View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

federal government means higher
interest rates. Historically, excessive money supply growth has triggered increases in inflation and
interest rates. But, these are longrun effects.
It is not so clear what would
happen in the short run if the Federal Reserve tried to accommodate
more government borrowing with
higher money supply growth. In
the short run, it may be possible to
reduce interest rates slightly with
higher targets for the monetary
aggregates. Whether this strategy

would work and for how long
depend, in part, on the sophistication of participants in the market
for long-term securities. If market
participants believed that excessive
money growth would lead to further inflation, they would almost
certainly bid up long-term rates
and drive borrowers into the shortterm market, which would drive up
short-term rates. The impact of
increased money supply growth on
short-term interest rates would be
offset by inflationary expectations.
The net impact on interest rates in
the short run is ambiguous. The
net effect in the long run is clear:
interest rates would be higher.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Summary

The Federal Reserve sets monetary targets based on its desire to
achieve sustainable economic
growth and gradual disinflation.
Monetary targets are set low
enough to reduce inflation and interest rates in the long run. Large
budget deficits must be financed in
credit markets, because the Federal
Reserve cannot buy large amounts
of government debt without creating excess money growth. To
lower interest rates, the budget deficit must be reduced, and money
supply growth must be limited to a
non-inflationary rate.

The Monetary
Targets in 1984
by William T. Gavin

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OR 44101

••

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

BULK RATE

U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OR
Permit No. 385

Every February, the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors reports to Congress on
the economy and presents objectives for monetary policy for the
coming year. The chairman's
reports are required by the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins).
In July, the chairman reviews the
current years' objectives and presents tentative objectives for the
next year. These objectives are
stated as annual target ranges for
growth in the supply of money
and credit. As Chairman Paul A.
Volcker stated in his February 1984
report, "The ranges for 1984 are
intended to be consistent with the
basic policy objective of achieving
long-lasting economic expansion in
a context of continuing control of
inflationary pressures"!

-

Economist William T Gavin works in the area 0/
monetary theory and monetary policy lor the
Federal Reserve Bank 0/ Cleveland. June Gates
provided research assistance lor this article.
The views stated herein are those 0/ the author
and not necessarily those 0/ the Federal Reserve
Bank 0/ Cleveland or 0/ the Board 0/ Governors
0/ the Federal Reserve System.

ISSN 0428-1276
March 26, 1984

Table 1

a

Objectives for Money and Credit for 1984

Ranges in percent

1984 ranges

Tentative
1984 ranges,
set July 1983

M·2

6.0 to 9.0

6.5 to 9.5

7.0 to 10.Ob

M·3

6.0 to 9.0

6.0 to 9.0

6.5 to 9.5

M·l

4.0 to 8.0

4.0 to 8.0

5.0 to 9.0c

Monetary
aggregate

1983 ranges,
set July 1983

a. Ranges apply to periods from fourth quarter to fourth quarter, except as specified.
b. Range applies to period from February-March 1983 to fourth quarter of 1983.
c. Range applies to period from second quarter of 1983 to fourth quarter of 1983.
SOURCE: "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1984, p. 69.

Not many years ago, economists
believed policy makers had to accept
trade-offs between unemployment
and inflation. Today, most economists have come to agree that this
trade-off-if it exists at all-is only
a short-run phenomenon. The experience of the last 20 years suggests
that more inflation leads to more
uncertainty and less efficiency in
the economy. Current Federal
Reserve policy is based, in part, on
the premise that the best way to
increase potential real output and
reduce unemployment over the long
haul is to eliminate inflation. As
Chairman Volcker stated, "In a
real sense, the greatest contribution that the Federal Reserve itself
can make to our lasting prosperity
is to foster the expectation-and

1. See "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 70, no. 2
(February 1984), p. 71.

the reality-that
we can sustain
the hard-won gains against inflation and build upon them.?
The 1984 Targets
In his recent testimony, Chairman
Volcker presented targets consistent with a continuation of the Federal Reserve strategy of gradual
reduction of growth in the supply
of money and credit. The targets
for 1984 were set 0.5 percent to
1 percent below the target ranges
for 1983 (see table 1). The 1984
target range for M-1 is 4 percent to
8 percent. This current target is
1 percent below the 5 percent to
9 percent range chosen for the
second half of 1983 and the same

2. Statement of Paul A. Vo1cker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before Committee on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives,
February 7, 1984, p. 17. See also "Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress:' pp. 100-01.

Chart 1

Target Ranges for M-1

Billions of dollars

550

525

1980
1981
1982
1983

Announced,
percent
4.0-6.5
6.0-8.5
2.5-5.5
4.0-8.0
5.0-9.0·

Velocityadjusted,
percent
5.1-7.6
3.9-6.6
10.9-13.9
6.0-10.0

475

450

425

NOTE: Data prior to November 1982 do not incorporate benchmark and seasonal factor revisions.
Dotted purple lines indicate announced target ranges. Dotted blue lines indicate velocity-adjusted
target ranges.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Department of Commerce.

as the tentative range suggested in

july 1983. Once again, the target

range for M-1 is 4 percentage
points wide, reflecting continuing
uncertainty about the long-term
behavior of M-1 velocity, or the
ratio of GNP to M-l. Developments
over the past two years suggest
caution in the use of M-1 as a
primary target for monetary policy.
In August 1982, M-1 began to
grow very fast. Normally such
growth would have signaled the
end of the recession, but the economy did not recover in 1982. The
sustained and rapid growth of
M-1 during the recession caused

an unprecedented decline in M-1
velocity and led the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) to deemphasize the M-1 target in October 1982, placing more emphasis on
the broader M-2 and M-3 aggregates.
While M-1 subsequently was reinstated as a target, it does not hold
the primary status it held between
October 1979 and October 1982.
Although several studies have tried
to explain the unusual behavior of
M-1 velocity, none of them offers
a completely satisfactory explanation' In view of the uncertainty

••

3. For an exhaustive study of the effects of
deregulation on the opportunity cost of holding
transactions balances, see Flint Brayton et al.,
"Alternative Money Demand Specifications and
Recent Growth in M-1;' Manuscript (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
May 23, 1983).

about velocity, M-1 has a probationary status for 1984. The desired
outcome relative to the 4 percent to
8 percent range clearly depends on
the behavior of velocity.
M-2 grew 12.1 percent during
1983. In contrast to the usual practice of basing targets on average
fourth-quarter levels, the target
range for 1983 was based on the
average level of February and
March 1983. From that base, M-2
grew 8.3 percent, or slightly below
the middle of the 7 percent to
10 percent target range. The February to March base was chosen
because of uncertainty surrounding
deposit flows after the introduction
of money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs) in December 1982. When
the M-2 target was set, the Federal
Reserve was unable to predict the
amount of funds that would flow
from outside M-2 into the MMDAs,
but expected that there would be
a transition period that would be
largely completed by March.
For 1984, the FOMC has reduced
the M-2 target growth range by a
full percentage point from the
target range established in February 1983. The target range, 6 percent to 9 percent, is 0.5 percent
below the tentative range set in
Iuly 1983. The 1983 range had been
raised from 1982 to accommodate
a temporary movement of funds
associated with residual flows into
MMDAs from outside M-2 after
March. One reason for the further
0.5 percent downward shift in
the M-2 range for 1984 was the belief
that this one-time temporary movement of funds was over.
The 1983 M-3 target was not
adjusted for MMDA growth. M-3
was the only aggregate to grow
above its 1983 range of 6.5 percent
to 9.5 percent. In 1983, the FOMC
introduced a monitoring range
for domestic nonfinancial sector

Three other studies attempting to explain the
unusual behavior of M-1 velocity were presented
at the Conference on Monetary Policy and Velocity, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
December 1983. See Robert]. Gordon, "The
1981-82 Velocity Decline: A Structural Shift in
Income or Money Demand?"; Michael]. Hamburger, "Recent Velocity Behavior, the Demand

Table 2
Percent

Economic Projections for 1984
FOMC members and
other FRB presidents

Economic
indicator

Range

Central
tendency

Administration's
projections

Change, fourth quarter
to fourth quarter
Nominal GNP
Real GNP
GNP deflator
Average unemployment
rate in fourth quarter

8.0 to 10.5
3.5 to 5.0
4.0 to 6.0

9.0 to 10.0
4.0 to 4.75
4.5 to 5.0

9.8
4.5
5.0

7.25 to 8.0

7.5 to 7.75

7.7

SOURCE: "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1984, p. 71.

debt. Actual growth for this credit
aggregate was 10.5 percent in
1983-in the top half of the 8.5 percent to 11.5 percent range. This
experimental target range has been
set at 8 percent to 11 percent
for 1984.
Gradual Disinflation
If the real world were as regular
and predictable as the world presented in econometric models, the
Federal Reserve could reduce target
ranges and actual monetary growth
in a predictable way from one year
to the next. While the target ranges
and actual monetary growth rates
have not been reduced smoothly
and gradually each year, the Federal Reserve has come close to
achieving this objective for effective
money growth, effective being the
amount of money growth plus
or minus unexpected changes in
velocity. Each year the targets
are chosen based on an implicit
assumption about velocity. To
see how the Federal Reserve has
achieved reductions in effective
money growth, we can compare the
deviations of actual M-1 growth
from the pre-announced targets
with the unexpected developments
in velocity.

for Money and Monetary Policy"; and John A.
Tatom, "Alternative Explanations of the 1982-83
Decline in Velocity" See also John P. Judd, "The
Recent Decline in Velocity: Instability in Money
Demand or Inflation?" Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Spring 1983,
pp. 12-19.

From the fourth quarter of 1979
to the fourth quarter of 1983, M-1
growth was never inside its target
ranges at year-end (see chart 1).
In 1981, M-1 fell below the range;
in all the other years, M-1 grew
beyond the target ranges.
We have adjusted the target
ranges to reflect ex post information
about velocity and how it deviated
from previous patterns. These
ranges are represented by the
shaded areas in chart 1, showing
M-1 growth at the top of the range
in 1980, in the middle of the range
in 1981, well below the range in
1982, and at the top in 1983. We
arrived at these figures by assuming that the FOMC based its target
ranges on a velocity growth equal
to a 20-year moving average.' Different estimates of the velocity
trend would lead to different effective ranges. The point illustrated
by these adjusted targets is that
unexpected developments in velocity seem to explain the discrepancy
between the actual target ranges
and actual monetary growth rates.

••

4. It should be emphasized that the FOMC did
not necessarily follow this procedure.

In his February 1984 prepared
testimony, Chairman Volcker
explicitly cited this relationship
between the M-1 target and the
velocity assumption. "Growth in
the midpoint of the (M-1) range
would appear appropriate on the
assumption of relatively normal
velocity growth; if velocity growth
remained weak compared with
historical experience, M-1 growth
might appropriately be higher in
the range."
FOMC velocity forecasts for
1984 might be approximated from
target ranges and the central tendency of nominal GNP forecasts
made by FOMC members and other
Federal Reserve Bank presidents
(see table 2). The central tendency
of the nominal GNP forecast is
9 percent to 10 percent. Given a
6 percent midpoint for the M-1
range, the implied central tendency
of the M-1 velocity assumption is
3.5 percent.
The Targets and
the Federal Deficit
Much of Chairman Volcker's testimony before various congressional committees treated the relationship between the 1984 targets
and the large federal budget deficit.
To achieve disinflation, it is necessary to limit the supply of money
and credit. The Federal Reserve is
only one source of funds on the
supply side of the credit markets.
The federal government is only one
user of funds on the demand side.
Given stable growth of the money
supply, the level of the interest rate
depends on actions of all the other
suppliers and users of funds in
the credit markets. Other things
being equal, more borrowing by the

••

5. See "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' p. 72.

Chart 1

Target Ranges for M-1

Billions of dollars

550

525

1980
1981
1982
1983

Announced,
percent
4.0-6.5
6.0-8.5
2.5-5.5
4.0-8.0
5.0-9.0·

Velocityadjusted,
percent
5.1-7.6
3.9-6.6
10.9-13.9
6.0-10.0

475

450

425

NOTE: Data prior to November 1982 do not incorporate benchmark and seasonal factor revisions.
Dotted purple lines indicate announced target ranges. Dotted blue lines indicate velocity-adjusted
target ranges.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Department of Commerce.

as the tentative range suggested in

july 1983. Once again, the target

range for M-1 is 4 percentage
points wide, reflecting continuing
uncertainty about the long-term
behavior of M-1 velocity, or the
ratio of GNP to M-l. Developments
over the past two years suggest
caution in the use of M-1 as a
primary target for monetary policy.
In August 1982, M-1 began to
grow very fast. Normally such
growth would have signaled the
end of the recession, but the economy did not recover in 1982. The
sustained and rapid growth of
M-1 during the recession caused

an unprecedented decline in M-1
velocity and led the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) to deemphasize the M-1 target in October 1982, placing more emphasis on
the broader M-2 and M-3 aggregates.
While M-1 subsequently was reinstated as a target, it does not hold
the primary status it held between
October 1979 and October 1982.
Although several studies have tried
to explain the unusual behavior of
M-1 velocity, none of them offers
a completely satisfactory explanation' In view of the uncertainty

••

3. For an exhaustive study of the effects of
deregulation on the opportunity cost of holding
transactions balances, see Flint Brayton et al.,
"Alternative Money Demand Specifications and
Recent Growth in M-1;' Manuscript (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
May 23, 1983).

about velocity, M-1 has a probationary status for 1984. The desired
outcome relative to the 4 percent to
8 percent range clearly depends on
the behavior of velocity.
M-2 grew 12.1 percent during
1983. In contrast to the usual practice of basing targets on average
fourth-quarter levels, the target
range for 1983 was based on the
average level of February and
March 1983. From that base, M-2
grew 8.3 percent, or slightly below
the middle of the 7 percent to
10 percent target range. The February to March base was chosen
because of uncertainty surrounding
deposit flows after the introduction
of money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs) in December 1982. When
the M-2 target was set, the Federal
Reserve was unable to predict the
amount of funds that would flow
from outside M-2 into the MMDAs,
but expected that there would be
a transition period that would be
largely completed by March.
For 1984, the FOMC has reduced
the M-2 target growth range by a
full percentage point from the
target range established in February 1983. The target range, 6 percent to 9 percent, is 0.5 percent
below the tentative range set in
Iuly 1983. The 1983 range had been
raised from 1982 to accommodate
a temporary movement of funds
associated with residual flows into
MMDAs from outside M-2 after
March. One reason for the further
0.5 percent downward shift in
the M-2 range for 1984 was the belief
that this one-time temporary movement of funds was over.
The 1983 M-3 target was not
adjusted for MMDA growth. M-3
was the only aggregate to grow
above its 1983 range of 6.5 percent
to 9.5 percent. In 1983, the FOMC
introduced a monitoring range
for domestic nonfinancial sector

Three other studies attempting to explain the
unusual behavior of M-1 velocity were presented
at the Conference on Monetary Policy and Velocity, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
December 1983. See Robert]. Gordon, "The
1981-82 Velocity Decline: A Structural Shift in
Income or Money Demand?"; Michael]. Hamburger, "Recent Velocity Behavior, the Demand

Table 2
Percent

Economic Projections for 1984
FOMC members and
other FRB presidents

Economic
indicator

Range

Central
tendency

Administration's
projections

Change, fourth quarter
to fourth quarter
Nominal GNP
Real GNP
GNP deflator
Average unemployment
rate in fourth quarter

8.0 to 10.5
3.5 to 5.0
4.0 to 6.0

9.0 to 10.0
4.0 to 4.75
4.5 to 5.0

9.8
4.5
5.0

7.25 to 8.0

7.5 to 7.75

7.7

SOURCE: "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1984, p. 71.

debt. Actual growth for this credit
aggregate was 10.5 percent in
1983-in the top half of the 8.5 percent to 11.5 percent range. This
experimental target range has been
set at 8 percent to 11 percent
for 1984.
Gradual Disinflation
If the real world were as regular
and predictable as the world presented in econometric models, the
Federal Reserve could reduce target
ranges and actual monetary growth
in a predictable way from one year
to the next. While the target ranges
and actual monetary growth rates
have not been reduced smoothly
and gradually each year, the Federal Reserve has come close to
achieving this objective for effective
money growth, effective being the
amount of money growth plus
or minus unexpected changes in
velocity. Each year the targets
are chosen based on an implicit
assumption about velocity. To
see how the Federal Reserve has
achieved reductions in effective
money growth, we can compare the
deviations of actual M-1 growth
from the pre-announced targets
with the unexpected developments
in velocity.

for Money and Monetary Policy"; and John A.
Tatom, "Alternative Explanations of the 1982-83
Decline in Velocity" See also John P. Judd, "The
Recent Decline in Velocity: Instability in Money
Demand or Inflation?" Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Spring 1983,
pp. 12-19.

From the fourth quarter of 1979
to the fourth quarter of 1983, M-1
growth was never inside its target
ranges at year-end (see chart 1).
In 1981, M-1 fell below the range;
in all the other years, M-1 grew
beyond the target ranges.
We have adjusted the target
ranges to reflect ex post information
about velocity and how it deviated
from previous patterns. These
ranges are represented by the
shaded areas in chart 1, showing
M-1 growth at the top of the range
in 1980, in the middle of the range
in 1981, well below the range in
1982, and at the top in 1983. We
arrived at these figures by assuming that the FOMC based its target
ranges on a velocity growth equal
to a 20-year moving average.' Different estimates of the velocity
trend would lead to different effective ranges. The point illustrated
by these adjusted targets is that
unexpected developments in velocity seem to explain the discrepancy
between the actual target ranges
and actual monetary growth rates.

••

4. It should be emphasized that the FOMC did
not necessarily follow this procedure.

In his February 1984 prepared
testimony, Chairman Volcker
explicitly cited this relationship
between the M-1 target and the
velocity assumption. "Growth in
the midpoint of the (M-1) range
would appear appropriate on the
assumption of relatively normal
velocity growth; if velocity growth
remained weak compared with
historical experience, M-1 growth
might appropriately be higher in
the range."
FOMC velocity forecasts for
1984 might be approximated from
target ranges and the central tendency of nominal GNP forecasts
made by FOMC members and other
Federal Reserve Bank presidents
(see table 2). The central tendency
of the nominal GNP forecast is
9 percent to 10 percent. Given a
6 percent midpoint for the M-1
range, the implied central tendency
of the M-1 velocity assumption is
3.5 percent.
The Targets and
the Federal Deficit
Much of Chairman Volcker's testimony before various congressional committees treated the relationship between the 1984 targets
and the large federal budget deficit.
To achieve disinflation, it is necessary to limit the supply of money
and credit. The Federal Reserve is
only one source of funds on the
supply side of the credit markets.
The federal government is only one
user of funds on the demand side.
Given stable growth of the money
supply, the level of the interest rate
depends on actions of all the other
suppliers and users of funds in
the credit markets. Other things
being equal, more borrowing by the

••

5. See "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' p. 72.

federal government means higher
interest rates. Historically, excessive money supply growth has triggered increases in inflation and
interest rates. But, these are longrun effects.
It is not so clear what would
happen in the short run if the Federal Reserve tried to accommodate
more government borrowing with
higher money supply growth. In
the short run, it may be possible to
reduce interest rates slightly with
higher targets for the monetary
aggregates. Whether this strategy

would work and for how long
depend, in part, on the sophistication of participants in the market
for long-term securities. If market
participants believed that excessive
money growth would lead to further inflation, they would almost
certainly bid up long-term rates
and drive borrowers into the shortterm market, which would drive up
short-term rates. The impact of
increased money supply growth on
short-term interest rates would be
offset by inflationary expectations.
The net impact on interest rates in
the short run is ambiguous. The
net effect in the long run is clear:
interest rates would be higher.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Summary

The Federal Reserve sets monetary targets based on its desire to
achieve sustainable economic
growth and gradual disinflation.
Monetary targets are set low
enough to reduce inflation and interest rates in the long run. Large
budget deficits must be financed in
credit markets, because the Federal
Reserve cannot buy large amounts
of government debt without creating excess money growth. To
lower interest rates, the budget deficit must be reduced, and money
supply growth must be limited to a
non-inflationary rate.

The Monetary
Targets in 1984
by William T. Gavin

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OR 44101

••

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

BULK RATE

U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OR
Permit No. 385

Every February, the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors reports to Congress on
the economy and presents objectives for monetary policy for the
coming year. The chairman's
reports are required by the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins).
In July, the chairman reviews the
current years' objectives and presents tentative objectives for the
next year. These objectives are
stated as annual target ranges for
growth in the supply of money
and credit. As Chairman Paul A.
Volcker stated in his February 1984
report, "The ranges for 1984 are
intended to be consistent with the
basic policy objective of achieving
long-lasting economic expansion in
a context of continuing control of
inflationary pressures"!

-

Economist William T Gavin works in the area 0/
monetary theory and monetary policy lor the
Federal Reserve Bank 0/ Cleveland. June Gates
provided research assistance lor this article.
The views stated herein are those 0/ the author
and not necessarily those 0/ the Federal Reserve
Bank 0/ Cleveland or 0/ the Board 0/ Governors
0/ the Federal Reserve System.

ISSN 0428-1276
March 26, 1984

Table 1

a

Objectives for Money and Credit for 1984

Ranges in percent

1984 ranges

Tentative
1984 ranges,
set July 1983

M·2

6.0 to 9.0

6.5 to 9.5

7.0 to 10.Ob

M·3

6.0 to 9.0

6.0 to 9.0

6.5 to 9.5

M·l

4.0 to 8.0

4.0 to 8.0

5.0 to 9.0c

Monetary
aggregate

1983 ranges,
set July 1983

a. Ranges apply to periods from fourth quarter to fourth quarter, except as specified.
b. Range applies to period from February-March 1983 to fourth quarter of 1983.
c. Range applies to period from second quarter of 1983 to fourth quarter of 1983.
SOURCE: "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1984, p. 69.

Not many years ago, economists
believed policy makers had to accept
trade-offs between unemployment
and inflation. Today, most economists have come to agree that this
trade-off-if it exists at all-is only
a short-run phenomenon. The experience of the last 20 years suggests
that more inflation leads to more
uncertainty and less efficiency in
the economy. Current Federal
Reserve policy is based, in part, on
the premise that the best way to
increase potential real output and
reduce unemployment over the long
haul is to eliminate inflation. As
Chairman Volcker stated, "In a
real sense, the greatest contribution that the Federal Reserve itself
can make to our lasting prosperity
is to foster the expectation-and

1. See "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress;' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 70, no. 2
(February 1984), p. 71.

the reality-that
we can sustain
the hard-won gains against inflation and build upon them.?
The 1984 Targets
In his recent testimony, Chairman
Volcker presented targets consistent with a continuation of the Federal Reserve strategy of gradual
reduction of growth in the supply
of money and credit. The targets
for 1984 were set 0.5 percent to
1 percent below the target ranges
for 1983 (see table 1). The 1984
target range for M-1 is 4 percent to
8 percent. This current target is
1 percent below the 5 percent to
9 percent range chosen for the
second half of 1983 and the same

2. Statement of Paul A. Vo1cker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before Committee on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives,
February 7, 1984, p. 17. See also "Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress:' pp. 100-01.