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February 2,1973

While it will probably never show
up on the list of best sellers of
1973, a thick hardcover green book
which appeared this week promises
to be one of the more controversial
books of the year. The volume
carries the not very catchy title of
The Budget of the United States
Government, 1974. Politicians will
scrutinize it carefully because
it proposes to abolish some of
their favorite programs, but
economists also will be watching
because it is designed to remove
at least some of the fiscal stimulus
now supporting the business boom.
The document contains estimates
of receipts and expenditures for the
two fiscal years, 1973 and 1974,
but since more than half of fiscal
1973 already has elapsed, its
effective time horizon is limited
to 18 months. For the current fiscal
year, it calls for expenditures of
$250 billion and receipts of $225
billion (a $25-bi Ilion deficit),
while for fiscal 1974, it calls for
expenditures of $269 billion and
receipts of $256 billion (a
$13-bi Ilion deficit).
Ceilings and Congresses
Budget-cutting has dominated the
headlines for some months past,
especially in view of the
Administration's determined efforts
to reduce expenditures for fiscal
1973 to the $250-billion level.
At first glance, this might not
appear too difficult, especially
when it is remembered that fiscalyear expenditures originally were
budgeted at $246 billion last
January and were revised to $250
billion last June. But then, it must be
remembered that the presentation

of the Administration's budget to
Congress is only part of the
budgetary process.
Upon receipt of the budget,
Congress proceeds to pass
appropriations bills for the various
Executive Departments and to pass
tax bills to provide the necessary
revenues— but not necessarily
in matching totals. The
actual budget thus consists of
the combined expenditure and
revenue actions taken by Congress
subsequent to the presentation of
the Administration's budget.
During fiscal 1973, a number of
such legislative additions— plus a
certain number of executive actions
such as the recent heavy bombing
of North Vietnam— have combined
to add $10 billion or more to the
expenditure totals first proposed a
year ago.
These budget figures have a strong
economic impact, and in turn the
budget is affected by the overall
level of activity in the economy.
Federal expenditures are a net
addition to the income stream, and
taxes are a net subtraction from the
income stream. In the event that
expenditures run ahead of receipts,
the resultant budget deficit is
considered stimulative; conversely,
if receipts exceed expenditures,
the budget surplus is considered
restrictive.
Why full employment?
To make sense to economists,
however, the actual budget figures
must be converted to a "fullemployment" basis, using a concept
which was developed a decade or
so ago, and is now widely accepted
(continued page 2)




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by politicians and economists
alike. According to this concept,
the amount of stimulation or
restrictiveness in a given budget can
be measured more accurately by
calculating the levels of receipts and
expenditures at an assumed fullemployment level of 4-percent
unemployment than by relying
on the actual budget figures.
Revenues would be higher at full
employment than at lower levels,
because more people are working
(and paying taxes) at that level;
some expenditures, such as
unemployment compensation,
conversely would be lower in
such a situation.
The full-employment budget
concept has served as a useful
policy guide throughout the past
decade. During the relatively
sluggish advance of 1962-63,
economists saw that the Federal
income-tax structure would yield a
substantial surplus at full
employment— the famous "fiscal
drag"— and so recommended the
tax cut which played such a major
role in the solid yet noninflationary
expansion of the mid-decade.
Later, during the overheated
Vietnam period, they saw the
inflationary consequences of the
$25-billion full-employment deficit
of fiscal 1968, and so drew the
necessary conclusion— the need for

2



an income-tax surcharge to lessen
some of the pressure.
Just a year ago, policymakers argued
the case for an $8-billion fullemployment deficit for fiscal 1972,
evidently reasoning that that much
of a stimulus would be needed to
keep the expansion going. At the
same time, they called for a modest
full-employment surplus in the
fiscal 1973 budget, providing for a
relatively neutral (or mildly
restrictive) economic impact.
What 1974 will bring
But as of today, the Administration
projects a $21/2 billion fullemployment deficit for fiscal
1973—that is, a mildly stimulative
budget— followed by a modest
full-employment surplus for fiscal
1974. Thus, today as a year ago,
the Administration estimates that
the upcoming budget will exert
only a neutral impact on the
national economy.
The $31 -billion rise in "actual"
revenues for fiscal 1974 mainly
reflects the impact of a fast-growing
economy on tax receipts, especially
since the budget document
contains little in the way of tax-rate
changes except for the recent
social security tax hike. The $19billion rise in "actual" expenditures
is traceable in part to significant
legislative changes in certain
programs, especially the recent
social-security benefit increase—
but the most striking item in this
post-Vietnam period is a $4-billion

rise (to $79 billion) in defense
spending.

must be paid to maintain the full faith
and credit of U.S. Treasury securities.

With military spending rising in this
fashion, most of the proposed
cutbacks will show up in civilian
programs, highlighted by the
trimming or even dismantling of
some of the social programs
developed during the last several
decades. Grants for hospital
construction and subsidized loans
for construction of higher education
facilities are to be ended, in view of
the present surplus of hospital
rooms and decline in college
enrollments. No new funds are to
be provided for housing subsidies,
although the authorizations in the
pipeline will be slightly higher in
calendar 1973. Moreover, farm
subsidies will be lowered and farmexport subsidies will be terminated.

Economic as well as political
planning also can be frustrated by
the open-ended nature of the
appropriations process. Obligated
balances need not be expended
during the year the obligations are
incurred, while unobligated
balances of budget authority can be
carried forward from one fiscal year
to the next without further
Congressional action. Thus, in fiscal
1973, about 39 percent of current
outlays can be attributed to earlier
appropriations, and about 45
percent of current appropriations
will show up in future expenditures.

Complicating factors
The Administration's attempt to
rein in the budget began several
months ago with the announcement
of a $250-billion ceiling on
expenditures for fiscal 1973, which
implied cuts of perhaps $8 billion
concentrated in the current half­
year. The task has been
complicated, in this as in other
years, by the fact that certain major
areas are immune to reduction
because of permanent authorizing
legislation which automatically
appropriates budget authority on a
recurring basis. For example,
social-security benefits are
mandated trust-fund expenditures,
while interest on the public debt

3



Looking a half-decade ahead,
policymakers are faced with the
conclusion of a recent Brookings
Institution study, "Full-employment
revenues under existing tax laws
may not be large enough to match
projected expenditures under
current programs and policies." At
the same time, pressures are
building for large additional outlays
for major new programs—
property-tax relief, educational
equalization, pollution control,
expanded health care, and so on
down the list. In this atmosphere, it
will be difficult indeed to rein in the
budget so as not to overstimulate a
sharply expanding economy.
Herbert Runyon

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BANKING DATA—TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(D ollar amounts in m illions)
Selected Assets and Liabilities
Large Com m ercial Banks
Loans adjusted and investments*
Loans adjusted— total*
Com m ercial and industrial
Real estate
Consum er instalm ent
U.S. Governm ent securities
O ther securities
Deposits (less cash items)— total*
Dem and deposits adjusted
U.S. Governm ent deposits
The deposits— total*
Savings
O ther tim e I.P.C.
State and political subdivisions
(Large negotiable CD 's)

Am ount
O utstanding
1/17/73

Change
from
1/10/73

68,731
50,283
17,657
15,128
7,709
7,263
11,185
67,105
21,265
679
44,011
18,179
17,080
6,441
6,907

— 132
— 10
— 12
-I- 55
+ 17
— 67
— 55
— 330
— 412
— 43
+136
— 39
+186
— 7
+ 67

Change from
year ago
D o llar
Percent
+ 7 ,2 8 1
+ 7 ,0 1 2
+ 1 ,8 1 9
+ 2 ,3 8 8
+ 1 ,2 4 7
+ 310
—
41
+ 6 ,3 4 0
+ 1 ,9 8 0
— 159
+ 4 ,3 4 9
+ 474
+ 2 ,7 2 5
+ 564
+ 1 ,7 5 3

+ 1 1 .8 5
+ 1 6 .2 0
+ 1 1 .4 9
+ 1 8 .7 4
+ 1 9 .3 0
+ 4.46
— 0.37
+ 1 0 .4 3
+ 1 0 .2 7
— 18.97
+ 1 0 .9 7
+ 2.68
+ 1 8 .9 8
+ 9.60
+34.01

W eekly Averages of D aily Figures
W eek ended
Week ended
Com parable
1/17/73
1/10/73
year-ago period
M ember Bank Reserve Position
Excess reserves
Borrow ings
Net free ( + ) / Net borrow ed (— )
Federal Funds— Seven Large Banks
Interbank Federal funds transactions
Net purchases ( + ) / Net sales (— )
Transactions: U.S. securities dealers
Net loans ( + ) / Net borrow ings (— )

5
209
— 214

— 19
68
— 87

—

‘-223

+420

+563

+150

+364

+256

—

—

7
0
7

‘ Includes items not shown separately.
Inform ation on this and other publications can be obtained by callin g or w riting the
Adm inistrative Services Departm ent. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O . Box 7702,
San Francisco, California 94120. Phone (415) 397-1137.
Digitized for F R A S E R


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