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FABSF

WEEKLY LETTER

Number 94-29, September 2, 1994

Linkages of National Interest Rates
As government-imposed barriers to the international flow of capital between the major industrialized countries were relaxed in the 1970s and
virtually eliminated in the 1980s, the international·integration of financial markets increased
dramatically. Some have argued that the international integration of financial markets would
tend to equalize real interest rates at home and
abroad, making them move closely together over
time. But the data do not support this argument.
The U.S. real interest rate on 91-day Treasury bills
first rose well above that on a trade~weighted
measure of rates on comparable foreign money
market instruments in the early 1980s and then
fell well below such rates afterward (Figure 1).
The reason for the divergence has to do with the
operation of a system of flexible exchange rates.
This Weekly Letter first discusses the evidence for
the existence of a high degree of international
integration of financial markets since the early
1980s. It then explains the effect that such integration would be expected to have on real interest rate differentials under a system of flexible
exchange rates, as opposed to one of fixed rates.
Finally, it presents estimates of the response of
the differential between
and foreign real
interest rates to shocks to either rate.

u.s.

Figure 1
Real Short-Term Interest Rates

Percent
8

u.s.

Foreign

6

.'. ... ..-. -.
., .
~

4
2
O-l-'t-'-----..::I.........- - - - - - -.....7-

'\

·2

U.S. - F~reign \/\

-4

-6

....r \
\., /.
\

\....

i

1\
\.

\/

-+--,--,-.,.....,.....,....,...---r----r---r--r---r~__.

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

eign exchange relative to spot foreign exchange
equals the difference between U.S. and foreign
interest rates. In the 1980s the average absolute
difference between
and covered foreign
short-term interest rates has been only about
25 basis points.

u.s.

Evidence of financial market integration
Nearly complete international integration of
financial markets, at least for relatively large borrowers and lenders, is indicated at the short end
of the market.
rates tend to move closely
together with major "covered" foreign interest
rates, that is, covered against exchange rate
uncertainty in the forward market. The forward
market allows a
investor to sell foreign
exchange in the future at a price that is known
today, thus eliminating uncertainty in the dollar
denominated return on foreign assets: Dealers in
forward exchange require a price that compensates them for the expected change in the exchange rate and the risk that the actual change
may turn out to be different from expectations.
Given the availability of such forward cover, investors in fully integrated markets tend to bid the
spot and forward prices of foreign exchange to
the point at which the premium on forward for-

u.s.

u.s.

These results indicate almost a complete absence
of institutional or governmental barriers to inter~
national flows of capital. But they do not necessarily imply an equality between U.S. and foreign
real interest rates, that is, nominal interest rates
adjusted for inflation. The reason is that the premium or discount on the forward cover does not
necessarily equal the difference in inflation rates.
As a result, as seen in Figure 1, differences between U.S. and the trade-weighted measure of
foreign real interest rates can persist despite the
existence of a parity in covered returns.

Linkages under fixed and flexible exchange rates
Under a system of fixed exchange rates, such as
the Bretton Woods system that existed from 1946
to 1973, nominal interest rates at home and
abroad tend to be closely linked in the absence
of governmental controls over capital flows. The

FRBSF

reason is the near absence of exchange rate
uncertainty when exchange rates are fixed by
monetary authorities to within a small deviation
from the official parity. Capital tends to flow to
that economy with the higher nominal interest
rate, since only a small amount of the difference
in interest returns can be offset by changes in the
exchange rate. In the process, the increase in the
supply of loanable fupds.inthe ecoQomywitn
higher interest rates and the corresponding decrease in the low interest rate economy tends to
bring about an equalization of nominal interest
rates. Because the system of fixed exchange rates
holds together only if price levels at home and
abroad are not allowed to get out of line with
one another, rates of inflation at home and
abroad tend to be similar also. This produces a
tendency for an equalization of real interest rates,
or nominal rates adjusted for inflation, as well.
Under a system of flexible exchange rates, which
characterizes most major currencies since 1973,
there still is a strong tendency for capital flows to
equalize real interest rates athome and abroad
over the long run. But the process is less direct
and may not be observable in the short to medium run. Even when there are no institutional or
governmental barriers to the international flow of
capital, two elements tend to work against the
equalization of real interest rates at home and
abroad under flexible exchange rates: (1) expected changes in exchange rates, and(2) premiums in interest rates to compensate for the risk
of unexpected changes in currency values.
Under flexible exchange rates, if real interest
rates are higher at home than abroad, then a capital inflow tends to occur, just as in the fixed rate
case. But the capital inflow pushes up the value
of the home currency at the same time that it
adds to the supply of loanable funds at home.
'vVhether national real interest rates are fully
equalized by this process depends in part upon
expectatiolls aboutthe future value of the real exchange rate. If investors believe that the upward
pressure on interest rates and the exchange rate
in the home country is temporary, they will be
willing to bring in capital only up to the point at
which the expected future depreciation in the
real value of the home currency just offsets the
difference in real interest rates, except for any
differential due to a premium to compensate for
exchangerate risk. As a result, variations in the
pressures on interest rates at home and abroad
produce varying differentials in real interest rates.
These are proportional to expected future changes
in the real exchange rate towards a longer run
equilibrium. Evidence of the importance of this

expectational factor is that movements in real interest rate differentials have been significantly
associated with movements in real exchange
rates (Throop 1993).
The importance of premia for exchange rate risk as
an additional factor contributing to divergences
in realjnterest rates is suggested by evidence
from ~urveys of market expectations of future exchange rates. If currency risk premia were small,
we wouldexpectfairlysmall differences in anticipated returns on comparable assets calculated
using survey data as a measure of expected exchange rate changes. But Pigott (1993-1994)
shows thatthis is not the case. Therefore, changing currency risk premia probably also contribute
to variation in differentials between real national
interest rates. Unfortunately, empirical studies to
date have had little success in isolating the fundamental economic factors that tend to cause
changes in these currency risk premia.

Empirical evidence
To determine the extent to which U.S. real interest rates tend to be equal ized with real rates
abroad over a longer run, a simple dynamic
model (an "error correction" model) was esti~
mated for the period of fuily integrated financial
markets since the early 1980s (Throop 1994). Figure 2 shows the effect on the differential between
the u.s. and the trade-weighted foreign real
short-term interest rate of a 1 percentage point
shock to the U.S. rate, and Figure 3 indicates the
effect on the same differential of a 1 percentage
point shock to the foreign rate. The shaded areas
indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around
these estimated "impulse-response" functions
based on the observed distribution of errors in
the historical sample.
A positive shock of 1 percentage point to the u.s.
rate is estimated to raise the u.s. rate by close to
1 percentage point, but to have little effect on the
foreign rate. Asa result, the estimated response
of the U.S. minus the foreign interest rate to a 1
percentage point shock to theUS. rate is not significantly different from 1 percentage point and is
significantly different from zero over a period of
up to 16 quarters (Figure 2). (A zero response
would correspond to the case of an equalization
of interest rates, either by the u.s. rate falling or
the foreign rate rising sufficiently after the shock.)
Similarly, Figure 3 indicates that the response of
the differential to a 1 percentage point shock to
the foreign rate is not significantly different from
minus 1 percentage point and is also significantly
different from zero. Thus, shocks to either real

Figure 2
Effect of Shock to u.S. Real Interest Rate on
the Differential

interest rate have close toa one-to-one effect on
the differential, with no signifitanttendencyfor
this effect to die out over 16 quarters. Moreover,
a further statistical test indicates thatin.the long
run, there has been no significant tendency for
real short-term interest rates at home and abroad
to move in the same direction during the period
of fully integrated financial markets.

Percent

Conclusion
Since the early 1980s, national financial markets
and other major countries have been
in the
fully integrated, in that they essentially operate
without government-imposed barriers to the international flow of capital. Yet, we have shown
that the responses of U.S. and foreign real interest
rates to one another have been extremely weak.
This is not surprising. Under a system of flexible
exchange rates, national real interest rates can be
kept apart for extended periods of time by timevarying expectations of changes in exchange
rates and varying premia for bearing exchange
rate risk. As a consequence, U.S. and foreign
central banks have been able to influence their
domestic interest rates quite independently from
the influence of interest rates abroad, despite a
high degree of international integration of finan~
cial markets.

u.s.

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Quarters

Figure 3
Effect of Shock to Foreign Real Interest Rate on
the Differential
Percent

Adrian W. Throop
Research Officer

0.0
-0.5
References

-1.0

Pigott, Charles. 1993~1994. "International Interest
Rate Convergence: A Survey of Issues and Evidence:' Federal Reserve .Bank of New York
Quarterly Review (Winter) pp. 24-37.

-1.5

-2.0

Throop, Adrian W. 1994. "International Financial Market Integration and Linkages of National Interest
Rates:' Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review (No.3, forthcoming).

-2.51
-3.0
-3.5

1-r.....,-~r-T' ........,.-T"""T-..-.-T"""T-..-,.-'r-1

2

4

6

8

10

Quarters

12

14

16

_ _ _ _ . 1993. "A Generalized Uncovered Interest Parity Model of Exchange Rates:' Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review
(No.2) pp. 3-16.

MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1994
On July 20, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a mid-year report to the Congress on the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy objectives for the remainder of 1994. The report reviews economic and
financial developments in 1994 and presents the economic outlook heading into 1995. For single or multiple
copies of the report/write to the Publ ic Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box
7702, San Francisco, CA 94120; phone (415) 974-2246 or fax (415) 974-3341.

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor orto the author...• Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974·2246, Fax (415) 974-3341.

Research Department

FederalReserve
Bank of
San Francisco
P.O. Box 7702
San Francisco, CA 94120

Printed on recycled paper Q
~,
with soybean inks.
\%I ~

Index to Recent Issues of FRBSF Weekly Letter

DATE NUMBER TITLE

AUTHOR

2/11
2/18
2/25
3/4

94-06
94-07
94-08
94-09

3/11

94--10

3/18
3/25
4/1
4/8
4/15
4/21
4/29
5/6
5/13
5/20
5/27
6/10
6/24
7/1
7/15
7/22
8/5
8/19

94-11
94-12
94-13
94-14
94-15
94-16
94-17
94-18
94-19
94-20
94-21
94-22
94-23
94-24
94-25
94-26
94-27

Kim/Moreno
Cheng
Dean
Parry
Booth
Motley
Neuberger
Cogley
Kasa
Furlong
Furlong/Soller
Cromwell
Huh
Moreno
Booth
Neuberger/Schmidt
Schmidt
Sherwood-Call/Schmidt
Trehan
Cogley/Schaan
Levonian
Walsh
Walsh

94~28

Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in Japan
Taiwan at the Crossroads
1994 District Agricultural Outlook
Monetary Policy in the 1990s
The iPQ Underpricing Puzzle
New Measures of the Work Force
Industry Effects: Stock Returns of Banks and Nonfinancial Firms
Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Regime
Measuring the Gains from International Portfolio Diversification
Interstate Banking in the West
California Banks Playing Catch-up
California Recession and Recovery
Just-In-Time Inventory Management: Has It Made a Difference?
GATS and Banking in the Pacific Basin
The Persistence of the Prime Rate
A Market-Based Approach to CRA
Manufactllring Bias in Regional Policy
An "Intermountain Miracle"?
Trade and Growth: Some Recent Evidence
Should the Central Bank Be Responsible for Regional Stabilization?
Interstate Banking and Risk
A Primer on Monetary Policy Part I: Goals and Instruments
A Primer on Monetary Policy Part II: Targets and Indicators

The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December.