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A - .- . _ _

ASSAYS ON ISSUES

T H E FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF CHICAGO

SEPTEMBER 19K7
NUMBER I

Chicago Fed Letter
T h e ordeal of change:
W o rk in g it out
in the Midwest
The Midwest has been undergoing a
costly but necessary process of rebuild­
ing its economy. This ordeal of change
has dramatically altered state develop­
ment policies in recent years.
Economic change in the 1930s has been
something of a puzzle in the Midwest.
The decade began with two short but
severe recessions, which raised fears of
a collapse of the region's economy. But
a strong economic expansion by mid­
decade prompted some commentators
to predict an economic renaissance for
the Midwest comparable to the New
England experience a decade earlier.
Clearly, both images of the Midwest
were distorted by a failure to isolate
long-term economic forces—the kind
economists call “structural
changes’’—
from short-term economic
forces, such as the business cycle.

dow ns and dampened the ups. Among
the most important of these forces were
rising international competition, the
energy' dislocations of the 1970s, and a
general shift in the nation’s economic
center of gravity low'ard the SouLh and
West. Making matters worse, an
unsustainable boom in agriculture went
bust.
The effects of these structural forces
were often masked in the beginning by
the short-term business cycle. But the
results of structural change were cu­
mulative. Businesses failed or cut back;
whole industries stagnated or declined:
unemployment remained stubbornly

in the sense that its output shrank rel­
ative to the rest of the country, but that
its output declined in absolute terms.
Now, in 1987, the Midwest has found
that the U.S. economy is much less
dependent on its industrial heartland
than it had been for most of the twen­
tieth century.
This decline in manufacturing output
was not accompanied by a shift from
manufacturing to service output. In
the Midwest, manufacturing's share of
the economy has remained fairly stable
over the years, as it has at the national
level. The Midwest's nonmanufactur­
ing output, including services, however,

State policymakers have been caught
in the middle of these economic forces,
trying to develop long-run strategies at
a time when short-run resources have
been dwindling. Policymakers have
begun to lake a fresh look at their
states' economies and to design new',
more flexible policies that meet the
needs of the 1980s. The new ap­
proaches are a direct result of a better
understanding of how their states’
economies are changing.
The changing economic
environment
The economy of the region (defined
here as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan and Wisconsin) received
more than its share of battering by the
ups and downs of the business cycle.
Structural changes amplified those

high, and some people “voted with
their feet,’’ emigrating South and West
to warmth and work. The figures
eventually told the story: Midwest
manufacturing output began a declin­
ing trend after 1970. Manufacturing
output in the rest of the nation was
relatively stable. Thus, the Midwest
has been “deindustrializing," not only

has lagged the national growth rate,
even declining 10 percent between
1978 and 1982. As a result, the decline
in manufacturing output has not meant
that the Midwest is any less dependent
on its manufacturing sector.
The general effect was not merely eco­
nomically depressing, it was psycho-

logically depressing. In gloomily as­
sessing the Midwest, business analysts
rounded up the usual suspects—
aging
manufacturing plants, high wages and
taxes, climate, stodgy management—
and characterized the region as old,
cold, and rusting.
What was sometimes forgotten is the
economic adage: “the market works.”
Economic forces in the long-run tend
to move regional growth rates toward
the national average—that is, regional
growth rates tend to converge rather
than diverge. While the Midwest’s
economy has undergone often wrench­
ing changes, these changes ultimately
strengthen the region’s economy by
forcing businesses to be more efficient
in order to meet competition from out­
side the region. Without a clear
understanding of these economic forces,
state policymakers can not be effective.
New approaches to state policies
Deindustrialization forced state gov­
ernments to reshape their approaches
to development. Smokestack
chasing—ad hoc programs to attract
specific manufacturing plants to a
region—
proved not terribly useful.
Studies on the location decisions of
companies cast doubt on the long-run
effectiveness of state efforts to attract
businesses by offering them tax and fi­
nancing incentives. Such plans also
had the side effect of irritating the ex­
isting business community, which freauently argued that the newcomers
were being provided benefits at the ex­
pense of established businesses.
There are, of course, limits to what a
state can do to improve its own econ­
omy. Most of the structural forces af­
fecting states are national or interna­
tional in scope. Accordingly, states
have traditionally attempted to ease
the burden of structural change with
unemployment benefits, retraining
programs, and a wide range of social
services. But these are relatively pas­
sive responses.
There is a grow ing belief among state
policymakers that economic develop­
ment strategies can slow and even re­
verse economic decline. If this is
true—
and the jury is still out— can
it
only be true when public and private

decision makers have a clear view of
the strengths and weaknesses of their
state's economy and a solid under­
standing of the structural changes af­
fecting their state.
Since 1934, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, and Wisconsin have each
produced new development plans, de­
signed to address the structural changes
in their economies.1 Unlike their
“quick-fix” predecessors, these plans
are more strongly founded on data col­
lection and analysis and stress long­
term strategies. While each plan
reflects the unique features of its state,
three common themes emerge from
them:
1) A need to revitalize each stale’s
manufacturing sector,
2) A stress on technology transfer to
provide the spark for renewed grow th:
and
3) The nurturing of an economic cli­
mate in which firms can thrive.
The interest in manufacturing seems
appropriate, since the District histor­
ically has had its highest degree of eco­
nomic specialization in. and has

derived its highest contribution to,
value added from its manufacturing
sector. Moreover, the association be­
tween declining manufacturing output
and weakness in nonmanufacturing
and services suggests that attention fo­
cused on manufacturing will also bene­
fit nonmanufacturing. For example,
Michigan has targeted the automotive
industry' in an effort to assist in im­
proving the worldwide competitiveness
of the state’s most important industry.
One of the most effective ways to revi­
talize any economy is through techno­
logical advancement, the second
common theme of the states’ plans.
Stressing both the implementation of
existing technology, such as robotics
and computer-aided design and manu­
facturing (CAD/CAM), and the search
for new technology, policymakers hope
to assist industries in lowering labor
costs, improving productivity, and thus
boosting competitiveness. For exam­
ple, both Michigan and Illinois are
currently striving to attract a multi­
billion dollar subatomic research facilitv to their state. Indiana intends to set
up technology transfer centers to facili­
tate the transfer of new technology to
existing firms.

Finally, the attention to economic cli­
mate, the third common theme, is de­
signed to create an atmosphere that is
conducive to growth. The focus on a
state’s economic “climate" goes far be­
yond appeasing business people with
low taxes and tax abatement, which
have widely been challenged as effec­
tive tools for economic development.
Policymakers are becoming increas­
ingly aware that the quality of services
they provide affects their state’s
competitiveness. Like any other input
into the production process, poor qual­
ity in roads, water, and other types of
state-provided services can raise pro­
duction costs and reduce competitive­
ness. Moreover, poor quality of public
services inhibits the creation of new
firms and the attraction of out-of-state
firms, just as easily as it harms existing
firms.
In improving the region’s economic
climate, all types of firms—
large and
small, new and old—benefit, thus cre­
ating a balanced approach to quality
and cost of services for both existing
and new firms. For example, Illinois’
program allocates public funds to
infrastructure improvements and small
business loans while trying to keep
taxes in line with neighboring states.
Iowa’s plan, Rebuilding Iowa’s Economy,
exemplifies how these common themes
relate to the state’s unique economy.
Iowa's high degree of economic spe­
cialization in agriculture-related indus­
tries served it well until the “farm
crisis” of the 1980s. Yet, when the need
arose for increased state development
activity in the late 1970s, Iowa focused
on its existing strengths in agriculture
by searching for ways to broaden its
narrow dependence on two crops—
corn
and soybeans. One of its approaches,
which relates to the theme of economic
climate, has been to search for
entrepreneurial gaps that can broaden
its agricultural base. In addition, it
stressed the importance of technology
through its support of technologyoriented agronomy and biotechnology.
Encouraging signs for the future
Although smokestack chasing has not
totally lost its appeal, state develop­
ment programs have vastly improved

in the 1980s. In contrast to state poli­
cies that once lacked coordination and
a clear economic underpinning, current
development strategies are more com­
prehensive in scope. Increasing em­
phasis is being placed on the long-run
costs and benefits of programs, priori­
ties established among competing pro­
grams, and coordination of programs
and institutions to achieve the desired
results.
Are the state plans working? It is loo
early to say, and their impact may
never be clearly known. But they are
pointed in the right direction. They
recognize, as did the economist Joseph
Schumpeter, that capitalism is “by na­
ture a form or method of economic
change and not only never is but never
can be stationary." Notably, the plans
do not resist the structural change tak­
ing place in the Midwest’s economy.
They accept it and try to adapt the
advantages the Midwest already has to
the change it is undergoing.
In the summer of 1987, there are a few
hopeful signs. The Conference Board
says that “help-wanted” linage in
Midwestern newspapers is well abov e
that in other areas of the country. The
agricultural decline shows signs of
bottoming out, although the national
policies and internauonal market
structures that led to the decline are
still operating. In manufacturing, the
auto industry continues to post profits,
despite a marked slowdown in sales
from several years ago.
These are modest signs, to be sure, but
may reflect a favorable restructuring of
the Midwest’s underlying economy.
To test for permanent improvements in
the region’s economy, economists at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago per­
formed a simple experiment. With the
aid of a recent Wharton Econometrics
forecast of industrial production growth
by industry betvveen 1986 and 1996,
we calculated what industrial pro­
duction growth would be for the Mid­
west, using first its current industrial
structure and second its industrial
structure in 1972. The result was that
the current structure would provide a
slightly higher growth rate than the
1972 structure. Although many other
factors will determine the actual

growth performance of Midwest man­
ufacturing over the next ten years, the
experiment indicates the region's cur­
rent structure is more conducive to
growth than in the past.
Economic change is a collection of
gradual processes. Short-run gains
could be obliterated by some national
or international event beyond the con­
trol of state policymakers. But the
combination of market forces and in­
telligent state policymaking in recent
years prompts cautious hope. Winston
Churchill, speaking on another matter,
said. “Now this is not the end. It is not
even the beginning of the end. But it
is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
We may be seeing the end of the be­
ginning of the Midwest's revitalization.
At such a time it is important to re­
member that, while the way down was
painful, the way back up will be hard
work.
— David R. Allardice and
Robert H. Schnorbus

1 The plans are: Illinois, Building Illinois:
A Five Tear Strategic Plan fo r the Development
o f the Illinois Economy (1 9 8 5 ); Indiana, In
Step W ith the fu tu re ... Indiana's Strategic
Economic Development Plan (1 9 8 4 ). Iowa,
Rebuilding Iowa’s Economy: A Comprehensive
State Economic Development Plan (1 9 8 5 );
Michigan, The Path to Prosperity (1 9 8 4 ); and
Wisconsin, The Final Report o f the Wisconsin
Strategic Development Commission (1 985).

Karl A. Schcld, Senior Vice President and
Director of Research: David R. .Allardice, Vice
President and Assistant Director of Research:
Edward G. Nash. Editor.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Departm ent of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. The views expressed arc the
authors' and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve Svstem. Articles may be reprinted if the
source is credited and the Research Departm ent
is provided with copies of the reprints.
Chicago Fed Letter is available without charge
from the Public Information Center. Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. P.Q. Box 834. Chicago.
Illinois 60690. or telephone (312) 322-5 III.
ISSN 0893-0164

Manufacturing activity in the Midwest (defined here as comprising Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin) rose 0.9 percent in June, following two
months of decline from its peak in the current expansion. In contrast, activity
nationally was virtually flat, after rising steadily throughout the year.
Manufacturing activity in the Midwest experienced a marked slowdown in 1984
similar to the national slowdown. Since then, the pace in the Midwest has lagged
the nation. For example, the current level in the Midwest is only 1.4 percent
above its year-ago mark, or less than half the national gain of 3.6 percent.

Chicago Fed Letter
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Chicago. Illinois 60690
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N O TE: T he MM I is a composite index of 15
m anufacturing industries and is constructed from
a weighted combination of monthly hours
worked, and kilowatt hours data. See "Midwest
M anufacturing Index: T he Chicago Fed's new
regional economic indicator," Economic Perspectives,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. X I, No.
5, S eptem ber October, 1987. The United States
represents the Federal Reserve Board's Index of
Industrial Production, M anufacturing.