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August 15, 1997

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Wage Inflation and
Worker Uncertainty
by Mark E. Schweitzer

A

ccording to a recent article in the
New York Times, the leading explanation
of why inflation has been so limited these
last three years—despite low unemployment rates—is that wage demands have
been held down by an unusually high
degree of “worker uncertainty.”1 Substantial effort has gone into identifying
(and disputing) the sources of this presumed insecurity in the face of a rather
buoyant labor market. The most commonly mentioned reasons are the threat
of middle-management layoffs, competition from foreign workers, and less
unionization, all of which are believed to
reduce wage inflation by making workers think twice before requesting higher
pay—even if their firms’ balance sheets
have improved.
As an alternative to that approach, I begin by reviewing the salary adjustment
policies favored by human resource
managers, the people who propose and
justify pay increases in most large
U.S. firms. Typically, these managers
report that they use local cost-of-living
increases and the wages paid by other
employers to guide their wage-scale
adjustments. Though potentially compatible with many economic theories
(including the idea that firms pay workers the prevailing market price), these
policies suggest that wage changes are
driven by inflation instead of driving it.
At a macroeconomic (economywide)
level, this means that wage-setting policies should tend to tie pay increases to
inflation and productivity growth on a
ISSN 0428-1276

lagging or contemporaneous basis, reversing the order of events described by
the worker uncertainty hypothesis.
To examine the relationship between
nominal wage growth and inflation, I
use an unusually long, detailed time
series (including more than 40 years of
data) which shows that wages have generally moved with the sum of prices and
productivity. Furthermore, this relationship is contemporaneous, at least for
annual data. These results are largely
confirmed by data from the more commonly used, but far shorter, Employment
Cost Index (ECI) time series.
The subtle distinctions between these
explanations for the recent restraint in
wage and price growth are critical, because evidence for the worker uncertainty hypothesis has diminished as the
expansion has continued. The “human
resource policy” view implies that future
wage growth will remain modest because recent inflation has been quite
subdued. In contrast, the worker uncertainty story suggests that there will be a
run-up, first of wages and then of prices,
when the cloud of insecurity finally lifts.

■ Firms’ Wage-Setting Decisions
Human resource directors (or compensation managers) typically use wagesetting procedures that seem alien to
economists’ models. In adjusting their
firms’ nominal wage structure, they look
foremost at the wages paid by other
firms, then at cost-of-living indexes, and
last at their own firms’ financial results.2

What keeps the lid on wages in
today’s vigorous labor market? If
workers’ uncertainty about their jobs
prevents their asking for raises, we
can expect wage demands—and then
prices—to rise when the insecurity
lifts. But the wage-setting behavior of
human resource managers tells a different story. Pay changes are mostly
based on compensation at other firms,
cost-of-living indexes, and their own
firms’ financial results (in that order).
This suggests that wages will respond
to price changes, with little danger
that a burst of worker optimism will
set off an inflationary spiral. This
Commentary looks at how these stories
match the evidence on the timing of
inflation and wage changes.

Many managers survey local companies
on their salary rates for comparable occupations. Unemployment rates, an obvious indicator of labor market tightness,
rarely enter the calculation directly. In a
recent survey, only 13 percent of the
compensation managers questioned said
they would alter their companies’ wages
even if the jobless rate in their own
industry rose five percentage points.3
The combined impact of diverse firms
setting wages along these lines has not
been fully explored, but the procedures
they use suggest that wages are likely to
adjust either contemporaneously or following inflation rate changes.

One interpretation of this behavior is
that firms adjust their real wages to keep
them even with their workers’ alternatives at comparable firms, even though
few employees may in fact contemplate
switching. This is surprising on several
counts. When managers look outward at
the wages currently being paid by other
employers and at cost-of-living indexes,
they ignore other wage rates that might
prove acceptable to unemployed workers with appropriate skills. Furthermore,
the low priority given to firms’ inside
financial information suggests that the
link between firms’ own prices and their
wages is weaker than simple microeconomic explanations indicate. Overall,
compensation managers’ procedures
show that firms are operating with limited direct information about their workers’ marginal products; otherwise, they
would simply pay those rates period
by period.
We know that individual firms primarily use outside information to determine
wage adjustments, but what guides
aggregate changes? While any number
of factors might be relevant, I will
focus on the simplest determinants. In a
competitive market, economic theory
says that wages will equal workers’
marginal revenue product, which is calculated as their marginal physical product times the market price of the goods
or services they produce.4 Expressing
this relationship in aggregate rates of
change produces an equilibrium condition in which wage growth should
approximate the inflation rate plus productivity growth.5 My earlier description of how human resource managers
adjust pay rates questioned firms’ ability to pinpoint marginal physical product at the individual worker level. We
know that aggregate movements in
wages relative to prices and productivity would alter labor’s share of production. However, the stability of labor’s
share of output confirms the relevance
of the microeconomic relationship,
even at the aggregate level. Therefore,
including productivity growth is simply
a statement that real wage growth can
also change nominal wages.

FIGURE 1 COMMUNITY SALARY SURVEY DATA

NOTE: CPI-U is the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers. All data were current as of October 6, 1997.
SOURCES: Community Salary Survey, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.

■ The Long-run
Empirical Relationship
This description of processes does not
answer two important empirical questions: Are wage changes closely associated with inflation and productivity
growth? And, if they are, what is the relative timing of these comovements? To
examine the relationship between inflation and wage changes, the data set must
either specify occupations or adjust for
the changing structure of employment.
This is because even in a five- or 10year period, the economy’s occupational
mix will shift substantially, creating an
illusion of wage inflation or deflation.
For example, an increase in the number
of highly paid professionals, even if
their wages are held constant, will cause
an apparent increase in wage rates.
The effect can be large in periods like
1983–94, when the share of the workforce employed as managers or professionals rose more than four percentage
points (from 23 to 27 percent of total
employment).
The source of the long-term data used
here is unique in that it includes wage
rates within defined occupations over
the last 40 years. The data set is constructed from the Community Salary
Survey (CSS), conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRBC)
since 1965 for use in its own salary
administration in Cleveland, Pittsburgh,
and Cincinnati.6 The survey asks

employers their wage and salary levels
(including bonuses but not fringe benefits). The measured changes are averaged, accounting for both the firm and
occupation, to provide the mean wage
change line plotted in figure 1.
This figure confirms that CSS wage
changes are generally synchronized with
CPI+ (an abbreviation for the sum of
productivity gains and inflation). The
CSS mean wage adjustments’ correlations with inflation and CPI+ are fairly
high (0.815 and 0.642, respectively).
Throughout the period shown, productivity growth varies substantially more than
either the inflation rate or average wage
growth, which obscures the relationship.
However, productivity growth must be
included, because over the whole period,
wages grew 0.35 percentage point faster
than prices on average. Over the last
three years, average wage growth has
been much closer to the inflation rate
(wage growth led by only 0.05 percentage point), yet wage gains have been
closer to CPI+ (0.3 percentage point
lower) than in the full sample (1.5 percentage points lower). This suggests that
wage growth in the last three years was
fairly strong, considering the weakness
of measured productivity gains.
As for the timing question, CSS data are
gathered annually, so wages and prices
are best described as changing contemporaneously (their correlation is 0.81).
The correlations between inflation (or

FIGURE 2 EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX DATA

for which ECI data are available. While
CSS mean wage changes are not shown
(to avoid overcomplicating figure 2),
they are very comparable to yearly
changes in the ECI, suggesting that the
CSS data do match national wage trends.

■ Conclusion

NOTE: All data were current as of October 6, 1997.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

CPI+) and wage growth are considerably lower for wage growth, leading
inflation by one year (0.54) or two years
(0.35). The alternative—that wage
growth follows inflation or CPI+ by one
or two years—is similarly not supported. It is also clear that wage growth
exceeded inflation or CPI+ growth during particular periods, with or without
subsequent increases in the inflation
rate. Overall, this source of detailed
wage data is not consistent with the implication that current wage growth is
unusually weak (at least relative to inflation and productivity growth) or that
wage growth leads inflation.

Repeating the comparison for the more
limited sample, figure 2 shows quarterly
year-over-year growth rates in the CPI+
and the ECI, both of which are more
variable; however, like CSS mean wage
changes, ECI total compensation has typically grown faster than inflation but
more slowly than the sum of inflation
and productivity growth. Over the whole
period, total compensation growth lagged
growth in CPI+ by 0.44 percentage point
on average. More recently, this difference
has been smaller—only 0.26 percentage
point lower since 1993. Again, this is primarily due to weak productivity growth,
since the inflation rate has remained
remarkably stable during this period.

■ The Employment Cost Index
The ECI addresses some of the potential
problems of CSS data (it covers all regions and most occupations and includes
information on benefits), but it has only
been compiled since 1982. Total compensation, which includes both wages
and benefit costs, is the best measure of
the firm’s labor-cost structure. Benefits,
which now amount to 28 percent of total
compensation, have generally risen as a
fraction of compensation.7 To keep the
index reflecting actual compensation-rate
increases for like work, the ECI holds the
occupational composition of the workforce constant and isolates changes in
hours (for example, increased use of
overtime) from changes in the standard
rate of pay.8 These careful statistical
controls make the ECI similar to the CPI.

The timing of inflation and wage
growth, as measured by the ECI, is
less clear. The peak correlation (0.72)
between CPI+ and wage growth occurs
when wage growth leads by three quarters. Interestingly, inflation, on its own,
is most correlated (0.66) when wage
growth follows inflation by three quarters. When wage growth leads inflation,
the correlations are far lower (for example, 0.34 for a three-quarter lead). The
reason that increases in CPI+ follow
wage growth is the relatively strong correlation between wage growth and productivity increases three or four quarters
out (0.540). Ultimately, the timing of
these correlations lends limited support
to either story. One of the problems with
this analysis may be the shorter period

This Commentary is not intended to
refute the idea that worker uncertainty
accounts for today’s low inflation rates.
Instead, it seeks to provide an alternative explanation for the “low” wage increases of the last three years that is at
least as consistent with long-run and
recent wage, price, and productivity
data. Indeed, I do not attempt to analyze
the unemployment rate’s empirical
importance in determining wage growth
and inflation. Nonetheless, a preliminary
look at two data sources yields evidence
on the relationship between inflation and
nominal wage growth that is consistent
with the “human resource policy” explanation for our current low rates of wage
growth. Further research will be required
to determine how wage offerings at the
firm level relate to firms’ own price
decisions and aggregate data on inflation
and productivity.
Why worry about which story provides
the more accurate explanation of recent
wage gains? Because different answers
suggest different paths for future inflation. It has become increasingly difficult
to fathom why workers should feel insecure about their jobs, when surveys show
they believe employment opportunities
are abundant. If this is the case, inflation
in wage demands and prices must be just
around the corner. On the other hand, if
human resource managers expect today’s
low inflation, low productivity gains, and
low wage growth in other firms to continue, there is no reason to anticipate pay
increases that could set off an inflationary spiral. Because the policy implications of these stories are so divergent, it
is important to investigate alternatives to
the worker uncertainty hypothesis.

■ Footnotes
1. See Peter Passell, “A Pulse that Lingers,”
New York Times, July 22, 1997, p. A1.
2. See Audrey Freedman, “The New Look
in Wage Policy and Employee Relations,”
Report No. 865, The Conference Board, 1985.
3. See David I. Levine, “Fairness, Markets,
and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives,” American Economic
Review, vol. 83, no. 5 (December 1993),
p. 1248.
4. The marginal physical product is the addition to output made by the last worker hired.
5. Several simplifications are implicit in this
move from microeconomic wage determination to the aggregate relationship. Notably,
both the price and marginal products must be
correctly aggregated for the simple relationship to hold, yet the aggregate data series are
not even intended for this purpose. For
example, productivity is measured on an
average, rather than a marginal, basis. These
are reasons to examine how well the relationship performs using actual data over an
extended period.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101
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6. The FRBC chooses participants in each
city as representative of the area’s employers.
Although the survey has been conducted
annually, the month for which data are collected has changed several times since 1955.
All data, including the CPI and productivity
figures, refer to the period between the preceding survey and the one conducted that
year. In most cases, this is a 12-month span,
but occasionally the interval is less or more
than a year.
How well do the CSS wages reflect national
trends? The year-to-year changes usually follow the national pattern closely (when U.S.
wage-change data are available), but characteristics specific to this region have also
caused its wage levels to change relative to
the nation’s. In general, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh are more urban, have
more cyclically sensitive employment, and
have undergone more industrial restructuring
than the United States as a whole. Before the
1980s, wages in these three cities were
higher than the national average, but now
they are on par with the rest of the country.

8. Occupations in which overtime is a standard, continuing feature of the compensation
structure are assigned a rate that exceeds the
base wage, on the basis of typical overtime
levels within the occupation.

Mark E. Schweitzer is an economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He
thanks Erica Groshen for her initial work on
collecting the community salary data.
The views stated herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Economic Commentary is available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on
the World Wide Web: http://www.clev.frb.org.
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7. This has resulted from increases in both
mandated benefits (such as the employer’s
contribution to the Social Security fund and
unemployment insurance premiums) and
voluntary benefits (such as health care insurance and paid vacation days).

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