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August 15, 2000

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

How to Keep Growing “New Economies”
by Jerry L. Jordan

I

n recent years, at least in North America, we have heard ever more frequent
assertions concerning the emergence of a
“new economy.” The pundits contend
that we need a new paradigm to understand how this new economy works. Not
surprisingly, some old economic models
have come under attack for not being
able to reconcile the low inflation, high
growth, and quite low unemployment
rates we have witnessed over the past
decade.
This is not a useful way for economists
to talk. There is something new, but it
isn’t the economy. Certainly, computers
and information technology have sped
up the flow of acquiring or disseminating
knowledge: knowledge about prices;
knowledge about production techniques.
But it doesn’t necessarily follow that we
need a new paradigm because of this
technological progress. And the reason
that the old models are not performing
well is not because of bandwidth or
megahertz, but probably, instead,
because they never were very useful.
Using statistical correlations, such as the
relationship between inflation and unemployment, to determine policy can be
dangerous.
This paper discusses some ideas concerning economic performance and
progress that are old and yet still highly
relevant to the world we are living in
today. These ideas will not help anyone
predict next year’s real GDP growth or
instruct the FOMC on what to do with
the federal funds rate at its next meeting.
But they should help our thinking about
a more important question: How do we
design monetary and fiscal institutions
so that we maximize social welfare over
time? The lesson these ideas point to is
that the key to sustainable prosperity is
the strength of the underlying economic
infrastructure.

ISSN 0428-1276

Elements of Growth
One thing that has not changed over the
last millennium or two is that each and
every day new businesses are born, and
each and every day other businesses
fail. Along with this turnover, the labor
market churns, giving rise to new jobs
and eliminating older, less productive
ones. The same can be said of other
productive resources, such as physical
and entrepreneurial capital. Individuals
and firms must respond to the various
shocks hitting the economy. They must
rethink not only the way they do business, but also the way labor and capital
are put together to produce final consumption. Technological progress
necessitates obsolescence. And this
observation is just as valid today as it
was in 1900, or 1800, or even much
earlier.
Some shocks are large. Movable-type
printing was every bit as revolutionary
as the computer. Gutenberg’s invention
in the 1430s allowed information to be
mass produced. Thirty years after the
introduction of the printing press, there
were print shops in every corner of the
European continent. It is believed that
more books were produced in the 50
years following Gutenberg’s invention
than in the 1,000 years before it.
The Industrial Revolution was obviously another large shock. The steam
engine, for example, increased horsepower by several orders of magnitude.
With the added power, not only could
some products be made more quickly,
but new products could also be produced that would have been much more
costly with manual labor alone.
Today we may very well be in the midst
of another large shock: The information
technology revolution. Indeed, computers and the Internet allow us to obtain
information instantaneously from

Rather than debate whether technical
advances have created a “new economy,” economists should focus on the
more interesting and useful question:
How do we create the sort of environment in which innovation and the productive use of new technology thrive,
thereby creating economic prosperity?
This Economic Commentary discusses
the features governments must incorporate into their institutions in order to
build an economic infrastructure that
promotes prosperity. It is an excerpt of
a paper presented by Jerry Jordan,
President and CEO of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, at the 75th
Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International in
Vancouver, B.C., Canada, on July 1,
2000. The full text of the paper will be
available in Contemporary Economic
Policy, vol. 19, no. 1 (January), 2001.

almost anywhere in the world, 24 hours
a day, while sitting at our desks, and at
very little cost.
But today’s economy is not new. The
fundamental determinants of healthy
economies are the same as they ever
were. So long as the right environment
exists, markets will flourish, and in that
environment individuals and markets
will adapt to shocks. And as they adapt,
the face of the economy changes.
In the right environment, the changes
that do occur are the result of the people being allowed to respond optimally
to the shocks that confront them, making everyone better off as a result. How
does such an environment arise? It is
the product of government laying the
appropriate infrastructure.

In the United States, as well as in more
and more countries throughout the
world, an infrastructure exists that
allows a large proportion of resources to
be spent on research and development.
The infrastructure ensures that we will
reap the rewards from a successful
outcome and, of course, pay the price
for an unsuccessful one. Certainly, more
people “online” means ideas can spread
faster and new techniques and processes
can spill over into other sectors of the
economy. Nevertheless, there really
isn’t anything new here. The printing
press, the telegraph, and the telephone
each had the same effect. In fact, so
much attention has been devoted to the
so-called new economy that we have
overlooked the importance of the infrastructure that has allowed a freer flow
of information, products, capital, and
labor—all of which have enabled us to
fully exploit those new technologies.

Another “New Economy”
To understand better how an infrastructure can foster the increase in output,
and concomitantly wealth, in the economy, it is instructive to glance back at
another “new economy”—the Industrial Revolution. What made the capital
accumulation, innovation, and industrial
enterprise of that economic transformation possible over a century and a half
ago? The appropriate institutions and
enforcement mechanisms were in place.
In contrast, the technical preconditions
for such a revolution almost certainly
existed elsewhere in the world over
time, yet none arose.
Institutions—those that existed and the
way they were structured—have been
cited as the proximate cause of the
Industrial Revolution. Because of its
institutions, Great Britain could combine innovation and resources to create
greater wealth and set the revolution in
motion. While leaders of countries
across the globe may have had similar
attitudes toward their citizenry at that
time, the European fiefdoms were small
and open, allowing individuals to move
across jurisdictions easily if the conditions in one were not conducive to their
skills, or if the particular area was governed in an arbitrary manner. Individuals with the foresight to realize that
gains in the standard of living could be
made by enforcing property rights,
establishing individual autonomy to
make contracts, and so on, were able to
capture such gains to the benefit of the
citizenry.

Still, trading between jurisdictions was
problematic, because laws or rules
between them were often idiosyncratic.
The merchants took it upon themselves
to impose and enforce their own rules,
known as medieval lex mercatoria
(custom of merchants). These rules basically established property rights and
enforcement mechanisms for breaches
of those rights, enabling a freer flow of
both goods and ideas, leading to higher
levels of prosperity.
It is easy to point to many cases where
institutions can be singled out as the
force that encouraged or discouraged
growth. For instance, we can compare
the “Asian Tigers” over the past couple
of decades to China or North Korea. Or
we can compare countries divided by
some arbitrary border, as East and West
Germany were, or as North and South
Korea are. It seems doubtful that explanations other than the underlying infrastructure can adequately explain the
disparate patterns of growth between
such politically divided regions.

The Importance of
Institutions
If we ask a simple question such as,
“Why are some economies rich and others poor?” we get a simple answer: Rich
economies have greater resources per
capita—more capital, both human and
nonhuman, and better technology connecting the two. But this answer only
begs another question: “Why do some
economies have high levels of capital
and technology, while others do not?”
It is a nation’s choice of institutions—
the totality of which we call the
economic infrastructure—that determines wealth and development. What
separates economic “haves” from
“have-nots” is whether the role of an
economy’s institutions—particularly its
public institutions—is to facilitate
production, or to confiscate it.
We can describe an economy’s infrastructure as the climate created by
institutions that serve as conduits of
commerce. Some of these institutions
are private; others are public. In either
case, an institution’s role can be that of
conversion—helping to transform
resources into output—or diversion—
transferring resources to nonproducers.
Most private institutions are sustained
by the value they add—either they
produce, or they fail. But the same
cannot be said of public institutions that
are sustained by the power of the state.

Effective Public
Institutions
At the most basic level, there can be
only two rationalizations for the state’s
participation in an economy. The first is
as a social equalizer, redistributing the
fruits of a nation’s production under the
presumption that a particular social need
takes precedence over private desires.
The second is the assertion that markets
fail to produce an efficient outcome.
Where equity issues are concerned, the
role of the state is unambiguous. Society
chooses to accept a lower average level
of wealth in exchange for some presumably higher social objective.
It is the state’s role as a promoter of
market efficiency that raises the most
complex questions. Even if the objective is to overcome a particular market
failure, once the state has involved itself
in the economy, its influence will have
wide-ranging and unanticipated consequences. And state institutions, which
are not bound to obey market forces,
exert influence long after their usefulness has passed.
Market failures are likely not as common as activist policymakers presume,
but it is clear that they do occur. The
most frequently cited example is “public
goods,” where providing a good for
anyone makes it possible to provide it
for everyone with no additional costs.
But, precisely because it is difficult to
exclude individuals from receiving the
benefits of such goods, the private sector would produce too little of them. A
legal system and national defense are
such public goods. Another, though not
often mentioned in economics textbooks, is that of a stable currency.
But once the state is introduced into the
economic infrastructure, it cannot help
but tax the system’s productive capacity.
Sometimes, these taxes are direct and
sustain the government activity. But
direct taxes are probably only a small
part of the overall cost to the economy.
Also important are the costs borne by
private agents who invest resources to
minimize their tax burdens, either
through tax-avoidance schemes or
through attempts to influence the taxing
authorities.
What are the elements, then, that the
state must put in place to allow an
economy to be able to take full advantage of possible gains from trade? A
market economy requires a foundation
of enforceable property rights, generally

accepted accounting principles, sound
financial institutions, and a stable
currency.
Where public contracts are not honored
and private contracts not enforced, markets are impaired. Where title to property is not certain, normal banking is
not possible. Where financial statements are not reliable, investment
opportunities are obscured. Where the
purchasing power of money is not stable, resources are wasted in costly
information gathering or in producing
or consuming the wrong things.
Additionally, the rules governing individual interactions are inherently not
any different than those we would want
governing interactions between individuals and institutions. It is essential that
we trust that those we interact with will
act in predictable ways, will fulfill
promises, and so on. If this were not the
case, transactions’ costs might exclude
possible gains from trade. It seems
remarkable, when you think about it,
that we often take substantial amounts
of money to our bank and hand it over
to people we have never met before. Or,
that securities traders can send millions
of dollars to people they don’t know in
countries they have never been in. Yet
this occurs all the time. We trust that the
infrastructure is set in place that allows
us not to worry that the person at the
bank who takes our money doesn’t just
pocket it. Or that when we use our
credit cards to buy a new CD or tennis
racquet over the Internet, from a business that is located in some other state
or country, we are confident we will get
our merchandise, and they are confident
they will get paid.
We must require from our government
institutions the same features we
require from our private ones—predictable behavior, trustworthiness, and
commitment. People would like to expect that if taxes are taken from them to
provide for their retirement, the government will honor its obligation and
return the funds with interest when they
are old.

A Reputable Monetary
Authority
These rules should apply at all levels
and to all institutions, including the
monetary authority. We should expect
that the currency issued by the government is subject to the same level of
trust, and that its value will not be
eroded by arbitrary policies. Economic
exchange involves information and

transaction costs that require real
resources. These costs, which influence the extent of trade, the degree of
specialization of labor, and the economic benefit derived from goods,
stem primarily from the difficulty of
acquiring information about the quality
of the goods—their true worth, as
opposed to their money worth. The
lower the information and transactions
costs, the greater the opportunities for
individuals to undertake exchanges
that maximize mutual welfare. When
we find ways to conserve productive
resources that had been devoted to
gathering information and conducting
exchange, we liberate them and make
them available for creating consumable output. In this way, sound money
promotes prosperity.
Of course, a nation must be concerned
not only about the integrity of its
money, but also about the stability and
reliability of its financial system. The
condition of a nation’s financial intermediaries and financial (asset) markets
may influence a monetary authority’s
policy actions, but need not compromise its objectives. Unsound financial
institutions and inefficient financial
markets may impede, but do not preclude, the achievement and maintenance of a stable currency. Nevertheless, if ex ante concerns about, or ex
post responses to, the condition of
financial intermediaries or markets
divert monetary authorities from a
disciplined, sound policy stance, then
overall financial instability can result.
While the adverse effects of shocks to
the financial sector can never be eliminated, their disruptive influence can be
minimized if monetary authorities continue to provide a stable monetary unit.
While central banks around the world
have begun to understand the longterm efficiencies that stable money can
provide, they are also part of a fiscal
regime that includes strong incentives
to violate the public’s trust by generating unanticipated inflation. Through
unanticipated expansions of fiat
money, central banks can levy an
unlegislated tax, reduce the real value
of the government’s outstanding debts,
or attempt to exploit a short-term
trade-off between growth and inflation. Governments, especially those
that heavily discount the future, will
always be tempted to instruct or pressure their central banks to issue
excessive amounts of money.

The beneficial effects of such shortsighted government policies are transitory at best. As people alter their
behavior in the face of inflation, the
cost of conducting exchanges
increases. The additional resources
expended on gathering information
and protecting the real value of wealth
would otherwise have been available
for growth-enhancing activities.

Institutions that Achieve
Monetary Stability
Governments lacking the willpower to
maintain price stability may attempt to
ensure the quality of their monetary
unit by adopting institutional arrangements that restrict their own monetary
discretion. Certain types of rules can
enhance a central bank’s reputation by
signaling that the government intends
to maintain the quality of its currency.
Examples include explicit price-level
targets or other legal imperatives that
place monetary stability above other
objectives. Such arrangements may be
particularly important because a reputation for monetary integrity is built
only very slowly.
One example of the role of institutions
in providing an infrastructure conducive to fostering long-run growth is
the degree to which the Federal
Reserve makes public the way it
makes monetary policy decisions. It is
imperative that the Fed maintain the
purchasing power of the dollar. Not
minute by minute, not necessarily at
the frequency at which the FOMC
meets, but over some longer time horizon, maybe three to five years. The
rules for institutions mentioned earlier
apply equally well here. Predictability
is an important component; if the rules
are transparent enough, people know
with some amount of certainty how
the monetary authorities will respond.
If they know that policymakers have a
three- to five-year horizon, then seeing
an uptick in price statistics in one
quarter will not cause people to alter
their behavior.
It ought to become clearer that the
Federal Reserve is focused on one
goal: the long-run stability of the purchasing power of the dollar. There
should be no perception that the central bank is “antigrowth,” as has often
been portrayed in the media, or that it
is pursuing some sort of “countercyclical stabilization policy.” If an
economy’s monetary unit is known to
be a stable standard of value, then

changes in money prices will accurately reflect changes in the relative
values of goods and assets. This is the
best that can be done. While monetary
authorities are focused on this one
intermediate goal, there is no sacrifice
of output or employment. The notion
of a social/political trade-off between
prosperity and price stability is a
mischievous myth.
When monetary stability is certain,
substantial resources are preserved
since people do not have to solve a
complicated signal extraction problem,
trying to decide if the price changes
they observe are relative or more
general. Resources will not be wasted
searching for and using near-money.
The monetary authority of any country
has an important role in the ideal
economic infrastructure. Therefore, it
is imperative that we understand, in a
structural sense, how money fits into a
dynamic, equilibrium economy.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101
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the above address.
Material may be reprinted if the source is
credited. Please send copies of reprinted
material to the editor.

Economic infrastructure plays a major
role in determining economic prosperity. That infrastructure depends crucially on the culture of the institutions
that are supported by the state. While
we are fortunate to be in the midst of
what appears to be a new technological
revolution, we should keep in sharp
focus the environment that encourages
such great leaps forward. And, it would
be false hope for countries or regions
without such an environment to think
that adopting new technologies will
allow them to achieve the tremendous
gains experienced by those with a more
conducive infrastructure in place.

Jerry L. Jordan is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Economic Commentary is published by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. To receive copies or to be
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to 4d.subscriptions@clev.frb.org or fax it to
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World Wide Web: www.clev.frb.org/research,
where glossaries of terms are provided.
We invite comments, questions, and suggestions. E-mail us at editor@clev.frb.org.

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