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October 28, 1977

Dollars and Deficits
According to many headlinewriters and telecasters, the dollar
has been sharply declining in the
foreign-exchange markets, but the
picture they draw somehow doesn;t
jibe with reality. In the first half
October, the trade-weighted value
of the dollar was in the middle of a
fairly narrow range that has prevailed since late 1975-more specifically, 10.6 percent below its value
in May 1970, prior to the breakdown of the old regime of fixed
exchange rates. That October figure was less than 2 percent below
the March 1977 peak but about 11
percent above the March 1975 recession low.

or

The explanation for the difference
between perception and reality is
related to the diverse exchangerate movements of the nation's major trading partners. The dollar has
depreciatedby 19 percent against
the Japaneseyen and by 13 percent
against the German mark over the
past two years, but it has appreciated significantly against the currencies of several other major trading
partners-for example, by 7 percent against the Canadian dollar, 15
percent against the British pound,
and 45 percent against the Mexican
peso.

Massive,sudden decline
Still, many observers have expressed fears about the future of
the dollar in the wake of the
massiveand sudden shift toward
deficit in the nation's merchandise-

trade account. While the U.S. recorded an unusually large trade
surplus of $9 billion in 1975, the
balance shifted to a deficit of like
size in 1976-and in the first eight
months of 1977 the deficit reached
an annual rate of $30 billion. Moreover, many analystsare forecasting
an even larger trade deficit in 1978.
To measure the likelihood of this
occurrence, we should examine the
status of the oil-import trade, the
health of our agricultural and industrial exports, and (a related
question) the competitiveness of
U.S. producers in world markets.
The most important factor in the
swing has been the increase in U.S.
oil imports, which have risen from
lessthan $5 billion in 1972to· an
estimated $45 billion this year. A
sharp rise in the price of OPEC oil,
from $2.53to $13.25a barrel, helps
account for this massive.deficit. But
in addition, U.S. oil imports have
increased 80 percent in volume
terms over the past five years, reflecting both a rise in domestic
consumption and a decline in domestic output. Roughly tlfiJo-fifths of
the increase in oil imports can be .
attributed to our reduced production, which suggestsa need for expanding Alaskan and other domestic energy sources as well as curbing domestic demand. Restraining
imports can be difficult in a growing economy, because every 1percent increase in GNP typically is
accompanied by a 2-percent increase in oil imports.
(continued on page 2)

The shifts in trade with non-OPEC
countries have been somewhat
more complex. As expected, nonoil imports have rebounded with
the strong recovery in the U.S.
economy. After a sharp increase last
year from 1975's recessiondepressed level, imports are rising
again in 1977 by about 20 percent in
value terms. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, U.S. exports have
lagged over the past two years,
rising in value only about 7 percent
in both 1976 and 1977. Other nations have limited their purchases
in this country because of bumper
worldwide grain harvests and, in
particular, because of the sluggishnessof their own economies.

Export wea!,"ess
In the past two years, the U.S. economy has been growing at about a
5V2-percentannual rate, in contrast
to roughly a 4-percent growth rate
in the rest of the industrial world
and a 4V2-5percent growth rate in
the developing (LDC) countries.
This is a sharp reversal of the pattern of the several previous decades, and means a much sharper
increase in U.S. imports than in U.S.
exports. Businesshas turned sluggish especially among our more
important customers.
The largest, Canada, which buys
roughly 20 percent of all U.S. exports, has weakened significantly
over the past year or so. The LDC
countries, which take another 25
percent of U.S. exports, maintained
relatively rapid growth rates until
this year, but now many of them
2

have adopted austerity programs in
order to curb the unsustainably
large deficits they had incurred in
their earlier period of growth. Mexico and Brazil, the fourth and tenth
largest U.S. export markets, have
both adopted stringent stabilization
programs, and U.S. exports thus
have dropped 19 percent to both
countries over the past year.
Competitiwe weakll1ess1
Does a sluggish export trade indicate any dedJoe in thecompetitive-:_-.
nessof the U.S. economy? One
possible measure would be a comparison of relative prices adjusted
for exchange-rate changes. Since
the end of 1975,the year of our
record trade surplus, U.S. inflation
has been lower than the weightedaverage inflation rate experienced
by our major trading partners. in
the same period the tradeweighted exchange rate of the dollar has appreciated slightly. By this
standard, therefore, our competitive position has neither improved
nor depreciated substantially in the
past two years.
The recent performance of U.S.
exports to key LDC markets illustrates some of the complex factors
involved-few of which indicate
any decline in competitiveness. Between 1970 and 1976, both the U.S.
and Japan increased their market
shares,outperforming the other
major industrial countries in LDC
markets-but the U.S. (unlike Japan) lost all of that earlier gain over
the past year. The major reason
concerns the geographic distribu-

tion of trade. U.S. sales are heavily
concentrated in Latin America,
where the absolute volume of imports declined, while the Japanese
sell more than two-thirds of their
LDC-destined goods to Asian customers, whose markets expanded
sharply in 1976-77.A second reason
for this relative decline was the
improvement in harvests abroad,
which masked an increase in the
U.S. share of manufactured imports
in several major LDC markets. In
fact, U.S. manufacturers maintained
or increased their market share in
13 of 18 major non-OPEC markets
in early 1977.

Future deficit?
Many observers see little chance of
a reduction in the merchandisetrade deficit in 1978. Domestic petroleum supplies will increase because of the opening of the Alaska
pipeline, but oil imports should still
continue high because of purchases
for the strategic petroleum reserve.
U.S. farm exports may remain weak
because of good harvests abroad

and large carryovers in the world
grain market. Meanwhile, the trade
balance in industrial products may
remain unfavorable, because of the
continued pattern of sluggish
growth in overseaseconomies.
The current-account deficit (which
contains transfers and services as
well as goods receipts) will be much
smaller than the merchandise-trade
deficit, if there is a repeat of the
patterns visible in the first half of
1977. During that period, transfer
payments (private and public) resulted in a net annual outflow of $5
billion, but the overall services
category produced a net annual
surplus of $17 billion. (This category
includes investment income, military transactions, transportation, insurance and tourism.) Nonetheless,
if another massivetrade deficit occurs, the current-account deficit
would remain substantial. In that
case, trade problems and the state
of the dollar will remain in the
headlines for some time to come.

WilHam Burke

May 1970 Base

o

$

Billions

50
-5

-10

-15

-20

3

-ar::
Trade-weighted
of dollar

\

III

1976
1977
Sources: Morgan Guaranty Bank, Commerce Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

0

U Ol8u!4SEM' 4Eln • uo8aJO • EpEi\aN .04E PI
!!EMEH .. E!U.lOJ!lE:J • EUOZPV 0 qSEI V

'me:> lo;)spue.l:l ues
ZSL. 'O N
(BlVd
: J9V.lSOd '5'(1
lBVW SSV1:>
.lsm:!

lill@

BANKING DATA- TWElfTH fEDERALRESERVE
DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Selected Assetsand liabilities
large Commercial Banks

Amount
Outstanding
10/12/77

Loans(gross,adjusted) and investments*
Loans (gross,adjusted)-total
Security loans
Commercial and industrial
Real estate
Consumer instalment
U.S.Treasurysecurities
Other securities
Deposits (lesscash items)-total*
Demand deposits (adjusted)
U.S. Government deposits
Time deposits-total*
Statesand political subdivisions
Savingsdeposits
Other time deposits:j:
Large negotiable CD's

101,682
79,296
1,971
24,170
25,947
13,694
7,646
14,740

Weekly Averages
of Daily figures

Week ended
10/12/77

Member Bank ReservePosition
Excess
Reserves
(+)/Deficiency
H
Borrowings
Net free(+)/Net borrowed (-)
Federal funds-Seven large Banks
Interbank Federalfund transactions
Net purchases(+)/Net sales(-)
Transactionswith U.s. security dealers
Net loans (+)/Net borrowings (-)

100A59
29,555
305

68A44
5,252
31,837
29,054
11,373

+

118
107
11

+

277

+

Change from
year ago
Dollar
Percent

Change
from
10/5/77
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

-

285
293
462
210
123
25
480
472
194
616
150
329
26
77
177
203.

+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+

-

+
+
+
+
+

Week ended
10/5177
+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+

11,654
10,573
408
1,865
5,056
1,890
1,019
2,100
9,237
2,727
6
5,924
136
3,790
2,101
321

-

+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+

12.94
15.38
26.10
8.36
24.20
16.01
11.76
16.61
10.13
10.16
1.93
9.48
2.66
13.51
7.80
2.90

.comparable
year-ago period

92
38
54

+

18
0
18

590

+

424

+ 171
+ 480
*Includes items not shown separately.:j:lndividuals, partnerships and corporations.

+

+ 1,164

Editorial comments may be addressedto the editor (William Burke) or to the author•. . •
Information on this and other publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public
1.1formation Section, federal Reserve Bank of San francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco94120.
Phone (415) 544-2184.