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FRBSF

WEEKLY LETTER

Number 93-11, March 19, 1993

On the Changing Composition
of Bank Portfolios
u.s.

In recent years,
banks appear to have been
eager to invest in government securities but reluctant to lend. In fact, with the recent buildup
in government securities holdings, banks now
hold more securities than they do business loans.
These developments have raised concerns in
banks have
Congress and elsewhere that
gotten away from their "proper" role of lending
to consumers and to small and medium-sized
businesses. Critics claim that banks are beginning to look more like mutual funds than lending
institutions.

u.s.

In this Letter, I put these recent developments in
perspective by looking at the historical behavior
of bank portfolio composition. During the past
40 years, bank portfolios have changed dramatically. For example, since the early 1950s, the
proportion of bank portfolios allocated to securities has declined significantly, while the
proportion invested in mortgage loans has increased. In addition to long-term changes, bank
portfolio composition exhibits cyclical behavior.
These cyclical changes reflect efforts by bankers
to adjust their portfolios to the changing opportunities that arise over the course of the business
cycle. The recent behavior of bank portfolio
composition reflects long-term structural effects,
cyclical adjustments, and more recent changes
in the banking environment.

Bank portfolios since the 1990 recession
The National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) has dated the starting point of the last
recession as mid-1990. From that point to the
third quarter of 1992, total financial assets of
the commercial banking sector increased about
10 percent according to the Flow of Funds data
published by the Federal Reserve. During the
same period, total loans on the books of the nation's banks rose less than 3 percent, business
loans actually fell over 4 percent, and banks'
holding of securities increased by over 30 percent. The rapid growth in securities was fueled
largely by increased holdings offederal government securities (Treasuries and agency issues,
including mortgage-backed securities), which

rose almost 50 percent from the second quarter
of 1990 to the third quarter of 1992.

Long-term trends in bank portfolios
While these recent portfolio shifts are striking,
it is useful to consider them from a longer-term
perspective. The figure shows the proportion of
total bank financial assets allocated to four major
categories for the period from the early 1950s to
the early 1990s. The shaded areas represent recessions as determined by NBER.

Portfolio Shares of
U.S. Commercial Banks

Percent of
Financial Assets

50
45
40
35

30
25
20
15
10
5
1952

1960

1968

1976

1984

1992

o

Source: Flow of Funds Accounts

Several long-term trends are evident in the figure.
Perhaps the most obvious feature is the secular
decline in the proportion of securities in bank
portfolios. In the early 1950s, securities made
up almost half of total bank financial assets. By
the mid-1970s, this percentage had declined to
roughly one-quarter of bank assets. The change
in the proportion of securities held by banks actually displays two distinct segments: The first is
a rather steep drop from the early 1950s through
the early 1970s; the second shows that securities
have remained at a roughly constant proportion
of bank portfolios since the mid-1970s.
Another development shown in the figure is the
rise in the proportion of business loans in bank

FABSF
portfolios from the early 1950s through the mid1970s. Business loans were less than 20 percent
of bank assets in the early 1950s and rose to over
30 percent of assets by the mid-1970s. This rise
in business lending coincided with the decline in
bank securities holdings. From the 1950s through
the mid- to late-1970s, banks engaged in a portfolio substitution away from securities and toward
business loans and, to some extent, mortgage
loans.
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, the proportion of bank portfolios allocated to business
loans declined steadily, and was less than 22 percent of assets by the third quarter of 1992. Contrary to some popular perceptions, the drop in
the share of business loans in bank portfolios is
not a recent phenomenon but, instead, has gone on
for some time. This decline is especially notable
because it occurred during the long economic
expansion of the 1980s. It reflects the increasingly competitive market for short-term business
loans, as banks lost market share to nonbank financial institutions such as finance companies.
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed rapid growth
in the markets for commercial paper and other
forms of "nonintermediated" debt. A growing
number of companies during this time were able
to bypass banks and sell debt securities directly
to the open market.
Another trend in the figure is the significant and
steady rise in mortgage loans held by the banking system throughout the 40-year period. At the
end of 1951, mortgages were less than 10 percent
of total bank assets. By 1990, these holdings had
increased to over 25 percent of bank portfolios,
based on Flow of Funds data. The increase in
bank mortgage loans exhibits two distinct phases:
a gradual rise through the mid-1980s, followed
by more rapid growth since then. Among other
factors, this growth spurt corresponds to the decline of the savings and loan industry in the late
1980s. Notably, the period of more rapid growth
in the portfolio share of mortgage loans also
coincides with the period of declining share of
business loans. The period since the mid-1980s
has largely been one of portfolio substitution for
banks away from business loans and toward
mortgage loans.

Bank portfolio composition
and the business cycle
While several long-term trends are evident from
the figure, the data also exhibit distinct cyclical

patterns. Most notably, business loans as a proportion of total assets typically decline during
recessions (the shaded areas in the figure) and
rise during expansions. The converse is true for
securities holdings; that is, banks increase securities holdings as a share of assets during
recessions and reduce them during expansions.
Looking at the eight postwar business cycles covered in the figure, business loans as a proportion
of assets held by banks rose an average of 7 percent in the two years prior to the business cycle
peak (the start of a recession) and then fell by
4.5 percent in the two years after the peak. The
share of bank assets held as securities, in contrast, fell over 10 percent in the two years before
the beginning of a recession and then rose an
average of 5 percent in the two years after the
onset of a recession. These patterns represent a
reasonable response by banksto cyclical influences. Loan growth, especially growth in business loans, declines during and after a recession,
as credit demand falls and banks tighten loan
standards in the face of higher loan losses. Inthe
absence of abundant lending prospects, banks
shift a higher proportion of their assets into
securities.

Analysis of recent developments
During the most recent recession, bank portfolios
exhibited a cyclical pattern of falling business
loans and rising securities holdings. However,
compared to earlier business cycles, recent experience is somewhat unusual in that the proportion
of business loans fell and the share of securities
holdings rose more than in previous episodes. For
example, instead of rising in the two years before
the business cycle peak, business loans as a percent of assets actually fell 6 percent from mid1988 to m id-1990. In the two years after the start
of the 1990 recession, the business loan share fell
by an additional 12 percent, almostthree times
the postwar average. The proportion of assets
held in securities also differed form earlier business cycles, falling by only 3 percent in the two
years before the start of the 1990 recession, and
then increasing by over 15 percent in the two
years after the peak, again roughly three times
the historical average.
This behavior suggests that factors in addition to
the business cycle are influencing recent bank
portfolio allocation decisions. In the case of business loans, the current weakness appears to be,
in part, a continuation of a longer-term decline

that began in the early 1980s. Banks continue to
face strong competition from nonbank sources of
credit and from direct debt markets. On top of
the declining bank share of the market for business loans, business loan demand during and
after the most recent recession was especially
weak. Among possible explanations for this unusual weakness in loan demand are a lower than
normal economic recovery and a concerted effort by businesses to restructure their balance
sheets from the debt overhang of the 1980s. Additionally, changes in the regulatory environment
also may have contributed to slow loan growth at
the nation's bank. There is evidence that capital
standards have become more stringent in recent
years and that concerns about bank capital may
have exerted a constraining effect on loan
growth. It also is possible that loan loss exposures and high problem loan ratios may have
made banks more cautious in their lending. It is
unclear which of the effects is most important,
though it is likely they all have contributed to the
particularly steep declines in business loans
shown in the figure.
The recent sharp increase in bank securities
holdings also appears to be, in part, the result of
structural factors. A significant change in bank
regulation in· the 1980smade the most recent recession different from earlier ones and may have
accentuated the cyclical effects. A typical feature
of earlier recessions was disintermediation as deposits exited the banking system when market

interest rates rose above Regu'lation Q ceilings.
The outflow essentially cut off an important
source of funds for bank loan growth. The Reg Q
ceilings were abolished in the early 1980s, and
the 1990 recession was the first to occur without
the associated interest rate restrictions. Notably,
the kind of disintermediation that characterized
earlier recessions did not occur in the most recent cycle. While banks allowed large CDs to
run off, so-called core deposits stayed in the
bankingsystem. Faced with extremely weak loan
demand, banks may have decided to invest these
funds in safe and relatively lucrative government
securities.

Will banks become mutual funds?
For the first time in 20 years, banks are allocating
more of their asset portfolios to securities holdings than to business loans. While some suggest
that this means that banks are getting away from
their proper role in the economy, this charge
seems premature, especially in light of the longerterm behavior of bank portfolios. Recent portfolio
shifts appear to be a response to a combination
of cyclical effects and both short- and long-term
structural changes in bank markets. Continued
portfolio adjustments should be expected in the
future as long as the environment in which banks
operate continues to evolve.

Jonathan A. Neuberger
Economist

Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor or to the author.•.. Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974·2246, Fax (415) 974·3341.

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Index to Recent Issues of FRBSF Weekly Letter

DATE NUMBER TITLE
9/25
10/2
10/9
10/16
10/23
10130
11/6
11/13
11/20
11/27
12/4
12/11
12/25
1/1
1/8
1/22
1/29
2/5
2/12
2/19
2/26
3/5
3/12

92-33
92-34
92-35
92-36
92-37
92-38
92-39
92-40
92-41
92-42
92-43
92-44
92-45
93-01
93-02
93-03
93-04
93-05
93-06
93-07
93-08
93~09

93-10

The Slow Recovery
Ej ido Reform and the NAFTA
The Dollar: Short-Run Volatility and Long-Run Adjustment
The European Currency Crisis
Southern California Banking Blues
Would a New Monetary Aggregate Improve Policy?
Interest Rate Risk and Bank Capital Standards
NAFTA and U.S, Banking
A Note of Caution on Early Bank Closure
Where's the Recovery?
Diamonds and Water: A Paradox Revisited
Sluggish Money Growth: Japan's Recent Experience
Labor Market Structure and Monetary Policy
An Alternative Strategy for Monetary Policy
The Recession, the Recovery, and the Productivity Slowdown
U.S, Banking Turnaround
Competitive Forces and Profit Persistence in Banking
The Sources of the Growth Slowdown
GOP Fluctuations: Permanent or Temporary?
The Twelfth District Agricultural Outlook
Saving-Investment Linkages in the Pacific Basin
A Single Market for Europe?
Risks in the Swaps Market

AUTHOR
Throop
Schmidt/Gruben
Throop
Glick/Hutchison
Zimmerman
Motley
Neuberger
Laderman/Moreno
Levonian
CromwelllTrenholme
Schmidt
Moreno/Kim
Huh
Motley/Judd
Cogley
Zimmerman
Levonian
Motley
Moreno
Dean
Kim
Glick/Hutchison
Laderman

The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December,