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VOL. 12, NO. 8 • JULY 2017

DALLASFED

Economic
Letter
Impact of Macroeconomic Surprises
Changed After Zero Lower Bound
by Christoffer Koch and Julieta Yung

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ABSTRACT: Macroeconomic
surprises involving
employment and inflation—
reflecting the Fed’s attempts
to achieve its dual mandate to
promote full employment and
price stability—increased in
importance during the zerolower-bound period. Also,
market participants were more
attentive to housing market
indicators and final GDP
revisions.

T

he Federal Reserve’s Federal
Open Market Committee
meets eight times a year in
Washington to set monetary
policy. Regional Federal Reserve Banks
and the staff of the Board of Governors
produce economic forecasts for each of
these meetings. Projections are updated
based on macroeconomic data releases
during the intermeeting period.
These periods usually feature one or
two employment reports, vintage releases of gross domestic product (GDP),
inflation data such as producer and consumer prices and other macroeconomic
indicators that yield new information
about the health of the U.S. economy.
Thus, macroeconomic announcements
play an important role in updating policymakers’ and the public’s assessment of
the U.S. economy.
The conduct of monetary policy
changed substantially in the aftermath
of the global financial crisis. The Fed’s
typical pre-2009 policy instrument was
adjustment of the federal funds rate.
After the downturn, policymakers set the
federal funds rate at near zero—the zero
lower bound (ZLB)—and the Fed’s monetary policy statements about the path
of interest rates became more explicitly
linked to the anticipated evolution of
inflation and unemployment, known as
forward guidance.1

The impact of macroeconomic surprises on asset prices changed during
the ZLB—in terms of composition and
importance—domestically and internationally.2 Domestic financial markets put
a greater focus on indicators depicting
the housing sector, which had led to the
recession and inhibited the recovery.
Additionally, there was added interest
in news directly related to the Fed’s dual
mandate—to promote full employment
and price stability—such as initial jobless
claims and Consumer Price Index (CPI)
inflation.
In light of this new environment, it
is important to study how markets react
to updates on the state of the economy.
Interest rate futures provide a view of
expected domestic conditions, while
exchange rate futures offer a global
perspective on the U.S. outlook. In each
case, our analysis relies on a comparison
of intraday asset prices following U.S.
macroeconomic surprises.
The ZLB period was very different from
the previous monetary policy regimes in
terms of the nature of Fed policy communication and policy setting itself. It brought
the introduction of unconventional quantitative tools to stimulate the economy.
The tools included quantitative easing—
increasing the money supply by purchasing Treasuries and mortgage-backed
securities and the maturity-extension

Economic Letter
program, with the Federal Reserve shifting
its balance-sheet holdings of Treasuries to
longer-term debt.

Reacting to Disappointing News
The April 3, 2015, unemployment
report illustrates a reaction to disappointing news. The statement, detailing
March activity, reported that the economy added 126,000 jobs—sharply lower

than the 245,000 jobs expected in the
Bloomberg expectations survey. Payroll
figures are subject to sometimes substantial adjustment. The report included
a revision of the previous two reporting
months. With those changes, the actual
overall negative surprise grew from
119,000 to 188,000 jobs.
This development led to an increase
in Treasury note futures prices and, thus,

a decline in their implied interest rates,
as well as a depreciation of the U.S. dollar
within a very tight time interval around
the announcement (Charts 1 and 2).
Because the employment data release
was likely the only new information coming out during this very short time period, these price responses illustrate the
reaction of interest and exchange rates to
employment report surprises.

Macroeconomic Surprises
Chart

1

Treasury Futures Rise After Employment Report Disappoints

Index, 7:30 = 100

101.5

101.0

Nonfarm payroll report
(7:30 a.m. April 3, 2015)

30-Year Treasury
10-Year Treasury
5-Year Treasury
2-Year Treasury

100.5

100.0

99.5
U.S. central
time zone

99.0
0:40

2:00

3:20

4:40

6:00

7:20

8:40

10:00

NOTES: The dashed line indicates the exact time the unemployment report was released. Treasury futures prices
immediatly increased, indicating lower yields at different maturities, as disappointing news in the U.S. labor market was
announced.
SOURCES: Tick Data; Bloomberg.

Chart

2

U.S. Dollar Depreciates After Employment Report Disappoints

Index, 7:30 = 100

101.5

101.0

100.5

Nonfarm payroll report
(7:30 a.m. April 3, 2015)

Euro
Japanese yen
Australian dollar
Canadian dollar
British pound

100.0

99.5
U.S. central
time zone

99.0
0:40

2:00

3:20

4:40

6:00

7:20

8:40

10:00

NOTES: The dashed line indicates the exact time the unemployment report was released. Currency futures prices
immediatly increased, indicating a decpreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies as disappointing news in the
U.S. labor market was announced.
SOURCES: Tick Data; Bloomberg.

2

The impact of a macroeconomic
surprise can be viewed in terms of the
difference in an asset’s price after an
announcement and its expected value
prior to the actual release of information. Although it is difficult to measure
market expectations, they can be proxied
by financial instruments that are set to be
traded in the future and, thus, incorporate market expectations.
Another way to infer what markets
expect prior to a particular macroeconomic announcement is to directly ask
investors what they anticipate before the
data are published. To this end, a variety
of data aggregators and news outlets survey market participants leading up to the
release. Where significant, the difference
between the survey response and the
actual news report, or “surprise,” can be
interpreted as an update on the state of
the U.S. economy.3
The response of 10-year Treasury
futures prices and currency futures using
intraday data within a 15-minute symmetric window around the exact time
of the release of macroeconomic news
captures the market’s reaction to the
surprise. Although markets respond to a
variety of news in a given day, considering the change in asset prices 15 minutes
before and after data are made public
helps narrow down the responses to specific announcements.
The analysis requires a regression of
price changes in 10-year U.S. Treasury
note futures and currency futures on
macroeconomic surprises during two
subsamples—before the ZLB (1996–
2008) and during the ZLB (2009–16).
Foreign-exchange futures are expressed
in U.S. dollars so that an increase in the
exchange rate indicates a depreciation of
the U.S. dollar relative to a foreign currency. The surprises are normalized to

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • July 2017

Economic Letter
have a unit standard deviation, and coefficients are in basis points to make the
results comparable.

What News Matters?
Chart 3 shows the impact of 21
macroeconomic surprises and how
their characteristics changed when the
federal funds rate reached the ZLB. The
horizontal bars display the responses of
10-year Treasury futures prices to macroeconomic surprises. In general, positive
surprises tend to decrease futures prices
and, thus, most estimates are to the left
of the vertical zero line.4
Meaningful changes related to the
Fed’s dual mandate appear at the ZLB.
On the inflation side, CPI surprises have
no significant impact on asset prices
before 2009. In contrast, during the ZLB
period, a hypothetical CPI release that
comes in one standard deviation higher
than anticipated lowers the 10-year
futures price 4.7 basis points.
On the employment side, initial
jobless claims appear to become more
important; at the same time, standard
signals of labor market activity are
less definitive. To be sure, it is unclear
whether headline figures such as the
unemployment rate and nonfarm payroll growth are able to sufficiently depict
labor market imbalances.
Indeed, the Fed dropped its reference to the unemployment rate in later
forward-guidance monetary policy statements. The weaker impact from nonfarm
payroll surprises and the simultaneously released unemployment rate may
be a result of uncertainties regarding
the significance of secular demographics on labor force participation rates.5
The severity of the economic downturn
induced unprecedented movement in
measures of underemployment that are
more encompassing than the headline
unemployment rate. This also affected
headline unemployment’s potential signaling value.
The informational content of the final
readings of previous-quarter U.S. GDP
appears larger in the ZLB era. Positive
final-revision surprises of quarterly GDP
contain enough new information to move
Treasury futures prices down (and 10-year
rates up) but only during the post-2008
period. Conversely, the effect of surprises

Chart

3

10-Year Treasury Futures Respond to U.S. Macroeconomic News

Housing: Existing-home sales
Housing: Housing permits
Housing: Housing starts
Housing: New-home sales
Initial jobless claims
Nonfarm payrolls
Real GDP growth: Advance
Real GDP growth: Second
Real GDP growth: Final
Inflation: Consumer Price Index
Inflation: Producer price index
Personal income
Personal spending
Retail sales
Consumer confidence
Consumer sentiment: Preliminary
Consumer sentiment: Final
Industrial production
Durable goods orders
Factory orders
ISM manufacturing index
–30

Pre-2009
Post-2008

–25 –20 –15 –10
–5
0
Magnitude of response (basis points)

5

10

NOTES: Horizontal bars display the responses of 10-year Treasury futures prices to normalized macroeconomic surprises,
with the black spikes indicating a one-standard-error confidence band for each estimated response before (blue) and
during (orange) the zero lower bound. Positive surprises tend to decrease future prices and, thus, most estimates appear
to the left of the vertical zero line. ISM is the Institute for Supply Management.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

related to manufacturing activity such as
durable goods orders, factory orders and
industrial production weakens.
This could reflect ongoing structural
change but is more likely related to
the financial-crisis-related realization
that macroeconomic vulnerabilities
were associated with households’ balance sheets and the financial system.
Reflecting these changes, some housing
releases became more important during
the ZLB.
New- and existing-home sales retain
their relevance in both periods. However,
during the ZLB, all four housing indicators—including housing starts and the
more-leading indicator, housing permits—depressed Treasury futures prices,
implying higher future yields. The housing bust triggered the near-collapse of
the financial system in the recession and
constrained aggregate spending during
the recovery, refocusing investors’ attention on these housing-related indicators.

the euro is much more sensitive to U.S.
macroeconomic surprises before than
after the ZLB. This may reflect a shift in
the business cycle following the global
financial crisis. While the recovery in the
U.S. was well underway, the euro area
remained on its path to recovery; news
from across the Atlantic might have been
of second-order importance during the
U.S. recovery.
This was not necessarily the case for
other foreign currencies. In fact, there
is more sensitivity to U.S. surprises in
Japan’s and Canada’s currency responses
post-2008. The effects of two “flash” survey indicators, the Conference Board’s
Consumer Confidence Index and the
Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index, are softer domestically
and internationally after 2008 and, interestingly, depreciate the dollar against
the currencies of commodity exporters
Canada and Australia. Retail sales exhibit
similar behavior.

International Focus

Understanding Financial Markets

Exchange rate futures tend to be
relatively less sensitive to U.S. macroeconomic news (Chart 4).6 Interestingly,

Intraday asset price responses to
macroeconomic surprises tell us how
markets interpret the unexpected

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • July 2017

3

Economic Letter

Chart

4

Notes

Dollar/Euro Futures Less Sensitive to U.S. News Post-2008

Housing: Existing-home sales
Housing: Housing permits
Housing: Housing starts
Housing: New-home sales
Initial jobless claims
Nonfarm payrolls
Real GDP growth: Advance
Real GDP growth: Second
Real GDP growth: Final
Inflation: Consumer Price Index
Inflation: Producer price index
Personal income
Personal spending
Retail sales
Consumer confidence
Consumer sentiment: Preliminary
Consumer sentiment: Final
Industrial production
Durable goods orders
Factory orders
ISM manufacturing index

Pre-2009
Post-2008

–30 –25 –20 –15 –10 –5 0
5
10
Magnitude of response (basis points)

15

20

NOTES: Horizontal bars display the responses of U.S. dollar/euro futures prices to normalized macroeconomic surprises,
with the black spikes indicating a one-standard-error confidence band for each estimated response before (blue) and
during (orange) the zero lower bound (ZLB). During the ZLB, responses are more muted, reflecting lower sensitivity to
U.S. news. ISM is the Institute for Supply Management.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

informational content embedded in
macroeconomic data releases. This
analysis provides a snapshot of what the
markets believe to be the current state
of the economy and where it is heading
relative to other economies. Changes in
those responses hint at where markets
and policymakers perceive risks to the
current economic outlook.
Asset prices’ responses suggest a
greater focus on the housing market in
line with the vulnerabilities that led to

DALLASFED

the recession and inhibited the recovery.
They also show stronger responses to
weekly initial jobless claims and to CPI
inflation readings, consistent with the
Fed policy mandate and policymakers’
continuing commitment to attain monetary policy objectives.
Koch is a senior research economist and
Yung is a research economist in the Research Department at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.

Economic Letter

is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
The views expressed are those of the authors and
should not be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted on the condition that
the source is credited to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
Economic Letter is available on the Dallas Fed
website, www.dallasfed.org.

1
Motivated by the increased importance of macroeconomic news for the more forward-looking central bank
communication at the ZLB, “Measuring the Effect of the
Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates,” by Eric T. Swanson and John C. Williams,
American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp.
3,154–85, estimated the time-varying sensitivity of domestic yields along the yield curve to establish the extent
to which policy was effectively constrained by the ZLB.
2
A taxonomy accounting for heterogeneity in macroeconomic news effects on asset prices can be found in “Is
the Intrinsic Value of Macroeconomic News Announcements Related to Their Asset Price Impact?” by Thomas
Gilbert, Chiara Scotti, George Strasser and Clara Vega,
European Central Bank, Working Paper no. 1882, February 2016.
3
Previous research has shown that these survey-based
market expectations are similar to forecasts derived
from financial instruments built on the underlying
macroeconomic news releases. See “Macroeconomic
Derivatives: An Initial Analysis of Market-Based Macro
Forecasts, Uncertainty, and Risk,” by Refet Gürkaynak
and Justin Wolfers, in NBER International Seminar on
Macroeconomics 2005, Jeffrey Frankel and Christopher
Pissarides ed., pp. 11–50.
4
“Positive surprises” describe higher than expected
values. This is opposite for weekly initial claims for
unemployment. The interpretation of inflation surprises
is more ambiguous because higher-than-expected inflation could be considered good or bad depending on the
inflation’s level relative to the target.
5
“Key Secular Trends and Implications for Monetary
Policy,” speech by Robert S. Kaplan, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Aug. 2, 2016, www.dallasfed.org/news/
speeches/kaplan/2016/rsk160802.aspx.
6
These results are in line with the literature that has
previously found that the link between macroeconomic
news and bond markets is simpler and stronger than with
foreign exchange markets.

Mine Yücel, Senior Vice President and Director of Research
Jim Dolmas, Executive Editor
Michael Weiss, Editor
Kathy Thacker, Associate Editor
Ellah Piña, Graphic Designer

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