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November 2000

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

The Performance and Profitability of
CRA-Related Lending
by Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, and Glenn B. Canner

C

oncerns about the availability of
credit to lower-income borrowers and
communities and to small businesses
and farms are long-standing. Over the
years, many government programs, such
as those of the Federal Housing Administration, have been established to
address these concerns. Regulation of
private-sector activities also is intended
to bolster such lending. The most prominent government regulatory effort to
improve access to credit, the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), was
designed to encourage commercial
banks and savings associations to help
meet the needs of borrowers in all
segments of their communities, consistent with safe and sound operations.
Responding to the CRA, banking institutions have used various methods to
expand lending to lower-income customers and those in lower-income neighborhoods, but their approaches fall into
two broad types, both typically involving special marketing and outreach.
In one approach, lenders have sought
additional CRA-related customers who
would qualify for market-priced loans
using traditional standards of creditworthiness. In the other, lenders have gained
customers by modifying their underwriting guidelines or loan pricing. Many
banking institutions, especially the larger
ones, have established or participate in
special programs to foster lending.
Special lending programs vary widely
but they often feature more flexible
credit-underwriting guidelines than those

ISSN 0428-1276

used for other products; education and
counseling for prospective borrowers;
enhanced, targeted marketing of credit
products; and coordination with a wide
range of third parties, both private and
public. In addition, some banking institutions offer pricing incentives for loans
made under these programs and have
established procedures to mitigate the
credit risk associated with such loans.
Although the CRA’s effects on lending to
lower-income populations and neighborhoods are difficult to assess, such lending
has increased substantially over the past
decade or so. For example, homepurchase lending to lower-income households has increased 86 percent since
1993 (compared to about 50 percent for
higher-income households). Lending to
borrowers in lower-income neighborhoods also has risen sharply (nearly 80
percent) since 1993.
However, despite all this experience,
little systematic information has been
publicly available about performance
and profitability, either for CRA-related
lending activities as a whole or for the
loans extended under CRA special
lending programs.

n Congressional Mandate
In November 1999, wanting to learn
more, the U.S. Congress asked the
Federal Reserve Board to do a comprehensive study on the performance
(that is, the delinquency and default
rates) and profitability of loans made in
conformity with the CRA. Before

In November 1999, the U.S. Congress asked the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System to
conduct a comprehensive study of
loans made under the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977. The
Board’s study focused on the loans’
delinquency and default rates—
their performance—as well as their
profitability. This Commentary
reports the results of the study.
responding to their request, the Board
needed to address three basic questions:
What is a CRA loan? How does one
measure the effect of a law or regulation
on the profitability and performance of
lending? Is previous research adequate to
fulfill Congress’ request?
In considering the first question—how
to define a CRA loan—the Reserve
Board staff looked to the CRA statute
and regulations for guidance. Banking
institutions alone are subject to the law,
so we focused on them exclusively and
did not consider credit unions or mortgage companies. Next, we determined
that a CRA-related loan was one
extended to a lower-income household
anywhere in a banking institution’s local
community or to a borrower of any
income in a lower-income neighborhood
within that community. We used a similar definition for small business lending.
Note that these definitions exclude about

half of all lower-income lending done by
banking organizations.
The second question proved considerably
more difficult. In principle, to assess a
law or regulation’s influence on loan
performance and profitability, one must
measure its “marginal” effect; ideally, this
would mean considering only the additional loans made because of the law.
Such an assessment, however, is impossible in practice because one cannot specify
the subset of loans that are made solely
because of the CRA. In the end, we chose
to examine the performance and profitability of all loans made in conformity
with the CRA; in other words, those that
met our definition of a CRA-related loan.
This approach, though not ideal,
complied with the language of the law
that mandated the study.
To answer the third question—whether
the research already available was
capable of satisfying Congress’
request—Board staff reviewed the
existing studies of the performance and
profitability of CRA-related lending.
We found that such research as did exist
was too limited to meet our needs.
Nearly all of it had focused on the
performance and profitability of home
lending, and most of this concerned the
relatively narrow group of loans made
under affordable-home-loan programs.
Although they target much of the same
population as the CRA, loans extended
under affordable-home-loan programs
often deviate from the definition of a
CRA loan in a few important respects:
They are often extended by institutions,
such as mortgage companies, that are
not subject to the CRA; they frequently
include loans made by banking institutions outside their local communities;
and they sometimes are made to borrowers whose incomes exceed our
lower-income criterion.
Our review of previous research on loan
performance showed wide variation in
the experience of individual banking
institutions, depending on such factors
as their location and the kinds of
approaches they used to extend credit.
The delinquency rates reported are
generally higher than those for other
loans, while default rates are slightly
higher or about the same.
Two types of research on loan profitability have been conducted, one based on a

special survey of banking institutions’
experiences and the other on statistical
analysis of standardized reports filed by
all banking institutions. The Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 1995
survey focused on home-purchase lending; its main finding was that CRArelated lending was profitable, but somewhat less so than traditional lending.
Statistical analysis of Call Report data,
merged with data on home-purchase
lending, showed that institutions doing
relatively more lower-income mortgage
lending are no less profitable than other
institutions.

n The Board’s Study
Having concluded that existing research
did not provide adequate data to satisfy
Congress’ request, the Board decided to
undertake some new research. To this
end, the 500 largest retail banking institutions were surveyed about their lending
experience, focusing on CRA-related
loans. This focus included special lending
programs, which are sometimes an
important aspect of institutions’ CRArelated lending activities. We selected the
500 largest retail banking institutions
because they account for about 75 percent
of all CRA-related lending. Respondents
were assured that the data reported would
not be disclosed to the public in a manner
that compromised confidentiality. In
preparing the survey instrument, we
received input from many sources,
including banking institutions, community-based and nonprofit organizations,
and members of Congress and their staffs.
The survey had limited goals. It is especially important to note that its results
do not represent a cost/benefit analysis
of the CRA. Consistent with Congress’
mandate, the survey focused only on
the performance and profitability of
CRA-related lending. It did not examine investment and service activities
that banking institutions may have
undertaken because of the CRA. It did
not address the CRA’s effects on local
communities and included little information about its benefits to individual
institutions. The survey collected information about activities in only four
loan-product categories (the most significant ones for most institutions).
These included home purchase and
refinance lending, home improvement
lending, small business lending, and
community development lending.

n Special Challenges
of the Survey
Three of the challenges posed by this survey warrant particular comment. Because
of statutory deadlines imposed by Congress, banking institutions had little time
to prepare responses. In fact, we continued to accept responses for nearly a
month beyond the deadline. The timing of
our survey coincided with due dates for
the annual reports that institutions must
file under the provisions of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the CRA,
as well as several other regulatory reports.
In addition, we encountered some confusion as to the definition of a CRA loan.
The definition was not well understood
by all survey respondents, some of
whom equated CRA loans with loans
made under special lending programs.
Finally, the study used return on equity
as a measure of profitability. To calculate
it, we sought very comprehensive data,
asking respondents to include all sources
of costs and revenues. Survey responses
and follow-up phone calls, however,
indicated that some lenders had considered cost of capital and others had not.
As a result, much of our analysis
focused on a relative ranking of profitability for CRA and non-CRA lending
within a bank. Such internal comparisons are not affected by failure to consider the cost of capital or any other factor, as long as it is reported consistently
within a bank.

n Survey Results:
CRA-Related Lending
We received responses from 143 of the
500 institutions to which we sent the
survey (a 28.6 percent response rate).
These responses and our follow-up
telephone contacts revealed that banking
institutions generally do not track profitability and performance separately for
CRA-related lending, so our report
emphasized qualitative results regarding
profitability. Because fewer than half of
the respondents answered quantitative
questions on performance, one must be
cautious when using these responses to
draw qualitative inferences comparing
the performance of CRA-related and
other lending.
The results varied by loan product.
Home purchase and refinance lending
has the largest origination volume by far
($570 billion, of which about 10 percent

is CRA-related). Responses indicated
that overall as well as CRA-related
home purchase and refinance lending is
profitable or marginally profitable for
most institutions. On a dollar-weighted
basis, about 85 percent of survey respondents said that their CRA-related lending
as a whole was at least marginally profitable. However, CRA-related home
purchase and refinance lending was
reported to be less profitable and to have
similar or higher delinquency rates than
other home purchase and refinance
lending. Concerning this product, about
63 percent of respondents said that their
CRA-related lending was less profitable
than their overall lending. Differences
are less dramatic when measured on a
per-institution basis.
One of the strongest relationships
revealed by the survey concerns the correlation between an institution’s size and
the profitability and performance of its
CRA-related lending. Large banks were
less likely than small banks to report that
CRA-related lending is profitable, and
much more likely to say that it is less
profitable than their overall lending. A
large proportion of respondents in all
bank-size categories reported that CRArelated and other home purchase and
refinance loans have very similar origination and servicing costs, credit losses,
and pricing on a per-institution basis.
However, the respondents who did
report differences most often said they
had lower prices or higher costs or credit
losses for CRA-related home purchase
and refinance loans than for others.

Home Improvement and
Refinance Lending
The results for home improvement lending ($12 billion in originations, of which
about 18 percent is CRA-related) are
similar to those for home purchase and
refinance lending, although fewer differences between CRA-related and other
home improvement lending were
reported. The vast majority of respondents in all size categories said that origination and servicing costs, credit losses,
and prices for home improvement lending were about the same for CRA-related
loans as for others.

Small Business Lending
Nearly all respondents reported that
small business lending overall
($117 billion in originations) and CRArelated small business lending are both

profitable. They reported few differences in performance and profitability
between CRA-related and other small
business lending. The same was true of
origination and servicing costs, credit
losses, and pricing. These results may
reflect the relatively large proportion
(about 50 percent) of all small business
loans that are CRA-related.

effects. The other side maintains
that these programs exist for several
different reasons, only one of which
is to respond to the CRA, and do
not necessarily measure the bite of
the law. Ongoing research to be presented at a Federal Reserve System
conference in April 2001 will examine this debate in some detail.

Community Development Lending

n Concluding Comments

Virtually all respondents reported that
community development lending
($13 billion in originations) is at least
marginally profitable. Comparative
questions were not asked for this
category of loans because it was
unlikely that we would be able to construct valid comparison groups from
banking institutions’ loan portfolios.

n Survey Results: CRA Special
Lending Programs
Evidence suggests that CRA special
lending programs ($11 billion in originations across all loan-product categories) are relatively small and
account for a small proportion of the
loans extended by most banking institutions. Only 1 percent of respondents
reported that they established these
programs solely to obtain a “satisfactory” or “outstanding” CRA rating.
A large share said that they established
their programs to meet the local community’s credit needs and to promote
its growth and stability. Programs have
a wide range of characteristics but they
commonly feature altered underwriting standards. About three-quarters of
all programs involve third parties, such
as government entities, nonprofits and
lending consortia, which are often a
source of subsidies and provide many
services such as screening of prospective borrowers. In addition, third
parties often share the credit risk of a
loan with the lender. A majority of
CRA special lending programs were
reported to be profitable or marginally
profitable. About 25 percent of them
were described as unprofitable or
marginally unprofitable.
Here I mention an interesting debate
about interpreting the results from the
CRA special lending programs.
One side maintains that these
programs represent the marginal
impact of the CRA—“the bite of the
law”—and therefore are the appropriate focus for analyses of the CRA’s

The report does not characterize the
overall performance and profitability of banking institutions’ CRArelated lending because it does not
cover all the activities of a given
bank. However, the performance
and profitability of most institutions’ CRA-related home purchase
and refinance and small business
lending provide a good indication
of the performance and profitability
of their CRA-related lending as a
whole because these two categories
are the most important ones for the
majority of banks.
The relatively low response rate to
the survey does not necessarily
imply that its results are
idiosyncratic. In particular, we
found no evidence that the survey’s
results are not broadly representative of the experiences of the 500
institutions considered together.
Although the response rate was
28.6 percent, the institutions that
responded are estimated to account
for between 45 and 50 percent of
all the CRA-related lending in each
loan-product category.
Furthermore, statistical tests indicate
that survey respondents resemble
nonrespondents along several dimensions, including overall profitability
and CRA performance ratings. The
survey data are primarily reflections
of the experiences of larger banking
institutions in a particularly healthy
economic environment. Experiences
may differ for small institutions or
under different economic conditions.
Our current research efforts are
focused on a fuller assessment of the
section of the survey that concerns
special lending programs. In this
regard, Board staff recently published an article in the November
issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

Glenn B. Canner is a senior advisor in the
Research Division at the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Robert B. Avery and
Raphael W. Bostic are senior economists there.
The views expressed here are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
or its staff.
Economic Commentary is published by the
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where glossaries of terms are provided.
We invite comments, questions, and suggestions.
E-mail us at editor@clev.frb.org.

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