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Vol. 8, No. 3 • June 2013­­

DALLASFED

Economic
Letter
A Balanced-Growth View of Men’s
and Women’s Unbalanced
Labor Market Recoveries
by Carlos E.J.M. Zarazaga

Correctly gauging
the output gap is
particularly difficult
because an economy’s
potential output is not
directly observable.

T

he difference between the
actual and potential output of
an economy—widely known as
the output gap—is so critical
to central bank policy that scholars and
policymakers devote a great deal of time
and effort to estimating it and, accordingly, deciding how much to adjust various
monetary instruments. Correctly gauging
the output gap is particularly difficult
because an economy’s potential output is
not directly observable.
The gap is sometimes derived from
theoretic relationships between economic
variables. For example, final output is the
result of combining primary inputs—capital and labor—with a given technology.1
The Federal Reserve’s Open Market
Committee, which sets U.S. monetary
policy, has said employment conditions
will govern its decisions over the near
future, renewing attention on the labor
input component of the output gap.
Thus, determining how far labor
deployment for men and for women has
deviated from normal becomes especially important. This is a task fraught with
measurement problems and potentially
controversial methodological decisions.
Balanced-growth theory—that key macroeconomic ratios tend over the long
term toward constant values—provides

a well-established analytical framework
from which to start thinking about how
to accomplish the task. An indicator of
labor input dictated by that theory shows
sharply deteriorating conditions for both
genders during the Great Recession and
a subsequent, albeit slow, improvement
for men. Similar signs of an upturn are
not obvious in the analogous indicator for
women.
This unbalanced recovery pattern is
not, however, an anomaly that necessarily needs to be corrected: Past dynamics
of the same balanced-growth labor-input
indicator suggest that it may, at least in
part, be the result of the unavoidable
reversal of extraordinarily favorable labor
market conditions for women in the years
prior to the Great Recession.

Labor Market Indicator
Nicholas Kaldor, a leading postwar
Cambridge University economist, postulated six “facts” about economic growth,
among them that labor productivity and
capital grow at a sustained rate, that the
ratio of capital to output has become
stable over time, and that payments for
capital and labor services each make up a
fairly stable share of national income.
More generally, macroeconomic variables of actual economies tend to grow

Economic Letter
at an overall stable “balanced-growth
rate”—output, consumption and investment can occasionally expand at different rates, but over time, they converge.
Moreover, this balanced-growth dynamic
implies that in the long run, the ratios
between these variables tend to fluctuate
around constant values.2
The balanced-growth implication
also applies to the ratio between the total
hours that the working-age population
allocates to work and the total available
hours the same population could allocate
to work. More specifically, this alternative
measure of labor-input utilization is the
number of people at work times the average hours they work in a given period;
that product is divided by the available
discretionary time that the working-age
population (16 and over) could have allocated to work during that same period.3
Discretionary time—the time each
working-age member of the population
can dedicate to activities of their own
choosing—is roughly 100 hours a week.
The commute to and from work, the
physiological need to sleep, visits to the
doctor and other personal care use up the
remaining 68 hours, on average, in a week.
The ratio’s denominator (available discretionary time) takes into
account demographic growth. Thus, an
unchanged ratio from one period to the

Labor-input utilization
values above the
balanced-growth
benchmark value
are an indication of
strong labor markets,
much as above-trend
capacity-utilization
rates are typically
associated with
favorable conditions in
the industrial sector.

Chart

1

Labor Input Indicator for Men Rebounding

Fraction of available time spent at work
.150

Male Labor Indicator Rebound

Recession

.145
Long-run benchmark

.140

9.9%
gap

.135
13%
gap

.130
.125

Current pace of
improvement
would return
male labor-input
utilization to
benchmark by 2021

.120
.115
.110

’77

’80

’85

’90

’95

’00

’05

’10

’15

’20

’23

NOTES: Time period reflects Bureau of Labor Statistics availability of applicable employment data by gender. Data on hours
at work are unavailable between 1993 and 2000 and were estimated by linear interpolation. Because hours at work fluctuate
around a relatively narrow band in the short and medium term, the interpolation is unlikely to have introduced quantitatively
significant differences between the resulting labor input indicator and the one that would have been obtained if the missing
data had been available.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Defense.

2

next doesn’t mean that job growth was
nil. Rather, it implies that hours worked
grew by just enough to absorb the growth
of the working-age population.4
Importantly, balanced-growth theory
predicts that the ratio should stabilize
around a well-defined value over time.
The ratio’s numerator—total hours
worked—should grow on average at the
same rate as the denominator, leaving the
ratio fluctuating cyclically up and down
around a trendless, flat line.
Because this ratio measures the extent
to which total hours available to work are
actually used for that purpose, it can be
interpreted as an indicator of the utilization rate of “installed labor-input capacity.” It is analogous to installed capacityutilization rate indicators commonly used
to assess industrial sector conditions and
can serve a similar purpose: to monitor
labor market conditions. Labor-input
utilization values above the balancedgrowth benchmark value are an indication of strong labor markets, much as
above-trend capacity-utilization rates are
typically associated with favorable conditions in the industrial sector. The opposite
also holds when labor-input utilization
is below its balanced-growth benchmark
value.
Although the balanced-growth
implications for the labor-input utilization indicator apply only to the overall
population, with certain reasonable
assumptions, they can be extended to
gauge U.S. labor market conditions for
men and for women separately.

From 1977 through the Great
Recession, working-age men’s time on
the job accounted for about 14 percent
of the total hours available to the entire
working-age population (Chart 1).5 The
consistency of this proportion over time
is exactly what balanced-growth theory
predicts. Given the agreement of theory
and evidence, it seems safe to assume
that the dotted black line in the chart
identifies average or normal market conditions for men in the U.S.
Using this benchmark, the labor
market for men deteriorated sharply during the Great Recession. At the trough,
men’s contribution to labor-input utilization declined 13 percent below the

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • June 2013

Economic Letter
gender’s benchmark. Almost four years
later, the situation has improved but at
a pace unlikely to restore labor market
conditions for men any time soon to the
benchmark level observed immediately
before the Great Recession.

Chart

2

Labor Input Indicator for Women Is Little Changed

Fraction of available time spent at work
.110

Recession

.105

Female Labor Input Flat
Unlike what occurred with men, the
fraction of potentially available hours that
women actually worked rose steadily until
the end of the 20th century (Chart 2). This
upward drift reflects a massive incorporation of female workers into the labor force
beginning around World War II.
This process eventually had to end
once the majority of working-age women
had entered the labor force. More than 10
years have passed since the female laborinput measure peaked in second quarter
2000, perhaps indicating that this longlasting, but ultimately temporary, source
of labor market strength had played out by
the dawn of the 21st century.6 The apparent loss of dynamism of this labor market
indicator also may have anticipated that
women’s contribution to labor-input
utilization was about to stabilize around
a well-defined value, consistent with the
predictions of balanced-growth theory.
There still isn’t a clear indication of
what that value is—no one level emerges
that’s as distinctive as the 14 percent
benchmark for men. There is, however,
a hint in Chart 2 of the range of values
in which that benchmark value could
lie. It is bracketed by the average values
observed during two periods of relative
stability for the female labor-market indicator: the seven years immediately before
the most recent recession, and the four
years that have passed since the trough of
that downturn.
The higher value of about 0.101 (10.1
percent) associated with the first of those
two periods is depicted by the red dotted line in Chart 2. It would lead to the
conclusion that labor market conditions
for women have been rather poor since
the Great Recession began. The 8 percent
labor-input gap for women, from the relatively high benchmark to the trough of
the contraction, isn’t as severe as the 13
percent gap for men. Even so, conditions
for women hadn’t improved much by first
quarter 2013, in contrast to the modest
gains for men.

2000–07 average

.100

2013:Q1
no gap?

8% gap?

.095

2009:Q3–2013:Q1
average

.090
.085
.080
.075
.070

’77

’80

’85

’90

’95

’00

’05

’10

’15

’19

NOTES: Time period reflects Bureau of Labor Statistics availability of applicable employment data by gender. Data on hours
at work are unavailable between 1993 and 2000 and were estimated by linear interpolation. Because hours at work fluctuate
around a relatively narrow band in the short and medium term, the interpolation is unlikely to have introduced quantitatively
significant differences between the resulting labor input indicator and the one that would have been obtained if the missing
data had been available.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Chart

3

Postcrisis Education Jobs Fall for Women, Stabilize for Men

Thousands

Thousands

4,400

2008:Q3
Peak in local government
education employment

4,200

9,600

9,200

Employment in
education: women

4,000

8,800

3,800

8,400

3,600

3,400

8,000

Employment in
education: men

’01

’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

’08

’09

’10

’11

’12

7,600

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

If the normal conditions are identified
instead by the lower hypothetical value of
about 0.094 (9.4 percent)—the blue dotted
line in Chart 2—the labor market for women in the first quarter approached what
could be considered the benchmark level.
This assessment may seem implausible
in light of the indicator’s high levels in the
decade prior to the most recent recession.
That exceptionally good performance,
however, may be unsustainable because
of a possible link between the booming
housing market during those years and

the labor market for women. The local
government property taxes that largely
finance public education rose during the
housing boom years and fed an increase
in the number of teachers; the opposite
occurred during the recession. Women
hold a significant proportion of teaching
positions, well above their roughly 50 percent share of the working-age population,
and unavoidably were hurt the most amid
what became a structural change in local
government funding of educational services (Chart 3).

Economic Letter • Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas • June 2013

3

Economic Letter

Thus, the end of the housing boom
may have also ended an era of unusually
good job market opportunities for women. At the very least, the hypothesis that
long-run female labor input is closer to
the low, 0.094 end of the range of benchmark values than to the high of 0.101
deserves further investigation.7

Possible Policy Implications
Balanced-growth theory suggests that
a labor-input utilization indicator—the
fraction of total available hours that
working-age individuals are on the job—
is a useful gauge of labor market conditions for men and women. While that
indicator shows the Great Recession had
a large adverse effect on the labor market
for both men and women, subsequent
dynamics for each gender have not followed the same pattern.
The 13 percent decline in men’s contribution to labor-input utilization from
what seems to be its well-defined, longrun benchmark value has given way to an
exasperatingly slow recovery. This pace
hints at the possibility that another eight
or more years may pass before conditions
for men revisit levels that could be considered normal by historical standards.
An equally clear assessment of labor
market conditions for women isn’t possible, reflecting the difficulty of determining a long-run value for the contribution
of women to labor-input utilization. From
the perspective of the high end of a range
of possible values for that benchmark,
conditions at the beginning of 2013 were
somewhat better than those for men
but hadn’t significantly improved with
respect to those observed during the

DALLASFED

recent recession. From the perspective of
the lower end of the range, current levels
of the female labor-input indicator may
be closer to normal if the real estate-fed
boom years and other factors overheated
employment sectors historically dominated by women. Which end of the spectrum is most valid will be revealed over
time.
Until then, policymakers would be
well advised not to base decisions on the
assumption that normal labor market
conditions can be identified with those
prevailing before the Great Recession.
Cyclical factors (as well as demographic
ones not explicitly discussed here) may
have previously pushed labor force participation, especially that for women,
beyond sustainable levels. In that case,
policies that attempt to bring labor-input
utilization rates to prerecession levels
may not succeed and could, instead, create undesired inflationary pressures and/
or asset bubbles that might destabilize
the economy when they burst.
Zarazaga is a senior research economist
and advisor in the Research Department
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Notes
The author wishes to thank Evan Koenig for his contributions to this article.
1
For an overview of this approach and issues of implementation, see “The Challenges of Estimating Potential Output
in Real Time,” by Robert W. Arnold, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, July/August 2009, pp. 271–90.
2
An excellent technical exposition of the empirical and
theoretical foundations of balanced-growth theory can be
found in “Production, Growth and Business Cycles: Technical Appendix,” by Robert G. King, Charles I. Plosser and

Economic Letter

is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The
views expressed are those of the authors and should not
be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the
Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted on the condition that the
source is credited and a copy is provided to the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Economic Letter is available free of charge by writing
the Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 75265-5906; by fax
at 214-922-5268; or by telephone at 214-922-5254. This
publication is available on the Dallas Fed website,
www.dallasfed.org.

Sergio T. Rebelo, Computational Economics , vol. 20, 2002,
pp. 87–116.
3
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ household survey is the
source of the data in the numerator, the number of persons
at work and the average hours they work. These data capture
the total hours people are at work rather than the hours for
which they are paid. It excludes, for example, vacation and
leaves of absence for which payment is received.
4
Discretionary time available to work can also grow as a
result of technological progress that, for example, reduces
the time needed to commute to and from work, but this
factor is quantitatively insignificant relative to demographic
influences.
5
This figure may seem low. Recall, however, that the
numerator of the ratio includes men in college as well as
retired men, who typically work part time, if at all. Thus,
consider a five-member household composed of two
parents of the opposite sex, two young males in college and
a retired grandfather. In the plausible situation in which the
father is at work 40 hours a week, the grandfather 20 hours
and the children 9.5 hours, the fraction of time that the men
in the family devote to work would be 0.139, or 14 percent:
the 69.5 hours they were at work divided by 500 hours
(5 x 100) of weekly discretionary time available to the
household as a whole.
6
This suggests that the usual comparison of the vibrant
labor market recovery after the pronounced recession of
1980–81 with the rather anemic one observed so far after
the severe Great Recession is not entirely fair. The first of
these two recoveries was helped by the extraordinary pace at
which women entered the labor force, a factor that ceased to
exert a beneficial influence on U.S. labor markets well before
the Great Recession, as the so-called “jobless recovery”
from the 2000–01 recession may indicate.
7
More rigorous empirical grounds for this hypothesis can
be found in two studies presented at the 2012 Brookings
Panels on Economic Activity, “Disentangling the Channels
of the 2007–2009 Recession,” by James H. Stock and Mark
W. Watson, and “The U.S. Employment-Population Reversal
in the 2000s: Facts and Explanations,” by Robert A. Moffitt.

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