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Vol. 3, No. 4
APRIL 2008­­

EconomicLetter
Insights from the

F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B a n k o f Da l l as

Editor’s note: When it
comes to the U.S. financial
markets, Richard Fisher has,
so to speak, been in the belly
of the beast. Before becoming
Dallas Fed president in 2005,
his career included success
in the private sector—first
in private banking at Brown
Brothers Harriman & Co.,
then running his own
investment firms and
serving on corporate boards.
Fisher’s experience as
market operator and Fed
official gives him a broad
perspective on the financial
stresses and strains from the
excesses in mortgage lending.
We hope the following
excerpts from his speeches
will help our readers better
understand recent events and
the Fed’s response to them.
—Richard Alm

Financial Market Tremors:
Causes and Responses
by Richard W. Fisher
The roots of the current crisis are not unlike those of earlier bubbles.
They originated in the seductive power of price escalation — of a “whole lot of
excess”— and the “egocentricity of the present,” which led some to believe we
had entered a “new era.” We either didn’t notice this elaborate conceit or failed
to deal with it.
But it was there. Many coastal areas of the U.S. were beginning to see
20 to 30 percent year-over-year increases in house prices, some even as high as
30 to 40 percent. Subprime mortgage borrowing, or lending to less creditworthy
individuals by lenders who were eager to finance a “sure thing,” exploded.
The good news is that levels of homeownership among the U.S. population reached unprecedented heights, extending the American dream to more

people than before. The bad news is
that the methods used to do so were
not sustainable.

Things began to
unravel once it
became apparent that
the housing bubble
could not
expand forever.

On financial markets. We saw
a wave of innovative mortgage products during the housing boom. Indeed,
there would have been no other way
for many borrowers to have procured
financing without these new mortgage
products.
These innovations in financing
took two forms. First, credit-scoring
models enabled lenders to better
sort and price mortgages made to
nonprime borrowers. The second set
of innovations allowed these loans to
be funded and sold to a new class of
investors.
While traditional mortgages had
long been securitized and sold through
government-sponsored enterprises
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
the securitization market ushered in
new players from the private sector
who would hold nonprime mortgages
that could not meet the standards of
Fannie and Freddie and that banks
would generally not hold in portfolios.
These so-called structured credit
products became all the rage with
investors. These new and complex
securities sliced and diced risk into
different tranches. It was thought that
the collateralized debt obligations and
collateralized loan obligations could
be hedged with credit default swaps to
make them seem almost risk free.
On the flash point. Like exotic
foods, consumption of new risk products can lead to indigestion, and even
allergic reactions. Lately, we have
witnessed many allergic reactions — in
the form of losses and setbacks —
especially among money center banks
and other financial institutions.
What began as isolated pockets
of trouble in the U.S. housing market
soon spread to global markets in mortgage-backed securities, where many
of the exotic home mortgage products
were gobbled up. Soon it became
obvious that financial market partici-

EconomicLetter 2

F ederal Re serve Bank of Da ll as

pants were gagging on the many types
of structured credit products — not just
those backed by mortgages — they
were being served.
As we approached the summer
of 2007, this gag reflex reached a pinnacle; the larger banks found it difficult, if not impossible, to sell to others
many types of loans; and the interbank
lending market experienced intense
liquidity pressures as banks became
fearful of lending to each other for
longer than overnight.
We’ve seen yet another historical cycle of excess risk-taking—in this
case, concentrated in financial innovations in credit and structured finance
served up and consumed without
regard for the downside — followed by
extreme risk aversion.
This round of speculation and
financial amnesia seems to have been
driven by a combination of factors,
including an over-reliance on statistical
models and rating agencies, excessive liquidity and perverse incentives compounded by an excess of
complacency.
On spreading troubles. Things
began to unravel once it became
apparent that the housing bubble could
not expand forever. Losses began to
be recorded on traditional mortgagebacked securities, with the newer types
of structured finance products used to
securitize the newer types of mortgage
lending being especially hard hit.
It didn’t stop there. Banks in
other countries that had invested in
the too-good-to-be-true U.S. housing
market through these products began
to record large losses. Even some that
weren’t directly involved in the U.S.
housing sector or these products still
felt the repercussions; who could have
imagined that house price declines in
the U.S. would contribute to a bank
run in England?
All types of structured credit
products soon came under suspicion.
Issuance of asset-backed commercial
paper declined sharply beginning last
summer. Although some of that paper

was backed by mortgages, not all of
it was. But that didn’t seem to matter.
The market for auction rate municipal bonds was also hit, as doubts
spread regarding the financial health
of the misnamed “monoline” insurers.
Investment banks also experienced
abnormal difficulties in the usually routine task of syndicating their leveraged
loans in the private equity sphere,
which is fairly remote from the mortgage industry.
The banking industry was smack
in the middle of this maelstrom. This
sector is of obvious importance to the
Federal Reserve. Not surprisingly, large
losses have been recorded at some of
the largest banks. Their capital ratios
are also under pressure from the fallout in the securitization markets.
The difficulty in selling loans and
the increase in lending to borrowers
who were shut out of the securitization markets have increased banks’
exposure. In addition, some banks that
offered off-balance-sheet commitments
to their structured investment vehicles,
or SIVs, have found themselves having
to move these assets onto their balance sheets.
All this asset on-boarding has
pressured capital ratios. Combine
these pressures with the difficulty of
establishing values for structured credit
products in seized-up markets and it is
no surprise that term interbank lending
thinned out considerably.
On monitoring lapses. Seasoned
investors and creditors know that
incomplete information — or information asymmetry, in technical jargon—
is a fact of life in financial markets.
In fact, the presence of information
asymmetries goes a long way toward
explaining the structure of financial
markets and institutions. In our system, we have implemented a process
of “delegated monitoring” to address
these asymmetries.
Let me explain what I mean
by “delegated monitoring.” Because
an individual saver would be hardpressed to monitor the many potential

Conducting Monetary Policy
As we sat down to the FOMC table, we were faced with a situation that,
drawing on my Naval Academy days, I would liken to a ship navigating a
narrow passage between two shorelines.
On one shore, we have an otherwise healthy economy weakened to
an unknown degree by a correction to excessive speculation in its housing
sector and related financial instruments. On the price front, the economy
has been experiencing mitigation in inflationary tendencies, thanks, I believe,
to prudent monetary policy — albeit against a background of an energetic
global economy that continues to create upward price pressures on all
sorts of commodities, on transportation costs and even on what was once
assumed to be an endless supply of cheap imports from China.
If we had maintained the anti-inflationary course we had been following
for more than 14 months by holding the fed funds rate at 5.25 percent, I
believe we would have risked oversteering our course and potentially run
afoul of the shoals of unacceptably slow economic growth.
Those of you who know me are aware that I am a compulsive worrier
about inflation — I do not know any central banker in the world worth his or
her salt who is not — because I see inflation as the bête noire, or bugbear,
of any successful economy. Recent trends in inflationary impulses and
expectations, however, appeared to me to provide some wiggle room to
adjust our tiller and steer a more growth-oriented course.
Looking to the other shoreline, we were confronting the rocky
outcropping that economists call moral hazard. From these rocks, one
could hear the siren call of market operators and institutions that had made
imprudent decisions and now hoped the Fed would rescue them with easy
money. Overcorrecting our course with too aggressive a shift in the fed
funds tiller would have, I believe, undermined the discipline that market
forces impose upon wayward financial institutions and investors.
Moral hazard is a dangerous predicament for any central bank. Yet we
had an unsettled money market riddled with angst — a money market that, in
my view, was going into a defensive crouch in which even the best and most
careful depository institutions and market operators feared that the positions
taken by their less prudent brethren may come up a cropper and seize up the
entire financial system.
Those were the conditions on the financial seas when we met
September 18. As with any navigator of turbulent seas, the FOMC relies on
an impressive array of instruments; we are blessed with a rich complement
of superb economists and a fulsome dashboard of databases. But in the
end, no models or formulas substitute for judgment in making monetary
policy. The course of monetary policy is a matter of discernment — akin to
the decisions made by a ship captain who knows that steering through a
turbulent sea requires drawing on more than just charts and computerized
navigation equipment.
Drawing upon its best judgment, the committee chose to navigate the
passage with a 50-basis-point reduction in base rates, following its Aug. 17
action to reduce the spread between the discount rate and the federal funds
rate.
Central banking is not and never should be a popularity contest. It is
a serious duty undertaken by earnest public servants for the greatest good
of the nation. Thus, FOMC members will continue taking in-depth soundings
on the progress of the economy and the financial markets as we evaluate the
impact of the need for course corrections. Should further correction—either
to port or to starboard — be needed to stay on the course toward sustainable,
noninflationary growth over time, we will make it.

F ederal Reserve Bank of Da ll as	

3 EconomicLetter

Listening to Washington Irving
There is nothing “unprecedented” about the situation we find
ourselves in. To illustrate the point, I want to read a passage from
Washington Irving’s 1819 essay on the Mississippi Bubble. For those
of you who think the recent housing bubble and the ensuing financial
imbroglio are “unprecedented,” listen to these words penned almost 200
years ago:
		
Every now and then the world is visited by one of these
delusive seasons, when the ‘credit system’…expands to full
luxuriance: everybody trusts everybody; a bad debt is a thing
unheard of; the broad way to certain and sudden wealth lies plain
and open…. Banks…become so many mints to coin words into
cash; and as the supply of words is inexhaustible, it may readily
be supposed what a vast amount of promissory capital is soon in
circulation…. Nothing is heard but gigantic operations in trade;
great purchases and sales of real property, and immense sums
made at every transfer. All, to be sure, as yet exists in promise;
but the believer in promises calculates the aggregate as solid
capital….
		
Now is the time for speculative and dreaming or designing
men. They relate their dreams and projects to the ignorant and
credulous, [and] dazzle them with golden visions…. The example
of one stimulates another; speculation rises on speculation;
bubble rises on bubble…. No ‘operation’ is thought worthy of
attention, that does not double or treble the investment…. Could
this delusion always last, the life of a merchant would indeed be
a golden dream; but it is as short as it is brilliant.1
And to think, Washington Irving had never met a subprime
mortgage, or a CDO, a CLO, an SIV or a credit default swap! It is
indeed true that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat
it. That is the bad news. Financiers, “dazzle[ing] the credulous,”
including regulators, repeated history in spades, despite their claim
to unprecedentedly clever and new risk-management tools and
mathematical sophistication. It was as short as it was momentarily
“brilliant.”
But that is done, and now we must do what we can to remedy the
situation. One thing, however, is clear. The answer, to be curt, is not to
compound the bad by repeating the oft-prescribed remedy of inflating
our way out of our predicament with a wing-and-a-prayer promise that
it can always be reined in later, as some public commentators have
suggested. It is for this reason that I have maintained a strong reluctance
to further general monetary accommodation and the FOMC as a group
has stressed vigilence on inflation. At the same time, I have been an
advocate of using our various discount window facilities, within reason,
to bridge the financial system’s structural problems as the credit markets
correct themselves and run the long course of contrition.
1
Washington Irving, “A Time of Unexampled Prosperity,” The Crayon Papers: The
Great Mississippi Bubble (1819–1820).

EconomicLetter 4

F ederal Re serve Bank of Da ll as

borrowers to whom they could lend,
they have delegated that monitoring
role to their bank, which then is in
charge of keeping tabs on borrowers. In the U.S., where the safety of
deposits at most banks is federally
guaranteed, regulators are a delegated
monitor, loosely speaking, watching
over banks on behalf of their collective depositors.
The regulators also are not above
delegating some work. Rather than
attempting to monitor the entire universe of financial institutions, U.S.
regulators rely heavily on a core group
of very large money center banks with
significant exposures, expecting them
to act as delegated monitors, disciplining the remaining players in the financial system through effective controls
on counterparty risk by assessing and
limiting the risk of other banks, hedge
funds and private equity firms. And
finally, regulators and investors alike
have come to depend on ratings agencies to assess and monitor firms and
securities on their behalf.
All these complex monitoring
arrangements are motivated, at least
in part, by the fact that information is
costly. Yet it seems to me that a lot
of our recent problems can be attributed to breakdowns in this chain of
delegated monitoring. To this end, the
secretary of the Treasury has put forward recommendations to modernize
and clarify the chain of command of
delegated monitoring. We are studying
the recommendations he has made—as
is the Congress and others —and will
contemplate them dispassionately over
time.
On the Fed’s response. The
Federal Reserve is doing its level best
to facilitate the process of price discovery and adjustment from a period
of excess in a manner that restores
the efficacy of the financial system.
Even as we have been cutting
the fed funds rate — even as we
have been opening the monetary
spigot — interest rates for private sector borrowers have not fallen cor-

respondingly, and rates for some
borrowers have increased. To address
this problem, we have created some
new facilities that should provide a
liquidity bridge over the currently
dysfunctional system while the marketplace and regulators — ourselves
included — go about restoring the system’s plumbing.
The term auction facility —
known by its acronym, TAF — was
introduced in December as an entirely new approach to funding problems
at banks. Those who are eligible for
primary credit at the Fed’s traditional
discount window can now bid at
bimonthly auctions for term funds.
So far, the auctions have been wellsubscribed and term funding pressures abated after the introduction of
the TAF.
The term securities lending
facility we announced last month
expands the Fed’s securities lending
program. Securities will now be made
available through an auction process
with an expanded array of collateral
on a weekly basis for a term of 28
days. We also set up a primary dealer
credit facility, an overnight lending
facility that provides funding to primary dealers in exchange for a range
of eligible collateral.
And, at the request of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the Board of Governors of the Fed
approved a loan to J. P. Morgan so
that that bank might digest the exposure that many counterparties had
to Bear Stearns, without rewarding
Bear Stearns shareholders for the
imprudent risks assumed by their
management.
On the Fed’s goals. The objective of all this activity is to provide a
bridge for the financial system while it
transitions from a period of indiscriminate excess and gets back to normalcy.
I do not believe the Fed should be, or
is, “bailing out” any particular institution. Nor do I personally believe that
any institution in and of itself is “too
big to fail.”

But I do believe that we must
have a financial system that is in
working order. We must have a system where the chain of delegated
monitors operates smoothly and
efficiently. We must have a system
where the financial pipes and sprinkler heads that nourish capitalism
sustain the fertile lawn that is the
American economy. It is the Fed’s
duty as lender of last resort to lead
the way to restoring the efficacy of
the financial system.
The Fed has made some tough
judgment calls lately, and, having
been party to making those calls, I
can assure you they certainly were not
made lightly. In principle, we know
that the market should decide the
winners and losers, who survives and
who fails. I am a big fan of Winston
Churchill. “It is always more easy to
discover and proclaim general principles than to apply them,” Churchill
said. I now know full well what he
meant.
Looking to the future, the emerging discussion on new regulations and
a new supervisory framework should
proceed, but regulations by themselves
cannot replace good judgment by individual investors or bankers or financiers, and certainly by policymakers.
Policymakers need to remain
vigilant in seeking the right balance
between prudent and indiscriminate
risk taking. But the elimination of
risk — and the consequences of incurring risk — can never be the goal of
any policymaker in a capitalist system.
In building the bridge to restore financial order and efficiency, my primary
interest is to do the minimum necessary to get the job done. And no more.

Regulations by
themselves cannot
replace good judgment
by individual investors
or bankers or financiers,
and certainly by
policymakers.

On the historical perspective.
In assessing the situation, don’t let anyone convince you that we’ve entered
a “new era.” The details may be different, but we’ve been here before. Allow
me to temper the ego of the present
by recalling the not-too-distant past
and the events that happened right
here in Texas.

F ederal Reserve Bank of Da ll as	

5 EconomicLetter

Dallas Fed Chief Rejects Japan Analogy
Comparisons between the U.S. today and Japan in the 1990s are
misleading and could lead to the wrong conclusions for economic policy,
Richard Fisher, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has told
the Financial Times.
Mr. Fisher, an inflation hawk, said: “To say we are falling into the Japan
trap, that we are like Japan was in the 1990s, is in my view very misleading.
It would be a mistake for us to do now what we advised them to do back
then.”
The Dallas Fed president, who spent much of the 1990s in Japan as a
hedge fund manager and later as co-chairman of the U.S.–Japan commission
on deregulation, said the microeconomic foundations of the two economies
were completely different.
“You are not even comparing apples with oranges,” he said. “These are
totally different societies, different economies, different political systems.”
His comments, in an interview, challenge the assertion that Japan in
the 1990s offers a useful template as to what could happen to the U.S. as a
result of the house price bust.
A number of experts — in particular in Japan — believe the parallels are
close enough that the U.S. should implement the kind of policies it pressed
Japan to deploy then, including the use of public funds to recapitalise the
banking system.
Yoshimi Watanabe, minister for financial policy and administrative
reform, told the FT recently that “given Japan’s lesson, public fund injection
is unavoidable.”
However, Mr. Fisher said that while there were superficial similarities
between the two episodes — both of which involve sharp declines in asset
prices — the “dramatic differences between our societies and our economies”
meant different policy actions were required.
Mr. Fisher said “our society and our economy are enormously flexible.
Theirs were not.” He said the financial systems were “totally different” —
with Japan then dominated by banks and the state-owned postal savings
system, and the U.S. today dominated by securitised financial markets.
Moreover, Japan was practically a “command economy” with universal
acceptance that the government should play a “highly intrusive” role in the
private sector, Mr. Fisher said.
Because of the differences between the economies, he maintained,
injection of public funds into U.S. banks was “less necessary than it was in
the case of Japan.”
The Dallas Fed chief said the U.S. had only started pushing for
recapitalisation of Japan’s banking system after Japan had remained in
stagnation for years after the original stock market and real estate crash—
and was at risk of deepening deflation.
He said that this parallel was “not applicable” to the U.S. today.
He added: “We are adjusting much more quickly. We are going through
the price discovery process. It is enormously painful but it is happening.”
— Krishna Guha
Reprinted with permission from
the Financial Times, April 6, 2008

In the 1980s, the euphoria of oil
prices around $100 a barrel in today’s
dollars led to a frenzy of lending
activity in Texas. At least I think that’s
what any reasonable observer would
call the annual growth rate of business loans of over 40 percent at Texas
banks and annual growth in commercial real estate lending of almost 50
percent that we saw in the early part
of that decade.
Booking assets at such a rapid
clip has a seductive power. My favorite line from the musical “Evita” is
when she belts out, “All I want is a
whole lot of excess!” Well, we certainly pursued excess here in the
1980s. In pursuit of a seemingly sure
thing, more than 550 new banks were
chartered in Texas from 1980 through
1985.
This made for a volatile brew,
combining dramatic rates of growth
in activity with a dramatic expansion
of the number of players with limited
experience in knowing what to do
when things go wrong. The assumption of permanently high, or permanently rising, prices in an asset class—
in this case, oil — invariably leads to
regrettable decisions.
You recall what ensued. Real oil
prices began to fall, contributing to an
economic slowdown in the region’s
most energy-sensitive areas, such as
Houston. The regional economy held
its own for a while, propelled by a
red-hot commercial real estate sector.
The state economy suffered a severe
decline, however, when oil collapsed
to the current equivalent of around
$22 per barrel by mid-1986. Bank and
thrift failures reached a frightful magnitude. More than 800 financial institutions went out of business in Texas
during the 1980s and into the early
1990s. Nine of the 10 largest banking
organizations based in Texas didn’t
make it.
On booms and busts. Ned
Gramlich, a much-revered and very
wise former Fed governor who, sadly,
succumbed to leukemia in September,

EconomicLetter 6

F ederal Re serve Bank of Da ll as

reminded us that America’s economic
progress has been punctuated with
booms and busts. The 19th century
had its canal, railroad and mineral
booms. The 20th century had its rushes of financial innovation and new
technology.
Each boom was followed by a
collapse when prices could no longer
keep up. “When the dust clears,”
Gramlich wrote, “there is financial
carnage, many investors learning to
be more careful next time, but there
are often the fruits of the boom still
around to benefit productivity…. The
canals and railroads are still there and
functional, the minerals are discovered
and in use, the financing innovations
stay and we still have the Internet and
all its capabilities.” The fruits of the
subprime market boom, he reminded
us, are the millions of low-income and
minority borrowers who now own
their own homes and are successfully
making their payments and building
equity for the future.
Keep this in mind as the housing
market corrects and the new financial
instruments spawned by the housing
boom and turbocharged financial technology continue seeking more rational
price levels—levels that will be determined not by ersatz valuation models
and unsustainable return assumptions,
but by the market’s discipline in equilibrating supply and demand. A great
many families who would never have
had access to the ultimate fruit of the
American harvest—homeownership—
were able to achieve that dream
because of the housing boom.
And what about the “bust” side
of the equation, what Gramlich
referred to as the “financial carnage”?
I managed a hedge fund for 10 years
before selling my interests in 1997,
as I wound up a banking and assetmanagement career that had started
in 1975. I know from experience that
markets are manic-depressive, subject to enormous mood swings. They
overshoot not only on the upside in
periods of enthusiasm but also on the
downside when reality sets in.

On the nature of risk. We must
not forget that prudent risk taking is
the lifeblood of capitalism, especially
in the American form of capitalism
where we are constantly replacing the
old with the new, and the familiar with
the new and the innovative. If we had
not taken risks, we would never have
created from scratch the $14 trillion
U.S. economy.
The necessity of risk taking as a
pillar of market capitalism has also given rise to agents to service it. Insurers
and banks are two such agents, as
are investment banks, money managers, hedge funds and other financial
intermediaries that provide the means
to assess, package and distribute risk.
In the old days, their job was fairly
straightforward.
The agents packaged straight-up
risk instruments like letters of credit,
bankers’ acceptances, commercial
paper, simple loans and stocks, life
and property insurance and fixed-rate
mortgages.
More recently, with the aid of
technology and computational power
that can assess probabilities at lightning speeds, the menu of risk instruments expanded dramatically. Financial
intermediaries began offering exotic
products to satisfy almost any risk
taker’s needs anywhere in the world at
any time.
Hunger for the new risk products
was stimulated by a lengthy period
of abnormally low interest rates and
the normal human instinct to look for
ever-higher yields when the returns
on orthodox financial instruments, like
U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds or
bank CDs, become ho-hum.
On a possible regulatory
response. My guess is that a great
deal of the potential dislocation resulting from corrective reactions to the
subprime boom will be resolved by
regulatory initiatives rather than by
monetary policy. Yet it is important to
remember that regulatory reforms are
like a vaccine—better at preventing
sickness than at curing it. Much of the

F ederal Reserve Bank of Da ll as	

We must not forget
that prudent risk
taking is the lifeblood
of capitalism.

solution for the current pathology lies
in the curative workings of the financial markets. I suspect the markets will
be unsparing in their treatment of the
most egregious of those who engaged
in risky financial behavior. There is
little that regulation can or should do
to interfere with letting that treatment
run its course.
Any new regulations that might
now be crafted to prevent future recurrences must be well thought out, for
two reasons. First, financial institutions will quickly adapt to defeat any
regulation that is poorly designed,
morphing into new, vaccine-resistant
strains. Second, heavy-handed regula-

7 EconomicLetter

EconomicLetter

tions are sometimes worse than the
disease against which they are meant
to protect. I would be wary of any
regulatory initiatives that interfere with
market discipline and attempts to protect risk takers from the consequences
of bad decisions for fear of creating
a moral hazard that might endanger
the long-term health of our economic
and financial system simply to provide
momentary relief.
On the danger of inflation. Our
job is not to bail out imprudent decisionmakers or errant bankers, nor is it
to directly support the stock market or
to somehow make whole those money
managers, financial engineers and real
estate speculators who got it wrong.
And it most definitely is not to err on
the side of Wall Street at the expense
of Main Street.
In fact, to benefit Main Street, we
have a duty to maintain a financial system that enables American capitalism
to do its magic.
In setting broader monetary policy
and the fed funds target rate, the Fed
operates under a dual mandate. We
are charged by Congress with creating
the monetary conditions for sustainable, noninflationary employment
growth. Put more simply, our mandate
is to grow employment and to contain
inflation. Unstable prices are incompatible with sustainable job growth. Some
critics worry that we have forgotten
that axiom. We haven’t.
In discharging our dual mandate,
we must be mindful that short-term
fixes often lead to long-term problems.
The Fed occupies a unique place in
the pantheon of government institutions. It was deliberately designed to
be calm and steady, untainted by the
passion of the moment and immune
to political exigency and influence.
Because monetary policy’s effects
spread into the economy slowly and
accumulate over time, having an itchy
trigger finger with monetary policy
risks shooting everyone in the foot.

Our policy mandate is discharged with
careful and deliberate aim.
Fisher is president and chief executive
officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Notes
Excerpts have been culled with minor editing
from the following speeches:

is published monthly
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views
expressed are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the
Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted on the condition that
the source is credited and a copy is provided to the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Economic Letter is available free of charge
by writing the Public Affairs Department, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX
75265-5906; by fax at 214-922-5268; or by telephone
at 214-922-5254. This publication is available on the
Dallas Fed website, www.dallasfed.org.

“The U.S., Mexican and Border Economies,”
remarks before a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Community Luncheon, Laredo, Texas, Sept. 10,
2007.
“You Earn What You Learn,” delivered to the
North Dallas Chamber of Commerce Seventh
Annual Real Estate Symposium, Dallas, Sept. 24,
2007.
“Challenges for Monetary Policy in a Globalized
Economy,” remarks before the Global
Interdependence Center, Philadelphia, Jan. 17,
2008.
“The Egocentricity of the Present (Prefaced by
the Tale of Ruth and Emma),” remarks before
a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Community

Richard W. Fisher
President and Chief Executive Officer
Helen E. Holcomb
First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

Forum, San Antonio, April 9, 2008.

Harvey Rosenblum
Executive Vice President and Director of Research

“Selling Our Services to the World (With an Ode

W. Michael Cox
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist

to Chicago),” remarks before the Chicago Council
on Global Affairs, Chicago, April 17, 2008.
The full speeches can be found at
www.dallasfed.org.

Robert D. Hankins
Senior Vice President, Banking Supervision
Executive Editor
W. Michael Cox
Editor
Richard Alm
Associate Editor
Jennifer Afflerbach
Graphic Designer
Ellah Piña

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
2200 N. Pearl St.
Dallas, TX 75201