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November 30, 1979

Mourningin Motown
The tenth largest U.S. industrial corporation
will probably lose a billion dollars or more
in 1979. The third largest industrial
corporation will probably lose a like amount
on its domestic operations alone-although
luckily, it can balance its books with
profitable operations elsewhere. The
important point is that these two firms
(Chrysler and Ford) are key elements
in an industry which has long typified the
power and efficiency of the American
economy. Their plight suggeststhe need for
a searching examination of the industry
which directly or indirectly supports about
one-sixth of the American workforce, and
which sets the tone for American lifestyles
as well.

Detroit has shown an admirable ability
to produce cars and above all to "move the
metal." This year, Detroit produced its
300 millionth passenger car, as well as its
75 millionth truck. In the process, it has
provided Americans with their most important consumer durable; the $251 billion
worth of autos (net of depreciation) which
consumers held at year-end 1978 accounted
for about 35 percent of their total holdings
of durable goods. But as it enters the 1980's,
Detroit must decide whether the market
is becoming saturated (at least, saturated with
American products) -or whether consumers
will be willing to buy the much-improved
models of the coming decade. (A separate
question is how much fuel will be available
to propel those models.)

Problems: cyclical, secular
New-car sales are in the midst of a cyclical
downturn, with sales off about 4 percent this
year from the year-ago level. Some weakness
could be predicted, following as it does the
sales upsurge of the 1976-78 period. However, the record is considerably worse when
import sales are excluded. Sales of
U. S.-produced autos have dropped 9 percent
in 1979, to an 8.7-million annual rate forthe
first three quarters of the year. At that level,
domestic sales are not much higherthan they
were a decade ago, whereas import sales (at
a 2.3-million rate) have more than doubled
over that same time-span (see chart). Moreover, new-car inventories are higher now
than at any time since the dismal days
of 1974. At a time of year when inventories
normally would be at their lowest because
of new model introductions and the resulting
sales upturn, the domestic industry was burdened by a 65-day supply on November 1,
compared with a 48-day stockpi Ie a year
earlier.
The industry's problems may be more than
cyclical, as the record of import penetration
suggests. Admittedly, ever since the Duryea
brothers founded the industry in 1893,

Payingfor today's autos
The weakness in the industry'S near-term
sales outlook reflects the weakness of the
consumer's income situation, as well
as the growing demands by other sectors'for
the consumer dollar. Total real disposable
income in the January-September period was
3.0 percent above the year-ago figure-only
about two-thirds the annual gain of the
several preceding years-and the average
worker's real spendable earnings have
actually declined. Moreover, with the sharp
rise in prices of more essential items,
consumers are hard-pressed to find enough
dollars to spend on autos. Compared with
a decade ago, for example, auto spending
as a share of consumer disposable income
has dropped slightly, from 6.0 to 5.9 percent,
whereas the housi ng share has risen from
13.8 to 14.7 percent, and the energy share
has jumped from 6.3 to 7.8 percent.
Auto sales have benefited considerably from
heavy infusions of credit during the past
several years-auto buyers borrowed
$93 billion (annual rate) in the first half of this
year, or double the 1974 pace. But the lending pace has alreadyslowed, and with the

in coming years; B.2 milliun cars were
.
scrapped in 1977 alone. Of course, effective
demandcould weaken if drivers postpone
junking their older cars, as has
throughout the 1 970's-the proportion
of older cars (six years or older) has jumped
from 39 to 47 percent of the total between
1970 and 1978.

recent tightening of credit, the industry can't
count on further sales boosts through easy
credit. Certainly there seems to be little room
for further lengthening of maturities on auto
loans. In 1974, finance companies wrote
contracts with maturities of over three years
for only 9 percent of their new-car loans, and
for practically none of their used-car loans;
in 1978, they offered lengthy maturities for
57 percent of their new-car loans and even
for 22 percent of their used-car loans.

The sharply rising cost of owning and
.
operating a car might help account for this
growing tendency by drivers to postpone new
pu rchases. Accord i ng to a recent study by the
Hertz car-rental firm, ownership and
operating costs rose from 33 to 38 cents
a mile over the past year-and altogether,
jumped 88 percent between 1
and 1979,
compared with a 63-percent rise In the
overall consumer price index over that
period. Indeed, motorists now pay more
to run a subcompact car than they paid
to operate a full-sized luxury model in 1973.

Enoughautos?
Assuming reasonable fuel availability,
we can expect that Americans will continue
to rely heavily on the private auto for
transportation. About 85 percent of all
Americans now ride to work in their own
autos or in carpools. And they use cars, trucks
or ta")<isfor about 91 percent of all Working,
shopping or recreational trips. Still, they
appear to have enough vehicles to handle
their needs. About 84 percent of all
households own at least one car - the
proportion rises to 96 percent for those with
over $1 2,000 income-and 36 percent of all
households own two or more cars.

Tomoll'lI'ow' S autos
Detroit of course has been working
strenuously to reduce ownership costs
through increased attentjon to fuel efficiency,
reflecting industry (and Congressional) fears
about the availability as well as the price
of Middle Eastern oil. The industry obtained
its mandate from the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975, which calls for
a rise in fleet-average fuel economy
to 27.5 miles per gallon for the 1985 model
year. That 1 13-percent projected rise in fuel
economy over the 1 974 performance has
already resulted in dramatic product
changes. The new generations of "downsized" vehicles are as much as 1,000 pounds
lighter than their predecessors, and
of them feature thriftier powerplants, lighter
materials, and electronic engine controls.
By 1 985, the average car cou Id be 25-P?rc?nt
lighter than its current counterpart, weighing
in at only about 3,000 pounds, and it could
incorporate 50 percent more aluminum and
plastic than today's model.

Under these conditions of relative saturation,
further sales growth depends on the growth
in the number of younger drivers-and
on the growth in the number of aged cars,
i.e., those ready for the scrap heap. Probably
not much can be expected from the
demographic front. The increase in the
number of individuals in the 20-34 age
bracket will be only about 2 million during
the 1980's, compared with a gain of almost
15 million in the 1970's. On the other hand,
replacement demand can be expected
to provide strong support for the industry

During the 1970's, the industry has made
substantial advances in meeting Congres2

MIllions

10

NEW

CA R

SALES

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Domestic

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1960

1965

1970

1975

1979

grovvth(21 million) in new-car SniPsin the

sionally imposed fuel-economy standards,
along with safety and anti-pollution
standards. The fuel economy of passengercarfleets has already surpassed the industry's
original goal of a 40-percent improvement
over 1 974-fleet standards. Traffic fatalities
per 1 00 million vehicle miles have continued
their historical downtrend, declining from
5.40 deaths in 1 968 to 3.41 in 1978. And
today's cars emit 86 percent fewer hydrocarbon emissions, 82 percent less carbon
monoxide, and 51 percent less nitrogen
oxide, than the uncontrolled 1 967 models.

U.S. market.
Detroit's fate, in the final analysis, may
be settled as much by foreign producers
as by American consumers. Most of the world
auto industry is beset by overcapacity, and
is intensely protectionist at home and
intensely competitive overseas. Most
producers are heavily reliant on export sales,
especially salesto the American market -the
japanese industry being a case in point.
Despite a sharp rise in the value of the yen,
Japan in recent years has increased its share,
from one-third to two-thirds, of the U.S.
import market. This year alone, about
40 percent of all japanese-produced cars wi II
be sold to American buyers.

Yet meeting the even more stringent
standards ofthe 1980's will require, by the
industry's calculations, the greatest retooling
of a single industry ever undertaken in the
nation's peacetime history. The required
investment will reach $70 to $80 billion over
the 1978-85 period-twice the bill for
putting a man on the moon, as industry
spokesmen frequently remind Congressional
listeners. Chrysler, for one, has found
it impossible to finance its investment needs
internally-hence its request for
a $1 .5-billion government-loan guaranteeand the industry generally will have to pass
these unprecedented costs along to the
consumer in the form of much higher sticker
prices in the early 1980's.

Detroit's response involves not only building
"import fighters" with fuel economy and
other "import" characteristics, but also
expanding the American presence overseas,
most notably through the development
of "world" cars. General Motors' new T -car
for example, may be built in millions around
the world-at Opel in West Germany,
at Vauxhall in Britain, at a new plant in Spain
or France, at Isuzu in japan, at Holden
in Australia, at other plants in Brazil and
South Africa, and of course at Chevrolet
in this country. Thus, if Detroit is unable
to "move the metal" as it once could in the
domestic market, it can at least uti Iize its
world-famed mass-production techniques
on a worldwide scale-thereby achieving
the necessary economies of scale while
maintaining a sales presence in every
possible market.
'

Tomorrow's market
The problem wou Id be eased if Detroit cou Id
take advantage of efficiencies of scale, with
lengthy production lines for their 1 980-85
models. But increased sales may not come
easily. Faced with higher auto prices,
consumers may hold on to their older (and
roomier) cars for longer periods of time,
as they have been doing recently-or faced
with long lines at the gas pump, they may
even become desperate enough to take the
bus. But again, if consumers do decide
to buy, they might choose the similar
appearing but frequently more reliable
import model over the Detroit version. The
trend of course is already evident; between
the 1 960's and the 1970's, imports
accounted for more than half of the entire

William Burke

3

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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH flEDERAlRESERVE
DISTRICT
(Dollaramountsin millions)
SelectedAssetsand liabilities
large CommercialBanks

I)

Amount
Outstanding
11/14/79
135,057
112,024
31,080
42,196
23,876
1,589
7,421
15,612
45,903
32,157
28,893
57,539
49,179
21,465
Weekended
1/14/79

Change
Changefrom
yearago@
from
Dollar
Percent
11/7/79
+ 16,261
+ 121
+ 13.7
+ 15,977
+ 104
+ 16.6
- 199
+ 2,924
+ 10.4
+ 217
+ 8,765
+ 26.2
NA
NA
+ 54
NA
NA
+ 55
969
15.0
+ 37
20
+ 8.7
+ 1,253
+1,614
+ 2,750
+ 6.4
+ 296
+ 1,287
+ 4.2
1,488
223
4.9
+ 851
+ 18.6
-+ 9,006
+ 837
+ 9,942
+ 25.3
+ 12.8
+ 610
+ 2,432
Weekended
Comparable
year-agoperiod
11/7/79

Loans(gross,adjusted)and investments*
Loans(gross,adjusted)- total#
Commercialand industrial
Realestate
Loansto individuals
Securitiesloans
U.s. Treasurysecurities*
Othersecurities*
Demanddeposits total#
Demanddeposits- adjusted
Savingsdeposits- total
Timedeposits total#
Individuals,part.& corp.
(LargenegotiableCD's)
WeeldyAverages
of Daily Figures
MemberBankReservePosition
ExcessReserves
(+ )/Deficiency(-)
1
+ 175
+ 37
+
Borrowings
276
+ 201
+ 17
Net freereserves
(+ )/Net borrowed(- )
26
239
16
federal Funds- SevenLargeBanks
Net interbanktransactions
389
+ 584
+ 1,156
[Purchases
(+ )/Sales(-)]
Net, U.s. Securitiesdealertransactions
+ 222
+ 343
+ 208
[Loans(+
(-)J
* Excludestradingaccountsecurities.
# Includesitemsnotshownseparately.
@ Historicaldataare not strictly comparabledueto changesin the reportingpanel;however,adjustments
havebeenappliedto 1978datato removeasmuchaspossiblethe effectsof the changesin coverage.In
addition,for someitems,historicaldataarenot availabledueto definitionalchanges.
Editorialcommentsmaybe addressed
to theeditor (William Burke)or to the author.... Freecopiesof
and other FederalReservepublicationscanbe obtainedby cAllingor writing the PLiblicInformation
Section,FederalReserveBank of San Francisco,P.O. Box 7702, SanFrancisco94120. Phone(415)
544-2184.
.