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Economic
Letter
VOL. 13, NO. 9 • DECEMBER 2018

Reserve Adequacy Explains
Emerging-Market Sensitivity
to U.S. Monetary Policy
by J. Scott Davis, Dan Crowley and Michael Morris

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ABSTRACT: Emerging
economies that borrow in
U.S. dollars are sensitive to
U.S. monetary policy due to
changing exchange rates.
However, the marginal effect
of this sensitivity is determined
by the relative amount of
U.S. dollars held in reserve.

R

ecent depreciation of the Turkish
lira and Argentine peso have
shaken investor confidence in
emerging-market stability. Tightening U.S.
monetary policy can lead to capital outflows from emerging economies and result
in a stronger dollar as rates of return from
foreign investments become less attractive.
Turkey suffered a rapid currency devaluation of 40 percent against the dollar from
January to mid-September 2018. Similarly,
Argentina’s currency fell 53 percent over
the same period. Both countries’ expenditures have exceeded their income, and
both have issued U.S. dollar-denominated
debt to cover the difference.
The decision to borrow in dollars makes
Turkey and Argentina more sensitive to
U.S. monetary policy than countries that
use debt issued in the local currency.
Exchange rate movement becomes a key
determinant of the cost of borrowing in
foreign currency.
JPMorgan’s Corporate Emerging Market
Bond Index (CEMBI) tracks the weighted
average yield for investment-grade U.S.
dollar-denominated bonds. Chart 1
shows the CEMBI yield spread against the
10-year Treasury for Turkey, Argentina
and an aggregate of other emerging econ-

omies. A higher spread indicates greater
probable difficulty repaying debt.
Turkey has a large negative current
account balance, a measure of the net
national savings rate that includes the
balance of trade, investment income and
transfers. Turkey’s current account deficit—6 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP)—is one of the highest in the world.
Furthermore, external debt (including
government and private sector debt) totals
55 percent of GDP and is primarily denominated in foreign currency.
With its deep negative national savings
rate and high debt levels, Turkey needs
access to approximately $200 billion a year
to finance its maturing debts.1 Because the
debt is denominated in foreign currency,
the weaker Turkish lira means it costs more
in that local currency to repay the debt.
Argentina faces a similar challenge. The
country’s current account deficit totals
approximately 5 percent of GDP. Foreigncurrency-denominated debt amounts to
nearly 40 percent of GDP, making it difficult
to pay down the debt as the peso continues
to weaken.
Due to tightening U.S. monetary policy,
Turkey and Argentina face an increasingly large cost to finance their external

Economic Letter
debt and counteract negative savings.
Additionally, investors holding dollardenominated bonds require higher yields
because of the increased riskiness of lending to Turkish or Argentine public and
private sector borrowers.

Measuring Reserve Adequacy
In this context, a simple way to view
the current account is as the difference
between a country’s spending and its
income. When the current account is in
CHART

1

deficit, the imbalance must be financed by
issuing new external debt. The total stock
of external debt is the legacy of past imbalances. A country’s short-term foreign-currency-denominated external debt is debt
in a foreign currency to be repaid or rolled
over within the coming year.
In many emerging-market countries,
financing current imbalances or the maturing legacy of past imbalances requires
a stream of dollar financing. When the
Federal Reserve tightens policy and with-

CEMBI Spreads for Turkey, Argentina Widen Since Jan. 1, 2018

Basis points
1,000
800
600

Turkey
Argentina
Other emerging markets

400
200
0
-200
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Jun.

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

NOTE: The Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index (CEMBI) is calculated from U.S. dollar-denominated bonds and is
depicted as the spread above the 10-year Treasury.
SOURCES: Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Bank for International Settlements; World
Bank; Haver Analytics.

CHART

2

Capital Adequacy Affects CEMBI Spread Reaction
to Federal Funds Futures Increase

Percentage-point change in CEMBI
0.6
0.5
Break in reserve adequacy marginal
effect at 7.1% of GDP

0.4

Breakpoint model
Baseline model

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-10

-5

0
5
10
15
20
Reserve adequacy as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP)

25

30

NOTES: Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Percentage-point change in Corporate Emerging Markets
Bond Index (CEMBI) spread is in response to a 1-percentage-point change in the 12-month federal funds futures rate.
SOURCES: Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Bank for International Settlements; World
Bank; Haver Analytics.

2

draws liquidity, dollar financing arrangements become more difficult. Borrowers
in an emerging market must offer larger
amounts of the domestic currency to
obtain the same amount of dollar liquidity.
To guard against this external instability,
central banks in emerging-market economies hold reserves—liquid foreign-currency-denominated assets. These reserves
can provide foreign currency liquidity to
domestic borrowers at times when it is hard
to obtain from foreign lenders and, thus,
stabilize the value of the local currency.
Reserves are a safety net to guard against
currency instability when major advancedeconomy central banks tighten policy.
Emerging markets must decide what
reserve level is adequate to protect their
currency against swings in foreign monetary policy. Pablo Guidotti, a former
deputy finance minister in Argentina,
came to a conclusion later popularized
by former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan. In a 1999 speech to the
World Bank, Greenspan summarized the
rule stating “that countries should manage their external assets and liabilities in
such a way that they are always able to live
without new foreign borrowing for up to
one year.”2
The rule suggests that emerging-market
central banks should hold a stock of foreign currency assets equal to at least the
sum of their short-term foreign-currencydenominated debt and the current account
deficit. This leads to a simple measure of a
central bank’s reserve adequacy: foreign
exchange reserves minus short-term foreign-currency-denominated external debt
minus the current account deficit.
Regression analysis helps assess the
reserve adequacy’s effectiveness at buffering emerging markets against foreign
monetary policy changes. Daily changes
in the CEMBI spreads for a panel of 26
emerging-market economies are regressed
on: a) daily changes in 12-month federal
funds futures prices, b) a term interacting
the fed funds futures price with a country’s
reserve adequacy and c) a dummy variable
that allows the coefficient on the interaction term to change if reserve adequacy is
below a particular threshold level.3
The interaction term allows the sensitivity of a country’s CEMBI spread to changes
in expected U.S. monetary policy to vary

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • December 2018

Economic Letter
with the country’s reserve adequacy;
the dummy variable allows for that sensitivity to change if adequacy falls below a
critical level.4
With the Guidotti–Greenspan rule suggesting a safe level for reserves in emerging economies, the panel data model can
test if there is an empirically robust level of
“sufficient reserve adequacy.”
To that end, a range of possible threshold values is tested—from reserve adequacy of -10 percent of GDP to 20 percent of
GDP. The threshold value most supported is 7.1 percent of GDP. When reserve
adequacy is less than that, the sensitivity of the CEMBI spread to changes in fed
funds futures is proportional to a country’s
reserve adequacy, with the CEMBI spread
becoming more sensitive as reserve adequacy declines.
Reserve adequacy above 7.1 percent
doesn’t much affect CEMBI sensitivity to
expectations of U.S. monetary policy—
sensitivity is similar whether reserve adequacy is 9 percent or 29 percent.

Sensitivity to U.S. Monetary Policy
Chart 2 shows the estimated increase
in the CEMBI spread following a 1-percentage-point increase in 12-month fed
funds futures. The breakpoint model (red
line) indicates a diverging marginal effect
when reserve adequacy equals 7.1 percent
of GDP. Below this breakpoint, the CEMBI
spread is increasingly sensitive to U.S.
monetary policy.
Above 7.1 percent reserve adequacy,
the breakpoint model does not differ in a
statistically significant way from a baseline
model where the reserve adequacy is not
taken into account (blue line). The standard-error bands suggest that above the
7.1 percent threshold, the marginal effects
in the two models are indistinguishable.

Emerging Economy Reserve Levels
Chart 3 is a heat map depicting reserve
adequacy in 18 emerging economies from
2010 through the second quarter of 2018. A
country is a shade of blue if it is above the
7.1 percent breakpoint and a shade of red
if it is below the breakpoint, with the intensity of the color indicating how far from the
breakpoint it is.
This heat map reveals how countries
have changed over time. China, for exam-

ple, had extremely high reserve adequacy
in 2010; it has since steadily declined.
Thailand has exceedingly high reserve
adequacy for the whole period, a lasting
policy outcome of the Asian currency crisis
in the late 1990s.
Turkey and Argentina are the two countries with the lowest reserve adequacy. It
is apparent that this is not new, but rather
an enduring issue. Interestingly, other
CHART

3

countries such as India, Chile and South
Africa, all of which have experienced considerable weakness in 2018, are also below
the threshold.

Federal Reserve Loosening,Tightening
A historical event study illustrates how
tightening and loosening Federal Reserve
policy affects CEMBI spreads. Chart 4 shows
the change in the CEMBI spread for emerg-

Emerging Economy Reserve Adequacy
45% 7.1%

Thailand
Czech Republic
Russia
South Korea
Peru
Phillipines
China
Brazil
Hungary
Mexico
Poland
Indonesia
Colombia
India
Chile
South Africa
Turkey
Argentina

Reserve adequacy as a percent of GDP:

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

-10%

2017

2018

SOURCES: International Monetary Fund; Bank for International Settlements; World Bank; Haver Analytics.

CHART

4

CEMBI Spread Reacts to U.S. Monetary Policy

Basis points
20
0
-20
-40

Federal Reserve formally announces QE3

Bernanke
announces QE
tapering

Fed delays
implementation
of tapering

High reserve adequacy
Low reserve adequacy

-60
-80
-100
-120
-140
-160
-180

Expectation
of future
monetary
tightening

Monetary policy
looser than
expected

Monetary loosening
-200
Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
2013
2012

NOTE: The Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index (CEMBI) spread is calculated from U.S. dollar-denominated bonds by
JPMorgan and is the spread above the 10-year Treasury. QE refers to quantitative easing. Bernanke is former Fed Chairman
Ben Bernanke.
SOURCES: JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund; Bank for International Settlements;
World Bank; Haver Analytics.

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • December 2018

3

Economic Letter
ing economies grouped by those above
and below the 7.1 percent breakpoint from
Aug. 1, 2012, through the end of 2013. The
period is characterized by sharp changes
in expectations of U.S. monetary policy—in
both directions, loosening and tightening.
On Sept. 14, 2012, the Federal Reserve
disclosed a third round of quantitative
easing (QE3), unconventional monetary policy that attempts to lower rates
through the purchase of Treasuries and
mortgage-backed bonds. This announcement led to expectations of looser U.S.
monetary policy and a weakening dollar. CEMBI spreads in countries with low
reserve adequacy declined significantly
as their ability to pay off their debts eased,
reflecting an exchange rate more to their
favor. The spreads in countries with high
reserve adequacy also fell during this time
of U.S. monetary easing but not by nearly
as much.
Fe d e r a l R e s e r v e C h a i r m a n B e n
Bernanke hinted during congressional
testimony on May 22, 2013, that the Fed
could taper its asset purchases. His suggestion that the third round of quantitative easing would be winding down led
to expectations of monetary tightening.
Markets expected tapering to begin with
the September meeting. The CEMBI
spread increased sharply in anticipation of
tighter U.S. monetary policy and a stronger
dollar; the gap between the high- and lowreserve-adequacy countries closed.

Expectations of future monetary policy
took another turn when no tapering was
announced in September 2013. After that
Fed meeting, the fed funds futures-implied
policy rate fell to about half of what it had
been in the weeks before as investors
altered their views of how fast monetary
policy tightening would occur.
This shift in policy outlook pushed
CEMBI spreads for low-reserve-adequacy
emerging economies to separate from
their high-reserve-adequacy counterparts,
similar to their behavior after the quantitative-easing announcement.

Sensitivity and Adequacy
While Turkey and Argentina have
recently been in the headlines for currency
depreciation, an empirical model and historical analysis show that other countries
with insufficient reserve adequacy, such as
South Africa, Chile and India, will also be
sensitive to U.S. monetary tightening.
Following the 1997 East Asian currency
crisis, countries that include Thailand,
South Korea and the Philippines faced
a similar problem. In the subsequent
decades, these countries ran currentaccount surpluses and built a large stock
of foreign exchange reserves in an effort to
reduce their sensitivity to fluctuations in
the availability of foreign financing.
At-risk emerging economies can follow
this example and increase central bank
reserves or decrease short-term foreign

currency debt in order to reduce sensitivity
to U.S. monetary policy.
Davis is a research economist and advisor,
Crowley is a research analyst and Morris
is a research assistant in the Research
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.

Notes
1

“Inflation Rise Poses Challenge to Erdogan as Election

Looms,” by Laura Pitel, Financial Times, June 4, 2018.
2

“Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan,” speech by

Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, April
29, 1999, www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/1999/19990429.htm.
3

Federal funds futures are contracts allowing investors to

bet or hedge on future movement of the Federal Reserve’s
mainstay interest mechanism, the overnight bank lending
rate, known as the fed funds rate.
4

Specifically, we consider the following panel data model

using daily data on the CEMBI spread and the 12-month
fed funds futures contract. ∆CEMBIi,t=αi+β∆FFFt+γRAi,t

∆FFFt+δIRA<T RAi,t ∆FFFt+εi,t, where ∆CEMBIi,t is the daily

change in the CEMBI spread in country i, ∆FFFt is the daily
change in the 12-month fed funds futures, RAi,t is the level
of reserve adequacy in country i and I^RA<T is an indicator

variable that takes a value of 1 if reserve adequacy in country
i is less that a certain threshold T and 0 if it is above
that threshold.

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