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of U.S. policymakers at reducing
inflation has renewed confidence in
the dollar.

Dollars and Speculation
Many exchange-market
analysts
believe that speculators sometimes
cause the dollar to deviate from the
path it would normally follow based
solely on economic developments.
Occasionally, since early 1983, analysts have used this argument to explain the behavior of the dollar.
Exchange traders use all available
information, including expectations
of future events and policies, when
buying and selling currency. Sometimes when new information becomes
available, it is incomplete or partially
incorrect, thus traders are slow to
form firm opinions about its implications. Analysts then might rely solely
on recent movements in an exchange
rate to indicate market sentiment
and future movements in the rate.
Traders then might buy an appreciating currency, reinforcing the rise
and expectations. More and more
traders might buy the appreciating
currency, perpetuating the speculative run.
The process continues, and the
exchange rate moves further away
from its "equilibrium;'
as long as participants believe that the gains from
further appreciation outweigh possible losses associated with an end to

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

Address Correction Requested:
Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

the speculative run. The further the
exchange rate deviates from equilibrium, the greater the liklihood that the
run will end and that investors will
incur losses.
Speculative runs probably do not
last very long, but they could form and
fade away frequently. While they
could be influential in the short term,
they do not adequately explain long
swings in exchange rates.

Recent Trends

The dollar has depreciated about
11 percent on a nominal and a real
trade-weighted basis since February
1985. This depreciation is substantial in view of the dollar's persistent
advance in recent years. As yet, however, it has offset only a small proportion of the dollar's appreciation.
Unless it continues, the depreciation's
influence on the trade balance and
on price levels is likely to be small.
The recent depreciation of the dollar, in large part, seems to reflect
uncertainty about the future course
of U. S. monetary policy. Economic
activity appears to be slowing, federal borrowing requirements remain
large, and the U.S. banking system
is burdened with troubled agricultural
and international loans. To exchangemarket participants, these develop-

ments increase the likelihood that the
Federal Reserve System might pursue a more expansionary monetary
policy in the future. Such a policy
would promote a nominal dollar depreciation by raising prices. As explained
earlier, a nominal depreciation of
the dollar would do little to enhance
the United States' international competitiveness. A more expansionary
monetary policy also could lower the
real exchange value of the dollar, because price levels often respond slowly
to changes in monetary policy. The
real depreciation, however, would only
be tem porary.
While the factors supporting the
dollar's real appreciation in recent
years no longer seem to favor a continued appreciation, it is too soon to
argue that these factors favor a sharp
dollar depreciation. The recent decline
in the dollar's real exchange value is
not much larger than that of early
1984, early 1983, or late 1981. To the
dismay of exchange-rate forecasters,
all of these depreciations reversed
themselves.
The recent experience in exchange
markets has shown that, because of
the complicated interactions among
economic variables and expectations,
exchange-market analysts cannot forecast accurately the near-term path
of exchange rates. Such failure is not
uncommon when one is dealing with
prices of financial assets.

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OH
Permit No. 385

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

September

ECONOMIC
COMMENTARY
Since mid-1980, the dollar has experienced an unprecedented appreciation
in foreign-exchange markets. On a .
trade-weighted basis, the dollar appreciated 77 percent from its low in mid1980 to its most recent peak in February 1985.' The sharp appreciation
of the dollar put U. S. trade-related
industries at a competitive disadvantage in world markets and contributed
to the record $107 billion trade deficit in 1984. The dollar has since depreciated by approximately 11 percent,
but remains high.
The phenomenal appreciation of
the dollar was especially puzzling to
exchange-market
analysts who had
widely anticipated a depreciation
of the dollar in 1983 and again in 1984.
These analysts based their expectations on a limited set of economic
variables, such as the growing currentaccount deficit, which they thought
had a strong and consistent influence
over movements in the dollar," The
expected depreciation of the dollar, however, failed to materialize.
This Economic Commentary identifies factors that help explain exchangerate patterns in recent years and
concludes that none of these factors
provides a complete or consistent
explanation of the behavior of the
dollar over this period. This review
emphasizes the need to exercise caution when attempting to project
exchange-rate trends.

Owen F Humpage is an economist with the Federal
Reserve Bank 0/ Cleveland. Nicholas V Karamouzis
is an assistant professor in the Department 0/ Economics at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio.
The views stated herein are those 0/ the authors
and not necessarily those 0/ the Federal Reserve
Bank 0/ Cleveland or 0/ the Board 0/ Governors 0/
the Federal Reserve System.

The Dollar and Inflation
In part, the unprecedented appreciation of the dollar since mid-1980 was
an adjustment to a slower pace of inflation in the United States as compared
to the pace of inflation in most other
industrialized countries. If this were
the only factor underlying the dollar's movements, the adverse impacts
on production and on employment
would be quite limited.
According to one theory, exchange
rates tend to adjust so that a dollar,
after conversion to a foreign-currency
equivalent, buys as much in a foreign country as in the United States.
The currencies of countries with low
rates of inflation should appreciate
against the currencies of countries
with high rates of inflation. Movements in exchange rates that simply
offset inflation-rate differentials among
countries are called nominal exchangerate movements. Nominal exchangerate movements do not alter the international competitive positions of
nations and, therefore, do not contribute to a deterioration in a nation's
trade balance.
Movements in exchange rates that
either exceed or fall short of the adjustments for inflation-rate differentials represent real exchange-rate
appreciations or depreciations. Real
exchange-rate movements alter the
relative prices of traded goods among
countries and, therefore, can have
important influences on real worldwide economic activity.

1. The trade-weighted dollar is an index constructed as the weighted sum of the dollar's exchange value relative to the currencies of 10 important trading partners. The weights are based on
each country's worldwide trade share.
2. The U.S. current account measures imports
and exports of goods and services and unilateral
transfers.

1, 1985

The Dollar in
the Eighties
by Owen F. Humpage
and Nicholas V. Karamouzis

Chart 1 The Nominal Trade·Weighted
Dollar and the Inflation-Rate
Differential

NOTE: Both U.S. and foreign inflation are measured
by 12-month moving averages of changes in the consumer price indexes. Furthermore, the foreign inflation rate equals a trade-weighted average of inflation
in 10 large foreign countries. The inflation-rate differential then is calculated as the foreign inflation rate,
minus the domestic inflation rate.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Movements in the trade-weighted
dollar do correspond to movements in
the differential between the inflation
rate in the United States and the tradeweighted inflation rate of our major
trading partners (see chart 1). The
dollar depreciated sharply between
1977 and 1980, as inflation in the
United States accelerated relative to
inflation abroad and as international
money managers lost confidence in
the resolve of U.S. policymakers to
adopt and to maintain a credible antiinflation policy.

In October 1979, however, the Federal Reserve made a more concerted
effort to reduce inflation. By the early
1980s, the rate of monetary growth
in the United States slowed considerably. This, in turn, lowered the inflation rate in the United States compared to inflation rates in most other
industrial countries and contributed
to the sharp appreciation of the dollar.
Chart 1 also indicates that the dollar appreciation exceeded that dictated
by inflation-rate differentials. By the
end of 1982, movements in the inflation-rate differential no longer favored
a further dollar appreciation. While
the inflation rate in the United States
remains below inflation rates in most
other major developed countries, the
differential has narrowed over the
past two years. The dollar, however,
has appreciated 31 percent on a real
trade-weighted basis since 1982.

Determinants of
Real Exchange Rates
Economists have identified numerous
factors that help explain the behavior
of real exchange rates. These "fundamentals" include inflation-adjusted
interest-rate differentials, unsustainable current-account
positions, differences in productivity growth, and
risk factors. Unfortunately, none
of these factors, or even combinations
of these factors, has consistently explained exchange-rate movements
with a satisfactory degree of precision. The impact of each, while continuous, is frequently diluted or completely overwhelmed by other market
influences, including such unquantifiable factors as political events and

expectations.'

Exchange-market
analysts have
offered three major explanations for
the rapid, real appreciation of the
dollar since 1982. One argument is that
inflation-adjusted,
or "real" interestrate differentials favored holding
dollar-denominated
assets over for-

3. Richard N. Cooper, "Summary
of the Symposium on Exchange Rates;' Floating Exchange Rates
in an Interdependent World. Washington,
DC:
General Accounting
Office, April 1984, pp. 1-26.

eign-currency-denominated
assets. A
second suggestion is that threats of
instability in other countries have
enhanced the "safe-haven" qualities
of dollar-denominated
assets. A third
explanation attributes some of the
dollar's recent strength to speculation rather than to basic economic
factors. Each of these arguments is
explored below.

Real Interest-Rate Differentials
Interest rates are determined by the
supply of and demand for loanable
funds. In the United States, households are the single most important
source of loanable funds. The corporate and the government sectors
use these funds to finance their respective investments and deficit spending. The Federal Reserve System influences the supply of loanable funds
by regulating the creation of credit
through the banking system. If the
demand for loanable funds exceeds the
supply, real interest rates rise to constrain investment, to encourage saving, and to clear the loanable-funds
market.
In an international setting, the rise
in real interest rates on dollar-denominated assets tends to attract foreign
savings. Foreigners, however, first
must obtain dollars to buy dollardenominated assets and, in doing so,
raise the dollar's exchange value. The
increased demand for dollar-denominated assets will continue as long as
the expected return on dollar assets
exceeds the expected return on foreigncurrency assets.
International investors receive a
two-part return from holding dollar
assets. They earn interest from the
investments, plus any gains or losses
from expected exchange-rate movements. The increased demand for dollar-denominated assets in response
to real interest-rate differentials causes
an immediate appreciation of the dollar above its long-term value. Investors, consequently, expect the dollar
to depreciate in the future. In fact,
the expected dollar depreciation should

exactly offset the real interest-rate
differential and equalize international
rates of return,' As long as domestic
real interest rates exceed foreign rates,
the exchange rate should exceed its
long-run expected value.
The immediate dollar appreciation, however, weakens exports and
encourages imports, causing a gradual deterioration in the current-account
balance. This deterioration provides
foreign investors with the increased
supply of dollars required to purchase
additional dollar-denominated
assets.
Thus, a deterioration in the current
account is necessary if the United
States is to gain additional foreign

savings.

Chart 2 The Real Trade-Weighted
Dollar and the Real Short-Term
Interest-Rate Differential
Index

Percent

2

-2

-6
-8
1975

1980

1985

NOTE: The interest-rate differential is calculated as
the real 3·month U.S. Treasury bill rate. minus a real
trade-weighted average of 3·month securities for 10
large industrial countries. The real interest rate is
defined as the nominal interest rate. minus a 12-month
moving average of inflation (see note to chart 1).
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Such an inflow of foreign savings
increases the supply of loanable funds
in the United States and helps to
keep real interest rates lower than
they otherwise would be. These savings flows, however, tend to raise foreign interest rates. Eventually, real
interest rates here and abroad should
equalize, and the dollar exchange
rate should return to its long-term
value. These adjustments, however,
might take many years to complete.

4. We assume here that holding
involves similar risks.

both securities

In recent years, US. real interest
rates frequently have exceeded historic levels. As chart 2 shows, interest rates in the United States rose
faster than interest rates in most
other industrialized countries. While
movements in the trade-weighted dollar seem related to movements in the
trade-weighted interest-rate differential, chart 2 indicates that the correlation is not always close, especially
since mid-1983.
The substantial tightening of monetary policy, undertaken in the late
1970s and early 1980s to eliminate
inflation, contributed to the initial
rise in real interest rates in the early
1980s. The dollar appreciated sharply.
Because the adjustment in the rate
of inflation proceeded more slowly
than the movement in interest rates,
the dollar appreciated on a real basis.
This real appreciation should have
been temporary, until the shift in
monetary policy fully affected the
rate of inflation.
While the slowdown in the rate of
US. money growth helps explain
why the dollar initially appreciated
in value in the early 1980s, it does
not explain what has happened since
1982. Other factors are involved.
The relatively high level of US.
real interest rates since 1982 could
reflect the relative profitability of plant
and equipment investment in the
United States. A vigorous, inflationfree recovery in the United States
greatly enhanced the prospects for investment in this country. In contrast,
the recovery in most other industrialized countries proceeded more slowly.
Changes in US. tax laws also favored
investment by improving depreciation allowances and the investment
tax credit. In addition, the cost of
investment goods declined between
1982 and 1984, while other business
costs, including unit labor costs, rose
moderately. Reflecting these developments, business investment rose
rapidly during the recent recovery
period. As investors, attracted by
the high return on real capital in the
United States, borrowed to finance

their investment programs, they increased market interest rates.
A third explanation for high US.
interest rates centers on the federal
budget deficit. The deficit has equaled
between 5 percent and 6 percent of
GNP over the past three years. Many
analysts expect the deficit to remain
roughly equal to 5 percent of GNP
throughout the decade. During the
1970s, the federal budget deficit averaged approximately 2 percent of GNP;
during the 1960s, it rarely exceeded
1 percen t of GNP.
The relationship between the deficit and interest rates is not simple;
it depends on how fiscal policies and
the deficit affect peoples' decisions
to save and invest. A $100 billion deficit that causes private savings to rise
by $100 billion could have no effect
on interest-rate levels> Most studies
have failed to verify that increases in
federal borrowing have raised interest rates." These studies rely on historical relationships, but the relative
size and expected duration of recent
federal deficits is unique, and past
relationships offer little insight into
the current situation. The unprecedented magnitude of our current
deficits undoubtedly has kept real
interest rates in the United States
above levels they otherwise would
have attained.
Ironically, the long-run effect of persistent budget deficits on the exchange
rate can be quite different from the
short-run impact? The initial appreciation of the dollar tends to produce
a trade deficit. This means that the
United States is paying for its imports
by selling foreign assets and claims
on its wealth, such as Treasury securities, stocks, bonds, land, and bank
deposits. At some point, foreign portfolios could become saturated with
dollar-denominated
debt. If foreigners grow reluctant to hold additional
dollar-denominated
assets, and if
they attempt to diversify their portfolios out of dollars, the dollar would
depreciate.

5. If people view current deficits as implying a
higher future tax liability for themselves
or for
their children to retire the debt, they might save
more. For a discussion,
see Neil A. Stevens, "Government
Debt Financing-Its
Effects in View of
Tax Discounting;'
Review, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, vol. 61, no. 7 (July 1979) pp. 11-19.

6. For a summary
of the literature
see U.S.
Treasury
Department,
Office of the Assistant
Secretary
for Economic Policy, The Effect of Def-

icits on the Prices of Financial Assets: Theory
and Evidence. U.S. Government
Printing Office,
March

1984.

It is unlikely that United States
has saturated the world market with
dollar-denominated
claims. Much of
the world's trade is conducted in dollars, and international investors traditionally have been willing to hold
substantial balances in dollar-denominated assets. Moreover, unlike some
countries that must acquire foreign
exchange to service their international
debts, US. foreign liabilities generally are denominated in dollars, and
the United States typically pays interest on these obligations in dollars.
As discussed in the next section, the
market generally appears to view the
risks of holding dollar-denominated
assets quite favorably.

Exchange -Rate Appreciation
and the Safe-Haven View

The dollar's recent strength could result from the perception of the United
States as a "safe-haven" for investments. If Americans and foreigners believe that investments abroad are
more risky than investments in the
United States, they will invest more
here than abroad, even when foreign
assets offer a higher yield than dollar
assets. Such perceived risks reflect
concerns that host governments
might confiscate assets, restrict the
free flow of capital, tax foreign investments excessively, or fail to earn
enough foreign exchange to meet
external obligations.
The dollar's safe-haven role derives
from the long history of political stability in the United States, from t.he
large, diversified US. economy, and
from our success at maintaining relatively stable economic growth. Dollardenominated assets are widely held
and used in international transactions not directly involving Americans. Broad liquid markets exist for
dollar-denominated
assets, so investors easily can trade dollar assets without fear that their individual trades
will affect prices adversely. At times
during the 1970s, when US. inflation
accelerated, the attractiveness
of dollar assets waned. The recent success

7. See: Alessandro
Penati, "Expansionary
Fiscal
Policy and the Exchange Rate;' International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1983), pp. 542-69.

In October 1979, however, the Federal Reserve made a more concerted
effort to reduce inflation. By the early
1980s, the rate of monetary growth
in the United States slowed considerably. This, in turn, lowered the inflation rate in the United States compared to inflation rates in most other
industrial countries and contributed
to the sharp appreciation of the dollar.
Chart 1 also indicates that the dollar appreciation exceeded that dictated
by inflation-rate differentials. By the
end of 1982, movements in the inflation-rate differential no longer favored
a further dollar appreciation. While
the inflation rate in the United States
remains below inflation rates in most
other major developed countries, the
differential has narrowed over the
past two years. The dollar, however,
has appreciated 31 percent on a real
trade-weighted basis since 1982.

Determinants of
Real Exchange Rates
Economists have identified numerous
factors that help explain the behavior
of real exchange rates. These "fundamentals" include inflation-adjusted
interest-rate differentials, unsustainable current-account
positions, differences in productivity growth, and
risk factors. Unfortunately, none
of these factors, or even combinations
of these factors, has consistently explained exchange-rate movements
with a satisfactory degree of precision. The impact of each, while continuous, is frequently diluted or completely overwhelmed by other market
influences, including such unquantifiable factors as political events and

expectations.'

Exchange-market
analysts have
offered three major explanations for
the rapid, real appreciation of the
dollar since 1982. One argument is that
inflation-adjusted,
or "real" interestrate differentials favored holding
dollar-denominated
assets over for-

3. Richard N. Cooper, "Summary
of the Symposium on Exchange Rates;' Floating Exchange Rates
in an Interdependent World. Washington,
DC:
General Accounting
Office, April 1984, pp. 1-26.

eign-currency-denominated
assets. A
second suggestion is that threats of
instability in other countries have
enhanced the "safe-haven" qualities
of dollar-denominated
assets. A third
explanation attributes some of the
dollar's recent strength to speculation rather than to basic economic
factors. Each of these arguments is
explored below.

Real Interest-Rate Differentials
Interest rates are determined by the
supply of and demand for loanable
funds. In the United States, households are the single most important
source of loanable funds. The corporate and the government sectors
use these funds to finance their respective investments and deficit spending. The Federal Reserve System influences the supply of loanable funds
by regulating the creation of credit
through the banking system. If the
demand for loanable funds exceeds the
supply, real interest rates rise to constrain investment, to encourage saving, and to clear the loanable-funds
market.
In an international setting, the rise
in real interest rates on dollar-denominated assets tends to attract foreign
savings. Foreigners, however, first
must obtain dollars to buy dollardenominated assets and, in doing so,
raise the dollar's exchange value. The
increased demand for dollar-denominated assets will continue as long as
the expected return on dollar assets
exceeds the expected return on foreigncurrency assets.
International investors receive a
two-part return from holding dollar
assets. They earn interest from the
investments, plus any gains or losses
from expected exchange-rate movements. The increased demand for dollar-denominated assets in response
to real interest-rate differentials causes
an immediate appreciation of the dollar above its long-term value. Investors, consequently, expect the dollar
to depreciate in the future. In fact,
the expected dollar depreciation should

exactly offset the real interest-rate
differential and equalize international
rates of return,' As long as domestic
real interest rates exceed foreign rates,
the exchange rate should exceed its
long-run expected value.
The immediate dollar appreciation, however, weakens exports and
encourages imports, causing a gradual deterioration in the current-account
balance. This deterioration provides
foreign investors with the increased
supply of dollars required to purchase
additional dollar-denominated
assets.
Thus, a deterioration in the current
account is necessary if the United
States is to gain additional foreign

savings.

Chart 2 The Real Trade-Weighted
Dollar and the Real Short-Term
Interest-Rate Differential
Index

Percent

2

-2

-6
-8
1975

1980

1985

NOTE: The interest-rate differential is calculated as
the real 3·month U.S. Treasury bill rate. minus a real
trade-weighted average of 3·month securities for 10
large industrial countries. The real interest rate is
defined as the nominal interest rate. minus a 12-month
moving average of inflation (see note to chart 1).
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Such an inflow of foreign savings
increases the supply of loanable funds
in the United States and helps to
keep real interest rates lower than
they otherwise would be. These savings flows, however, tend to raise foreign interest rates. Eventually, real
interest rates here and abroad should
equalize, and the dollar exchange
rate should return to its long-term
value. These adjustments, however,
might take many years to complete.

4. We assume here that holding
involves similar risks.

both securities

In recent years, US. real interest
rates frequently have exceeded historic levels. As chart 2 shows, interest rates in the United States rose
faster than interest rates in most
other industrialized countries. While
movements in the trade-weighted dollar seem related to movements in the
trade-weighted interest-rate differential, chart 2 indicates that the correlation is not always close, especially
since mid-1983.
The substantial tightening of monetary policy, undertaken in the late
1970s and early 1980s to eliminate
inflation, contributed to the initial
rise in real interest rates in the early
1980s. The dollar appreciated sharply.
Because the adjustment in the rate
of inflation proceeded more slowly
than the movement in interest rates,
the dollar appreciated on a real basis.
This real appreciation should have
been temporary, until the shift in
monetary policy fully affected the
rate of inflation.
While the slowdown in the rate of
US. money growth helps explain
why the dollar initially appreciated
in value in the early 1980s, it does
not explain what has happened since
1982. Other factors are involved.
The relatively high level of US.
real interest rates since 1982 could
reflect the relative profitability of plant
and equipment investment in the
United States. A vigorous, inflationfree recovery in the United States
greatly enhanced the prospects for investment in this country. In contrast,
the recovery in most other industrialized countries proceeded more slowly.
Changes in US. tax laws also favored
investment by improving depreciation allowances and the investment
tax credit. In addition, the cost of
investment goods declined between
1982 and 1984, while other business
costs, including unit labor costs, rose
moderately. Reflecting these developments, business investment rose
rapidly during the recent recovery
period. As investors, attracted by
the high return on real capital in the
United States, borrowed to finance

their investment programs, they increased market interest rates.
A third explanation for high US.
interest rates centers on the federal
budget deficit. The deficit has equaled
between 5 percent and 6 percent of
GNP over the past three years. Many
analysts expect the deficit to remain
roughly equal to 5 percent of GNP
throughout the decade. During the
1970s, the federal budget deficit averaged approximately 2 percent of GNP;
during the 1960s, it rarely exceeded
1 percen t of GNP.
The relationship between the deficit and interest rates is not simple;
it depends on how fiscal policies and
the deficit affect peoples' decisions
to save and invest. A $100 billion deficit that causes private savings to rise
by $100 billion could have no effect
on interest-rate levels> Most studies
have failed to verify that increases in
federal borrowing have raised interest rates." These studies rely on historical relationships, but the relative
size and expected duration of recent
federal deficits is unique, and past
relationships offer little insight into
the current situation. The unprecedented magnitude of our current
deficits undoubtedly has kept real
interest rates in the United States
above levels they otherwise would
have attained.
Ironically, the long-run effect of persistent budget deficits on the exchange
rate can be quite different from the
short-run impact? The initial appreciation of the dollar tends to produce
a trade deficit. This means that the
United States is paying for its imports
by selling foreign assets and claims
on its wealth, such as Treasury securities, stocks, bonds, land, and bank
deposits. At some point, foreign portfolios could become saturated with
dollar-denominated
debt. If foreigners grow reluctant to hold additional
dollar-denominated
assets, and if
they attempt to diversify their portfolios out of dollars, the dollar would
depreciate.

5. If people view current deficits as implying a
higher future tax liability for themselves
or for
their children to retire the debt, they might save
more. For a discussion,
see Neil A. Stevens, "Government
Debt Financing-Its
Effects in View of
Tax Discounting;'
Review, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, vol. 61, no. 7 (July 1979) pp. 11-19.

6. For a summary
of the literature
see U.S.
Treasury
Department,
Office of the Assistant
Secretary
for Economic Policy, The Effect of Def-

icits on the Prices of Financial Assets: Theory
and Evidence. U.S. Government
Printing Office,
March

1984.

It is unlikely that United States
has saturated the world market with
dollar-denominated
claims. Much of
the world's trade is conducted in dollars, and international investors traditionally have been willing to hold
substantial balances in dollar-denominated assets. Moreover, unlike some
countries that must acquire foreign
exchange to service their international
debts, US. foreign liabilities generally are denominated in dollars, and
the United States typically pays interest on these obligations in dollars.
As discussed in the next section, the
market generally appears to view the
risks of holding dollar-denominated
assets quite favorably.

Exchange -Rate Appreciation
and the Safe-Haven View

The dollar's recent strength could result from the perception of the United
States as a "safe-haven" for investments. If Americans and foreigners believe that investments abroad are
more risky than investments in the
United States, they will invest more
here than abroad, even when foreign
assets offer a higher yield than dollar
assets. Such perceived risks reflect
concerns that host governments
might confiscate assets, restrict the
free flow of capital, tax foreign investments excessively, or fail to earn
enough foreign exchange to meet
external obligations.
The dollar's safe-haven role derives
from the long history of political stability in the United States, from t.he
large, diversified US. economy, and
from our success at maintaining relatively stable economic growth. Dollardenominated assets are widely held
and used in international transactions not directly involving Americans. Broad liquid markets exist for
dollar-denominated
assets, so investors easily can trade dollar assets without fear that their individual trades
will affect prices adversely. At times
during the 1970s, when US. inflation
accelerated, the attractiveness
of dollar assets waned. The recent success

7. See: Alessandro
Penati, "Expansionary
Fiscal
Policy and the Exchange Rate;' International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1983), pp. 542-69.

of U.S. policymakers at reducing
inflation has renewed confidence in
the dollar.

Dollars and Speculation
Many exchange-market
analysts
believe that speculators sometimes
cause the dollar to deviate from the
path it would normally follow based
solely on economic developments.
Occasionally, since early 1983, analysts have used this argument to explain the behavior of the dollar.
Exchange traders use all available
information, including expectations
of future events and policies, when
buying and selling currency. Sometimes when new information becomes
available, it is incomplete or partially
incorrect, thus traders are slow to
form firm opinions about its implications. Analysts then might rely solely
on recent movements in an exchange
rate to indicate market sentiment
and future movements in the rate.
Traders then might buy an appreciating currency, reinforcing the rise
and expectations. More and more
traders might buy the appreciating
currency, perpetuating the speculative run.
The process continues, and the
exchange rate moves further away
from its "equilibrium;'
as long as participants believe that the gains from
further appreciation outweigh possible losses associated with an end to

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

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the speculative run. The further the
exchange rate deviates from equilibrium, the greater the liklihood that the
run will end and that investors will
incur losses.
Speculative runs probably do not
last very long, but they could form and
fade away frequently. While they
could be influential in the short term,
they do not adequately explain long
swings in exchange rates.

Recent Trends

The dollar has depreciated about
11 percent on a nominal and a real
trade-weighted basis since February
1985. This depreciation is substantial in view of the dollar's persistent
advance in recent years. As yet, however, it has offset only a small proportion of the dollar's appreciation.
Unless it continues, the depreciation's
influence on the trade balance and
on price levels is likely to be small.
The recent depreciation of the dollar, in large part, seems to reflect
uncertainty about the future course
of U. S. monetary policy. Economic
activity appears to be slowing, federal borrowing requirements remain
large, and the U.S. banking system
is burdened with troubled agricultural
and international loans. To exchangemarket participants, these develop-

ments increase the likelihood that the
Federal Reserve System might pursue a more expansionary monetary
policy in the future. Such a policy
would promote a nominal dollar depreciation by raising prices. As explained
earlier, a nominal depreciation of
the dollar would do little to enhance
the United States' international competitiveness. A more expansionary
monetary policy also could lower the
real exchange value of the dollar, because price levels often respond slowly
to changes in monetary policy. The
real depreciation, however, would only
be tem porary.
While the factors supporting the
dollar's real appreciation in recent
years no longer seem to favor a continued appreciation, it is too soon to
argue that these factors favor a sharp
dollar depreciation. The recent decline
in the dollar's real exchange value is
not much larger than that of early
1984, early 1983, or late 1981. To the
dismay of exchange-rate forecasters,
all of these depreciations reversed
themselves.
The recent experience in exchange
markets has shown that, because of
the complicated interactions among
economic variables and expectations,
exchange-market analysts cannot forecast accurately the near-term path
of exchange rates. Such failure is not
uncommon when one is dealing with
prices of financial assets.

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Permit No. 385

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

September

ECONOMIC
COMMENTARY
Since mid-1980, the dollar has experienced an unprecedented appreciation
in foreign-exchange markets. On a .
trade-weighted basis, the dollar appreciated 77 percent from its low in mid1980 to its most recent peak in February 1985.' The sharp appreciation
of the dollar put U. S. trade-related
industries at a competitive disadvantage in world markets and contributed
to the record $107 billion trade deficit in 1984. The dollar has since depreciated by approximately 11 percent,
but remains high.
The phenomenal appreciation of
the dollar was especially puzzling to
exchange-market
analysts who had
widely anticipated a depreciation
of the dollar in 1983 and again in 1984.
These analysts based their expectations on a limited set of economic
variables, such as the growing currentaccount deficit, which they thought
had a strong and consistent influence
over movements in the dollar," The
expected depreciation of the dollar, however, failed to materialize.
This Economic Commentary identifies factors that help explain exchangerate patterns in recent years and
concludes that none of these factors
provides a complete or consistent
explanation of the behavior of the
dollar over this period. This review
emphasizes the need to exercise caution when attempting to project
exchange-rate trends.

Owen F Humpage is an economist with the Federal
Reserve Bank 0/ Cleveland. Nicholas V Karamouzis
is an assistant professor in the Department 0/ Economics at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio.
The views stated herein are those 0/ the authors
and not necessarily those 0/ the Federal Reserve
Bank 0/ Cleveland or 0/ the Board 0/ Governors 0/
the Federal Reserve System.

The Dollar and Inflation
In part, the unprecedented appreciation of the dollar since mid-1980 was
an adjustment to a slower pace of inflation in the United States as compared
to the pace of inflation in most other
industrialized countries. If this were
the only factor underlying the dollar's movements, the adverse impacts
on production and on employment
would be quite limited.
According to one theory, exchange
rates tend to adjust so that a dollar,
after conversion to a foreign-currency
equivalent, buys as much in a foreign country as in the United States.
The currencies of countries with low
rates of inflation should appreciate
against the currencies of countries
with high rates of inflation. Movements in exchange rates that simply
offset inflation-rate differentials among
countries are called nominal exchangerate movements. Nominal exchangerate movements do not alter the international competitive positions of
nations and, therefore, do not contribute to a deterioration in a nation's
trade balance.
Movements in exchange rates that
either exceed or fall short of the adjustments for inflation-rate differentials represent real exchange-rate
appreciations or depreciations. Real
exchange-rate movements alter the
relative prices of traded goods among
countries and, therefore, can have
important influences on real worldwide economic activity.

1. The trade-weighted dollar is an index constructed as the weighted sum of the dollar's exchange value relative to the currencies of 10 important trading partners. The weights are based on
each country's worldwide trade share.
2. The U.S. current account measures imports
and exports of goods and services and unilateral
transfers.

1, 1985

The Dollar in
the Eighties
by Owen F. Humpage
and Nicholas V. Karamouzis

Chart 1 The Nominal Trade·Weighted
Dollar and the Inflation-Rate
Differential

NOTE: Both U.S. and foreign inflation are measured
by 12-month moving averages of changes in the consumer price indexes. Furthermore, the foreign inflation rate equals a trade-weighted average of inflation
in 10 large foreign countries. The inflation-rate differential then is calculated as the foreign inflation rate,
minus the domestic inflation rate.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Movements in the trade-weighted
dollar do correspond to movements in
the differential between the inflation
rate in the United States and the tradeweighted inflation rate of our major
trading partners (see chart 1). The
dollar depreciated sharply between
1977 and 1980, as inflation in the
United States accelerated relative to
inflation abroad and as international
money managers lost confidence in
the resolve of U.S. policymakers to
adopt and to maintain a credible antiinflation policy.