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public cannot be sure of the FOMC's policies
beyond the present year, the Federal
Reserve is particularly vulnerable to a
loss of credibility if the monetary growth
target ranges are exceeded in 1985.
The experience of the late 1970s has
shown us that, while a single year of
excessive monetary growth may not lead
to accelerating inflation, the effects of
one year's above-target growth are compounded when the target for the next year
is set. Because money growth targets are
announced only one year at a time, many
are justifiably wary of the extended effects
of a money overshoot. Thus, the possibility
of base drift causes the public to overemphasize a single year's money stock
growth.
There are a number of ways in which
the monetary targeting strategy could be
extended to encompass a multi-year perspective, ranging from a fixed money
growth rule to a commitment to base each
year's target ranges on the midpoint of
the previous year's range. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze
or even describe all the alternatives, it
would be desirable for the Federal Reserve
to formulate a method for expressing its

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

long-term policy intentions without losing
the ability to alter specific paths should
changing circumstances warrant their
adjustment. It is important that an innovation be found that enhances the Federal
Reserve's long-term credibility without
sacrificing its flexibility.
Continuing Progress Toward Price
Stability
While the FOMC's expectations do not
indicate any further reduction in the
inflation rate in 1985, the assumption of
an unchanging inflation rate during a
cyclical expansion would ordinarily be
considered optimistic. In the conventional
macroeconomic view, prices tend to rise
as an economic expansion continues and
as capacity constraints are approached.
However, the behavior of prices thus far
in the recovery has been surprising, and
it is not inconceivable that we may see a
further decline in inflation in 1985.
Chairman Volcker sounded this note of
optimism on the inflation outlook: "The
public at large seems to sense a greater
degree of control over inflation than for
many a year - and I sense some chance of
further progress toward price stability
this year, even as the economy grows."

But while the Federal Reserve has
established and maintained credibility in
its fight against inflation in recent years,
there has been no structural change in its
procedures for setting monetary targets
since the inflationary period of the late
1970s. It is important to view the inflationary effects of monetary growth in a
multi-year context, but the experience of
the 1970s, and the absence of a longerterm framework of objectives, make the
annual monetary targets seem more
important then they deserve to be.
Market participants may believe that
the FOMC intends to keep inflationary
pressures subdued and monetary growth
under control in 1985, but there may be
many reasons for money growth either to
exceed or to fall short of the target
ranges. If that occurs, many may fear that
policy has changed.
Perhaps the time has come, after a
decade of experience under annual
monetary targets, to seek a broad-based
consensus on the objectives of monetary
policy that would allow the Federal Reserve
to commit to a longer-term perspective
in announcing its intentions.

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OH
Permit No. 385

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

March 1, 1985
ISSN 0428- 1276

ECONOMIC
COMMENTARY
In February, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve's Board of Governors made the
annual announcement of the Federal Open
Market Committee's (FOMC) current
monetary growth targets. The Federal
Reserve began announcing annual targets
in 1975 in response to House Concurrent
Resolution 133, and the practice was
refined and formalized in the Federal
Reserve Reform Act of 1977 and in the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 (better known as the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
This legislation requires a representative
(usually the Chairman) of the Federal
Reserve to appear before Congressional
banking committees twice each year. In
July the Federal Reserve's monetary
targets for the current year are reviewed,
and the preliminary objectives for the
following year are discussed. The February
hearings include a review of the Federal
Reserve's performance in the previous
year and a formal announcement of the
targets for the current year.
In the decade that has passed since the
Federal Reserve began to announce its
monetary targets, little has changed in
the target-setting and reporting procedures,
but we have seen a dramatic shift in
policy emphasis and outcome. Before 1979,
monetary growth had persistently exceeded target ranges, and inflation and
inflationary expectations were rising.
Since 1979, however, the Federal Reserve
has sought to restore price stability by
reducing the annual growth rate of money
over a number of years.

Michael Pakko is a research assistant with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.

Although the selection of appropriate
target ranges during a period of financial
deregulation has been problematic at
times, the disinflationary policy of the
post-1979 period has been very successful.
The Chairman's recent testimony suggests
that the FOMC's monetary targets for
1985 remain consistent with this antiinflationary emphasis.
But even after five years of successful
disinflationary policy, many still watch the
current behavior of the Federal Reserve
for clues to its policy priorities. No
institutional changes have been made to
assure the public that a noninflationary
policy will be pursued beyond the current
year, so the Federal Reserve must always
seek credibility on the basis of each year's
targets. This places an inordinate emphasis
on money growth in a single year, suggesting that a multi-year targeting horizon
might improve the present policy
reporting arrangements.

The 1985
Humphrey-Hawkins
Testimony
By Michael R. Pakko

activity to the supply of money in the
economy: M V = P Q. In this form, the
money supply (M) times the income velocity
of money (V) is equal to the price level
(P) times real output (Q). Velocity is
defined by the equation as the ratio of
nominal output to money, and can be
thought of as a measure of the turnover
rate of money in the economy.
Table 1 Monetary Targets in 1984
and 1985
Annual percent change,
fourth quarter over fourth quarter
Aggregate

1984

1984

1985

Targets

Actual

Targets

Ml

4 to 8

5.2

4 to 7

M2

6 to 9

n

6 to 9

6 to 9

10.4

M3

6 to 9.5

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

In the form of growth rates, the equation
can be approximated as m + v = p + q,
where the lower case letters indicate
The Equation of Exchange and
rates of change for the variables. Since
Monetary Targets
economic policy makers are primarily
The Equation of Exchange provides a
interested in economic growth and inflation
(price level changes), this form is
framework for evaluating the relationship
between monetary targets and the broader
appropriate for evaluating policy.
economic goals of Federal Reserve policyWhile monetary growth may affect real
makers. The Equation of Exchange
economic growth in the short-run, it is
relates the level of prices and economic
generally agreed that, within reasonable
limits, these short-term effects are
transitory. Average real growth over longer
periods is independent of short -run money
supply fluctuations. Inflation, on the

other hand, is closely related to monetary
growth over the long run. To deal with it,
monetary policy makers should seek to
achieve long-term money supply growth
that encourages the expectation of
price stability.
Such an approach has, in fact, been a
cornerstone of the Fed's monetary policy
in recent years. It was reiterated by
Chairman Paul Volcker in his recent
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony before the
Senate when he said, "Prospects for
sustained growth and productivity over
time rest importantly on success in
achieving and maintaining an environment
of greater stability of prices and
financial markets:"
A Decade of Monetary Aggregate
Targeting
The ten years that have passed since the
Federal Reserve began announcing its
Chart 1 M1and Target Ranges,
1976 to 1985
Billions of dollars
550
500
450
400
350

o~~~~~~~~--~~~~
1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

annual monetary targets in 1975 consists
of two distinct sub-periods. In the late
1970s, the growth of Ml tended to exceed
the FOMC's target ranges. As chart 1
illustrates, the money growth overshoots
of 1977-79 were reinforced by the Federal
Reserve's practice of basing its annual
targets on the money supply level from the
fourth quarter of the previous year. This
practice, which has come to be known as

1. This and all subsequent quotations are excerpts
from "Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 20, 1985;'
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 71, no. 4 (April 1985),
pp.211-24.

'base drift,' caused current target ranges
to incorporate the target misses of the
previous year. In the case of the 1977-79
period, base drift allowed money growth
overshoots to accumulate, compounding
the inflationary effects of the yearly
excesses.
By the fall of 1979, the persistent excess
growth of money and an accelerating
inflation rate had eroded the credibility of
the Federal Reserve's monetary targeting
policies. In October 1979, the Federal
Reserve announced a number of actions
that were intended to provide better control
over money growth in order to assure the
public that announced targets would be
met. Since that time, the Federal Reserve's
stated objectives have emphasized the
role of monetary restraint in bringing down
the rate of inflation. This policy has
apparently been very successful, as the
rate of inflation has fallen from over 10
percent in 1980 to less than 4 percent
in 1983 and 1984.
The annual values for the variables in
the Equation of Exchange shown in table 2
illustrate the acceleration of monetary
growth that accompanied rising inflation
from 1975 to 1979. However, the deceleration of money supply growth in the
post-1979 period is obscured by the unusual behavior of velocity in 1982 and
1983. In those years, the effects of financial
deregulation, decelerating inflation, and
declining nominal interest rates distorted
the money-income relationship, resulting
in velocity behavior that was unusual by
postwar standards.
When monetary growth rates in the post1979 period are compared with changes
in velocity, the Federal Reserve's restraint
is more apparent. Chart 2 compares the
deviation of velocity from its trend rate
of growth (measured as a 15-year moving
average rate) with deviations of monetary
growth from the midpoint of its original
target range. An examination of chart 2
shows that the apparently high monetary
growth rates in 1982 and 1983 were offset by the unusual velocity declines in
those two years.
In addition, an analysis of money growth
rates in 1982 and 1983 should include a
recognition of the negative base drift

inherited from 1981. When the effects of
velocity growth and Ml growth deviations
are considered together with the negative
1981 base drift, monetary policy in 1982
and 1983 appears much less expansionary
than suggested by the annual monetary
growth rates alone, and much more consistent with an anti-inflation strategy.
In 1984, velocity growth appeared to be
returning toward more normal behavior.
Table 2 Equation of Exchange
Annual percent change,
fourth quarter over fourth quarter
Growth
Ml
+ Velocity = Infla- + in real
growth
growth
tion
output

1975

5.0

4.8

7.7

2.2

1976

6.1

3.0

4.7

4.4

1977

8.1

3.8

6.1

5.7

1978

8.2

6.0

8.5

5.8

1979

7.5

8.2

1.4

1980

7.5

2.1
1.7

10.2

-0.8

1981

5.1

5.3

8.9

1.6

1982

8.7

-5.6

4.3

-1.5

1983

10.4

0.0

3.8

6.3

1984

5.2

4.1

3.6

5.7

NOTE: The additive relationship may not hold,
due to the inexact nature of this representation.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and U.S. Department of Commerce.

inflation will remain below 4 percent. Given
the target range for Ml, these assumptions
imply a velocity growth rate of between
1 percent and 3 percent.
In his remarks, Chairman Volcker gave
a more specific assessment of the FOMC's
velocity expectations: "The annual target
ranges for Ml and M2 assume that trends
in velocity are returning to a more normal
and predictable pattern. However, there
is some analysis that suggests the trend
of velocity over time may be a little lower
than the trend of 3 percent or so characteristic of much of the postwar period,
when interest rates were trending higher.
Should developments during 1985 tend
to confirm that somewhat lower velocity
growth, and provided that inflationary
pressures remain subdued, the Committee
anticipates that those aggregates might
end the year in the upper part of their
ranges. The lower part of the Ml range
would be consistent with greater cyclical
growth in velocity than now thought
likely."
Chart 2 Deviations of Money from
Target and Velocity from Trend
Percent
4
2

Chairman Volcker explained that, although
the growth rate of velocity was above its
long-run trend, it was "00. broadly in line
with cyclical experience in the past, taking
into account both the pattern of interest
rate movements and income growth:' With
velocity closer to trend than in 1982 and
1983, the FOMC held Ml growth to near
the midpoint of its target range.
For 1985, the FOMC expects that
velocity growth will continue to be consistent with past experience, as indicated
by the economic assumptions of FOMC
members shown in table 3. The FOMC
expects that real growth will continue to
increase at a moderate pace, and that

0
-2
-4

J-Lll~111--r

::-=

~

1-

• Money deviations

-6
• Velocity deviations
-8
-10

1976

1978

1980

1·-;;.
1982

1984

SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and U.S. Department of Commerce.

This statement provides a base on which
to build expectations of FOMC behavior
in 1985. As new information about price
trends, business activity, and velocity is
revealed, the FOMC may adjust monetary
growth rates accordingly. The testimony
suggests that whether the FOMC aims
above or below the midpoint of the Ml
growth range will depend, in part, on
whether velocity proves to be below or
above the FOMC's expectations.

The Challenges Faced in 1985
In addition to some continued uncertainty
regarding the behavior of velocity growth,
there are other economic concerns that
will challenge the FOMC's anti-inflation
strategy in 1985. Chairman Volcker's
comments before Congress suggest, however, that the Federal Reserve intends to

The unprecedented strength of the dollar
in foreign-exchange markets, and the
resulting international trade deficit, is a
related problem. The shortage of domestic
savings in relation to borrowing demands
has produced a massive redirection of U.S.
direct investment and bank lending - from
foreign assets to domestic assets and
markets. This imbalance has reduced the

Table 3 Economic Assumptions for 1985
Annual percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter
FOMCa
Central
tendency

Range

Administration

7.5 to 8

8.5

3.25 to 4.25

3.25 to 4

4.0

Implicit deflator for GNP

3 to 4.75

3.5 to 4

4.3

Ml

4 to 7

Nominal GNP
Real GNP

7 to 8.5

Implied velocity"

6.4
1 to 3

1.9

a. Forecasts of FOMC members and other Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
b. Author's construction.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Council of Economic Advisors.

continue its emphasis on progress against
inflation and to resist pressures to boost
monetary growth.
The fundamental problem confronting
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy in
1985 is the imbalance between the demand
for credit and the supply of domestic
savings. The combination of growing
private sector credit demands and continuing government deficit financing
requirements is straining credit supplies,
tending to put upward pressure on interest
rates. It is possible that these pressures
will diminish support for long-term antiinflation objectives in favor of direct
attention to interest rates.
The Federal Reserve's position on
resisting interest-rate pressures, however,
is that such a policy would be self-defeating.
As Chairman Volcker explained, "To
create money beyond that needed to
sustain orderly growth would be to invite
renewed inflation - damaging incentives
to save in the process ... the only constructive alternative is to attack the problem
from the other side of the ledger by
reducing the federal deficit."

supply of dollars in foreign-exchange
markets and pushed up the exchange value
of the dollar. The dollar's appreciation
has helped to restrain inflation by keeping
import prices low, but it has also put
pressure on the exporting and importcompeting sectors of the economy.
As in the case of rising interest rates,
the trade deficit and the exchange value
of the dollar are issues that could generate
support for accelerated monetary growth.
But the Chairman's remarks on this issue
were as forceful as those regarding the
budget deficit and domestic interest rates:
"No doubt bad monetary policy could drive
the dollar down - a monetary policy that
aroused inflationary expectations, undermined confidence, and drove away
foreign capital."

Beyond 1985: The Second Decade of
Target Announcements
Chairman Volcker's statements make it
clear that the FOMC intends to continue
the fight against inflation, and that the
monetary targets have been set within the
context of that objective. But because
these pressures exist, and because the

other hand, is closely related to monetary
growth over the long run. To deal with it,
monetary policy makers should seek to
achieve long-term money supply growth
that encourages the expectation of
price stability.
Such an approach has, in fact, been a
cornerstone of the Fed's monetary policy
in recent years. It was reiterated by
Chairman Paul Volcker in his recent
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony before the
Senate when he said, "Prospects for
sustained growth and productivity over
time rest importantly on success in
achieving and maintaining an environment
of greater stability of prices and
financial markets:"
A Decade of Monetary Aggregate
Targeting
The ten years that have passed since the
Federal Reserve began announcing its
Chart 1 M1and Target Ranges,
1976 to 1985
Billions of dollars
550
500
450
400
350

o~~~~~~~~--~~~~
1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

annual monetary targets in 1975 consists
of two distinct sub-periods. In the late
1970s, the growth of Ml tended to exceed
the FOMC's target ranges. As chart 1
illustrates, the money growth overshoots
of 1977-79 were reinforced by the Federal
Reserve's practice of basing its annual
targets on the money supply level from the
fourth quarter of the previous year. This
practice, which has come to be known as

1. This and all subsequent quotations are excerpts
from "Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 20, 1985;'
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 71, no. 4 (April 1985),
pp.211-24.

'base drift,' caused current target ranges
to incorporate the target misses of the
previous year. In the case of the 1977-79
period, base drift allowed money growth
overshoots to accumulate, compounding
the inflationary effects of the yearly
excesses.
By the fall of 1979, the persistent excess
growth of money and an accelerating
inflation rate had eroded the credibility of
the Federal Reserve's monetary targeting
policies. In October 1979, the Federal
Reserve announced a number of actions
that were intended to provide better control
over money growth in order to assure the
public that announced targets would be
met. Since that time, the Federal Reserve's
stated objectives have emphasized the
role of monetary restraint in bringing down
the rate of inflation. This policy has
apparently been very successful, as the
rate of inflation has fallen from over 10
percent in 1980 to less than 4 percent
in 1983 and 1984.
The annual values for the variables in
the Equation of Exchange shown in table 2
illustrate the acceleration of monetary
growth that accompanied rising inflation
from 1975 to 1979. However, the deceleration of money supply growth in the
post-1979 period is obscured by the unusual behavior of velocity in 1982 and
1983. In those years, the effects of financial
deregulation, decelerating inflation, and
declining nominal interest rates distorted
the money-income relationship, resulting
in velocity behavior that was unusual by
postwar standards.
When monetary growth rates in the post1979 period are compared with changes
in velocity, the Federal Reserve's restraint
is more apparent. Chart 2 compares the
deviation of velocity from its trend rate
of growth (measured as a 15-year moving
average rate) with deviations of monetary
growth from the midpoint of its original
target range. An examination of chart 2
shows that the apparently high monetary
growth rates in 1982 and 1983 were offset by the unusual velocity declines in
those two years.
In addition, an analysis of money growth
rates in 1982 and 1983 should include a
recognition of the negative base drift

inherited from 1981. When the effects of
velocity growth and Ml growth deviations
are considered together with the negative
1981 base drift, monetary policy in 1982
and 1983 appears much less expansionary
than suggested by the annual monetary
growth rates alone, and much more consistent with an anti-inflation strategy.
In 1984, velocity growth appeared to be
returning toward more normal behavior.
Table 2 Equation of Exchange
Annual percent change,
fourth quarter over fourth quarter
Growth
Ml
+ Velocity = Infla- + in real
growth
growth
tion
output

1975

5.0

4.8

7.7

2.2

1976

6.1

3.0

4.7

4.4

1977

8.1

3.8

6.1

5.7

1978

8.2

6.0

8.5

5.8

1979

7.5

8.2

1.4

1980

7.5

2.1
1.7

10.2

-0.8

1981

5.1

5.3

8.9

1.6

1982

8.7

-5.6

4.3

-1.5

1983

10.4

0.0

3.8

6.3

1984

5.2

4.1

3.6

5.7

NOTE: The additive relationship may not hold,
due to the inexact nature of this representation.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and U.S. Department of Commerce.

inflation will remain below 4 percent. Given
the target range for Ml, these assumptions
imply a velocity growth rate of between
1 percent and 3 percent.
In his remarks, Chairman Volcker gave
a more specific assessment of the FOMC's
velocity expectations: "The annual target
ranges for Ml and M2 assume that trends
in velocity are returning to a more normal
and predictable pattern. However, there
is some analysis that suggests the trend
of velocity over time may be a little lower
than the trend of 3 percent or so characteristic of much of the postwar period,
when interest rates were trending higher.
Should developments during 1985 tend
to confirm that somewhat lower velocity
growth, and provided that inflationary
pressures remain subdued, the Committee
anticipates that those aggregates might
end the year in the upper part of their
ranges. The lower part of the Ml range
would be consistent with greater cyclical
growth in velocity than now thought
likely."
Chart 2 Deviations of Money from
Target and Velocity from Trend
Percent
4
2

Chairman Volcker explained that, although
the growth rate of velocity was above its
long-run trend, it was "00. broadly in line
with cyclical experience in the past, taking
into account both the pattern of interest
rate movements and income growth:' With
velocity closer to trend than in 1982 and
1983, the FOMC held Ml growth to near
the midpoint of its target range.
For 1985, the FOMC expects that
velocity growth will continue to be consistent with past experience, as indicated
by the economic assumptions of FOMC
members shown in table 3. The FOMC
expects that real growth will continue to
increase at a moderate pace, and that

0
-2
-4

J-Lll~111--r

::-=

~

1-

• Money deviations

-6
• Velocity deviations
-8
-10

1976

1978

1980

1·-;;.
1982

1984

SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and U.S. Department of Commerce.

This statement provides a base on which
to build expectations of FOMC behavior
in 1985. As new information about price
trends, business activity, and velocity is
revealed, the FOMC may adjust monetary
growth rates accordingly. The testimony
suggests that whether the FOMC aims
above or below the midpoint of the Ml
growth range will depend, in part, on
whether velocity proves to be below or
above the FOMC's expectations.

The Challenges Faced in 1985
In addition to some continued uncertainty
regarding the behavior of velocity growth,
there are other economic concerns that
will challenge the FOMC's anti-inflation
strategy in 1985. Chairman Volcker's
comments before Congress suggest, however, that the Federal Reserve intends to

The unprecedented strength of the dollar
in foreign-exchange markets, and the
resulting international trade deficit, is a
related problem. The shortage of domestic
savings in relation to borrowing demands
has produced a massive redirection of U.S.
direct investment and bank lending - from
foreign assets to domestic assets and
markets. This imbalance has reduced the

Table 3 Economic Assumptions for 1985
Annual percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter
FOMCa
Central
tendency

Range

Administration

7.5 to 8

8.5

3.25 to 4.25

3.25 to 4

4.0

Implicit deflator for GNP

3 to 4.75

3.5 to 4

4.3

Ml

4 to 7

Nominal GNP
Real GNP

7 to 8.5

Implied velocity"

6.4
1 to 3

1.9

a. Forecasts of FOMC members and other Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
b. Author's construction.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Council of Economic Advisors.

continue its emphasis on progress against
inflation and to resist pressures to boost
monetary growth.
The fundamental problem confronting
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy in
1985 is the imbalance between the demand
for credit and the supply of domestic
savings. The combination of growing
private sector credit demands and continuing government deficit financing
requirements is straining credit supplies,
tending to put upward pressure on interest
rates. It is possible that these pressures
will diminish support for long-term antiinflation objectives in favor of direct
attention to interest rates.
The Federal Reserve's position on
resisting interest-rate pressures, however,
is that such a policy would be self-defeating.
As Chairman Volcker explained, "To
create money beyond that needed to
sustain orderly growth would be to invite
renewed inflation - damaging incentives
to save in the process ... the only constructive alternative is to attack the problem
from the other side of the ledger by
reducing the federal deficit."

supply of dollars in foreign-exchange
markets and pushed up the exchange value
of the dollar. The dollar's appreciation
has helped to restrain inflation by keeping
import prices low, but it has also put
pressure on the exporting and importcompeting sectors of the economy.
As in the case of rising interest rates,
the trade deficit and the exchange value
of the dollar are issues that could generate
support for accelerated monetary growth.
But the Chairman's remarks on this issue
were as forceful as those regarding the
budget deficit and domestic interest rates:
"No doubt bad monetary policy could drive
the dollar down - a monetary policy that
aroused inflationary expectations, undermined confidence, and drove away
foreign capital."

Beyond 1985: The Second Decade of
Target Announcements
Chairman Volcker's statements make it
clear that the FOMC intends to continue
the fight against inflation, and that the
monetary targets have been set within the
context of that objective. But because
these pressures exist, and because the

public cannot be sure of the FOMC's policies
beyond the present year, the Federal
Reserve is particularly vulnerable to a
loss of credibility if the monetary growth
target ranges are exceeded in 1985.
The experience of the late 1970s has
shown us that, while a single year of
excessive monetary growth may not lead
to accelerating inflation, the effects of
one year's above-target growth are compounded when the target for the next year
is set. Because money growth targets are
announced only one year at a time, many
are justifiably wary of the extended effects
of a money overshoot. Thus, the possibility
of base drift causes the public to overemphasize a single year's money stock
growth.
There are a number of ways in which
the monetary targeting strategy could be
extended to encompass a multi-year perspective, ranging from a fixed money
growth rule to a commitment to base each
year's target ranges on the midpoint of
the previous year's range. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze
or even describe all the alternatives, it
would be desirable for the Federal Reserve
to formulate a method for expressing its

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Research Department
P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101

Address Correction Requested: Please send
corrected mailing label to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Research Department,
P.O. Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101.

long-term policy intentions without losing
the ability to alter specific paths should
changing circumstances warrant their
adjustment. It is important that an innovation be found that enhances the Federal
Reserve's long-term credibility without
sacrificing its flexibility.
Continuing Progress Toward Price
Stability
While the FOMC's expectations do not
indicate any further reduction in the
inflation rate in 1985, the assumption of
an unchanging inflation rate during a
cyclical expansion would ordinarily be
considered optimistic. In the conventional
macroeconomic view, prices tend to rise
as an economic expansion continues and
as capacity constraints are approached.
However, the behavior of prices thus far
in the recovery has been surprising, and
it is not inconceivable that we may see a
further decline in inflation in 1985.
Chairman Volcker sounded this note of
optimism on the inflation outlook: "The
public at large seems to sense a greater
degree of control over inflation than for
many a year - and I sense some chance of
further progress toward price stability
this year, even as the economy grows."

But while the Federal Reserve has
established and maintained credibility in
its fight against inflation in recent years,
there has been no structural change in its
procedures for setting monetary targets
since the inflationary period of the late
1970s. It is important to view the inflationary effects of monetary growth in a
multi-year context, but the experience of
the 1970s, and the absence of a longerterm framework of objectives, make the
annual monetary targets seem more
important then they deserve to be.
Market participants may believe that
the FOMC intends to keep inflationary
pressures subdued and monetary growth
under control in 1985, but there may be
many reasons for money growth either to
exceed or to fall short of the target
ranges. If that occurs, many may fear that
policy has changed.
Perhaps the time has come, after a
decade of experience under annual
monetary targets, to seek a broad-based
consensus on the objectives of monetary
policy that would allow the Federal Reserve
to commit to a longer-term perspective
in announcing its intentions.

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Permit No. 385

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

March 1, 1985
ISSN 0428- 1276

ECONOMIC
COMMENTARY
In February, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve's Board of Governors made the
annual announcement of the Federal Open
Market Committee's (FOMC) current
monetary growth targets. The Federal
Reserve began announcing annual targets
in 1975 in response to House Concurrent
Resolution 133, and the practice was
refined and formalized in the Federal
Reserve Reform Act of 1977 and in the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 (better known as the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
This legislation requires a representative
(usually the Chairman) of the Federal
Reserve to appear before Congressional
banking committees twice each year. In
July the Federal Reserve's monetary
targets for the current year are reviewed,
and the preliminary objectives for the
following year are discussed. The February
hearings include a review of the Federal
Reserve's performance in the previous
year and a formal announcement of the
targets for the current year.
In the decade that has passed since the
Federal Reserve began to announce its
monetary targets, little has changed in
the target-setting and reporting procedures,
but we have seen a dramatic shift in
policy emphasis and outcome. Before 1979,
monetary growth had persistently exceeded target ranges, and inflation and
inflationary expectations were rising.
Since 1979, however, the Federal Reserve
has sought to restore price stability by
reducing the annual growth rate of money
over a number of years.

Michael Pakko is a research assistant with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.

Although the selection of appropriate
target ranges during a period of financial
deregulation has been problematic at
times, the disinflationary policy of the
post-1979 period has been very successful.
The Chairman's recent testimony suggests
that the FOMC's monetary targets for
1985 remain consistent with this antiinflationary emphasis.
But even after five years of successful
disinflationary policy, many still watch the
current behavior of the Federal Reserve
for clues to its policy priorities. No
institutional changes have been made to
assure the public that a noninflationary
policy will be pursued beyond the current
year, so the Federal Reserve must always
seek credibility on the basis of each year's
targets. This places an inordinate emphasis
on money growth in a single year, suggesting that a multi-year targeting horizon
might improve the present policy
reporting arrangements.

The 1985
Humphrey-Hawkins
Testimony
By Michael R. Pakko

activity to the supply of money in the
economy: M V = P Q. In this form, the
money supply (M) times the income velocity
of money (V) is equal to the price level
(P) times real output (Q). Velocity is
defined by the equation as the ratio of
nominal output to money, and can be
thought of as a measure of the turnover
rate of money in the economy.
Table 1 Monetary Targets in 1984
and 1985
Annual percent change,
fourth quarter over fourth quarter
Aggregate

1984

1984

1985

Targets

Actual

Targets

Ml

4 to 8

5.2

4 to 7

M2

6 to 9

n

6 to 9

6 to 9

10.4

M3

6 to 9.5

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

In the form of growth rates, the equation
can be approximated as m + v = p + q,
where the lower case letters indicate
The Equation of Exchange and
rates of change for the variables. Since
Monetary Targets
economic policy makers are primarily
The Equation of Exchange provides a
interested in economic growth and inflation
(price level changes), this form is
framework for evaluating the relationship
between monetary targets and the broader
appropriate for evaluating policy.
economic goals of Federal Reserve policyWhile monetary growth may affect real
makers. The Equation of Exchange
economic growth in the short-run, it is
relates the level of prices and economic
generally agreed that, within reasonable
limits, these short-term effects are
transitory. Average real growth over longer
periods is independent of short -run money
supply fluctuations. Inflation, on the