — 3.31 + 38.45 Week ended 3 /2 7 /7 4 Week ended 3 /2 0 /7 4 Comparable year-ago period 65 309 244 19 175 156 16 -1 0 8 - 92 Member Bank Reserve Position Excess Reserves Borrowings Net free ( + ) / Net borrowed ( - ) - - Federal Funds— Seven Large Banks Interbank Federal funds transactions Net purchases ( + ) / Net sales ( - ) Transactions: U.S. securities dealers Net loans ( + ) / Net borrowings ( - ) + 1,884 + 2,026 - - + + 24 7 3 91 •Includes items not shown separately. Information on this and other publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Administrative Services Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, Digitized for FR^ s e Francisco, California 94120. Phone (415) 397-1137. http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis E>|SE|V (0) s jju n T g g j *l!lc3 'ODspueij ubs Selected Assets and Liabilities Large Commercial Banks •
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