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September 24,1975
n o ?

As Maine Goes?
A political slogan of years gone by
was, "'As Maine goes, so goes the
nation/' In those days, independ­
ent Mainers held their Presidential
election earlier than the rest of the
states, providing a sample of voter
preference. Maine lost some of its
reputation as a political weathervane in 1936, when Alf Landon
showed that "As Maine goes, so
goes Vermont/' But the state may
still have some standing as a fore­
caster of financial trends, because
legislation which Maine enacted
last fall gives a foretaste of what
would happen to the U.S. financial
structure if the recommendations
of various government study
groups were implemented on the
national level.
Maine's new legislation brought
about sweeping changes in the
powers (or, as a practical matter,
the products and services) of vari­
ous types of depository financial
institutions within the state. As
many of these changes have been
hotly debated elsewhere, the
Maine legislation should provide
some evidence on which to evalu­
ate their appropriateness at the
national level.

institutions in determining their
policies with regard to lending,
investing, and acquisition of funds.
More specifically, it recommended
that specialized financial institu­
tions, such as mutual-savings banks
and savings-and-loan associations,
be given broader powers so that
they could provide the public with
a more comprehensive package of
financial services.
The recommendations were de­
signed to make these institutions
less vulnerable to periodic swings in
interest rates, so that they could
provide the housing market with a
more stable flow of funds. Also,
ceilings on interest paid to deposi­
tors would be eliminated gradually
over a period of years.
The Commission made a strong
plea that its recommendations be
viewed as an integrated, compre­
hensive package—a plea that has
been generally ignored in the ensu­
ing years. However, a unique fea­
ture of the system of financial regu­
lation in this country is the degree
of autonomy left to the individual
states. Enter the State of Maine.
Maine’s initiative

National studies

In mid-1970, the President appoint­
ed the Commission on Financial
Structure and Regulation (the
Hunt Commission) to review "the
structure, operation, and regula­
tion" of the nation’s private finan­
cial institutions, and in December
1971 it delivered a far-ranging re­
port on this subject. The general
thrust of the report was toward a
greater freedom for all financial

In late 1970 the Androscoggin
County Savings Bank unilaterally
changed its by-laws and began of­
fering demand deposits to its cus­
tomers. Maine’s Superintendent of
Banking issued a cease-and-desist
order, and his order was upheld by
the courts. Then, in the following
year, the legislature considered—
but rejected—a bill calling for the
conversion of mutual-savings banks
to state-chartered commercial
(continued on page 2)

Digitized for F R A S E R


Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not
necessarily reflect the views of the management of the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, nor of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

banks or trust companies, if they
wished to issue checking accounts
or engage in any other commercialbank activity.
Following the release of the Hunt
Commission report, leading
Mainers decided that the creation
of a broad-based panel comprised
of bankers, businessmen, consumer
advocates, and legislators would be
the best way to reach a consensus
on the reform of the state's finan­
cial statutes. This approach worked,
because the general provisions of
the Report of the Governor's Bank­
ing Study Advisory Committee re­
mained intact in the bill which
passed the legislature last year. This
legislation thus implemented a ma­
jor share of the Hunt Commission
recommendations.
Important features

Branching. Under the new legisla­
tion, all depository financial institu­
tions are permitted to establish
branches on a statewide basis. Pre­
viously, branching had been limited
to contiguous counties on a de
novo basis, or else statewide by
merger—a situation beneficial to
the banks. Commercial banks had
more incentive to engage in merger
activities than mutual institutions,
where there is no opportunity for
capital gain. In addition, banks
through their holding companies
could expand through both acqui­
sition and establishment of de novo
affiliates. Consequently, unlike the
thrift institutions, they had already
achieved effective statewide
branching capability. The new leg­
islation redressed this situation by
Digitized for F R A S E R


granting statewide branching pow­
ers to the thrifts as well as to the
banks.
Deposit powers. In perhaps its most
controversial section, the new law
granted demand-deposit powers to
all state-chartered thrift institutions,
although under the limited form of
“ personal checking accounts.” This
power had been actively sought by
thrift institutions, especially mutual
savings banks, but had been viewed
with substantial concern by com­
mercial bankers, who saw their
competitors receiving additional
benefits without assuming addi­
tional burdens. The new law also
gave explicit permission to all insti­
tutions to issue negotiable orders of
withdrawal (N.O.W. accounts)
should Federal law permit. The leg­
islation consequently was activated
when Congress altered the Federal
law to permit the use of these
demand-type time accounts
throughout New England, effective
last February.
Reserve requirements. The new law
specified reserve requirements for
various types of deposits, with some
discretion left to the State Superin­
tendent of Banking. The law stated
that the requirements for each de­
posit category must be identical for
all depository financial institutions.
Lending powers. Here again, the
thrust of the new law provided for
greater flexibility for thrift institu­
tions in managing their asset port­
folios. Thrift institutions hence­
forth may participate in consumer
loans, commercial loans (with

Maine commercial banks), and
“ prudent loans” including com­
mercial loans—in each case up to 10
percent of total deposits. In addi­
tion, thrifts are explicitly permitted
to issue credit cards.
Reflection of Hunt report

In summary, Maine's legislation im­
plements much of what the Hunt
Commission recommended in the
area of liberalized powers for thrift
institutions. As a practical matter,
Maine has retained no important
distinctions between the powers of
commercial banks and those of
thrift institutions. However, there is
one important distinction remain­
ing on the Federal level—the V a ~
percentage point differential which
thrift institutions can pay on various
types of deposits. Maine’s legisla­
ture asked Federal regulatory au­
thorities to abolish the differential
for Maine, since there was no long­
er any justifiable reason for thrift
institutions to have this competitive

advantage. However, no action has
yet been taken at the Federal level.
Against this background, we can
understand the proposalof Massa­
chusetts Bank Commissioner Carol
Greenwald—to raise deposit
interest-rate ceilings step-by-step,
until Regulation Q ceilings become
a dead letter. While Maine has
gone the farthest, thrift institutions
in Northeastern states have been
more successful than those else­
where in expanding their consumer
powers. Hence, it may be argued
that one of the traditional supports
for the 14-point differential is no
longer operative in the Northeast. It
used to be thought that thrift insti­
tutions would have to be able to
offer higher interest payments to
attract depositors away from the
“ one stop shopping” commercial
banks, since they themselves were
precluded from offering the public
a broad range of services. Clearly,
this is no longer the case in Maine.
Neil Murphy

Copies are now available of the summer issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco's E c o n o m i c R e v ie w . Under the theme of “ Financial Markets and Uncer­
tainty/' the issue contains analyses of variable-rate home mortgages, the impact of
inflation on capital-market efficiency, debt-equity ratios in financial markets, and
the shifting relationship of money demand and GNP. This publication is designed
for financial analysts, college students and teachers. For those not on the mailing
list, copies may be obtained from the Public Information Section, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.

3




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BANKING DATA—TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Selected Assets and Liabilities
Large Commercial Banks

*
Amount
Outstanding
9/08/76

Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments*
Loans (gross, adjusted)—total
Security loans
Commercial and industrial
Real estate
Consumer instalment
U.S. Treasury securities
O ther securities
Deposits (less cash items)—total*
Demand deposits (adjusted)
U.S. Governm ent deposits
Time deposits—total*
States and political subdivisions
Savings deposits
O ther time deposits^
Large negotiable C D ’s

89,389
67,746
1,615
21,701
20,607
11,448
9,020
12,623
88,792
25,485
388
61,394
5,372
27,035
26,541
10,818

Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures

W eek ended
9/08/76

Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves
Borrowings
Net free(+)/Net borrowed (-)
Federal Funds—Seven Large Banks
Interbank Federal fund transactions
Net purchases (+)/Net sales (-)
Transactions of U.S. security dealers
Net loans (+)/Net borrowings (-)

-

Change
from
9/01/76

Change from
year ago
Dollar
Percent

+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

-

+
+
+
+
+
-

+
+
+

721
598
99
209
31
28
148
271
474
285
146
186
97
92
70
162

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

3,009
2,270
672
889
956
1,282
858
119
2,159
1,107
29
1,273
494
6,206
3,097
4,918

W eek ended
9/01/76

3.48
3.47
29.38
3.94
4.86
12.61
10.51
0.93
2.49
4.54
8.08
2.12
8.42
29.79
10.45
31.25

Comparable
year-ago period

-

17
4
21

+

53
0
53

-

730

-

920

+ 1,487

+

337

+

122

+

-

8
29
21

916

*lncludes items not shown separately. ^Individuals, partnerships and corporations.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (William Burke) or to the author. . . .
Information on this and other publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public
Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 544-2184.