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FRBSF

WEEKLY LETTER

May 3, 1991

The Credit Crunch and
The Real Bills Doctrine
Is the U.s. currently suffering from a credit
crunch? If it is, what should the Federal Reserve
do about it? These questions have loomed large
in recent discussions of the current recession.
The credit crunch has been cited as both a cause
of the recession and as a barrier to recovery.
Some market analysts have attributed a credit
crunch to overzealous bank regulators or to contractionary Federal Reserve policy. Others deny
that a credit crunch even exists.
Some commentators who believe a credit crunch
is seriously hampering the economy's chances
of recovery also argue that the Fed's traditional
arsenal of monetary policy tools is not enough.
Some have called on the Fed to buy commercial
loans from the banking sector. If the Fed were to
purchase existing loans from banks, the banks
could then use the proceeds to make new loans.
This idea appears related to the "real bills"
doctrine, which dates back at least to the writings of John Law who proposed a version of the
doctrine in 1705. Despite its long history, the real
bills doctrine has generally been identified with
unsound monetary policy. Mark Blaug (1985,
p. 54), a well-known historian of economic
thought, places the real bills doctrine "high
on the list of longest-lived economic fallacies
of all time."
After reviewing the arguments for proposals
to have the Fed purchase commercial loans, this
Letter discusses the arguments against the real
bills doctrine to see what light they might shed
on recent proposals. In addition, some evidence
is presented to suggest that the credit crunch
may not be the dominant factor behind the recent contraction in bank lending and economic
activity.

Discounting commercial paper
In principle, a bank that wanted to expand its
commercial lending could borrow reserves from

the Fed's discount window; in practice, discount
window borrowing is available only for easing
very short-term reserve shortages. When the Fed
wants to expand bank lending, it purchases government securities held by the banking sector.
The resulting rise in bank reserves can be used
by banks to expand commercial lending. It has
been argued, however, that recent regulations
linking bank capital requirements to risk have
limited the effectiveness of the Fed's open market
security purchases as a stimulus to bank lending.
Under the new bank capital requirements,
which were established to help relieve taxpayers
of the burden associated with potential claims on
the deposit insurance fund, a bank with a large
fraction of its assets in the form of commercial
loans must have more capital than a bank of similar size that holds more of its assets in the form
of lower risk loans or government securities. If
a bank sells a government security to the Fed
in order to make a commercial loan, its capital
requirement will rise. If the bank previously had
just the minimum required amount of capital,
it would be unable to expand its commercial
lending. This would also be true if the bank
discounted government securities with the
Federal Reserve.
In addition, the differential capital requirement
can be viewed as a tax on commercial lending
that will induce banks to reallocate their asset
portfolios away from commercial loans. As a
result, it will raise loan rates relative to interest
rates on assets like government securities, a process that will continue until the return on commercial loans is sufficient to compensate for
the higher capital tax.
A capital-constrained bank would be able to
expand its commercial lending, however, if it
could sell some of its existing loans to the Federal Reserve. This is the basis for proposals, such
as one by Harvard Professor Martin Feldstein,

FRBSF
that the Fed purchase high-quality commercial
loans from banks. A bank faced with an increased demand for loans could sell some of its
existing portfolio of loans to the Federal Reserve
and use the proceeds to make new loans. Such a
transaction would result in an expansion of the
level of bank reserves and the money supply in
the face of an increase in loan demand, which
potentially could ease a credit crunch in the
banking industry.
The real bills doctrine
Such a policy could have undesired effects
on the economy as a whole. If implemented
without being systematically offset by contractionary monetary actions by the Fed, bank loan
discounting amounts to a revival of what monetary economists call the real bills doctrine. The
basic argument of this doctrine is that the expansion of money will not be inflationary if banks
restrict their lending to commercial paper issued
to finance real business activity. The real bills
doctrine argues that the central bank should
allow the money supply to expand automatically,
thereby providing the means of payment to
finance the increase in real economic activity.
Under such a policy, a credit crunch could never
arise. As the credit needs of the business sector
rose, banks would be allowed to expand their
lending. The real bills doctrine would argue
against any actions by the monetary authority
to limit bank lending to finance real activity.
Mainstream economists have rejected the real
bills doctrine, arguing that it can lead to runaway
inflation. In 1802, for example, Henry Thornton
pointed out that inflation would, under a real
bills policy, cause an automatic increase in the
money supply that would simply fuel further inflation. He argued that an initial rise in prices
would increase the demand for bank credit to
finance commercial activity. If prices rise 5 percent, a company that formerly needed to issue
$1 million in commercial paper now needs to
borrow $1.05 million, and if the real bills doctrine were followed, the money supply would
automatically rise by 5 percent. Thus, any inflation is automatically accommodated. Risi ng
prices increase the demand for credit which, in
turn, is allowed to cause the money supply to
rise, \vhich simply results in further inflation.
The fallacy of the real bills doctrine is that it
allows the dollar value of credit demand to deter-

mine the dollar value of the money supply. As a
result, money and prices can rise without limit.
A rise in the money supply pushes up prices.
This raises the dollar value of credit demand,
thereby leading to a rise in the money supply
and a further rise in prices.
Real bills and the Federal Reserve
Despite its rejection by most economists, the
real bills doctrine heavily influenced the 1913
Congressional act that established the Federal
Reserve System. The preamble sets out very
clearly that one purpose of the Federal Reserve
Act was to afford the means of discounting commercial loans. In its report on the proposed bill,
the House Banking and Currency Committee
viewed a fundamental objective of the bill to
be the "creation of a joint mechanism for the extension of credit to banks which possess sound
assets and which desire to liquidate them for the
purpose of meeting legitimate commercial, agricultural, and industrial demands on the part of
their clientele:'
The similarity between these objectives and a
policy of fixing the market rate of interest was
made explicit in the Committee's report which
argued for the establishment of a liquid commercial bills market, with the Federal Reserve
ensuring "a constant and unfailing market for
such bills at a steady rate of interest:' However,
the experience of the 1970s shows how a policy
that acts to limit interest rate increases in response to increased nominal demand for credit
will result in an accommodative monetary policy
that simply fuels inflation.
The credit crunch and Fed policy
The real bills doctrine does not provide a
satisfactory framework if low inflation is to be
an objective of monetary policy, since it suggests
the Fed should always accommodate credit expansion. At times, of course, the Fed will want
to stimulate bank lending as part of a short-run
policy designed to speed the recovery from recession. In those times, the Fed's traditional tools
are adequate to the task. For example, increased
Fed open market purchases of government securities will increase reserves and thereby raise
the liquidity of the banking sector and alleviate
a credit crunch caused by a lack of liquidity. If
banks use the additional reserves to

buy

govern-

ment securities themselves instead of making
loans, the sellers of those securities will need
to reinvest the proceeds in such assets as com-

mercial paper, so that the total supply of credit
sti II rises.
In the present circumstances, evaluating the
appropriateness of expansionary Fed policy
requires a determination of the cause of the
recent slowdown in overall lending, in other
words, a demonstration that a credit crunch
actually exists. While the nature of the information problems between borrowers and lenders
is important for understanding the operations
of credit markets, a simple supply-demand
perspective is useful as a guide to what might
be happening in lending markets. The causes
usually cited for the credit crunch-banks'
unwillingness to lend due to increased capital
requirements or "overzealous regulators"-are
factors that would lower the supply of bank
credit. A reduction in the supply of bank loans
will lower the quantity of loans and tend to push
up interest rates on bank credit. As bank rates
rise, some firms will turn to other sources of
credit, such as the commercial paper market.
This will push up interest rates on commercial
paper if the reduction in bank lending is having
a significant effect on the total supply of credit.
In contrast, a fall in bank lending due to a
decline in loan demand-perhaps as a result
of the current recession-would be accompanied
by a decline in lending rates. While other factors
influencing interest rates will also be at work, an
examination of lending rates may provide some
clue as to the source of the decline in bank
lending.
The accompanying chart shows monthly data
on the prime rate, the 90-day commercial paper
rate, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate during
1989 and 1990. Contrary to the situation expected in a credit crunch, commercial paper
rates declined steadily during 1990, suggesting
an overall fall in the demand for credit. The
prime rate, however, has failed to move downward with the Treasury bill rate and the commercial paper rate, suggesting some evidence
of greater bank reluctance to lend-a situation
undoubtedly compounded by the heightened

uncertainty about the near-term prospects for the
economy. And the commercial paper rate since
late 1990 has fallen less than the 3-month Treasury bill rate, perhaps also reflecting the impact of
a decline in bank lending. The chart seems most
consistent with some reduction in the supply of
credit from banks, although its impact on the
total supply of credit appears to have been
smaller than the recession-induced decline
in credit demand.

Interest Rates

Percent
12

11
Prime

10
9

Commercial Paper

8
3-Month
Treasury Bill
1989

1990

7
6
1991

In sum, the Fed's traditional tools-open market
operations, the discount window, and reserve
requirements-are adequate to alleviate any
constraints on total credit that do exist. Open
market purchases that increase reserves in the
banking sector will expand the total supply of
credit in the economy, even if banks do not
directly increase their lending.

Carl E. Walsh
Associate Professor
University of California, Santa Cruz
Visiting Scholar
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Reference
Blaug, Mark. 1985. Economic Theory in Retrospect
4th ed. Cambridge University Press.

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the-management of the Fedeial ReS€iVe Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Judith Goff) or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications.can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,
San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.

Research Department

Federal Reserve
Bank of
San Francisco
P.O. Box 7702
San Francisco, CA 94120