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l l★K

Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas

May 31, 2002

DALLAS, TEXAS
75265-5906

Notice 02-24

TO: The Chief Executive Officer of each
financial institution and others concerned
in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District
SUBJECT
Request for Comments on a Proposal
to Revise Federal Reserve Discount Window Programs
DETAILS
The Board of Governors has requested public comment on a proposed amendment to Regulation A that would replace the existing adjustment and extended credit programs with new discount
window programs called primary credit and secondary credit, respectively. This proposed restructuring of Federal Reserve credit programs is designed to improve the functioning of the discount window and does not represent a change in the stance of monetary policy. The proposed rule also would
reorganize and streamline existing provisions of Regulation A. The Board solicits comment on all
aspects of the proposal.
The Board must receive comments by August 22, 2002. Please address comments to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20551. Also, you may mail comments electronically to
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov . All comments should refer to Docket No. R-1123.
ATTACHMENT
A copy of the Board’s notice as it appears on pages 36544–51, Vol. 67, No. 101 of the
Federal Register dated May 24, 2002, is attached.
MORE INFORMATION
For more information, please contact Paul Elzner, Discount and Credit Department, at
(214) 922-5590. Paper copies of this notice or previous Federal Reserve Bank notices can be printed
from our web site at http://www.dallasfed.org/banking/notices/index.html.

For additional copies, bankers and others are encouraged to use one of the following toll-free numbers in contacting the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas: Dallas Office (800) 333-4460; El Paso Branch Intrastate (800) 592-1631, Interstate (800) 351-1012;
Houston Branch Intrastate (800) 392-4162, Interstate (800) 221-0363; San Antonio Branch Intrastate (800) 292-5810.

36544

Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC, 20551 or mailed electronically to
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Comments addressed to Ms. Johnson
also may be delivered between 8:45 a.m.
and 5:15 p.m. to the Board’s mail
facility in the west courtyard of the
Eccles Building, located on 21st Street
between Constitution Avenue and C
Street, NW. Members of the public may
inspect comments in accordance with
the Board’s Rules Regarding the
Availability of Information (12 CFR part
261) in Room MP–500 of the Martin
Building on weekdays between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Brian Madigan, Deputy Director (202/
452–3828) or William Nelson, Senior
Economist (202/452–3579), Division of
Monetary Affairs; or Stephanie Martin,
Assistant General Counsel (202/452–
3198) or Adrianne Threatt, Senior
Attorney (202/452–3554), Legal
Division; for users of
Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf
(TDD) only, contact 202/263–4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Current Credit Programs of Reserve
Banks and Their Relationship to
Monetary Policy and Open Market
Operations

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 201
Regulation A; Docket No. R–1123
Extensions of Credit by Federal
Reserve Banks
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors is
publishing for comment a proposed
amendment to Regulation A that would
replace the existing adjustment and
extended credit programs with new
discount window programs called
primary credit and secondary credit,
respectively. This proposed
restructuring of Federal Reserve credit
programs is designed to improve the
functioning of the discount window and
does not represent a change in the
stance of monetary policy. The
proposed rule also would reorganize
and streamline existing provisions of
Regulation A. The Board solicits
comment on all aspects of the proposal.
DATES: Comments on the proposed rule
must be received not later than August
22, 2002.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to
docket number R–1123 and should be
sent to Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the

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Under existing Regulation A, the
Reserve Banks may make credit
available to depository institutions at
the discount window by making
advances secured by acceptable
collateral or by discounting paper that
meets the requirements of the Federal
Reserve Act. Reserve Bank credit
usually takes the form of an advance.
Reserve Banks make credit available
at the discount window through three
credit programs: adjustment credit,
seasonal credit, and extended credit.
Adjustment credit is available for short
periods of time at a basic discount rate
that, over the past decade, typically has
been 25 to 50 basis points below the
market rates that apply to overnight
loans, as indexed by the federal funds
rate. Reserve Banks also extend seasonal
credit for longer periods than permitted
under the adjustment credit program to
help smaller depository institutions
meet funding needs that result from
expected patterns in their deposits and
loans. Finally, Reserve Banks may
provide extended credit to depository
institutions where similar assistance is
not reasonably available from other
sources. The rates applied to seasonal
and extended credit are at or above the
basic discount rate.

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When implementing monetary policy,
the Federal Reserve relies primarily on
open market operations to supply
reserves to the banking system and
currency to the public and to make
short-run adjustments in reserves.
However, lending to depository
institutions through the discount
window aids the Federal Reserve’s open
market operations in two important
ways. First, discount window lending
provides additional reserves to the
overall banking system when the supply
of reserves provided through open
market operations falls short of demand.
Second, discount window lending
provides a temporary source of reserves
and funding to financially sound
individual depository institutions that
have experienced an unexpected
shortfall in reserves or funding.
Discount window credit permits such
an institution to make payments
without incurring an overdraft in its
Federal Reserve account or failing to
meet its reserve requirements.
Historically the Federal Reserve System
has relied on the adjustment credit
program to accomplish these two
objectives.
The discount window also can, at
times, serve as a useful tool for
promoting financial stability by
providing temporary funding to
depository institutions that are
experiencing significant financial
difficulties. The provision of credit to a
troubled depository institution can help
to prevent the sudden collapse of the
institution by easing liquidity strains
while the institution is making a
transition to more sound footing, or by
facilitating an orderly closure of the
institution. An institution obtaining
credit in such a situation must be
monitored appropriately to ensure that
it does not take excessive risks in an
attempt to return to profitability and
does not use central bank credit in a
manner that would increase costs to the
deposit insurance fund of resolving the
institution if resolution were to become
necessary. Historically, the Federal
Reserve System has relied on extended
credit to aid depository institutions
experiencing significant financial
difficulties.
The Rationale for Changing the Basic
Framework Through Which Reserve
Banks Extend Credit
A below-market discount rate creates
incentives for institutions to obtain
adjustment credit to exploit the spread
between the discount rate and the
market rates for short-term loans.
Regulation A therefore provides that a
Reserve Bank cannot extend adjustment
credit to a depository institution until

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules
the institution exhausts other sources of
funds. Regulation A also provides that
recipients may not use adjustment
credit to finance sales of federal funds.
Because of the restrictions
necessitated by a below-market discount
rate, a substantial degree of Reserve
Bank administration is associated with
adjustment credit. In particular, the
Reserve Bank may need to review each
prospective borrower’s funding
situation to establish that the borrower
has exhausted other reasonably
available sources of funds and that the
reason for borrowing is appropriate.
Because that evaluation necessarily is
subjective, achieving a reasonable
degree of consistency in credit
administration across the System is
difficult.
The administration of and restrictions
on discount window credit create a
burden on depository institutions that
reduces their willingness to seek credit
at the discount window. In addition, the
rules governing discount window credit
have proved difficult to explain, and
depository institutions often have cited
uncertainty about their borrowing
privileges as a disincentive to seek
credit. Depository institutions also have
expressed concern about the
requirement that borrowers fully utilize
other sources of funds before borrowing
adjustment credit. Institutions have
expressed concern that turning to the
window after signaling in the market
their need for funds could be
interpreted as a sign of weakness,
particularly during periods of financial
stress. Concerns such as these have
limited the willingness of depository
institutions to borrow at the discount
window, even in circumstances of
extremely tight money markets where
such borrowing would have been
appropriate. The reluctance to borrow in
turn has limited the discount window’s
effectiveness in buffering shocks to
money markets.
In light of the drawbacks associated
with the current below-market discount
window programs, the Board believes
that the interests of depository
institutions, the Federal Reserve
System, and the economy more
generally would be served more
effectively by an above-market lending
program. Under the Board’s proposed
rule, Reserve Banks would extend credit
under the primary credit program to
institutions the Reserve Banks
determine to be generally sound.
Primary credit usually would be
extended at an above-market rate, which
should essentially eliminate the
incentive for institutions to seek
discount window credit simply to
exploit the usual spread between the

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discount rate and short-term market
rates. Eliminating this incentive would
reduce sharply the need for
administration regarding the extension
and use of Federal Reserve credit. The
streamlined eligibility criteria also
should encourage greater uniformity in
administration of the discount window
across Federal Reserve districts. By
minimizing a Reserve Bank’s need to
question potential borrowers, not
requiring that an institution first attempt
to borrow elsewhere, making the
borrowing program significantly more
transparent, and limiting extensions of
primary credit to generally sound
financial institutions, the proposed
above-market lending program should
reduce depository institutions’
reluctance to borrow when money
markets tighten sharply. As a result, the
discount window should become a more
effective policy instrument.
The Board reiterates that replacing the
current below-market adjustment credit
program with an above-market program
would not signal a shift in the stance of
monetary policy. Rather, the proposed
changes represent a broad structural
change that should enable the discount
window to operate more efficiently as a
source of funds for individual
depository institutions and as a
mechanism for implementing the policy
objectives of the Federal Reserve
System. The proposed structure of
providing credit at the margin at abovemarket interest rates also would be
similar to mechanisms adopted by other
major central banks.
Section-by-Section Analysis
The Proposed Changes to the Discount
Lending Framework—§§ 201.4 and
201.51
The Board proposes to replace the
adjustment credit with a new lending
program called primary credit and the
extended credit program with a new
program known as secondary credit.
Although the proposed regulation
retains the seasonal credit program with
minor revisions, as discussed in more
detail below the Board specifically
requests comment on whether a
seasonal credit program remains
necessary and, if so, whether the
interest rate on seasonal credit would
more appropriately be set at the primary
discount rate. As required by the
Federal Reserve Act, all advances made
under the proposed discount lending
programs would have to be adequately
collateralized. The Reserve Banks’
collateral policies would be unchanged
and they would continue to accept a
broad range of financial assets as
collateral for discount window loans.

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36545

The substantive changes to the
lending programs are contained in
§ 201.4 of the proposed rule, which
replaces existing § 201.3. The rates that
apply to the proposed lending programs
are described in § 201.51, which
combines and replaces existing
§§ 201.51–201.52.
Primary Credit
Primary credit would replace
adjustment credit, would be extended
on a very short-term basis (usually
overnight) at an above-market rate, and
ordinarily would be available to
generally sound depository institutions
with little or no administrative burden
on the borrower or the Reserve Banks.
A Reserve Bank also could extend
primary credit with maturities up to a
few weeks to a depository institution if
the Reserve Bank finds that the
institution is in generally sound
condition and cannot obtain such credit
in the market on reasonable terms. The
Board expects that institutions receiving
longer-term primary credit would be
relatively small institutions that lack
access to national money markets.
Although the primary credit program
is designed to make short-term credit
available as a backup source of liquidity
to generally sound institutions, a
Reserve Bank is not obligated to extend
primary credit. A Reserve Bank
therefore may choose not to lend to a
generally sound depository institution if
the Reserve Bank determines that doing
so would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the primary credit program.
Section 201.4(a) of the proposed rule
describes the primary credit program,
and § 201.51(a) sets forth the rate that
applies to primary credit.
1. Interest Rate Applicable to Primary
Credit
The interest rate on primary credit
ordinarily would be above short-term
market interest rates, including the
target federal funds rate, and would be
set by the boards of directors of the
Reserve Banks subject to review and
determination by the Board of
Governors. A substantial spread
between the discount and market rates
would encourage depository institutions
to use primary credit only to meet shortterm, unforeseen needs. If the spread
were too wide, however, the primary
discount rate would not cap the federal
funds rate at a reasonable level above
the rate targeted by the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC).
The Board proposes to recommend
that the boards of directors of the
Reserve Banks, subject to the Board’s
review and determination, initially
establish a primary discount rate that is

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules

100 basis points above the FOMC’s
then-prevailing target for the federal
funds rate. A spread of 100 basis points
would be similar to the spreads
employed by other central banks and
likely would place the primary discount
rate somewhat above the alternative cost
of overnight funds for eligible
depository institutions. The Board
believes that public comment could
help inform the Federal Reserve
System’s choice of the initial spread
between the federal funds and discount
rates and assist the boards of directors
of the Reserve Banks when they
establish rates subsequently. The Board
therefore specifically solicits comment
regarding the interest rate spread.
After establishment of the initial
primary discount rate, the Federal
Reserve System would change that rate
through a process identical to the
existing discretionary procedure for
changing the basic discount rate. The
boards of directors of the Federal
Reserve Banks would establish a
primary discount rate and other
discount rates every two weeks subject
to review and determination by the
Board of Governors, as required by the
Federal Reserve Act. The primary
discount rate presumably would move
broadly in line with the target federal
funds rate, much as the basic discount
rate does currently.
2. Eligibility for Primary Credit
Under the proposed regulation, only
depository institutions deemed
generally sound in the judgment of the
Reserve Bank would be eligible to
obtain primary credit. Reserve Banks
would classify depository institutions
with borrowing agreements already on
file as either eligible or ineligible for
primary credit before a primary credit
program takes effect and would notify
each such institution of its status. A
new applicant for Federal Reserve credit
would be notified of its eligibility after
filing borrowing documents with the
appropriate Federal Reserve Bank. The
Reserve Banks would notify an
institution promptly of any change in
the institution’s eligibility status. An
institution’s eligibility status, which
would be based in part on that
institution’s confidential supervisory
and examination information, would be
considered confidential information and
the Federal Reserve System would
handle it accordingly.
The Board expects that the Reserve
Banks would adopt on a System-wide
basis uniform guidelines for judging the
degree of an institution’s financial
soundness and thus its eligibility for
primary credit. The Board envisions that
the guidelines for determining eligibility

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would be based primarily on
supervisory ratings, but supplementary
information, such as ratings issued by
major rating agencies, spreads on
subordinated debt, and information
from supervisory exams in progress,
also would be considered. The Board
further expects that the majority of
depository institutions would be eligible
for the primary credit program under
such guidelines.
The Board anticipates that Reserve
Banks initially would adopt guidelines
under which domestically chartered
depository institutions with composite
CAMELS ratings of 1 or 2 and U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign
banking organizations with Strength of
Support Assessment (SOSA) composite
rankings of 1 would be eligible for
primary credit, unless supplementary
information suggested that the financial
condition of the depository institution
had deteriorated since the most recent
exam. Similarly, the Board expects that
under the initial guidelines institutions
rated CAMELS 3 or SOSA 2 would be
eligible for primary credit if
supplementary information suggested
that they were generally sound.
However, the funding situation of such
institutions seeking credit would be
reviewed and monitored more closely
than that of stronger institutions. The
Board expects that institutions rated
CAMELS 4 or SOSA 3 would be
ineligible for primary credit except in
rare circumstances, such as an ongoing
examination that indicated a substantial
improvement in condition. The Board
further anticipates that institutions rated
CAMELS 5 would in no case be eligible
for primary credit and could obtain only
secondary credit.
Because lending to troubled
institutions would be subject to careful
monitoring, the expected eligibility
criteria would be consistent with the
intent of the guidelines for discount
window lending included in section
10B(b) of the Federal Reserve Act, as
added by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act. The
criteria also would be consistent with
the guidelines used by Federal Reserve
Banks to determine institutions’ access
to daylight credit in the Payments
System Risk policy. In general, the
depository institutions that qualify for
access to daylight credit would qualify
for primary credit, and those that would
not qualify for daylight credit would be
restricted to secondary credit.
A depository institution that meets
the eligibility criteria adopted by the
Reserve Banks would not be required to
exhaust other reasonable available
sources of funds before obtaining
primary credit. The removal of this

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requirement is consistent with the
overall reduction in discount window
administration under the proposed new
discount window structure. In addition,
depository institutions that receive
primary credit would be free to sell
federal funds to others. This would
enhance the ability of the primary credit
rate to serve as a cap on the federal
funds rate when money markets tighten.
The Board would encourage financially
sound institutions to use primary credit
to fund sales of federal funds if such
transactions were in their financial
interest.
3. Benefits of a Primary Credit Program
Because of the reduced administration
and corresponding reduction in the
reluctance of depository institutions to
borrow, the Board expects that primary
credit would serve as a more effective
safety valve for the banking system and
a backup source of liquidity for
individual depository institutions that
are financially sound.
The proposal to adopt a primary
credit program also is an aspect of the
Federal Reserve’s ongoing planning for
contingencies. The Federal Reserve
System expects to establish special
procedures through which the System
could lower discount rates quickly in an
emergency. If, as the Board intends, the
availability of primary credit
significantly reduces the reluctance of
depository institutions to use the
discount window, the System should be
able to cap the federal funds rate near
the target during a crisis by reducing the
primary discount rate to a level close to
the federal funds target rate. During a
financial market crisis, the proposed
discount window structure therefore
would provide a means of preventing an
undue tightening of money markets if
depository institutions’ demands for
excess reserves rose sharply, if
disruptions inhibited the flow of funds
through the banking system, or if the
Federal Reserve’s ability to carry out
open market operations were impaired.
In addition, the Board expects that
moving to an above-market primary
credit program would be beneficial to
the Federal Reserve System as the
mechanisms by which the Board
implements monetary policy evolve. For
example, if Congress authorizes the
Federal Reserve Banks to pay interest on
reserve balances, an above-market
lending program would allow the
Reserve Banks to avoid lending to
depository institutions at a belowmarket rate while paying interest to
those institutions at a market-related
rate. Also, if the level of required
operating balances resumes the
substantial downward decline

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules
experienced for much of the last decade,
a lending program with appreciably less
administration could enhance the dayto-day implementation of monetary
policy. A decline in operating balances
could lead to increased volatility in the
federal funds rate, and the availability of
reserves from an above-market lending
facility would serve to limit the increase
in volatility.
Secondary Credit
Secondary credit would replace
extended credit and would be available
to depository institutions that do not
qualify for primary credit. Because some
institutions that currently are eligible
for adjustment credit would not qualify
for primary credit, secondary credit
potentially would be used more often
than has the extended credit program.
The text of the proposed regulation
therefore seeks to eliminate the focus on
longer-term credit extensions in the
existing extended credit program and to
recognize the somewhat broader class of
borrowing situations that a Reserve
Bank may handle under the secondary
credit program.
Section 201.4(b) of the proposed rule
describes the secondary credit program,
and § 201.51(b) describes the interest
rate that applies to secondary credit.
Under the proposal, Federal Reserve
Banks may extend secondary credit to
meet temporary funding needs of an
institution if such a credit extension
would be consistent with the
institution’s timely return to a reliance
on market funding sources. A Reserve
Bank also may extend secondary credit
if it determines that such credit would
facilitate the orderly resolution of
serious financial difficulties of the
borrowing institution. When extending
secondary credit to an undercapitalized
or critically undercapitalized depository
institution, a Reserve Bank also must
observe the requirements set forth at
proposed § 201.5. The interest rate on
secondary credit would be set by
formula 50 basis points above the
primary discount rate. This higher rate
reflects the less-sound condition of
borrowers of secondary credit.
Seasonal Credit
Section 201.4 of the proposed rule
makes only minor revisions to the
existing seasonal credit provisions of
Regulation A. The seasonal credit
interest rate is based on short-term
market rates, and historical interest rate
relationships suggest that the rate for
seasonal credit usually will be below
the primary credit rate. Sections 201.4
and 201.51(c) of the proposed rule,
which discuss the rate applicable to
seasonal credit, would not contain

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existing language requiring the seasonal
credit rate to be at least as high as the
primary credit rate. In addition, the
System for some time has not required
that a seasonal credit borrower
demonstrate that it could not obtain
similar assistance from special industry
lenders, and the proposed rule
accordingly deletes this requirement.
The seasonal credit program
originally was designed to address the
difficulties that relatively small banks
with substantial intra-yearly swings in
funding needs faced because of a lack of
access to the national money markets.
Reserve Banks traditionally have
extended seasonal credit to small
institutions that demonstrate significant
seasonal swings in their loans and
deposits. However, funding
opportunities for smaller depository
institutions appear to have expanded
significantly over the past few decades
as a result of deposit deregulation and
the general development of financial
markets. The Board therefore
specifically solicits comment on
whether small depository institutions
still lack reasonable access to funding
markets; on the desirability of
eliminating the seasonal lending
program; and on the appropriate setting
of the seasonal lending rate, particularly
in view of the proposed establishment
of a primary credit program with an
above-market rate. Depending on the
comments received, the Board may
decide to adjust the rate applicable to
seasonal credit or to eliminate the
seasonal credit program altogether.
Reorganization of and Proposed
Changes to Other Provisions of
Regulation A
In addition to replacing the
adjustment and extended credit
programs with primary and secondary
credit programs, respectively, the Board
also proposes to reorganize much of
existing Regulation A in order to
streamline the text of the rule and make
it easier to read and understand. In
addition, the Board proposes to delete
certain provisions of existing Regulation
A that are obsolete or superfluous.
Deletion of Provisions Concerning the
Century Date Change Special Liquidity
Facility (SLF)
The Board previously amended
Regulation A so that depository
institutions would have access to an
SLF from October 1, 1999, to April 7,
2000, to ease liquidity pressures unique
to the century date change period. The
SLF for U.S. depository institutions is
described at existing § 201.3(e), and the
circumstances under which a U.S.
branch or agency of a foreign bank could

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36547

use the facility are described at existing
§ 201.7(b). Sections 201.2(j)–(k) define
two terms—‘‘eligible institution’’ and
‘‘targeted federal funds rate,’’
respectively—that pertain only to the
SLF provisions. Because the SLF is no
longer in effect, the Board proposes to
delete each of the four provisions
discussed above. As discussed in more
detail in connection with proposed
§ 201.3(d), the Board proposes to delete
a portion of existing § 201.6(d) that
allows a depository institution to use
credit obtained from the SLF to fund
sales of federal funds.
Section 201.1 Authority, Purpose and
Scope
The Board proposes to amend the
existing authority citations at § 201.1(a)
to include sections 11(i)–11(j) and 14(d)
of the Federal Reserve Act. Sections
11(i)–(j) provide the Board with
rulemaking authority and general
supervisory authority over the Reserve
Banks, respectively, and section 14(d)
authorizes the Reserve Banks, subject to
the review and determination of the
Board, to establish discount rates.
As in the existing regulation,
§ 201.1(b) of the proposed rule describes
the purpose and scope of the Regulation
A and states that the regulation governs
lending by Reserve Banks to depository
institutions and others. To gather all the
provisions concerning the scope of
Regulation A into one section, the
proposed rule incorporates language
from existing § 201.7(a) regarding the
circumstances under which U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks
are subject to the regulation.
Section 201.2—Definitions
This section would remain unchanged
except for the deletion of five
definitions. As discussed above,
§§ 201.2(j)–(k) contain definitions that
are unnecessary because they relate only
to the SLF. The other three terms the
Board proposes to delete are liquidation
loss, increased loss, and excess loss,
found at existing §§ 201.2(d)–(f),
respectively.
Liquidation loss and increased loss
are used to derive the term excess loss,
which is the amount the Board would
owe the FDIC under section 10B(b) of
the Federal Reserve Act if outstanding
Reserve Bank advances to a critically
undercapitalized depository institution
increased the FDIC’s cost of liquidating
that institution. Excess loss, the only
one of these three terms used elsewhere
in the regulation, appears in existing
§ 201.4(c). That section states that the
Board would assess a Reserve Bank for
any excess loss attributable to advances
made by that Reserve Bank and

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules

discusses the procedure by which the
Board would calculate the amount to be
assessed.
The Board believes the regulation
would be less cumbersome but no less
accurate if the assessment section
incorporated the concept of excess loss
by simply cross-referencing section
10B(b) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Although the existing definitions
explain accurately and in detail how the
Board would calculate the excess loss,
they produce the same result required
by section 10B(b) of the statute.
Section 201.3 General Requirements
Governing Extensions of Credit
This section would prescribe the
Board’s rules governing a Federal
Reserve Bank’s extension of credit. This
section would permit Federal Reserve
Banks to extend credit in the form of an
advance or discount and would discuss
requirements that both the Reserve
Banks and the depository institutions
receiving credit must observe. The text
of proposed § 201.3 combines in one
place all the existing provisions of
Regulation A that relate to each of these
topics.
Proposed paragraph (a) of § 201.3
would consolidate all the existing
provisions of Regulation A concerning a
Reserve Bank’s authority to extend
credit. Proposed § 201.3(a) mostly
contains existing text from § 201.5 and
provides that a Reserve Bank may
extend credit to a depository institution
in the form of an advance or a discount
of certain types of paper described in
the Federal Reserve Act. Like existing
§ 201.5, the proposed section states that
credit to depository institutions
generally will take the form of an
advance but preserves a Reserve Bank’s
discretion to lend through discounting
eligible paper if the Reserve Bank
determines that a discount would be
more appropriate for a particular
depository institution. The proposed
rule would delete existing § 201.8,
which provides that a Reserve Bank may
discount paper for an institution that is
part of the farm credit system, and
instead would discuss that authority at
proposed § 201.3(a)(3). Rather than
providing the lengthy discussion at
existing § 201.8, proposed § 201.3(a)(3)
simply cross-references section 13A of
the Federal Reserve Act, which
authorizes Reserve Banks to discount
paper for such institutions.
Proposed § 201.3(b) contains the text
of existing § 201.9, which states that a
Reserve Bank has no obligation to make,
increase, renew, or extend any advance
or discount to a depository institution.
Proposed § 201.3(c) gathers in one
place the existing provisions of

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Regulation A concerning the
requirements a Reserve Bank must
observe when it does extend credit.
Section 201.3(c)(1) contains text from
existing § 201.4(d) providing that a
Reserve Bank should ascertain whether
an institution is undercapitalized or
critically undercapitalized before
extending credit to that institution. This
section adds text stating that, if the
institution is undercapitalized or
critically undercapitalized, the Reserve
Bank must follow special lending
procedures. These procedures are
specified in proposed § 201.5, which
contains the text of current § 201.4 and
is discussed in more detail below.
Proposed §§ 201.3(c)(2)–(3) include
text from existing §§ 201.6(b)–(c)
regarding a Reserve Bank’s duty to
require any information it deems
appropriate to ensure the acceptability
of assets tendered as collateral or for
discount, to ensure that credit is used
consistent with Regulation A, and to
keep itself informed of the general
character and amount of loans and
investments of a depository institution
as required by section 4(8) of the
Federal Reserve Act.
Proposed § 201.3(d) consists of
existing § 201.6(d), with revisions,
regarding how a depository institution
may use Federal Reserve credit. In
existing Regulation A, only depository
institutions that received credit under
the century date change SLF were
permitted to use Federal Reserve credit
to fund sales of federal funds without
permission of the Reserve Bank
extending the credit. Because the SLF
no longer is in effect, the Board would
delete the language that pertains to
credit obtained through that facility.
Instead, as explained more fully above
in the section discussing primary credit,
proposed § 201.3(d) would permit an
institution that receives primary credit
to use that credit to fund sales of federal
funds without Reserve Bank permission.
Recipients of secondary or seasonal
credit would continue to need Reserve
Bank permission to use Reserve Bank
credit to fund sales of federal funds.
The Board proposes to delete existing
§ 201.6(a), which provides that a
depository institution may not use
Federal Reserve credit as a substitute for
capital. Although the Board continues to
believe this to be an appropriate policy,
the Board believes that other provisions
of the statutes and regulations that it
administers address this issue. Thus, the
Board sees no need to retain this
provision in Regulation A.

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Section 201.5 Limitations on
Availability and Assessments
The existing text of § 201.4 would be
redesignated as § 201.5, with technical
revisions. This section incorporates the
limitations on advances to an
undercapitalized or critically
undercapitalized depository institution
set forth in section 10B(b) of the Federal
Reserve Act and also applies those
limitations to discounts for such
institutions. In addition, § 201.5
discusses section 10B(b)’s requirement
that the Board pay a specified amount
to the FDIC if a Reserve Bank advance
to a critically undercapitalized
depository institution increases the loss
the FDIC incurs when liquidating that
institution. The existing regulation
explains in detail through the
definitions of ‘‘liquidation loss,’’
‘‘increased loss,’’ and ‘‘excess loss’’ how
the Board would calculate that amount.
The proposed rule, by contrast, would
delete these three definitions and
simply provide that the Board will
assess the Federal Reserve Banks for any
amount the Board pays to the FDIC in
accordance with section 10B(b) of the
Federal Reserve Act.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with section 3(a) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
603(a)) the Board must publish an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis with this
proposed regulation. As discussed
above, the proposed above-market
discount rate structure is designed to
enable the discount window to operate
more efficiently as a back-up source of
funds for individual depository
institutions and as a mechanism for
implementing the policy objectives of
the Federal Reserve System. By limiting
primary credit eligibility to generally
sound institutions, minimizing a
Reserve Bank’s need to question
potential borrowers, and making the
borrowing programs more transparent,
the proposal seeks to eliminate current
disincentives for depository institutions
to seek Federal Reserve credit when
money markets tighten. The Board
knows of no other regulations that
overlap or conflict with, or duplicate,
the proposed rule.
The proposed rule would apply to all
depository institutions that are eligible
to borrow at the discount window,
including approximately 16,000 small
depository institutions, and would not
add any recordkeeping, reporting, or
compliance requirements associated
with discount window borrowing. The
requirements of the proposed rule
would be the same for all depository
institutions regardless of their size.

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules
However, if the Board altered the
seasonal credit program in response to
public comments, small depository
institutions, which are the primary
users of that program, would be affected
more than larger institutions. Because
the Board estimates that fewer than 5
percent of eligible small depository
institutions typically receive seasonal
credit each year, the Board does not
expect changes to or elimination of the
seasonal credit program to have a large
impact in the aggregate.
The Board solicits comment on the
likely impact the proposed rule would
have on depository institutions,
including those that are small business
concerns. The Board particularly is
interested in the public’s view on how
the increase in the discount rate relative
to money market interest rates and the
corresponding reduction in
administrative burden would affect
depository institutions of different sizes.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506;
5 CFR 1320 Appendix A.1), the Board
has reviewed the proposed rule under
the authority delegated to the Board by
the Office of Management and Budget.
The proposed rule contains no new
collections of information and proposes
no substantive changes to existing
collections of information pursuant to
the Paperwork Reduction Act.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 201
Credits.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Board revises part 201 of
subchapter A of Chapter II, Title 12 of
the Code of Federal Regulations to read
as follows:
PART 201—EXTENSIONS OF CREDIT
BY FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
(REGULATION A)
Sec.
201.1 Authority, purpose and scope.
201.2 Definitions.
201.3 Extensions of credit generally.
201.4 Availability and terms of credit.
201.5 Limitations on availability and
assessments.
201.51 Interest rates applicable to credit
extended by a Federal Reserve Bank.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(i)–(j), 347a, 347b,
343 et seq., 347c, 348 et seq., 357, 374, 374a,
and 461.
§ 201.1

Authority, purpose and scope.

(a) Authority. This part is issued
under the authority of sections 10A,
10B, 11(i), 11(j), 13, 13A, 14(d), and 19
of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
248(i)–(j), 347a, 347b, 343 et seq., 347c,
348 et seq., 357, 374, 374a, and 461).

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(b) Purpose and scope. This part
establishes rules under which a Federal
Reserve Bank may extend credit to
depository institutions and others.
Except as otherwise provided, this part
applies to United States branches and
agencies of foreign banks that are
subject to reserve requirements under
Regulation D (12 CFR part 204) in the
same manner and to the same extent as
this part applies to depository
institutions. The Federal Reserve
System extends credit with due regard
to the basic objectives of monetary
policy and the maintenance of a sound
and orderly financial system.
§ 201.2

Definitions.

For purposes of this part, the
following definitions shall apply:
(a) Appropriate federal banking
agency has the same meaning as in
section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDI Act) (12 U.S.C.
1813(q)).
(b) Critically undercapitalized insured
depository institution means any
insured depository institution as
defined in section 3 of the FDI Act (12
U.S.C. 1813(c)(2)) that is deemed to be
critically undercapitalized under
section 38 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.
1831o(b)(1)(E)) and its implementing
regulations.
(c)(1) Depository institution means an
institution that maintains reservable
transaction accounts or nonpersonal
time deposits and is:
(i) An insured bank as defined in
section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.
1813(h)) or a bank that is eligible to
make application to become an insured
bank under section 5 of such act (12
U.S.C. 1815);
(ii) A mutual savings bank as defined
in section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.
1813(f)) or a bank that is eligible to
make application to become an insured
bank under section 5 of such act (12
U.S.C. 1815);
(iii) A savings bank as defined in
section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.
1813(g)) or a bank that is eligible to
make application to become an insured
bank under section 5 of such act (12
U.S.C. 1815);
(iv) An insured credit union as
defined in section 101 of the Federal
Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752(7)) or
a credit union that is eligible to make
application to become an insured credit
union pursuant to section 201 of such
act (12 U.S.C. 1781);
(v) A member as defined in section 2
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (12
U.S.C. 1422(4)); or
(vi) A savings association as defined
in section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.
1813(b)) that is an insured depository

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36549

institution as defined in section 3 of the
act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2)) or is eligible
to apply to become an insured
depository institution under section 5 of
the act (12 U.S.C. 15(a)).
(2) The term ‘‘depository institution’’
does not include a financial institution
that is not required to maintain reserves
under § 204.1(c)(4) of Regulation D (12
CFR 204.1(c)(4)) because it is organized
solely to do business with other
financial institutions, is owned
primarily by the financial institutions
with which it does business, and does
not do business with the general public.
(d) Transaction account and
nonpersonal time deposit have the
meanings specified in Regulation D (12
CFR part 204).
(e) Undercapitalized insured
depository institution means any
insured depository institution as
defined in section 3 of the FDI Act (12
U.S.C. 1813(c)(2)) that:
(1) Is not a critically undercapitalized
insured depository institution; and
(2)(i) Is deemed to be
undercapitalized under section 38 of the
FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o(b)(1)(C)) and
its implementing regulations; or
(ii) Has received from its appropriate
federal banking agency a composite
CAMELS rating of 5 under the Uniform
Financial Institutions Rating System (or
an equivalent rating by its appropriate
federal banking agency under a
comparable rating system) as of the most
recent examination of such institution.
(f) Viable, with respect to a depository
institution, means that the Board of
Governors or the appropriate federal
banking agency has determined, giving
due regard to the economic conditions
and circumstances in the market in
which the institution operates, that the
institution is not critically
undercapitalized, is not expected to
become critically undercapitalized, and
is not expected to be placed in
conservatorship or receivership.
Although there are a number of criteria
that may be used to determine viability,
the Board of Governors believes that
ordinarily an undercapitalized insured
depository institution is viable if the
appropriate federal banking agency has
accepted a capital restoration plan for
the depository institution under 12
U.S.C. 1831o(e)(2) and the depository
institution is complying with that plan.
§ 201.3

Extensions of credit generally.

(a) Advances to and discounts for a
depository institution. (1) A Federal
Reserve Bank may lend to a depository
institution either by making an advance
secured by acceptable collateral under
§ 201.4 of this part or by discounting
certain types of paper. A Federal

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules

Reserve Bank generally extends credit
by making an advance.
(2) An advance to a depository
institution must be secured to the
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank
that makes the advance. Satisfactory
collateral generally includes United
States government and federal-agency
securities, and, if of acceptable quality,
mortgage notes covering one-to fourfamily residences, state and local
government securities, and business,
consumer, and other customer notes.
(3) If a Federal Reserve Bank
concludes that a discount would meet
the needs of a depository institution or
an institution described in section 13A
of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
349) more effectively, the Reserve Bank
may discount any paper indorsed by the
institution, provided the paper meets
the requirements specified in the
Federal Reserve Act.
(b) No obligation to make advances or
discounts. A Federal Reserve Bank shall
have no obligation to make, increase,
renew, or extend any advance or
discount to any depository institution.
(c) Information requirements. (1)
Before extending credit to a depository
institution, a Federal Reserve Bank
should determine if the institution is an
undercapitalized insured depository
institution or a critically
undercapitalized insured depository
institution and, if so, follow the lending
procedures specified in § 201.5.
(2) Each Federal Reserve Bank shall
require any information it believes
appropriate or desirable to ensure that
assets tendered as collateral for
advances or for discount are acceptable
and that the borrower uses the credit
provided in a manner consistent with
this part.
(3) Each Federal Reserve Bank shall:
(i) Keep itself informed of the general
character and amount of the loans and
investments of a depository institution
as provided in section 4(8) of the
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 301); and
(ii) Consider such information in
determining whether to extend credit.
(d) Indirect credit for others. Except
for depository institutions that receive
primary credit as described in
§ 201.4(a), no depository institution
shall act as the medium or agent of
another depository institution in
receiving Federal Reserve credit except
with the permission of the Federal
Reserve Bank extending credit.
§ 201.4

Availability and terms of credit.

(a) Primary credit. A Federal Reserve
Bank may extend primary credit on a
very short-term basis, usually overnight,
to a depository institution that is in
generally sound condition in the

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judgment of the Reserve Bank. Such
primary credit ordinarily is extended
with minimal administrative burden on
the borrowing institution. A Federal
Reserve Bank also may extend primary
credit with maturities up to a few weeks
to a depository institution if the Reserve
Bank determines that the institution is
in generally sound condition and that
the institution cannot obtain such credit
in the market on reasonable terms.
Credit extended under the primary
credit program is granted at the primary
discount rate.
(b) Secondary credit. A Federal
Reserve Bank may extend secondary
credit to meet temporary funding needs
of a depository institution that is not
eligible for primary credit if, in the
judgment of the Reserve Bank, such a
credit extension would be consistent
with the institution’s timely return to a
reliance on market funding sources. A
Reserve Bank also may extend
secondary credit if the Reserve Bank
determines that such credit would
facilitate the orderly resolution of
serious financial difficulties of a
depository institution. Credit extended
under the secondary credit program is
granted at a rate above the primary
discount rate.
(c) Seasonal credit. A Federal Reserve
Bank may extend seasonal credit for
periods longer than those permitted
under primary credit to assist a smaller
depository institution in meeting regular
needs for funds arising from expected
patterns of movement in its deposits
and loans. An interest rate that varies
with the level of short-term market
interest rates is applied to seasonal
credit.
(1) A Federal Reserve Bank may
extend seasonal credit only if:
(i) The depository institution’s
seasonal needs exceed a threshold that
the institution is expected to meet from
other sources of liquidity (this threshold
is calculated as a certain percentage,
established by the Board of Governors,
of the institution’s average total deposits
in the preceding calendar year); and
(ii) The Federal Reserve Bank is
satisfied that the institution’s qualifying
need for funds is seasonal and will
persist for at least four weeks.
(2) The Board may establish special
terms for seasonal credit when
depository institutions are experiencing
unusual seasonal demands for credit in
a period of liquidity strain.
(d) Emergency credit for others. In
unusual and exigent circumstances and
after consultation with the Board of
Governors, a Federal Reserve Bank may
extend credit to an individual,
partnership, or corporation that is not a
depository institution if, in the

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judgment of the Federal Reserve Bank,
credit is not available from other
sources and failure to obtain such credit
would adversely affect the economy. If
the collateral used to secure emergency
credit consists of assets other than
obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by, the United
States or an agency thereof, credit must
be in the form of a discount and five or
more members of the Board of
Governors must affirmatively vote to
authorize the discount prior to the
extension of credit. Emergency credit
will be extended at a rate above the
highest rate in effect for advances to
depository institutions.
§ 201.5 Limitations on availability and
assessments.

(a) Lending to undercapitalized
insured depository institutions. A
Federal Reserve Bank may make or have
outstanding advances to or discounts for
a depository institution that it knows to
be an undercapitalized insured
depository institution, only:
(1) If, in any 120-day period, advances
or discounts from any Federal Reserve
Bank to that depository institution are
not outstanding for more than 60 days
during which the institution is an
undercapitalized insured depository
institution; or
(2) During the 60 calendar days after
the receipt of a written certification
from the chairman of the Board of
Governors or the head of the appropriate
federal banking agency that the
borrowing depository institution is
viable; or
(3) After consultation with the Board
of Governors. In unusual circumstances,
when prior consultation with the Board
is not possible, a Federal Reserve Bank
should consult with the Board as soon
as possible after extending credit that
requires consultation under this
paragraph (a).
(b) Lending to critically
undercapitalized insured depository
institutions. A Federal Reserve Bank
may make or have outstanding advances
to or discounts for a depository
institution that it knows to be a
critically undercapitalized insured
depository institution only:
(1) During the 5-day period beginning
on the date the institution became a
critically undercapitalized insured
depository institution; or
(2) After consultation with the Board
of Governors. In unusual circumstances,
when prior consultation with the Board
is not possible, a Federal Reserve Bank
should consult with the Board as soon
as possible after extending credit that
requires consultation under this
paragraph (b).

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 101 / Friday, May 24, 2002 / Proposed Rules
(c) Assessments. The Board of
Governors will assess the Federal
Reserve Banks for any amount that the
Board pays to the FDIC due to any
excess loss in accordance with section
10B(b) of the Federal Reserve Act (12
U.S.C. 347b(b)). Each Federal Reserve
Bank shall be assessed that portion of
the amount that the Board of Governors
pays to the FDIC that is attributable to
an extension of credit by that Federal
Reserve Bank, up to 1 percent of its
capital as reported at the beginning of
the calendar year in which the
assessment is made. The Board of
Governors will assess all of the Federal
Reserve Banks for the remainder of the
amount it pays to the FDIC in the ratio
that the capital of each Federal Reserve
Bank bears to the total capital of all
Federal Reserve Banks at the beginning
of the calendar year in which the
assessment is made, provided, however,
that if any assessment exceeds 50
percent of the total capital and surplus
of all Federal Reserve Banks, whether to
distribute the excess over such 50
percent shall be made at the discretion
of the Board of Governors.
§ 201.51 Interest rates applicable to credit
extended by a Federal Reserve Bank.

(a) Primary credit. The rates for
primary credit provided to depository
institutions under § 201.4(a) are: [The
chart will appear in the final rule.]
(b) Secondary credit. An interest rate
50 basis points above the rate for
primary credit in § 201.51 will apply to
secondary credit extended to depository
institutions under § 201.4(c).
(c) Seasonal credit. The rate for
seasonal credit extended to depository
institutions under § 201.4(b) is a flexible
rate that takes into account rates on
market sources of funds.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, May 16, 2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 02–12781 Filed 5–23–02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210–01–P

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