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August 1, 2001

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

From Market Failure to Market-Based
Solution: Policy Lessons from Clean Air
Legislation
by Eduard A. Pelz and Terry J. Fitzgerald
FIGURE 1 STATES’ SHARES OF NATIONAL SULFUR DIOXIDE
OUTPUT, 2000a

The history of clean air legislation in the
United States provides an excellent case
study of the effectiveness of marketbased environmental policy. Here we
focus specifically on legislation intended
to lower sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions,
one of the main contributors to acid rain.

6.5%–11%
4.5%–6.5%
2.5%–4.5%
0.5%–2.5%
0%–0.5%

a. Emissions from all plants covered under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
SOURCE: Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Markets Program Emissions Scorecard 2000,
Appendix A and Table A2.

E

nergy policy in the United States has
once again taken center stage in politics,
in the media, and in our daily lives.
California’s electricity shortage, along
with dramatic increases earlier this year
in natural gas and gasoline prices, has
re-ignited a national debate on the need
for increased energy production. At the
same time, national and global environmental concerns about the by-products of
energy production and consumption
continue to build.
Policymakers face the difficult task of
creating regulations that both accommodate the steadily rising demand for energy
ISSN 0428-1276

How can the United States balance its
need for increased energy production
with national and global environmental concerns? This Economic
Commentary argues that competitive
markets can be used to address
environmental needs without placing
an excessive burden on citizens.

and address the associated environmental
hazards. Competitive, unrestricted energy
markets are often viewed as part of the
problem, implying that restricting market
forces through government mandates is
part of the solution. This is one view of
the current situation in California.
This Commentary takes an opposing view,
arguing that competitive markets should
not be seen as the enemy; rather, they can
be a valuable ally in formulating effective
energy and environmental policies. We
argue that markets can be used to address
environmental concerns without placing
an excessive burden on citizens through
dramatically higher energy prices or a
sustained economic slowdown.

Acid rain legislation is of particular interest in the Fourth Federal Reserve District.
The states that comprise the Fourth
District—Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
and West Virginia—have accounted for
roughly one-third of national SO2 emissions since 1980 (see figure 1). Ohio has
been the single largest producer of SO2
during this time period, averaging about
12 percent of the national total. Clearly,
policies intended to reduce SO2 emissions will have a disproportionate impact
on our regional economy.

■

The Economics of Clean Air

While competitive markets generally
provide an unparalleled mechanism for
pricing and allocating resources, there are
situations in which markets can produce
inefficient or undesirable outcomes. Such
market failures are often the rationale for
government intervention. But even when
market failures exist, intervention does
not guarantee a better outcome. Intervention can, in fact, lead to substantially
worse outcomes.

In the case of energy production, market
failure stems from what economists refer
to as a negative externality: Some costs
of generating electricity are not borne by
the producers. One such cost is that a
harmful by-product—pollution—is created in the process. Yet producers do not
pay for the adverse effects of their emissions, which results in a misallocation of
resources from a societal point of view.
Specifically, too much pollution is likely
to be generated.
Historically, air pollution legislation has
used one of two general approaches,
“command and control” or “cap and
trade.” Command-and-control strategies
typically require a specific action be taken
and are enforced by regulatory agencies.
Examples include limits on the amount of
lead in gasoline and the requirement that
cars use catalytic converters.
Cap-and-trade programs, on the other
hand, do not mandate specific behaviors.
Instead, they cap the total allowable
pollution and provide an equal amount of
“allowances” or “rights” to emit a specific quantity of pollution. Each producer
decides how much electricity to produce
and how to produce it, but they must own
or purchase pollution allowances covering their individual emissions. In other
words, the cap-and-trade strategy creates
a new market (in pollution rights) to
address failures in the existing market.
Economists have long argued that capand-trade strategies are, under the right
circumstances, a cost-effective way to
abate pollution.1 The economics are
straightforward: Producers face varying
costs of lowering pollution emissions.
Clearly, it is more cost effective to allow
producers who can reduce their pollution
cheaply to do the bulk of the abatement,
rather than forcing all producers to abate
equally. With marketable pollution
allowances, those that can reduce emissions at the lowest cost will do so, while
those facing high treatment or prevention
costs can purchase additional pollution
allowances on the open market.
The key to any successful pollutioncontrol program is to correctly align
economic incentives with the desired
pollution-abatement outcomes. Relying
on the good will of producers and their
shareholders to voluntarily adopt costly
abatement procedures in the face of
market competition is unrealistic. Therefore, the program must offer the proper

incentives—incentives that will lead
producers, behaving in their own best
interest, to achieve the abatement goals.

■

Lessons from the 1970s
Legislation2

Clean air legislation of the 1970s was
dominated by a variety of commandand-control programs. At best, this
legislation had mixed results, and, at
worst, it exacerbated pollution by
creating incentives that increased SO2
emissions or accentuated their effects.
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
limited the emissions of all new electricgenerating facilities to a fixed rate per
unit of heat input (a measure of the
amount of fuel burned to generate
electricity). The amendments created a
significant discrepancy between the
amount of emissions that new generating
facilities could produce and the amount
that facilities built before the legislation
could produce. It was thought that emissions could be reduced through normal
plant attrition as existing facilities—
which often had much higher emission
rates—were replaced by newer, more
efficient plants. In retrospect, it is not
surprising that “normal” plant attrition
did not occur during this period; in fact,
grandfathering the existing plants created such powerful financial incentives
that many continued to operate far
longer than expected.
The 1970 act also required states to
develop plans that outlined the actions
they would take to meet the new standards. As part of their plans, some states
mandated that tall smokestacks be built
at certain plants to disperse emissions
over a wider area, thereby reducing local
SO2 concentrations. The tall stacks did
reduce SO2 locally, but they often
increased pollution in other areas. Ironically, they also carried emissions higher
into the atmosphere, facilitating the
chemical processes that cause acid rain.
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
adopted a “percent reduction” formula,
which required the removal of a percentage of potential SO2 emissions,
determined by the sulfur content of the
fuel. This effectively required all new
coal plants, regardless of their actual
emissions, to remove sulfur from their
postcombustion exhaust by a process
called flue-gas desulfurization, or
“scrubbing,” which requires extensive
capital investment.3 Because the revised

1977 amendments required lowering
potential SO2 emissions, the relatively
inexpensive strategy of switching to
coals with lower sulfur content (and
thus lower SO2 emissions) would no
longer satisfy the requirements.
While hindsight makes the flaws in
this early legislation clear, the difficulty
of forecasting such flaws should not be
underestimated. This is especially true
of rigid command-and-control strategies. The Acid Rain Program created
by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
represented a different approach to
pollution abatement, away from the
command-and-control strategies of the
1970s and toward a more flexible,
market-based approach.

■

Lessons from the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments

Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments was the first significant
attempt to use marketable pollution
allowances—a cap-and-trade strategy—
to reduce pollution. Title IV established
the Acid Rain Program, which sought
substantial reductions in SO2 and was to
be accomplished in two phases (beginning January 1, 1995, and January 1,
2000) with progressively stricter emissions standards.
The goal of the SO2 emissions-trading
program was to reduce aggregate
national emissions to about half their
1980 levels—around 18 million tons—
by 2000, and to limit annual emissions
to roughly 9 million tons thereafter.
Pollution allowances, which authorize
the holder to emit one ton of SO2 during
or after the issuing year, were allocated
to plants that were required to participate. Allocation was based on historic
heat input multiplied by a prescribed
emission rate (though numerous special
provisions provided exceptions to this
rule). Compliance required each source
to remit allowances equal to their annual
output of SO2 at the end of each year.
Extra allowances could be “banked” for
future use or sold on the open market.
During Phase I, 261 high-emission,
mostly coal-fired generating units
(referred to as “Table 1 units,” after the
legislation) were required to participate.
Phase II expanded the program’s coverage to include about 1,600 new units and
more than halved the emission rate used
to calculate allowance allocations.4

FIGURE 2 EFFECTS OF THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
ON NATIONAL SULFUR DIOXIDE OUTPUT
Millions of tons of SO2
20

Phase I

18

Phase II and beyond

Table 1 emissions
Non–Table 1 emissions
Phase II emissions
Emissions cap

16
14
12
10
8
6
4

It might appear that Phase II will not be
as successful as Phase I because the
emissions target was exceeded in 2000.
However, to say so misses a fundamental
point of emissions trading: Compliance
is determined by whether a unit remits
the requisite number of allowances
during a given year—using banked
allowances of an earlier vintage is completely acceptable. Emissions cannot
exceed the cap for very long because the
number of banked allowances is limited
and the penalty for noncompliance is
much greater than an allowance’s current
market value.7 From an environmental
perspective, it is more important that
total Title IV emissions declined more
than 10 percent in 2000, despite having
exceeded the cap.

2

■

0

Cap-and-trade strategies should not
be construed as an environmental
panacea. However, the history of clean
air legislation clearly demonstrates the
usefulness of harnessing market forces
to address market failures, and the
hazards of inflexible policies that do
not adequately consider such forces—
a lesson that policymakers would do
well to heed.

1980

1985

1990

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2010+

SOURCES: Emissions data are from the Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Markets
Program Emissions Scorecard 2000, Table A2, excepting 1995 and 1996, which are from the EPA’s
1996 Acid Rain Program Compliance Report. Allowance data are from the 1995–99 Acid Rain Program
Compliance Reports. Phase I, Table 1 emissions are from the EPA Clean Air Markets Program
Emissions Scorecard 1999.

The program’s success is evidenced by a
striking statistic: Table 1 units reduced
SO2 emissions from 9.4 million tons in
1980 to 4.3 million tons in 1999 (see figure 2). Furthermore, all participants were
fully compliant throughout Phase I.
SO2 emissions at Table 1 units dropped
nearly 40 percent in the first year alone,
from 7.4 million tons in 1994 to 4.5 million tons in 1995. After a slight increase
in 1996, they continued their downward
trend during the last two years of Phase I.
In contrast, SO2 emissions at non–Table 1
units increased nearly 11 percent over the
same period.
Why was the SO2 emissions-trading
program so successful in reducing emissions during Phase I? Most analysts
attribute its success to the versatility of
the market-based system. The program’s
flexibility allowed producers to take
advantage of fortuitous developments
that made switching from high-sulfur to
low-sulfur coals relatively inexpensive.
These developments included declining
shipping costs due to deregulation of the
transportation industry and lower-thanexpected modification costs at highsulfur-generating units. More than half
of Table 1 units used fuel switching or
fuel blending to achieve SO2 reductions
in 1995, accounting for 59 percent of
total reductions.5

There is a great deal of evidence that producers behaved exactly as the theory
predicted. First, many electric utilities
took advantage of the unexpected cost
savings from switching to low-sulfur
coal. Second, producers followed vastly
different strategies to meet the requirements—almost certainly due to differing
costs of pollution-abatement strategies.
On average, generating units chose to
overcomply (that is, reduce their emissions below the number of allocated
allowances) by 29 percent per year during Phase I. A handful of electric utilities
dramatically reduced their emissions,
allowing them to sell their pollution
allowances to producers who chose little
or no abatement, or to bank them for
future use during Phase I or during the
more stringent Phase II that began in
2000. In fact, four plants accounted for
25 percent of the overall emission reduction in 1997.6
Phase II initiated a new era of SO2
regulation in terms of emissions standards and scope. Preliminary estimates
for 2000 indicate that SO2 emissions
exceeded the 8.9 million ton cap by
22 percent, requiring plants to remit two
million banked allowances. The Fourth
District alone exceeded its annual
allocated allowances by more than
1.3 million tons (63 percent) last year.

Conclusions

What is often called “deregulation,” for
example, did not create unfettered competitive energy markets in California. By
installing caps on the retail price of
electricity, deregulators likely discouraged investment in new generating
capacity. Price caps—along with the
larger California regulatory environment—are largely responsible for the
state’s current dilemma. But one cannot
blame markets for bad policy.
Carbon dioxide, a so-called greenhouse
gas, provides a similar opportunity to
apply the cap-and-trade strategy. The
Kyoto Protocol contains just such a
provision and, although the United
States declined to participate, there is
some discussion of U.S. participation in
an alternative cap-and-trade program.
Striking a balance between our evergrowing energy needs and environmental protection is a thorny problem. There
is inherent tension between these goals,
and trade-offs must inevitably be faced.
Furthermore, technology, energy
demands, and our understanding of the
environmental impact of our past and
current decisions are all constantly
evolving.8 In this dynamic environment,
policymakers must develop flexible

policies that effectively address the tradeoffs and limit adverse consequences on
the economy and its people. Markets
should be viewed as a powerful ally in
this difficult balancing act, not the enemy.

■

Footnotes

1. John Dales, Pollution Property and Prices,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

(note 2). Some emissions reductions would
surely have occurred due to the cost effectiveness of fuel switching, even without the
Acid Rain Program. Independent statistical
analysis estimates that about 36 percent of
emissions reductions in 1995–97 are linked
to the spread of low-sulfur coal, independent
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(Ellerman et al. [note 2]).
6. Ellerman et al. (note 2), p. 128.

2. Examples and history are drawn from
Denny A. Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean
Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000;
Richard Schmalansee et al., “An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12,
no. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 56–68; and Energy
Information Administration, “The Effects of
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 on Electric Utilities: An Update,” March
1997, DOE/EIA-0582(97).
3. A scrubber, usually a separate facility,
passes gas from combusting fuel through
tanks containing materials that capture and
neutralize the sulfur.
4. See the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Clean Air Markets Program, www.epa.gov/
airmarkets.

7. As of July 2001, current-vintage
allowances are trading around $200. The
penalty for noncompliance is $2,000 per
ton of SO2.
8. One recent study finds that significant
declines in acid rain have occurred since the
1970s legislation, but the environment’s
capacity to neutralize acid has also declined.
See Hubbard Brooks Research Foundation,
“Acid Rain Revisited: Advances in Scientific
Understanding since the Passage of the 1970
and 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
Science Links, vol. 1, no. 1 (2000), pp.1–20.

Eduard A. Pelz is a senior economic
research analyst at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. Terry J. Fitzgerald is
an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland.
The views expressed here are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, or its staff.
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We invite comments, questions, and suggestions. E-mail us at editor@clev.frb.org.

5. See Energy Information Administration

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