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FRBSF

WEEKLY LETTER

Number 93-14, April 9, 1993

Why Has Employment Grown
So Slowly?
Although theeconomy has been in a recovery since
the first half of 1991, job growth has been anemic.
This Weekly Letter looks at the behavior of employment and related variables since the current
recovery began, and compares it to the behavior
of these variables during earlier postwar recoveries. The results from this comparison provide a
useful way of evaluating the different explanations
that have been offered to explain the slow employment growth. One of the explanations considered suggests that rapid productivity growth
is the culprit; the other suggests that it is the
unusually high degree of uncertainty that has
prevailed over this expansion.
What the data show
Figure 1 compares the behavior of employment
over the current recovery with its average behavior over prior postwar recoveries that have
lasted at least as long as the current one. (This

eliminates the short recovery that lasted from
1980.Q4 to 1981.Q2.) The contrast shown in the
figure could hardly be more obvious: While
employment increased on average by more than
7 percent over the first eight quarters'of a recovery, this time it has grown by around half a perFigure 1:
Cumulative Growth of Employment

Percent

7.2
6.0
4.8
3.6
2.4

1.2
.;
0.0
Current Recovery
r----.----,---.---.----.---.------.---+a -1.2
2
3
4
5
6
Quarters from Recession Trough

Note: The dotted line is atwo-month estimate of 1993.01.

7

cent. (As data for March were not available at the
time of this writing, I assume that employment in
March will be the same as elliployment in February.) In fact, for the first six quarters of the recovery, employment was lower than it was at the
bottom of the recession. Confirmation of sluggish
job growth is provided by the unemployment
rate, which-two years into the recovery-is still
higher than it was at the bottom of the trough.
This is the only postwar recovery for which this
is the case.
Several hypotheses have been put forward to
explain the sluggish employment growth in this
expansion. For our purposes, it is useful to look
at these hypotheses in the context of the following relationship: The rate of growth of output
can be expressed as the sum of the rate of growth
of employment, the growth in average hours per
worker and the growth rate of productivity (or
output per wOiker hour). If growth in output is
accompanied by little change in employment, for
example, then either productivity must be higher
or workers must be working longer hours.
Uncertainty
One explanation for the sluggish behavior of
employment has to do with uncertainty about the
state of the current expansion. Some observers
have suggested that the sluggish pace of economic growth over the early part of the recovery
made it more likely that the economy would stall
and employers became cautious about hiring
more workers as a result. This caution was not
unfounded, since the current recovery did appear
on the verge of collapse around mid-1992. Employers could have responded to this higher uncertainty by inducing existing employees to work
longer hours, instead of hiring more workers.
Data on manufacturing employment appear to
be consistent with this hypothesis: The February
employment report showed that the average
workweek for production workers was the longest it has been in over 25 years, while overtime
was the highest it has been in the 36-year history
of the series.

FRBSF
What does this explanation imply about employment in the near future? Clearly employers
cannot keep increasing hours indefinitely, and
they will have to hire additional workers at some
point. This tendency is likely to be reinforced
by growing evidence of a strong economy. The
4 percent growth rate of output in the second
half of last year and the subsequent strong employment gains in February are consistent with
this hypothesis.
Striking though this evidence is, it is important to
realize that the manufacturing data refer to only
a part of the economy. It turns out that average
weekly hours for all workers across all industries
are just about where they were at the recession
trough. These data do not suggest that employers
are reacting to unusually high uncertainty by hiring fewer workers and making existing workers
work longer hours. Furthermore, this behavior of
hours is not very different from what typically
happens two years into a recovery.
Productivity
Of the various explanations put forward, perhaps
the most commonly encountered points to the
unusually rapid growth of productivity last year;
it turns out that productivity growth in 1992 was
the fastest it has been in 20 years. The logic underlying this argument is that since workers are
becoming more productive, firms can increase
output without hiring more workers. In the words
of Paul Krugman (1993) of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, "We are now officially a
year and a half into an economic recovery, yet
unemployment remains stubbornly high. One of
the reasons for this lingering joblessness is that
productivity has risen faster than expected ..."

Computers play an important role in this explanation. Some analysts point out that companies
are only gradually learning to make efficient use
of the compLiters and related equipment that they
purchased during the 1980s. This process may
have been accelerated by the need to economize
in the recession. Krugman says that "corporate
hierarchies are getting flatter" because of more
efficient use of computers. Indeed, increasing
automation may be one reason behind the unusually large number of white-collar job losses
during this recession. If increased computerization is behind the unusually rapid growth of
productivity, then it is likely that the relatively
faster growth in productivity will continue for a

while. This is because investment in computers
and related equipment continues to be unusually
strong.
While developments such as increased computerization do imply continued growth in productivity over time, available data provide a
somewhat ambiguous picture of the size of such
effects over this recovery. Figure 2 looks at productivity growth since the trough of the last recession and compares it to productivity growth
over the first seven quarters of the average postwar recovery. The figure shows that productivity
has grown somewhat slower than average in this
recovery. Thus, part of the remarkably fast productivity growth in 1992 could just be a rebound
from the unusually slow growth in the early quarters of the recovery.
Figure 2:
Cumulative Growth of Productivity

Percent

6
5

.......................................

/ ~:;r: ;: :o:er:/·/ :
0

.----.,.--~-,------.--,----r-------.---'---+I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Quarters from Recession Trough

Is there a puzzle?
So far we have found that neither productivity nor
hours appear to be behaving unusually compared
to the average postwar recovery. Since we can
think of output growth as the sum of the growth
in productivity, the growth in average hours and
the growth in employment, it is tempting to conclude that the unusually slow growth in employment over this cycle is due to the unusually slow
growth of output, and that whatever is causing
the latter must be causing the former.

Accepting this conclusion, however, overlooks an
important feature of the data, which is that productivity growth has accounted for a disproportionately large share of output growth over this
recovery. Thus, there is still a puzzle concerning
the behavior of employment in this recovery, and
it lies in the relative movement of productivity
and employment. Specifically, why hasn't rising
productivity led to rising employment? Economic
theory tells us that this is what should happen. If

workers become more efficient, firms will find it
more profitable to hire more of them.
The historical evidence is consistent with this
theoretical prediction. Figure 3 compares the
cumulative growth in productivity and employment over the first seven quarters during each of
the postwar recoveries (except 1980, as before).
In every recovery-except the current oneproductivity and employment have gone up
together.
These considerations demonstrate why it is difficult to buy arguments that firms are not hiring
because growing worker productivity allows
them either to expand output without hiring
more workers or produce the same amount with
fewer workers. It seems that the reasons for sluggish employment growth must lie elsewhere. It
may be, for instance, that the kind of technological change that is taking place requires new skills
and so employment will only go up slowly as
workers are retrained. This would imply that the
sources of productivity growth over this expansion are differentfrom what they have been in
prior expansions; it would also explain why firms
have not increased employment after almost two
years of increasing productivity this time around,
even though they have always managed to do so
in every other postwar recession (see Figure 3).
While this is a plausible hypothesis, and is heard
often, more evidence is needed before we can be
sure that this is really what is going on.

Conciusions
In thisWeekly Letter I have looked at the behavior
of employment since the recovery began, and
have discussed some popular explanations for
this behavior. One of the explanations is that we
are in a period of unusual productivity growth,
and that firms have used this opportunity to increase output without increasing employment.
While it is difficult to determine whether the
growth in productivity since the end of the recession has been due to unusual factors, it is useful
to keep in mind that the growth rate of productivity in this recovery is not very different from

Figure 3:
Comparing Employment & Productivity Growth
Percent

Growth over First Seven Quarters of Recovery

12
10
8

Employment

6
4

2
1949

1954

1958

1961

1970

1975

1982

1991

o

Year of Recession Trough

the past. More obviously unusual is the fact that
employment growth has not kept pace with the
increase in productivity since the recovery
began.
It is possible that uncertainty about the durability
of the recovery has kept firms from hiring more
workers even though productivity has been going
up. Here, at least, the passage of time is likely to
provide a test. As (and if) the recovery lengthens,
firms should become more confident and should
respond by increasing employment to match the
increases in productivity we have seen over the
first seven quarters of this expansion. This would
imply a surge in employment at some point in
the near future. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. At this point in time, though,
neither of the two popular explanations discussed above seems to provide a complete
answer.

Bharat Trehan
Research Officer
Reference
Krugman, Paul R. 1993. "Plugging in to Productivity!'
U.S. News and World Report (February 15).

MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1993
On February 19 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a report to the Congress on the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy objectives for 1993. The report includes a summary of the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy plans along with a review of economic and financial developments in 1992 and the economic outlook in 1993. Single or multiple copies of the report can be obtained upon request from the Public
Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.o. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120;
phone (415) 974-2246; FAX (415) 974-3341.

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,San Francisco94120.
Phone (415) 974-2246, Fax (415) 974-3341.

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Index to Recent Issues of fRBSf Weekly Letter

AUTHOR

DATE NUMBER TITLE
10116
10/23
10/30
11/6
11/13
11/20
11/27
12/4
12/11
12/25
111
1/8
1/22
1/.29
2/5
2/12
2/19
2/26
3/5
3/12
3/19
3/26
4/2

92-36
92-37
92-38
92-39
92-40
92-41
92-42
92-43
92-44
92-45
93-01
93-02
93-03
93-04
93-05
93-06
93-07
93-08
93-09
93-10
93-11
93-12
93-13

The European Currency Crisis
Southern California Banking Blues
Would a New Monetary Aggregate Improve Policy?
Interest Rate Risk and Bank Capital Standards
NAFTA and
Banking
A Note of Caution on Early Bank Closure
Where's the Recovery?
Diamonds and Water: A Paradox Revisited
Sluggish Money Growth: Japan's Recent Experience
Labor Market Structure and Monetary Policy
An Alternative Strategy for Monetary Policy
The Recession, the Recovery, and the Productivity Slowdown
Banking Turnaround
Competitive Forces and Profit Persistence in Banking
The Sources of the Growth Slowdown
GOP Fluctuations: Permanent or Temporary?
The Twelfth District Agricultural Outlook
Saving-Investment Linkages in the Pacific Basin
A Single Market for Europe?
Risks in the Swaps Market
On the Changing Composition of Bank Portfolios
Interest Rate Spreads as Indicators for Monetary Policy
The Lonesome Twin

u.s.

u.s.

Glick/Hutchison
Zimmerman
Motley
Neuberger
Laderman/Moreno
Levonian
Cromwell/Trenholme
Schmidt
Moreno/Kim
Huh
Motley/Judd
Cogley
Zimmerman
Levonian
Motley
Moreno
Dean
Kim
Glick/Hutchison
Laderman
Neuberger
Huh
Throop

The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December.