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Federal R eserve Bank
OF DALLAS
ROBERT

D. M c T E E R , J R .

P R E S ID E N T
AND

C H IE F

E X E C U T IV E

O F F IC E R

June 4 , 1993

dallas,texas 75222

Notice 93-61
TO:

The Chief Executive Officer of each
member bank and others concerned in
the Eleventh Federal Reserve District
SUBJECT
Request for Public Comment on a Proposed
New Rule— Regulation EE (Netting Eligibility
for Financial Institutions)
DETAILS

The Federal Reserve Board has issued for public comment a proposed
rule to expand the definition of "financial institution" in Section 402 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (Act). The Act vali­
dates netting contracts among financial institutions.
The Act defines "financial institution" to include a securities
broker or dealer, a depository institution, a futures commission merchant, or
any other institution as determined by the Board. The proposed rule would
establish a category of entities considered financial institutions under the
Act, while reserving the ability to expand that category further through
individual determinations.
Parties to a netting contract agree that they will pay or receive
the net, rather than the gross, payment due under the netting contract. The
Act provides certainty that netting contracts will be enforced, even in the
event of the insolvency of one of the parties. The A c t ’s netting provisions,
effective December 19, 1991, were designed to promote efficiency and reduce
systemic risk within the banking system and financial markets.
The Board must receive comments by
be addressed to William W. Wiles, Secretary,
Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution
20551. All comments should refer to Docket

August 20, 1993. Comments should
Board of Governors of the Federal
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
No. R-0801.

ATTACHMENT
58,

A copy of the Board’s notice as it appears on pages 29149-52,
No. 95, of the Federal Register dated May 19, 1993, is attached.

Vol.

For additional copies, bankers and others are encouraged to use one of the following toll-free numbers in contacting the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
Dallas Office (800) 333-4460; El Paso Branch Intrastate (800) 592-1631, Interstate (800) 351-1012; Houston Branch Intrastate (800) 392-4162,
Interstate (800) 221-0363; San Antonio Branch Intrastate (800) 292-5810.

This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)

- 2 -

MORE INFORMATION
For more information, please contact Jane Anne Schmoker at (214)
922-5104. For additional copies of this Bank’s notice, please contact the
Public Affairs Department at (214) 922-5254.
Sincerely yours,

Federal Register / Vol. 58, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 19, 1993 / Proposed Rules

29149

netting provisions. The Act authorizes
the Board to expand the definition of
"financial institution” to the extent
consistent with the purposes of
enhancing efficiency and reducing
systemic risk in the financial markets.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before August 2 0 ,1 9 9 3 .
ADDRESSES: Comments, which should
refer to Docket No. R-0801, may be
mailed to Mr. William W. Wiles,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551. Comments addressed to Mr.
Wiles also may be delivered to the
Board's mail room between 8:45 am and
5:15 pm and to the security control
room outside of those hours. Both the
mail room and the security control room
are accessible from the courtyard
entrance on 20th Street between
Constitution Avenue and C Street, NW.
Comments may be inspected in Room fi­
l l 22 between 9 am and 5 pm.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Oliver Ireland, Associate General
Counsel (202/452-3625), or Stephanie
Martin, Senior Attorney (202/452-3198),
Legal Division, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. For the
hearing impaired only,
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
(TDD), Dorothea Thompson (202/4523544), Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th and C Streets,
NW., Washington, DC 20551.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 231
[Regulation EE; Docket No. R-C301]

Netting Eligibility for Financial
Institutions
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Board is requesting
comment on a rule to include certain
entities under the definition of
“financial institution" in section 402 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
so that they will be covered by the Act’s

Background
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(Act) (Pub. L. 102-242, sections 401-407;
105 Stat. 2236, 2372-3; 12 U.S.C. 44014407) validates netting contracts among
financial institutions. Parties to a
netting contract agree that they will pay
or receive the net, rather than the gross,
payment due under the netting contract.
The Act provides certainty that netting
contracts will be enforced, even in the
event of the insolvency of one of the
parties. The Act’s netting provisions,
effective December 19,1991, were
designed to promote efficiency and
reduce systemic risk within the banking
system and financial markets.
The netting provisions apply to
bilateral netting contracts between two
financial institutions and multilateral
netting contracts among members of a
clearing organization.1 Section 4402(9)
1 “Clearing organization” means a clearinghouse,
clearing association, clearing corporation, or similar
organization—
(A) That provides clearing, netting, or settlement
services for its members and—
Continued

29150

Federal Register / Vol. 58, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 19, 1993 / Proposed Rules

of the Act defines “financial institution’’
to include a depository institution, a
securities broker or dealer, or a futures
commission merchant. Section 4402(9)
also authorizes the Board to determine
whether institutions that do not fall
within the Act’s definition may be
considered financial institutions for
purposes of the netting provisions. In
addition, the Act’s definition of "broker
or dealer” (section 4402(1)(B)) includes
any affiliate of a registered broker or
dealer, to the extent consistent with the
Act, as determined by the Board.
The Board could expand the
“financial institution” definition either
by case-by-case determinations or by
rule-making. The Board believes it
would be appropriate to establish, by
rule, a category of entities that may be
considered financial institutions under
the Act. The Board would retain the
discretion to make individual
determinations in cases where entities
do not meet the rule’s requirements for
a financial institution, but where
application of the Act’s netting
provisions to their transactions would
reduce systemic risk and increase
efficiency in the financial markets.2
Scope o f the proposed mle. The Board
believes that, consistent with the
purposes of the Act, the netting
provisions of the Act should extend to
all financial market participants that
regularly enter into financial contracts,
both as buyers and sellers, where the
failure of the participant could create
systemic problems in the financial
markets. The failure of a significant
market participant to meet its
obligations at the end of the day could
have serious systemic consequences in
terms of losses to counterparties or
market confidence and liquidity. The
Board considered limiting coverage to
institutions that are regulated by the

federal or state government, that are
affiliated with a defined financial
institution, or that have a specific type
of corporate charter. However, the Board
believes that broad netting coverage
would further the Act’s goals to enhance
efficiency and decrease systemic risk in
the financial markets.
Market participants generally manage
counterparty risk by setting bilateral
exposure limits vis-a-vis other market
participants. These limits may be
influenced by a counterparty’s
affiliation, charter, or regulatory status.
In some cases, these limits may
constrain activity, particularly for
participants that act as intermediaries
and provide liquidity to the market.
Extending the Act’s netting provisions
broadly to market obligations would
allow participants to engage in more
transactions within a given set of credit
limits because those limits would be
applied to the net, rather than the gross,
amount of exposure to individual
counterparties (including
clearinghouses). Therefore, broader
netting coverage would tend to loosen
constraints on intermediaries, thereby
enhancing market liquidity and
reducing counterparty risk. Market
participants could increase their gross
transactions while maintaining the same
or reducing exposure to bilateral credit
risk. Accordingly, the Board believes
that it is appropriate to extend netting
coverage broadly to achieve enhanced
liquidity and decreased risk in the
financial markets. Market participants
could then use their own judgment to
account for a counterparty’s affiliation
charter, or regulatory status when
setting bilateral credit limits.
Furthermore, a test based on
regulatory status, affiliation, or class of
charter may foster presumptions about
the risks posed by market participants
covered by the test. For example, tying
netting to a particular regulatory status
(i) In which all members other than the clearing
organization itself are financial institutions or other may lead market participants to
clearing organizations; or
conclude that regulated entities are less
(ii) Which is registered as a clearing agency under risky than unregulated entities. In
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a
practice, such a conclusion may prove
et ssq.)\ or
(B) That performs clearing functions for a contract -unwarranted. The Board also believes
that an extension of the Act’s coverage
market designated pursuant to the Commodity
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.).
should be competitively neutral, if
2 The Board has already made individual
possible, in its effects on existing and
determinations in the cases of three participants in
potential financial market participants
the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments
who may benefit from the increased
System (CHIPS). The three participants (American
Express Bank Ltd., French American Banking
liquidity and reduced systemic risk
Corporation, and Banesto Banking Corporation) do
resulting from greater certainty about
not meet the Act's definition of f ln a n n ’Al
netting arrangements.
institution, but the Board determined that they may
In addition, “regulated entity,”
be considered financial institutions under the Act's
“affiliation,” and “charter” tests could
netting provisions for purposes of their
participation in CHIPS. In making thin
be both over- and under-inclusive. For
determination, the Board considered the substantial example, extending coverage only to
payments volume that flows through CHIPS, the
steps taken to achieve settlement finality for CHIPS, government-regulated entities could
exclude major unregulated market
and the systemic consequences of a CHIPS
settlement failure.
participants, such as swap dealers that

are affiliates of securities broker-dealers,
while at the same time covering entities
that are regulated but that engage in
little or no financial market activity that
would benefit from netting. Similarly,
applying an “affiliation” or “charter”
test could exclude major market
participants that are not affiliated with
financial institutions or that lack a
specific type of charter and could
include marginal-to-inactive market
participants. Thus, the Board believes
that a “regulated entity,” “affiliation,”
or “charter” test would be
inappropriate.
Proposed rule. The proposed rule is
designed to allow certain participants in
markets for financial contracts, other
than depository institutions, brokerdealers, and futures commission
merchants (which are already covered
by the Act), to receive the benefits of the
Act’s netting provisions. The proposal
sets out a two-prong test for market
participants, one regarding the nature its
market activity and one regarding the
volume of its activity, to determine
whether it qualifies as a “financial
institution” under the Act.
To meet the first prong of the test, a
person must actively participate in a
financial market for its own account and
hold itself out as a counterparty that
will engage in transactions both as a
buyer and a seller in one or more
financial markets (hereinafter such a
person will be referred to as a “dealer”).
A financial market is a market for a
financial contract, which, in turn,
means a “qualified financial contract”
as defined in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.3 A “person" means any
legal entity, including a corporation,
unincorporated company, partnership,
government unit or instrumentality,
natural person, or any similar entity or
organization.
A dealer must hold itself out to the
market (such as through advertisements
or company reports or by setting twoway price quotes) as an intermediary
who will enter into transactions both as
a buyer and seller in the market. For
example, a dealer would offer either to
make fixed-rate payments or to receive
fixed-rate payments in the market for
fixed/floating interest rate swaps. A
dealer must engage in market
transactions for its own account, rather
than as agent or fiduciary for its
customers. A dealer normally would not
receive a brokerage commission but
rather would rely on favorable price
spreads as compensation.
s 12 U.S.C 1821(e)(8)(D). For purposes of the
definition of “qualified financial contract," the
definition of a forward contract includes a spot
contract (a contract with a maturity of 2 days or
less).

Federal Register / Vol. 58, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 19, 1993 / Proposed Rules'
A dealer must be engaged in the
business of dealing on a regular basis,
but dealing need not be its primary
business activity. For example, a nonfinancial corporation may qualify as a
dealer if it actively participates in the
swaps or foreign exchange markets,
even though the focus of its primary
business may be unrelated to the
financial markets. Such a corporation,
which would maintain a "professional”
market presence and would regularly
receive solicitations from other market
participants, is distinguishable from an
"end-user,” which may enter into
certain types of financial contracts on a
recurring basis but does not actively
deal on both sides of the market.
The size of a dealer’s financial market
activity must be large enough to have
the potential to cause systemic risk
problems should it fail to settle for its
obligations. As the second prong of its
test, the Board has set threshold levels
on financial market activities that a
dealer must meet in order to be
considered a financial institution for
purposes of the Act. To satisfy the
quantitative test, a dealer must:
(1) Have outstanding one or more
financial contracts of a total gross dollar
value of $1 billion in notional principal
amount on any day during the previous
15-month period, with counterparties
that are not its affiliates, or
(2) Have incurred total gross mark-tomarket positions in one or more
financial contracts of $100 million on
any day during the previous 15-month
period with unaffiliated counterparties.'*
Once a market participant meets both
prongs of the test, it would be
considered a financial institution for the
next 15 months. Any netting contract, as
defined in section 402(14) of the Act,
that the participant enters into during
the period when it qualifies as a
financial institution would be eligible
for coverage under the Act’s netting
provisions.
The Board requests comment on
whether the quantitative thresholds are
too high or too low. The lower the
thresholds, the greater the number of
dealers that can qualify for netting, and
the easier it will be for relatively large
dealers to prove their netting
qualifications to counterparties. Many
institutions, such as small banks and
credit unions, already qualify for netting
under the terms of the Act, even though
they would not meet the quantitative
thresholds in the proposed rule. The
Board would reexamine whatever
4 In effect, a dealer could meet the quantitative
test on a "rolling” basis. A dealer would qualify as
a financial institution for IS months after the most
recent day it met the quantitative test

thresholds it sets if market practice
demonstrates that the thresholds are
giving certain small institutions a
competitive advantage. For example,
small-volume market participants that
qualify as financial institutions by
virtue of the Act’s definition could take
advantage of the Act’s netting
provisions and therefore could gain a
potential competitive advantage over
small-volume dealers that are not
covered by the Act and cannot meet the
rule’s quantitative thresholds.
To determine whether it is a financial
institution on any given day, a dealer
would apply the quantitative tests to
financial contracts that it entered into
during the previous 15 months. Under
the proposed rolling 15-month period, a
dealer could compile its trading data on
an annual basis and, depending on the
last date it met the threshold, could
have as many as three additional
months after the end of the annual
reporting period to calculate the data.
The Board requests comment on
whether a longer or shorter period, or a
fixed period such as a calendar year,
would be appropriate.
There may be instances where a
person engages in netting but does not
qualify as a financial institution. Such a
person may request that the Board,
under its discretionary authority,
determine that it is a financial
institution. The request must include a
statement as to how a determination
that the person is a financial institution
would enhance efficiency and reduce
systemic risk in financial markets. The
Board may certify such persons as
financial institutions for general
purposes [e.g., for all types of netting
contracts entered into by the institution)
or for limited purposes (e.g., for netting
contracts within a certain clearing
organization).
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601-612) requires an agency to
publish an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis with any notice of proposed
rulemaking. Two of the requirements of
an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
(5 U.S.C. 603(b))—a description of the
reasons why the action by the agency is
being considered and a statement of the
objectives of, and legal basis for, the
proposed rule—are contained in the
supplementary information above.
There are no reporting provisions or
relevant federal rules that duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed
rule.
Another requirement for the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis is a
description of, and where feasible, an
estimate of the number of small entities

29151

to which the proposed rule shall apply.
The proposed rule will apply only to
entities with financial contracts of $1
billion in gross notional principle
amount or gross mark-to-market
positions of $100 million over a period
of a year. Entities with a smaller level
of market activity would not be covered
by the Board’s expanded definition of
“financial institution.” Many small
market participants are included in the
Act’s definition of "financial
institution” and thus are already
covered by the netting provisions. The
Board limited its expansion of the Act’s
definition to entities with a relatively
large volume of activity because the lack
of netting coverage for small entities is
unlikely to affect overall market
efficiency or systemic risk.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 231
Banks, banking, Financial
institutions, Netting.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, the Board proposes to add a
new part 231 to Title 12, Chapter II of
the Code of Federal Regulations to read
as follows:
PART 2 31 — NETTING ELIGIBILITY FO R
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Sec.

231.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
231.2 Definitions.
231.3 Qualification as a financial institution.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4402(1)(B) and
4402(9).
§ 231.1

Authority, purpoM , an d sco p e.

(a) Authority. This part (Regulation
EE; 12 CFR part 231) is issued by the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System under the authority of
sections 402(1)(B) and 402(9) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (12 U.S.C.
4402(1)(B) and 4402(9)).
(b) Purpose and scope. The purpose of
the Act and this part is to enhance
efficiency and reduce systemic risk in
the financial markets. This part expands
the Act’s definition of “financial
institution” to allow more financial
market participants to avail themselves
of the netting provisions set forth in
sections 401-407 of the Act (12 U.S.C.
4401-4407). This part does not affect the
status of those financial institutions
specifically defined in the Act.
§231.2

Definitions.

As used in this part, unless the
context requires otherwise:
(a) A ct means the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Ac t
of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-242,105 Stat.
2236), as amended.

23152

Federal Register / Vol. 58, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 19, 1993 / Proposed Rules

(b) Affiliate, with respect to a dealer,
means any person that controls, is
controlled by, or is under common
control with the dealer.
(c) Financial contract means a
qualified financial contract as defined in
section 11(e)(8)(D) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1821(e)(8)(D)), as amended, except that
a forward contract includes a contract
with a maturity date two days or less
after the date the contract is entered into
(j'.e., a “spot” contract).
(a) Financial market means a market
for a financial contract.
(e) Gross mark-to-market positions in
one or more financial contracts means
the sum o f the absolute values of
positions in those contracts, adjusted to
reflect the market values of those
positions in accordance with the
methods used by the parties to each
contract to price the contract.
(f) Person means any legal entity,
including a corporation, unincorporated
company, partnership, government unit
or instrumentality, natural person, or
any similar entity or organization.

§ 231.3 Qualification as a financial
institution.
A person qualifies as a financial
institution for purposes of sections 401-

407 of the Act if it—
(a) Participates actively in a financial
market for its own account and holds
itself out as a counterparty that w ill
engage in transactions both as a buyer
and a seller in the financial market; and
(b)(1) Had one or more financial
contracts of a total gross dollar value of
$1 billion in notional principal amount
outstanding on any day during the
previous 15-month period with
counterparties that are not its affiliates;
or
(2) Incurred total gross mark-tomarket positions (aggregated across
counterparties) in one or more financial
contracts of $100 m illion on any day
during the previous 15-month period
with counterparties that are not its
affiliates.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, May 13,1993.
William W. Wiles,

Secretary of the Board.
IFR Doc. 93-11835 Filed 5-18-93; 8;45 am]
BU.UNG CODE #210-01-F