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October 9, 1981 American Emirates? Key energy-producing states-located mainly in the West-were heartened by a recent Supreme Court decision upholding Montana's right to levy a stiff "severance" tax on coal mined there. (The name "severance tax" comes from the fact that it is appl ied at the production stage, as the product is "severed" from the ground.) The decision supports those states' efforts to use energy severance taxes as a major source of general revenue. But industries, utilities and other energy consumers in the energy-resource deficient states-mainly in the Midwest and Northeast -were angered by the decision. Producing states argue that severance taxes are necessary to provide for the roads, sewers, schools and other facilities required to support rapid energy development-and to ensure that some revenues are left in state coffers followi ng the depletion of thei r energy resources. But opponents argue that the tax drains income from energy-poor to energyrich states, and thereby precipitates one of the largest capital transfers in the nation's history. Indeed, they envision the creation of a de facto "United American Emirates" -a group of energy-producing states whose control over domestic energy sources leads to a major transfer of wealth. Also, they maintain that, because of the increased revenue from this source, energy-producing states can reduce other business taxes and thereby encourage business to locate there, facilitating further transfers of wealth. These states, moreover, can qualify for additional Federal payments on revenue sharing and other programs, because the allocation formulas sometimes reward states for their "tax effort," the amount of revenue they raise on their own. The arguments against the tax bear closer scrutiny. There is no question that severance taxes constitute an important and growing source of state revenue for the resource-rich states, particularly now that domestic oil prices have been decontrolled. It is also true that severance-tax revenues are making it possible for state governments to reduce other taxes below levels that might otherwise prevail. But the argument that such taxes are being passed on to out-of-state customers through higher energy prices undoubtedly holds true only for certain energy sources. Most of the pass-through apparently pertains to coal and uranium, which account for less than one-tenth of the total state revenues derived from energy severance taxes. Montana decision Since 1921, Montana has imposed a severance tax on the output of its coal mines, including coal mined on Federal lands. In 1975, however, the state legislature voted to raise the tax for surface-mined coal to a range of 20 to 30 percent of the contract sales pri ce, with the maximum applying to coal with the highest heat content. In 1978, four Montana coal producers and eleven of their out-ofstate electric-utility customers sought tax refunds on constitutional grounds. The trial court-and later the Montana Supreme Court -upheld the tax, and the utilities then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The uti Iities contended that the Montana tax discriminates against interstate commerce, because 90 percent of Montana coal is shipped to other states under contracts that shift the burden primarily to non-Montana utility companies and thus to residents of other states.Those contracts typically provide for a pass-through of state-taxation costs to the utilities, while fuel-adjustment clauses in turn provide for a further pass-through of such costs to utility customers. The utilities argued furtherthatthetax is excessive, being unfairly related to the value of the mine-related services the state provides or the mine-related costs it incurs. Finally, they argued thatthe tax violates Federal law-namely the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1 920-because it IP1@\[ffi HZ\ (G)TI JFIt 11\\ (CIi (G). Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Fpderal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, or of the Board crf Governors of the Federal Reserve System. $3.7 billion in 1 980-largely reflecting the upsurge in domestic energy prices duringthis period. Coal revenues showed the most rapid growth, rising from $38 million to $329 million over the period, but still comprised only 9 percent of the total by 1980. Oil-andgas severance tax revenues-the bulk of the total-rose from $808 million to $3.4 billion. As a result of this growth, energy severance taxes rose in importance as a source of state revenue-in 1980, accounting for over onethird of Alaska's total revenues and over onefourth of Oklahoma's and Wyoming's totals. reduces the Government's royalty payments from output from Federally-owned land. The Supreme Court ruled that a state severance tax is subject to Constitutional review even though imposed on goods prior to their entrance into the stream of interstate commerce. The Court added, however, that the Montana tax is even-handed and nondiscriminatory with regard to out-of-state users, because it is computed at the same rate regardless of the coal's final destination. The Court ruled further that the question of what constitutes an "excessive" rate is a matter for Congress and not the courts to resolve. Finally, it ruled that the tax does not violate the purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which expressly authorized the states to levy and collect taxes as though the Federal government were not concerned. The growth in severance-tax revenues occurred in the face of price controls on domestically-produced oil and gas. But revenues may now soar, in the wake of (full or partial) decontrol of these prices. Moreover, rents and royalties on state-owned oil and gas properties add even more to the total. According to Treasury Department estimates, oil-producing states could collect $128 billion during this decade simply as a result of decontrol. More than $100 billion of that total would flow to just four states: Alaska, California, Louisiana and Texas. (That accounts for Alaska's abilityto repeal its income tax and to refund 1979 and 1980 taxes.) Phased decontrol of natural-gas prices under present law would yield producing states another $50 billion, 'with immediate decontrol yielding revenues many times greater. Risingrevenues Only a few states are net exporters of primary energy: Louisiana, Wyoming, New Mexico, Kentucky, Alaska, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Montana and Texas (1976 data). The major oil-and-gas producing states are Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, California and Oklahoma. Coal resources are more widely dispersed, with the largest producers being Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. (Montana actually is one of the smaller producers, with about 4 percent of the total.) New Mexico and Wyoming produce most of the nation's uranium. Who really pays? Energy resource-deficient states argue that these taxes are shifted forward fully to consumers; and that, since most of the production is sold in interstate markets, most of the tax is "exported". Butthat argument neglects the fact that the structure of the markets for most energy sources will not permit a full pass-through of severance taxes to consumers, even when the regulatory framework is not an impediment. Many producing states now impose severance taxes. The Alaska legislature recently raised that state's petroleumseverance tax from 12.25 percent to 15.0 percent, making it the highest in the nation. Louisiana charges 12.5 percent, while other states charge rates ranging from 7.0 percent to 1.5 percent. In the case of coal, Wyoming charges the second highest rate after Montana-namely 10.5 percent-while other states' rates range from 8.4 percent to as little as 0.2 percent. Indeed, producers' ability to pass on a production tax depends largely upon the elasticity of demand for the product in question. The moreunresponsive the quantity demanded is to a given change in Tax revenues from this source have grown substantially, from $840 million in 1973 to 2 price-i.e., the more inelastic demand schedule-the greater is the ability to passon the tax to consumers through a higher price. Severance taxes appear to be largely or fully passed on to consumers only in the cases of coal and uranium. A large proportion of coal production is sold to electric power plants under long-term fixed supply contracts which allow for "pass-through" of increased production taxes. Also, the high costs of coal transportation tend to segment the national market, reducing the competition among producing states and making the demand schedule relatively inelastic. The highly concentrated nature of the uranium industry, together with the lack of substitutes for nuclear purposes, also suggests a full pass-through of severance taxes. In the case of domestically-produced crude oil in an unregulated environment, imports constitute a near-perfect substitute, and the demand for domestic oil approaches infinity -i.e., is perfectly elastic -at the landed price for imported oil. Even in the absence of Federal controls, domestic producers cannot raise their price above the world (import) price regardless of tax-related changes in marginal costs and shifts in domestic supply. Refiners simply will not pay more for domestic oil than the world price, because a virtually unlimited supply of imported oil is available at the world price. Given the world price, the severance tax must be fu Ily absorbed by domestic producers-including owners of the resource in question -through a lower after-tax realized price. The regulatory framework for natural gas apparently allows for the pass-through of severance taxes to final consumers in interstate markets, butthe ability of producers to fully avoid those taxes may be limited by interfuel substitution, namely competition from fuel oil. These two fuels, however, account for a relatively small share of the total tax revenue generated by energy severance taxes. For that reason, we may question the claim that these taxes generally result in a massive shift of income to energy resource-rich states. Nonetheless, coal provides the greatest potential for such an income transfer, and consequently, large energy-consuming states may continue their attempts to limit severance taxes on that particu lar fuel. Yvonne levy State Energy Severance Tax Revenues $ Billions o 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 D NATURAL GAS 1973 -C O AL OIL AND NATURAL GAS COAL Wyoming her States 1 980 / Louisiana / Other \ \Montana States \ Oklahoma Kentucky 3 SS"l::> .LSl:Il:I U018u!4seM.4eln • uo8cuO• epei\aN • o4epi !!eMeH • e!UJoJ!!t?:)• eUOZ! J'v' • e>jselV y \ill\2?Jr (0) 'I!le:> 'OJSpueJ:Iues Z;S4'ON llWH:Jd OIVd :J!)VlSOd 's'n llVW SSV1JlSHI:I @.mJr@<§@CQI :{} BANKING DATA-TWELFTHfEDERALRESERVE DISTRICT (Dollaramountsin millions) SelectedAssetsandLiabilities large CommercialBanks Loans(gross,adjusted) andinvestments* Loans(gross,adjusted) - total# Commercialandindustrial Replestate Loansto individuals Securities loans U.s.Treasury securities* Othersecurities* Demanddeposits- total# Demanddeposits- adjusted Savingsdeposits- total Timedeposits- total# Individuals,part.& corp. (Large CD's) WeeklyAverages of Daily Figures MemberBankReservePosition Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency(- ) Borrowings Netfreereserves (+ )/Netborrowed (- ) Amount Outstanding Change from 9/23/81 151,894 130,986 39,286 54,459 23,039 1,534 5,715 15,193 38,834 27,002 29,311 85,287 77,182 33,918 9/16/81 215 - 206 15 19:3 11 3 11 20 -3,092 -1,039 - 477 170 189 74 Changefrom yearago Dollar Percent - 11,012 12,021 4,708 6,206 927 497 786 219 4,339 5,530 210 19,789 20,292 8,807 Weekended Weekended 9/23/81 9/16/81 n/a n/a n/a 249 20 229 - - 7.8 10.1 13.6 12.9 3.9 47.9 12.1 1.4 10.1 17.0 0.7 30.2 35.7 35.1 Comparable year-ago period 52 136 85 * Excludes tradingaccountsecurities. # Includesitemsnotshownseparately. Editorialcommentsmaybe addressed to the editor (William Burke)or to the author. ... 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