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ESSAYS ON ISSUES

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF CHICAGO

AUGUST 1999
NUMBER 144

Chicago Fed Letter
Japanese banks and
market discipline
Recently, Japanese banks reported
their financial results for the fiscal year
ending in March 1999. The 17 largest
banks suffered a net combined aftertax loss of ¥3.6 trillion ($29.51 billion
at $1 = ¥122). Moreover, even after
spending ¥10.4 trillion to dispose of
nonperforming loans in the 12 months
previously, the total nonperforming
loans at these banks stood at over ¥20.9
trillion, representing a little over 3%
of total loans of the banks. These reports were the latest installment of
bleak news for a banking system that
has been in the grip of a deep and
prolonged crisis. Since the collapse
of stock and land prices in 1990, the
Japanese economy has exhibited tepid
performance, with continued declines
in asset prices and sharp increases in
business bankruptcies. Consequently,
the quality of assets at Japanese banks
has deteriorated significantly, culminating in the failure of several large institutions in 1997 and 1998. Currently,
it is estimated that the bad loans of
major banks alone total about 7% of
gross domestic product (GDP).1 This
figure far exceeds the amount of government resources spent, 2.5% to 3%
of GDP, to resolve the savings and loan
crisis in the U.S.
Almost from the onset of the crisis,
Japanese regulators have received most
of the blame. They have been criticized
for not controlling the level of risk in
the banking system, for not taking
prompt corrective action against poorly capitalized banks, and for making
regulatory and accounting changes
that allowed economically insolvent
or nearly insolvent institutions to continue their operations.
Effective supervision and regulation
of banks is essential to a safe and

sound financial system. However, it
is increasingly recognized that supervision and regulation is not the only
means of controlling risk in banking
systems. Information about bank business behavior and the resulting discipline provided by market participants
can be effective tools that enhance
regulatory discipline.
Although several studies document
the efficacy of market discipline on
U.S. banks, there is skepticism about
the effectiveness of market discipline
on Japanese banks.2 It is widely argued
that the particular features of Japanese
markets create an inhospitable environment for effective market discipline. However, recent evidence
reviewed in this article suggests that
market discipline on Japanese banks
is alive and well. Hence, reform proposals aimed at improving the condition of Japanese banks should give
serious consideration to policies promoting market discipline.
Potential constraints on
market discipline
By demanding a higher rate of return
on debt and equity securities of riskier banks, market participants can provide information to regulators and
can potentially discipline bank management by penalizing banks with
higher risk. There are two prerequisites for market discipline to be effective. First, market participants need
an incentive to price risk. That is, they
need to be personally exposed to potential losses arising from risk. Second,
market participants need quality information on banks’ exposures to various
types of risks to be able to judge the
overall risk of the bank.
A widespread perception is that the
regulatory, institutional, and informational structures of Japanese markets

hinder the development of effective
market discipline on banks. For instance, until the mid-1980s regulators
encouraged banks to limit stock price
fluctuations in an effort to influence
the public’s perception of risk at banks.
As a result, the share prices of Japanese
banks were nearly constant for long
periods of time. When share prices
cannot respond to new information or
their response is muted, they do not
provide useful signals. Furthermore,
the “convoy system,” where all Japanese
banks move in the same general direction and the strong institutions protect
the weak ones, can also hinder market
discipline. If the protection provided
by strong institutions shields creditors
and shareholders of weak banks from
extensive losses, then market participants have little incentive to charge a
risk premium.
The institutional arrangements among
Japanese firms do not seem any more
welcoming to market discipline than
the regulatory system. There are extensive ties among Japanese firms, fostered through holdings of each other’s
debt and equity and through other
business ties. Banks and other financial institutions form the nexus of
these relationships. For instance, the
major shareholders of Japanese banks
are other banks and insurance companies. Furthermore, insurance companies are among the major creditors
of banks. As a result of these links, the
long-term stakeholders at Japanese
banks may have different and more
complex exposures to losses, and
hence different incentives, than regulators or individual market participants.
In such cases, the signals provided
by participants with close ties to banks
may not be useful to regulators in
assessing bank risk.
Japanese investors also have less information on banks than investors in other

industrial countries. For instance, it
was not until 1993 that Japanese banks
were required to report the amount of
nonperforming loans in their loan portfolio, and it was not until March 1999
that they reported such loans by the
relatively strict standards required in
the U.S. This and the lack of other information on the asset composition and
risk of Japanese banks serve as potential
impediments to market participants’
ability to judge and price risk.

1. Responses of shareholders
percent

0
-1
-2
-3
-4

Bank failures and
shareholder responses
Despite the potential constraints
placed on market discipline by these
features of Japanese markets, evidence
indicates that market participants do
provide informative signals about risk
of Japanese banks.
In a recent study, Brewer, Genay,
Hunter, and Kaufman (1999) examine the impact of recent failures of
large financial institutions in Japan
on the share prices of surviving institutions.3 They suggest that these failures represented major changes in the
risk environment of surviving banks.
For the first time in the postwar history
of Japanese banks, the shareholders
of insolvent or weak banks suffered
losses, increasing the likelihood that
the shareholders of other weak banks
would suffer losses. If market discipline
exists, the failure announcements
should have had a negative impact on
the share prices of surviving institutions. Indeed, the authors of the study
find that share prices of banks, adjusted
for market movements, declined significantly in the days following the
failure announcements (figure 1).
Moreover, consistent with the market
discipline hypothesis, the sell-off in
bank shares was not indiscriminate.
Banks with observably higher risk
(banks with higher loan loss reserves
or nonperforming loans relative to
their equity capital, banks with a higher fraction of risky loans in their portfolio, and banks with lower Moody’s
ratings) experienced larger losses in
value than others.
The significant negative reaction to
the failures is particularly interesting
because the problems at the failed

Hyogo

Takugin

LTCB

NCB

Notes: The average excess returns for a portfolio of
bank stocks on the day and the following two days
of the announcements of the failure of Hyogo Bank
Ltd., Hokkaido Takushoku Bank Ltd. (Takugin), the
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (LTCB), and
the Nippon Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (NCB).
Source: Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William C.
Hunter, and George G. Kaufman, 1999.

institutions were widely known prior
to their failure. In fact, as shown in
figure 2, the shareholders of the four
failed banks had already suffered significant losses relative to shareholders
of surviving banks in the 12 months
leading up to failure. For all but one
of the failed banks, the average daily
returns (adjusted for market returns)
during this period were significantly
negative and less than the returns of
surviving banks. In fact, during the
12 months prior to the failures of
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Takugin)
and the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan, Ltd., these banks had the lowest average daily returns of all banks.
Prior to the failure of Hyogo Bank,
only two banks had lower returns than
Hyogo. Moreover, the share prices of
the failed banks were significantly
more volatile than those of other banks.
For instance, in the 12 months leading up to their failure, the standard
2. Average daily excess returns
percent

0.4
0.01*

0.06*

–0.02*

0.04*

0.0
-0.4
-0.8
Failed

Survivors

-1.2
-1.6

Hyogo

Takugin

LTCB

NCB

*indicates the average excess returns of
surviving banks.
Notes: The average daily excess returns of failed
and surviving Japanese banks in the 12 months
prior to each failure. Daily excess return for a bank
is defined as the daily return on the bank’s stock
minus the return on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
TOPIX index.
Source: Author’s calculations based on share
price data from Bloomberg.

deviations of the daily excess returns
for Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank were
three and 1.56 times the standard deviation of returns for all other banks,
respectively. The behavior of stock
returns of banks prior to their failure
suggests that shareholders provided
fairly powerful signals about the condition of these institutions.
Other evidence on pricing for risk
In addition, the behavior of stock returns of Japanese banks suggests that,
despite the poor quality of disclosed
information on asset quality, shareholders price for observable measures
of risk. Figure 3 compares the one-year
holding period returns for banks with
relatively high risk to those of banks
with low risk. Banks that announced
higher loan loss reserves, more risky
loans, and lower capital ratios at the
end of a fiscal year earned significantly lower returns over the prior 12
months.4 Simple correlations between
market-adjusted returns and these measures of risk paint a similar picture.
This evidence of market discipline
is consistent with the results of other
studies on Japanese banks. For instance, Peek and Rosengren (1998)
relate the daily movements in the
“Japan premium,” the premium
charged to large Japanese banks in
the international interbank loan markets, to announcements of bank failures, regulatory policy changes, and
ratings downgrades.5 Their results
indicate that unsecured creditors of
Japanese banks demand a higher return on loans to riskier banks and the
premium changes in response to the
perceived risk faced by creditors. Interestingly, the authors find that the
Japan premium does not respond significantly to announcements of policy
change by regulators, unless those
announcements are associated with
actual policy changes.
A recent article by Bremer and Pettway
(1999) examines the impact of ratings
downgrades by Moody’s on bank share
prices.6 The authors look at stock returns prior to the announcement of the
downgrade, as well as returns on the
days surrounding the announcement.

3. Bank risk and stock returns
percent

0
-2
-4
-6
-8

Risky Nonperformloan
ing loan

LLR

Low

High

Equity
capital

BIS
capital

Notes: A bank is identified as having a “low” (“high”)
ratio if, in any given year, the bank has a ratio that is
below (above) the median value of the ratio for all
banks in that year. Time period covered is fiscal
year 1990 through 1997. The risky loan ratio is the
ratio of loans to finance, real estate, and construction sectors to total domestic loans; the nonperforming loan ratio is the amount of nonperforming loans,
as disclosed by banks, to total loans; the LLR ratio
is loan loss reserves divided by total loans; equity
capital ratio is book value of equity capital divided
by total assets; and the BIS ratio is the total BIS
capital divided by risk-weighted assets as defined
by the BIS capital rules. Holding period returns are
defined as

R i ,t =
−

March 31,t +1

"

! s = April 1, t

#$

∏ (1+ ri ,s ) − 1# x 100

March 31, t +1

"

! s = April 1, t

#$

∏ (1 + rm,s ) − 1# x 100,

where ri,s is the return on bank i at time s and rm,s is
the return on TOPIX index at time s.
Source: Author’s calculations based on share price
data from Bloomberg and accounting information in
FitchIBCA’s Bankscope February 1999 disk.

Although there appears to be no significant share price reaction to announcements of ratings downgrades, there is
a significant decline in the share prices of banks in the two years prior to the
downgrade. The authors argue that
this is consistent with shareholders
providing market discipline that augments regulatory discipline.

In recognition of the value of such
information, the regulatory framework in developed countries has
been shifting over the last several years
from one of rigid command and control to one based on disciplinary incentives. Proposed changes in the
Basle Capital Accord, disclosure requirements, and proposals requiring
banks to issue subordinated debt are
examples of the emphasis placed on
incentives and market discipline.7
In the last two years, Japanese regulators also have taken steps in this direction. They have allowed insolvent
institutions to fail. Perhaps more
importantly, although creditors of
failed institutions were protected
from major losses, shareholders were
not. Evidence reviewed in this article
indicates that shareholders of surviving banks responded to the changes
in the potential losses they faced.
Stricter disclosure rules and reconstruction requirements for banks
receiving public funds have been
positive developments for effective
market discipline. Further changes
that promote market discipline, such
as exposing creditors with junior
claims to potential losses, taking
prompt corrective action against poorly capitalized institutions, and resolving insolvent banks quickly and
efficiently, can help prevent and mitigate the economic cost of future crises.
—Hesna Genay
Economist

Conclusion
The recent global financial crises illustrate the importance of accurately
assessing risk in banking systems.
There is strong evidence that, given
the opportunity, market participants
provide useful information, and thus
can enhance the discipline imposed
by banking regulations and supervision. To the extent that investors are
exposed to losses and have the information to evaluate banks, they can provide timely information to regulators
in an environment of rapid changes in
asset prices and risks faced by banks.

1

See Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap, 1999,
“The Japanese banking crisis: Where did
it come from and how will it end?,” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, forthcoming.
2
For instance, see Mark J. Flannery and
Sorin M. Sorescu, 1996, “Evidence of bank
market discipline in subordinated debenture yields: 1983–1991,” Journal of Finance,
Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 1347–1377; and
Sangkyun Park and Stavros Peristiani, 1998,
“Market discipline by thrift depositors,”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol.
30, No. 3, pp. 347–364.

3
Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William C.
Hunter, and George G. Kaufman, 1999,
“Does the Japanese stock market price bank
risk? Evidence from bank failures,” in Global
Financial Crises: Implications for Banking and
Regulation, Proceedings of the 35th Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, forthcoming.
4
A similar relationship holds between these
measures of bank risk and the holding period
returns during the 12 months following the
fiscal yearend.
5
Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, 1998,
“Determinants of the Japan premium: Actions
speak louder than words,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, working paper, No. 98-9.
6
Marc Bremer and Richard H. Pettway, 1999,
“Does the market discipline Japanese banks,”
working paper, available from the authors at
bremerm@ic.nanzan-u.ac.jp and pettway@
missouri.edu.
7

For instance, see Bank for International
Settlements, 1999, “A new capital adequacy
framework,” June, available on the Internet
at http://www.bis.org/publ/; Douglas D.
Evanoff, 1993, “Preferred sources of market
discipline,” Yale Journal of Regulation, Summer,
pp. 347–367; and Charles Calomiris, 1999,
“Building an incentive-compatible safety net,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming.

Michael H. Moskow, President; William C. Hunter,
Senior Vice President and Director of Research; Douglas
Evanoff, Vice President, financial studies; Charles
Evans, Vice President, macroeconomic policy research;
Daniel Sullivan, Vice President, microeconomic policy
research; William Testa, Vice President, regional
programs and economics editor; Helen O’D. Koshy,
Editor.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. The views expressed are the
authors’ and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System. Articles may be reprinted if the
source is credited and the Research Department
is provided with copies of the reprints.
Chicago Fed Letter is available without charge from
the Public Information Center, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834, Chicago, Illinois
60690-0834, tel. 312-322-5111 or fax 312-322-5515.
Chicago Fed Letter and other Bank publications are
available on the World Wide Web at http://
www.frbchi.org.
ISSN 0895-0164

Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Manufacturing output indexes, 1992=100

Manufacturing output indexes
(1992=100)

CFMMI
IP

140

May

Month ago

Year ago

130.7
138.6

130.9
138.1

129.5
135.4

IP

CFMMI
130

Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Cars
Light trucks

June

Month ago

Year ago

5.6
7.3

5.5
7.2

4.8
5.2
120

Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
MW
U.S.

June

Month ago

Year ago

65.0
63.0

61.4
59.2

56.8
50.7

110
1996

1997

The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) fell 0.1% from April
to May, to a seasonally adjusted level of 130.7 (1992=100). Revised data show
the index rose 0.5% in April. The Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Production
Index for manufacturing (IP) increased 0.4% in May, the same rate experienced
in April. Light truck production increased from 7.2 million units in May to 7.3
million units in June. Car production also increased from 5.5 million units for
May to 5.6 million units for June.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (a weighted average of
the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production increased to 65.0%
in June from 61.4% in May. The purchasing manager’s indexes increased for
all three indexes. The national purchasing managers’ survey for production
increased from 59.2% to 63.0% from May to June.

1998

1999

Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Production Index for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and light
trucks are measured in annualized units, using
seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonally adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing
Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.

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