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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
ment securities, because it pays for the debt
by increasing bank reserves. This in turn can

would lead to even higher inflation
higher interest rates.

and

lead to more bank lending, more money in
circulation, higher demands for goods and
services, and an accelerating inflation rate
as both private and public sectors compete
for the same resources.
This problem is complicated, because
all of this takes time. If inflation followed
immediately on an excessive increase in bank
reserves, interest rates would rise immediately
to reflect the higher inflation rates, and it
would not be possible for the Federal Reserve to prevent interest rates from rising by
purchasing government debt. However, it
takes time for an increase in bank reserves
to work its way through to a higher inflation
rate. During that transition period interest
rates will be below their long-run marketclearing levels.
The opposite happens when the trend in
money-supply growth is lowered. Bank reserves are reduced immediately, shrinking
the supply of credit available. Lower growth
in bank reserves will lead to less lending,
less money in circulation, a lower demand
for goods and services, and a decelerating
inflation rate. But this also takes time.
During the transition period interest rates
will be above their long-run market-clearing levels.
Today's high interest rates reflect a reduction in the growth of bank reserves without a reduction in the underlying inflation
rate. Interest rates are high, and the existence
of a large budget deficit only makes interest
rates higher. Increasing bank reserves to reduce interest rates could offer some shortterm relief, but it would be self-defeating;
faster growth in bank reserves eventually

The deficit also matters to the monetary
authorities for a technical reason related to
the process described earlier. The amount
of interest-bearing debt outstanding can
have an effect on inflation (the inverse of
the value of money) if it is perceived that
the taxing potential of the government is
being strained and that interest-bearing debt
is likely to be redeemed by inflating the
money supply. In this case, deficits will
raise inflation expectations and slow the
adjustment process needed to end inflation.
The Federal Reserve has adopted a monetary-growth rule intended to guarantee that
deficits will not be financed. Most economists
would agree that the steady growth rule is a
reasonable if not optimal long-run policy.
On the other hand, there is no well-accepted
economic theory ensuring that it is reasonable or optimal to force the money supply
to grow at the long-run constant rate in the
short run, i.e., week-to-week or even monthto-month. But to maintain credibility and
change expectations, the Federal Reserve
must convince the public that it will not
overshoot its long-run targets. One way
to do this is to adhere to the long-run targets even in the short run. The presence
of large deficits makes it more difficult
to convince the public that the Federal
Reserve System will not finance those
deficits and places pressure on the System
to adhere even more closely to its longrun targets in the short run.
From a technical point of view, this is
a relatively simple task. It becomes complicated, however, because the central bank

is the largest trader in the money market
and appears to have control over interest
rates. During periods of disinflation policy,
all the adjustment costs will be attributed
to high interest rates and the central bank.
Political coalitions will be formed by sectors
in the economy that are most sensitive to
high interest rates. These coalitions will
often be strong, having benefited from the
inflationary policies of the past. They will
put pressure on the Federal Reserve to revert to an inflationary policy-although
it will be called a low interest-rate or a
low-unemployment policy.
Conclusion
Deficits can cause inflation when they
are financed by excessive growth of the
money supply. However, the Federal Re-

serve sets growth-rate targets for the money
supply that do not depend on the size of
the deficit or on interest rates. These targets are intended to be low enough to reduce inflation and interest rates in the long
run, although they may require higher interest rates in the short run. Large budget
deficits have to be financed in credit markets, because the Federal Reserve cannot
buy large amounts of government debt
without creating excess bank reserves and
above-target money growth. Given the
money targets, a larger budget deficit will
require higher interest rates to reduce private
borrowings enough to float the extra government debt.

July 13, 1981

f.£Q!)omic Commentary

Why Do Deficits Matter?
by William T. Gavin

NOTE: No issues of the Economic Commentary
were published in June.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland,OH 44101

Address correction requested
o Correct as shown
o Remove from mailing list

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland,OH
Permit No. 385

The current budget process is likely to
produce large budget deficits in fiscal year
1982 and thereafter. The budget deficit is
the residual from the taxing and spending
policies of the federal government. Our
founding fathers gave the government the
power to borrow money in article 1, section
8, of the U.S. Constitution. Without such
authority the government would be forced
to collect taxes priorto making expenditures.
Economic theory and empirical evidence
suggest that it is in the interest of the people
and in the self-interest of political leaders to
plan tax collections independently of exWilliam Gavin is an economist with the Federal

penditures. In such a budget process there is
obviously room for temporary deficits.1
The persistent and large deficits of recent
years, however, have spawned intense debate
about the effect of government borrowing
on monetary policy and inflation. Calls for
a constitutional
amendment to require a
balanced budget indicate that some observers
believe the danger of inflation posed by large
and persistent deficits outweighs the benefits
of a flexible fiscal authority.
In the past we often have heard opponents
of proposed federal programs claim that
funding these programs would cause a deficit
that would lead to inflation. Today, in an
apparent contradiction, many of these same

ReserveBank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the author

1. For a rigorous development of this theory,

and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve

Please send mailing label to the Research Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

see Robert J. Barro, "On the Determination of

Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors

the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy,

of the Federal ReserveSystem.

vol. 87, no. 5, part 1 (October 1979), pp. 940-71.

voices

are calling

allowing

for

tax

for supply-side
produce

cuts

that,

stimulus,

likely

to

closer

even

would

be

roads,

canals,

or

buildings,

large and immediate;

the

costs

the benefits,

are

deficits.

A

accrue

slowly over a long period of time. By

to

issuing

debt

even

larger

and

smoothing

time,

the

the issue.

costs

of tax collection
to future

generations

What Is the Deficit?

from the investment

and

monetary

policy

may clarify

payments

The

deficit

tween

the

dollar

government
amount

is simply

because

a different

path

services,
deficits

some

circumstances,

If we assume

tax

rates

time,

then

the

when

there

is a temporary

floats

finance

the

sector.

Taxes

rapid

to pay for the
for example,
ment

there

of GNP.
larger

of debt

percent

of GNP,

centage

of

size,

1940.

World War II,

In

to

vestment.

like

issue debt

govern-

that

are falling.

taxpayers

tax rates, the taxpayer

the government

Given
to

would prefer
rather

than

will

spending

rises above

debt stood

to 115 percent
debt,

had

although

fallen

to

to the prewar
1980 the

43

their

whether
know

the

this

budget

Debt

issue
levels,

likely

to

be very

federal

budget

policy.

Since

are

capital

in-

builds schools,

duct

is not likely
deficits

governments
in determining

large

and

as the

size

of the

debts,

to

inflation,
Reserve

state

the

and

is

budget.
among

and

local

and local

to be a major

factor

expectations.

debt

only

gradually.

spending

will
above

issue will be chosen

result

budget

invest-

goods, or the business

cycle.

deficits

from

deficits,

war,

these

appear
process

authority

services

without

these deficits

to have

re-

that has used

to prove
direct

govern-

taxation.

In

had to be financed

by

or by inflating the money supply.

Inflation

today

accelerating

is the

money

over a period
persistent

result

growth

that

of slowly

that

also included

budget

deficit

deficits.

represented

large and

In
the

occurred
each

year

provision

of

government

services for which

there

was no

liability.

extra

money

growth

tax

A little

in each year had no visible connection

with that year's deficit and no visible impact
on inflation.
was

Only when

accumulated

over

time did the long-run
The
level
All
taxes

discussion

spending
are

raised

each year's
a longer

excess

period

of

effects occur.

so far

of government
government

private

money,

takes

spending

actual

as optimal.
"crowds

out"

to

degree.

When

to pay for spending,

the

credit

If the

credit

interest

the

to

the

private

If the

Federal

banking

system,

immediately,

does

then

private

and

ducing

If the

policy

prices
and

persist,

will

policy,

lead

to

crowding

out

of

inflation

private

loans.

government

spending

depends

ment's

on

will ac-

marginal

value

of the

duct.
sector

the

is too
value

high
of the

relative

rises.

and the

output

has been

tive to private-sector

output

enlarges

tax

reductions

deficits
that

Why the deficit

matters

of

authorities

or too

conflicting

govern-

officials.

A stable

to

thought

the

can be seen

govern-

growing

rela-

for 100 years

promises

of

by

They judge the value of marto be low rela-

judgments
government

about

the

spending.

appropriate

level

If government-pro-

Federal

more

that seemingly

give up current

consumption.

at the

services

to sell its debt directly

the

the

Federal

Reserve;

immediate

kets,

and

interest

However,

the

the

Part

in

debt

raised

promise

another
the

on

debt in full. The debt can only grow if more

of

lenders

(savers)

current

consumption.

can

be

found

As the

to

Therefore,

debt

maintain

the

the

the

Reserve

valuable

because

promise

standard,
the

Federal

agency)
money

to

deficit.3
to re-

in full is its commitment
paper

the

market

value of the currency.

current

which

open

of the government's

pay the

the

promises

to

Under
dollar

U.S. government

Reserve

is
(of

is an indepen-

to limit the quantity

in circulation.

3.

In fact,

since

bought

to repay

ex-

A problem

can

Reserve buys govern-

to

then borrows

in the credit market.
implicit

pro-

of the current

arise when the Federal

represents

Act

from buy-

Federal

in the

absorb the equivalent

services

debt

have

Reserve

amounts.

is whether

of

But government

not

from the U.S. Treasury

dent

the difference

would

Reserve System

if both

are not

take
mar-

Federal

hibits the Federal

deficits

and taxes

this

rates

Persistent

provided,

would

off the credit

pressure

raise taxes.

Government

to

for the government
to

not to

kept.

anyone

When interest

it might seem tempting

also are made

are

in

can buy govern-

requiring

Promises

promises

lender

might be willing to acquire enough additional

suggests

occur

bor-

rates are very high,

government

A trend toward

government

private

is one

without

debt

question

to con-

expenditures

more

in the cur-

out

Reserve

future.

promise-an
depends

force

the economy

government

promise

may actually

tive to private-sector
production.
An evaluation
of the deficit

to re-

in the past may be

in the future.

government

promises
the

made

trend

pay for them. The government

be arguing against more govern-

or to

ing debt directly

by looking

a higher

to rise fu rther.

to the monetary

of as an implicit

level

more,

to give up consumption
period

The

if they result

The Deficits and Monetary Policy

are

production

of

the public

are meant

suggests that many who argue against deficits

ginal government

because

and

be paid to induce

cept in very limited

and

a particular
That

may support

(relative to private output)

temporary

higher

as output

will differ

occur

that

programs

tinue the trend

falls

programs
that

more

must

ment

Their judgments,
that

borrow
rate

rowers at the margin.

we rely

Those who place a low value on gov-

ernment

pro-

from

is not

Those who place a high

spending

pro-

consumers

Instead,

on values

increased

marginal

to

ment-sector

depend

the value of marginal

private-sector's

output

test.

citizens.

deficits

from

rent

process to reflect the evalua-

temporary
sector.

people

of

duce the role of the public sector.

investment

product

In general,

duction

in turn,

be

a non-

borrowing

rates

Whether

the

on the political

tions of individual

may support

accommodating

interest

consumption
low

with

up, thus re-

government

higher

for this market

value on government

demand

celerate, and interest rates will rise.
If the Federal
Reserve follows
inflationary

suited

to

interest

judgment

government

with each individual.

as surely as if taxes had been
deficits

yet most

collective

to the

credit

will compete

to force

incomes

raised.

to save.

buyers;

the

rates may not rise

services

demand

monetary

forcing

out of the mar-

but the government's

goods

not

of

tries

produced

this evaluation

result

and

would

goods and services,

system,

adds

interest

priced

the

banking

more people

Reserve

were

the

banking

ket as well as inducing

services

with privately

Reserve

borrowers

and

sold in competition

effect

rates will rise immediately,

marginal

goods

Reserve does

into

Federal

duced

government

if the Federal

extra

ment spending.
the

spending
some

add

When

the "crowding-out"

only

inject

system.

for

policy.

from a political

borrowing

spend-

departure

federal

not

borrowing

the

but

past

in public

ment

the ex-

in government

finance

did

Ex post,

at some

so that

lower. Tax rates will begin to be

of the

sulted

monetary

does not con-

of state

or inflation

and

project

in state

the deficits
likely

States.

relationship

operations

inflation

at the

relative

Federal

are not

United

trend

not

of government

as a temporary

however,

is obvious.

borrows

explicit

to be a reason

investment

the

deficits,

open-market

government

an

examines
the

in the

common

because

was

well

cumulative

is more

article

we have to

in income
as

All

fall

issue may arise from public-invest-

programs,

for federal

or

effect

underlying

be lowered

immediately

general,

To determine

trends

the

trend

collections

is desirable,

expenditures
and

local

tax
trends.

expected

duration

government

its long-run

and

a deficit

government

ment

whenever

long-run

This

firms,

to finance

income

per-

of GNP.

private

When a government

debt

below

rise

to

and partial

ment

level

in the future,

in the optimal

the

the

levels of government

seen

trend,

in-

want

issue debt

generally

2. While debt

of expenditures.

$715.1 billion, or 27 percent
likely

military

of the federal

equal

to

but not by enough

equivalent

in absolute

Governments,

is a tem-

of the

1963 federal

By

in gov-

government

In 1946 the level of government
at $241.9 billion,

to rise when

and tax collections
assumption

whenever

50 percent

exceeded

spending

often

the desired deficit

During

deficits

structure,

lowered
Current
be

an

the extra spending.

increase

buildup

war.

long-run

Viewed in this context,

amount

are raised,

cause government

smooth

pected

and

the

is going

ing becomes

programs,

income-tax

that

benefit

such as unemployment

welfare

Suppose
time

Institu-

if

determination

is obvious

known

that

This

change.

spending

raise tax rates to finance

federal

a large

arrangements,

trend.

complicated

the tax

fall during recessions.

income-sensitive

that

but spreads

also may issue debt when

compensation,

our

minimizes

over

in income.
the

tional

only

will issue debt

or when

a war

usually

constant

government

porary decrease

for

that taxpayers

to be fairly

spending

than

tax collections

comes

to plan

for expenditures

prefer

During

and the dollar

allow the government

tax collections.

ernment

federal

Temporary

under

they

the

be-

on goods,

payments.

desirable

that

in taxes

it spends

and transfer
are

amount

collects

that

the difference

A government

not

trends

rates over

proiects.f

inflation

government

tax

from

becomes

however,

and its relation

look at the deficit

departure

forego

government

as little

percent

of the

1965,

the

Federal

as 2 percent
annual

Reserve

has

and as much as 150

growth

of Treasury

debt.

Since the Accord of 1951, the general presumption
has been that the Federal
more general
encompass
tionary

than

the

monetary

Reserve's

financing

need

for a flexible

policy.

objectives

Treasury

debt.

were
They

but noninfla-

voices

are calling

allowing

for

tax

for supply-side
produce

cuts

that,

stimulus,

likely

to

closer

even

would

be

roads,

canals,

or

buildings,

large and immediate;

the

costs

the benefits,

are

deficits.

A

accrue

slowly over a long period of time. By

to

issuing

debt

even

larger

and

smoothing

time,

the

the issue.

costs

of tax collection
to future

generations

What Is the Deficit?

from the investment

and

monetary

policy

may clarify

payments

The

deficit

tween

the

dollar

government
amount

is simply

because

a different

path

services,
deficits

some

circumstances,

If we assume

tax

rates

time,

then

the

when

there

is a temporary

floats

finance

the

sector.

Taxes

rapid

to pay for the
for example,
ment

there

of GNP.
larger

of debt

percent

of GNP,

centage

of

size,

1940.

World War II,

In

to

vestment.

like

issue debt

govern-

that

are falling.

taxpayers

tax rates, the taxpayer

the government

Given
to

would prefer
rather

than

will

spending

rises above

debt stood

to 115 percent
debt,

had

although

fallen

to

to the prewar
1980 the

43

their

whether
know

the

this

budget

Debt

issue
levels,

likely

to

be very

federal

budget

policy.

Since

are

capital

in-

builds schools,

duct

is not likely
deficits

governments
in determining

large

and

as the

size

of the

debts,

to

inflation,
Reserve

state

the

and

is

budget.
among

and

local

and local

to be a major

factor

expectations.

debt

only

gradually.

spending

will
above

issue will be chosen

result

budget

invest-

goods, or the business

cycle.

deficits

from

deficits,

war,

these

appear
process

authority

services

without

these deficits

to have

re-

that has used

to prove
direct

govern-

taxation.

In

had to be financed

by

or by inflating the money supply.

Inflation

today

accelerating

is the

money

over a period
persistent

result

growth

that

of slowly

that

also included

budget

deficit

deficits.

represented

large and

In
the

occurred
each

year

provision

of

government

services for which

there

was no

liability.

extra

money

growth

tax

A little

in each year had no visible connection

with that year's deficit and no visible impact
on inflation.
was

Only when

accumulated

over

time did the long-run
The
level
All
taxes

discussion

spending
are

raised

each year's
a longer

excess

period

of

effects occur.

so far

of government
government

private

money,

takes

spending

actual

as optimal.
"crowds

out"

to

degree.

When

to pay for spending,

the

credit

If the

credit

interest

the

to

the

private

If the

Federal

banking

system,

immediately,

does

then

private

and

ducing

If the

policy

prices
and

persist,

will

policy,

lead

to

crowding

out

of

inflation

private

loans.

government

spending

depends

ment's

on

will ac-

marginal

value

of the

duct.
sector

the

is too
value

high
of the

relative

rises.

and the

output

has been

tive to private-sector

output

enlarges

tax

reductions

deficits
that

Why the deficit

matters

of

authorities

or too

conflicting

govern-

officials.

A stable

to

thought

the

can be seen

govern-

growing

rela-

for 100 years

promises

of

by

They judge the value of marto be low rela-

judgments
government

about

the

spending.

appropriate

level

If government-pro-

Federal

more

that seemingly

give up current

consumption.

at the

services

to sell its debt directly

the

the

Federal

Reserve;

immediate

kets,

and

interest

However,

the

the

Part

in

debt

raised

promise

another
the

on

debt in full. The debt can only grow if more

of

lenders

(savers)

current

consumption.

can

be

found

As the

to

Therefore,

debt

maintain

the

the

the

Reserve

valuable

because

promise

standard,
the

Federal

agency)
money

to

deficit.3
to re-

in full is its commitment
paper

the

market

value of the currency.

current

which

open

of the government's

pay the

the

promises

to

Under
dollar

U.S. government

Reserve

is
(of

is an indepen-

to limit the quantity

in circulation.

3.

In fact,

since

bought

to repay

ex-

A problem

can

Reserve buys govern-

to

then borrows

in the credit market.
implicit

pro-

of the current

arise when the Federal

represents

Act

from buy-

Federal

in the

absorb the equivalent

services

debt

have

Reserve

amounts.

is whether

of

But government

not

from the U.S. Treasury

dent

the difference

would

Reserve System

if both

are not

take
mar-

Federal

hibits the Federal

deficits

and taxes

this

rates

Persistent

provided,

would

off the credit

pressure

raise taxes.

Government

to

for the government
to

not to

kept.

anyone

When interest

it might seem tempting

also are made

are

in

can buy govern-

requiring

Promises

promises

lender

might be willing to acquire enough additional

suggests

occur

bor-

rates are very high,

government

A trend toward

government

private

is one

without

debt

question

to con-

expenditures

more

in the cur-

out

Reserve

future.

promise-an
depends

force

the economy

government

promise

may actually

tive to private-sector
production.
An evaluation
of the deficit

to re-

in the past may be

in the future.

government

promises
the

made

trend

pay for them. The government

be arguing against more govern-

or to

ing debt directly

by looking

a higher

to rise fu rther.

to the monetary

of as an implicit

level

more,

to give up consumption
period

The

if they result

The Deficits and Monetary Policy

are

production

of

the public

are meant

suggests that many who argue against deficits

ginal government

because

and

be paid to induce

cept in very limited

and

a particular
That

may support

(relative to private output)

temporary

higher

as output

will differ

occur

that

programs

tinue the trend

falls

programs
that

more

must

ment

Their judgments,
that

borrow
rate

rowers at the margin.

we rely

Those who place a low value on gov-

ernment

pro-

from

is not

Those who place a high

spending

pro-

consumers

Instead,

on values

increased

marginal

to

ment-sector

depend

the value of marginal

private-sector's

output

test.

citizens.

deficits

from

rent

process to reflect the evalua-

temporary
sector.

people

of

duce the role of the public sector.

investment

product

In general,

duction

in turn,

be

a non-

borrowing

rates

Whether

the

on the political

tions of individual

may support

accommodating

interest

consumption
low

with

up, thus re-

government

higher

for this market

value on government

demand

celerate, and interest rates will rise.
If the Federal
Reserve follows
inflationary

suited

to

interest

judgment

government

with each individual.

as surely as if taxes had been
deficits

yet most

collective

to the

credit

will compete

to force

incomes

raised.

to save.

buyers;

the

rates may not rise

services

demand

monetary

forcing

out of the mar-

but the government's

goods

not

of

tries

produced

this evaluation

result

and

would

goods and services,

system,

adds

interest

priced

the

banking

more people

Reserve

were

the

banking

ket as well as inducing

services

with privately

Reserve

borrowers

and

sold in competition

effect

rates will rise immediately,

marginal

goods

Reserve does

into

Federal

duced

government

if the Federal

extra

ment spending.
the

spending
some

add

When

the "crowding-out"

only

inject

system.

for

policy.

from a political

borrowing

spend-

departure

federal

not

borrowing

the

but

past

in public

ment

the ex-

in government

finance

did

Ex post,

at some

so that

lower. Tax rates will begin to be

of the

sulted

monetary

does not con-

of state

or inflation

and

project

in state

the deficits
likely

States.

relationship

operations

inflation

at the

relative

Federal

are not

United

trend

not

of government

as a temporary

however,

is obvious.

borrows

explicit

to be a reason

investment

the

deficits,

open-market

government

an

examines
the

in the

common

because

was

well

cumulative

is more

article

we have to

in income
as

All

fall

issue may arise from public-invest-

programs,

for federal

or

effect

underlying

be lowered

immediately

general,

To determine

trends

the

trend

collections

is desirable,

expenditures
and

local

tax
trends.

expected

duration

government

its long-run

and

a deficit

government

ment

whenever

long-run

This

firms,

to finance

income

per-

of GNP.

private

When a government

debt

below

rise

to

and partial

ment

level

in the future,

in the optimal

the

the

levels of government

seen

trend,

in-

want

issue debt

generally

2. While debt

of expenditures.

$715.1 billion, or 27 percent
likely

military

of the federal

equal

to

but not by enough

equivalent

in absolute

Governments,

is a tem-

of the

1963 federal

By

in gov-

government

In 1946 the level of government
at $241.9 billion,

to rise when

and tax collections
assumption

whenever

50 percent

exceeded

spending

often

the desired deficit

During

deficits

structure,

lowered
Current
be

an

the extra spending.

increase

buildup

war.

long-run

Viewed in this context,

amount

are raised,

cause government

smooth

pected

and

the

is going

ing becomes

programs,

income-tax

that

benefit

such as unemployment

welfare

Suppose
time

Institu-

if

determination

is obvious

known

that

This

change.

spending

raise tax rates to finance

federal

a large

arrangements,

trend.

complicated

the tax

fall during recessions.

income-sensitive

that

but spreads

also may issue debt when

compensation,

our

minimizes

over

in income.
the

tional

only

will issue debt

or when

a war

usually

constant

government

porary decrease

for

that taxpayers

to be fairly

spending

than

tax collections

comes

to plan

for expenditures

prefer

During

and the dollar

allow the government

tax collections.

ernment

federal

Temporary

under

they

the

be-

on goods,

payments.

desirable

that

in taxes

it spends

and transfer
are

amount

collects

that

the difference

A government

not

trends

rates over

proiects.f

inflation

government

tax

from

becomes

however,

and its relation

look at the deficit

departure

forego

government

as little

percent

of the

1965,

the

Federal

as 2 percent
annual

Reserve

has

and as much as 150

growth

of Treasury

debt.

Since the Accord of 1951, the general presumption
has been that the Federal
more general
encompass
tionary

than

the

monetary

Reserve's

financing

need

for a flexible

policy.

objectives

Treasury

debt.

were
They

but noninfla-

voices

are calling

allowing

for

tax

for supply-side
produce

cuts

that,

stimulus,

likely

to

closer

even

would

be

roads,

canals,

or

buildings,

large and immediate;

the

costs

the benefits,

are

deficits.

A

accrue

slowly over a long period of time. By

to

issuing

debt

even

larger

and

smoothing

time,

the

the issue.

costs

of tax collection
to future

generations

What Is the Deficit?

from the investment

and

monetary

policy

may clarify

payments

The

deficit

tween

the

dollar

government
amount

is simply

because

a different

path

services,
deficits

some

circumstances,

If we assume

tax

rates

time,

then

the

when

there

is a temporary

floats

finance

the

sector.

Taxes

rapid

to pay for the
for example,
ment

there

of GNP.
larger

of debt

percent

of GNP,

centage

of

size,

1940.

World War II,

In

to

vestment.

like

issue debt

govern-

that

are falling.

taxpayers

tax rates, the taxpayer

the government

Given
to

would prefer
rather

than

will

spending

rises above

debt stood

to 115 percent
debt,

had

although

fallen

to

to the prewar
1980 the

43

their

whether
know

the

this

budget

Debt

issue
levels,

likely

to

be very

federal

budget

policy.

Since

are

capital

in-

builds schools,

duct

is not likely
deficits

governments
in determining

large

and

as the

size

of the

debts,

to

inflation,
Reserve

state

the

and

is

budget.
among

and

local

and local

to be a major

factor

expectations.

debt

only

gradually.

spending

will
above

issue will be chosen

result

budget

invest-

goods, or the business

cycle.

deficits

from

deficits,

war,

these

appear
process

authority

services

without

these deficits

to have

re-

that has used

to prove
direct

govern-

taxation.

In

had to be financed

by

or by inflating the money supply.

Inflation

today

accelerating

is the

money

over a period
persistent

result

growth

that

of slowly

that

also included

budget

deficit

deficits.

represented

large and

In
the

occurred
each

year

provision

of

government

services for which

there

was no

liability.

extra

money

growth

tax

A little

in each year had no visible connection

with that year's deficit and no visible impact
on inflation.
was

Only when

accumulated

over

time did the long-run
The
level
All
taxes

discussion

spending
are

raised

each year's
a longer

excess

period

of

effects occur.

so far

of government
government

private

money,

takes

spending

actual

as optimal.
"crowds

out"

to

degree.

When

to pay for spending,

the

credit

If the

credit

interest

the

to

the

private

If the

Federal

banking

system,

immediately,

does

then

private

and

ducing

If the

policy

prices
and

persist,

will

policy,

lead

to

crowding

out

of

inflation

private

loans.

government

spending

depends

ment's

on

will ac-

marginal

value

of the

duct.
sector

the

is too
value

high
of the

relative

rises.

and the

output

has been

tive to private-sector

output

enlarges

tax

reductions

deficits
that

Why the deficit

matters

of

authorities

or too

conflicting

govern-

officials.

A stable

to

thought

the

can be seen

govern-

growing

rela-

for 100 years

promises

of

by

They judge the value of marto be low rela-

judgments
government

about

the

spending.

appropriate

level

If government-pro-

Federal

more

that seemingly

give up current

consumption.

at the

services

to sell its debt directly

the

the

Federal

Reserve;

immediate

kets,

and

interest

However,

the

the

Part

in

debt

raised

promise

another
the

on

debt in full. The debt can only grow if more

of

lenders

(savers)

current

consumption.

can

be

found

As the

to

Therefore,

debt

maintain

the

the

the

Reserve

valuable

because

promise

standard,
the

Federal

agency)
money

to

deficit.3
to re-

in full is its commitment
paper

the

market

value of the currency.

current

which

open

of the government's

pay the

the

promises

to

Under
dollar

U.S. government

Reserve

is
(of

is an indepen-

to limit the quantity

in circulation.

3.

In fact,

since

bought

to repay

ex-

A problem

can

Reserve buys govern-

to

then borrows

in the credit market.
implicit

pro-

of the current

arise when the Federal

represents

Act

from buy-

Federal

in the

absorb the equivalent

services

debt

have

Reserve

amounts.

is whether

of

But government

not

from the U.S. Treasury

dent

the difference

would

Reserve System

if both

are not

take
mar-

Federal

hibits the Federal

deficits

and taxes

this

rates

Persistent

provided,

would

off the credit

pressure

raise taxes.

Government

to

for the government
to

not to

kept.

anyone

When interest

it might seem tempting

also are made

are

in

can buy govern-

requiring

Promises

promises

lender

might be willing to acquire enough additional

suggests

occur

bor-

rates are very high,

government

A trend toward

government

private

is one

without

debt

question

to con-

expenditures

more

in the cur-

out

Reserve

future.

promise-an
depends

force

the economy

government

promise

may actually

tive to private-sector
production.
An evaluation
of the deficit

to re-

in the past may be

in the future.

government

promises
the

made

trend

pay for them. The government

be arguing against more govern-

or to

ing debt directly

by looking

a higher

to rise fu rther.

to the monetary

of as an implicit

level

more,

to give up consumption
period

The

if they result

The Deficits and Monetary Policy

are

production

of

the public

are meant

suggests that many who argue against deficits

ginal government

because

and

be paid to induce

cept in very limited

and

a particular
That

may support

(relative to private output)

temporary

higher

as output

will differ

occur

that

programs

tinue the trend

falls

programs
that

more

must

ment

Their judgments,
that

borrow
rate

rowers at the margin.

we rely

Those who place a low value on gov-

ernment

pro-

from

is not

Those who place a high

spending

pro-

consumers

Instead,

on values

increased

marginal

to

ment-sector

depend

the value of marginal

private-sector's

output

test.

citizens.

deficits

from

rent

process to reflect the evalua-

temporary
sector.

people

of

duce the role of the public sector.

investment

product

In general,

duction

in turn,

be

a non-

borrowing

rates

Whether

the

on the political

tions of individual

may support

accommodating

interest

consumption
low

with

up, thus re-

government

higher

for this market

value on government

demand

celerate, and interest rates will rise.
If the Federal
Reserve follows
inflationary

suited

to

interest

judgment

government

with each individual.

as surely as if taxes had been
deficits

yet most

collective

to the

credit

will compete

to force

incomes

raised.

to save.

buyers;

the

rates may not rise

services

demand

monetary

forcing

out of the mar-

but the government's

goods

not

of

tries

produced

this evaluation

result

and

would

goods and services,

system,

adds

interest

priced

the

banking

more people

Reserve

were

the

banking

ket as well as inducing

services

with privately

Reserve

borrowers

and

sold in competition

effect

rates will rise immediately,

marginal

goods

Reserve does

into

Federal

duced

government

if the Federal

extra

ment spending.
the

spending
some

add

When

the "crowding-out"

only

inject

system.

for

policy.

from a political

borrowing

spend-

departure

federal

not

borrowing

the

but

past

in public

ment

the ex-

in government

finance

did

Ex post,

at some

so that

lower. Tax rates will begin to be

of the

sulted

monetary

does not con-

of state

or inflation

and

project

in state

the deficits
likely

States.

relationship

operations

inflation

at the

relative

Federal

are not

United

trend

not

of government

as a temporary

however,

is obvious.

borrows

explicit

to be a reason

investment

the

deficits,

open-market

government

an

examines
the

in the

common

because

was

well

cumulative

is more

article

we have to

in income
as

All

fall

issue may arise from public-invest-

programs,

for federal

or

effect

underlying

be lowered

immediately

general,

To determine

trends

the

trend

collections

is desirable,

expenditures
and

local

tax
trends.

expected

duration

government

its long-run

and

a deficit

government

ment

whenever

long-run

This

firms,

to finance

income

per-

of GNP.

private

When a government

debt

below

rise

to

and partial

ment

level

in the future,

in the optimal

the

the

levels of government

seen

trend,

in-

want

issue debt

generally

2. While debt

of expenditures.

$715.1 billion, or 27 percent
likely

military

of the federal

equal

to

but not by enough

equivalent

in absolute

Governments,

is a tem-

of the

1963 federal

By

in gov-

government

In 1946 the level of government
at $241.9 billion,

to rise when

and tax collections
assumption

whenever

50 percent

exceeded

spending

often

the desired deficit

During

deficits

structure,

lowered
Current
be

an

the extra spending.

increase

buildup

war.

long-run

Viewed in this context,

amount

are raised,

cause government

smooth

pected

and

the

is going

ing becomes

programs,

income-tax

that

benefit

such as unemployment

welfare

Suppose
time

Institu-

if

determination

is obvious

known

that

This

change.

spending

raise tax rates to finance

federal

a large

arrangements,

trend.

complicated

the tax

fall during recessions.

income-sensitive

that

but spreads

also may issue debt when

compensation,

our

minimizes

over

in income.
the

tional

only

will issue debt

or when

a war

usually

constant

government

porary decrease

for

that taxpayers

to be fairly

spending

than

tax collections

comes

to plan

for expenditures

prefer

During

and the dollar

allow the government

tax collections.

ernment

federal

Temporary

under

they

the

be-

on goods,

payments.

desirable

that

in taxes

it spends

and transfer
are

amount

collects

that

the difference

A government

not

trends

rates over

proiects.f

inflation

government

tax

from

becomes

however,

and its relation

look at the deficit

departure

forego

government

as little

percent

of the

1965,

the

Federal

as 2 percent
annual

Reserve

has

and as much as 150

growth

of Treasury

debt.

Since the Accord of 1951, the general presumption
has been that the Federal
more general
encompass
tionary

than

the

monetary

Reserve's

financing

need

for a flexible

policy.

objectives

Treasury

debt.

were
They

but noninfla-

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
ment securities, because it pays for the debt
by increasing bank reserves. This in turn can

would lead to even higher inflation
higher interest rates.

and

lead to more bank lending, more money in
circulation, higher demands for goods and
services, and an accelerating inflation rate
as both private and public sectors compete
for the same resources.
This problem is complicated, because
all of this takes time. If inflation followed
immediately on an excessive increase in bank
reserves, interest rates would rise immediately
to reflect the higher inflation rates, and it
would not be possible for the Federal Reserve to prevent interest rates from rising by
purchasing government debt. However, it
takes time for an increase in bank reserves
to work its way through to a higher inflation
rate. During that transition period interest
rates will be below their long-run marketclearing levels.
The opposite happens when the trend in
money-supply growth is lowered. Bank reserves are reduced immediately, shrinking
the supply of credit available. Lower growth
in bank reserves will lead to less lending,
less money in circulation, a lower demand
for goods and services, and a decelerating
inflation rate. But this also takes time.
During the transition period interest rates
will be above their long-run market-clearing levels.
Today's high interest rates reflect a reduction in the growth of bank reserves without a reduction in the underlying inflation
rate. Interest rates are high, and the existence
of a large budget deficit only makes interest
rates higher. Increasing bank reserves to reduce interest rates could offer some shortterm relief, but it would be self-defeating;
faster growth in bank reserves eventually

The deficit also matters to the monetary
authorities for a technical reason related to
the process described earlier. The amount
of interest-bearing debt outstanding can
have an effect on inflation (the inverse of
the value of money) if it is perceived that
the taxing potential of the government is
being strained and that interest-bearing debt
is likely to be redeemed by inflating the
money supply. In this case, deficits will
raise inflation expectations and slow the
adjustment process needed to end inflation.
The Federal Reserve has adopted a monetary-growth rule intended to guarantee that
deficits will not be financed. Most economists
would agree that the steady growth rule is a
reasonable if not optimal long-run policy.
On the other hand, there is no well-accepted
economic theory ensuring that it is reasonable or optimal to force the money supply
to grow at the long-run constant rate in the
short run, i.e., week-to-week or even monthto-month. But to maintain credibility and
change expectations, the Federal Reserve
must convince the public that it will not
overshoot its long-run targets. One way
to do this is to adhere to the long-run targets even in the short run. The presence
of large deficits makes it more difficult
to convince the public that the Federal
Reserve System will not finance those
deficits and places pressure on the System
to adhere even more closely to its longrun targets in the short run.
From a technical point of view, this is
a relatively simple task. It becomes complicated, however, because the central bank

is the largest trader in the money market
and appears to have control over interest
rates. During periods of disinflation policy,
all the adjustment costs will be attributed
to high interest rates and the central bank.
Political coalitions will be formed by sectors
in the economy that are most sensitive to
high interest rates. These coalitions will
often be strong, having benefited from the
inflationary policies of the past. They will
put pressure on the Federal Reserve to revert to an inflationary policy-although
it will be called a low interest-rate or a
low-unemployment policy.
Conclusion
Deficits can cause inflation when they
are financed by excessive growth of the
money supply. However, the Federal Re-

serve sets growth-rate targets for the money
supply that do not depend on the size of
the deficit or on interest rates. These targets are intended to be low enough to reduce inflation and interest rates in the long
run, although they may require higher interest rates in the short run. Large budget
deficits have to be financed in credit markets, because the Federal Reserve cannot
buy large amounts of government debt
without creating excess bank reserves and
above-target money growth. Given the
money targets, a larger budget deficit will
require higher interest rates to reduce private
borrowings enough to float the extra government debt.

July 13, 1981

f.£Q!)omic Commentary

Why Do Deficits Matter?
by William T. Gavin

NOTE: No issues of the Economic Commentary
were published in June.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland,OH 44101

Address correction requested
o Correct as shown
o Remove from mailing list

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland,OH
Permit No. 385

The current budget process is likely to
produce large budget deficits in fiscal year
1982 and thereafter. The budget deficit is
the residual from the taxing and spending
policies of the federal government. Our
founding fathers gave the government the
power to borrow money in article 1, section
8, of the U.S. Constitution. Without such
authority the government would be forced
to collect taxes priorto making expenditures.
Economic theory and empirical evidence
suggest that it is in the interest of the people
and in the self-interest of political leaders to
plan tax collections independently of exWilliam Gavin is an economist with the Federal

penditures. In such a budget process there is
obviously room for temporary deficits.1
The persistent and large deficits of recent
years, however, have spawned intense debate
about the effect of government borrowing
on monetary policy and inflation. Calls for
a constitutional
amendment to require a
balanced budget indicate that some observers
believe the danger of inflation posed by large
and persistent deficits outweighs the benefits
of a flexible fiscal authority.
In the past we often have heard opponents
of proposed federal programs claim that
funding these programs would cause a deficit
that would lead to inflation. Today, in an
apparent contradiction, many of these same

ReserveBank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the author

1. For a rigorous development of this theory,

and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve

Please send mailing label to the Research Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

see Robert J. Barro, "On the Determination of

Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors

the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy,

of the Federal ReserveSystem.

vol. 87, no. 5, part 1 (October 1979), pp. 940-71.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
ment securities, because it pays for the debt
by increasing bank reserves. This in turn can

would lead to even higher inflation
higher interest rates.

and

lead to more bank lending, more money in
circulation, higher demands for goods and
services, and an accelerating inflation rate
as both private and public sectors compete
for the same resources.
This problem is complicated, because
all of this takes time. If inflation followed
immediately on an excessive increase in bank
reserves, interest rates would rise immediately
to reflect the higher inflation rates, and it
would not be possible for the Federal Reserve to prevent interest rates from rising by
purchasing government debt. However, it
takes time for an increase in bank reserves
to work its way through to a higher inflation
rate. During that transition period interest
rates will be below their long-run marketclearing levels.
The opposite happens when the trend in
money-supply growth is lowered. Bank reserves are reduced immediately, shrinking
the supply of credit available. Lower growth
in bank reserves will lead to less lending,
less money in circulation, a lower demand
for goods and services, and a decelerating
inflation rate. But this also takes time.
During the transition period interest rates
will be above their long-run market-clearing levels.
Today's high interest rates reflect a reduction in the growth of bank reserves without a reduction in the underlying inflation
rate. Interest rates are high, and the existence
of a large budget deficit only makes interest
rates higher. Increasing bank reserves to reduce interest rates could offer some shortterm relief, but it would be self-defeating;
faster growth in bank reserves eventually

The deficit also matters to the monetary
authorities for a technical reason related to
the process described earlier. The amount
of interest-bearing debt outstanding can
have an effect on inflation (the inverse of
the value of money) if it is perceived that
the taxing potential of the government is
being strained and that interest-bearing debt
is likely to be redeemed by inflating the
money supply. In this case, deficits will
raise inflation expectations and slow the
adjustment process needed to end inflation.
The Federal Reserve has adopted a monetary-growth rule intended to guarantee that
deficits will not be financed. Most economists
would agree that the steady growth rule is a
reasonable if not optimal long-run policy.
On the other hand, there is no well-accepted
economic theory ensuring that it is reasonable or optimal to force the money supply
to grow at the long-run constant rate in the
short run, i.e., week-to-week or even monthto-month. But to maintain credibility and
change expectations, the Federal Reserve
must convince the public that it will not
overshoot its long-run targets. One way
to do this is to adhere to the long-run targets even in the short run. The presence
of large deficits makes it more difficult
to convince the public that the Federal
Reserve System will not finance those
deficits and places pressure on the System
to adhere even more closely to its longrun targets in the short run.
From a technical point of view, this is
a relatively simple task. It becomes complicated, however, because the central bank

is the largest trader in the money market
and appears to have control over interest
rates. During periods of disinflation policy,
all the adjustment costs will be attributed
to high interest rates and the central bank.
Political coalitions will be formed by sectors
in the economy that are most sensitive to
high interest rates. These coalitions will
often be strong, having benefited from the
inflationary policies of the past. They will
put pressure on the Federal Reserve to revert to an inflationary policy-although
it will be called a low interest-rate or a
low-unemployment policy.
Conclusion
Deficits can cause inflation when they
are financed by excessive growth of the
money supply. However, the Federal Re-

serve sets growth-rate targets for the money
supply that do not depend on the size of
the deficit or on interest rates. These targets are intended to be low enough to reduce inflation and interest rates in the long
run, although they may require higher interest rates in the short run. Large budget
deficits have to be financed in credit markets, because the Federal Reserve cannot
buy large amounts of government debt
without creating excess bank reserves and
above-target money growth. Given the
money targets, a larger budget deficit will
require higher interest rates to reduce private
borrowings enough to float the extra government debt.

July 13, 1981

f.£Q!)omic Commentary

Why Do Deficits Matter?
by William T. Gavin

NOTE: No issues of the Economic Commentary
were published in June.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland,OH 44101

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Cleveland,OH
Permit No. 385

The current budget process is likely to
produce large budget deficits in fiscal year
1982 and thereafter. The budget deficit is
the residual from the taxing and spending
policies of the federal government. Our
founding fathers gave the government the
power to borrow money in article 1, section
8, of the U.S. Constitution. Without such
authority the government would be forced
to collect taxes priorto making expenditures.
Economic theory and empirical evidence
suggest that it is in the interest of the people
and in the self-interest of political leaders to
plan tax collections independently of exWilliam Gavin is an economist with the Federal

penditures. In such a budget process there is
obviously room for temporary deficits.1
The persistent and large deficits of recent
years, however, have spawned intense debate
about the effect of government borrowing
on monetary policy and inflation. Calls for
a constitutional
amendment to require a
balanced budget indicate that some observers
believe the danger of inflation posed by large
and persistent deficits outweighs the benefits
of a flexible fiscal authority.
In the past we often have heard opponents
of proposed federal programs claim that
funding these programs would cause a deficit
that would lead to inflation. Today, in an
apparent contradiction, many of these same

ReserveBank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the author

1. For a rigorous development of this theory,

and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve

Please send mailing label to the Research Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

see Robert J. Barro, "On the Determination of

Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors

the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy,

of the Federal ReserveSystem.

vol. 87, no. 5, part 1 (October 1979), pp. 940-71.