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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • EL PASO BRANCH

ISSUE 2 • 2007

Crossroads
E C ONOM IC T R E NDS I N T HE DESER T SO U T H W ES T

El Paso Economy
Sluggish in 2007:
U.S. Slowdown
Outweighs
Fort Bliss
Expansion

T

his has been a disappointing year for El Paso
in terms of job growth. Through October, the city
added only 1,200 new wage and salary jobs, according to seasonally adjusted data, an annualized
growth rate of less than 1 percent.1 The seasonally
adjusted unemployment rate remained at a historically low level of 5.4 percent in October, but progress
in lowering the rate further stalled at midyear.
El Paso’s job growth over the past decade has
had a strong positive correlation with the U.S. business cycle (Chart 1).2 El Paso’s industrial roots and
continued economic ties to the Mexican maquiladora industry keep the city closely linked to the U.S.
factory system. A broad slowdown in U.S. growth—
jobs grew at a 1.1 percent rate through October—
has been under way for over a year and provides the
backdrop to sluggish local growth.
However, some elements of El Paso’s economic
performance are specific to the city. For example,
the major factor behind lower U.S. growth is the
housing bust, an event whose effects vary widely in
markets across the country, and El Paso has its own
story to tell. Further, economic neighbor Mexico has
broken out of the mold of mechanically following the
U.S. business cycle, with surprisingly good growth
continuing in that country. And the maquiladora industry has at least held its own across the border in
Ciudad Juárez, with job growth flat in recent months.
Finally, El Paso has high expectations built up by the
Fort Bliss expansion. It is an economic boom that
is still waiting to happen; the stimulus is unfolding
more slowly than initially forecast.

Housing Turns Down

U.S. economic growth slowed in the middle of
2006, with the gross domestic product expanding at
annualized rates of 2.4, 1.1, 2.1 and 0.6 percent in
consecutive quarters. Growth bounced back in the
second and third quarters of this year to around 4
percent but is widely expected to slip back to near 2
to 2.5 percent in coming quarters. Sluggish auto sales
and a major downturn in the housing market are the
major reasons for the diminished pace of economic
growth. On average, over the last five quarters the

Chart 1

Job Growth in El Paso Slows Along with U.S.
U.S.

Percent

El Paso

3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3

’97

’98

’99

’00

’01

’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

NOTE: December-to-December growth; 2007 through October at annualized rate.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, with adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

decline in residential investment
alone has subtracted nearly 1 percent from GDP growth.
The housing downturn unfolded in two steps.
The first stage was a rapid
price appreciation in many metropolitan markets, the product of
low-interest rates that drove demand, and land-use and building
restrictions that limited the supply of new homes in many markets. Price appreciation turned
into a price bubble in selected
markets, mostly on the East and
West coasts, and the bubbles began to burst in 2006 as potential
buyers were increasingly priced
out of the market.
For example, in late 1999, 43
percent of families in Los Angeles
could afford to buy and finance a
median-priced home (Table 1).3 By

Table 1

Percentage of Local Families
That Can Afford Median-Priced Home

Los Angeles
New York
Miami
Chicago
Dallas
Houston
Atlanta

1999
Fourth
quarter
43
55
59
61
64
66
73

2007
Third
quarter
4
7
11
40
54
47
64

SOURCE: Wells Fargo Housing Opportunity
Index.

	

the third quarter of this year, only
4 percent could do so. New York
and Miami follow a similar pattern,
while more developer-friendly cities like Atlanta, Houston and Dallas saw limited appreciation relative to income, even in the face of
strong economic growth and surging home demand. As these local
price bubbles burst, the resulting
decline in metropolitan housing markets was uneven across
metro areas but big enough in aggregate to be a macroeconomic
event, with double-digit declines
nationally in new and existing
home sales, residential starts and
permits.
El Paso was part of the problem. Local home prices jumped
43 percent between 2004 and the
third quarter of this year. In first
quarter 2004, over 70 percent of

El Pasoans could afford a medianpriced home. This fell to less than
30 percent early this year and
to nearly 20 percent in the third
quarter. Part of the price escalation was local and out-of-town
speculation driven by the Fort
Bliss expansion.
The second stage of housing
problems began in August, when
subprime, low-documentation and
other high-interest-rate lending
was abruptly curtailed as a result of credit problems spreading
through financial markets. This
high-interest lending had been instrumental in fueling home-price
escalation by stretching the normal lending standards and greatly
expanding the number of potential buyers. As these financing vehicles disappeared, they sharply
narrowed the number of potential
buyers.
Table 2 shows the percentage
of new mortgages by metro area
in 2006 that were originated using high-interest loans, defined as
mortgage lending at rates 3 percent or more above the yields on
prevailing Treasury securities of
similar duration.4 Selected major
metro areas are listed on the left;
regional cities are on the right.
Texas border cities, including El
Paso, relied heavily on high-interest lending last year and now find
a significant fraction of those potential customers excluded from
the market.

Table 2

Use of High-Cost Mortgages for Originations by Metro Area, 2006
Major cities
Detroit
Miami
Los Angeles
Las Vegas
Chicago
Atlanta
New York
Boston
Philadelphia
San Francisco

Percent
52.94
50.07
34.69
31.06
27.33
24.37
21.65
19.88
16.74
13.32

Regional cities
McAllen
Laredo
Brownsville
El Paso
Phoenix
Tucson
Las Cruces
Albuquerque

Percent
54.25
49.00
47.37
37.18
30.33
20.14
17.44
17.10

NOTE: A high-cost mortgage is one that yields 3 percent above prevailing Treasury securities.
SOURCE: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.

Crossroads

Both new- and existing-home
sales slowed sharply this year in
El Paso, with the top of the market hurt worse than the less expensive end. Existing-home sales
were down 21 percent in October
versus a year earlier; the number
of houses on the market jumped
70 percent in the same period.
Builders have pulled back sharply
on new construction and, in some
cases, are returning lots to developers. As seen in Chart 2, the
number of single-family permits
issued in El Paso has been falling steadily all year, taking away
an important source of recent
growth for the city.

Mexico and the Maquiladoras

Another source of El Paso’s
slowing economy is the maquiladora industry. Maquiladora
employment in Ciudad Juárez
in 2006 grew more rapidly than
in any other Texas border city,
adding over 12,000 jobs. But this
year, job growth has come to a
standstill as slower U.S. economic
growth cast a chill over the Mexican maquiladora system—including Juárez.
Mexico’s maquiladoras are
intimately tied to U.S. industrial production. Chart 3 shows
how U.S. industrial production
has driven maquiladora employment since 1990, including the
big downturn of 2000–03, when
the industry lost nearly a quarter
million jobs. The downturn was
partly cyclical, coinciding with
the 2001 recession in the U.S., but
it was also forced by the advent of
low-wage competition from China
and other Asian, Caribbean and
Central American countries.5
This low-wage competition
forced heavy job losses in apparel,
textiles, toys and other low-wage
industries. It took several years for
the maquiladora industry to work
through these losses and find firm
footing again in products in which
Mexico has a competitive advantage. These include products that

Issue 2 • 2007

Chart 2

Single-Family Building Permit Trend Down in El Paso
Number of permits
500

12-month average

450

Monthly

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

’95

’96

’97

’98

’99

’00

’01

’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

SOURCES: Census Bureau; Haver Analytics.

benefit from proximity to the U.S.,
like big-screen television sets and
appliances; products with a high
ratio of value-added to labor content, like medical instruments;
and products that contain intellectual property to be protected.
From 2003 to 2006, maquiladoras
again followed the lead of a strong
U.S. economy until a cyclical
slowdown gripped the industry
again this year.
Juárez’ maquiladora employment is shown in Chart 4. Mexico’s
chief statistical agency stopped
publishing maquiladora employment as of last October, but a
similar data series is available
from the Mexican Social Security
Institute.6 This series (also shown

in Chart 4) is for all manufacturing,
but maquiladoras dominate manufacturing in Juárez. This series indicates that employment in Juárez
factories turned flat this year and
remains in a no-growth pattern.
The importance of maquiladoras to El Paso is indicated by the
orange line in Chart 4, which shows
the Dallas Fed’s index of coincident economic activity, a measure
of the local business cycle.7 El Paso
provides myriad services to maquiladoras in real estate, warehousing, transportation, logistics, computer systems, management and
other services. This is true for all
Texas border cities and their Mexican neighbors; the general rule of
thumb is that a 10 percent increase

Chart 3

Maquiladora Employment Mirrors U.S. Industrial Production
Index, 2002 = 100

Number of workers
1,500,000

120

1,300,000

110

1,100,000
900,000

Maquiladora employment

100
U.S. Industrial Production Index

90

700,000

80

500,000

70

300,000

60

100,000
’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07

50

SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.



euro exchange rate that is highly
favorable to European buyers.

Chart 4

El Paso Follows Maquiladora Industry
Number of workers

Index, October 1980 = 100
200

350,000
El Paso Business-Cycle Index

190

300,000

180
170

Juárez manufacturing employment

250,000

160
150

200,000

140
150,000

130

100,000
50,000

120

Juárez maquiladora employment

110
100

’90

’91

’92

’93

’94

’95

’96

’97

’98

’99

’00

’01

’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social;
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.

in production in a neighboring Mexican city will increase employment
in the bordering U.S. city by 1 to 2
percent. This influence is apparent
in the pattern of recent changes in
El Paso’s economic activity. The
recent loss of maquiladora momentum means that El Paso has been
unable to count on another key
source of economic stimulus during 2007.
Mexico is important to El Paso
well beyond the maquiladoras, although these manufacturing plants
probably stand at the top of the
list. General economic stability is
important in bringing the Mexican
shopper to El Paso. Throughout
the decades, about 14 percent of
El Paso’s retail sales have been to
Mexican shoppers, most crossing
bridges from Juárez. Economic
stability provides confidence to
the Mexican consumer and is fundamental to maintaining a strong
peso. Mexico’s currency has held
steady between 10 and 11 pesos
per dollar since 2003, with little
change in 2007.
Mexico’s economic performance has been—and is expected
to remain—much better than might
be anticipated given a sweeping
U.S. economic slowdown. The influence of U.S. industrial production
extends beyond the maquiladoras,
and it’s fair to say that the U.S. has
been the major driver of the Mexi-



can economy in recent years. This
is because over 90 percent of Mexican exports go to the U.S., and over
80 percent of those exports are industrial products.
However, Mexico has enjoyed
solid GDP growth near 3 percent
in 2007, and expectations are that
this growth will continue and pick
up slightly in 2008 (Table 3). This
separation from the recent slowdown in the U.S. economy is based
on the continued growth of the
domestic Mexican economy and
strong consumption, driven in part
by oil revenues. It is also based
on strong exports to Europe that
filled in any shrinkage in the U.S.
export market (Chart 5). Just as
U.S. exports have soared because
of a strong dollar against the euro,
Mexican exports have followed the
same strong path based on a peso/

Table 3

Forecasts for Mexican
Economic Growth
(Percent, annual)

Banamex
Bancomer
Banco de México*
International
Monetary Fund

2007
3.4
3.2
3.0

2008
3.8
3.9
3.4

2.9

3.0

*Private domestic and international economic
analysts surveyed by Banco de México.
SOURCES: Banamex, Bancomer, Banco de
México, IMF.

Fort Bliss

In 2005, the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) Commission
put a number of West Texas and
southern New Mexico military facilities up for review: Fort Bliss
in El Paso, White Sands Missile
Range near Las Cruces, Holloman
Air Force Base in Alamogordo and
Cannon Air Force Base in Clovis.
Perhaps in testament to the military’s need for open land and clear
skies for maneuvers, all but one of
these regional facilities will remain
staffed at pre-BRAC levels.
The only one that won’t stay
at pre-BRAC levels is Fort Bliss,
which emerged as a significant
winner in terms of size and employment. The initial plan was to add
11,500 troops and civilian employees to the 8,500 already assigned
to the base, bringing total employment to 20,000. This would result
from moving the 1st Armored Division from Germany to El Paso, with
these gains partly offset by the loss
of the Army’s Air Defense Artillery
School to Oklahoma.
Subsequent announcements
have added a combat brigade to
Fort Bliss, as well as artillery, aviation and other support units for the
1st Armored. These units will take
the initial plan raising Fort Bliss
employment by 11,500 to one that
adds 20,000 troops and civilians.
This would triple the size of Fort
Bliss to 30,000 by 2012. The Army
is planning a $2.6 billion expansion on the base for living facilities,
headquarters and administrative
space, dining facilities, aircraft hangars, barracks and various range
improvements. In addition, the city
and state are planning and financing extensive road upgrades to improve base access. Local school districts must provide for the 27,000
family members who will accompany the relocating troops.
In 2006, Fort Bliss saw an addition of nearly 4,000 troops. The

Crossroads

bulk of these troops were the result
of a newly formed combat brigade
under the 1st Cavalry. The net addition of military and civilian jobs
in 2007 was fewer than 1,000, and
much of this stimulus was likely
offset by the deployment of thousands of troops to Iraq. Original
plans to have much of the expansion complete by 2010 have been
delayed to 2012, and the biggest
years for base expansion—perhaps
accounting for 14,000 of the 20,000
increase—will not come until 2010
and 2011.
The promise of a significant
economic expansion and even an
economic boom driven by Fort
Bliss remains firmly in place. If
we assume that the expansion will
add roughly 40,000 new jobs over
the long term, both directly at Fort
Bliss and indirectly through economic multipliers in the community, this single event adds the same
number of jobs as were added from
all sources in El Paso during 1997–
2005.8 The arrival of new military
and civilian jobs in El Paso may be
slower than originally anticipated,
but the wave of infrastructure expansion on the base, on the roads
and in the school districts is just
beginning. It will provide substantial stimulus for El Paso’s construction sector over the next several
years.
Also, the expansion carries the
promise of new technology jobs

for the city because the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team will
be formed at Fort Bliss. This unit
will be the test ground for future
combat technologies using robotics and information systems, and it
should attract an array of military
contractors and consultants eager
to be near this activity during the
test and evaluation process. The
city hopes to capitalize on this new
nucleus of technology development
and testing to form a growing cluster of associated knowledge-based
businesses.

of another 2,500 jobs on the base
should provide enough momentum
for a better 2008 locally. The year
will remain something of a tug-ofwar between slow national growth
and Fort Bliss spending.
—Jesus Cañas
Robert W. Gilmer
Charles James

Looking Forward

Notes

Expectations are high for economic stimulus from the Fort Bliss
expansion, but this stimulus arrived
too late to avoid a significant economic slowdown in 2007. Sluggish
growth in the U.S. industrial sector,
a housing downturn that spread to
El Paso and a flat year for the maquiladora industry all conspired to
pull El Paso’s job growth down to
less than 1 percent through October.
Improvement should be slow
but steady into 2008. The U.S.
economy is not expected to lend
a lot of help in 2008. The consensus for the year centers on belowpotential 2.5 percent GDP growth
and an industrial sector that will
perform well below the long-run
average. But infrastructure expansion at Fort Bliss and the arrival

Cañas is an assistant economist and
James is a research assistant at the
El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Gilmer is a vice
president and senior economist at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

1

2

3

4

5

Chart 5

Mexican Exports to Europe Replace Shrinkage in Exports to U.S.
Index, March 2000 = 100
(three-month moving average)
300
Exports to U.S.
250

6

Exports to European Union

7

200
150
100
8

50
0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

The payroll job growth cited here does not
include military employment but only civilian government jobs. See the discussion
later in the article on military employment
at Fort Bliss.
Over the previous 10 years, El Paso’s payroll employment has averaged only 0.9
percent growth annually, compared with
1.1 percent for the U.S. and 1.9 percent
for Texas.
The definition of median income used in
these calculations is taken from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The methodology changed in 2005,
making comparisons before and after 2005
not strictly comparable. For the sweeping
changes we are trying to illustrate here,
it is unlikely that the methodology difference would alter the picture in a meaningful way.
These figures were compiled directly from
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data for
calendar year 2006, which provide highinterest rate lending by metropolitan
area. These are for origination of conventional mortgages (excluding governmentguaranteed loans) on one- to four-family
homes. Refinanced and mobile homes are
excluded. See www.ffiec.gov.
For details on the maquiladora’s recent
history, see “Maquiladora Recovery: Lessons for the Future,” by Jesus Cañas,
Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest
Economy, March/April 2007.
See “Mexican Reform Clouds View of Key
Industry,” by Jesus Cañas and Robert W.
Gilmer, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Southwest Economy, May/June 2007.
This measure averaged a 1.3 percent annual increase over the last 10 years in El
Paso, and it has grown at a 1.9 percent annual rate for the first 10 months of 2007. It
is a weighted average of changes in local
payroll employment, the unemployment
rate, real income and real retail sales.
Based on total employment calculations
(including military) from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Regional Economic
Information System.

SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.

Issue 2 • 2007



Correction: Low-Wage
Occupations in El Paso
In “Low-Wage Occupations Remain a Hallmark of El Paso Economy,”
which appeared in the last issue of
Crossroads (Issue 1, 2007), two tables
contained errors that did not affect the
article’s conclusions.
In Table 1, wages and salaries
per worker were inadvertently shown
rather than per capita income. The new
figures do not change El Paso’s low
ranking due to an income level near
two-thirds of the U.S. average, nor is

Regional Economic
Indicators

the city’s ranking improved by adjustments for the cost of living.
Table 2 contained errors in the calculation of income growth for El Paso,
McAllen and Albuquerque. El Paso’s
growth in real wages per worker was
significantly stronger than indicated in
the earlier calculations, matching the
U.S. However, growth in real wages
per worker in El Paso continued to lag
its peer cities—including Albuquerque
and McAllen.

Monitor economic activity
in Texas, major metros and
border cities with the Texas
Business-Cycle Indexes.

Posted monthly
www.dallasfed.org

Per Capita Income Among El Paso’s Peer Cities, 2005
Per capita
income (dollars)
41,577
35,624
34,685
32,770
31,464
30,898
30,884
30,844
30,810
29,654
29,464
23,256
16,359

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Adjusted for cost of living
Per capita
income (dollars)
Rank
39,335
1
37,979
3
38,241
2
34,386
5
*
*
35,312
4
31,938
7
31,831
8
32,397
6
29,044
10
30,982
9
26,043
11
19,686
12

*ACCRA data unavailable in 2005.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Council for Community and Economic Research,
ACCRA Cost of Living Index; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.

Table 2

Increases in Real Wages, Salaries and Benefits per Worker, 1999–2005
U.S. metros Peer cities
Real wages per worker 1999
Real wages per worker 2005
Percent of U.S. average 2005

$47,387
$51,877
100

$38,702
$42,533
82.0

Annual percentage increase
Nominal wages
– Inflation
= Real wages
– Employment
= Real wages per worker

4.5
2.2
2.3
.5
1.7

4.9
2.2
2.7
.9
1.9

El Paso

McAllen Albuquerque

$34,287
$37,440
72.2

$28,773
$30,761
59.3

4.6
2.2
2.4
.7
1.7

8.9
2.2
6.8
4.6
2.2

NOTES: Real wages are in 2005 dollars; percentage changes may not add up due to rounding.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.



Dallas Fed
Web Site

at

Table 1

Sarasota, Fla.
Raleigh, N.C.
Tulsa, Okla.
Little Rock, Ark.
Greensboro, N.C.
Knoxville, Tenn.
Albuquerque, N.M.
Charleston, S.C.
Columbia, S.C.
Baton Rouge, La.
Greenville, S.C.
El Paso, Texas
McAllen, Texas

on the

$39,839
$43,810
84.4
5.4
2.3
3.1
1.2
2.0

Crossroads
ECONOMIC TRENDS IN
THE DESERT SOUTHWEST

Issue 2 • 2007
Crossroads is published by the El Paso
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas. The views expressed are those
of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the positions of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System.
Subscriptions are available free of
charge. Please direct requests for
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changes to the Public Affairs Department, El Paso Branch, Federal Reserve
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Paso, TX 79901-1326; call 915-5215233; fax 915-521-5228; or subscribe
via the Internet at www.dallasfed.org.
Articles may be reprinted on the condition that the source is credited and a
copy of the publication containing the
reprinted material is provided to the
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Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Crossroads is available on the Bank’s
web site at www.dallasfed.org.
Editor: Robert W. Gilmer
Associate Editor: Kathy Thacker
Graphic Designer: Samantha Coplen

Crossroads