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FABSF

WEEKLY LETTER

Number 94-20, May 20, 1994

The Persistence of the Prime Rate
Perhaps no quoted interest rate has had as much
publicity as the prime rate. Used as a benchmark
rate for various types of bank lending arrange
ments, the prime is generally considered a barometer of credit market conditions. Some observers
criticize this use of the prime rate as anti-competitive and argue that its role in loan pricing is
nothing short of tyranny. Much of the misunderstanding about this loan pricing convention
stems from confusion over the historical and current role of the prime rate in loan pricing. This
Letter examines the history and current use of the
prime rate and provides an analysis of the economics of this pricing mechanism.

The role of the prime rate
Many firms approaching banks want to purchase
an option to borrow for a period of three to five
years. Most are unwilling to pay the cost of locking in a fixed rate over this long of a period when
they are uncertain about exactly what their borrowing patterns will be. Thus, the bank needs an
index to float the interest rate that reflects the
costs of making the funds available and permits
it to earn a fair rate of return on its capital. The
prime rate convention evolved to serve as a pricing index. Prior to the mid-1970s it was used for
virtually all floating rate business!oans and v"as
often referred to as the rate that banks charged
their best customers. Customers judged to be
less than "prime" quality were charged a rate
that reflected a fixed mark-up over prime.
During the credit crunch of the early 1970s many
banks found they were unable to meet the credit
needs of their corporate borrowers. This led to
the growth, with many banks' support, of the
commercial paper market. In this market high
credit quality firms sell short-term notes directly
to investors, though banks typically offer credit
enhancements by backing the issues with a
standby letter of credit.
As the commercial paper market began to expand in the late 1970s, some business loans to
the highest quality borrowers were priced below
prime, a practice that continues today. This led to
abandoning the definition of the prime as the rate

banks charge their best customers and redefining
it simply as a reference rate used in loan pricing.
Around this time banks also started to use additional pricing indices, of which the most popular
was L1BOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). This
index appears frequently in loans that have characteristics similar to commercial paper. These
loans are usually made to high-quality borrowers, and on average, the loans are larger and of
shorter maturity than typical bank business
loans. This shift to an increasing use of oth~r
indices affected the role of the prime. However,
predictions that the prime would become extinct
were exaggerated.

Still important in loan pricing
To examine the current role of the prime in loan
pricing, I analyzed a sample of over 2,800 loans
received by companies required to report external finance with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the period of January 1987 to
May 1990. These are large publicly traded firms
that tend to have ready access to the capital
markets. The top panel ofFigure 1 compares the
percent of loans indexed to the prime rate, to
L1BOR, and to a CD rate. Single index pricing
means that the loan is ti'edtb,on!y one of the indices over its entire life. Multiple index pricing
means that the bank quotes the borrower a fixed
spread to two or more indices. The borrower
then has the option at each pricing intervalto
choose the least costly alternative. As the top
pane! indicates, whether used alone orin .combination with the L1BOR or some measure of the
CD rate, the prime rate continues to be the most
popular index with which to price business
lending.
Examining the average size of sample loans stratified by pricing index (Figure 1, bottom panel),
we see that the prime is most frequently used in
smaller loans. Additionally use of the prime or
any other single pricing index is most popular for
shorter maturity loans. This suggests that as loan
pricing has become more complex the reaction
has been to move to multiple indices with continued use of the prime as one of the choices.

FRBSF
Figure 1
Percent of Loans Using Each Price Index

Percent
0.4 T

•

0.35

lEI

Single
Index
Multiple
Index

0.3
0.25

than to adjust it up when rates are rising. Empirical evidence confirms that the prime lags other
market rates. The slower downward adjustment
in the prime has not been readily apparent, however (Furlong 1991). In addition, recent evidence
suggests that it is becoming more responsive to
changes in open market rates (Laderman 1990).
Thismore responsive behavior of the prime rate
may reflect its new role in loan pricing or increased competition from capital markets or
both.

The resilience of the prime rate

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05

o
Prime

CD

UBOR

Average Loan Size by Price Index

$MiIIlons

300
•

250

lEI

200

Single
Index
Multiple
Index

150

100
50

o
Prime

UBOR

CD

Criticisms of the prime rate
Critics of the use of the prime rate as an index in
loan pricing argue it is anti-competitive and slow
to respond to changing credit market conditions.
Accusations related to collusive behavior have
focused on the facttheprime rate is typically
uniform nationwide. Also it is argued thatthe
prime is relatively "sticky" compared with other
market-determined rates and that banks are
slower to adjust it down when rates are declining

Understanding the context in which the prime
is most frequently used helps explain how the
prime has survived despite the criticism. Most
business borrowing occurs under commitments
to lend. In this type of contract, typically the
bank and firm agree on the maximum amount
and the time period that the customer may take
down the loan. The interest rate that the borrower
must pay is tied to an index or base rate that
floats, such as the prime. It is common for these
loan commitments to be negotiated for a couple
of years. During that time the borrower can take
down and repay the loan up to the maximum
amount of the commitment.
By agreeing to a loan commitment over a multiyear contract in which the borrower has a takedown option, the bank faces a variety of risks,
and the stickiness of the prime ratemay help
compensate the bank for those risks. For example, in addition to uncertain interest costs banks
are subject to regulatory uncertainty, such as
changes in reserve and capital requirements.
The stickiness of the prime rate also may reflect a
form of average cost pricing. Banks quote a single prime, and as it is adjusted, the pricing index
for new and all previously negotiated ioan arrangements changes. Thus, banks may use this
form of average cost pricing to cover the costs
associated with offering multiperiod loan commitment contracts. Calls for the prime to be replaced by a rate linked directly to open market
rates ignores the fact that open market rates generally represent the pricing of new contracts only.
Consistent with the average pricing role of the
prime is the diminished importance of the prime
in short-term financing to high quality bank borrowers, where the benefit of average cost pricing
is low.
In addition to the issue of stickiness, it has been
argued that a uniform national prime constitutes

price fixing. But there may be a good rationale
for a uniform prime. Most commercial lending is
under multiyear commitment contracts. A borrower who wants to price a three-year loan
commitment from two banks might get quotes of
50 and 75 basis points over each bank's prime
rate. But if the borrower were not certain that the
two banks' prime rates will be equal over the
term of the commitment, then the borrower
would not know which was the cheapest source
of funds. Thus, a uniform prime can be useful
when comparing floating rate loans between
competing banks. In more recent years, banks
have been pricing both above and below the
prime. Pricing below the prime gives banks additional flexibility to be competitive when the
credit risks on previously negotiated commitments are higher than on new loans the banks
would like to make. Again this is related to the
complexities of pricing multiperiod floating rate
loan commitments.

The future of the prime
Even with the tremendous amount of criticism
that has been leveled at the prime over the years

it continues to be the most popular pricing index
for business loans. However, in recent years it
has increasingly been used in combination with
other indices, providing the borrower with options to price relative to alternative indices like
L1BOR and large CD rates. As for its use for large
short-term loans to high quality borrowers has
diminished the prime is gaining a foothold in the
pricing of home-equity loans. The evidence presented here suggests its role in loan pricing is
changing, but it will likely continue to be popular in loan pricing.

James Booth
Visiting Scholar and
Associate Professor of Finance
Arizona State University
References
Furlong, ET. 1991. "Is the Prime Rate Too High?"
FRBSF Weekly Letter Ouly 5).
Laderman, E. 1990. "The Changing Role of the Prime
Rate:' FRBSF Weekly Letter Ouly 13).

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank "of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974-2246, Fax (415) 974-3341.

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Index to Recent Issues of FRBSF Weekly Letter

DATE NUMBER TITLE
11/19
11/26
12/3
12/17
12/31
1/7
1/14
1/21
1/28
2/4

2/ii
2/18
2/25
3/4
3/11
3/18
3/25
4/1
4/8
4/15
4/21
4/29
5/6
5/13

93-40
93-41
93-42
93-43
93-44
94-01
94-02
94-03
94-04
94-05
94-06
94-07
94-08
94-09
94-10
94-11
94-12
94-13
94-14
94-15
94-16
94-17
94-18
94-19

NAFTA and the Western Economy
Are World Incomes Converging?
Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Interest Rates
Banks and Mutual Funds
Inflation and Growth
Market Risk and Bank Capital: Part 1
Market Risk and Bank Capital: Part 2
The Real Effects of Exchange Rates
Banking Market Structure in the West
Is There a Cost to Having an Independent Central Bank?
Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in japan
Taiwan at the Crossroads
1994 District Agricultural Outlook
Monetary Policy in the 1990s
The !PO Underpricing Puzzle
New Measures of the Work Force
Industry Effects: Stock Returns of Banks and Nonfinancial Firms
Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Regime
Measuring the Gains from International Portfolio Diversification
Interstate Banking in the West
California Banks Playing Catch-up
California Recession and Recovery
just-In-Time Inventory Management: Has It Made a Difference?
GATS and Banking in the Pacific Basin

AUTHOR
Schm idt/Sherwood-Call
Moreno
Cogley
Laderman
Motley
Levonian
Levonian
Throop
Laderman
Walsh
Kim/Moreno
Cheng
Dean
Parry
Booth
Motley
Neuberger
Cogley
Kasa
Furlong
Furlong/Soller
Cromwell
Huh
Moreno

The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in june, july, August, and December.