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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

December 1, 1986
ISSN 042R-1276

ECONOMIC
COMMENTARY
Labor costs are often cited as the primary hindrance to economic development in cities where wages are high
and as a spur to development in cities
where wages are 10w.1 The relationship
between labor costs and growth is complex, however. Many high-wage cities do
experience a decline in growth, but
others do not. Similarly, many low-wage
cities grow rapidly, but some do not.
These patterns are illustrated in table
1 for selected cities in the United States,
including some of the major cities in
the Fourth Federal Reserve Bank District.! Akron, Detroit, Chicago, Gary,
and Cleveland were all high-wage cities
in 1974, and they experienced lowerthan-average employment growth in the
subsequent decade. Similarly, Dallas,
Fort Worth, Greensboro, and Tampa
were all low-wage cities in 1974, and
they experienced higher-than-average employment growth over the same period.
Contrary patterns are equally evident.
San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and
Columbus were high-wage cities in
1974, but they continued to experience
higher-than-average employment
growth. Similarly, Birmingham and
Norfolk experienced lower-than-average
employment growth despite low labor
costs in 1974.
In this Economic Commentary, we
examine the complex relationship
between labor costs and economic
growth-first,
by exploring some of the
major causes of labor cost differentials;

Randall W. Eberts is an assistant vice president
and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. Joe A. Stone is the W. E. Miner Professor of Economics at the University of Oregon. The
authors thank Michael Fogarty and Mark Sniderman for their helpful comments.
The views stated herein are those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.

Labor Cost
Differentials:
Causes and
Consequences
by Randall W. Eberts
and Joe A. Stone

Table 1 Labor Costs and Employment Growth for Selected Cities
Low Labor Costs (1974)

High
Employment
Growth
(1974·84)

Low
Employment
Growth
(1974-83)

High Labor Costs (1974)

Dallas
Fort Worth
Greensboro
Tampa

San Francisco
San Jose
Seattle
Los Angeles
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Columbus

Birmingham
Norfolk

Akron
Detroit
Chicago
Gary
Cleveland

NOTE: Cities in bold are in the Fourth Federal Reserve Bank District.
SOURCE: Eberts and Stone (1986a).

and second, by investigating their consequences. Our central point throughout is that labor costs not only help
determine rates of economic growth,
but also respond to growth.
Many of the issues we discuss were
raised by participants in a recent conference of labor economists, community
business leaders, and union representatives sponsored by the Center for
Regional Economic Issues at Case
Western Reserve University and by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland."
We conclude with a brief discussion of
local policy issues related to labor cost
differentials and economic development.

1. Labor costs and wages are used interchangeably. Differences between the two are discussed
later in the paper.
2. Measures of wage differentials are from Eberts
and Stone (1986a) and are adjusted for skill differences in the work force.
3. The papers presented at this conference and
the conference discussions are summarized in
Eberts and Stone (1986b).

Causes of Labor Cost Differentials
Like most prices, wages are determined
primarily by market forces. Two persistent and powerful forces affect
wages. People move to places that
improve their well-being through
higher income and a more amenable
environment. Firms seek locations that
minimize costs and increase productivity. If, for some reason, wages and
other employment compensation are
higher in one region than another, people will have increased incentives to
move to the higher-wage area. When

they do move, the number of workers
declines in the place they left and increases in their new location. If all
other factors are constant, the result is
a wage increase in their hometown and
a wage decrease in their destination.
But the same high wages that attract
workers may deter business formation.
As firms leave an area, labor demand
falls and wage rates decrease. Both
forces, working together, tend to equalize wages across regions.
If this simple explanation of regional
wage determination is accurate, then
why would we ever observe wage differences in different parts of the country?
Indeed, if we do observe differences, why
not just attribute them to some temporary disturbance, which eventually
will dissipate as workers seek higherpaying jobs and firms seek lower-wage
areas? The answer to both questions is
that although this simple explanation
is a useful starting point, it rests upon
a number of unrealistic assumptions.
One such assumption is that workers
and firms respond only to wage incentives when deciding where to move.
Workers seek locations that increase
their well-being. In addition to wages,
workers consider climate, recreational
features, quality of the school system,
income maintenance programs, and
other local attributes. Consequently,
people may be willing to accept lower
wages in an area that offers positive
amenities and may wish to be compensated with higher wages for living in
an area with disamenities.
Firms view site characteristics in a
similar manner. They are able to offer
higher wages in areas that provide
attributes that improve productivity
and that still remain competitive with
low-wage areas that do not have the
same productivity advantages.
It is also assumed that workers are
perfectly mobile. In reality, workers
become attached to their jobs, families,
and friends, or find it difficult to sell
their houses even when job opportunities look much brighter in another area.
A firm's mobility also has limitations,
due to its capital investments and proximity to customers and supplies. Before
a firm decides to locate in an area, it
weighs benefits such as proximity to
markets, availability of raw materials,
and quality of public services.

Table 2 Skill Differentials for Selected Cities
(Percentage above or below national average)
City (SMSA)

1974

1983

Change

Seattle
San Jose
Cleveland
Detroit
Birmingham
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Fort Worth
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Dallas
Chicago
Columbus
Greensboro
Norfolk
Tampa
Gary
Akron

15.3
10.3
6.9
6.5
4.8
4.7
3.9
2.4
2.3
2.0
0.4
-0.4
-0.5
-0.5
-2.0
-2.4
-4.1

7.2
10.3
1.9
-0.2
1.8
0.6
-0.4
2.3
7.3
4.2
4.1
0.1
-1.9
0.0
-1.0
-4.8
2.7

-8.1
0.0
-5.0
-6.7
-3.0
-4.1
-3.5
-0.1
5.0
2.2
3.7
0.5
-1.4
0.5
1.0
-2.4
6.8

NOTE: Cities in bold are in the Fourth Federal Reserve Bank District.
SOURCE: Eberts and Stone (1986a).

Another assumption is that there is
perfect information to match jobs with
job-seekers. A job-seeker can find considerable information about nearby
employment opportunities in local
newspapers and employment offices.
However, it is much more difficult to
discover openings in other cities and
states. The firm is in a similar situation. It may know that wages are lower
in another area, but it may not know
whether that area also has the right
level and mix of skills.
Because of factors limiting mobility
and the nonwage aspects of the location
decision, migration between areas may
not completely equalize wages. Can
wages that are higher than the national
average be sustained over time? Or will
an area lose firms and gain workers, perhaps in excess of available jobs, until
wages fall back in line? In some periods
of United States history, notably from
1919 to 1929, regional wage differentials
not only were sustained, but also continued to grow. Capital and other

resources continued to flow into highwage areas, but worker in-migration
was not large enough to lower or even
hold relative wages constant. Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and
other North Central cities continued to
grow, even with high wages.
Why did wage differentials continue
to increase? The most likely explanation
lies in the dominance of very large-scale,
capital-intensive industries, combined
with proximity to markets, high relative
rates of technological change in the geographically concentrated industries, and
increasing importance of site-specific
characteristics. In more recent decades,
some of these forces have been reversed
- efficient firm size has been declining
in most industries; proximity to markets
and suppliers is a less critical issue for
plant location; and relative rates of
technological change have shifted in
favor of previously lower-wage regions.
Skills and technology. At the most
fundamental level, labor cost differentials arise primarily from differences in
labor skills and technical productivity.

Worker skills are acquired through
formal education, on-the-job training,
and the worker's own talents and ingenuity. Many skills can be transferred
from one job to another, but others are
specific to particular jobs. When comparing wage differentials between
regions, one should account for skill
differences in the labor force. In a labor
market context, "skill" has two components: the specific talent or training
held by the worker, and the valuation
of that talent or training by the market.
Table 2 presents estimates of labor
skill differentials for the sample of cities listed in table 1. The four cities
with the highest skill differentials in
1974 are Seattle, San Jose, Cleveland,
and Detroit. By 1983, however, both
Cleveland and Detroit are much closer
to the national average, with the four
highest cities now being San Jose, San
Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas. The four
cities with the lowest skill differentials
in 1974 are Akron, Gary, Tampa, Norfolk, and Greensboro (Norfolk and
Greensboro are tied). By 1983, Akron
and Norfolk are no longer in the bottom
four, and are replaced by Fort Worth.
Technical productivity depends upon
a number of factors: the number of
machines and other resources available
to workers, the level of technology
contained in these machines, and the
scale of operation when the return to
scale is not constant. Luce (1986) has
found significant regional variations in
technical productivity.
For example, workers in highly
automated steel mills that utilize the
latest technology are much more productive, as measured by output per worker,
than workers in turn-of-the-century
steel mills. Therefore, the newer, more
technologically advanced mills pay
workers more than the older, less efficient mills. If the newer mills are concentrated in certain regions and the
older mills in others, then wage differentials may arise between these regions.
In addition, if geographically concentrated industries that were once subject to strong economies of scale decline
(or undergo changes that reduce the
economies of scale), labor cost differentials arising from the economies of
scale in these industries will erode.

Unionization differences. Of course,
factors unrelated to labor productivity
may also influence wages. In this case,
firms may not be getting a dollar's
worth of productivity for a dollar's
expenditure on labor. In particular,
labor unions may bargain wages that
exceed the value of labor's contribution
to output. Unions may also restrict
employment. Therefore, one would
expect heavily unionized areas to have
higher-than-average wages, but lowerthan-average employment growth.
Clearly, union membership is not distributed evenly across the country. The
percentage of Ohio's manufacturing
workers unionized, for example, is nearly three times the percentage unionized
in the high-growth states of California,
Florida, Georgia, and even Massachusetts.
Table 3 presents the proportion of all
workers organized in our sample of
major cities. If unions do have a significant effect on wages, then we would
observe significant wage differentials
between Ohio and the high-growth
states and among the cities in table 3,
other factors the same. In fact, a
number of researchers (including Jackson [1986] and Medoff [1986]) have
found that unionization rates are a significant determinant of regional labor
cost differentials.
Supplemental labor costs. The wage
differentials that we have considered so
far do not include supplemental labor
costs. Supplemental labor costs make
up, on average, 20 percent of total labor
costs and include such expenses as the
employer's contribution to Social
Security, worker's compensation, and
health and life insurance. Luce (1986)
has estimated a total labor cost index
for the 20-largest metropolitan areas.
He finds, for example, that Cleveland's
supplemental labor costs are 15 percent
higher than the national average, while
its simple wage index is only 9 percent
higher. When these two costs are combined, Cleveland's total labor costs are
10 percent above the national average.

Cleveland is not the only city whose
supplemental labor cost differential exceeds its simple wage differential. The
supplemental labor costs of the five cities sampled in the North Central region
average 10 percent higher than the
nation, while their wages average only
9 percent higher. Metropolitan areas in
the Northeast, on the other hand, have
lower supplemental labor costs than in
the rest of nation, while wages are only
slightly higher. In the South and West,
wages and supplemental labor costs are
on a par and average slightly less than
in the rest of the nation.
The result of all of this is that total
labor costs are dramatically higher in
the North Central region than in the
rest of the country, largely because of
the high employer expenditures on worker's compensation and health and life insurance benefits. These results are
somewhat overstated, however, since
the data available cannot account for differences in skills. Nonetheless, the reduction in regional wage differentials when
variations in skills are controlled for
may be offset somewhat by the region's
higher supplemental labor costs.
Convergence of labor costs. There is substantial evidence that regional differences in labor costs are converging. According to Eberts and Stone (1986a), the
variation in observed wage differentials
across metropolitan areas declined by
almost half from 1974 to 1983, and the
variation in the skill-adjusted differentials fell about one-fifth.
The observed wage differential is
composed of the skill-adjusted wage differential and a differential related to
differences in observed skills. Therefore, the fact that observed wages converged more than twice as much as
skill-adjusted wages suggests that
variations across metropolitan areas in
observed skill levels also declined during the period.
Why do we observe relatively strong
wage convergence during the 1974-1983
period? Earlier wage convergence in the
first decade after World War II appears
to have been the result of shifts in
labor supply resulting from regional
migration. More recently, however,

they do move, the number of workers
declines in the place they left and increases in their new location. If all
other factors are constant, the result is
a wage increase in their hometown and
a wage decrease in their destination.
But the same high wages that attract
workers may deter business formation.
As firms leave an area, labor demand
falls and wage rates decrease. Both
forces, working together, tend to equalize wages across regions.
If this simple explanation of regional
wage determination is accurate, then
why would we ever observe wage differences in different parts of the country?
Indeed, if we do observe differences, why
not just attribute them to some temporary disturbance, which eventually
will dissipate as workers seek higherpaying jobs and firms seek lower-wage
areas? The answer to both questions is
that although this simple explanation
is a useful starting point, it rests upon
a number of unrealistic assumptions.
One such assumption is that workers
and firms respond only to wage incentives when deciding where to move.
Workers seek locations that increase
their well-being. In addition to wages,
workers consider climate, recreational
features, quality of the school system,
income maintenance programs, and
other local attributes. Consequently,
people may be willing to accept lower
wages in an area that offers positive
amenities and may wish to be compensated with higher wages for living in
an area with disamenities.
Firms view site characteristics in a
similar manner. They are able to offer
higher wages in areas that provide
attributes that improve productivity
and that still remain competitive with
low-wage areas that do not have the
same productivity advantages.
It is also assumed that workers are
perfectly mobile. In reality, workers
become attached to their jobs, families,
and friends, or find it difficult to sell
their houses even when job opportunities look much brighter in another area.
A firm's mobility also has limitations,
due to its capital investments and proximity to customers and supplies. Before
a firm decides to locate in an area, it
weighs benefits such as proximity to
markets, availability of raw materials,
and quality of public services.

Table 2 Skill Differentials for Selected Cities
(Percentage above or below national average)
City (SMSA)

1974

1983

Change

Seattle
San Jose
Cleveland
Detroit
Birmingham
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Fort Worth
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Dallas
Chicago
Columbus
Greensboro
Norfolk
Tampa
Gary
Akron

15.3
10.3
6.9
6.5
4.8
4.7
3.9
2.4
2.3
2.0
0.4
-0.4
-0.5
-0.5
-2.0
-2.4
-4.1

7.2
10.3
1.9
-0.2
1.8
0.6
-0.4
2.3
7.3
4.2
4.1
0.1
-1.9
0.0
-1.0
-4.8
2.7

-8.1
0.0
-5.0
-6.7
-3.0
-4.1
-3.5
-0.1
5.0
2.2
3.7
0.5
-1.4
0.5
1.0
-2.4
6.8

NOTE: Cities in bold are in the Fourth Federal Reserve Bank District.
SOURCE: Eberts and Stone (1986a).

Another assumption is that there is
perfect information to match jobs with
job-seekers. A job-seeker can find considerable information about nearby
employment opportunities in local
newspapers and employment offices.
However, it is much more difficult to
discover openings in other cities and
states. The firm is in a similar situation. It may know that wages are lower
in another area, but it may not know
whether that area also has the right
level and mix of skills.
Because of factors limiting mobility
and the nonwage aspects of the location
decision, migration between areas may
not completely equalize wages. Can
wages that are higher than the national
average be sustained over time? Or will
an area lose firms and gain workers, perhaps in excess of available jobs, until
wages fall back in line? In some periods
of United States history, notably from
1919 to 1929, regional wage differentials
not only were sustained, but also continued to grow. Capital and other

resources continued to flow into highwage areas, but worker in-migration
was not large enough to lower or even
hold relative wages constant. Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and
other North Central cities continued to
grow, even with high wages.
Why did wage differentials continue
to increase? The most likely explanation
lies in the dominance of very large-scale,
capital-intensive industries, combined
with proximity to markets, high relative
rates of technological change in the geographically concentrated industries, and
increasing importance of site-specific
characteristics. In more recent decades,
some of these forces have been reversed
- efficient firm size has been declining
in most industries; proximity to markets
and suppliers is a less critical issue for
plant location; and relative rates of
technological change have shifted in
favor of previously lower-wage regions.
Skills and technology. At the most
fundamental level, labor cost differentials arise primarily from differences in
labor skills and technical productivity.

Worker skills are acquired through
formal education, on-the-job training,
and the worker's own talents and ingenuity. Many skills can be transferred
from one job to another, but others are
specific to particular jobs. When comparing wage differentials between
regions, one should account for skill
differences in the labor force. In a labor
market context, "skill" has two components: the specific talent or training
held by the worker, and the valuation
of that talent or training by the market.
Table 2 presents estimates of labor
skill differentials for the sample of cities listed in table 1. The four cities
with the highest skill differentials in
1974 are Seattle, San Jose, Cleveland,
and Detroit. By 1983, however, both
Cleveland and Detroit are much closer
to the national average, with the four
highest cities now being San Jose, San
Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas. The four
cities with the lowest skill differentials
in 1974 are Akron, Gary, Tampa, Norfolk, and Greensboro (Norfolk and
Greensboro are tied). By 1983, Akron
and Norfolk are no longer in the bottom
four, and are replaced by Fort Worth.
Technical productivity depends upon
a number of factors: the number of
machines and other resources available
to workers, the level of technology
contained in these machines, and the
scale of operation when the return to
scale is not constant. Luce (1986) has
found significant regional variations in
technical productivity.
For example, workers in highly
automated steel mills that utilize the
latest technology are much more productive, as measured by output per worker,
than workers in turn-of-the-century
steel mills. Therefore, the newer, more
technologically advanced mills pay
workers more than the older, less efficient mills. If the newer mills are concentrated in certain regions and the
older mills in others, then wage differentials may arise between these regions.
In addition, if geographically concentrated industries that were once subject to strong economies of scale decline
(or undergo changes that reduce the
economies of scale), labor cost differentials arising from the economies of
scale in these industries will erode.

Unionization differences. Of course,
factors unrelated to labor productivity
may also influence wages. In this case,
firms may not be getting a dollar's
worth of productivity for a dollar's
expenditure on labor. In particular,
labor unions may bargain wages that
exceed the value of labor's contribution
to output. Unions may also restrict
employment. Therefore, one would
expect heavily unionized areas to have
higher-than-average wages, but lowerthan-average employment growth.
Clearly, union membership is not distributed evenly across the country. The
percentage of Ohio's manufacturing
workers unionized, for example, is nearly three times the percentage unionized
in the high-growth states of California,
Florida, Georgia, and even Massachusetts.
Table 3 presents the proportion of all
workers organized in our sample of
major cities. If unions do have a significant effect on wages, then we would
observe significant wage differentials
between Ohio and the high-growth
states and among the cities in table 3,
other factors the same. In fact, a
number of researchers (including Jackson [1986] and Medoff [1986]) have
found that unionization rates are a significant determinant of regional labor
cost differentials.
Supplemental labor costs. The wage
differentials that we have considered so
far do not include supplemental labor
costs. Supplemental labor costs make
up, on average, 20 percent of total labor
costs and include such expenses as the
employer's contribution to Social
Security, worker's compensation, and
health and life insurance. Luce (1986)
has estimated a total labor cost index
for the 20-largest metropolitan areas.
He finds, for example, that Cleveland's
supplemental labor costs are 15 percent
higher than the national average, while
its simple wage index is only 9 percent
higher. When these two costs are combined, Cleveland's total labor costs are
10 percent above the national average.

Cleveland is not the only city whose
supplemental labor cost differential exceeds its simple wage differential. The
supplemental labor costs of the five cities sampled in the North Central region
average 10 percent higher than the
nation, while their wages average only
9 percent higher. Metropolitan areas in
the Northeast, on the other hand, have
lower supplemental labor costs than in
the rest of nation, while wages are only
slightly higher. In the South and West,
wages and supplemental labor costs are
on a par and average slightly less than
in the rest of the nation.
The result of all of this is that total
labor costs are dramatically higher in
the North Central region than in the
rest of the country, largely because of
the high employer expenditures on worker's compensation and health and life insurance benefits. These results are
somewhat overstated, however, since
the data available cannot account for differences in skills. Nonetheless, the reduction in regional wage differentials when
variations in skills are controlled for
may be offset somewhat by the region's
higher supplemental labor costs.
Convergence of labor costs. There is substantial evidence that regional differences in labor costs are converging. According to Eberts and Stone (1986a), the
variation in observed wage differentials
across metropolitan areas declined by
almost half from 1974 to 1983, and the
variation in the skill-adjusted differentials fell about one-fifth.
The observed wage differential is
composed of the skill-adjusted wage differential and a differential related to
differences in observed skills. Therefore, the fact that observed wages converged more than twice as much as
skill-adjusted wages suggests that
variations across metropolitan areas in
observed skill levels also declined during the period.
Why do we observe relatively strong
wage convergence during the 1974-1983
period? Earlier wage convergence in the
first decade after World War II appears
to have been the result of shifts in
labor supply resulting from regional
migration. More recently, however,

wage convergence appears to be related
to factors associated with labor
demand. These factors include investment mobility, the expanding scope of
most product markets (both domestically and internationally), the declining
importance of geographic proximity
(both in production and in sales),
increased competition faced by geographically concentrated firms that
may have had some power to influence
price, the relative decline of industries
whose products use relatively large
amounts of local natural resources, and
the emergence of manufacturing industries that require smaller-scale plants.
The results of wage convergence tend
to help high-wage cities for two reasons. First, as wages converge, firms
searching for a new location will not
view these cities as exceptionally highwage labor markets. Second, the overall
reduction in regional wage variation
makes it less advantageous for firms to
search for low-wage areas, since the
relative cost savings are smaller.
The causes of wage convergence, on
the other hand, tend to hurt high-wage
cities. If convergence occurs because
productive firms leave the area, lowering the demand for workers and, consequently, lowering the wage rate, then a
paradox emerges: High wage rates encourage firm and household decisions
that tend to reduce the wage differential
so that wage differentials are less important over time. Some people may consider this a "shaking out" of an area's
less productive or desirable firms. Yet,
an exodus of firms large enough to
reduce noticeably the area's wage rates
warns potential entrants that something may be wrong with the area.

Table 3 Unionization Rates of All Workers in Selected
Metropolitan Areas
Metropolitan Area

Los Angeles
Chicago
Detroit
San Francisco
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Dallas
Seattle
Cincinnati
San Jose
Tampa
Columbus
Fort Worth
Birmingham
Norfolk
Akron
Gary
Greensboro

Percent Unionized
1977

1981

25.2
28.6
40.3
32.8
34.0
33.1
26.6
9.6
27.8
24.1
20.3
9.8
21.6
12.0
22.4
21.9
38.5
45.1
8.2

18.9
23.9
31.4
26.4
39.1
27.1
16.0
8.1
33.0
25.7
15.6
11.4
22.3
13.2
17.2
7.2
23.8
49.7
3.7

NOTES: Unionization rates are based on union membership for all civilian workers. Cities in bold
are in the Fourth Federal Reserve Bank District.
SOURCE: Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985).

Consequences of Labor
Cost Differentials
We concentrate on three broad consequences of regional labor cost differences - their effect on the demand for
labor, on the demand for equipment
and structures, and on business openings. We have already discussed the
effect of regional wage differentials on
the supply of labor and regional migration. Now we focus on firm behavior.
Our basic premise is that if wages
differ significantly across regions, then
firms, in seeking to maximize profits,
adjust the quantity of labor and capital
they employ in the short run and
decide the location of their operations
in the long run.
For example, firms in metropolitan
areas with higher-than-average wages
will use relatively less labor than firms
in low-wage areas in order to minimize

production costs. If costs still remain
higher than they would be in lowerwage areas, then new firms will tend to
choose lower-cost areas and existing
firms may decide to relocate.
'
Unions and employment. Montgomery
(1986) considers the effect of regional
differences in unionism on employment. He finds that employed workers
in cities where unions are stronger are
less likely to have full-time jobs than
workers in cities with weaker union
strength. He measures union strength
as the combined effect of the percentage of workers unionized in the city
and the union wage premium in the
area. The probability that an average
employed worker has a full-time job
rather than a part-time job is about 8
percent lower in Cleveland, for example, than in the city with the lowest

union strength. He interprets this finding to suggest that increases in union
wages might have a larger effect on
hours worked per week or on the mix
of full-time and part-time jobs than on
the total number of jobs.
Montgomery also finds that the
union's detrimental effect on employment varies among types of workers.
Men between the ages of 25 and 54, for
example, are less likely to lose their
full-time jobs because of strong unions
than are teen-agers, men 20 to 24 years
old, and women 25 to 54 years old. Placing the union effect on employment in
perspective, however, Montgomery
concludes that the union effect is
dwarfed in importance by other factors
such as schooling, experience, and local
labor-market conditions.
Net capital formation. If firms cut
back on labor in areas where unions
are strong and wages high, then they
must substitute some other factor of
production if output is held at the same
level. Garofalo and Fogarty (1986) consider the effect of labor costs on
investment in 16 Midwestern metropolitan areas. They estimate that net
investment in these cities would have
been $2.8 billion higher over the period
1970-1978 if their labor costs had
equaled the national average.
Business openings. Another important
issue is how relative differences in input prices affect firms' expectations
about the longer-run profitability of
locating production in an area. Eberts
(1984) looks at the effects of regional
wage differentials on firms' location decisions. In particular, he uses metropolitan area data on business openings
compiled by the Small Business Administration and relates them to differences
across metropolitan areas in wages and
unionization. Results show that areas
with higher wages have fewer business
openings. These estimates net out
regional differences in labor quality,
energy prices, tax rates, size of the
labor market, right-to-work laws,
unionization, and regional location.
An interesting finding is the relative
strength of wage and union variables in
explaining business openings. Where
wages are high, numbers of openings

are low; the same is true for unionization. Even with labor costs held constant, unionization has a dominant
depressing effect on business openings.
It appears, therefore, that the perceived
total costs to management of operating
in a union environment far outweigh
the costs of higher union wages alone.
Thus, businesses may avoid locating in
highly unionized areas even when
wages are the same.
Policy Issues
Where does this discussion of labor cost
differentials leave us? We have found
that wages differ significantly across
regions, that these differentials are
partly explained by regional differences
in worker skills and union membership, and that wage and skill differentials appear to be diminishing over
time. Significantly, high-wage areas
have lower rates of investment in new
equipment and structures and fewer
business openings.
Is the economic decline experienced
by older industrial cities a selfcorrecting process or is it a permanent
feature to be altered, if at all, through
public intervention? At least part of the
relative economic decline appears to be
self-correcting. As regional wage differentials narrow, they become a smaller
and smaller factor in determining plant
locations, expansions, contractions, and
closings. Even though part of this wage
convergence results from a reduction in
worker skill differentials across
regions, workers in many older industrial cities are still more highly skilled
than the national average. The difference, however, has narrowed significantly, which should direct our attention to issues of education and training.
Furthermore, several trends adversely
affecting cities like Cleveland, Gary,
Akron, and Detroit have recently been
reversed. High energy prices are less
pernicious to growth in these cities
now than in recent years for two reasons: The energy intensity of production has declined in most industries,
making energy a less-critical factor in
production cost; and the real price of
energy has declined significantly from
its previous peak. Similarly, the
exchange value of the United States
dollar has declined recently, which

should improve the competitive position of trade-sensitive industries characterizing the economies of these cities.
On these grounds, therefore, prospects
look brighter than before.
Areas of concern do remain, however.
Much-higher-than-average rates of
unionization continue to deter new business formation, as do continuing problems induced by years of relative economic decline. These problems include
an eroding tax base, strong public service demands, and central city crime.
In examining appropriate local development policies to respond to these and
other problems, one can easily overlook
obvious policies that would promote competitiveness and economic growth: such
as offering the necessary range of public services and infrastructure at the
lowest feasible tax costs; structuring
the tax systems so that individuals and
firms have sufficient incentives to take
the risks associated with invention, innovation, and entrepreneurship; and providing individuals and firms with a relatively stable local environment conducive
to long-range planning and growth.
With regard to taxes, it is clear that
firms look not just at what they pay,
but also at what they get in return.
Encouragement of entrepreneurship,
invention, and innovation (both
through positive enticements and
through the elimination or reduction of
current impediments) would seem to be
an especially crucial issue for public
policy in many cities. Most economic
growth in the United States occurs
through technological change, and
there is no apparent reason to believe
that individual cities should be different in this regard.
In fact, many older industrial cities
formerly experienced high rates of technological innovation in key industries,
which no doubt was a central factor in
their earlier growth and high wages.
Even now, some industries usually
characterized as unproductive and
technologically obsolete are experiencing a renaissance. Cities that are home
to these industries are in a position to
share in this future prosperity.

References
Eberts, Randall W. "The Effects of Labor Cost
Differentials on Firm Location," Center for
Regional Economic Issues, Case Western
Reserve University, 1984.
Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone. "Metropolitan Wage Differentials: Can Cleveland Still
Compete?" Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. 1986 Quarter 2, pp. 2-8.
Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone. "Comparing Labor Costs," REI Review, September
1986, pp. 4-21.
Fogarty, Michael, and Gary Garofalo. "The Role
of Labor Costs in Regional Capital Formation," Center for Regional Economic Issues,
Case Western Reserve University, 1986.

Luce, Thomas. "The Effects of Supplemental
Income and Labor Productivity on Metropolitan Labor Cost Differentials," Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
1986 Quarter 2, pp. 9-16.
Medoff, James L. "Labor Market Conditions in
Ohio Versus the Rest of the United States:
1973-1984," Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1986 Quarter 1. pp. 24-30.
Montgomery, Edward. "The Impact of Regional
Difference in Unionism on Employment,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, 1986 Quarter 1. pp. 2-11.

Jackson, Lorie D. "The Changing Nature of
Regional Wage Differentials From 1975 to
1983," Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1986 Quarter I, pp. 12·23.
Kokkelenberg, Edward C., and Donna R. Sockell,
"Union Membership in the United States,
1973-1981," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 38 (luly 1985), pp. 497-543.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

Material may be reprinted provided that the
source is credited. Please send copies of reprinted
materials to the editor.

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OH
Permit No. 385

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
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P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

union strength. He interprets this finding to suggest that increases in union
wages might have a larger effect on
hours worked per week or on the mix
of full-time and part-time jobs than on
the total number of jobs.
Montgomery also finds that the
union's detrimental effect on employment varies among types of workers.
Men between the ages of 25 and 54, for
example, are less likely to lose their
full-time jobs because of strong unions
than are teen-agers, men 20 to 24 years
old, and women 25 to 54 years old. Placing the union effect on employment in
perspective, however, Montgomery
concludes that the union effect is
dwarfed in importance by other factors
such as schooling, experience, and local
labor-market conditions.
Net capital formation. If firms cut
back on labor in areas where unions
are strong and wages high, then they
must substitute some other factor of
production if output is held at the same
level. Garofalo and Fogarty (1986) consider the effect of labor costs on
investment in 16 Midwestern metropolitan areas. They estimate that net
investment in these cities would have
been $2.8 billion higher over the period
1970-1978 if their labor costs had
equaled the national average.
Business openings. Another important
issue is how relative differences in input prices affect firms' expectations
about the longer-run profitability of
locating production in an area. Eberts
(1984) looks at the effects of regional
wage differentials on firms' location decisions. In particular, he uses metropolitan area data on business openings
compiled by the Small Business Administration and relates them to differences
across metropolitan areas in wages and
unionization. Results show that areas
with higher wages have fewer business
openings. These estimates net out
regional differences in labor quality,
energy prices, tax rates, size of the
labor market, right-to-work laws,
unionization, and regional location.
An interesting finding is the relative
strength of wage and union variables in
explaining business openings. Where
wages are high, numbers of openings

are low; the same is true for unionization. Even with labor costs held constant, unionization has a dominant
depressing effect on business openings.
It appears, therefore, that the perceived
total costs to management of operating
in a union environment far outweigh
the costs of higher union wages alone.
Thus, businesses may avoid locating in
highly unionized areas even when
wages are the same.
Policy Issues
Where does this discussion of labor cost
differentials leave us? We have found
that wages differ significantly across
regions, that these differentials are
partly explained by regional differences
in worker skills and union membership, and that wage and skill differentials appear to be diminishing over
time. Significantly, high-wage areas
have lower rates of investment in new
equipment and structures and fewer
business openings.
Is the economic decline experienced
by older industrial cities a selfcorrecting process or is it a permanent
feature to be altered, if at all, through
public intervention? At least part of the
relative economic decline appears to be
self-correcting. As regional wage differentials narrow, they become a smaller
and smaller factor in determining plant
locations, expansions, contractions, and
closings. Even though part of this wage
convergence results from a reduction in
worker skill differentials across
regions, workers in many older industrial cities are still more highly skilled
than the national average. The difference, however, has narrowed significantly, which should direct our attention to issues of education and training.
Furthermore, several trends adversely
affecting cities like Cleveland, Gary,
Akron, and Detroit have recently been
reversed. High energy prices are less
pernicious to growth in these cities
now than in recent years for two reasons: The energy intensity of production has declined in most industries,
making energy a less-critical factor in
production cost; and the real price of
energy has declined significantly from
its previous peak. Similarly, the
exchange value of the United States
dollar has declined recently, which

should improve the competitive position of trade-sensitive industries characterizing the economies of these cities.
On these grounds, therefore, prospects
look brighter than before.
Areas of concern do remain, however.
Much-higher-than-average rates of
unionization continue to deter new business formation, as do continuing problems induced by years of relative economic decline. These problems include
an eroding tax base, strong public service demands, and central city crime.
In examining appropriate local development policies to respond to these and
other problems, one can easily overlook
obvious policies that would promote competitiveness and economic growth: such
as offering the necessary range of public services and infrastructure at the
lowest feasible tax costs; structuring
the tax systems so that individuals and
firms have sufficient incentives to take
the risks associated with invention, innovation, and entrepreneurship; and providing individuals and firms with a relatively stable local environment conducive
to long-range planning and growth.
With regard to taxes, it is clear that
firms look not just at what they pay,
but also at what they get in return.
Encouragement of entrepreneurship,
invention, and innovation (both
through positive enticements and
through the elimination or reduction of
current impediments) would seem to be
an especially crucial issue for public
policy in many cities. Most economic
growth in the United States occurs
through technological change, and
there is no apparent reason to believe
that individual cities should be different in this regard.
In fact, many older industrial cities
formerly experienced high rates of technological innovation in key industries,
which no doubt was a central factor in
their earlier growth and high wages.
Even now, some industries usually
characterized as unproductive and
technologically obsolete are experiencing a renaissance. Cities that are home
to these industries are in a position to
share in this future prosperity.

References
Eberts, Randall W. "The Effects of Labor Cost
Differentials on Firm Location," Center for
Regional Economic Issues, Case Western
Reserve University, 1984.
Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone. "Metropolitan Wage Differentials: Can Cleveland Still
Compete?" Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. 1986 Quarter 2, pp. 2-8.
Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone. "Comparing Labor Costs," REI Review, September
1986, pp. 4-21.
Fogarty, Michael, and Gary Garofalo. "The Role
of Labor Costs in Regional Capital Formation," Center for Regional Economic Issues,
Case Western Reserve University, 1986.

Luce, Thomas. "The Effects of Supplemental
Income and Labor Productivity on Metropolitan Labor Cost Differentials," Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
1986 Quarter 2, pp. 9-16.
Medoff, James L. "Labor Market Conditions in
Ohio Versus the Rest of the United States:
1973-1984," Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1986 Quarter 1. pp. 24-30.
Montgomery, Edward. "The Impact of Regional
Difference in Unionism on Employment,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, 1986 Quarter 1. pp. 2-11.

Jackson, Lorie D. "The Changing Nature of
Regional Wage Differentials From 1975 to
1983," Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1986 Quarter I, pp. 12·23.
Kokkelenberg, Edward C., and Donna R. Sockell,
"Union Membership in the United States,
1973-1981," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 38 (luly 1985), pp. 497-543.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

Material may be reprinted provided that the
source is credited. Please send copies of reprinted
materials to the editor.

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OH
Permit No. 385

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.