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June1 5,1 984

Is the Government an Honest Borrower?
Over the last three years, the private U.s.
economy has benefitted from one of the
largest federal personal income tax cuts in
U.s. history. The strong and continued
growth in personal consumption since early
1983 is often attributed to this tax cut. Over
the same period of time, the U.S. economy
has faced a major related change in the
financial status of its federal governmenta federal deficit that has risen from about
$28 billion in fiscal 1979, the economic
peak of the previous recovery, to $195
billion in fiscal 1983, the first year of
recovery in the current cycle.
While a large portion of the deficit in 1982
and 1983 may be related to changes in the
business cycle (deficits automatically rise
during recessions), a significant part of
current and future deficits is not. That is, the
United States will have a large federal deficit
even when the economy reaches a point
where its labor and capital stocks are at
or near "full employment." The Office
of Management and Budget (OM B) in April
estimated that the federal government will
be in deficitto the tune of $193 billion in
1985, when the economy is expected to be
near such conditions offull employment.
The OM B expects the federal deficit to
remain in the area of $164 billion as far into
the future as 1988, even if Congress and the
Administration agree on a "down payment"
to reduce the deficit.
The rise in the federal deficit has triggered an
enormous debate both in academic circles
and in the financial and popular press. Some
argue that the stream of future deficits
threatens to undermine long-term U.S.
economic growth, and point to the current
level of real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates
and the large deterioration in the net export
position of the United States since 1980.
Others claim that the deficit has not caused
the current high interest rates and will not
jeopardi:z:e future u.s. economic growth.

It must seem unusual to the non-economist
that such an important issue as the effect of
thefi nancial status of the federal government on the behavior of the private economy is still unresolved among professional
economists and, more important, macroeconomic policymakers. Yet, this issue is
part of an economic and political science
debate that has raged for the last 150 years:
to what extent can the government alter
private market behavior and to what extent
does the private market consider government financial behavior, that is, the choice
between taxation and borrowing, in making
its consumption and investment decisions?

Ricardo and Puviani
Much of the theory about how government
affects private market behavior revolves
around the private market's perceptions of
government behavior and its response in the
marketplace. To distinguish two opposing
positions on this issue, we will consider one
well-known view in academic circles and
another that is very little known.
The first view is associated with the camp
that argues that alternative means of financing the government are irrelevant to the
determination of interest rates and to private
market behavior. This so-called "neo"
Ricard ian" school of thought argues that the
private sector perceives government deficits
to be a sequence of future tax liabilities that
will be needed to service the continuing
government debt. Thus, where the deficit is
caused by a tax cut, the private sector is
viewed as perceiving that taxes really
haven't been cut. It therefore saves the entire
tax cut because it knows that later on it will
have to pay higher taxes to service the additional principal and interest on the new debt.
Because the extra saving exactly matches
the new borrowing the government has to
undertake, the end result is no change in
interest rates. The private sector's consumption behavior does not change one iota

Opinions
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in fooling the public into substantially
altering its private market behavior.

because its "true" income-taking into
account the higher taxes that will have to
be paid later-is the same as before.
Perceived real disposable personal income,
in other words, remains unchanged.

Puviani stated his theory in his book, Teoria
della illusion finanziari/Theory of Financial
Illusion, which was published in Palermo in
1903. Later fiscal theorists, such as Mauro
Fasiani in Italy and JamesBuchanan in the
United States, paid attention to Puviani's
arguments because they seemed to be consistent with actual government behavior,
such as the preference for indirect over
direct taxation. However, because Puviani's
comprehensive arguments are not available
in English, and also because of the lack of
mathematical formalism, Puviani's theory
has had little if any direct impact on public
finance theory in the United States.

In this rarefied picture of the government
deficit, government financial behavior is
completely neutral. It does not affect private
market consumption or investment decisions because the deficit does not effectively
alter the resources individuals will have at
their disposal over a suitably defined
horizon. This horizon covers not only the
individual's lifetime, but that of his heirs.
The neo-Ricardian argument requires a
forward-looking public, and one which is
benevolent in considering the welfare of its
heirs. Hence, current generations do not, in
this story, attempt to "exploit" future generations by reaping the benefits of current
deficit-financed expenditures while leaving
the cost of servicing the newly created debt
to them.
To the academic economist, the Ricardian
argument may seem elegant and consistent,
but to the general public, it probably
appears unrealistic. Given that long-term
interest rates have risen in recent years more
instep with movements in the federal deficit
than with observed inflation, financial
market participants seem to be signalling
some concern over the future costs of financing the deficit (see chart).

The "neo-Ricardian" fiscal arguments and
Puviani's theory differ in one specific area.
Whereas the neo-Ricardian arguments
assume individuals know that the capitalized (discounted present) value of future
taxes needed to service the new debt
associated with a tax cut exactly equals
the value of the new debt held by the public
(such that there is no increase in the
net wealth of the public), Puviani argued
that the public has difficulty figuring
out what the capitalized value of future tax
payments will be. As a result, using deficits
or current taxes to finance government
expenditures results in different impacts on
private economic behavior.

A fiscal theory quite unlike the Ricardian
theory, based on the argument that the
financial status of the government does
indeed alter private market economic behavior, is that of the turn-of-the-century
Italian fiscal theorist, Amilcare Puviani.
Puviani argued that government financial
behavior can be best understood by starting
with the hypothesis that government will
always attempt to hide the burden of financing the government and extol the benefits
of its expenditures. This type of government
behavior, hethought, was often successful

According to Puviani, the public suffers from
"fiscal illusion." Part of this illusion results
from governments that actually keep their
financial dealingssecret. In addition, the use
of public enterprises to generate revenue
and government preferences for indirect
overdirecttaxation made it difficult, Puviani
argued, to calculate the true individual tax
burden. Individuals in Puviani's world
would indeed spend a large portion of a tax
cut and disregard the future servicing costs,
and associated future taxation, connected
with the tax cut.
2

Federal Deficit and Long-term Interest Rates
SSililons

Percanl

250

16

200

14

.: .

100
50

1.c::
••::.IIIa*"" ••.;...c
• Federal••DefIcit
,
o ...
·50
1960

12

20·Year Treasury Bond Rate ..

150

1964

1968

1972

1976

...../
,

V

10
8
6
4

......... 2
1980 1983

Is the government a good risk?
There is another side to the government
deficit issue which Puviani did not consider
-the default risk of government debt. With
any private loan, default is always an option
for the borower. The choice of this option
implicitly involves determining whether the
cost of default is greater than the value to the
borrower of not repaying the loan.

---------------

iness of the federal government. However, it
is difficult for the private sector to judge the
true "default characteristics" of the federal
government because it does not know what
sorts of inflationary policies future administrations may undertake.
The private market can, however, reveal its
fears of possible futwe inflation by requiring
a substantial premium in interest rates considerably above the observed inflation rate.If the neo-Ricard ian argument were correct,
the federal deficit should have little, if any,
impact on long-term interest rates since an
increase in the federal government's supply
of securities would be automatically
matched by an equivalent private demand.
An alternative view of the government suggeststhat the private sector real izes it may-be
taxed via inflation if future inflation is greater
than that currently expected. One way for
the private sector to reduce the risk of this
form of taxation is for it to treat the government as a bad insurance risk and raise the
premium required to hold long-term government debt. Recent interest rates appear to
reflect the private market's difficulty in evaluating the inflation-related credit-worthiness
of the federal government.

In private financial markets, lenders attempt
to vary the cost of borrowing according to
the defau It characteristics of the borrower.
However, it has been argued that imperfect
information leads lenders to charge more to
"good borrowers" than if good information
were available on the risk characteristics of
all borrowers. This is somewhat analogous
to the more familiar auto insurance problem
where "good drivers" pay higher premiums
because premiums are based on average
risks and the insurance companies cannot
isolate the "bad risks" before these bad risks
result in auto accidents.
There is, in addition, one major difference
between loans to private and government
borrowers. Private lenders do not have the
same enforcement powers over the federal
government as they do over private borrowers. They have, for example, few means of
enforcing repayment.

Puviani's "model" of the government
attempting to hide the true costs of its financial policies while exaggerating the benefits
of these policies may help us to understand
why financial markets witnessed a rise in the
20-year Treasury bond rate from about 10.50
percent in May 1983 to over 13.50 percent in
early June 1984, when there was no significant change in observed inflation.

No one seriously believes that the u.s.
government will formally default on any of
its obligations. Nonetheless, governments
may be able to "default" on part of their
loans when they pursue inflationary policies
that cause the real, or inflation-adjusted,
return on government debt to be less than'
investors had expected. Inflation history is,
then, one way of assessingthe creditworth-

Joseph Bisignano

3

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B AN KI N G D ATA-TWE L F TH FEDERAL RESERVEDI STRI CT
(Dollar amountS in millions)

Selected Assets and Liabilities
Large Commercial Banks
Loans, Leases and Investments 1 2
Loans and Leases1 6
Commercial and Industrial
Real estate
Loans to Individuals
Leases
U.s. Treasury and Agency Securities2
Other Securities 2
Total Deposits
Demand Deposits
Demand Deposits Adjusted 3
Other Transaction Balances4 :
Total Non-Transaction Balances6
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS

Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( -)

Change from 12/28/83
Percent
Dollar
Annualized

Amount
Outstanding

Change
from

5/30/84
179,543
160,057
48,331
59,882
28,191
4,985
11,945
7,541
187,606
44,505
27,773
12,112
130,989

5/23/84
- 132
216
- 305
27
149
3
81
3
1,493
1,480
218
118
- 105

39,373

70

-

224

39,526
19,807

72
158

-

1,361
3,200

-

-

-

Weekended

Weekended

5/21/84

5/7/84

-

16
55
71

3,518
4,702
2,368
983
1,540
78
562
622
3,391
4,732
3,558
663
2,004

-

-

-

-

4.7
7.1
12.1
3.9
13.6
3.6
10.6
18.0
4.1
22.7
26.8
12.2
3.6
1.3

8.4
- 32.8

89
147
58

1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2

Excludes trading account securities

3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items

ATS, N OW, Super N OW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPsand other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
Editorial comments may be addressedto the editor (Gregory Tong)or to the author .... Freecopies of
Federal Reserve publications can be obtained from the Public Information Section, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.
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