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U N IT E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T OF L A B O R
Frances Perkins, Secretary
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
Isador Lubin, Commissioner (on leave)
A . F. Hinrichs, Acting Commissioner
+
Demobilization
of
Manpower, 1918-19
By
STELLA STE W ART
Bureau o f Labor Statistics
B ulletin
T^o. 784
Letter o f Transmittal
U nited States D epartment of L abor ,
B ureau of L abor Statistics ,
Washington , D . C ., M a y 19, 1944•
The S ecretary of L abor :
I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on demobilization of
manpower in 1918 and 1919. The study is in three parts: 1.— Plans
for returning soldiers to civil life; 2.—Early phases of demobilization;
and 3.—Employment situation in 1919. Part 1 of this study appeared
in the March 1944 issue of the Monthly Labor Review, and part 2 in
the April 1944 issue. The report was prepared by Stella Stewart of
the Bureau’s Division of Historical Studies of Wartime Problems.
A. F. H inrichs, Acting Commissioner.
Hon. F rances P erkins ,
Secretary o j Labor.
For sale by the Superintendent o f Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, £ )/ C. *• Price 15 cents
Contents
P age
Part 1.— Plans for returning soldiers to civil life------------------------------------Expansion of the Army____________________________________________
Troops eligible for discharge at time of Armistice___________________
Initial steps toward demobilization_________________________________
Proposed methods of demobilization_______________________________
Demobilization by industrial needs or occupation_______________
Demobilization by locality____________________________________
Demobilization by length of service____________________________
Demobilization by military unit_______________________________
Part 2.— Early phases of demobilization________________________________
Civilian proposals for post-war readjustments---------------------------------War Department program_________________________________________
Changes in War Department policy_______________________________
Beginning of unemployment_______________________________________
Employment situation in various industrial areas:
Connecticut area______________________________________________
Ohio area_____________________________________________________
Michigan area________________________________________________
New Jersey area____________________________________________
Buffalo, N. Y., area___________________________________________
Conditions in small companies_____________________________________
Public and other reactions and appraisals--------------------------------------Part 3.— Employment situation in 1919:
Situation in winter of 1919_________________________________________
Effect of unplanned demobilization upon civilian workers----------------Industry’s problems of reconversion___________________________
Unemployment situation in the spring of 1919--------------------------Regional variations in the post-war patterns of employment____
New England area________________________________________
Middle Atlantic area_____________________________________
South Atlantic and South Central areas----------------------------North Central area_______________________________________
Mountain and Pacific areas_______________________________
Labor situation in May 1919, by regions_______________________
Shifts in labor supply_________________________________________
The upturn in business and employment----------------------------------Special problems of War Department and servicemen______________
Demobilization problems______________________________________
Problems of assistance to returning soldiers____________________
Other problems_______________________________________________
Placements in relation to demobilization_______________________
Administration of war risk insurance___________________________
Conclusion_______________________________________________
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Bulletin J^lo. 784 o f the
U nited States Bureau o f Labor Statistics
Demobilization of Manpower, 1918-19
Part 1.— Plans for Returning Soldiers to Civil Life
Until the war is won, the spotlight must be focussed on the process
of building, training, and equipping our armed forces. Nothing can
be allowed to detract from the concentration of national energy
necessary to win a complete victory over the enemy at the earliest
possible moment. The army of production takes its place, along
with the armed forces, in this concentrated effort. Nevertheless, a
knowledge of the relative and absolute magnitudes of the mobiliza
tion of manpower and economic forces involved in this war requires
that, behind the scenes, serious thought be given to the problems of
returning the soldier and the industrial worker to peacetime activities.
The same necessity existed in the first World War. Study of
the problem of demobilization of the soldiers was not begun until a
month before the end of the war, however, and then the need for
haste resulted in mistakes that might have been avoided under more
leisurely planning and consideration. No program was adopted for
the effective passing of the industrial worker to peacetime production.
The inevitable appearance of unforeseen problems which arose during
demobilization at the close of the first World War will repeat itself
at the close of this war. Further, the task will be much greater;
the number of men will be three times as large as in 1918-19 and
soldiers from the United States will have served longer and in more
combat areas, so that the period of their demobilization may be longer
than was the case after World War I. The magnitude of current
industrial production is a forecast of the problems of transition and
contraction.
For these reasons it seems probable that that earlier experience
may be of value in planning the gigantic task of demobilization that
lies ahead. The present article, which relates solely to the demobili
zation of the soldiers, reviews the four proposals for the return of
servicemen to peacetime pursuits that were advanced in that earlier
war period, showing where they originated, who supported them,
and their respective merits and disadvantages.
When the first World War came to an abrupt end with the signing
of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the armed services of the
United States had been expanded from a peacetime force of about
380,000 to almost 5,000,000. About 3,700,000 of these, constituting
the “ emergency army” (that is, those enlisted or inducted during
the war), were eligible for immediate discharge when the war ended.
Official consideration of plans for the discharge and return of these
men to civil life had been started a month before the Armistice.
(l)
2
This left far too little time for adequate preparations for so compli
cated a task. The method finally adopted was the traditional plan
for demobilization by military organizations. The military authori
ties favored this plan and it was the only one for which regulations
and administrative procedures could be quickly developed at so
late a date.
However, three other plans had been advanced, proposing demobili
zation (a) by industrial needs or occupations, (b) by locality, through
the use of the local or regional draft boards, and (c) by length of
service.
(a) The first plan, demobilization by occupation, had been adopted
originally by the British, but proved to be so unfeasible that new
legislation was passed, allowing the men to be withdrawn on the
general basis of length of service.
In both Great Britain and the United States it was civilians who
proposed and supported the occupational-demobilization plan. The
plan’s proponents in the United States recognized that, to be success
ful, it must be predicated upon an exhaustive analysis of the indus
trial situation of the country, especially if it was to be used for pro
viding employment for skilled and unskilled discharged soldiers,
many of whom had developed new proficiencies during their service
and would not wish to return to their old occupations. Such an
analysis had not been made.
Another major defect of the plan was its disregard of the instinctive
individualism of the average American and of the fact that regimen
tation after return to civil life would prove distasteful. This demobil
ization system was carefully reviewed by the General Staff but ulti
mately rejected.
(b) The second method, that of using draft-board machinery for
facilitating discharge, was developed by the Provost Marshal General
who had been closely connected with the operation of these boards
during the war. He argued that the local communities could do
more than any other agency to reestablish the released soldier. He
insisted that the problem oi “ finding the job for the men and of re
plenishing industry and agriculture at the point of depletion” could
best be done on a local scale.
His plan was favored by many civilian groups who thought that if
the men were returned to the communities from which they came
they would be more readily drawn into the economic life of these
areas and this, in turn, would relieve the situation in the large indus
trial cities near debarkation camps, where there would inevitably be
a brief period of great unemployment as the munitions plants reverted
to peacetime production.
The Provost Marshal General’s proposal was forwarded to the Sec
retary of War and then to the Chief of Staff. However, the militaryunit demobilization plan had already been adopted and announced,
and it was then too late to utilize even the best features of the draftboard plan.
The value of many of the aspects of the draft-board plan became
apparent during the winter and spring of 1919 when the War Depart
ment was besieged by citizens of all classes urging that the released
soldiers be withdrawn from the industrial centers which were also
faced with the problem of dealing with thousands of unemployed
3
war workers for whom the Federal Government had provided no
means of carry-over from wartime to civilian employment.
(c)
The third method, discharge by length of service, was rejected
for valid reasons. The country had been at war for only 18 months,
and the majority of the men had been in service a year or less. It
was important that the men in France, regardless of period of serv
ice, should be returned to this country as soon as possible.
Review of these several proposed systems of demobilization leads
to the conclusion that it was regrettable that plans could not have
been perfected far enough ahead of the need for their application to
have incorporated the best and most feasible features of each. This
would have required the sympathetic cooperation of the professional
soldiers, familiar with military procedure, and the trained civilian
groups which were familiar with the industrial and economic needs
of the country.
Expansion o f the A rm y
The story of demobilization of the Army after the first World War
cannot be intelligently evaluated without some knowledge of the
expansion of the Army to its size at the time of the Armistice. The
United States has never maintained a large standing Army, because
of its geographical situation and its amicable relations with its neigh
bors on the North American continent. For protection from foreign
aggression, this country has depended upon a strong Navy.
The American people were loath to accept the inevitability of
participation in the World War of 1914-18. When the United
States entered the war in April 1917, therefore, it was unprepared
from both a military and an industrial standpoint. The achieve
ments of supply of manpower and material during the following 18
months were striking and at that time unparalleled.
On April 1, 1917, just prior to the entrance of this country into the
war, the personnel of the armed forces of the United States num
bered 378,619. Of these, 291,880 were in the Army. Immediately
following the declaration of war on April 6, enlistment was accelerated
and was heavy throughout April, May, and June.
From the beginning of hostilities the American military experts
declared themselves in favor of the “ selective draft” as the only
democratic method for increasing the size of the Army. They empha
sized that it would distribute the burden of combat equitably through
all areas of the population, all social levels, and all occupational
groups. A bill to provide for “ selective service” was introduced
into Congress almost immediately after the declaration of war. It
was not a popular bill, being termed “ the Administration’s program
of conscription.” However, it became a law on May 18, 1917.
The act called for the registration of all men “ between the ages of 21
and 30 years, both inclusive,” but with the proviso that men should
be drafted only if voluntary enlistments did not provide the 500,000
additional men needed immediately. It differed from similar acts
of the Civil War in that no bounty could be offered to induce enlist
ments.
Altogether, 9,780,535 men responded to this .first registration,
held on June 5, 1917. This number proved inadequate for the
rapidly increasing military demands, partly because of the number
of deferments and exemptions which greatly reduced the number
4
of effectives in Class I, available for military service. Another limita
tion was the limitation of the age requirements for military service.
On M ay 20, 1918, Congress passed a Joint Resolution requiring
registration of men reaching the age of 21 after June 5, 1917, and
authorizing the President to require further registrations. Under
this resolution there were two registrations, totaling 10,679,814.
It was from these early registrations that all inductions into active
service were made.
It became evident by the summer of 1918 that the expanded mili
tary campaign proposed for the spring of 1919 would require many
more men than were available from the above groups. Therefore
Congress in August 1918 extended the age limits for military service'
to include men between the ages of 18 and 45, inclusive, but the
Armistice came before any of the 13,229,762 men registered under
the amendment were inducted.
The gradual expansion of the armed forces between April 1, 1917,
and the Armistice in November 1918 is shown in the accompanying
table.
Expansion of the Armed Forces of the United States After April I, 1917, and Total
Strength on November 11,1918 1
Item
A rm y
Total
Naval forces
Num ber in armed forces, April 1,1917................................
Additions^
Selective Service___________________________________
Enlistments____________________ ______ ___________
Commissions________________ _____________ _______
378,619
4,412,663
2,810,296
1,371,970
230,287
291,880
3,893,340
2,810,296
879,258
203,786
86,739
519,213
(a)
492,712
26,501
Total strength, Novem ber 11,1918......................................
4,791,172
4,185,220
605,952
* Report of the Provost Marshal General, December 20,1918 (tables 79 and 80, pp. 223 and 227).
* Additions to Naval forces b y induction were negligible.
Troops Eligible fo r Discharge at T im e o f A rm istice
Only the “ emergency army,” made up of men enlisted or inducted
during the war, was eligible for immediate discharge. What is more,
some of the inducted men were en route to camp when the fighting
ceased and so were little affected by the problems of demobilization.
When the Armistice came, this new emergency army was concen
trated in two big groups, consisting of the forces still in cantonments
in the United States, and the American Expeditionary Force in France.
Small numbers were stationed in the insular possessions and in Siberia.
The following statement shows the distribution of the “ emergency”
troops on November 11, 1918.1
In Europe_______________
At sea en route to Europe
In the United States_____
Number
1, 981, 701
22, 234
1, 634, 499
Percent
53. 5
.6
44.1
Total_____________
3, 638, 434
98. 2
64, 839
1. 8
Others
Grand total.
Annual Report of tbe Secretary of W ar, 1919, V ol. I, Part I, p. 448.
3, 703, 273
100. 0*
5
Initial Steps Toward Demobilization
The Secretary of War commented in his annual report in 1919:
“ The problem of demobilization of United States forces was different
from that of other countries since its pivotal or key men had not been
withdrawn from industry nor had its manpower been drafted to the
same extent as those of our Allies.” 2 However, later events indicated
that, even so, demobilization could not be satisfactorily accomplished
without definite plans developed well ahead of their need. The
Secretary himself said, “ The first steps in demobilization were taken
while the policy itself was being formulated.” 3
The first move toward demobilization made by the General Staff
was on October 8, 1918, just a month before the Armistice. It was
then suggested that, because of the enormous expense connected with
the military establishment and the desirability of a speedy return
to normal economic conditions, repatriation and demobilization of
the armed forces should be accomplished with the least practicable
delay.
At about the same time an informal note was sent to the head of
the Army War College: “ There are one or two questions it seems to
me should be studied and worked out so that you shall be good and
ready for any contingency. The first of these is the plan for demobili
zation and musters out. * * * I do not want to advertise it too
much at present as it might be thought to be peace propaganda.” 45
The War Plans Division immediately began a study of “ plans.”
Expedition was urged, since other divisions would need to review
the final report, but even then great secrecy was urged.6 Aside from
the development of general policies it was necessary for each branch
of the service (motor transport, signal corps, engineers, chemical
warfare, services of supply) to make its own specific plans.
The formal report to the Chief of Staff analyzing the various pro
posals for demobilization and making recommendations as to general
procedures was not forwarded until 10 days after the Armistice,
but undoubtedly major decisions had been reached earlier. No de
mobilization plan adopted would have been universally acceptable,
but this lack of preparedness and its results brought continuing
criticism from every quarter.
Proposed M ethods o f Dem obilization
The General Staff reviewed four distinctly different policies for
the demobilization of the soldiers at the close of World War I. One
was accepted, and three were rejected.
The method adopted, that of discharge by military units, is a
matter of record. The public is less familiar with the other three
plans. They proposed demobilization (a) by industrial needs or
occupations, (b) by locality (through the use of the local or regional
draft boards), and (c) by length of service.
These methods separate themselves into those originating in civilian
groups, whether or not they were in the civil establishments of the
Federal Government or attached to the War Department; and those
* Annual Report of the Secretary of W ar, 1919; Vol. I, Part I, p. 14.
* Idem, p. 453.
4 A rm y War College files, Chief of Operations, General Staff, to President, A rm y War College.
5 Idem, Chief of Operations’ Memorandum of October 16,1918.
589966°— 44------2
6
supported by the professional military groups in the offices of the
Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General, or the Provost Marshal General.
The civilian programs were the result of investigation and careful
consideration by two separate but sympathetic groups. The first
open approach to the demobilization problem was through the
civilian experts who were working with the War Department on
personnel classification. This group included outstanding psy
chologists and personnel administrators, most of whom were in
uniform and working closely with Army officers in the Adjutant
GeneraPs office. The second civilian group consisted of economists
and executives in the Department of Labor (chiefly in the War
Labor Policies Board and the U. S. Employment Service) and in
the War Industries Board.
There was frequent conference and interchange of ideas among
the various civilian groups, but there is little evidence of any genuine
effort at mutual understanding between these groups and the military
strategists in the War Department. There is, however, considerable
evidence that each group pressed its proposals upon the Secretary
of War, himself a civilian.
DEMOBILIZATION BY INDUSTRIAL NEEDS OR OCCUPATION
The civilians, both in the established Government departments
and in the emergency war agencies, were deeply conscious of the
difficult economic, industrial, and fiscal situation which would con
front the country with the cessation of production for war, and the
inevitable interval of uncertainty as the industries of the Nation
took stock and made their essential readjustments of program,
plant, and personnel. There was an undisputed need for an ex
tensive and intensive survey of the country’s industries, of their
ability to return promptly to peacetime production and so keep to
a minimum the unemployment attending the transition period.
The civilians’ study of these questions led them to the conclusion
that “ the rate of absorption [of labor] into industry is the active
and variable factor in the demobilization problem.” 6
It was logical therefore that a proposal for industrial demobilization
based upon industrial needs should gain their support.
British plan.— The details of such a plan had been worked out and
adopted in Great Britain, partly in the War Office but mainly in ac
cordance with civilian opinion. Under this plan, men needed for
industrial and civil reconstruction would be the first to be released
from the Army; and the rate of demobilization would be controlled by
industrial needs.
A member of the United States Committee on Classification of
Personnel of the Army spent some time in England in the spring of
1918. H e studied this plan carefully and came back convinced that
some adaptation of the plan to the situation in the United States would
greatly facilitate industrial readjustment and would insure “ that the
men in the Army shall be so dispersed that skilled and unskilled labor
in its many classifications of kind and degree shall be made available
for industrial absorption as needed.” 7
8 National Archives. Department of Labor, W ar Labor Policies Board: Memorandum to Chairman
of the Board from W alton H . Hamilton, October 28,1918.
7 A rm y W ar College. Report to the Secretary of W ar on British Plans for Demobilization and Recom
mendations as to the American Program.
7
An analysis of the British plan, to be used as a basis for approaching
the American problem, was prepared and a recommendation for the
adoption of this plan was submitted to the Adjutant General and the
Secretary of War in the summer of 1918. The two civilian groups
were working together and by the fall of 1918 agreed that, should the
plan be adopted, some cooperative arrangement should be made with
the Employment Service of the Department of Labor in its adminis
tration.
It is possible that the greater problem of the readjustment of the
country’s industries to peacetime conditions, and concern over the
effect of the returned servicemen upon a surplus labor market during
a period of mounting unemployment, obscured in the minds of these
men the fact that the soldier was a citizen with rights and privileges
as an individual when he had finally discharged his duties as a soldier.
The British plan, as reported, provided that men should be drafted
from the Army for service in civil life upon the declaration of peace
much as, upon the declaration of war, men were drafted from civil
life for service in the Army. Whatever the desirable factors of the
plan, it took into little account the instinctive individualism of the
average American, and gave scant consideration to the serviceman’s
possible negative reaction to further regimentation upon his release
from the Army, but provided that he should be moved about as best
fitted the success of the scheme. This fact was well stated by a
member of the staff of the War Labor Policies Board: “ Any policy of
reconstruction is largely dependent upon the spirit with which it is
met by the men to be demobilized. No one can say with certainty
what the effect of adventures, discipline, physical training, etc.,
which men have experienced in the Army, and the psychology result
ing from the offer of sacrifice, will be.” 8
Attitude of plan’s proponents.—Although the plan for demobilization
by industry was ultimately rejected by the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of War, brief consideration should be given to some of its
specific details and to the attitudes of some of its supporters. To the
Committee on Classifications it was “ obvious that America * * *
must demobilize by trades if a disastrous condition of unemployment
and unrest is not to ensue. Demobilization by * * * any other
schedule is not feasible. * * * The interests of the Army * * *
must be subordinated to the civic interests.” 9
Under such procedure the primary factor in the priority of demobili
zation would be the individual’s industrial classification, and the first
administrative task would be the classification of officers and men by
profession, trade, or occupation. This task was already partially
done, as the so-called “ qualification cards” of the men were based
upon their skills and experience at the time they entered the Army.
It was suggested that these cards, which had “ proved effective in
taking men from industry and placing them right in the Army,” be
used for redrafting them into industry, for, in the opinion of the
committee, “ there is just as close a relation between classification and
placement in industrial life as there is between classification and Army
placement; it is all part of the same problem.” However, there was
no record of new skills acquired in the Army, nor of the possible desire
for change resulting from the experiences in the Army and in new and
•National Archives. Department of Labor, W ar Labor Policies Board: T o Chairman from G. S. Arnold,
July 24,1918.
• Arm y W ar College. Report to the Secretary of W ar on British Plans for Demobilization and Recom
mendations as to the American Program.
8
different surroundings. It was granted that an “ exhaustive analysis
of the industrial situation of the country and the preparation of a
program of reorganization on a peace basis” was essential to the
functioning of the plan, and it was suggested that the Department of
Labor should assume this task.
Economists on the staff of the War Labor Policies Board were, in
the summer of 1918, engaged in analyzing the major problems of
industrial readjustment. Elaborate memoranda were prepared but
they dealt largely with generalizations and were of necessity specu
lative. One member of the staff acknowledged this and urged the
substantiation, by fact, of some of the statements made. The follow
ing abstract contains the essential statements on the release of the
soldier.
For this large body to be projected upon the community without provision for
immediate employment is unthinkable. And however confident we may be that
they can shortly be assimilated there is bound to be an intermediate period of
great confusion unless some elastic source of employment is provided— work
which may be available for all, but work of such a character that, if the conditions
of the country provide occupation more rapidly than is expected, it can be post
poned for future completion. Enough of such employment should be provided
and it should be so elastic in its nature that it will for a period of 2 or 3 years
provide work for the maximum estimate of unemployed men, and yet, in part
at least, not be sufficiently pressing or important to offer competition to perma
nent necessary employment. It might be advisable to do much of this work
before the men are actually discharged from the Army, with the provision, of
course, for the payment of industrial as opposed to military wages. (National
Archives. Department of Labor, War Labor Policies Board: Memorandum to
Chairman from G. S. Arnold, July 24, 1918.)
A longer and more comprehensive memorandum “ Upon the Prob
lem of Demobilization” discussed in great detail the problem in general
and the obstacles which would be encountered, and gave many
specific suggestions for carrying out a policy of demobilization by
industry.
The memorandum stressed the necessity for correlation of military
discharge with accessibility to reemployment, without periods of
“ idleness and dependency.” This required recognition of the fact
that munitions workers, released in large numbers from war plants,
would also be seeking employment. Thus, there were “ two comple
mentary problems of employment to be solved. To give employment
to discharged soldiers by denying it to munitions workers” was to
“ solve one problem of unemployment by creating another.” In
other words, if the situation was to be met sfquarely, enough jobs
must be provided to satisfy both groups, and at a high rate of absorp
tion, for it was probable that the release of war workers would not
be at the even flow anticipated for the release of soldiers.
The key problem of providing a “ mechanism” for discharge was
well stated. There was no doubt that failure so to provide would
mean failure of the plan as a whole. “ It will probably involve the
reorganization of the Army into new units, based upon occupational
status, for demobilization purposes. * * * Demobilization will
involve not so much legislation as a long series of administrative
decisions. Its success depends upon the precision and quickness
with which they can be made. This depends upon the range and
accuracy of information at hand and upon a mechanism for trans
lating judgments into accomplishments.” 10
10 National Archives. W ar Labor Policies Board: Memorandum to the Committee on Classification of
Personnel of the W ar Department from W alton H . Hamilton, October 28,1918.
9
The Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board commented to the
Secretary of Labor upon the “ comprehensive plan” of the Committee
on Classification of Personnel and said:
The function of the War Department as the Committee views it, ends with
the actual demobilization of the war, but the Committee keenly appreciates the
necessity of conducting demobilization in such a way that it shall best meet the
industrial requirements of the country, and shall result in a minimum of unneces
sary unemployment, and no breaking down of recently established labor standards.
* * * It is necessary to determine when and where the industry of the country
can re-absorb the men and whether it is possible to stimulate industry to so great
a degree that this re-absorption can be effectively accomplished. * * * It is
unnecessary to dwell upon the disastrous results to labor which may result from
allowing the demobilization to take its course without more definite preparation
than the present general speculation on problems of reconstruction. (National
Archives. War Labor Policies Board: Memorandum from Chairman Frank
furter to Secretary Wilson, October 22, 1918.)
After the Armistice and even after the War Department had
announced the demobilization policy which it had adopted, sup
porters of the industrial plan continued their exchange of views.
Some of the salient points of one of these memoranda were as follows:
* * * the physical productive capacity of the country is large enough to
furnish employment to all discharged soldiers and munitions workers and to
spare. But this does not prove that a purely military demobilization will furnish
employment to the discharged as they need it. * * * A haphazard discharge
of men and cancellation of contracts will not give men and materials in the order
in which they are needed to hasten the resumption of business. * * * What
ever the ultimate capacity of the system to take labor, there are abundant reasons
for thinking that unless extreme care is taken the labor market will be glutted.
* * * A word must be added about the possibility of local gluts. * * *
Unless the flow is locally controlled, soldiers will be demobilized in such centers as
Bridgeport, Pittsburgh, and Detroit, in which most of the work now going on is
under Government contract. If this happens, soldiers will be sent into markets
disorganized by the involuntary discharge of munitions workers through the
cancellation of Government contracts. (National Archives. War Labor Policies
Board: Unsigned memorandum to Lieut. Col. Coss, a member of the
Committee on Classification of War Department Personnel, November 1918.)
All of these statements reveal concern over the inevitable period
of unemployment which would accompany contract cancellation,
unless the Federal Government made specific provisions for bridging
the gap during the months when soldiers would be leaving the Army.
Results of industrial demobilization plan in Great Britain.— Since the
American proposal for industrial demobilization was premised upon
the British plan which had been worked out with great care, it seems
desirable to report upon the results of the British effort. At the time
of the Armistice, the United States had been in the war about 18
months, as contrasted with more than 4 years for the British. (The
British soldier’s length of service therefore parallels the probable ex
perience of the American soldier in this war more nearly than in
World War I.) The following record of the British experiment comes
from Winston Churchill’s story of his participation in demobilization
following World War I.11 In January 1919, 2 months after the
Armistice, Mr. Churchill had consented to take over administration
of the War Office because the “ temper of the Army and the problem
of demobilization caused increasing anxiety.” He was “ immediately
confronted with conditions of critical emergency.” Under the plan
for demobilization by occupation, “ key men” in industry were being
hurried back from the front regardless of their length of service, but*
n Churchill. W inston S.:
The Aftermath—1918-28 (Preface and Chapters I and III).
10
because they were key men many of them had been at the front only
a few months. Then, too, the plan lent itself to abuse, and influence
released certain men ahead of their comrades without such support
but with many months of Army service. The inevitable result was
the undermining of Army discipline and the creation of great im
patience and resentment on the part of the troops.
It was decided that only one remedy would prove effective— a
complete change in the scheme for demobilization. The new policy
provided that (1) soldiers should, as a general rule, be released from
the front in accordance with their length of service and their age, (2)
the pay of the Army was to be immediately increased to lessen the
gap between the rewards of military and civil employment, and (3)
the younger men who had completed training but not yet seen active
service were to be sent abroad to serve in the Army of Occupation, in
place of the older men and those of long service. Once this new
system was understood, the disaffection of the soldiers disappeared
and later the men were discharged at an average rate of 10,000 a day.
Mr. Churchill himself deprecated the lack of coordination between
the plans for meeting industrial and military needs. Possibly the
results would have been better if the military group had been willing
to give the new plan a sympathetic hearing and if the civilian origina
tors of the new and untried procedure had tried to integrate it more
closely with the traditional demobilization methods of the Army.
DEMOBILIZATION BY LOCALITY
A memorandum recommending discharge of the soldiers through
the local draft boards was submitted to the Chief of Staff on Novem
ber 11, Armistice Day, by the Provost Marshal General, who had been
in close association with these boards12 during his administration of
the Selective Service Act. His memorandum stated:
The economic need of finding the job for the man and of replenishing industry
and agriculture at the points of depletion is an obvious one. * * * But its
complexities are so vast that any solution on a national scale will be many months
incoming. In the meantime, the problem will be more or less a local one. * * *
These returned men will be without jobs. There is only one agency most obvi
ously fitted to do this [provide jobs]. * * * That agency is the one which
in the first place took them out of their jobs. * * * Every local board
virtually now knows where every man came from and the opportunities which
exist in his community for reemploying him. * * * No measure could be
more popular to the responsible interests of this country than the one here men
tioned. These boards include representatives of agriculture, banking, manu
facturing, commerce, labor, and the professions. They possess the confidence
of their own communities in an unexampled degree. To charge them with the
proposed task would meet with unanimous popular approval.” (National
Archives. War Department, Files of Chief of Staff: Draft Boards.)
The Government had already made provision for family allotments,
term insurance, Liberty Bond allotments, compensation for dis
ability, etc., the carrying out of which would require months of
administrative activity at the best. Delays were bound to occur as a
result of the difficulties of handling official investigations through a
central agency far removed from any intimate knowledge of the
individual facts. As the Provost Marshal General saw it, it was
“ imperative to employ * * * an agency localized in each
13 There were 4,643 of these boards and, in addition, there were the district boards, all familiar with
local and regional conditions.
11
community to serve as the local intermediary between the Govern
ment and the soldier.”
He also believed that the individual welfare of the soldier would be
furthered by the adoption of this method:
The returned soldier * * * has in all times been an element of unrest in
the community. * * * [He] has just been freed from a rigid system of
restraint; he is something of a licensed hero; and however young, he now thinks
himself a veteran, and emancipated from control. There ought to be some
central agency that is charged to look after him. That agency is the local board.
* * * There will be an intense need in most communities, and for a large
portion of the returned soldiers in all communities, of some sort of a controlling
and supervising influence. This individual welfare of the returned soldier is not
exactly his moral welfare, but it is something above and beyond his economic
welfare. It is not easy to describe but it is a very real thing. (National Archives.
War Department, Files of Chief of Staff: Draft Boards.)
The memorandum was forwarded to the Secretary of War and then
on November 26 to the Director of Operations for review. It was
too late, however, for this memorandum to be considered, as orders
had already gone out on November 19 to begin demobilization from
camps in the United States by organization or military unit, and the
adoption of this traditional method had been announced by the
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.
Among the several groups that were early supporters of the localboard plan was the Vice Chairman of the War Industries Board.
In a memorandum to the Chairman of the Board he said that it was
his impression that the military demobilization plan just announced
by the War Department was. “ one of convenience for the Army rather
than one calculated to meet the demands of industry.” It was the
declared policy of the War Industries Board to release materials to
nonwar industries in order to stimulate peacetime activities. As this
would be futile without a supply of skilled labor, the Vice Chairman
proposed using the local draft boards in the demobilization of soldiers
still within the United States, in accordance with “ the evident needs
of industry for the immediate future.” He emphasized the need for
skilled workers and recommended that such men “ experienced in
food, fuel, mining, or transportation industries” be furloughed,
whether here or abroad, on certificate of need from war agencies
such as the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, and the
Emergency Fleet Corporation. Furlough, rather than discharge,
was proposed to insure that these men would be employed where
their skills were most needed. Publicity of this plan was urged “ to
prevent dispersion and tend to reconstruct the nonwar industries to
their former status. * * * A general plan of completing dis
charge of our whole Army at point of origination through local draft
boards is favored.” Throughout, the memorandum favored some
constructive and expedient method of bringing the soldiers back to
their places of pre-war employment and reflected a compromise with
the plan for full demobilization by trade or occupation.
The members of the draft boards were, of course, in favor of local
demobilization. Not only did the communities want their men to
come home, but farmers and business and professional men could
give employment to large numbers of returned soldiers in their
localities.
That the proposal received wide publicity is evident from the flood
of . letters, received by the War Department in its support after de
12
mobilization was in progress. These letters were forwarded to the
Secretary of War from members of Congress; they came from governors
and mayors, from State councils of defense, and from citizens’ com
mittees. It is probable that propaganda stimulated some of the
letters, but they continued to come throughout the winter of 1919,
as the problem of unemployment became increasingly acute.
There were legal technicalities which made it impossible for the
War Department to provide for the discharged soldiers the type of
transportation which would insure their movement out of the cities.
Legislation passed later only partially solved this difficulty. Then,
too, it was stated that the proposal would prove both costly and
inexpedient, that the necessary administrative details must be carried
out at larger centers.
It was conceded that the use of the boards would get the men
nearer their homes, but could not keep them there. “ Whether the
draft boards would succeed in placing men where they had come from
and keeping them there is a matter of considerable doubt. It is
believed, in view of the insistent demands that men be released from
the camps where the work of demobilization is now concentrated and
being done systematically by trained officers and men, that if the draftboard system were considered the largely increased personnel required
by dispersing the same work * * * would result in a popular
demand for the return to .the system now being used.” 13
DEMOBILIZATION BY LENGTH OF SERVICE
The plan of demobilization in accordance with length of service,
the system finally used by Great Britain, was considered by the
General Staff and rejected for valid reasons. The United States had
been at war a relatively short time. Most of the overseas troops had
been abroad little more than 6 months. Almost 50 percent of the
emergency Army was in camps in the United States, and some of these
men had been in camp only a few weeks. Others, chiefly in the Services
of Supply and other services needed for the administration of the camps,
had served longer than many of the troops abroad.
DEMOBILIZATION BY MILITARY UNIT
As already noted, the traditional method of discharge by military
organization was adopted and announced to the press by the Chief of
Staff on November 16— 5 days after the Armistice. This was just a
month after the War Plans Division had been directed to develop
plans for demobilization, and before the final formal report had been
received by the Chief of Staff.
There can be no doubt that the plan of discharge by military organ
izations was considered by the military authorities as the method best
adapted to the immediate problem. “ The decision as to the essential
principles under which our Army was to be demobilized was made by
the Chief of Staff in person, who determined on demobilization by
units. * * * He promptly and unerringly selected from the many
plans proposed the one best suited to American conditions.” 14 The
18 National Archives. W ar Department, Files of Chief of Staff: Letter to the Executive Comm ittee of
the Independent Citizen’s Committee of Welcome from the Chief of Operations, December 4,191$.
14 W ar Department. Files of General Staff: Lecture on Demobilization, January 2$, 192.1.
13
chief claims made for this method were that it expedited discharge,
that it insured the orderly return of troops, that large military units
represented a cross section of American industrial life, and that
because of its flexibility the rate of discharge could be controlled and
provision could be made for special situations and individual cases.
Under this method large units of men no longer needed could be dis
charged en masse. Other units needed at ports of debarkation, at
convalescent centers, and at cantonments, could be retained as a whole.
If carried to its logical conclusion it would prevent favoritism in release
of certain classes, but it could also provide for the release of certain
groups needed to support the civilian economy.
Demobilization was scarcely under way before complaints and
requests for special treatment of individual or group cases began to
pour into the War Department. The flood of discharged servicemen
into the large industrial areas brought an avalanche of calls for modi
fications in the demobilization program. Most of the letters dealt
with one of two problems— the danger to the community of too rapid
demobilization, or the need for obtaining the prompt discharge of men
needed in specific industries. These complaints and the tenor of the
replies reflect the haste with which the reversal from mobilization to de
mobilization was undertaken and the desirability of a program from
the outset which would have combined the best elements of the several
policies proposed. The complaints mounted, most of them suggesting
a modification of the system being used, in order to divert the dis
charged soldiers away from the large cities.
Many of the requests for action to ameliorate conditions came from
Congressmen who were besieged by their constituents, sometimes
from purely selfish motives, but more often in the interest of the com
munity or of the servicemen themselves. The War Department
found it difficult to answer these letters meticulously, to be consistent,
and to defend the system and the results of its applications.
One of its replies contained a carefully worded statement of the
efforts being made to overcome the “ local short comings” , of the
operations in progress:
Such organizations [of citizens] which find in the large cities a congregating
of ex-soldiers and other persons without employment, have, it is believed, er
roneously become convinced that this crowding to the larger cities is a fault of
the War Department’s system of demobilization, and that their proposed scheme
of demobilization through the local draft boards would have prevented such
crowding. It is believed that this opinion is entirely unjustified. Young men
from the farms and rural communities have been taken from their secluded
homes and isolated communities and have seen something of the world. The
desire of such young men to go to large cities and seek the excitement and dis
traction there to be found is a fault of human nature that cannot be overcome by
legislation or War Department regulation. The fact that discharged soldiers
after their discharge go to the large cities is not a fault of the War Department
demobilization but has occurred in spite of careful plans taken by the War De
partment to encourage soldiers to return to their homes.
This phenomena [sic] of persons crowding to the large cities is not confined to
the United States, but is occurring in every country that was in the war. At the
completion of wars, the tendency has always been shown for soldiers returning
from war to flock into the cities. * * *
I have written at this length because I wished to make it clear that demobiliza
tion is proceeding in accordance with a very definite and considered policy,
and the War Department feels certain that as time passes and the matter is more
thoroughly understood and the facts become more completely known, the country
will become convinced that the demobilization was conducted in an efficient and
589906°— 44-----3
14
well-planned manner, to the best interests of the greatest number of people of the
United States. (National Archives. War Department, Files of Chief of Staff:
Letter to Head of the House Military Affairs Committee from Chief of Opera
tions, February 25, 1919.)
Another reply to a Congressional inquiry contained this under
standing paragraph:
Demobilization is inevitably an unpopular process, * * * The eyes of soldiers
are turned from contemplation of the country's enemy to provision for their own
future, and no man with human sympathies "can fail to be moved in their behalf.
But for the public official entrusted with the completion of the undertaking it is
a time for self-restraint and broad vision, a time to see the larger aspect steadily
and to see it whole. (National Archives. War Department, Files of Chief of
Staff: Letter to Senator McKellar from Secretary of War, February 3, 1919.)
During the winter of 1919 the country was faced with a situation
which necessitated many modifications of the original procedures for
demobilization by military units. Finally, in March 1919, the War
Department published an official statement, entitled “ The Army
Demobilization System Reviewed and Analyzed in Order Better to
Acquaint the Public with the Many Difficult Problems Arising.” 15
At that time the country was suffering from an unemployment
crisis, resulting from the cancellation of war contracts for goods of no
peacetime value. The analysis of the demobilization situation at
tempted to explain the abrupt discharge of thousands of servicemen
in the absence of a well-planned program for their reemployment, in
view of the acute industrial situation. This detailed statement is, in
the main, a reply to the persistent demand for the use of the draft
boards for final discharge of the men. That such a necessity should
have arisen leads to the conclusion that from the beginning a system
of demobilization could have been used which would have incorporated
the most desirable portions of each proposal. A part of this statement
is a fitting conclusion to this review of the various plans proposed for
demobilization of the soldiers, any one of which would have failed in
some degree because of the unexpected Armistice and the delayed
preparations for readjustment.
This, then, is the tremendous problem that confronts us— to return to a country
whose digestion for labor is not now of the best, hundreds of thousands of men
without employment, not forgetting that they and their families deserve the
grateful thanks of the Nation, and remaining keenly aware that their patriotism
and sacrifice demand that they be given every possible recognition and favor.
As the welfare of the country demanded our entry into the war, and its vigorous
prosecution regardless of sacrifices, so does it seem that the welfare of the country
at large demands our first consideration in the matter of demobilization. The
absorption by the counlry of these returning men without disorder and without
upsetting the economic life of the Nation becomes of paramount importance.
The question arises— can the country digest these men best if fed into it in large
contingents by discharge in certain restricted areas such as the ports of the Atlantic
seaboard, or in small groups, distributed throughout the entire country in such a
way that the processes of assimilation can work easily on each small group?
The administration of demobilization of the soldiers is a separate
story and its results must be integrated with the coordinate problem of
the release of thousands of industrial workers.
w U . S. Official Bulletin (Washington), March 24,1919 (p. 6).
Part 2.— Early Phases o f Dem obilization
The national income in 1918 was larger than in any pre-war year.
About one-fourth of it went toward the expenses of running the war,
but more people had been employed at higher wages than ever before.
There was little advance in the incomes of salaried workers in the
middle and lower income groups and their standard of living had
declined as prices rose and war taxes increased, but wage earners,
both skilled and unskilled, had after a lag benefited materially from
steadily increasing wage levels and full employment. Wage ad
vances resulted from the great demand for workers in the war produc
tion areas and from a desire to allow nothing to interfere with the
steady output of war goods. These wages were further enhanced by
additional pay for overtime work.
Aside from savings represented by war savings stamps and Liberty
bonds, few of the workers in the low-income groups had made any
provision against the time when abnormal wage payments would
cease. Many of them had known thrift as a necessity but they had
not acquired the saving habits that might have encouraged them to
save from their high wartime wages. Furthermore, there was no
effort to encourage the workers to save against a day of need, and
neither industry nor government had assisted in the accumulation of
an emergency fund.
The war-making agencies proceeded upon the assumption that the
war might last until 1922. Plans had been completed for accelerating
the war effort. Hundreds of thousands of men anticipated an early
call to the armed forces. Thousands of additional Government
contracts had been negotiated. Industries were preparing for more
complete conversion to production of war products. The U. S.
Employment Service was expanding and making more effective its
work of providing the adequate number of workers for the scattered
war plants. Government controls over industry and over civilians
were to be tightened. The War Labor Administration was busy
with wage adjustments and settlement of labor difficulties.
This concentration upon the war effort had official approval, and
there was no encouragement of discussion of the problems to be
faced when the war was over. However, readjustment problems
engaged the minds of various groups in Government circles and in
industry during the 6 months preceding the Armistice.
Civilian Proposals fo r P ost-W a r Readjustments
There was full agreement that there could be no return to pre-war
levels of production, employment, and wages, and there was no
doubt as to the industrial future beyond the months of so-called
reconversion. Judgments differed, however, as to the magnitude
and precise character of the post-war problems and the time span
required for the swing away from production for war, through the
inevitable temporary but acute period of low productivity, unemploy
ment, uncertainty, and unrest, to the upswing of full production for
peacetime requirements. Only a few realized the dangers inherent
in short-range planning when industries began to compete for markets
( 15)
16
serving a public with relatively high and widely distributed purchas
ing power. It was the immediate and transitory post-war period
which provided the basis for most of the pre-Armistice considerations.
There is great similarity between these proposals of 1918 and the
current “ post-war planning” which has received official commendation
during this war.
The various proponents of a plan of action discussed different
angles of the readjustment problem but there was complete unity on
one point— the urgent need for an announced Federal policy supported
by constructive legislation and sufficient funds to meet emergencies
as they arose. It was generally conceded that the task of developing
a flexible program for the employment of men and machinery, during
the interim while the Government cancelled war orders and industry
equipped itself for peacetime production, should be undertaken by an
authoritative governmental agency, nonpartisan in character and
entirely free from the pressure of wartime considerations. Without
governmental action at both the Federal and State level the cost to
the Nation resulting from serious interruption to production and the
accompanying unemployment would be greater than the outlay for a
well-conducted program for “ buffer” employment.
The secretary of the Council of National Defense made the following
general observations in August:
It is elementary that after the war America will not be the same America.
* * * New conditions and relationships create new problems for nations as
well as for individuals * * *; the change will be as great in the thought
and ideals of the Nation as it will be in its strictly material problems, whether
these be military, commercial, or those having to do with labor. (National
Archives. War Department, Files of Council of National Defense.)
Economists of the War Labor Administration, who argued for the
creation of an official agency to act during the readjustment period
said: “ Already groups with pecuniary interests at stake are busied in
studying the situation with a view of turning it to their own ad
vantage.” They contended that, lacking governmental action, there
would be compromise between the strongest of these interested groups,
with little or no consideration of important but obscure interests.
“ Unity of effort cannot be superimposed. * * * If a consistent
plan is to come, it must be because those who are responsible for it
are animated by a common desire, a common viewpoint, and a common
willingness to merge their contributions into a common whole.” 1
With this point of view the board of directors of the United States
Chamber of Commerce was in agreement. It urged upon the Presi
dent Federal recognition of the problem, in order that all class interests
should be subordinated to the interests of the country as a whole.
The general acceptance of this proposal led many executives in the
emergency war agencies to assume that certain governmental controls
and restrictions would be retained during the period of cancellation of
war contracts and retooling for ciyilian production. The Secretary
of the Capital Issues Committee, in a memorandum of November 9,
made the following statement:
Industrial reconstruction after the war might be left to take its own course
without governmental interference just as industrial preparation for war might
have been left free but was not. The free operation of economic laws would result
in wide price fluctuations, unemployment, and prolonged business depres
sion. * * * There would seem to be no need therefore of any argument to *
>National Archives.
W ar Labor Policies Board, Keconstruction Files.
17
show that the Government must assist wherever necessary by artificially stimu
lating and restraining natural economic forces. (National Archives. War Labor
Policies Board, Reconstruction folder.)
Another businessman of the staff of the War Labor Policies Board
believed that there would be sufficient demand for consumer goods
“ for a time at least,” provided there was “ a gradual reduction of war
orders and carefully considered arrangement of selling prices for basic
commodities. * * * In my judgment there is bound to be a
period of confusion at the outset, considerable disorganization and
uncertainty and at least temporary unemployment.” He felt that
commodity prices which had been at a high wartime level should be
decreased, and that profits of the larger organizations had been such
as to warrant price reductions without the lowering of wage rates.
The method in which this hard piece of work is done will have a most vital effect
on the success with which demobilization and the re-introduction of demobilized
labor into industry is carried out. The social atmosphere is such that * * *
the inevitable reduction of the dollar wage rate should follow and not precede, in a
majority of industries, reasonable reductions in market prices. (National
Archives. War Labor Policies Board, Memorandum from George W. Perkins
to Felix Frankfurter, November 1918.)
There was, in addition to these broad approaches to the readjustment
problem, considerable discussion as to the rate at which production
of war goods should be discontinued. One group argued that the more
gradual the rate of contract cancellation, the less critical would be the
incidence of unemployment and the more readily could released work
ers be reemployed. The other contention was that it would be futile
to attempt to postpone the drastic changes resulting from cessation of
war orders; that the more promptly contracts were cancelled the more
quickly manufacturers could obtain access to raw materials, the speed
ier would be the reconversion of plants and therefore the shorter the
period of unemployment.
There was, however, one grave defect in all of these discussions:
they centered in Washington. There was no stimulation of post-war
thinking at the local or community level. Although local groups had
participated in wartime activities, it was not until after the Armistice
that there was open discussion of reconstruction problems. With the
Chief Executive engrossed first in winning the war and then in plans
for the peace conference, and with little or no pressure upon members
of Congress from their constituents, it is not surprising that the legisla
tion which was proposed for enabling a smooth transition from war to
peace died in committees with little or no public debate. Thus the
country faced the post-Armistice period without help from its leaders.
The abrupt advent of the Armistice found the country unprepared
for the reversal of this huge program. The Federal Government had
become the largest employer in the country but it gave less considera
tion to the welfare of these workers, both industrial and clerical, than
it would have expected from private industry. Neither the Govern
ment nor industry had provided machinery for readjustment to peace
time employment. Therefore, when the fighting stopped, the country
was totally unprepared for the return to peacetime living. The War
Department was not ready either for the discharge of the soldiers or
for the discontinuance of its huge manufacturing program. The
result was that the Armistice ushered in a period of uncertainty, of
claims and counterclaims, and of unemployment and tension for tens
of thousands of civilian workers.
18
W a r Department Program
The majority of all industrial workers were directly or indirectly
employed by the War Department which had, during the war, en
countered all phases of the labor problem. The selection, training,
and movements of about 4,000,000 men in the armed services had also
been the exclusive responsibility of the War Department. When
the war ended, slightly more than half of these men were in France
and about 1,600,000 eligible for immediate discharge were in training
camps in this country. Therefore there was centered in the War
Department both the authority and the responsibility for two of the
major post-Armistice transactions affecting the lives of millions of
American citizens—the demobilization of the Army and the cancella
tion of war contracts with the subsequent release of thousands of
Workers in war plants. This agency was not prepared for either task.
While it tardily made plans for the prompt discharge of the soldiers,
it disavowed any responsibility for their welfare as private citizens.
Later, however, it reversed this policy and cooperated in all efforts to
obtain employment for those who needed assistance.
During the war the Department had supported the maintenance of
such standards for war workers as would aid in the continued and
prompt production of supplies for the Army. Conscientious efforts
were made to improve living conditions for workers in all war industries.
The Secretary of War himself had said, however, that the War Depart
ment had no other purpose than to see that the armies received ade
quate supplies when and where they needed them. This indicated
little thought for post-war adjustments.
The method to be used in demobilizing the soldiers was announced
soon after the Armistice, but formulation of policy had been so
delayed that there was far too little time for selection and training of
the administrative force required for the task. The work was ham
pered still further because camps in this country were widely scattered.
What is more, all early plans had been directed primarily toward the
handling of men from overseas. The first order for soldier discharge
was ready within a week after the Armistice and called for the release
of about 600,000 men, in camps in the United States, who could no
longer be of service. Actual discharge moved slowly. During No
vember 45,000 men were released, about 90 percent of them during
the last week of the month.
During this period, the War Department was working upon a pro
gram of contract cancellation. It had been agreed that the policy
should be developed in consultation with such other agencies as the
War Industries Board and the Department of Labor. Each major
cancellation was to be reviewed as to its effect upon the industry,
the worker, and the geographical location of the plants. In order to
have at hand dependable information on industrial conditions and
opportunities for reemployment, the U. S. Employment Service made
a weekly telegraphic survey to determine the location and amount of
labor surpluses or shortages.
On November 12 the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and
Chairman of the Shipping Board issued directions to discontinue
immediately all Sunday and overtime work on Government construc
tion and in Government owned or operated plants. This meant a
sharp reduction, frequently as much as 50 percent, in the pay of the
19
workers. This first step in the process of the workers’ adjustment to
peacetime conditions was bound to create unrest and uncertainty.
Most of the wartime gains of the workers had been long overdue.
They were just and right. Now, the certain markets provided by
war needs were fast disappearing. However optimistic the long-time
industrial future of the country, the immediate future appeared
clouded. If Government restrictions were lifted, prices and the cost
of living were sure to rise. Surplus workers and released servicemen
would compete for available jobs. The result would be industrial
strife as workers fought to retain their recent gains. The months
immediately following the close of the war were certain to be as ab
normal as were the feverish months of preparation for war.
No legislation was available for this emergency. An Army officer
said in 1921:
Throughout the period of demobilization the legislative agencies left entirely
to the War Department the solution of problems pertaining to the disbandment
of our forces and disposition of surplus munitions. Even industrial demobiliza
tion was largely affected by military policy. (Lecture at Army War College on
Demobilization of Men of the Emergency Army, 1921, p. 2.)
Fortunately for the employment situation, the rate of discharge of
the soldiers was initially much slower than anticipated, owing in part
to delay in preparation and in part to the lack of sufficient shipping
space for returning the men from abroad. By December 1, the U. S.
Employment Service had established offices in all camps east of the
Mississippi River, to assist the men who were not returning to their
old jobs to find employment. This work was hampered in more than
one way. One difficulty was that the soldiers' qualification cards
were based upon skills which they had when they entered the Army;
many of them had received special training while in the service and
were fitted for and desirous of obtaining work of a different character
from that indicated on their cards.
During November there was a policy of gradual tapering off of war
production and although workers and employers feared the worst,
actually there was little distress. The announced value of cancella
tions was high but it included value of contracts on which work had
not yet been begun; deliveries of finished goods, valued at about 2
billion dollars, were made in November. Manufacturers of goods
suitable for civilian use continued their operations.
There was great pressure from Congress upon the War Department
for economy and reduction of expenditures. The Secretary of War
in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee
stated on November 18 that there had already been a saving of
$700,000,000 through stop orders on contracts where work had not
yet been begun; cancellation of contracts in process of execution had
effected a saving of more than $400,000,000; and the stopping of
overtune and Sunday work was saving about $2,900,000 a day.
This pressure, coupled with advice from certain industry groups and
an evident desire for change in procedure on the part of responsible
officers of the War Department, resulted in a change of policy and
abandonment of the centralized program for tapering off production.
Most of the November cancellations were for some percentage of
the product rather than the whole, and many of them were for products
where not more than 25 percent of the labor in the plants had been
diverted to war work. The important items scheduled for early
20
cancellation were confined chiefly to cotton and woolen goods, wood
products and hardware, and automotive products. There had as yet
been little cancellation of contracts for products where labor was 100
percent on war work.
Changes in W ar Department P olicy
Events were shaping themselves into a pattern quite different from
that indicated by the current public statements of Government offi
cials. The judicial review of proposed cancellations delayed action
beyond the wishes of the War Department. It had accepted the
premise that continuance of war contracts required the use of raw
materials better diverted to civilian use either here or abroad; that
production of war materials with no peacetime value should be dis
continued “ as speedily as is consistent with the primary consideration
of labor and the industries.” There was, however, no governmental
directive to implement these “ primary considerations.”
On November 27 an Advisory Board on Sales and Contract Ter
mination was established by the War Department. Immediately
there was an abrupt change in cancellation policy, and the War De
partment assumed full responsibility for cancellation. The intention
was to accelerate cancellation greatly. The administrative functions
were transferred to the District Offices of the Ordnance Branch, which
would act upon orders from the supply bureaus. The U. S. Employ
ment Service hoped that under the new procedures its regional and
State directors would be able to obtain adequate information concern
ing the numbers and location of workers in the plants where production
was to be discontinued. The earlier method had not yielded such
information. The cancellation and curtailment schedules gave no
indication of the way in which labor would be affected. Schedules
relating to the same class of commodity frequently lacked any state
ment of labor conditions in the particular plant, the industry as a
whole, or in the communities affected. Under the new plan the War
Department, at the urgent request of the U. S. Employment Service,
ordered its regional cancellation officers to consult with local represent
atives of the Employment Service “ so that these matters of labor
dislocation may be considered before the trouble is caused.”
Speedy cancellation was now the order of the day; and it was
comparatively easy to handle cancellation orders with expedition.
However, the reconversion of plants and the reemployment of workers
could not keep pace. During the first week in December thousands
of curtailment and cancellation orders went out. Many* of them in
cluded the phrase, “ Incur no further expense.” By December 9 these
recent cancellations totaled more than 2 billion dollars. The geo
graphical distribution of this slow-down in war production was approx
imately as follows:
Middle Atlantic States______________________________________
North Central States_____ ______ ______ ______________ ______
New England__________________
South Atlantic andSouth Central States_____________________
Western States___________________________________
Percent
38
27
21
13
1
It must be remembered that the Government’s shipbuilding program
was not affected by these cancellations.
21
B e g in n in g o f Unem ployment
The policy-making officers in the War Department seem to have
been skeptical from the beginning concerning the seriousness of pend
ing unemployment. The following statement, dated December 5,
1918, was made in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff:
It is believed there is nothing to justify the prediction of hard times, industrial
depression, lack of employment of large numbers of soldiers on account of the rate
of discharge. * * * By the time immediate labor needs are satisfied, new
construction will require the service of discharged soldiers. * * * The esti
mates that there may be considerable unemployment in the future are pure guess
work and there are many indications that there will be ample employment for
all. It is believed the energy and resources of manufacturers and urgent need of
the world for American raw materials and manufactured articles and the spirit
of helpfulness displayed by the entire country will solve the question of unem
ployment for discharged soldiers and other war workers without any period of
extended hard times or lack of employment. (National Archives. War Depart
ment, Files of the Chief of Staff: Demobilization.)
This note of optimism was reflected in most of the official statements
of December, and even in the President's message to Congress. The
Secretary of Labor, in a press conference as late as December 17,
stated that thus far there was nothing in the weekly reports on indus
trial conditions “ to indicate there is any difficulty in absorbing those
who are being released from military forces and war emergency
institutions."
It was the immediate problem of the transitionaPperiod which was
the concern of those closest to the labor situation. With the cooper
ation of citizens and civilian organizations including the Red Cross,
and men's and women's local clubs, the U. S. Employment Service
proceeded to establish in communities throughout the country
offices which would provide jobs for men returning from war and from
the areas where there had been emergency war work. These offices
were organized and managed by local committees. The U. S. Em
ployment Service acted as a clearing house, keeping the records of
jobs and of men, and directing the men sent to them by local bureaus.
In the meantime production under contract with the Government
was being stopped so rapidly that the Employment Service, which
had agreed to the decentralized control of the entire project of can
cellation, complained to the War Department that its own explicit
instructions to its district officers were being ignored in some areas.
No advance notice of cancellations was being sent to the labor rep
resentatives, and in the Ohio area laborers were being released by
hundreds. Private organizations in areas where this situation existed
were protesting or making suggestions for easing off army orders.
One such suggestion was for converting orders for army shoes and
clothing into manufacture for the civilian market, so far as materials
on hand would permit. “ Thousands of firms would thus be enabled
not only to keep their present labor forces over the winter but would
have a definite time in which to reconstruct their commercial organi
zations." In this case the records indicate some official concern, a
courteous reply, but no action. In some instances, particularly in
the manufacture of subsistence supplies, there was definitely a gradual
transfer over from war orders to civilian production.
However, it was in the plants operating entirely on munitions and
war materials that there was the greatest need for some program,
589966°— 44------4
22
sponsored jointly by Government and industry, for providing em
ployment for idle workers.
By December 28, surpluses of labor Were mounting daily in the
cities where war industries were closing down. The immediate
situation was most critical in Ohio and Michigan. The South was
the only section of the country where there was an increasing demand
for labor resulting in large part from the continued expansion in
shipbuilding. Day by day the industrial situation grew more dis
tressing. All munitions centers were affected. The area of surplus
labor comprised in general the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana. The number of workers
out of employment was increasing in these areas.
Although the program for the demobilization of the soldiers was
still in its formative stage, more than 600,000 men were released during
December, of whom only 70,000 were men returned from overseas.
About 30 percent of those released in December were demobilized
in areas where workers were rapidly being released from war plants.
There can be little doubt that the majority of these men returned
promptly to their homes. They had not been subjected to experiences
which alienated them from their environment, as had the men in the
American Expeditionary Force.
It was the minority which drifted aimlessly about the big cities.
Although these men were not representative of the whole they did
constitute a restless, roving group. Idle, and joined with unemployed
and disaffected war workers, they formed a potentially dangerous
element in the Nation’s life. Wise, courageous, and sympathetic
solution of their problems could not result from expedient decisions
of the moment; it could come only from mature consideration of
operating procedures worked out well ahead of their use, with sub
sidiary plans for meeting inevitable unforeseen emergencies.
E m ploym ent Situation in Various Industrial A reas
CONNECTICUT AREA
The Bridgeport, Conn., Local Board of Mediation and Cancel
lation, composed of representatives of employers and employees,
appealed to the National War Labor Board on December 18 for some
modification of cancellations to correct the rapid release of workers,
and to “ assure a graduated decrease in the number of munitions
workers employed m Bridgeport.” Connecticut was a crucial area
for war production, and the abrupt cancellation of the ordnance
program therefore created alarm in all business and labor groups.
Great quantities of small arms and ammunition had been produced
in this area which already had plants producing such materials when
the United States went into the war.
The Connecticut post-Armistice situation had been a matter of
continual concern. The Chief of the Small Arms and Ammunition
Section of the War Industries Board had submitted a memorandum
on November 23 to the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic,
the controlling cancellation agency of the War Department, in which
he carefully enumerated the problems of certain localities upon cessation
of war work, including the Connecticut area. He urged cooperation
between the regional representatives of the Army and the industries,
23
with a view to reducing the rate of deliveries and thus maintaining
employment while contractors returned to “ normal industry.” The
War Department felt that industry should itself take some initiative,
since it was plain that war production must cease.
There is every evidence that the contractors in the Connecticut
areas had been given the option to taper production gradually from
January 1, 1919, to May 1,1919, giving ample opportunity for gradual
release of workers. The appeal from the Connecticut Board of Media
tion and Cancellation was immediately followed by a long and urgent
telegram to the Secretary of War from the Governor of Connecticut
stating that—
War-contract suspensions are proceeding in Connecticut in an unreasonable
manner and at an alarming rate which jeopardizes our whole industrial organiza
tion affecting labor and capital alike. * * * Council of Defense and Employ
ment Service unite in recommending first that recent large cancellations * * *
be revoked for further consideration; second, that the curtailment program be
modified to extend over a longer period; third, in the case of important contracts,
manufacturers and Employment Service be given reasonable notice of proposed
suspensions to determine effect and make readjustment; fourth, that materials
under suspensions be released for commercial work and that future curtailments
be made after due consideration of possible effect.
The day following the release of this telegram the Clearance Officer
of the U. S. Employment Service made a separate presentation to the
War Department in which he stated that the Federal Employment
Director for Connecticut reported that: “ Accumulated cancellations
and suspensions, concerning which the Employment Service had no
advance notification, have thrown out of employment more than 4,000
persons in New Haven.” Further evidence of the lack of real coopera
tion between representatives of the War Department and those of the
Employment Service during this period is contained in the following
paragraph of this memorandum:
It was the understanding that the Employment Service would be kept imme
diately in touch with cancellations or curtailment. It was also the understanding
that cancellations or curtailment would be made with consideration of cancella
tions and curtailment already made in that district. This intent clearly is not
carried out if a large number of cancellations involving the release of a great
number of laborers are issued from the District Office at one time and without
notification to the Employment Service. (National Archives. War Department,
Purchase, Storage and Traffic File 164—Labor; from Sanford Freund to Assistant
Director, Dec. 20, 1918.)
These protests from various sources were passed along to cancella
tion officials in the War Department. One result was a memorandum
from the Chief of the Procurement Division, who admitted that there
were no statistics as to the number employed on war work in Bridge
port, and no information concerning the number who would be thrown
out of work through suspension of contracts. He stated that the
Ordnance Department was kept advised of labor conditions through
out the country and considered as carefully as possible the effect of
suspensions upon employment. He then said:
It has been forcibly suggested to the Department by Members of Congress
and Senators, that a good deal of the agitation in favor of continuing contracts
on account of the labor situation was clever propaganda on the part of the con
tractors who wish to continue to manufacture materials which the Government
does not need, simply for profit, and considerable pressure has been exerted to
force the suspension of contracts as rapidly as possible.
24
It was his judgment that it “ would have been greatly to the advan
tage of the Government if it had been possible to stop the work
immediately and to pay off the men, giving them 30 or 60 days7 extra
wages * * * for in this way the Government would have lost
only the cost of labor and would have saved vast quantities of good
material.” He drew attention to the abnormally increased popula
tion of Bridgeport, and stated that many of the workers would have
to leave the congested area and in many cases have to accept lower
wages.2
A few days later, the Assistant Secretary of War (the Director of
Munitions) wrote to General Goethals, the ranking cancellation officer,
urging that his office support the district offices in ascertaining the
degree to which manufacturers who had been allowed to spread pro
duction over a considerable period were adopting procedures which
“ would best serve the interests of all concerned. The question has
been raised, however, in some instances as to whether manufacturers
are in fact using this discretion in a way to secure the least possible
dislocation and hardship to labor.” He repeated his earlier urgent
recommendation that close cooperation with the Employment Service
be maintained “ so that the necessary steps can be taken for the ab
sorption of the labor employed.” 3
OHIO AREA
Ohio, too, was in difficulty. Cleveland, Toledo, and Dayton all
were receiving orders for ordnance cancellations or curtailment.
In addition, winter would bring seasonal idleness to many other
workers. There was a prospect that plants might remain closed for
“ at least 2 months because of lack of confidence in price of raw
material and lack of commercial orders and inability to procure raw
material.” Decrease in the rate of cancellation was urged. It was
certain that this Ohio area was due for serious unemployment.
Cancellation of contracts in many instances involved large labor
forces and millions of dollars on a single contract with a single firm.
Such situations are typified in the following telegram of December 19,
1918, from the Ohio office.of the Federal Employment Service regard
ing the unemployment imminent in that State.
We have received notice this week Cleveland ordnance division of cancellations
affecting 60 firms in Cleveland. We have 6 representatives interviewing firms
to ascertain number of employees that will be released. The following firms
claim that if work on contracts is stopped at once, that will make releases as
follows:
Cleveland Steel Products, 475 men, 60 women; Cleveland Hardware, 1,000
men, 200 women; Teplar Motor, 900 men, 100 women; Brown Hoisting Machine,
1,000 men; American Multigraph, 1,000 men, 1,400 women; McMyler Interstate,
1,400 men; Winton Motor, 1,200 men, 200 women; Cleveland Variety Iron Works,
250 men: Cleveland Tannery, 125 men; Browning Co., 100 men* Hydraulic
Pressed Steel, 650 men; McKinney Steel, 150 men; Cleveland Crane Engineering,
100 men; Cuyahoga Stamping, 200 men, 100 women; Cleveland Brass & Copper,
450 men; Damascus Brake Beam, 150 men; Ohio Trailer, 100 men; Lee C. Melville,
50 men.
A number of other firms interviewed will continue with present force on com
mercial work. Twenty-two firms, not yet interviewed, it is reported, will release
approximately 5,000 men. In addition to men released by cancellation of con
tracts, there are large numbers idle due to close of lake navigation season, and
about 2,000 men in building trades idle. Employment officers, despite careful
* National Archives. W ar Department, Purchase, Storage and Traffic File 164r—Connecticut: M em o
randum from Chief of Procurement Division, N ov. 21,1918.
* Idem , W ar Department, Purchase, Storage and Traffic File 164—Labor: M emorandum to General
Goethals from Benedict Crowell, Dec. 26,1918.
25
Inquiry, every day are unable to secure orders for any considerable number of
these unemployed workers, and report that large numbers are being turned away
from the plants. Majority of these thrown out through cancellation of war con
tracts from present prospects must remain unemployed for at least 2 months
because of lack of confidence in price of raw material, and lack of commercial
orders, and inability to procure material. Would suggest that you urge slowing
down of cancellation program. Any necessary investigation should be made
promptly as firms have been notified by Ordnance Department and are now start
ing to release men.
MICHIGAN AREA
The situation was similar in Michigan. There the district ordnance
branch informed the regional director of the Employment Service
“ that as their orders to cancel were final they could not see any
reason for discussing with us the advisability of cancelling or not
cancelling orders.” Possibly the district ordnance officers gave less
consideration to the labor situations arising from shut-down of plants
than had been contemplated by their superiors in Washington.
N E W JERSEY AREA
Organized labor and organized industry of the State of New Jersey
sent a joint appeal for modification of stoppage orders. They pro
posed the completion of all contracts where materials had already
been obtained unless the materials could be “ profitably diverted to
other immediate industrial use.” They referred to “ the order re
cently issued by the Government that manufacture of war supplies
must cease on January 31, 1919.” The War Department replied:
“ While it is necessary to discontinue the manufacture of war supplies
no longer needed and absolutely useless, every effort has been made
in directing such continuance to taper off in production activity to the
end that labor and industry may gradually shift from war to a peace
basis and unnecessary unemployment be avoided.”
BUFFALO, N. Y ., AREA
The effect of contract cancellations and the resulting threat of attend
ant unemployment are illustrated by the experience of the Curtis Air
plane Co. of Buffalo, which was one of the outstanding producers of
airplanes during that period. Up to the cessation of hostilities this
company, like thousands of others, was concentrating all of its energies
upon increasing output. After months of expanding effort, of in
creasing plant and equipment, and of meeting the problems of man
power shortage, the whole program collapsed almost overnight.
The Army, within 4 days after the Armistice, cancelled contracts
for planes valued at approximately 50 million dollars. The indica
tions were that the Navy and the Bureau of Aircraft Production
would also cancel or curtail, to the amount of 13 million dollars.
The company had, by November 15, dismissed about 7,000 women
and it was inevitable that a large number of other employees would
be dropped.
These early cancellations were for the finished product. During
December 1918 the company received almost 100 telegrams cancelling
or limiting production on parts such as bolts, nuts, screws, gaskets,
etc. In almost every case the telegram included the phrase, “ Incur
no further expense.” The resulting confusion and concern can be
imagined. Many of these cancellations affected the work of sub
contractors, many of them outside of the immediate Buffalo district.
26
During the last week in December the U. S. Employment Service
reported 10,000 unemployed in Buffalo, not including those laid off
for inventory. By the middle of January this number had increased
to 12,000 and the end was not yet in sight.
Conditions in Small Companies
It must not be forgotten that there were little firms, working on
subcontracts, that were scattered about the country in places where,
even though a comparatively small number of persons were thrown
out of work, the whole community suffered. A typical case was that
of a firm in Yonkers, N. Y., which had a prime contract with the
Signal Corps for 5,000 miles of outpost wire. A Boston firm had been
given a subcontract for making the cotton insulation tubes for this
wire. This Boston firm then subcontracted again for cotton braiding
for this insulation. What happened?
On November 27 the War Department received a telegram from the
Liberty Cotton Mills in Dallas, Ga., alarmed because of the cancella
tion of the Boston contract. Dallas is a small town not far from
Atlanta. The Liberty Cotton Mills provided employment for prac
tically all the industrial workers in the town. The telegram said,
“ Entire mill on this contract, and will throw 100 employees out of
work. There is no other work in this town they can do. Advise if you
cannot allow us to continue on this contract until we can secure other
business.”
The War Department asked the U. S. Employment Service to in
vestigate the labor situation at the Georgia plant, and sent the follow
ing telegram to the Liberty Cotton Mills:
Your telegram received. In connection with War Department contracts we
are doing our best to taper off production with due regard to the interests of
industry and. labor and in this connection are receiving the advice and assistance
of the War Industries Board and the Department of Labor. You will recognize
it is impossible for us to intervene in connection with subcontracts and subcon
tractors.
The gist of the War Department’s telegram was really contained in
the last sentence. The prime contractor m Yonkers had been notified
earlier to discontinue production after “ working up goods in process.”
What happened to the various subcontractors was his responsibility,
and the Government was relieved of all obligation for payment on
outstanding subcontracts or for the welfare of the workers.4
These situations, occurring in widely separated areas, have been
told in considerable detail since they are typical of the cross currents,
the misunderstandings, the honest efforts, and the various interests
which must be considered in any report of the situations which existed
in the crowded weeks following the Armistice.
P ublic and Other Reactions and Appraisals
In a guarded but fairly optimistic analysis of the business and
financial situation for December 1918, the Federal Reserve Board
said, in part:
In general, the transition from the war to the peace basis has thus far proceeded
with very considerable smoothness and with decided lack of friction. Such
4 National Archives.
W ar Department, Purchase, Storage and Traffic File 164.
27
slackening of business as has occurred is described as due to conservatism and
hesitation, the outcome of a desire on the part of producers to know more of
public policies and the probable trend of business.
Thus far the process of readjusting labor to the new conditions has caused but
little inconvenience or difficulty. Labor set free in war industries has been steadily
absorbed by general business, so that the principal effect thus far of the increasing
free supply has been merely that of relieving a previously existing shortage.
There is still an excess of demand at many points. In some places considerable
numbers of employees have been dropped, but of these a part were temporary
workers who had taken employment partly in order to aid war production,
while many others have been promptly reemployed. Costs have altered but little,
and the high expense of living has made employers feel that it was incumbent
upon them to maintain wages, so far as practicable, pending distinct revision of
prices for necessaries. In some cases it is reported that there is a tendency to a
"settling down” upon " a higher level of prices and a higher average of wages
than prevailed from some time preceding the war.”
In this connection it may be noted that the combined wholesaleprice indexes of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics remained un
changed throughout the last quarter of 1918. However, the retail
prices of cost-of-living items, which had moved steadily upward
throughout the year, advancing almost 12 percent between January
and December, continued their upward movement after the Armistice.
The Christian Science Monitor on December 2,1918, drew attention
to the profits which industrial companies had “ piled up” during the
war period and stated that these profits “ should enable them to go
through any ordinary period of depression.” It listed a range of
earnings per share for the 4 years ending December 31, for six of
the largest industrial companies. These ranged from $71.80 for
General Electric to $214.35 for General Chemical.
Although Congress was doing little to provide legislative authority
for aiding prospective unemployment, there was almost daily debate
on some phase of demobilization. Senator Chamberlain, a strong
supporter of the Administration, and Chairman of the Senate Military
Affairs Committee throughout the war, openly criticised the War
Department for its seeming lack of policy in the demobilization of the
Army and for inadequate publicity. He said that they “ had no policy
and they have not let the American people know what plans, if any,
they have, so that they may know how to govern themselves.”
As demobilization of the troops proceeded, the lack of authority
to expedite the transfer of the released servicemen out of the demobi
lization centers became an increasing problem. One expedient after
another was tried and the results received considerable publicity.
Soldiers were given in money the cost of transportation to their homes,
free to buy tickets wherever they pleased. Already they were
arriving in the cities, improvident, “ broke,” away from home without
work, applicants for civilian relief. It was not until February 1919—
too late to avoid an unfortunate situation— that the law providing
for travel allowance was changed to provide “ 5 cents per mile from
place of discharge to his actual bona fide home or residence, or original
muster into the service.”
So the year 1918 ended on a note of uncertainty, criticism, and
concern. The early months of 1919 were to be a difficult period for
the American people.
Part 3.— Employment Situation in 1919
Situation in W inter o f 1919
As the year 1919 opened, a sense of confusion and uncertainty per
vaded the country. The strong leadership that was needed was
lacking. The President was in Paris. He had delegated none of his
powers. His Cabinet, which had remained unchanged throughout
the war, was undergoing reorganization. The War Congress was now
in “ short session.” Its members were weary. Their wartime ac
complishments were almost obscured by the weight of post-war
problems, to the solution of which they had contributed little or
nothing.
The emergency war agencies were disintegrating. The War Indus
tries Board was already out of existence. In its last days it had
recommended the final withdrawal of industry from war contracts
not later than January 11, and announced as a policy of the Board
that there would be no further effort toward price control “ unless
extraordinary circumstances should arise.” The Price Fixing Com
mittee continued its activities where price agreements had not yet
expired. Most of the restrictions upon the prices and distribution of
food had been discontinued, and the Food Administrator was in
Europe organizing the work of the American Relief Administration.
More than 1,000,000 soldiers had been discharged, the majority of
whom had never left this country. The return of men from abroad
was not yet well under way. The aftermath of curtailment and can
cellation of war contracts was already in evidence. More than 6,000
firms scattered throughout the country were reporting labor conditions
each week to the Department of Labor. Employment, which had
been comparatively stable early in December, was now shifting toward
an oversupply of labor. Labor conditions as reported to the U. S.
Employment Service from 122 cities showed, for the first week in
January, that 22 percent of those cities still needed additional workers,
39 percent reported an oversupply, and the employment situation
was fairly well balanced in another 39 percent.
During the war the incomes of many wage-earner families had
doubled, tripled, and even quadrupled. Higher wage rates, longer
hours, extra pay for overtime, and a greater number of earners per
family had contributed to greatly increased purchasing power and led
to a false sense of security. Curtailment and suspension of Govern
ment work had meant an inevitable reduction in the working forces.
Immediately after the Armistice the Government cancelled Sunday
work and overtime on its projects. This made a sharp cut in family
income, even though the wage rate remained unchanged. For the
individual worker this frequently resulted in a reduction of as much
as 40 percent in his weekly pay; so even the wage earners who were
still employed felt, rightly or wrongly, a sense of injustice.
29
B y this time, in quarters where previously there had been little or
no concern regarding the post-war employment situation, there was
now alarm. The Journal of Commerce said on January 4—
There is an alarming growth of unemployment throughout the country which
has been aggravated by the fact that labor in many sections is disturbed by the
belief that it has been imposed upon in the settlement of wage adjustments and
other elements in the transition to a peace basis. Labor has the following very
well marked grounds of complaint:
(1) The repudiation by employers of agreements made before the Armistice to
abide by decisions of the Government in disputes then pending.
(2) Refusal of employers to pay back wages awarded by Government arbitra
tion tribunals.
(3) Suspension of war work without thought of ways to modify the hardships
inflicted upon labor by the operation.
(4) Effort to beat down wages without waiting for the reduction of living costs
by employees in different parts of the country.
(5) The general discharge of men to an extent not necessary.
At the present time labor has two distinct demands, a living wage and collective
bargaining. It has claimed that since the Armistice, employers have shown a
tendency to depart from the attitude of favoring collective bargaining.
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch urged governmental intervention:
“ It [the Government] can well afford millions to avoid having an
army of unemployed.” Congress, however, focused its attention on
retrenchment and economy.
The Federal Reserve Board which, like other spokesmen for the
Administration, had earlier maintained a note of optimism now took a
different attitude. In its report on business conditions for January
it said:
Practically throughout the country the month of January has been character
ized by the uncertainty incident to a period of transition in business. In some
cases more readjustment than had been expected has proved to be necessary.
Favorable developments which some had thought would present themselves
immediately after the Armistice with Germany have been delayed. There has
therefore been *‘hesitation” in business but no essential loss of confidence in the
future of the general situation.
Vast changes are now occurring in industry and extensive readjustment in
labor. * * * Labor is passing through a period of redistribution. De
mobilization is proceeding rapidly and is already liberating a considerable quantity
of men available for employment, while it is also bringing about a redistribution
of men, many deciding not to return to their original places of residence. On
the other hand, many employees are being set free in the so-called “ war indus
tries.” The process of absorbing the labor made available in these two ways,
into other lines is still relatively slow.
The general public blamed the obvious business inactivity upon
the cancellation of Government contracts, and the delay in making
cash settlements with contractors and in releasing materials. The in
creasing number of discharged servicemen appearing in areas where
there was already keen competition for the available jobs added to
the problem of absorption of workers. Reemployment, however,
was dependent upon the resumption of industrial output. There
was a ready demand for consumer goods and unprecedented purchas
ing power, but uncertainty as to the future price trend seriously
retarded renewed and confident activity.
The release of formal price controls left prices at the high level
which had been maintained in order to obtain maximum output from
all classes of producers. The cost of living, already more than 60
percent above the pre-war level, continued slowly upward.
5 8 9 9 6 6 °—
-5
30
The possible results of lack of a strong Government readjustment
policy had been recognized early:
* * * During the period of reconstruction following the war, if prices
should continue to rise, there will be further adjustments of wages on the basis of
rising prices. If, on the other hand, prices fall, it is certainly very desirable
that wages should not fall more than prices. In either event the changing cost
of living will be a prime factor in determining wages, and during the period of
reconstruction, social and industrial conditions are likely to be such as to need
the guiding hand of a strong public policy. Such a public policy must surely
consider the standard of living in any directing or control it may employ on the
course of wages. (A Reconstruction Labor Policy, in The Annals of the American
Academy of Political Science, January 1919, pp. 110-111.)
During the same period one of the members of the Federal Reserve
Board stated the situation in somewhat different terms:
Of all the financial difficulties confronting the country at the close of the war,
the price situation is, in a business way, the most serious and the one calling for
the most immediate attention. * * * The more far-sighted American com
munities are looking ahead to the falling of prices as something that is inevitable.
* * * We need give little attention to artificial methods of “ taking up the
slack” in the labor market, and otherwise stabilizing industrial conditions, if we
take promptly the solutic > of the price situation.
There was general acceptance of the inevitability of a price decline.
However, it was stabilization— the removal of uncertainty— that was
needed as a stimulus to production.
If the exercise of governmental authority in maintaining price
stability was unquestioned and desirable for gearing industry to war
needs, it was fully as necessary during the months of transition to
peacetime pursuits. In the absence of such support, industries
(with few exceptions) waited, alert but inactive. None wanted to
incur high production costs and later be forced to sell on a falling
market.
While they waited unemployment increased. Strikes became
prevalent from coast to coast. Representatives of industry, who
had earlier been loath to acknowledge their difficulties, were now
openly concerned. At last the Government itself officially recognized
that there “ existed an abnormal situation in the industrial world”
and that “ unemployment was increasing at such a rate as to challenge
the best thought that could be given to the situation.”
With the approval of the President, and the agreement of Cabinet
officers and others in high positions, it was announced early in Febru
ary by the Secretary of Commerce that conferences were to be held
with different industry groups in an attempt to reach informal price
agreements at levels commensurate with production costs. Thus
there was organized the Price Conference Board of the Department
of Commerce. “ The object of the Board is to aid in setting the wheels
of industry in motion by securing price adjustments that will create
confidence in the stability of prices so determined, and so stimulate
buying.” 1 To accomplish this it was proposed that the Government
itself, through such agencies as the Railroad Administration and the
Emergency Fleet Corporation, should go into the market to purchase
at the price agreed upon and thus establish the confidence so much
needed on the part of private purchasers.
Iron and steel prices were first considered, but without result.
Where there should have been unity there was disunity. Irreconcil
1 National A rchives.
Confidential Keport of Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, March 1,1919.
31
able differences as to what constituted a fair price level prolonged the
discussions for almost 2 months. The members of the Board resigned
early in May, having accomplished nothing. During these weeks of
disagreement, industry was making some progress and a more opti
mistic note pervaded the trade journals. The demands of the striking
workers were being granted in varying degrees, and in most areas some
idle labor was being absorbed.
The present study shows the effect of all these forces upon the
civilian workers and upon demobilized soldiers.
E ffect o f Unplanned Dem obilization
Upon Civilian W orkers
The war of 1914-18 brought great changes in the manufacturing and
distributing industries of the United States. Even before this country
entered the conflict many American industries had accepted contracts
from the European nations at war, and when the United States became
a participant the whole American economy felt the impact of wartime
demands. The changing pattern of industrial activity varied from
industry to industry and from place to place, and great shifts in the
distribution of manpower accompanied these changes.
The estimated changes in employment from 1914 through 1921,
and the approximate percentage of the working population employed,
are shown in table 1. It covers the years when industry was filling
European contracts, extends through the period of American participa
tion in the war, and into the post-war period. It goes beyond the
months which are reviewed in this report, for the ultimate effects of
unplanned demobilization were not felt until 1921, when the results
of the delayed release of dammed-up purchasing power and unregulated
return to civilian production was brought home to the American people.
T able
1.— Population
and Em ploym ent in the United States, 1 9 1 4 -2 1 1
Year
1914.........................................................................
1915.....................................................................
1916.........................................................................
1917........................................................................
1918...........................................................- ............
1919.........................................................................
1920.........................................................................
1921................................... ............................... .
Population, ages 15-64, Employment, including Percent
as of July 1
em
the armed forces
ployed,
ages
15-64,
Percent of
Percent of
Number.* total
N um ber
popula excluding
pop
(in thousands) ulation (in thousands) tion, ages armed
15-64
forces
63,213
64,103
64,974
65,751
66,125
66,648
67,743
69,039
64.6
64.5
64.5
64.4
63.8
63.5
63.5
63.7
37,731
37,890
40,293
44,066
47,957
42,444
41,656
38,006
59.7
59.1
62.0
67.0
72.5
63.7
61.5
55.1
59.4
58.9
61.8
64.9
66.8
63.1
61.0
54.6
1 Compiled b y Bureau's Occupational Outlook Division from Econom ic Record (National Industrial
Conference Board), M a y 20,1940.
8 Intercensal years estimated on a straight m onthly interpolation.
industry’ s problems of reconversion
There was marked diversity among industries in the character of
the war work which they did for the Government and in the changes
which Government requirements made in their factories and plants.
This explains in part some of the local and regional differences in labor
conditions and in unemployment after the war. A brief review of the
32
major differences in industrial wartime activities should prove helpful
in assaying post-war situations.
Some industries made little or no change in plant equipment in
order to do Government work, although they frequently expanded their
facilities and employed thousands of additional workers, in continuous
operation. Textile mills, shoe factories, food-processing plants, and
some of the firearms factories fell within this class. For them the
post-war problem was one of contraction rather than reconversion.
Other large industries, with huge Government contracts, had only
partially converted their plants to war work at the time of the Armis
tice. Some of these benefited materially from their wartime experi
ence and, with peacetime products greatly in demand, were among the
first to recover. The automobile and agricultural-implement industries
were in this category.
Many industries were before the war manufacturing so-called nonessential products. A large number of these were entirely converted
to war production. For them reconversion required an appreciable
amount of time. It was necessary to remove Government-owned
equipment and to set the plants in order for production of civilian
goods. Some were hampered by lack of capital because of the Gov
ernments delay in settling claims. Many had to recapture their
markets and reorganize their dismantled sales departments. Although
no single one of these plants may have employed as many workers as
did those industries in mass production, the combined number of
workers released by these smaller plants after the Armistice was con
siderable.
Other industries, still in the experimental stage of developing their
products, had forged ahead on the wave of tremendous Government
demands. The aircraft industry was one of these, and although its
post-war retrenchments were not easy, it gained technically from its
wartime experience. The coal-tar industries also belonged in this
class. They profited immeasurably from the development of their
wartime products and from access to German patents which greatly
expedited their post-war growth.
For some essential wartime products it was necessary to establish
entirely new communities. Explosives and ammunition were in this
group. The products themselves had little or no peacetime use, and
even though some of the plant facilities might have been converted to
civilian use their location was seldom suited to economical production.
Most of these communities were bound to disappear.
The construction industry had been busy in erecting new industrial
plants, in providing living quarters for war workers, and in construct
ing the army cantonments. Wherever new communities were estab»
lished, trade and service industries had sprung up.
Another industry which had expanded enormously during the war,
though not a so-called war industry, was shipbuilding. It employed
tens of thousands of workers on both the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts,
and during the first 6 months of 1919 when other Government projects
were contracting, it absorbed large numbers of civilian workers and
ex-servicemen. No reconversion was possible for this industry. When
the Government abandoned its shipbuilding program, the yards closed
down.
For every factory or plant manufacturing finished products, there
were a great many subsidiary plants providing semimanufactured
33
material or parts. Some of these were in the vicinities of the plants
of the prime contractors, some were hundreds of miles away. Rawmaterial requirements extended to the ore and fuel mines; to smelters,
furnaces, and rolling mills; to farms, forests, logging camps, and saw
mills.
The Government had been the Nation's biggest employer and when
it retired from the market only the most carefully developed work
program, supported by this same Government, could prevent great
pools of unemployment, for no post-war plan could check the release
of thousands of workers from factories whose products were no longer
needed. Even though the War Department tried to temper the effect
of contract cancellation, it was inevitable that production would cease
promptly if not abruptly in some areas.
Only plants producing goods suitable for civilian use could be
expected to continue production, and not even for these industries
had a change-over program been developed. Even those which could
most readily reestablish themselves must obtain raw materials, build
up their civilian markets, and reduce their labor force materially.
Some industries needed capital. All of them needed a well-grounded
confidence in the future. Many of the large and powerful low-cost
manufacturers of producer goods could have contributed greatly at
this trying period, if, soon after the Armistice, they had come to
terms with their customers, the manufacturers of consumer goods.
This they did not do.
So the events of the months immediately following the Armistice
provide a record of problems confronting human beings. The results
of the strain of continued uncertainty, both upon the workers and
upon the heads of many industries, cannot be encompassed in so
limited a study as this. However, some of the highlights of the
employment situation may contribute somewhat to the current
attempts to provide more adequately for the present immediate post
war period after this war.
UNEM PLOYM ENT
S IT U A T IO N
IN
THE
S P R IN G O F
1919
Cities in the areas which had War Department contracts reported
increasing unemployment week by week throughout the first quarter
of 1919. The War Department stated in its statistical report of
January 4 that most of the unemployment to date was due to cancella
tion of war contracts. The U. S. Employment Service reported on
January 182 that “ the apparent absence of any considerable supply
of unskilled labor and predominance of skilled labor in the cities
reporting surplus makes it probable that the resumption of normal
industry might be awaited to arrest growing unemployment and that
public buildings and works as a means of furnishing employment may
be limited by absence of ‘common labor' seeking employment."
The following table shows, as of March 1, 1919, the number of
workers thrown out of employment by cancellation of War Depart
ment contracts, affecting 3,180 contractors. There were States in
which no contracts had been cancelled and there were firms which had
released no labor upon cancellation. Although the table does not
include all firms whose contracts had been cancelled, it does provide*
* The Service received reports from more than 100 cities representing all areas of the country until it was
compelled to curtail its activities because of lack of Congressional support.
34
a basis for comparing the relative effects of cancellation in the various
regional areas. The States are shown in descending order of number
of workers released.
T a ble 2 .— Workers Unemployed on March 2, 1919 , Because o f Cancellations o f W ar
Department Contracts1
State
Firms
reporting—
Total
number
of firms
report N o la Labor
bor re
re
ing
leased leased
Workers released
Tota 1
M en
Number
W om en
Percent
Total............................................... .
3.180
1,901
1,279
359,897
100.0
343,740
16,157
Connecticut-............................... —.
M ichigan..... .....................................
N ew Jersey..... .................................
O hio..................................................
Pennsylvania.................................
Massachusetts.................................
199
261
287
427
639
156
121
101
134
268
427
57
78
160
153
159
212
99
55.926
50, 270
50,050
42,727
42, 691
33, 700
15.5
13.9
13.9
11.9
11.9
9.4
49,436
49,225
49,940
38,281
42,328
33,556
6,490
1,045
110
4,446
363
144
Illinois........... ................................
M a ry lan d .._______ _____________
N ew Y ork ______ _______________
M issouri..........................................
Indiana_________________________
M innesota______________________
233
88
42
100
42
58
36
145
13
16
45
44
15
24,505
15, 236
8,515
8,465
7,891
4, 506
6.8
4.2
2.4
2.3
2.2
1.2
22,151
15, 236
8,515
7,955
7,891
4, 506
2,354
116
87
1C2
51
A rkansas_______________________
D ela w a re______________________
W isconsin.............................. ..........
Tennessee_______________________
Virginia________________________
A ll others.........................................
5
16
99
29
29
389
2
7
65
23
20
310
3
9
34
6
9
79
3, 295
3,100
2,614
1,650
1,499
3,257
1.0
.9
.7
.5
.4
.9
3,295
3,100
1,949
1,650
1,499
3,227
55
51 a
665
30*
i From Labor and Industrial Situation, Mar. 1, 1919, reported b y Central Bureau of Planning and
Statistics.
The peak of unemployment for the country as a whole was reached
in the latter part of March. There were some States, chiefly in the
southeast, and all of them in the southern areas, where workers were
in demand throughout this period of general surplus. The shipyards
on the Atlantic Coast from Philadelphia south were on the lookout
for additional labor. The agricultural regions were desperately in
need of help, but, unfortunately, workers from the crowded industrial
areas as well as returned soldiers were averse to accepting jobs on
farms.
The map which is presented here shows the areas of labor surplus
and shortage as of March 1, 1919.
Added interest and significance is given to the surplus-labor areas
by tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows for 75 cities the surplus labor re
ported as of March 15, 1919.
36
T a ble 3.— Surplus Labor Reported from 75 Cities, M arch 15, 1919
Number
of surplus
workers
Region and city
A ll cities reporting............................
371, 340
N ew England....................................
Connecticut: New Haven........
Bridgeport..........
Hartford.............
M eriden..............
N orwich..............
D erb y_________
Stafford Springs.
S tam ford...........
M iddletow n___
N ew London___
Putnam ..............
Maine: Portland....... ...............
Massachusetts: Worcester-----Boston______
L yn n...............
M iddle Atlantic...............................
N ew Jersey: N ewark................
Paterson..............
Jersey C ity _____
C am d en ..............
Elizabeth.............
Trenton................
Passaic--------------New Brunswick.
N ew York: Buffalo— .............
A lb a n y .................
Rochester___ ____
Syracuse.................
U tica. ....................
K ingston...............
Bingham ton..........
Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh----Philadelphia...
Erie__________
Harrisburg___
Allentown____
Scranton_____
South Atlantic____________ ______
Delaware: W ilm ington---------Florida: Pensacola....................
38,895
8,000
7,000
3,000
2,600
1,400
900
420
400
350
250
75
1,000
6,500
5,700
1,300
104, 250
6,200
5.000
4.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
700
150
20,000
6, 500
5.000
5.000
3.000
1, 500
500
17,500
7,000
5,100
3.900
2, 500
1,700
7.900
2,000
800
Num ber
of surplus
workers
Region and city
South Atlantic—Continued.
Ornr^ia* Savannah
Virginia: R ich m o n d .______ _______
West Virginia: Wheeling....................
East North Central.....................................
Illinois: Rockford.................................
J o lie t ......................................
Indiana: Indianapolis______ _______
Evansville.............................
G ary...... ................................
Fnrt W ayne
___
___
H am m ond.... _
South B e n d ........................
Terre H aute..........................
Michigan: D etroit........ .......................
Grand R apids...................
Port H uron........................
Ohio: Cleveland. . . . . . . .
___
Dayton
_
.......
Youngstown.
___
Toledo
Akron___________ ____ ______
Cincinnati
Colum bus...... ................. ..........
Wisconsin: Milwaukee
Racine. ............................
Superior. ....................
West North C entral.. .............................
Kansas: Kansas C ity ______________
Minnesota: Minneapolis___________
D u lu th
N eb ra sk a : O m a h a ...
M ountain______________________________
C o lo r a d o : D e n v e r .
_
. . ...
_____
Montana: Butte___________ _______
Utah: Salt Lake C it y .........................
Pacific_________________ _______________
California: San Francisco__________
L o s A n g e l e s ______ ______ ___
Oakland_______________
Oregon: P ortland__________________
Washington: Seattle............................
1,600
1,500
2,000
145,895
870
650
4,500
1,500
600
500
500
400
400
23,000
800
400
60,000
10,000
9,000
7.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
14,400
1,500
875
11,200
2,200
7,500
1,000
500
15,400
400
10,000
5,000
47,800
12,300
9,000
7,500
9,000
10,000
The changes in employment in 55 industrial cities between Decem
ber 1918 and March 15, 1919, as reported to and by the Employment
Service, are shown in table 4.
All 55 cities.............. 3,897 1,969,526 1,816,226 - 9 . 2
New England (12
cities)___________
Portland, M a in e ...
Manchester, N .H ._
Bridgeport, C on n ..
Hartford, C onn___
N ew B rita in,
C onn_____ _____
N ew H a v e n ,
C o n n ...................
N ew L o n d o n ,
C onn........ ...........
Boston, M ass..........
595
85
14
94
38
417,301
2 12,105
24,566
55,243
34,472
860,241
10,271
21,952
41,716
30,032
-1 3 .4
-1 5 .2
-1 0 .6
-2 4 .5
-1 2 .9
36
25,427
25,536
+ .4
36
40,042
26,050 -3 4 .0
26
149
9,102
123,117
10,270 +12.8
119,198j - 3 . 2
See footnotes at end of table.
New England—Con.
Brockton, Mass___
Fall River, M a ss...
Lawrence, Mass___
Worcester, M a s s ...
Middle Atlantic (9
cities).................. .
Albany, N. Y _____
New York, N . Y . . .
Elizabeth, N . J.......
Newark, N. J ..........
Passaic, N . J...........
Paterson, N . J ........
Week ending—
Mar. 15,
19191
Percent of change
N ov. 30, Mar. 15,
19181
19191
Region and city
Num ber of em
ployees reported
gS
OO*
W eek ending—
Number of firms
reporting
N um ber of em
ployees reported
Percent of change
Region and city
Num ber of firms
reporting
T a ble 4.— Changes in Em ploym ent in 55 Industrial Cities, December 1918 to March 1919
20
15
26
56
15,560
11,116
34,980
31,571
16.532 + 6 .2
10,234 - 7 . 9
23,034 -3 4 .2
25,4161-19.5
641
95
200
25
113
35
50
583,455
64,511
* 93,847
20,132
280,933
26,073
30,590
516,970 1—11.4
56,626 -1 2 .2
86,309: - 8 . 0
20,761 + 3 .1
77,4841 - 4 .3
20,030 -2 3 .2
21,983 -2 8 .1
37
T a b le 4.— Changes in Em ploym ent in 55 Industrial Cities, December 1918 to March
Middle Atlantic—
Continued
Allento wn-S o u t h
11
Bethlehem, P a ...
12
Harrisburg, P a____
100
Philadelphia, P a South Atlantic and
South Central (9
543
cities)....................
Richmond, V a........
100
85
Louisville, K y ........
33
Wilmington, N . C .
W in s t o n -S a le m ,
31
N . C ......................
Memphis, Tenn___ 110
12
Savannah, Ga_____
28
Pensacola, Fla........
Dallas, T ex..............
50
94
Houston, T ex..........
Midwest and North
Central (20 cities). 1,387
R ock Island 111.......
56
Hammond, In d ___
20
48
Indianapolis, In d —
South Bend, In d —
16
Terre Haute, Ind —
23
N um ber of em
ployees reported
W eek ending—
N ov. 30, M ar. 15,
19191
19181
Percent of change
Region and city
Number of firms
reporting
1919—Continued
36,412
22,002
208,955
21,274 -4 1 .6
17,498 -2 0 .5
195,005 - 6 .7
127,374
3 24,889
24,291
6,674
121,155
21,918
23,540
7,447
- 4 .9
-1 1 .9
- 3 .1
+11.6
18,612
11,632
6,419
6,404
6,482
21,971
17,259
10,437
4,813
6,723
6,179
22,839
- 7 .3
-1 0 .3
-2 5 .0
+ 5.0
-4 .7
+ 3 .9
719,556
30,042
24,876
18,120
15,889
9,803
705,914
24,789
20,777
20,226
15,986
9,103
- 1 .9
-1 7 .5
-1 6 .5
+11.6
+ .6
-7 .7
i Unless otherwise indicated.
3December 21.
i*3*December 7.
* February 8.
N um ber of em
ployees reported
£ 2?
wS
Region and city
Midwest and North
Central—Con.
Kansas City, M o
st. Louis, M o .........
Detroit, M ich.........
Flint, M ich .........
Port Huron, M ich .
Akron, O h io ..........
Cincinnati, O h io ...
Cleveland, Ohio___
Columbus, O h io ...
Dayton, O h io.........
Youngstown, Ohio.
Omaha, N ebr..........
M i n n e a p o li s ,
M in n ....................
St. Paul, M in n ____
Milwaukee, W i s .. .
Far West (5 cities)..
Los Angeles, C alif..
S an F r a n c is c o ,
C a lif...................
Portland, Oreg........
Butte, M o n t ..........
Salt Lake City,
Utah......................
r
W eek ending—
!
©
©
I I
N ov. 30, Mar. 15,
19181
19191
i
Ph
97
10,281
10,838 + 5 .4
101 344,086
40,245 - 8 . 7
100 <120,267 *138,039 +14.8
25 3 17,727
24,136 +36.2
31
3 5,423
3,449 -3 6 .4
74 3 46,483
55,018 +18.4
97 2 37,096
34,137 - 8 .0
165
99,681 « 87,386 -1 2 .3
98 325,111
25,020 - . 4
96 232,923
30,300 - 8 . 0
57 2 49,311
44,037 -1 0 .7
34
13,396
14,973 +11.8
50
37
162
23,884
13,219
81,948
19,451 -1 8 .6
12,233 - 7 .4
75,771 - 7 .5
231
99
121,840
37,432
111,946 - 8 .1
37,855 + 1.1
26
43
7
24,513
34,002
717,366
20,812 -1 5 .1
33,348 - 1 .9
14,289 -1 7 .7
56
8,527
5,642 -3 3 .9
5*March 1.
3 February 22.
7January 11.
REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE POST-WAR PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT
The high concentration of wartime production in big industrial
areas was the forerunner of concentrated unemployment in these
same areas when industry was faced with the task of changing over
from the abnormal conditions of wartime to the usual activities of
production of civilian goods.
The major factors which contributed to the size of this problem and
to the lapse of time required to make the necessary adjustments have
already been discussed. There were in most of these areas more
workers than could be absorbed in peacetime production. Many of
the manufacturers of war materials were in a position to wait until the
decisions had been made which would make their future operations
profitable. For other industries the situation was much more difficult;
without sufficient capital and with only meager supplies of raw ma
terials, many of them were obliged to greatly curtail their programs.
The workers, having experienced improved living standards, were
loath to return to pre-war wages and hours, and used their only
method of organized protest— the strike.
The tables in the following pages show, for each regional area, (a)
the relative size of the employment problem between December 1918
and June 1919, as reported by the U. S. Employment Service, in terms
of labor shortages and labor surpluses, and (b) the trades and occupa
tions which were most affected by the unsettled post-war industrial
situation. In general, absence of figures in the columns indicates
that there was no substantial change in the labor-market situation.
38
N ew England Area
Munitions factories and their subsidiaries in Connecticut and to
some extent in Massachusetts were among those which first felt the
heavy impact of War Department contract cancellations. The textile
mills and shoe factories, too, reduced their forces and joined in the
general “ waiting” period for the resumption of business. Not all
factories working on Government orders released the workers at once,
but many of them did not take advantage of the option to continue their
work on contracts at a reduced rate, over a period of from 60 to 90
days.
Connecticut was then, as now, one of the principal centers for manu
facture of arms and munitions. The reductions in employment oc
curred almost altogether in the iron and steel industries. The most
striking unemployment was reported from Bridgeport and New Haven,
among machine-tool hands— employees from the rifle plants. These
cities had employed thousands of workers from outside the immediate
vicinity and until the majority of these transients disappeared the
problem of absorption of surplus workers remained difficult. Some
mills closed, others curtailed, all were seriously affected. Only here
and there were there early signs of recovery in this area, and it was not
until May and June that general recovery became evident.
The radical curtailment of textile output released tens of thousands
of mill workers, many of whom could not be absorbed at the level of
peacetime production. Mills ran on part time while they reorganized
and built up their markets. By March 1 there was great unemploy
ment in almost every textile city; almost 10,000 were idle in Fall
River alone. In Lowell five of the seven big cotton mills were on part
time, and similar conditions prevailed in Maine and Connecticut.
The situation seems to have been handled a little better in New Hamp
shire. The U. S. Employment Service reported applications for work
from more than 20,000 New England textile workers during February
and more than 14,000 during March.
There was great unrest among the workers and unprecedented
strikes followed, the most conspicuous being the Lawrence strike
which lasted from February to May and involved about 20,000
workers. Many of the textile strikes were settled by late March.
By April 15 there were definite signs of improvement and by M ay
there was a shortage of workers in the textile industry. The crisis
had lasted for 6 months after the Armistice, although the textile
industry was one which should have presented a relatively small
post-war problem.
The shoe industry, waiting for orders from conservative buyers,
also went on part time, and strikes resulted. In Brockton, Mass.,
alone, 13,000 wage earners were affected.
As Government projects were completed, the situation in the
building trades went from bad to worse. The construction industry
in New England is always inactive during the winter season. How
ever, during the spring and well into May and June there was little
sign of activity in either residential or industrial construction. Again
the workers voiced their dissatisfaction by striking.
There was general unrest among other workers. Strikes occurred
among the waterfront workers, taxicab drivers, fur workers, telephone
operators, fishermen, and electrical workers.
39
Only the cities manufacturing luxury goods, chiefly silverware and
jewelry, reported shortages of labor.
T a b l e 5.— Em ploym ent Situation in N ew England Area , December 1 9 1 8 -June 1919 i
[Figures given in table represent surpluses of labor, unless otherwise noted]
T a ble 6.— Trend o f Em ploym ent in N ew England Area , as Indicated b y Placement
Statistics, February-June 1919
Match
February
Occupation
77
1,627
2,030
165
4,831
9,707
1,939
Mfir.hine-t.nnl hand*? _
,r
_ 6,519
8hip workers
112
Shoe workers.. __________________ 2,482
Textile w ork ers............................... 20,438
Woodsmen
.
____
40
708 43,618
2
18
21
14
14
104
134
1,817
3,085
213
6,942
4,722
1,340
9,401
95
381
150 14,539
325
8
36
i Totals include some occupations not shown.
* Includes chauffeurs, truck drivers, and salesmen.
M ay
June
Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi
cants tions cants tions cants tions cants tions cants tions
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
aided filled aided filled aided filled aided filled aided filled
All reported occupations 1 ______ 50,496
Agricultural workers........................
Clerical and professional..................
Construction workers......................
Hotel and restaurant employees—
Laborers.............................................
Metal-trades workers....... ...............
Miscellaneous.................. - ________
April
256 26,184
3
3
16
109
154
595
1,475
85
2,467
1,820
73
1,531
137
725
105 16,034
15
164 30,965
5
1
15
12
4
112
48
369
1,978
118
1,567
3,162
1715
1,065
87
18,861
3 2,507
9
286 34,507
59
10
9
12
128
15
153
348
474
147
496
2,801
*1,772
510
58
2,529
4 25,002
1,485
56
407
60
429
113
170
165
23
40
M iddle Atlantic Area
The post-war industrial situation in the States and cities of this area
reflected conditions throughout the country. Almost every type of
industry operated in these States, and great readjustments were nec
essary when work for the Government ceased.
The arms factories, munitions, and aircraft plants were the first to
feel the effect of contract cancellation. Pools of unemployment ap
peared in these cities even before the turn of the year, and the iron
and steel industry in the big producing centers began to release
workers. The Pittsburgh situation, which could be duplicated in
other iron and steel centers, was reported as follows:
In a little over a month the labor situation has reversed itself and at present
there seems to be a larger supply of labor than can find steady work. There are
reports of men applying for work at lower wages * * * and being turned
away. If this continues it may reach the point shortly where labor will agree to
work for much less than present rates, rather than remain idle. * * * Opinion
is that the present quiet conditions are likely to last over the next 3 or 4 months,
but with the return of favorable weather, allowing outside operations again, a
material increase in the demand for steel is expected.
Mills point to the present high costs as the reason for not being able to grant
lower prices. Unless demand soon improves there is bound to be a further slow
ing down * * * and if there is any material decline in prices, some companies
state that they will simply close down until labor and other things come down
to the point that will allow them to compete. The outlook is for a quiet condition
in the steel trade at least until April. (U. S. Employment Service Report for
week ended January 18, 1919.)
It was reported in the trade that steel executives expected little
difficulty in putting wage reductions into effect when it became
necessary.
The textile strikes in Paterson and Passaic and other New Jersey
cities included all branches of the textile industry. Referring to the
Paterson strike, the Journal of Commerce said on January 24, “ Be
cause of the general lack of business some mills are not averse to the
strike, as it would greatly lower overhead.” Employers and em
ployees alike recognized the seriousness of the situation, but the
strikes continued week after week. The differences were finally
submitted to the War Labor Board, but it was not until April that
the Board’s efforts brought partial peace.
In Philadelphia the early phases of industrial demobilization differed
from other cities in the area, owing to the growing importance of the
big Hog Island shipyards south of the city, where workers were in
great demand. By February, however, unemployment in other
industries outweighed the shortages in the shipyards, as the big
munitions plants, the textile mills, and the factories manufacturing
leather products all reduced their forces. The situation changed so
rapidly that it was impossible to estimate the amount of unemploy
ment.
41
T ab le 7.— Em ploym ent Situation in M iddle Atlantic Area , December 1918-J u n e 1919
[Figures given in table represent surpluses of labor, unless otherwise noted.
N ew Jersey
Pennsylvania
Date
Phila
delphia
1918
Dec.
7
14
28
1919
Jan.
Feb.
4
18
1
-
6,000
22
1
8
15
22
-5 ,0 0 0
-5 ,0 0 0
-4 ,2 0 0
8,000
(«
(*:
Newark
Paterson
(1
2)
<*>
(5)
-3 ,7 0 0 Surpluses .
Unsettled.
Strikes.
480 mills affected.
85 percent of workers
returned.
Surpluses.......... .
11,000 2,800 -3 ,5 0 0
8
15
Mar.
Scran
Pitts
burgh Erie1 ton
—25,000 -5 ,0 0 0
-15,000 -4 ,0 0 0
-7 ,5 0 0
(’)
Shortage shown b y minus ( —)]
18,000 on strike-
3,000 -2 ,5 0 0
19,000 4.100
1,000
4,300
3,500
4,400
7,000 10,000 5.100
17,000 5.100
5,500
1,500
6,350—
6,600—
1,600 6, 200—
1,700 7,000—
l,i
Strikes.
29
Apr. 5
W oolen strike adjusted—
Conciliators unable to ad
just handkerchief strike
after 7 weeks.
(
12
15.000
19
26
M ay 10
24
June 7
5,000.
5,000*:
20.000
Is, 000
N ew York
Date
Buffalo
R o
ches
ter
A l
bany
dis
trict
Syra
cuse
Utica
N ew Y ork City
1918
Dec.
7
14
21
28
3,000................................................
8,000 .............................................
1,500
2,000
10/100
1,800
3.000
12,000 .............................................
13,000..........................................—
15,000...............................................
17,000............. ...............................
2,000
2,500
3.000
4.000
4.000
1919
Jan.
4
11
18
25
Feb. 1
8
15
Mar.
22
19,000 .................................*..........
20,000 .................................... ........
20,000.................— ........................
15
•9,500
4,500
2,000
5,500
5,800
5.000
5.000
2,500
5,000
6,000
6,500
5,000
{ 4,800
\Retail merchants urging public |4,500
29 / works.
5 Police fear violence___ ________
22
Apr.
12
19
26
M ay 3
8,500............................. ..................
8,200........... ...................................-
10
17
24
31
June 7
14
3,500
3.000
3.000
3,000
6,000........... .............- .....................
5,000 ............................................... 2,800
3,000
................................... 2,000
1,000........... .................................... 1,500
21
35,000 garment workers strike.
increasing.
2,550
1
8 j-20,00(^—A ll occupations affected .
4.000
3.000
5.000
worse.
3,050 jl3 strikes in clothing trade.
3,500 1,500 Brooklyn shoe workers
out.
3,325
Strikes.
5,000
5.000
5.000
5,500
4,500
5.000
5.000
5.000
2,400
3,200
2,500
2,000
Strikes.
125,000-200,000.
1.500
1.500
500
200
100, 000.
100, 000.
100, 000.
100, 000.
1 Machinists in General Electric went out on strike in December. Case referred to W ar Labor Board in
January. In March more than 1,300 employees of the D . L . & W . Railroad struck, following the discharge
of a machinist b y an efficiency foreman; late in April the strikers obtained their demands and resumed work.
* Balanced labor supply.
3*Shortages of miners.
* Small surpluses.
3 Shortages: Com m on labor, 3,000; miners, 4,000; textile workers, 1,000.
6Let out of arms factories.
42
T able 8.— Trend o f Em ploym ent in M iddle Atlantic A rea , as Indicated b y Placement
Statistics, February, March , ami June 1919
M arch
February
Occupation
June
Appli Positions Appli P ositions Appli P ositions
cants
cants
cants
unaided unfilled unaided unfilled unaided unfilled
All report,p.ri occupations!
9,872
A gTi'enltnral workers
____ _ _
(Tlerical and professional _ _ .
fJonstrnction workers
___
Hotel and restaurant employees__________
Laborers
____ _________________ _____
M etal -trad es workers
Miscellaneous___
81
3,530
1,844
34
1,781
1,259
96
Machine-tool hands .
Ship workers
___
Coal miners
■Engineers and firemen _
^ ......
Woodworkers ________________________
750
9
187
95
13,235
402
693
200
637
135
70
111
10,600
4
324
17,892
213
2,927
2,202
8,411
1,888
423
825
96
339
30
6,398
75
726
993
2,609
% 520
55
1,115
96
20
450
200
*2,823
15
550
135
85
2,631
64
370
3,197
39
18
286
1 Totals include some occupations not shown.
2 Includes chauffeurs, teamsters, and salesmen.
New York City.— New York City, which had not been so deeply
immersed in wartime activities as other cities in this area, became the
center of great unrest and industrial strife after the war. Trouble
began in January, when the strike of the harbor workers halted
transportation and threatened the city’s food supply. Although the
strikers returned to work at the request of the President and agreed
to submit to arbitration through the War Labor Board, the con
troversy continued throughout the winter and spring. Late in
January the garment workers had also gone out on strike, and at one
time as many as 55,000 workers were idle. Their demand for a 44hour week was finally granted, but only after weeks of conference
and controversy. Other strikes occurred during this period which
included those of the street-railway workers, candy makers, shoe
workers, building-trades men, brewers, barbers, and paper-mill
workers. The magnitude of the unemployment problem, the bitter
ness and open conflicts which accompanied the strikes prevailing
throughout the winter and spring of 1919, resulted in Nation-wide
publicity. It was estimated that discharged servicemen constituted
25 percent of the unemployed, which in March approximated 100,000.
Federal and State officials and public-spirited citizens worked to
bring industrial peace to the city. Although late in March the Em
ployment Service reported that there was “ evidence of more willing
ness to confer and conciliate,” the unrest continued throughout the
spring. B y the end of June, the general industrial situation had
improved and the Employment Service reported that industrial
relations were “ good,” but there still were 100,000 “ surplus” workers.
43
South Atlantic and South Central Areas
In the Southeastern States the situation was complex. There were
shortages of some kinds of labor and surpluses of others and there was
considerable variation in employment from time to time and from
place to place.
There was a serious shortage of agricultural workers throughout
the winter and spring of 1919. The South had lost more than 300,000
colored workers to the high-wage industries of the North. Returning
soldiers and civilian workers found both agricultural working condi
tions and compensation unsatisfactory. The shortages continued.
The shut-downs of munitions plants and textile mills brought about
situations similar to those in the North. Strikes occurred in one
textile mill after another, but the workers made few gains. The
Employment Service stated in its report of March 1,1919, that “ most
mills in South Carolina voluntarily adopted a 56- instead of a 60-hour
week.”
The sawmills were idle. The building trades reported unemploy
ment in all crafts, especially in the vicinity of Atlanta and New
Orleans. By April, there was a demand for southern hardwood from
the automobile and furniture factories, but the textile situation
remained a problem.
T able 9.— Em ploym ent Situation in South Atlantic A rea , December 1918-J u n e 1919
[Figures given represent surpluses of labor, unless otherwise n ted.
Shortages shown b y minus ( —)]
Alabama
Kentucky
Birmingham
Louisville
Tennessee
Date
Memphis
Nashville
Chattanooga
1918
D ec. 7.............................. Shortage. _
D ec. 14............................. ........ d o........ .............. —..............
D ec. 28............................. ........ d o........................................
1919
Jan. 4...............................
Jan. 1 8 - . . .......................
Feb. 1..............................
Feb. 8..............................
Feb. 15............................
Feb. 22............................
M ar. 1..............................
M ar. 8............................
M ar. 15..........................
M ar. 22............................
M ar. 29............................
A pr. 5_________________
Apr. 12.............................
Apr. 19.............................
Apr. 26.............................
M a y 10
_
M a y 24. _ _ _ _
June 14 _,
_ _
Production oft in iron and
steel.
-1 8 5 ............. ............................... -5 0 0 ..................... ..................... . Surplus______ ____
_
-1,0 0 0-™ .................................... Balanced labor supply.
2,000........... .................. ...........
-500............................................. ____ d o__________________ _____ 2,500...........................................
Expect lay-offs
—5,000 (colored) workers
(2,000 (white workers). FarmArea seriously affected b y f —450.............................................
labor shortage.
-3 5 0 ______ _________ _________
slow-down of iron and steel Textile situation acute
( industry throughout coun
(C o m m o n -la b o r s h o r ta g e ;
try.
skilled-labor surplus.
Balanced labor supply
Surplus
25ft
n _
.
500..............................................
350.................................................
1,500..............................................
1,500..............................................
1,500..............................................
1,250..............................................
1,000..............................................
1,000..............................................
1,000..............................................
2,000...........................................
1,500.................
1,000........................ ...............
Surplus of-skilled labor
-400.
-300.
Munitions plants to release
employees as work com
pleted.
Shut-down Jan. 31.
llnflux from Muscle Shoals
/ adds to surplus.
Strikes of harness workers,
boilermakers, and railway (Soldiers coming from nearby
| camps.
clerks.
do
_
__
____ do___________ _______ ___
........d o............................... ...........
........do............................................ 500.............................................
........d o............................................ 500..............................................
500..............................
500..............................................
500-—........................................
46
T able 10.— Trend o f Em ploym ent in South Atlantic and South Central Areas, as
Indicated by Placement Statistics, February-June 1919
. February
A p Posi
pli
cants tions
un
un filled
aided
Occupations
March
it
cants
un
aided
M ay
April
June
Posi i t
Posi i t
Posi
tions cants tions cants tions
un
un
un
un filled
un
filled a ided
aided filled
A p Posi
pli
tions
cants un
un
filled
aided
South Atlantic area
A ll reported occupations 1................... 1,582 7,332 !21,058 !12,089 1,837 6,061 2,547 4,502 |12,753
5,671
1,152
Agricultural workers_______________
228
282
Clerical and professional___________
Construction workers- - - - - - - ............. 1,012
1
266
Hotel and restaurant employees____
Laborers.................... ........ . . . _______
800 3,013 12,210
1
Metal-trades workers_______________
608
40 1,069 8,556
Miscellaneous........................................
512
157
363
270
1,700
169
424
Coal miners________________________
fihipwnrkers
Wnndsmen
600
62
500
All reported occupations 1..................
84 2,428
Agricultural workers_______________
Clerical and professional___________
Construction workers...... .......... ........
Hotel and restaurant employees____
Laborers___________________________
Metal-trades workers______________
Miscellaneous........................................
1,531
2,242
201
310
483
12
6,457 1,075
25
567
226
1,154
1,096
10
52
10
3,200
159
1,275
500 1,302
475
435
392 1,019
397
200
700
700
293
50
100
2 304
255 310,203
173 , 500
92
1,000
130
1,200
200
101
1,123
412 3,160
East South Central area
W oodsmen.
70
6
3
2
1
165
2
720
1 538 12,882
381 | 1,998 |
2
29
98
14
6
57
81
10
1,268
4,892
637
8
1
119
245
2,208
500
525
500
2
1,232
36
145 1,357
38
90 1,471
500
25
330
250
500
587
500
2
500
160
131
3
33
165
11
637
1,500
West South Central area
A11 reported nnnnpat,ions 1
... .
817 3,187
Agricultural workers_______________
Clerical and professional___________
Construction workers____ _________
TTotel and restaurant employees.
Laborers__ ________ _____ _________
Metal-trades workers_______________
Miseellaneons
.......
201
49
5
500 1,415
19
20
7
842
"Railroad workers _
W oodsm en_________________________
380
410
1,096
120
566
1,178
2,275
42
1,700
40
300
117
825
33
527
20
67
88
161
118
130
311
322
12
300
12
58
5
65
7
10
6
191
22
1Totals include some occupations not shown.
* Includes chauffeurs and teamsters.
<Includes chauffeurs and teamsters, as well as 10,000 structural-steel workers.
North Central Area
The war made heavy demands on the industrial cities in this area.
Ohio was among the first to be faced with labor difficulties as a result
of contract cancellation.
Of the industries in the North Central area, the automotive industry
was the first to recover. Detroit, Flint, and other cities manufactur
ing automobiles, as well as those making automobile parts, shared in this
renewed activity. By April calls were being made for workers, and
the returning soldiers (who had been a real problem in this area of
unemployment) were readily finding jobs.
However, other cities more dependent upon the iron and steel
industry, and cities with diversified industries which waited for the
general upturn in business conditions, continued to report large labor
surpluses well into the early summer.
T able 11.— Em ploym ent Situation in North Central A rea , December 1 9 1 8 -June 1919
[Figures given in table represent surpluses of labor, unless otherwise noted.
Shortages shown b y minus; —)]
East North Central area
Illinois
Indiana
West North Central area
W is M in
consin nesota
Missouri
M il M in
waukee neapo
lis
St. Louis
Ohio
Michigan
Date
Chicago
R ock Indi East
ford anapo Chi
cago
lis
Detroit
1918
Dec.
7 ...
(i).............
0)
Grand
Rapids
Akron
-3,000
0)
Cleveland
(n
__
___
D ayton
6,000
Tole
do
2,000
Youngs
town
-1 ,0 0 0
(0
0)
0).
1919
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
M ar.
4 ...
O
1 8 ...
2 5 ...
1 ... \Small net /
8 . . . /reductions \
1 5 ...
2 2 ...
1 ...
M ar. 8
M ar. 1 5 ...
M ar. 2 2 ...
M ar.
A pr.
A pr.
M ay
M ay
M ay
M ay
June
June
June
2 9 ...
12
26..
3—.
10
1 7 ...
3 1 ...
7 ...
14__
21__
(0
250
300
228
440
670
670
620
870
640
350
(i)
20,000
20,000.
55,000
50,000___
30,000
i Balanced labor supply.
1,900
4.000
4,400
4,800
5.300
6,060
6,200
6.300
5,700
4,500
4.000
.........
20,000......................
25,000 .................
30,000.....................
33.000
...........
35.000
...........
25,000......................
25,000......................
25,000......................
24,500.....................
23,000
___
22,500
[Employment shift
4.000 ■#
{shortage of skilled
4.000
2.000
labor.
1,000 3.500
4.000
3.500 Call sent for soldiers
3.000 i because of great
scarcity of labor.
500 -2 ,0 0 0 .................
600 (i).........................
2,000 (i)-_ .....................
2,000 1,500........ ...........
2,000 2,000....................
2,000 2,500.....................
1.500 2,500.....................
1.500 3,500....................
un1,000 /Conditions
\ settled.
800 3,000
/Agreements with
500
l employers.
15,000
40,000
55,000.
65,000............
70,000.
75,000............
75,000
75,000 _____
Jfi0,000
{state inves
j tigation.
7.000 6,000
7.000 10,000
7.000 10,000
8.000 9.000
11,000 9.000
11,000 9.000
11,000 9.000
11,000 8.000
10,000
-2 0 0
2,000
1,000
4,500 10,000
4,600 11,000
4,700 12,000
13,000
5,500 13,500
*4,900 13.700
7,500
9,000 14,400
7,000-9,000 15.700
t 8.000
----
8
2,000
4,000 ^Reduction expected.
Waiting.
5.000 448.
7.000
7.000 {Little business in iron and
7.000 | steel.
7,500
IUnemployment estimated inj creasing 1,000 per week.
25.000.
<*>
-3,000.................
—2,000.................
30,000
30,000
-2 ,0 0 0 .................
2 Unemployment abnormal in machine-tool trade
3,666
2,600 —
1,600
1,000
400
200
13.000
12,500
16.000
10,000
10,000
6,000
4.000
3.000
2,000
5,000
5.000
4.000
3,500
I
9,300.
10.000.
10,000.
7,800.
6,200.
4,900.
48
T able 12.— Trend o f Em ploym ent in North Central A rea , as Indicated b y Placement
Statistics, February-June 1919
February
Occupation
M ay
April
March
June
Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi Appli
cants tions cants tions cants tions cants tions cants
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
un
aided filled aided filled aided filled aided filled aided
Posi
tions
un
filled
East North Central area
All reported ocenpatimis V ,
44,381
Hlerieal and professional _ _
Construction workers .
_____
Hotel and restaurant employees___
L a b orers____ ____ _______ ______
Metal-trades workers_____________
M iscellaneous__________________ __
Coal miners _____ _______________
Machine-tool hands________ ______
Woodworkers
__ - ___ - ___
102
1,740
1,798
20
3,696
325
35,187
606
592
18
17,306 4,203
859
3,563 6,115 1,759
700
307
857
20
15,067 1,500
0
952
44
201
672
88
750
351
77
269
89
3,666 2,050
17 1,646
700
103
406
73
3
83
160
1,000
1,015
20
3
543
West North Central area
All reported occupations 1_________ 11,305 1,210 19,432 2,171
Agricultural workers______________
Clerical and professional . ,
Construction workers................. .......
Hotel and restaurant employees___
Laborers______ ____ ______________
Met.al-t.rades workers
Miscellaneous ...
100
2,277
3,659
2
2,700
951
1,207
W oodworkers_____________________
Railroad workers __
Ore miners.................. ........................
Engineers and firemen.......................
201
100
18
4
229
214
600
6
100
2,003
4,382
8,500
542
436
700
460
1,000
1,113
390
10
29
700
235
267
91
400
8,176
274
541
2,529
2
3,550
35
20
213 10,979 3,963 2,866
8
11
5
83
10
19
72
976
56
6,223
4 1,318
205
3,033
2
127
18
33
1
50
2,953
1,426
2,186
682
831
10
735
6
111
315
958
50165
37
1,200
14
2
618
47
2
351
43
i Totals include some occupations not shown.
M ountain and Pacific Areas
Pacific Coast— Shipbuilding dominated the Pacific Coast war
industries in World War I. The aircraft industry was unimportant
in that area at that time.
San Francisco and Oakland were the first of the West Coast cities
to report considerable unemployment. Differences arose over wages
to metal-trades workers as awarded by the Shipbuilding Labor
Adjustment Board and soon the mechanics in the shipyards were
striking and were joined by boilermakers, machinists, and other
metal-trades workers in private shops. In these two cities as many
as 18,000 were idle at one time. The Board intervened and by
April agreement on both hours and wages had been reached with the
majority of the workers.
Los Angeles reported serious unemployment in February, one
cause being the curtailment of shipbuilding and the consequent de
crease in the Government’s construction program. Workers in many
other industries, however, were unsettled throughout the spring and
early summer. The differences between the workers and their em
ployers lay mainly in the principle of the “ closed shop.” 3
The lumber industry in California, as in the Northwest, marked
time through the winter. This industry suffered a serious setback
when the Government’s wooden-ship program was abandoned in
March, for not only the workers in the shipyards but those in the
3 The work of the TJ. S. Employment Service proved so valuable during this unsettled period that 17 of
the California employment offices were continued with private funds when the Service was obliged to curtail
its operations.
49
lumber mills and logging camps had to await new business or seek
work elsewhere. The lumbermen were left with cancelled orders
and with quantities of lumber cut and ready for shipment.
By April, California reported a revival of business and the opening
of new projects, both municipal and private. Storage reservoirs,
packing plants, other food industries, and the hotel business promised
employment for many.
The shipyard workers in Seattle and Tacoma and other shipbuilding
centers in Washington were restless. In January they, too, struck
for higher wages and it was estimated that approximately 40,000
workers were idle at one time. This strike precipitated the most
unusual labor situation of the post-war period— the Seattle general
strike. Although it lasted only 3 days, troops were called in to main
tain order. The workers gained nothing from the strike, and the
shipyard strike was called off February 12.
Flour mills in Seattle and Portland were inactive during the winter.
Lumber mills were concerned because of the continued absence of
construction business and railroad orders. Returning soldiers
added to the tension, and among the waterfront workers there was
continuous unrest.
By April there were definite indications of a turn in the business
situation. Many industries were hiring additional workers. New
life in the construction industry meant increasing sales of lumber.
The steel shipyards were still busy. All of the available records
point to considerable judgment and understanding on the part of
the businessmen in this area. By the summer of 1919 the Pacific
Northwest was feeling the upturn in business throughout the country.
Mountain area.— Metal mining dominated the situation in the
Mountain States. It was obvious that as Government munitions
plants curtailed their output, the effect would be passed along the
line through the furnaces and rolling mills to the mines.
As early as December the copper companies began to cut down
production and some mines reduced their forces by 50 percent.
Announcements of wage reductions soon followed. Then came
scattered strikes, the number of miners affected varying from place
to place and from time to time. Butte, Mont., was the first center
of unemployment and stiife; in March similar but smaller situations
occurred in Arizona, Utah, and Idaho. In Colorado the lead industry
was stagnant. The reports of surplus labor reflect this condition.
It is probable that no group of workers was more .demoralized by
the abrupt ending of the war than the ore miners. There were
great surpluses of raw materials and the powerful mining companies
could afford to wait for business to readjust itself. The miners
waited also, but not without registering their protests.
Salt Lake City and Denver felt the effects of the demobilization of
war activities less than most of the other industrial cities of their
size. In these two cities the building trades suffered most from the
business uncertainty. The scattered striking workers in this area
gained little and returned to work, where possible, under conditions
prevailing when they went out.
Agricultural workers both in these States and in the Pacific area
were in demand, moving from crop to crop. They were unorganized
and without leadership, and such efforts as they made to better their
conditions were usually reported in such a way as to alienate the
reading public.
T able 13.— The Em ploym ent Situation in Pacific and M ountain Areas, December 1 9 1 8 -June 1919
[Figures given in table represent surpluses of labor, unless otherwise noted.
M ountain area
Pacific area
California
Date
San Francisco
Oakland
Dec. 7___
7,000.................
2,700........................
D ec. 28____
7,500.................
Los Angeles
Oregon
Washington
Montana
Utah
Portland
Seattle
Butte
Salt Lake City
Shortage of shipyard workers;
surplus in other industries.
Balanced labor sup
ply.
1918
1919
Jan. 4
8,000.................
Jan. 11.........
-Tan - 18 _ _
Jan. 25
F e b .1 ____
Feb. 8 ........ 7,000.............
Feb. 15........
Feb. 22........ 8,200.................
M ar. 1
M ar. 8
12,300...............
M ar. 15
M ar. 22
^ M a ch in ists*
M ar. 29
/ strike.
____
A pr. 5_____ 6, 000
A pr. 12____ 4,500........ - ____
Apr. 19
4,000.................
A pr. 26........ 3,500.................
3,000
...........
M ay 3
M a y 10____ 2,000.................
1,800.................
M a y 17
1,000
..........
M a y 31 ..........
June 14------- 1,000
Conditions good
Reductions expected. Balanced labor sup
ply.
3,000........................
4,000........................
10,000......................
7,500...................... .
Shipyard strikes. _
/ ........................ .........
\7,300........................
500............................
400
two
350...........................
350......................... .
\Shortage of ship/ yard workers.
200
200............................
Increasing surplus.
Less satisfactory___
6,000..............................
7,000...............................
6,500...............................
8 ,0 0 0 ...........................
8,000 (first surplus). Conditions acute.........
12,000........................... .
8,500...........................
Shipyard strike____ _______
8,000........... ..............................
10,000........................................
General strike......... ...............
12,000............................. .......
jshortages of metalworkers. .
000..........................................
16,000............. ..................
Labor disagreements_______
7,000...................... ................
10,000.......................................
1,000.
10,000.............................
7,500 .............................
18,000.........................
/16,000.............................
\12,000.............................
8,500
9,000..............................
10,000............. ..............
9,750..............................
9,666......................... . 7,500...............................
8,000............................. .
6,000...............................
8,000........................... 4,000 ...........................
7,000........................... 2,400...............................
7,500........................... 1,200...............................
6,500........................... 1,130............................... 2,000..........................................
7,000...........................
Irn ...
(i)...................................... .......
4,800...........................
* Unemployment slowly declining in the Northwest.
Some surplus.
u
2,000 ......................................
1,000.........................................
2.500.
3.000.
3.500.
5.000.
6,000.
5.500.
5,000.
4.500.
[Surplus building trades,
{ farm labor, and casual
1 workers.
1.500.
500.
O
51
T
able
14.— Trend o f Em ploym ent in the Far W est, as Indicated by Placement Statisticst
February-June 1919
February
Occupations
Appli
cants
un
aided
March
April
M ay
June
Posi Appli Posi Appli Posi
Posi
Posi
tions cants tions cants tions £
tions S t tions
un
un
un
un
un cants un cants un
un
un
filled aided filled aided filled
aided filled aided filled
Pacific
All reported occupations K ............... 14,510
83 36,477
35 36,570
9,556 1,175 8,115
Agricultural workers __ _ . _
475
Clerical and professional...................
860
Construction workers.......................... 2,785
Hotel and restaurant employees........
65
Laborers__ ____ ___________________ 6,450
Metal-trades workers...........................
255
Miscellaneous............... ........................ 1,025
2,800
2,170
3,630
1,100
16,500
73
798
10
400
1,500
1,005
5,030
610
14,500
35 11,925
160
1,000
900
2,056
5,000
2,140
800
1,000
Shipworkers___________ ___________
W oodsm en.
_
___ _
650
1,680
4,750
130
400
150
2,885
150
150
850
1,650
350
100
4,500
235
115
370
10
100
950
300
300
Mountain
All reported occupations 1.................. 15,491 6,058 17,810
Agricultural workers............................
925
Clerical and professional.
, _____
568
Construction workers.......................... 1,084
55
Hotel and restaurant employees........
L a b orers............................................... 4,829
Metal-trades workers........... ................
185
M iscellaneous.
604
Ore miners
^ _ _____
150
33
771
569
955
98
5,486
218
1,726
7,066 5,200
7,828
650
789
50
525
7,076 1,321 6,646 1,943 2,469
124
451
50
60
1,741
50
51
363
149
33
42
600
1,334
159
188
300
4,400
4,054
214
400
710
31
451
50
21
5
380
47
2,116
980
262
45
100
89
403
200
33
370
600 1,500
4
1 Totals include some occupations not shown.
LABOR SITUATION IN MAY
1919, BY REGIONS
The following statements covering labor conditions for the week
of M ay 10, 1919, were reported to the Employment Service by the
Division of Conciliation of the United States Department of Labor,
Federal Directors of the Service, and Community Labor Boards in
87 widely scattered cities.4
New England Area
With the exception of threats of strikes in Portland, Maine (the nature of
which is not indicated in the telegram), there seems to be no unrest in this section.
Middle Atlantic Area
New York.— There are strikes in the building trades in Albany, Schenectady,
and Troy, and at Burden Iron Co., Troy; threats of strikes in the large collar
plants at Troy (a Federal Conciliator has been asked for). Strikes in the paper
and pulp mills of Glens Falls; controversy at American Car & Foundry Co.,
Buffalo, over unfair conditions.
New Jersey.— There was a threatened strike of the employees at the Hey den
Chemical Co., Carfield, N. J., over hours and wages, which has been adjusted
during the week, the demands of the workers being granted, with the exception
of some minor details of which the men have approved.
Pennsylvania.— In Philadelphia there is a strike of bakers, and in Pittsburgh
threats of strikes of the street-car men; a threatened strike of 275 workmen in
Scranton which will indirectly affect 30,000 workmen. The situation is reported*
* Data are from National Archives files of the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics.
52
serious. A lockout of 40 workmen of the Chambersburg Foundry & Machine
Co., Chambersburg, Pa., because the company refuses to comply with the um
pire's decision to pay overtime since October; the Commissioner of Conciliation
has waited on the superintendent who says he cannot pay until authorized by
the board of directors; the employees have entered legal proceedings to collect
the amount claimed to be due; during the last week a controversy of the employees
of the Wolff Mfg. Co., Chambersburg, Pa., has been adjusted; a strike of molders
and carpenters at Bradford; a strike of sheet-metal workers at the York Corru
gating Co., York, Pa.; a strike of bakers at York over wages and conditions; a
controversy affecting 1,700 workers of the Page Co. steel mill at Monessen has
been adjusted.
East North Central Area
Ohio.— There are strikes as follows: In Akron 150 molders; Cleveland 2,000
woodworkers of the Theo. Keuntz Co. and Lang Body Co.; also strikes] in Youngs
town. A controversy is on in the building trades of Cleveland under a claimed
violation of agreement, also a controversy of 200 sheet-metal workers at Dayton,
which was adjusted during the week by the Division of Conciliation. A con
troversy is reported of the electrical workers and hod-carriers in Dayton. During
the week a threatened strike of 150 Jewish bakers at Cleveland, which would
indirectly affect an additional 50 workers, was adjusted by the conciliator; as
also was a strike in the Kelley Island Lime & Transportation Co. at Marblehead.
Indiana.— Fifty plumbers and fifty electricians are on strike in Fort Wayne.
There are threats of strikes of 2,000 building laborers and teamsters in East Chi
cago; strikes of 150 union electricians and painters; four iron workers at Stewart
Construction C o.; twenty carpenters and three hoisting engineers in South Bend.
Illinois.— There are strikes in the bread and shoe industries in Joliet, and there
are strikes in Rockford; a controversy of the employees in the American Hide &
Leather Co., Chicago, was brought to the attention of the Division of Conciliation
during the week, as also the mob violence at Nokomi where threats were made to
deport residents and the mayor was unable to handle the situation; also a con
troversy of the employees with the American Steel & Wire Co., Waukegan, because
of the dismissal of men without reason; also a controversy of 3,000 milk drivers in
Chicago, because of wages; strike of 100 waiters and cooks in eight restaurants in
South Chicago; sympathetic strike of 800 bakery drivers against the Master Bakers
Association, and lockout in the Crown Electrical Mfg. Co., St. Charles.
Wisconsin.— There is labor unrest in Racine, and strikes of plumbers in Super
ior; satisfactory settlement of machinists' strike in Madison is expected in the
near future; 40 molders' helpers and 43 machinists are locked out at LaCrosse;
strike at Drummond packing plant at Eau Claire; building trades in Superior
gradually reaching agreement. During the week a strike of the molders at Eau
Claire was brought to the attention of the Division of Conciliation, as also was a
strike of finishers at Matthews Bros Co., Milwaukee; and during the week the
Division of Conciliation reports a successful settlement of the controversy of the
leather workers employed by the Schwann-Seyberth Co. at Eau Claire.
West North Central Area
Minnesota.— There are threats of strikes in Duluth, all trade-unions now voting
on a general strike for June 1. Carpenters are striking in Minneapolis; St. Paul
last week reported the entire building trades affected— 600 carpenters and 600
building laborers— the report this week indicated that 1,000 more men are affected
by these strikes.
Missouri.— During the week a controversy of 400 employees of the Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Co. at St. Louis (indirectly affecting 3,400) was reported adjusted
by the Division of Conciliation, as also was a threatened strike in the bridge shops
in St. Louis.
Iowa.— Controversy at the Dubuque Boat & Boiler Works, Dubuque, and con
troversy of employees of the Rath Packing Co., Waterloo, over wage scales were
brought to the attention of the Division of Conciliation during the week.
South Atlantic Area
Virginia.— Strikes are reported at Norfolk which involved 2,000 in the metal
trades.
West Virginia.— Conditions in the Charleston district are unsettled because of
the building-trades controversy. A controversy of the employees of the Baldwin
53
Tool Works at Parkersburg, because of alleged discrimination, was brought to the
attention of the Division of Conciliation during the week. There are threats of
strikes in Charleston, and 200 plumbers, structural-iron workers, electricians, sheetmetal workers, and painters, retarding building trades generally, are on strike in
Wheeling.
North Carolina.— Strikes are in progress at Raleigh, and the unions at the same
place claim partial lockout of carpenters, electricians, and plumbers.
South Carolina.— Strikes are in progress in Charleston; 32 firms have signed
an agreement for open shop and carpenters are still out.
Georgia.— There are strikes among the electricians and iron molders in Atlanta.
Florida.— A strike of 38 employees at Jacksonville was brought to the attention
of the Division of Conciliation during the week.
East South Central Area
Kentucky.— For nearly 4 months there has been a strike on at Sherman & Sons,
textile workers, and conditions the past week are reported to be unchanged.
Tennessee.— During the week a controversy of the 80 miners of the Bon Air
Coal & Iron Co., at Allens Creek, which affected indirectly 250 workmen, was
reported settled during the week.
West South Central Area
Oklahoma.— During the week there was brought to the attention of the Division
of Conciliation a controversy of 100 machinists, blacksmiths, and molders of the
McEven Mfg. Co., Tulsa, the men claiming they were losing time for work spoiled;
also a controversy of the oil workers employed by Constantin Co., Tulsa, because
of alleged discrimination.
Texas.-—A controversy of 150 employees at the stock yards at Fort Worth over
an alleged noncompliance of the Alschuler award was adjusted by the Division of
Conciliation during the week.
Mountain Area
Utah.— Strikes are reported among the cooks, waiters, and bakers at Salt Lake
City, which it is hoped can be settled locally; strikes amongst the miners for which
Federal aid in adjustment is desired, a strike of 500 employees (indirectly affecting
650), Garfield Smelting Co., Salt Lake City, because of a cut in wages, was settled
during the week by the Division of Conciliation, the company providing for elec
tion of a grievance committee, preference to be given strikers; also a temporary
understanding that if any further reductions were necessary, the company would
give 25 percent less to smelting companies than to mining companies. A strike
of 1,000 miners in the Park City district over hours and wages has been reported
to the Division of Conciliation.
Montana.— A strike of 40 employees of the Tuolomne Copper Co., Butte, over
the employment of a blacksmith, not in good standing with the Metal Trades
Council, was reported and adjusted during the week, an agreement being made
which provided that all craftsmen employed must be in good standing with the
Council. The man in question was suspended and all the men returned to work.
Arizona.— A threatened strike of 400 miners of the United Eastern Co., at
Oatman, was reported and adjusted during the week. The union miners, although
in majority, said they would not “ scab” if 100 I. W. W .’s called the strike. After
correspondence with both sides the company agreed to give all union men in good
standing preference after the returned soldiers. There is peace for the time being.
Pacific Area
Washington.— There are threats of strikes along the waterfront in Seattle,
and at the same place the carpenters are now on strike for $7.50 per day, 5 days
per week.
California.— There are strikes in 18 baking concerns involving 200 bakers,
in Los Angeles, and also in 35 to 40 paint shops involving 700 workmen; 7 elec
trical shops involving 60 workmen. A Federal Conciliator is on the ground.
It is evident that these reports were, in the main, a record of wide
spread and prolonged strife between employers and the workers,
involving various demands by the latter, such as shorter working
54
hours and wage increases. The most difficult question involved,
however, was the right of the workers to organize. In this con
nection it should be remembered that collective bargaining as it is
known today did not then exist.
There were extremists in both ranks, but without free and open
communication between management and the workers, settlements
came slowly. However, the efforts of farseeing employers, of citizens
who acted as impartial arbitrators, and of sober men in the ranks
of labor gradually brought about more willingness on both sides to
confer and to conciliate. By and large, the just demands of the
wage earners were granted. The need for new management policies
was slowly recognized and here and there they were adopted. As
one writer said: “ The new employment policy * * * is a step
on the side of Americanization that begins, significantly enough, by
Americanizing the management.” 3 Out of these strikes came slow
realization of the essential need for industrial democracy.
S H IF T S I N
LABOR
SUPPLY
Each week from November 1918 to June 1919 about 100 large
industrial cities reported their approximate labor supply to the Em
ployment Service. In the following table this information is pre
sented in the form of percentages, showing for each reporting period
the percentage of the total number of cities reporting the need for
additional workers, the percentage where supply and demand were
about equal, and the percentage of total cities reporting surplus
workers.
Immediately after the Armistice only about 10 percent of the
cities reported surplus labor, and a fourth of them needed more
workers. As of March 8, however, about 70 percent had considerable
unemployment (table 15). The major part of the shift had occurred
in cities where employment conditions had earlier been satisfactory.
By June 14 the business revival is reflected in the decreasing
number of cities with labor surpluses. It is significant that during
the whole period there were areas where workers were needed, while
men were seeking employment elsewhere.
THE
UPTURN
IN
B U S IN E S S
AND
EM PLOYM ENT
Employment—By May 1919 there was definite evidence of a busi
ness upturn which would have been more general had the steel price
situation been settled. The steel trade reported in the middle of
May that not since May 1915 had pig-iron production been so low.
Reports of price concessions persisted, but the demand for steel did
not improve until optimistic statements by the large producers gave
some assurance that there would be no immediate price reduction.
The automobile industry was outstanding in its activity. Plants
with unfinished war contracts were working feverishly to complete
them. The demand for passenger cars was so great that orders were
booked into 1920. Hundreds of workers, both skilled and unskilled,
were being brought into the factories and facilities were being ex
panded.
The textile industry reported increased activity in every line, with
orders increasing each week. This probably accounted in part for
•John A . Fitch,.in The Survey, April 5,1919.
55
T a b le
15.— Shifts
in Labor Supply in Large Industrial Areas, November 3 0 , 1 9 1 8 June 14, 1919 1
Percent of all cities reporting
which estimated—
Percent of all cities reporting
which estimated—
Date
Date
Shortages
Balanced
labor
Surpluses
supply
25.2
23.8
24.6
20.8
21.3
64.4
63.1
54.1
48.4
45.1
10.4
13.1
21.3
30.8
33.6
22.3
18.0
14.8
14.8
13.1
13.9
14.9
14.8
11.5
38.9
44.3
40.1
35.2
. 30.3
29.1
24.6
18.0
24.6
38.8
37.7
45.1
50.0
56.6
59.0
60.7
67.2
63.9
1919
Jan. 4 __
.Tan. 11
.Tan. 18
.Tan. 25
Feb. 1......................
Fab. 8
F fth . 15
Feb. 22...............
Mar. 1......................
Balanced
labor
Surpluses
supply
1919— Con.
1918
TSTnv. an
Dec. 7.......................
Dftfi. u
Dec. 21........ ............
Dec. 28___________
Shortages
M ar. 8
Mar. 15....................
M a r . 22
_________
Mar. 29....................
Apr. 5____________
Apr. 12....................
Apr. 19.....................
Apr. 26................... .
M a y 3______ _____
M ay 10................. .
M a y 17.....................
M ay 24.....................
M a y 31.
June 7____________
June 1 4 . . . . .............
9.0
7.4
13.6
13.6
11.7
10.4
10.1
11.8
14.5
16.8
18.9
18.8
15.0
19.0
19.1
21.3
24.6
24.3
28.8
28.3
37.9
42.0
38.2
34.9
37.1
37.8
35.7
31.0
33.0
37.1
69.7
68.0
62.1
57.6
60.0
51.7
47.8
50.6
50.6
46.1
43.8
45.5
54.0
48.0
43.8
1 Data are from W eekly Reports on Labor Conditions, U. S. Employment Service, June 21, 1919, based
upon data received weekly from about 100 cities.
the 15-percent wage increase announced in May, affecting 600,000
textile workers in New England and New Jersey. Strikes then
subsided. The long-drawn-out strike of the New York garment
workers ended late in May with the granting of a 48-hour week,
unionization, wage increases, and a weekly work basis. There was
a decided improvement in the shoe business, and the glove industry
was held back only by a shortage of desirable leathers.
Construction activity was at last under way in the country at large.
Building permits for March were almost double those for February
and were three times those for December 1918. The whole industry
took a surge forward in April, bringing new life to the industries
manufacturing products needed for residential construction.
Unemployment was probably greatest among the ore and coal
miners in the late spring of 1919. Ohio reported 12,000 idle since
January; 70,000 were out of work in Illinois; and most of the 40,000
unemployed reported from Missouri were miners. By June, how
ever, the fuel industry was recovering as the factories increased their
activities.
During the second half of the year there was a net increase in
factory employment of almost 600,000 and for 1919 as a whole there
were 130 jobs for each 100 pre-war jobs. Statistics of monthly
changes in factory employment, by industries, shown in table 16,,
reveal the early months of uncertainty in manufacturing industries;
and the later period of rapid recovery.
General economic conditions.— At the end of 1919 it might have been
argued that the country had made a good recovery from the effects
of the war and that there was general prosperity. The national income
greatly exceeded that of the war years, amounting to $305 per capita
for the farm population and $670 for those in urban areas. Money
earnings had gone steadily upward throughout the year, and bank
deposits also climbed. Production of manufactured goods lagged,
however. Compared with the average for 1919, the monthly changes
56
T able 16.— M onthly Changes in Ft
y Em]
Itilustnr^
January-D ecem ber 1919 , by
[Figures are in thousands]
Industry
A ll industries:
Separations....................
Additions.......................
N et change....................
Textiles................. - ..............
Machinery............................
Iron and steel.......................
Food and canning...............
Transportation equipment.
Lum ber.................................
Paper and printing.............
Leather..................................
Stone, clay, and glass..........
T obacco.................................
Chemicals.............................
Nonferrous metals...............
Num ber of employees separated ( - ) or added ( + )
each m onth
Total
reported
January
1019
Net
change
Jan
uary
-2 6 1 .5
4-4.9
-2 5 6 .6
1,487.6
1,066.1
974.4
799.8
793.5
767.0
506.1
339.0
245.2
179.7
149.5
131.0
-9 4 .5
-2 4 .8
-4 5 .5
-2 5 .4
-5 3 .4
+ 2 .8
-3 .7
+ .7
- 9 .1
- 3 .4
-1 .7
+ 1 .4
Feb
ruary
March
April
M ay
June
-9 5 .3 -1 0 0 .7 -6 5 .8
-3 5 .8 - 4 2 .6
+84.1 +106.4 +120.8 +142.7 +247.0
-1 1 .2
+ 5 .7 + 55.0 +106.9 +204.4
+42.4
-3 2 .7
-3 3 .9
-7 .7
-1 0 .5
+23.6
+ .6
- 2 .3
+16.8
-2 .2
-6 .0
+ .7
+ 63.5
- 1 0 .6
-4 2 .9
- 1 8 .0
-1 4 .3
+ .9
- 6 .4
- 4 .2
+39.3
+ 1 .2
-4 .3
+ 1 .5
+57.1
-2 6 .6
- 1 8 .7
-6 .5
- 1 .3
+20.1
-8 .0
+ 5 .2
+33.9
-4 .1
-.6
+ 4 .5
+52.1
-2 0 .4
+ 7.1
+36.7
+14.0
+ 4 .5
+11.7
+ 3 .2
+10.5
-1 5 .0
-.4
+ 2 .9
+76.6
+ 6 .2
+ 54.5
+57.1
+ 7 .8
+29.1
+ 6 .9
+ 2 .3
- 2 5 .2
- 1 6 .2
- 1 .2
+ 6 .5
-6 01 .7
+705.9
+104.2
+197.2
—108.9
-7 9 .4
+ 36.2
-5 7 .7
+81.0
+ 1 .1
+ 4 .9
+66.2
-3 9 .7
-1 4 .2
+17.5
Number of employees separated ( —) or added ( + ) each
month
Industry
July
August
Sep
tember
October N ovem Decem
ber
ber
N et
change
All industries:
Additions......................................
Separations................................. Net change....... .......... .................
+215.5
-2 3 .9
191.6
+163.1
-1 8 .9
+144.2
+120.5
+148.9
-2 8 .4
+172.3
-8 6 .8
+ 85.5
+162.9
-3 0 .0
+132.9
+161.7
-9 5 .1
+66.6
+672.8
-8 0 .4
+592.4
Textiles................................. ...............
Machinery...........................................
Iron and steel......................................
Food and canning...............................
Transportation equipment...............
Lumber.................................................
Paper and printing.............................
Leather...................................... _.........
Stone, clay and glass..........................
Tobacco................................................
Chemicals....................... ....................
Nonferrous metals________________
+ 1 .6
+48.7
+ 23.2
+57.5
- 9 .3
+40.1
+ 4 .8
+10.3
+24.9
-1 4 .3
-.3
+ 4 .4
+ 24.5
+33.7
-1 .8
+42.5
+13.1
+33.6
+ 4 .2
+ 4 .9
-1 4 .7
+ 6 .6
-.5
-1 .9
+24.4
+38.1
-9 9 .9
-3 3 .6
-1 5 .4
+31.0
+ 1 .1
+ 3 .2
+10.8
+ 6.1
+ .8
+ 5 .0
+ 4 .9
+39.8
+ 82.0
-6 4 .9
-1 1 .3
+ 7 .2
+10.6
+ 7 .5
- 9 .4
+20.3
-.2
-1 .0
+ 35.8
+ 39.0
+55.4
-1 9 .8
-2 .9
+ 9 .1
+15.4
+ 6 .4
-5 .6
-.9
+ 1 .8
-.8
+26.1
+31.0
+37.4
-5 3 .1
+47.7
-2 5 .4
+ 6 .9
+ 3 .9
-1 4 .7
+ 6 .8
- 1 .9
+ 1 .9
+117.3
+230.3
+96.3
-7 1 .4
+21.9
+95.6
+43.0
+36.2
-8 .7
+24.6
-.3
+ 7 .6
1 From U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Study N o. 58: Post-Armistice Industrial Develop
ments, 1918-20. Data for the table were derived from basic figures for Federal Reserve Index of Factory
Employment.
in production from January 1919 through June 1920 did not reflect
the degree of activity which purchasing power in this country and the
needs abroad seemed to justify. Only the automobile industry, with
good employment and a high wage level, forged ahead.
Prices and cost of living.— There was one element of the economy
which was not reassuring. The high wartime prices did not recede.
On the contrary they advanced. For the year 1918 wholesale prices
averaged 88 percent higher than in 1913; for 1919 they were approxi
mately double the average for 1913. In December 1918 they were 95
percent higher than pre-war prices; in December 1919 they were 116
percent above the same period.
These increases were carried forward into the costs of items essential
to the maintenance of family life. Food costs, which had gone steadily
upward throughout the war period, kept on rising. Costs of clothing,
57
shoes, housefurnishings, and housing all rose, month by month.
There were scarcities in many of these goods and the young people
who were establishing new homes foirnd it difficult to obtain their
requirements even at the prevailing high prices.
Although dollar earnings of wage earners were increasing, their
purchasing power was decnninjg as prices rose. Professional workers,
public employees, and those in service trades were even worse off,
since they had received little or no additional compensation during
the war.
The “ high cost of living” was a matter of both private and public
concern. In August 1919, the President sought to stem the tide by
asking Congress for renewal of wartime price controls. This effort
failed. Each month saw a continuation of the upward trend. There
was general discussion of the large volume of buying orders, of unsatis
fied demand, and of unwise consumer spending. The value of the
construction of such projects as libraries, parks, and museums both
for providing employment and for satisfying human needs had not
yet been realized. The whole problem was so complex that those
most affected were unable to make a diagnosis or suggest a remedy.®
The Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, in September 1919
summed up the situation which was to continue for many months:
The high cost of liviing, which is the most serious problem confronting the
American people at the present time, is not merely a local question or a national
one, but is a world-wide condition. While various factors have contributed to
the existing situation, its fundamental cause is being better understood every day,
and the principles which must govern the application of the only effective remedy
are becoming more clearly defined. While the gratification of a general desire to
possess more of the comforts and luxuries of life and the demand for more hours
of leisure and recreation have undoubtedly contributed to higher costs, it is now
recognized that the primary cause of the great advance in prices and wages during
the past 4 }£ years is the terrible destruction of life and property and the consump
tion of liquid wealth occasioned by the world war.
There has been a vast expansion of credits, not only in the country but through
out the civilized world; and workers have manifested since the suspension of hos
tilities a desire to relax from the rigors of the wartime regime, from drastic econo
mies and deprivations, and they are at the same time demanding shorter working
hours and more pay. Because of this and of the impairment of productive capa
city, there has been a curtailment of production, together with higher costs in the
processes of distribution, which have driven prices up to a higher level than was
reached even during the closing months of the war. (W. P. G. Harding, Governor
of Federal Reserve Board, in The Economic World, Sept. 20, 1919.)
Special Problem s o f the W ar Department and Servicemen
During these months of industrial readjustment the War Depart
ment was coping with the task of returning the “ Emergency Army”
to civil life. This proved to be much more difficult than had been
anticipated when plans for discharging the soldiers were announced
soon after the Armistice. These servicemen, upon release, were again
free to control their own movements. Their interests as private
citizens were bound up with those of the industrial workers, but there
were frequent clashes between the groups as they each turned back to
peacetime living.
« For more detailed data see XT. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Study N o. 58: Post-Armistice
Industrial Development, 1918-20.
58
DEMOBILIZATION PROBLEMS
The rate at which demobilization of the Army should proceed was
debated throughout the period of demobilization. Appeals for speedy
discharge and for special consideration came from civilian groups and,
of course, from the men themselves. Manufacturers wno had lost
competent executives and skilled workmen to the Army urged their
prompt release to help in the reorganization of industry on a peace
time basis. The seasons of planting and of harvest brought appeals
from the farmers. Families besieged the War Department insist
ently. Some of the special pleadings were supported by Govern
ment agencies aware of real need in some quarters, and others were
channeled through Congressmen.
On the other hand, it seemed probable that the peak of industrial
unemployment and unrest would coincide with the peak period of
soldier discharge. It was therefore right that Government agencies,
civilian welfare groups, and harried businessmen should warn the
War Department of the possible ill effects of too rapid discharge when
there was already little employment available for the idle industrial
workers.
The method of demobilization selected by the Chief of Staff, as
well as the desires of the men themselves and of their commanding
officers, favored speedy discharge. It is therefore not surprising that
the War Department provided for considerable flexibility in carrying
out this procedure. Under special instructions of November 21,
1918, and under specified conditions, some men could be released
ahead of others upon their individual request. Although the War
Department publicly avowed its intention to administer these pro
visions cautiously and without discrimination, the evidence indicates
abuse by both soldiers and demobilization officers. As time went on,
special discharges were even more readily granted if the men could be
spared.
By the first of February 1919 the Chief of Staff had issued orders
for the discharge of all of the troops who were in this country at the
time of the Armistice, with the exception of the regular Army men,
medical personnel, and administrative detachments required for de
mobilization. The latter groups protested. Many of them were
disappointed because they did not get overseas; others knew that, if
necessary, they would have gone over whether they wished to or not;
almost all of them were resentful at being retained. Those in dis
embarkation camps along the Atlantic coast saw that men returning
after little service abroad were being released while they themselves
were retained. The situation became so grave that in March the
War Department arranged for the appointment of civilians to take
over the clerical work of those who wished to be discharged, keeping
only those enlisted men who wished to remain in the service.
As there were 31 widely scattered demobilization camps, dependent
upon semitrained personnel and without uniform procedures, the
actual discharge rate was relatively slow. One by one the demobili
zation camps were closed, orders for release were relaxed, and the
rule that men should be sent for discharge to stations near their
homes was followed only “ as far as practicable.” 7
TU. S. Official Bulletin, December 18,1918.
59
All efforts were now directed to the completion of plans for de
mobilizing troops returning from abroad. The early optimistic es
timates of rate of return were not borne out. The majority of the
troops landed in January and February 1919 were frequently held in
disembarkation centers and their discharge delayed for various rea
sons. In view of the mounting unemployment resulting from cur
tailment of war industries, this was probably fortunate.
PROBLEMS OF ASSISTANCE TO RETURNING SOLDIERS
About the first of March the War Department approved the installa
tion in France of a system for obtaining applications for employment
from the soldiers before they sailed, these to be forwarded immediately
to the office of the Employment Service in this country. The men
were given information as to the kind of help this service could provide
in obtaining jobs for them and in smoothing their way after discharge.
It was late to institute such a plan when men were arriving in this
country at the rate of over 100,000 a month.
Once again it must be stated that the majority of the ex-servicemen put on civilian clothing, went home, and made their own adjust
ments to civilian life, with little difficulty or under great stress as the
case might be. However, the best estimates indicate that of 3,422,233
men discharged during the first 12 months after the close of the war,
1,332,494 soldiers, sailors, and marines registered for employment.
By March the munitions factories were beginning to discharge
employees in large numbers. It was reported that Connecticut had
laid off 40,000 or more workers in 3 weeks. Some found work, some
left the area, but many were idle. Labor surpluses were reported
from every large city in New York. In Detroit five or six thousand
idle soldiers were added to the 15,000 “ normally” unemployed.
As signs of increasing unemployment became more evident, the
War Department issued instructions which would “ insure that every
enlisted man understands that the War Department does not desire to
discharge any soldier who cannot find civil employment.” He could
remain in military service “ upon his own written request” until he
could secure employment. During the period that he remained
in the service his dependents, if any, would continue to draw their
allotments.8
Congress had become concerned. Additional “ reconstruction”
bills and resolutions were introduced. Some died in Committee.
A few were debated in one or both Houses. None were enacted into
law. One proposal which had been considered in 1918 was again
brought up, sponsored by Senator Kenyon of Iowa and Congress
man Byrnes of South Carolina.
The Secretary of the Interior
had for many months urged legislation authorizing measures for
conservation, reclamation, and improvement of the country’s natural
resources. Such a policy if adopted in time would have provided
employment for workers at many levels of skill while it restored and
brought into cultivation lands long idle, and would have benefited
every part of the United States. To these proposals only two objec
tions of any moment were raised: (1) That the reclamation and cul
tivation of vast areas of unused and unproductive land throughout
8 W ar Department Circular N o. 34, January 23,1919.
60
the country would result in overproduction and depressing the prices
of food stuffs; (2) that abandoned farms, particularly in the New
England States, should be utilized before undertaking the reclamation
of new land.
The public press, the Congress, and the influential citizens who
had earlier discounted the idea of any demobilization crisis all became
vocal, as they saw the plain evidence of the critical and mounting
problem of the unemployed workers. Strong criticism was voiced,
of which the following is an example:
Neither the railroad administration, the Treasury, the states, the municipal
ities, or Congress have adopted any plans for needed renewals, new buildings and
equipment which would serve as a buffer against unemployment until the coming
fall. * * * If, consequently, suffering and unrest take place it will be the
clear fault of the government. The problem of transition was comparatively
easy in this country and because it was easy it was neglected. The Administra
tion and Congress have conspired to ignore a plain public obligation. (The New
Republic, Feb. 8, 1919, p. 35.)
The events of the following months justified these words, but it
was too late for recriminations or even for consideration of reconstruc
tion policies. It had been forgotten that the purposes of any policy
which came too late could be defeated because of the time required
for establishment of adequate administrative procedures. The
authorization at this time of a bonus of $60 for all officers, soldiers,
field clerks, and Army nurses (provided for in the Revenue Act of
February 24, 1919) could not be construed as a solution.
At this point Congress refused to provide funds for the expanding
and important activities of the U. S. Employment Service. This
meant that the Service must curtail its work about 80 percent, and
that the efforts being carried forward to place both soldiers and
civilians in employment in communities throughout the country
would be defeated. Immediately the esprit de corps of the staff was
lowered and the efficiency of the work reduced.
This occurred at a time when not yet half of the Army had been
demobilized and the volume of men arriving from France was in
creasing week by week. These arrivals did not reach their peak
until June and continued in considerable numbers throughout the
summer.
Aroused by the failure to provide support for the Employment
Service, individuals and private welfare agencies proffered funds to
continue its work. Some of the agencies undertook to continue the
work of a large number of the placement bureaus from which the
Employment Service was now obliged to withdraw.
The Council of National Defense, one of the continuing war agencies
of which all Cabinet officials were members, stepped into the breach.
On March 15 with the approval of the Secretaries of War and of
Labor it formed an Emergency Committee to carry on the program of
the Employment Service in assisting soldiers to find work wherever
there was need or desire. Heading the committee was Franklin D.
Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Col. Arthur
Woods, formerly Police Commissioner of New York City, was ap
pointed to take charge of the work.
Colonel Woods decided to strengthen the Bureau for Returning
Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines, already operating with more or less
efficiency in the most critical communities. He divided the country
into districts conforming roughly to the Military Departments of the
61
War Department. A staff of field investigators was sent out to review
the situation in the various placement bureaus.
Colonel Woods appealed to Chambers of Commerce and trade and
industrial organizations for understanding of the servicemen’s point
of view and for assistance in arranging for funds for returning to their
homes men who were stranded with little money, these amounts to
be loaned by local chambers and returned later. In a letter to the
U. S. Chamber of Commerce Colonel Woods said:
Most of the soldiers who are discharged from the Army find employment for
themselves, usually going back to their old jobs. It is therefore a minority who
need help. The work is made more difficult than it would otherwise be by the
human tendency of soldiers upon discharge to linger awhile in large cities, instead
of going home to find employment at once. Many soldiers also feel that they are
qualified to have better positions and therefore earn better pay than they did before
the war. * * * Unfortunately this is a hard time in which to make the
improvement which they are rightly ambitious to make, for industry is in a period
of transition and jobs are hard to find. The soldier should be urged to go back
to his home town and, unless a better position can be obtained for him, take his
old job, not because that is the best he is fitted for, but because, owing to the
industrial situation, it is an unfavorable time for him to seek a different position.
He should certainly not give up his aim to get the better job, but he should work
for it from his old position, and not from a state of unemployment. (U. S. Official
Bulletin, Mar. 26, 1919.)
OTH ER PROBLEM S
Among the other problems faced by the War Department repre
sentatives were those of maintaining the employment service, bringing
together scattered efforts of well-intentioned but separately ineffective
groups, convincing the public of the need for a special placement
service for the servicemen,9 and finally, coping with the attitude of
the men themselves.
The soldiers had returned from abroad expecting the wartime
wages of which they had heard so much, to face with surprise the fact
that there was a dearth of jobs at any wage. Many of them found
their old jobs gone, either because others had filled their places or
because the job itself no longer existed. Some employers, themselves
in distress, did all they could to assist these men; others became dis
affected and had little or no patience with them.
By the very nature of the Selective Service System, the “ Emer
gency Army” was drawn from the people as a whole, and reflected
all their virtues and faults. The evidence shows that [some dis
charged men took advantage of the uniform to prey upon the sym
pathies of the public; that many of them did not want jobs and were
slackers when they were given work; that in some cases they joined
forces with unscrupulous labor agitators; and that certain individuals
acted as strikebreakers, sometimes knowingly, sometimes not. In
short, this small proportion of the men did great injury to themselves
and others by their disregard of either their own or the public interest.
The men were also frequently the victims of sharpers who relieved
them of their money and their self-respect. Then, too, the prolonged
period of strikes in first one occupation and then another not only
made it difficult to place the men but encouraged their participation
in the accompanying acts of violence. The situation became so
flagrant that both the War Department and the local authorities
• The story of the attitude of the public toward the returning soldiers has already been told in detail in
the M onthly Labor Review, December 1943 (p. 1060).
62
were obliged to take disciplinary measures. Undoubtedly, some of
this could have been avoided if the machinery for handling the whole
problem of both military and civilian demobilization had been
functioning smoothly when the crisis arose.
PLACEM ENTS
IN
R E L A T IO N
T O D E M O B IL IZ A T IO N
The employment situation in the various regions and industries has
already been discussed. The place of the servicemen in the general
picture and their absorption into industry are indicated in the tables
which follow. Table 17, showing the monthly rate of actual discharge,
indicates the concentrated discharges in December 1918 of men not
needed in camps in this country. For subsequent months these
statistics of demobilization include all of the men discharged, both
those who remained in this country and those returning from Europe.
The peak of demobilization came in May. Although the figures in
the second column of the table include in some cases arrivals of civil
ian personnel, Marines, and Navy personnel, their total was so small
as not to affect the use of the figures for a study of trends.
T
able
17.— Demobilization
o f the Em ergency A rm y , 1 9 1 8 -1 9 1
M en discharged
M en discharged
M onth
M onth
T otal
number
Total discharged__________
3,422,233
Returned
from abroad
1,944,266
1918
Prior Nnv’Amhp.r 11
Novem ber 11-30___________
Dfififimbfir.
_ ______
44,002
621,203
20,638
4,563
70,055
332,666
307,398
120,399
140,896
1919
January
February__________________
T otal
number
Returned
from abroad
1919— Con.
March__________________
April............................... ..
M a y___________________
June___________________
Inly
August______________ —
September______________
October________________
November
DftPftmhftr
306,250
285,328
437,389
394,600
346,101
204,146
77,938
41,242
2 23,970
207,676
275,303
314,090
342,785
261,908
112,458
46,663
19,388
4,511
2,933
i Data are from Annual Reports to the Secretary of War.
* N ov. 1-15.
There was a striking but possibly unavoidable concentration of
troops arriving at Hoboken, the port for New York City. A review
of the arrival of 37 divisions landing between December 9, 1918, and
September 5, 1919, shows 27 landing at Hoboken, 7 at Newport News,
and one each at Charleston, S. C., Boston, and Philadelphia. Esti
mating an average of 30,000 men to a division, this means that not
less than 800,000 men went into or through the big cities in the New
York area. Some of the men were promptly discharged or moved to
demobilization camps much further inward. Others, particularly in
the early months, were held for several weeks before discharge.
On August 25, 1919, the Chief of Staff ordered the immediate dis
charge of all men available for discharge unless they could not be
spared or replaced. In November, the Commanding General in
France was told that the remaining work of demobilization would be
turned over to the military attach^ in Paris. By the end of 1919, the
Emergency Army had been demobilized, but there is no doubt that the
process extended over many more months than had been anticipated.
63
Industrial unemployment reached its peak in March and April of
1919. The weekly report for June 7, 1919, of the Statistics Branch of
the General Staff, shows that the proportion of discharged men re
questing assistance in obtaining work had ranged from 16 percent
for the week ended February 8, to 33 percent for March, and reached
a peak of 41 percent for the week ended March 10.
Table 18 shows the ratio of men finding work to those applying for
work, during the 5 weeks ended May 31,1919, for 31 cities of more than
200,000 population. In 3 cities more men were placed than registered,
owing to the fact that the Bureaus for finding work kept records of open
positions as well as of applicants and frequently placed the men
without their registering.
T able 18.— Rate o f Placements in Selected Cities9 5 W eeks Ended M a y 3 1 , 1 9 1 9 1
Placements
as percent
of regis
trations
C ity
"Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Buffalo
Oakland
Chicago
.... _
_
.......
......
City
Placements
as percent
of regis
trations
146
106
103
96
93
Baltimore___________ _______ ________
Milwaukee _ . . . . . . . .
_ _ ____
Philadelphia........... .................................
Newark_____________ ________ _______
Jersey C ity................................. —..........
75
73
72
71
70
Toledo
_________________________
Washington
Cleveland
Columbus _ ____ _______________
Kansas City, M o _ _________________
93
89
86
83
83
Seattle
Denver
St. TiOiiis___
St. Paul....... ..............................................
Louisville............................................... .
70
70
69
64
58
Portland, Oreg_______________________
T,os Angeles
Detroit
Providence
„
.
.......
Pan TiYanciscn ,
83
81
78
77
77
Rochester...................................................
Indianapolis _________ _____________
New Y ork_____ _____ _______________
Boston__________ _____ ________ ______
Pittsburgh__________________ ______
New Orleans.............................................
54
50
47
42
35
28
.
. .
i Data are from National Archives, Files of Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, W eekly Statistical
Report. Statistics Branch, General Staff, W ar Department,, June 7,1919.
Throughout the period of helping the ex-service men to find em
ployment, the Employment Service and, later, the War Department
had the active cooperation of many private agencies. Thus the
difficulty of keeping careful records of registrations and placements
was multiplied. However, the War Department collected and re
viewed these records and from them made the best possible estimates
of the results of this work. They are used here because it is believed
that they may prove useful in current attempts to provide for any
similar situation at the close of World War II.
The statistics in tables 19 and 20, taken from the registrations and
placements as reported by the Provost Marshal General, cover the
13 months from December 1918 through December 1919. As they are
based upon reports from 500 cities and towns, the State totals are
incomplete. Some States cooperated better than others, and this
may account for the low rate of registration in some States; in most
cases where the rate is low, however, labor shortages continued for
some time after the war. It is probable that the inclusion of hundreds
of additional communities would change only slightly the relationship
between men registered and men placed.
64
T able 19.— Percent o f Servicemen Registered fo r Jobs in 1919 and Rate o f Placement, by
States, December 1918-D ecem ber 2 7 , 1919
Region and State
United States
_
_
Discharged men regis
tered for jobs *
Total men contributed to
armed forces
Registered
prior to N ov.
Estimated as percent
1,1918»
o f State
number
total in
services
Ratio of
men
placed
to men
applying
4,009,129
1,482.384
37
70
New England...................................................................
M aine................... .........................................
N ew Hampshire............................ m........................
Vermont— ...............................................................
Massachusetts...........................................................
Connecticut...............................................................
R hode Island............................................................
287,384
26,602
14,970
11,223
167,101
55,218
22,270
192,538
21,827
4,930
3,752
99,757
42,085
20,187
67
82
33
33
64
76
91
64
81
90
90
59
60
64
M iddle Atlantic...............................................................
N ew Y ork .......................................................
N ew Jersey........ .......................................................
Pennsylvania............................................................
842,216
410,569
118,350
313,297
401,283
244,957
51,815
104,511
48
60
44
33
66
62
74
72
South A tlantic.............. .................................................
Delaware..................... .............................................
District of Columbia........... ..................................
Virginia.....................................................................
West Virginia............... ...........................................
M aryland.................................................................
North Carolina.........................................................
South Carolina........................................................
Georgia.................................................................
Florida..................................................................
464,222
7,985
17,945
78,524
55,895
51,700
74,705
54,284
86,973
36,211
107,940
4,652
19,116
16,542
7,488
21,698
8,570
5,427
16,000
8,447
23
58
107
21
13
42
12
IQ
18
23
65
76
84
81
80
73
49
67
68
74
East North Central.......................................................
Illinois........................................................
Indiana..................................................... .
M ichigan................................. .................................
Ohio...............................................................
Wisconsin.................................................................
827,153
272,235
104,973
142,397
205,852
101,696
269,018
93,503
27,075
59,322
68,892
20,226
33
34
26
42
34
20
74
74
72
74
76
72
W est North Central.......................................................
Iowa............................................................................
Kansas........................................................................
Minnesota............................................................
M issouri.. .................................................................
N ebraska..................................................................
North Dakota...........................................................
South Dakota...........................................................
522,455
101,638
66,645
106,918
140,257
49,614
27,253
30,130
139,942
20,387
13,995
21,429
59,022
18,213
4,617
2,279
27
20
21
20
42
37
17
8
74
58
69
86
74
88
57
86
East South Central.......................................................
Alabama........................................................
K entucky..................................................................
Mississippi...............................................................
Tennessee..................................................................
288,405
73,543
77,983
56,740
80,139
64,753
18,364
14,840
12,557
18,992
23
25
19
22 ,
24
72
84
74
74
59
West South C entral.._________________
Arkansas..................................................................
Louisiana...............................................................
Oklahoma _
Texas.................................................................
395,552
65,311
71,271
84,909
174,061
90,933
28,111
7,928
25,076
29,818
23
43
11
30
17
78
79
83
84
69
Mountain..........................................................................
Arizona...................................................................
Colorado............................................................
Idaho..........................................................................
M on ta n a .................................................................
N ew M exico..............................................................
N evada......................................................................
Utah....... .................................................................
W y om in g .................................................................
160,395
11,410
38,751
20,467
39,049
13,586
5,488
19,421
12,223
59,868
4,969
18,534
2,654
17,797
2,350
892
4,541
8,131
37
44
48
13
46
17
16
23
67
75
83
76
79
79
64
81
55
73
Pacific................................................................................
California................................................................
Oregon........................................................................
W ashington...............................................................
221,347
131,484
34,430
55,433
156,109
79,124
36,548
40,527
71
60
106
84
78
94
87
73
1Second Report of Provost Marshal General, December 20,1918 (Appendix table 79 A , p. 468).
* War Department, Report of Service and Information Branch, War Plans Division, from November
11,1918, to December 81,1919.
65
The proportion of placements for cities within a State frequently
showed considerable variation from the State average. The char
acter of the industries in the surrounding area undoubtedly explains
some of this difference; manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and
forestry provided employment in varying degrees from place to place
and from time to time. Cities which had been almost wholly engaged
in the manufacture of munitions had a great deal of civilian unemploy
ment and yet some of them show a high rate of placement for service
men. Cities in trading areas differed from cities in manufacturing
areas; coastal cities differed from inland cities; small communities,
from larger places. Some cities where there was considerable indus
trial strife varied from the less turbulent cities.
Table 20 shows these variations for selected cities in certain States.
T
able
2 0 . — Rate o f Placement o f Discharged Servicemen in 1919 , in Selected Cities
State and city
Esti
Ratio of
mated
number
place
of service ments to
regis
men reg
trations
istered
for jobs
New England
South Atlantic— Continued
Massachusetts___
Boston............
New Bedford.
Lawrence____
Fall R iver___
Lynn..............
L o w ell...........
Worcester___
Springfield...
99,757
45,474
9.501
4,048
3,004
3,816
2,726
1,185
3,650
59
58
68
54
66
41
55
103
33
Connecticut.........
N ew H aven..
Hartford____
W aterbury—.
BridgeportNew BritainN ew London.
42,085
4,623
3,454
2,522
4,451
2,687
1,375
60
52
62
68
38
46
51
244,957
161,269
16,505
18,185
3,501
4,116
2,441
1,287
2,451
62
58
75
82
73
62
57
41
61
New Jersey.........
Newark........
Jersey C ity~
Patterson___
Passaic..........
Camden____
Dover............
51,815
15,446
9,807
6,355
2,049
3,960
906
74
76
68
54
76
64
100
Pennsylvania. _ .
Philadelphia.
Pittsburgh-.
Scranton___
Bethlehem-.
Allentown__
Erie...............
Lancaster. __
104,511
33,948
13,773
5,554
2,509
1,090
1,644
1,055
72
64
49
75
97
83
53
66
8,570
1,883
4,307
49
76
Middle Atlantic
New Y ork............
N ew Y ork City.
Brooklyn...........
Buffalo...............
SchenectadyRochester___
A lbany..........
Utica..............
T ro y ...............
South Atlantic
North Carolina........... .
W ilmington...........
Charlotte.............. .
State and city
Esti
mated
Ratio of
number
place
of service ments to
men reg
regis
istered
trations
for jobs
28
South Carolina— ........... ........
Charleston.-.................... .
Columbia___ ____ ___ _
5,427
2,909
2,286
67
73
59
West Virginia_______________
Wheeling______ ______
Charleston..........................
Clarksburg...... ............... —
7,488
2,663
1,783
564
86
Illinois........ .......................... .
Chicago________ ________
E lgin....................................
Rockford........... ...............
Joliet................................
Bloomington......................
93,503
70,834
3,238
2,989
2,601
1,61"
74
67
93
99
72
49
Indiana.
Indianapolis_____________
Fort W ayne......... .............
East Chicago____________
South B end__________ _
Ham m ond______ ____ _
27,075
12,973
3,694
776
712
520
72
67
70
106
M ic h ig a n __
74
75
66
74
80
85
54
East North Central
Saginaw...............................
59,322
33,888
3,491
2,724
Ohio............................................
Cleveland...........................
Cincinnati...........................
Toledo.................................
D ayton................................
Columbus...........................
Akron...... ........ ................ .
Youngstown.......................
Canton................................
11,669
8,941
8,371
7,2 r
5,173
2,949
2,759
619
W is c o n s in
,
M ilw a u k e e
20,226
9,203
_____
Detroit.................................
G r a n d 'R a p id s
. . . . . .
_
_
Racine.................................
Qreen B ay..........................
1, 5<"
1,052
86
46
76
67
77
78
84
73
81
76
100
72
74
80
54
West North Central
Iowa...................
Des Moines.
Davenport.
Dubuque—
20,387
7,680
2,640
2,051
58
46
83
56
66
T able 20.— Rate o f Placement o f Discharged Servicemen in 1919, in Selected Cities—
Continued
State and city
W est
Esti
Ratio of
mated
number
place
of service ments to
men reg
regis
istered
trations
for jobs
North Central—Con.
W est
Minnesota
Minneapolis
D u lu th *.......................... —
St. Cloud
21,429
6'887
2'448
i; 339
86
105
58
81
M is s o u r i.__ _______________
St. Louis________________
Kansas C ity.......................
Joplin...... ............................
59,022
38,324
261
743
74
82
52
78
Kansas________ _____________
Transas C ity
W ichita........................... .
13,995
4,948
2,213
69
65
56
Nebraska....................................
Omaha............... — ............
Lincoln. _.
18,213
15,183
700
•88
86
93
Alabama....................................
Birmingham____________
M obile.................... ...........
18,364
12,356
5,454
84
79
95
Mississippi...... ........................
12,557
5,506
4,627
____
Meridian________________
Tennessee________ ________
N a s h v ille
M e m p h i s ________________
69
58
86
82
86
71
62
18,534
11,555
3,500
76
82
63
California...................................
San Francisco.....................
Oakland..............................
Los Angeles........................
San Diego_______________
Fresno______________
Sacramento__________
79,124
22,793
10,762
18,451
3,249
2,342
1,467
78
74
85
81
89
60
73
74
82
63
Oregon____________________ _
Portland______________ _
36,458
21,840
1,640
94
96
78
18,992
7,682
6,412
59
61
48
W a s h in g to n
40,527
17,401
5,595
3,230
860
87
68
81
126
97
28, 111
23,503
2,800
79
83
60
W est South Central
Arkansas_______ •_.....................
Little R ock....... ..................
Texarkana______________
South Central—Con.
Texas.......... ..............................
Beaumont_______________
H o u s to n ............................
Fort W orth........................
Dallas........................... .......
E l Paso................................
Denison
29,818
7,450
4,300
3,744
2,673
2,023
1,181
East South Central
J a c k s o n ..
State and city
Esti
mated
Ratio of
number
place
of service ments to
men reg
regis
istered
trations
for jobs
Mountain
Colorado___ ____ ___________
Denver.
Pueblo____ ________ ____
Pacific
S a le m .
......
Seattle______________
___
T a com a ....... ............ .........
Wenatchee.........................
S p o k a n e ______
Highly trained men with technical and professional skills were the
most difficult to place. These included officers drawn from civilian
life and young men who acquired special skills during their service.
Such men with special qualifications included civil and mechanical
engineers, accountants, architects, executives, and administrators.
Although positions were not readily available for such men during
the period of business uncertainty, the War Department gave this
matter special attention. Contact was made with business firms,
especially those in the neighborhood of the soldiers’ homes, and
special effort was made to bring together the man and the job. There
were more than 25,000 registrations for this type of serviceman,
and about 7,800 or slightly more than one-third, obtained employ
ment.
The staff which had functioned under Colonel Woods devoted the
latter months of 1919 to meeting the difficult situations which the
Provost Marshal General had foreseen when he recommended de
centralized demobilization.
67
A D M IN IS T R A T IO N
O F W A R R I S K IN S U R A N C E
In September 1914, the War Risk Insurance Bureau of the Treasury
was created. This legislation was amended in October 1917 and
greatly extended the benefits available to the servicemen and their
families. The chief additions were:
(a) Pay allotments and family allowances.
(b) Insurance against death or total disability.
(c) Compensation for death and disability.
(d) Rehabilitation and reeducation. (This provision was further
extended when the Federal Board for Vocational Education was
created under an act approved June 27, 1918.)
The act of October 1917 was effective November 1, giving officials
little time to assemble trained personnel, prepare the necessary forms,
regulations, and instructions essential to the administration of this
act. The United States had made no such provisions during earlier
wars. There was no earlier experience to serve as a guide. The
result was chaotic. The determination of eligibility for the several
benefits was in itself a prodigious task. There was also the problem
of Liberty Bonds, of pay in arrears, etc. Decentralization to the
States and to the district or local draft boards would have greatly
minimized the errors and delays.
At the close of 1919 the War Department's contribution to the
demobilization of the soldier was completed. Other agencies con
tinued with their replacement in civil life, and by the end of 1919
there was no necessity for an able-bodied man to be idle. Industry
had revived; educational institutions were inviting men to complete
their educations; and the feeding of this country and of the devastated
areas of Europe stimulated agriculture.
The Chief of Staff in his report to the Secretary of War for 1919
said: “ Undoubtedly the country has incurred much expense and has
lost many lives on account of the improvisations which were inevitable
on account of its lack of preparedness for war, and it is essential that
the lessons which have crystallized out of the experience of the War
Department as of other great agencies directly concerned in the war
be heeded and profited by if this tremendous toll of wealth and of life
is not to have been in vain."
Conclusion
America's share (1917-18) in the winning of the first World War was
made possible by the efforts of the millions of men and women, indus
trial workers, and soldiers whose immediate post-war fortunes have
been the subject of this discussion.
These individuals had little or no part in shaping the policies which
accounted for the confused and sometimes tumultuous events of this
brief interlude in their lives. Where policies were sound, where
reason prevailed, there was little publicity and men went quietly
about their business. Where there was no strong policy, no balanced
farsighted program, mistaken judgments frequently led to extreme
measures on the part of both workers and their employers.
Had there been a carefully planned post-war production program
strongly supported by Government and industry, ready to function
when the war ended, some of the post-war unemployment could have
68
been avoided, and the agitated war psychology would have been more
readily replaced by the normal reactions of peacetime. It is doubtful,
however, whether any program devised by the most wise and patient
of men would have prevented a considerable degree of turmoil as
men turned away from the tensions of war to the less exciting routine
of the workaday world.
The informed reader will recognize the existence today of situations
similar to, if not identical with, those underlying the events of the
early months of 1919. The importance of working together now—
Government, labor, and industry— to be prepared for the heavy de
mands of the post-war readjustment is evidenced by this record of
undirected demobilization of manpower.
I. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE* 19 44
@FedFRASER