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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

Loretta J. Mester

Banking Industry Consolidation:
What’s a Small Business to Do?

I

t seems not a week goes by without our reading about another proposed bank merger. Relaxation of the rules governing where banks can
expand and new technologies for providing
banking services have contributed to rapid consolidation in the industry. Consider just a few
statistics: Since 1979, there have been well over
3500 mergers in which two or more banks were
consolidated under a single bank charter and
more than 5800 acquisitions in which banks retained their charters but were bought by a different bank holding company. Over the first half of

Loretta J. Mester*
the 1990s, bank mergers involved about 20 percent of the industry’s assets in each year.1 And
the number of insured commercial banks in the
United States has fallen from over 14,000 in 1985
to around 9000 today.2 At the same time, assets
held by banks have been growing and banks
have been getting larger. Assets are being redistributed from smaller banks to larger ones (Figure 1). Now, over 60 percent of industry assets

1

See the article by Allen Berger, Joseph Scalise, Anthony Saunders, and Greg Udell.
*Loretta Mester is a vice president and economist and
head of the Banking and Financial Markets section in the
Research Department of the Philadelphia Fed.

2
These are net figures, so they understate bank closures. Since the beginning of 1985, over 2000 new institutions have opened.

3

BUSINESS REVIEW

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

are in banks with more than $10 billion in as- conclusion. The studies discussed below sugsets, compared with 40 percent in 1985. In infla- gest that small businesses will retain access to
tion-adjusted dollars, the average asset size of bank lending and that recent advances in techU.S. banks has doubled since 1985 and is cur- nology may even increase the volume of loans
rently about $550 million. Consolidation is even extended to small businesses. The positive asmore striking at the holding company level. The pects of consolidation are, therefore, expected to
share of assets in bank holding companies with over
FIGURE 1
$100 billion in assets has
Asset Distribution of Banks in the U.S.
tripled since 1985; these in1985 vs. 1998
stitutions now hold over 40
percent of industry assets
(Figure 2).
Consolidation in the
banking industry has many
benefits, including increased efficiency and better diversification as banks
are able to branch throughout the United States. But
small businesses have traditionally relied on banks
for credit, especially smaller
Size categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are in
banks based in their own
1998 dollars.
communities, which have
Excludes credit card banks.
the ability to closely moniFIGURE 2
tor these businesses. (See
Asset Distribution of
Leonard Nakamura’s article.) Should we be worried
Banking Organizations in the U.S.
that consolidation will lead
1985 vs. 1998
to a contraction of credit to
small businesses? No. First
it should be noted that to the
extent that consolidation
leads banks to make better
decisions in allocating
credit, a decline in smallbusiness lending need not
be harmful to the economy—
it might merely indicate that
funds are being funneled to
more productive businesses. But recent empiriSize categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are in
cal work suggests that such
1998 dollars.
a decline is not a foregone
4

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

outweigh any potential negative effect on small businesses’ access to
credit.

Loretta J. Mester

FIGURE 3

Small-Business and Total Domestic
Business Loans at Banks in the U.S.

WHAT’S THE
WORRY?
Small-business
loans account for
around one-third of
banks’ total business loans, and this
ratio has been fairly
constant over the
past five years (Figure 3).3 But these
aggregate figures
obscure how the
volume of smallbusiness lending
varies with bank
Small-business loans are commercial and industrial loans of $1 million or less.
Data are from the Call Reports.
Excludes credit card banks.

3
The data on smallbusiness loans used here
are small commercial
and industrial loans to U.S. addresses, collected on
“Schedule RC-C, Part II, Loans to Small Businesses and
Small Farms” of the June Reports of Condition and Income (the so-called Call Report) filed by banks. In my
figures I compare 1994 with 1998, since some have questioned the accuracy of the 1993 data, the first year banks
were required to report this information.
The reader should note that what the Call Report
labels as “loans to small businesses” are actually small
loans. That is, the Call Report asks banks to report
whether substantially all of their domestic loans to businesses have original amounts of $100,000 or less. If so,
they are asked to report the total number and volume of
business loans. (I included all of these banks’ business
loans in the tallies of small-business loans.) If not, they
are asked to report the number and volume of loans to
businesses with original amounts of $100,000 or less,
with amounts over $100,000 through $250,000, and with
amounts over $250,000 through $1 million.
The research that uses these data assumes that loans
of $1 million or less are small-business loans, and while
some small loans are extended to large businesses, this is

a fairly good assumption. First, loan size is correlated
with borrower size (see Leonard Nakamura’s article).
Second, the Call Report data do account for lines of
credit and loan syndications. For loans extended under
lines of credit, original amount is the larger of the most
recently approved line of credit or the amount outstanding, and similarly for loans extended under loan commitments. For loan participations and syndications, original amount is the entire amount of the credit originated
by the lead lender. In 1996, regulators began to collect
small-business loan data under the Community Reinvestment Act (see Raphael Bostic and Glenn Canner’s
article). These data contain information on whether the
borrower had revenues of $1 million or less, but the data
likely understate the reporting banks’ loans to small businesses, since firms with higher revenues are often considered to be small businesses (see, for example, Nakamura,
who states that small businesses can have revenues up
to $10 million), and banks are not required to report
borrower revenues if they did not consider revenues in
making their credit decision.

5

BUSINESS REVIEW

size. The catch phrase
“small-business lending is
the business of small
banks” sometimes makes it
easy to forget that larger
banks do a substantial
amount of lending to small
businesses. For example, in
1994, banks with assets
over $10 billion made over
a fifth of the industry’s
small-business loans (while
making nearly half of all
business loans); in 1998, the
large banks made an even
greater share—over a
third—of the industry’s
small-business loans,
partly reflecting the
industry’s shift toward
larger banks (Figure 4).
But small-business lending makes up a smaller share
of a large bank’s business
lending than that of a small
bank—just in terms of lending capacity, the smallest
banks will be unable to
make many large loans. For
example, in 1998, while
banks with assets under $10
billion made about a third
of the industry’s total business loans, these banks
made almost two-thirds of
small-business loans. The
ratio of small-business
loans to total loans—which
we’ll call the propensity to
lend to small businesses—
falls from over 96 percent for
the smallest banks to less
than 20 percent for the largest banks (Figure 5).
This fact has led some
6

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

FIGURE 4

Distribution of Small-Business Loans
and Total Business Loans, by Bank Size
Banks in the U.S., 1994

Size categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are in
1998 dollars.
Excludes credit card banks.

Distribution of Small-Business Loans
and Total Business Loans, by Bank Size
Banks in the U.S., 1998

Size categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are
in 1998 dollars.
Excludes credit card banks.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA

Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

people to worry that consolidation will lead to a
sharp reduction in the
availability of credit to small
businesses. They do the following thought experiment:
Suppose all small banks
(those with assets under $10
billion) were suddenly reorganized into large banks
(those with assets over $10
billion). Assume that the
newly merged banks’ propensity to lend to small businesses dropped to the average for large banks today.
That is, currently about 56
percent of small banks’
business loans are to small
businesses. But suppose
that after the reorganization,
this proportion fell to 15.2
percent, the current percentage for large banks. This
would imply a 47 percent
reduction in the level of
small-business loans—
we’ll call this the “size effect” (Figure 6).
But this thought experiment is misleading. Industry consolidation is much
more complex. The strategies followed by banks and
their competitors are likely
to change as consolidation
takes place. The total effect
of consolidation on smallbusiness lending will depend on how changes in
size, organizational form,
efficiency, and competition
that result from consolidation affect the propensity of
banks to make small-business loans.

Loretta J. Mester

FIGURE 5

Ratio of Small-Business Loans to Total
Business Loans, by Bank Size
Banks in the U.S., 1994 vs. 1998

Size categories are based on total assets (domestic and foreign) and are in
1998 dollars.
Excludes credit card banks.

FIGURE 6

Hypothetical Example
To Illustrate the Size Effect
Total business loans by banks with
assets < $10 billion in 1998Q2

= $ 222 billion

Small-business loans at these banks in 1998Q2

= $ 125 billion

Small-business loans at these banks if equal
to 15.2% of their total business loans
(same percentage as at larger banks)

= $ 34 billion

Reduction in dollars of small-business loans

= $ 91 billion

Total small-business loans at all size banks
in 1998Q2

= $ 193 billion

Reduction as a percent of small-business loans

=

47%

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BUSINESS REVIEW

WHAT’S THE EVIDENCE?4
Banking industry consolidation is a dynamic
process and its likely effect on small-business
lending cannot be discerned by mere introspection—it’s an empirical question. For example,
consolidation is likely to lead to improved efficiency in the industry. Two studies by Jith
Jayaratne and Philip Strahan (1996 and 1997)
found that relaxation of geographic barriers to
entry was associated with better quality loans
and increased profitability of the banks making
the loans. And my recent work with coauthors
(Joseph Hughes, William Lang, Loretta Mester,
and Choon Geol-Moon, 1996 and forthcoming)
has also shown that bank holding companies
that are more geographically diversified, especially ones that have diversified their exposure
to regional macroeconomic risk, tend to be more
efficient and more profitable than less diversified bank holding companies. If some of the
small-business loans currently being made by
inefficient banks are unprofitable, improved efficiency might lead to fewer small-business
loans. Such a decline would not be harmful to
the economy, since it would mean funds were
being shifted to more productive firms. On the
other hand, a more efficient banking system
could result in more loans being made, to the
extent that banks become more efficient at locating and evaluating potential borrowers and to
the extent that banks are able to diversify their
portfolios more easily and therefore shift more
of their assets toward loans and away from more
liquid assets.
Similarly, increased competition could either
increase or decrease the amount of small-business lending. It could decrease lending to small
businesses by undermining the long-term rela4

Given the large volume of recent work on small-business lending, I am unable to cite it all here. Nice reviews
of the literature with additional citations are included in
the study by Allen Berger, Anthony Saunders, Joseph
Scalise, and Greg Udell and the one by James Kolari and
Asghar Zardkoohi.
8

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

tionship-type of lending offered to small borrowers, in contrast to the transactions-type of lending offered to large borrowers.5 But competition
could increase small-business lending because
it forces banks to search for additional profit
opportunities. Competitors are likely to react to
a merger or acquisition in their market. If they
pick up any small-business loans dropped by a
merged institution, there would be no change in
the supply of credit to small borrowers. However, there might be some transition problems
while this shuffling occurred.
Recent studies have begun to investigate the
various aspects of consolidation. The general
conclusion of these studies is that consolidation
is certainly not going to be as negative for smallbusiness lending as suggested by the simple size
effect. Two potentially important considerations
are the type of merger and the organizational
form of the institutions involved.
Type of Consolidation. The total effect of
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity on smallbusiness lending may vary with the size of the
banks involved and whether the consolidation
was a merger or an acquisition.6 Several studies

5
Banks have traditionally been able to offer small borrowers “relationship” loans that are supported by the
fact that the bank expects to have a relationship with the
small borrower over the long term. These relationship
loans have flexible terms—a long-term relationship allows the bank to offer concessionary rates to a borrower
facing temporary credit problems, which the bank can
later make up for when the firm returns to health. Research has shown that banks need some type of market
power to sustain this type of lending (see, for example,
Petersen and Rajan, and Berlin and Mester). Borrowers
that have sources of credit in addition to banks, as most
large borrowers do, receive loans that are more like other
credit transactions, with rates set to maximize a bank’s
profits period by period rather than over the life of a
relationship.
6

In a merger, the target loses its charter and becomes
part of an existing bank. In an acquisition, the target
retains its charter but becomes a subsidiary of a different
bank holding company.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA

Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

found that M&As involving small banks led to
an increased propensity to lend to small businesses. Peek and Rosengren (1998a) compared
the propensity for small-business lending of
banks that acquired others over the period June
1993 to June 1996 with that of nonacquirers and
found that small acquirers (less than $100 million in assets) showed a greater increase over
the three years than nonacquirers.7 Using similar data, Nicholas Walraven confirmed this result.
Using data on 180 bank mergers between June
1993 and June 1994, Strahan and Weston (1996)
examined the change in the ratio of small-business lending to assets of the merged institutions,
pre- and post-merger, and compared it with that
of a control group of banks not involved in mergers. They found a significant increase in the ratio of small-business lending to assets after
small-bank mergers: for the 102 mergers involving banks with combined assets less than $300
million, the ratio increased from 9.12 percent to
10.12 percent. For the control group, the ratio
was relatively stable, increasing from 8.15 percent to 8.20 percent.8
In a study discussed more fully below, Berger
and coauthors examined over 6000 M&As that
occurred over the period 1980-95 and also found
an increased propensity to lend to small businesses three years after a merger involving small
7

They measured a bank’s propensity to lend to small
businesses as the ratio of its small-business loans to
assets. They also found that in the 912 acquisitions studied (some involving large acquirers and some involving
small acquirers), the post-acquisition ratio of small-business loans to assets tended toward that of the acquirer.
Since acquirers were about equally likely to have higher
as lower ratios compared to their targets, the authors
concluded that M&As need not reduce the propensity
for small-business lending and that many will raise it.
8
In a subsequent study using a larger sample of 563
banking organizations (i.e., the aggregate of all banks up
to the highest holding company level) involved in M&A
activity between July 1993 and June 1996, the authors
obtained similar results.

Loretta J. Mester

or medium-size banks (i.e., those with gross total assets less than $1 billion).
In contrast, two other studies did not find that
small-bank M&As had positive effects on smallbusiness lending. (But they didn’t find much in
the way of negative effects either.) Rather than
using data on banks, Jith Jayaratne and John
Wolken (1998) used data on small-business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small
Business Finances. They determined that the
probability that a small business had a line of
credit from a bank did not decline when there
were fewer small banks in an area. And small
businesses in these areas did not appear to be
more credit constrained than firms in areas with
many small banks.9 A study by Ben Craig and
João Cabral dos Santos found no definitive effect of M&As on the level of small-business lending.
The results concerning M&As of larger banks
are more mixed. Peek and Rosengren and Berger
and coauthors found a decline in small-business lending after large-bank M&As, while
Strahan and Weston, and Craig and dos Santos
found no effect.
Hence, the bulk of evidence suggests that
while small banks can become more effective
lenders to small business via M&As, this doesn’t
seem to be true for large banks.
Two papers have found that the effect of consolidation on small-business lending differed
depending on whether the consolidation involved a merger or an acquisition. Contrary to their
results for mergers, Berger and coauthors found
that acquisitions involving small and mediumsize institutions had a generally negative impact on the propensity to lend to small businesses. But using data from June 1993-96 for
banks in one-bank holding companies, James
Kolari and Asghar Zardkoohi found results opposite to those of Berger and coauthors: com-

9

The firms were not any more likely to be late in repaying their trade creditors.
9

BUSINESS REVIEW

pared with banks not involved in M&A activity,
banks involved in mergers had lower ratios of
small-business loans to assets post-merger, but
little difference was found for banks involved in
acquisitions. The authors suggest that mergers
involve a greater change in organizational structure than do acquisitions and, thus, a potentially
greater loss of important private information the
bank has about its small-business borrowers. But
studies on organizational form offer no strong
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Organizational Form. Organizational form
refers to whether the bank is part of a bank holding company, whether there are several layers of
holding companies over the bank, whether the
top-tier holding company is located out-of-state,
and so forth. Traditionally, lenders have obtained information on hard-to-value small businesses by having a presence in the community
in which the businesses operate. A potential
concern is that as institutions consolidate, their
organizational structure might become more
complex. And as a result, lending decisions may
be made at corporate headquarters located many
miles from the businesses’ activities and this distance could deter local lending. But again, there
is no strong agreement among empirical investigations that this is the case.
For example, a 1998 study by Strahan and
Weston that used 1993-96 data on banking organizations found that once the size of the bank
subsidiaries within a holding company was
taken into account, the organizational complexity of the company, measured by the number of
banks within the company and the number of
states in which the company operates, was not
significantly related to a company’s propensity
to lend to small business.10 But a study by Robert DeYoung, Lawrence Goldberg, and Lawrence
White, which used data on banks 25 years old
or younger with assets under $500 million over
1993-96, found that banks that were part of
multibank holding companies had a lower propensity to lend to small businesses than did other
banks.
10

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

Other researchers have focused on the location of the bank’s owner. Gary Whalen used
1993 data on 1377 banks in Illinois, Kentucky,
and Montana and found that banks with assets
under $300 million that are subsidiaries of outof-state bank holding companies invested about
the same share of their asset portfolios in smallbusiness loans as similar-size subsidiaries of instate bank holding companies or banks not
owned by a holding company.11 Whalen’s study
also examined the pricing of small-business
loans and found that out-of-state holding company subsidiaries tended to charge lower rates
for small-business loans than either in-state
holding company subsidiaries or independent
banks.12
Two studies by William Keeton, however, have
gotten contrary results. In a study using June
1994 data on banks in states in the Kansas City
Federal Reserve District, Keeton found that
banks owned by out-of-state multibank holding

10

A banking organization is the aggregation of all
banks up to the highest holding company level. Banks
within multiple-bank holding companies tend to be
smaller than banks in one-bank holding companies. Thus,
when the size of the bank subsidiaries is not controlled
for, the propensity to lend to small businesses is found to
increase with organizational complexity.
11

For banks with assets between $300 million and $1
billion, subsidiaries of in-state holding companies were
found to have a higher propensity to lend to small businesses than out-of-state holding company subsidiaries,
but the difference wasn’t found to be statistically significant in most cases. For the largest banks, with assets
above $1 billion, the situation was reversed, with out-ofstate holding company subsidiaries having a significantly
higher propensity for small-business lending than in-state
holding company subsidiaries.
12
Whalen found that the marginal costs of making a
loan were highest for out-of-state holding company subsidiaries, which is consistent with the view that having a
presence in the local market might make it easier to lend
to local businesses. This, together with their lower pricing, means they operated with lower margins on their
small-business lending.

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

companies lent a smaller percentage of their deposits to small businesses than did comparable
independent banks.13 In a 1996 study of bank
acquisitions over 1986-95 in the Kansas City
Federal Reserve District, Keeton found that when
ownership shifted to a distant location, there
tended to be a decline in the volume of total business loans at those banks during the first three
years after the acquisition. However, this decline was statistically significant only when the
previous owner had been located in an urban
area.
The conflicting results among the various
studies show that the relationship between organizational form and small-business lending
is not yet a settled issue. But having an out-ofstate owner does not necessarily mean less local
lending.
The Chosen Path. It is far from clear that
consolidated banks will limit the amount of
credit given to small businesses. But even if this
were so, it is important to consider the path the
industry as a whole follows during restructuring to determine the full impact on the availability of credit to small businesses. At the same
time that consolidation has been taking place at
a swift pace, new bank charters have also been
issued; more than 2000 new banks have opened
since the beginning of 1985. These de novo banks

13

The states included were Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.
The comparable independent banks were similar to the
holding company banks in terms of deposit size, location, and number of branches. Keeton also found that
banks with a relatively large number of branches tended
to lend less than comparable banks with a relatively small
number of branches.
14
The study considered three-year old banks, to allow
for a period when the banks gain operational experience.
The authors considered banks with assets between $5
million and $100 million from 1984-95 and assumed
that all business loans at such banks were to small businesses, since there are regulatory limits on the amount
banks can lend to any one borrower.

Loretta J. Mester

would seem to be a fertile source of lending for
small businesses. Indeed, a 1998 study by
Lawrence Goldberg and Lawrence White found
that de novo banks tend to lend more to small
businesses as a percentage of assets than other
banks of comparable size.14 Hence, new banks
can provide a source of additional credit for
small businesses to counteract any negative effect from consolidating institutions.
Full Effect. But new entrants aren’t the only
ones that can pick up the slack, should consolidated banks shift their focus from small-business lending. Other competitors in a merging
bank’s market can step in to meet demand. The
study by Berger and coauthors is perhaps the
most comprehensive study to date that attempts
to account for the full effect of industry consolidation on bank lending. It categorizes four effects of M&As on bank lending.
The first, which they call the static effect, is the
simple size effect discussed above. The simple
size effect is expected to result in decreased
small-business lending, since larger banks have
a lower propensity to lend to small business.
The second is the restructuring effect, which reflects the fact that a consolidated bank is not just
the sum of its parts—it can change its size, financial condition, or competitive position after
the merger or acquisition and this change can
affect its propensity to lend to small businesses.
Third is the direct effect, which reflects a direct
refocusing of the bank either toward or away
from small-business lending. The direct effect is
the difference between the bank’s small-business
lending after consolidation and the lending of
another bank of comparable size, financial condition, competitive position, and economic environment that hasn’t been involved in a merger
or acquisition. Finally, the external effect measures the reactions of competitors in the market
after a merger or acquisition.15 These competi15
Although these competitors might be other banks
or nonbank lenders, the study’s empirical work measures only the reaction of other bank lenders.

11

BUSINESS REVIEW

tors may more than make up for any decrease in
lending by the bank that has merged or been
acquired, or their reaction could be similar to
that of the consolidated bank. The external effect has not been accounted for in previous studies.
To quantify these four effects, Berger and coauthors used data from the Survey of Terms of
Bank Lending, in addition to Call Report data.
The survey’s quarterly data give detailed contract information on the loans made by about
300 banks and are available beginning in 1979.
The authors used the survey data over 1980-95
to estimate behavioral equations relating the proportion of a bank’s assets invested in loans to
borrowers in three different size categories to
various measures characterizing the bank’s size,
financial condition, competitive position, economic environment, and other aspects that might
affect its lending.16 These behavioral equations
were then used to predict the lending behavior
three years after a merger or acquisition of a much
more inclusive set of banks, not just those that
responded to the survey, and over a longer period, which included both economic expansions
and contractions. This set included nearly every bank involved in a merger or acquisition over
the period 1977-92: over 6000 banks that merged
to form about 2500 surviving banks and over
4000 banks that were acquired.17
16

The size of the borrower is proxied by an estimate of
bank credit available to the borrower given by the size of
the loan, the total commitment under which the loan was
drawn, or the total size of the participation by all banks
if the loan was part of a participation, whichever is largest. Small-business borrowers were then assumed to be
those with under $1 million in bank credit. Medium-size
borrowers were those with bank credit between $1 million and $25 million, and large borrowers were those
with more than $25 million in bank credit.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

The study’s results confirm that if you consider only the size effect of M&As (their static
effect), the amount of small-business lending
would be considerably reduced three years after
a merger or acquisition. Berger and coauthors
estimated that the static effect of all the mergers
reduced small-business loans by about $25.8
billion (measured in 1994 dollars), or 16 percent
of small-business lending in 1995.18 Both the
restructuring and direct effects for mergers were
found to increase small-business loans by only
slight amounts—by $3.5 billion and $2.6 billion,
respectively.19 But the external effect, which accounts for changes in the lending of all banks in
a local market in response to changes in business conditions after a merger, was found to be
large and positive, inducing an increase in
small-business lending of about $48.6 billion.20
The authors caution that the external effect is
less accurately measured than the other effects,
but on the basis of their results, they are able to
conclude that the full effect of M&A activity for
small-business lending is positive or at the very
least not negative.
WHAT’S THE FUTURE?
One impetus for the consolidation of the banktheir regression equations). But this caveat has to be
weighed against the fact that by using the survey data,
the researchers were able to consider the reactions of
lending behavior to M&As over a longer period than
would be permitted by the small-business loan data only
recently added to the bank Call Reports. In particular,
the study covers periods when the economy was expanding and periods when it was contracting, whereas
the studies that relied on the Call Report data could
examine only an expansionary phase of the business cycle.
18
The static effect of acquisitions over the period was
a $7-billion reduction in small-business loans.
19

17

Since respondents to the Survey of Terms of Bank
Lending tend to be larger banks, there is some question
about whether the estimated behavioral equations are
predictive of the behavior of banks of all sizes (even
allowing for the fact that the authors include bank size in
12

The restructuring and direct effects for acquisitions
were estimated to increase small-business loans by $0.4
billion and $7.8 billion, respectively.
20

The external effect for acquisitions was a $22.6billion increase in small-business loans.
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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

ing industry has been the easing of geographic
restrictions on U.S. banking. But the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
allowed virtually nationwide branching (via
acquisition) as of June 1, 1997, suggesting that
this spur to industry restructuring may be winding down. However, another impetus toward
consolidation is likely to remain important:
changes in technology have made it more efficient for banks to grow larger and consolidate
their operations. And this technological change
is also changing banks’ propensity to lend to
small businesses.
As I discussed in a previous Business Review
article, large banks are using credit scoring to
make small-business loans and are processing
applications using automated and centralized
systems.21 These banks are able to generate large
volumes of small-business loans at low cost even
in areas where they do not have extensive branch
networks. Applications are being accepted over
the phone, and some banks are soliciting customers via direct mail, as credit card lenders do.
Technology is also helping nonbanks become
larger players in the small-business loan market. For example, American Express is one of the
top granters of credit lines to small businesses
in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District, especially lines with face values under $100,000.
The smallest loans are the most likely to benefit from new technologies. Indeed, the very
modest increase in the propensity of banks with
assets over $10 billion to lend to small businesses
(see Figure 5) is completely accounted for by loans
with face values under $100,000. Similarly, a
study by Mark Levonian indicates that the 14
companies that control the 20 largest banks in
the San Francisco Federal Reserve District increased their holdings of small-business loans
with original amounts under $100,000 over 26
percent from June 1995 to June 1996 while other
21
Credit scoring is a statistical method used to predict the probability that a loan applicant or existing borrower will default or become delinquent.

Loretta J. Mester

banks increased their holdings only about 3 percent. At the same time, the largest banks decreased their holdings of small-business loans
with face values between $100,000 and $1 million about 5 percent while other banks increased
their holdings over 7 percent. Similar results
were obtained by Peek and Rosengren (1998b)
when they looked at small-business loan growth
between 1993 and 1997: only large banks (with
assets over $1 billion) that had been acquirers
increased their holding of the smallest smallbusiness loans (with face values under
$100,000). While all categories of banks increased their holdings of small-business loans
between $100,000 and $1 million, the smaller
banks did so much more than the larger banks.
While technology is opening the small-business lending market to new sources of credit—
namely, larger banks and nonbank lenders—the
types of loans being made by these lenders are
different from the loans traditionally made by
small banks to small businesses. A recent study
by Rebel Cole, Lawrence Goldberg, and
Lawrence White of over 1200 loan applications
made by small businesses indicates that large
and small banks do differ in the way they handle
applications from small businesses: large banks
rely more on easily verified, interpreted, and
quantifiable financial data while smaller banks
use more subjective criteria characteristic of
“character,” or relationship, lending.22
The scale economies in automation available
to large banks allow them to produce the transactions-type small-business loans more cheaply
than a small bank can. These types of smallbusiness loans are like credit card loans, which
do not require much in the way of information-

22
The study used data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, which includes a nationally representative sample of over 4500 small businesses
that operated in the United States as of year-end 1992 (a
small business is defined as a nonfinancial, nonfarm enterprise employing fewer than 500 full-time equivalent
employees). Bank Call Report data were also used.

13

BUSINESS REVIEW

intensive credit evaluation beyond what is done
in a credit scoring model. Credit scoring will tend
to standardize these loans and make default risk
more predictable. These steps should make it
more feasible to securitize the loans, that is, to
form pools of loans and then use the cash flows
of the loan pools to back publicly traded securities. This ability to securitize would bring a new
set of investors into the small-business loan
market, a positive effect that has not been measured in any of the studies we’ve discussed.23
Borrowers who have credit histories good
enough to receive a passing grade from a credit
scoring model will find it cheaper to obtain credit
from larger banks.24 Small banks will need to
serve the small borrowers who do not have the
financials to qualify for a passing credit score,
but who, upon further credit evaluation, are good
risks. Small banks will continue to offer the traditional relationship-driven lending, which requires the bank to be in contact with the borrower over time to gain information about the
borrower and also requires the bank to be a specialist in evaluating the creditworthiness of borrowers for which there is little public information. The more complicated organizational structure of large banks may put them at a disadvantage in making these relationship-type loans.
CONCLUSION
When examining the effect of industry consolidation on small-business lending, it is important to take into account more than just bank
size. Consolidated banks may change their own
lending strategies, and the competitors of newly

23
For more on the relationship between credit scoring
and securitization, see my earlier Business Review article
and the articles by Ron Feldman.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

merged banks may change their small-business
lending strategies in response to mergers and
acquisitions in their markets. Some recent empirical work suggests that the full effect of merger
and acquisition activity for small-business lending is positive.
Although the proportion of loans going to
small businesses is less for large banks than for
small banks, large banks do make a substantial
share of small-business loans. But the ones they
make and are likely to continue to make are those
in which they can take advantage of scale economies offered by new technologies, such as automated loan applications and credit scoring.
These loans are transaction-driven rather than
relationship-driven. Small banks should retain
their niche in relationship lending. But that
niche is likely to be smaller than it is today.
So, what’s a small business to do? First, not
be too concerned that bank credit will become
unavailable as the industry restructures. Next,
decide whether it values a traditional relationship loan over a transactions-type loan. A small
business whose prospects are quite variable over
the business cycle or whose financial condition
is harder to evaluate would probably value the
more flexible credit terms afforded by a relationship loan. With this type of loan, a bank can
offer better terms to a firm facing temporary problems, then make up for these concessionary rates
when the firm turns around. The firm should
expect to pay something for this kind of insurance. A small business whose financial condition is easier to evaluate, that is more insulated
from economic downturns or temporary problems, and that, therefore, does not want to pay
for such insurance might opt for a transactionstype loan offered by a larger bank. In either case,
banks are expected to remain a significant source
of small-business credit.

24
Even these borrowers, however, will need to take
into account that transactions-type loans have less flexible terms. Thus, there is some risk that the loan will not
be renewed should the borrower’s credit conditions head
south.

14

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

Loretta J. Mester

REFERENCES
Berger, Allen N., Anthony Saunders, Joseph M. Scalise, and Gregory F. Udell. “The Effects of Bank
Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending,” Journal of Financial Economics 50:2 (November 1998), pp. 187-229.
Berlin, Mitchell, and Loretta J. Mester. “Deposits and Relationship Lending,” forthcoming, Review of
Financial Studies.
Bostic, Raphael W., and Glenn B. Canner. “New Information on Lending to Small Businesses and
Small Farms: The 1996 CRA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 84 (January 1998), pp. 1-21.
Cole, Rebel A., Lawrence G. Goldberg, and Lawrence J. White. “Cookie-Cutter versus Character:
The Micro Structure of Small Business Lending by Large and Small Banks,” manuscript, Berman
and Company, University of Miami, and New York University, December 16, 1997.
Craig, Ben R., and João Cabral dos Santos. “The Dynamics of the Banking Consolidation Impact on
Small Business Lending,” manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Bank for International Settlements, May 1998.
DeYoung, Robert, Lawrence G. Goldberg, and Lawrence J. White. “Youth, Adolescence, and Maturity of Banks: Credit Availability to Small Business in an Era of Banking Consolidation,”forthcoming,
Journal of Banking and Finance.
Feldman, Ron. “Credit Scoring and Small Business Loans,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Community Dividend, Spring 1997.
Feldman, Ron. “Small Business Loans, Small Banks and a Big Change in Technology Called Credit
Scoring,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis The Region, September 1997.
Goldberg, Lawrence G., and Lawrence J. White. “De Novo Banks and Lending to Small Business: An
Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (August 1998), pp. 851-67.
Hughes, Joseph P., William Lang, Loretta J. Mester, and Choon-Geol Moon. “The Dollars and Sense of
Bank Consolidation,”forthcoming, Journal of Banking and Finance.
Hughes, Joseph P., William Lang, Loretta J. Mester, and Choon-Geol Moon. “Efficient Banking Under
Interstate Branching,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28 (November 1996), pp. 1043-71.
Jayaratne, Jith, and Philip E. Strahan. “Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution and Dynamic Efficiency:
Evidence from Commercial Banking,” Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1) April 1998, pp. 239-73.
Jayaratne, Jith, and Philip E. Strahan. “The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch
Deregulation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (August 1996), pp. 639-70.
Jayaratne, Jith, and John Wolken. “How Important Are Small Banks to Small Business Lending? New
Evidence From a Survey of Small Firms,” forthcoming, Journal of Banking and Finance.

15

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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

REFERENCES (continued)
Keeton, William R. “Multi-Office Bank Lending to Small Businesses: Some New Evidence,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Second Quarter, 1995, pp. 45-57.
Keeton, William R. “Do Bank Mergers Reduce Lending to Businesses and Farmers? New Evidence
from Tenth District States,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Third Quarter
1996, pp. 63-75.
Kolari, James, and Asghar Zardkoohi. “The Impact of Structural Change in the Banking Industry on
Small Business Lending,” Final Report of a Research Project Performed for the U.S. Small Business
Administration, Contract No. SBAHQ-95-C-0025, May 12, 1997.
Levonian, Mark E. “Changes in Small Business Lending in the West,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, January 24, 1997.
Mester, Loretta J. “What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, September/October 1997, pp. 3-16.
Nakamura, Leonard I. “Small Borrowers and the Survival of the Small Bank: Is Mouse Bank Mighty
or Mickey?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, November/December 1994,
pp. 3-15.
Peek, Joe, and Eric S. Rosengren. “Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: It’s Not Just Bank
Size That Matters,” Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (August 1998a), pp. 799-819.
Peek, Joe, and Eric S. Rosengren. “The Evolution of Bank Lending to Small Business,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston New England Economic Review, March/April 1998b, pp. 27-36.
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan. “The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (May 1995), pp. 407-43.
Strahan, Philip E., and James Weston. “Small Business Lending and Bank Consolidation: Is There
Cause for Concern?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance
2:3 (March 1996).
Strahan, Philip E., and James P. Weston. “Small Business Lending and the Changing Structure of the
Banking Industry,” Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (August 1998), pp. 821-45.
Walraven, Nicholas. “Small Business Lending by Banks Involved in Mergers,” Divisions of Research
and Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series Paper 1997-25, May 1997.
Whalen, Gary. “Out-of-State Holding Company Affiliation and Small Business Lending,” Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper 95-4 (September
1995).

16

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA

Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do?

Loretta J. Mester

Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of
Countercyclical Policies?
Satyajit Chatterjee*

B

usiness cycles have troubled market-oriented economies since the dawn of the industrial age. The upward march of living standards
in capitalistic countries has been repeatedly
punctuated by periods of markedly high unemployment rates and slow growth or an outright
decline in the living standard of the average person. This alternating pattern of boom and bust
is what the term business cycle means.
In an article published in 1986, Edward

*Satyajit Chatterjee is a senior economist and research
advisor in the Research Department of the Philadelphia
Fed.

Prescott forcefully argued that during the postWorld-War II period, business cycles in the
United States mostly resulted from random
changes in the growth rate of business-sector
productivity.1 He showed that upswings in economic activity occurred when productivity grew
at an above-average rate and downswings oc1

Edward Prescott is a professor of Economics at the
University of Chicago and a long-time research consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The antecedents of his views appear in an article he wrote with
Finn Kydland in 1982 and in a 1983 article by John Long
and Charles Plosser.
17

BUSINESS REVIEW

curred when productivity grew at a below-average rate.
Prescott challenged the dominant view that
business cycles are caused by monetary and financial disturbances. According to that view,
upswings in economic activity result from unexpectedly rapid increases in the supply of
money, while downswings result from slow
growth or a fall in the money supply. In contrast,
Prescott and his collaborators presented evidence that business cycles of the sort seen during the postwar era would occur even if there
were no monetary or financial disturbances.
John Long and Charles Plosser coined the
term real business cycles to describe business
cycles whose proximate causes are random
changes in productivity.2 Without a doubt, the
most controversial aspect of real-business-cycle
theory is its implications for countercyclical
monetary and fiscal policies. Real-business-cycle
theory appears to ascribe no importance to existing countercyclical policies. Moreover, it implies that some policies aimed at reducing the
severity of business cycles are likely to entail
more costs than benefits.
Both implications contradict long-held views.
Indeed, these policy implications strike many
economists as so outrageous that they simply
dismiss real-business-cycle theory as false. Yet,
the theory has successfully countered the many
objections leveled against it. 3 As a result,
macroeconomists are beginning to take it more
seriously.
Of course, countercyclical policies are of paramount importance to the Federal Reserve System. As real-business-cycle theory gains increas-

2

In this context, the term real means that the business
cycle is caused by factors not related to changes in the
money supply.
3

See my 1995 Business Review article for a more detailed discussion of real-business-cycle theory and an
account of how well the theory has rebutted the criticisms brought against it.
18

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

ing acceptance among economists, an understanding of its policy implications becomes crucial. Consequently, this article briefly describes
real-business-cycle theory, then turns to a discussion of its implications for countercyclical
policies.
The policy lessons of real-business-cycle
theory are more subtle than they appear at first
blush. Although the theory ascribes no ostensible role to postwar countercyclical policies, its
success in accounting for U.S. business cycles
may be the clearest indication yet of the effectiveness of these policies. At the same time,
though, the doubts raised by the theory about
the wisdom of some policy initiatives to control
business cycles may be well founded.
A PRIMER ON REAL-BUSINESS-CYCLE
THEORY
Real-business-cycle theory uses changes in
productivity to explain the cyclical ups and
downs in economic activity. To understand the
theory, we need to know what productivity
means and how changes in it can cause booms
and recessions.
The total output of an economy can be measured by the sum of value-added in all firms. The
value-added in a firm during a quarter is the
value of goods and services produced by the firm
in that quarter less the value of goods and services purchased from other firms and used up
in production in that quarter.4 Clearly, total output is related to the total time people spend working in these firms and the quantity of producers’
4
Goods and services purchased from firms and used
up in production in the same quarter are called intermediate inputs. When value-added is summed over all
firms, purchases of intermediate inputs cancel out, and
all that remains are goods and services sold to consumers and governments plus goods and services sold to
firms but not used up in production during that quarter.
Hence, total output could also be calculated as the value
of final goods and services (i.e., goods and services that
are not intermediate inputs) sold by firms during a quarter plus additions to inventory.

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Policies? to Do?
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Business

goods (such as machinery or buildings) that assist in production.
However, total output could also change if
the effectiveness of the workers and equipment
used in production changes. For instance, suppose a manufacturer of plastic products figures
out some mechanical modification that reduces
wastage of plastic, i.e., the modification allows
the same quantity of products to be manufactured using less plastic. In that case, value-added
at any given level of hours worked and equipment used will be higher. Economists refer to
this change in the effectiveness with which workers and machinery generate value-added as a
change in total factor productivity (TFP).
The most important reasons TFP changes
over time are improvements in the technology
for producing goods and services (as in the example above) and improvements in workers’
skills. However, TFP could also change for other
reasons. For example, TFP rises when new products are invented and sold by firms or when the
price of an imported input (such as oil) falls.
TFP may fall when the government imposes
stiffer environmental protection laws or when a
drought reduces crop yields.5
According to real-business-cycle theory, an
above-average rate of growth of TFP means that
more than the usual opportunities exist for the
gainful employment of labor and machinery. To
exploit this bonanza, firms invest more than
usual in buildings and equipment and hire more
than the usual number of workers. The additional income generated by above-average TFP
growth and by the increased production of buildings and equipment leads to an increase in consumption. Thus, macroeconomic variables such
as total output, consumption, investment, and
hours worked simultaneously rise above their
respective long-term trends. Furthermore, a quarter of above-average TFP growth tends to be fol-

5

For a fuller discussion of factors affecting TFP, see
my 1995 Business Review article.

Loretta J. Mester
Satyajit Chatterjee

lowed by more quarters of above-average TFP
growth, so that the increase in macroeconomic
variables tends to persist for some time. That is
how real-business-cycle theory explains a boom.
In an analogous fashion, real-business-cycle
theory explains recessions as the result of several quarters of below-average TFP growth.
How well does this theory work? Charles
Plosser calculated the values of several key macroeconomic variables predicted by the theory for
the years 1954 through 1985 (Figures 1 and 2).6
As is evident, the match between theory and facts
is not perfect, but it is remarkably close. In a
1991 article, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott
calculated that real-business-cycle theory can
account for about 70 percent of postwar business-cycle fluctuations in U.S. output.
To summarize, real-business-cycle theory uses
fluctuations in the growth rate of TFP to explain
business cycles. The theory gives a good account
of the cyclical behavior of major U.S. macroeconomic variables during the postwar period. Still,
since the theory leaves about 30 percent of the
cyclical fluctuations in U.S. output unexplained,
it doesn’t offer a complete explanation of business cycles.
LESSONS FOR
COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICY
What lessons concerning countercyclical
macroeconomic policies can be drawn from realbusiness-cycle theory? Many economists think
that real-business-cycle theory implies that existing countercyclical policies aren’t necessary.
But is that really true?
Real-business-cycle theory simply calculates
the optimal response to random variations in
TFP growth for an economic model that resembles
6

These plots were taken from Charles Plosser’s 1989
article, Figure 2 (p. 64) and Figure 4 (p. 65). To conserve
space, the figures for consumption and hours worked
were omitted. The reader may consult Plosser ’s 1989
article for the omitted figures and more detail about
real-business-cycle theory.
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BUSINESS REVIEW

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

FIGURE 1

Annual Growth Rate
Of Real Output

Reprinted, with permission, from Plosser, Charles I., "Understanding
Real Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 1989, p. 64.

FIGURE 2

Annual Growth Rate
Of Real Investment

the U.S. economy in important respects. Prescott presented these calculations as
a prediction of how the U.S.
economy would actually behave when faced with erratic
TFP growth. He made this
connection by invoking a general principle of economics,
namely, that competition
tends to produce economically optimal outcomes.7
In other words, Prescott
proceeded on the assumption that for the purposes of
business-cycle analysis, the
actual workings of the U.S.
economy are well approximated by a model economy
with perfect markets, that is, a
model economy in which all
markets are highly competitive and all markets function
smoothly without any need
for government regulation.
Since, according to economic
theory, a perfect-markets
economy will generate optimal economic outcomes,
Prescott simply calculated
the optimal response of his
model economy to fluctuations in TFP growth and took
7

Reprinted, with permission, from Plosser, Charles I., "Understanding
Real Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 1989, p. 65.

20

The principle dates back, in the
guise of Adam Smith’s famous
“invisible hand,” to the origin of
modern economics. Smith was one
of the first social philosophers to
argue that intrusive regulation of
commerce and industry is economically harmful. He argued that
the freedom to form mutually advantageous contracts (unregulated
markets) is the best guarantor of
efficient economic outcomes.

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Policies? to Do?
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Business

these responses to be a prediction of how the
actual U.S. economy would behave with respect
to those same fluctuations. The close match between predictions and fact means that his assumption was not far off the mark; somehow,
the U.S. economy manages to mimic a perfectmarkets economy.
Real-business-cycle theorists’ oft-repeated
claim that the U.S. economy behaves like a perfect-markets economy has fostered the impression that the theory means the economy doesn’t
need countercyclical policies. However, the perfect markets of economic theory do not exist in
the real world. The economic outcomes against
which the predictions of real-business-cycle
theory are compared have resulted from an interplay of imperfect markets and a vast array of
laws, regulations, policies, and customs that help
or hinder the workings of these markets. Thus,
the important policy question raised by realbusiness-cycle theory is: Did postwar
countercyclical policies help the U.S. economy
attain its near-optimal business-cycle behavior
or did they hinder it?
A question like this cannot lie too long without eliciting some response. And one came in a
30th anniversary review of Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960.8 The reviewer was Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., a leading proponent of the monetary
view of business cycles and a recent recipient of
the Nobel Prize in Economics. Lucas used the
review as an opportunity to trace the book’s significance for subsequent developments in mac-

8

For those not in the know, A Monetary History, published in 1963, is the definitive statement of the view that
monetary instability is a major factor in business cycles.
In the words of the authors, the objective of the book is to
give an account of “the stock of money in the United
States” and of the “reflex influence that the stock of
money exerted on the course of events.” It is still the
book to read for obtaining the factual basis of the view
that business cycles result from monetary and financial
disturbances.

Loretta J. Mester
Satyajit Chatterjee

roeconomics. Toward the end of his review, he
appraised real-business-cycle theory in the light
of A Monetary History.
Unlike other critics of real-business-cycle
theory, Lucas accepts the theory’s central finding, namely, that TFP shocks can lead to “output
variability of about the same magnitude as observed in the U.S. in the postwar period” and
can realistically explain the behavior of other
variables. Most important, he reconciles this finding with the lessons of A Monetary History by
noting that one may think of real-business-cycle
theory as “providing a good approximation to
events when monetary policy is conducted well
and a bad approximation when it is not.” He
then goes on to say, “Viewed in this way, the
theory’s relative success in accounting for postwar experience can be interpreted simply as evidence that postwar monetary policy has resulted
in near-efficient behavior, not as evidence that
money doesn’t matter.” Simply put, Lucas’s
point is that since real-business-cycle theory
shows it’s not necessary to invoke monetary and
financial disturbances to explain postwar business cycles, monetary policy during the postwar period must have been better than in the
prewar period studied by Friedman and
Schwartz.
Lucas’s reconciliation of real-business-cycle
theory with U.S. monetary history suggests an
answer to the question posed earlier about
whether postwar countercyclical policies helped
or hindered the U.S. economy: The postwar U.S.
economy may mimic a perfect-markets economy
in part because postwar monetary policy and other
countercyclical policies have prevented monetary and financial instabilities from dominating business fluctuations. Still, it is possible that
instead of guiding the U.S. economy toward optimal behavior, these policies may have caused
the discrepancy between actual and optimal behavior (Figures 1 and 2). Thus, to argue convincingly that postwar countercyclical policies were
beneficial, we should also explain how these
policies improved the economy’s cyclical per21

BUSINESS REVIEW

formance and provide some evidence that they,
in fact, did so.
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
THE BENEFITS OF
COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES
The legal and regulatory framework that
shaped U.S. countercyclical policies in the postwar era was established in the years following
the Great Depression, the disaster that spurred
the adoption of policies to regulate many sectors
of the U.S. economy. The policies most relevant
for counteracting business cycles are those aimed
at banks and financial markets.
Historically, financial markets have displayed a tendency to overreact to a deterioration
in business conditions. During a downturn, it’s
normal practice for financial intermediaries to
raise their credit standards and for risk-averse
investors to shift out of stocks and bonds into
cash and government securities. These actions
reduce the amount of credit extended to the private nonfinancial sector and raise interest rates
charged on loans. Usually, the cutback in credit
does not lead to widespread financial distress,
although some firms (and households) go bankrupt. But if the cutback is severe, many firms may
fail. Widespread business failures, in turn, may
cause the failure of financial intermediaries and
lead to further cutbacks in credit and more bankruptcies. This self-propelled cycle of credit cutbacks and bankruptcies leads to a financial crisis
that results in low output, high unemployment,
and very low investment.
Why a business downturn becomes a fullblown financial crisis is not fully understood,
but investor pessimism plays an important role.
If enough people think that a business contraction is about to degenerate into a financial crisis
and act accordingly, the crisis will, in fact, materialize: investors, fearing a financial crisis, may
withdraw so much cash from banks and other
depository institutions that they may force even
sound financial institutions to run out of cash
and fail. Furthermore, an economy that suffers
22

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

one financial crisis becomes prone to suffering
more crises because investors begin to view every downturn with alarm, and their pessimism
and fear cause downturns to degenerate into crises more often. In such a situation, countercyclical policies can restore investor confidence
in the ability of financial markets to weather
downturns.
In the United States, three financial-market
countercyclical policies serve this purpose. The
first is the federal insurance through which each
account at a bank or other depository financial
institution is insured up to $100,000.9 This insurance protects small depositors from bank failures and removes their incentive to withdraw
deposits during downturns or at any other time,
thus blocking one channel through which largescale cutbacks in credit occur.
The second policy is a commitment by the
Federal Reserve to act as “lender of last resort”
when some event threatens to precipitate a crisis. Generally, these are events that have the potential to inflict serious losses on loans made by
the banking system. In such a situation, the Fed
acts as “lender of last resort” by arranging loans
that permit illiquid but solvent financial institutions to honor their obligations. For instance,
during the 1987 stock-market crash, the Fed
made more credit available to the banking system until the crisis had passed. The policy prevents a “run” on uninsured deposits in banks
and thus blocks a second channel through which
large-scale cutbacks in credit occur.
Finally, the Fed’s countercyclical interest rate
policy also helps keep financial crises at bay. By
raising interest rates and slowing down the
growth of debt in booms, the policy makes it less
necessary for banks and investors to cut back
drastically on credit during the next
contractionary phase. And by reducing interest
9

Although the FDIC insures each account, there are
restrictions on the amount of insurance a single individual with multiple accounts at the same institution
can get.
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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Policies? to Do?
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Business

rates during contractions, the Fed makes it easier
for businesses and households to service their
debts, reducing the number of bankruptcies.
In summary, post-WWII monetary and banking policies were aimed at preventing financial
markets from amplifying the effects of both business downturns and the financial disturbances
(such as a stock-market crash) that often precede business downturns. But how well did these
policies do? Real-business-cycle theory suggests
they did well because the theory holds that it’s
not necessary to invoke monetary and financial
disturbances in order to explain postwar business cycles. However, we also have more direct
evidence of their benefits: business cycles from
the prewar era exhibit greater financial instability and sharper fluctuations in output than those
from the postwar era.
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND
POST-WORLD-WAR-II BUSINESS CYCLES
Scholars who have examined the evolution
of U.S. business cycles document important differences between post-WWII cycles and those
from the prewar era. First, financial crises were
more common during business downturns in
the pre-WWII era. In his 1992 book on business
cycles, Victor Zarnowitz records that a financial
crisis occurred during the contractionary phase
of four out of the 15 business cycles between 1870
and 1927, and two financial crises occurred during the contractionary phase of the business cycle
that began in November 1927 and ended in
March 1933. Generally speaking, the prewar
downturns in which financial crises occurred
were more severe than those in which no crisis
occurred. In contrast, in the 66 years since 1933,
the United States has not suffered a single prewar-style financial crisis.10
Second, during downturns, depositors tend
to increase their holdings of cash and banks tend
to increase their cash reserves while making fewer
loans. This shift toward greater liquidity on the
part of depositors and banks is reflected in the
fall in the ratio of bank loans to the monetary

Loretta J. Mester
Satyajit Chatterjee

base (the sum of currency held by the public and
bank reserves) during downturns. Clearly, this
ratio should be much more volatile when the
financial system is prone to crises than when it
is not: the fear of a crisis and the passing of such
fear should cause the ratio to plunge and soar
over time. Indeed, it appears that the cyclical
volatility in the ratio of bank credit to the monetary base was much more marked in the preWWII era (Figure 3).11 The same is true for the
U.S. money supply, of which the ratio of bank
loans to the monetary base is an important determinant (Figure 4).12 Overall, cyclical monetary
control has been far better in the postwar period
compared with the prewar era.13
Did a fall in the volatility of economic activity
accompany the fall in the volatility of the U.S.
money supply? Apparently it did. Business-cycle
fluctuations in the gross national product (GNP)
of the United States also show a dramatic reduction of volatility in the postwar period (Figure
5).14 Furthermore, there is a strong association
between up-and-down movements in the money
10

This is not to say that there were no financial disorders in the postwar period. For instance, the S&L industry faced a serious crisis in the 1980s. However, there
were no major runs on banks associated with this crisis.
11
The proxy measure of bank credit used in Figure 3
is the difference between the M2 measure of money supply and the monetary base.
12
The volatility of the ratio of bank loans to the monetary base, as measured by the standard deviation, fell
from 5.4 percent in the prewar period (1875-1941) to 2.1
percent in the postwar period (1946-1997). The standard deviation of the money supply fell from 4.7 percent
in the prewar period to 1.7 percent in the postwar period.
13

Of course, in another important sense, it has not
been. As is well known, the postwar era has witnessed
the worst inflation in U.S. history. The rapid increase in
the money supply that fed the inflation of the 1960s and
the 1970s caused the trend path of the money supply to
shoot up. Nevertheless, fluctuations around this rapidly
rising trend line were small compared with similar fluctuations in the prewar era.
23

BUSINESS REVIEW

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

FIGURE 3

Cyclical Changes in the Ratio
Of Bank Loans to Monetary Base
1875-1997

Figure shows percentage deviations from trend. In this figure, as in the
following ones, the trend is calculated using a procedure described by
Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott. The percentage deviation from
trend is simply 100 times the ratio of the difference between the actual
and trend value of a variable to its trend. The historical data on which
this figure and the following ones are based are taken from Appendix B of
the The American Business Cycle, Robert J. Gordon, ed., Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1986.

FIGURE 4

Cyclical Changes in the Money Supply
1875-1997

Figure shows percentage deviations from trend of the M2 measure of the
money supply.
24

supply during the prewar
period and the up-anddown movements in prewar
GNP.15 This lends credence
to the view that better monetary control was a key factor in the decline in volatility of postwar GNP in the
United States.
Although Lucas and
others are right to stress the
importance of better monetary policies, we should
not think that the entire
drop in the GNP’s volatility is a result of better monetary control. Other elements of postwar countercyclical policies, particularly various “income-

14
The standard deviation
of fluctuations around trend in
prewar GNP is 4.8 percent, as
compared to 2.3 percent in the
postwar period. However, because of the fragmentary nature of information on prewar
GNP, there is controversy about
how volatile prewar GNP really was. Some scholars have
suggested that for the period
preceding the Great Depression, U.S. GNP was only
slightly more volatile than in
the postwar period. For details,
consult the 1989 articles by
Christina Romer and by
Nathan Balke and Robert Gordon.
15
The correlation coefficient between the fluctuations
around trend in money supply
and real GNP, a measure of
how closely two data series
move together, is +0.56 in the
prewar period, but -0.02 in the
postwar period.

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Policies? to Do?
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Business

Loretta J. Mester
Satyajit Chatterjee

effective countercyclical
policy is one that elimiCyclical Changes in Real GNP
nates—or at least reduces—the random move1875-1997
ments in TFP growth. Because people generally like
stable economic environments, such a policy would
make them better off.
Unfortunately, economists and policymakers do
not know a sure-fire way
to eliminate random fluctuations in TFP growth.
However, what policymakers can do is adopt
policies to buffer people
Figure shows percentage deviations from trend of real GNP measured in
against the consequences
1972 prices.
of fluctuations in TFP
growth. But a surprising
maintenance” programs, probably contributed implication of real-business-cycle theory is that
to the decline as well. For instance, unemploy- such buffering may make people worse off.
ment insurance (which didn’t exist in most states
To see why, suppose that policymakers enact
before 1930, but covered more than half the civil- a plan that dissuades businesses from increasian workforce by the late 1940s) and progressive ing the rate of investment during periods of
taxation (which reduces the income-tax rate for above-average TFP growth and encourages them
households that experience a decline in income) to keep up their rate of investment during periprobably helped reduce output volatility by shor- ods of below-average TFP growth. By forcing
ing up demand for goods and services during businesses to invest at a steadier rate, the policy
business downturns.16
will reduce random fluctuations in consumption, hours worked, and output. However, by disARE ADDITIONAL COUNTERCYCLICAL
couraging investments when the growth rate of
POLICIES DESIRABLE?
TFP is above average and encouraging investBecause fluctuations in the growth rate of TFP ments when it’s below average, the policy also
are a major source of business cycles, the most entails a loss in output.17 Thus, the policy would
make people better off only if the benefits of
FIGURE 5

16
Another factor to keep in mind is that the structure
of the U.S. economy has changed over time and some of
these changes may have reduced business-cycle volatility. For instance, the rising share of service-sector income
and employment, a sector that’s not very cyclical, must
have reduced the cyclical volatility of postwar GNP.
Thus, economists must assess the contribution of these
types of structural changes to gain a keener appreciation
of the beneficial role of postwar countercyclical policies.

17

The expected return on new investment is above
average when the growth rate of TFP is above average
and it is below average when the growth rate of TFP is
below average. Therefore, the loss in future output from
curtailing new investments during periods of above-average TFP growth will exceed the gain in future output
from expanding new investments during periods of below-average TFP growth.
25

BUSINESS REVIEW

greater stability outweighed the value of lost
output.
However, recall that according to real-business-cycle theory, people and firms adjust investment spending and hours worked so that
the value of output foregone by not responding
more aggressively to fluctuations in TFP is balanced by the benefits of the resulting stability in
the levels of income, consumption, and hours
worked. In other words, according to the theory,
the “predicted” paths for output and investment
shown in Figures 1 and 2 are the U.S. economy’s
optimal responses to TFP shocks. Because the
optimal response calls for large fluctuations in
real investment, a policy that attempts to smooth
away these fluctuations will make people worse
off: the value of lost output will outweigh the
benefits of greater stability.
More generally, the resemblance between actual and optimal business cycles implies that
further progress in reducing the ill effects of business cycles can come only from reducing random fluctuations in the rate of TFP growth.
Merely buffering the economy against these random changes is unlikely to make people better
off because people and businesses seem to be
responding to these random changes in an almost optimal way.
However, it’s possible that other countercyclical policies could reduce fluctuations in TFP
growth. For instance, some researchers have argued that the bank failures during the Great
Depression may have caused TFP to fall by making it more difficult for businesses to carry out
production. Thus, the conduct of monetary
policy could have direct effects on fluctuations
in TFP. However, no one has yet created an economic model that convincingly demonstrates
this possibility. Until we have such a model,
Prescott’s questioning of the need for additional
countercyclical policies deserves to be heeded.

26

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999

SUMMARY
Real-business-cycle theory cites changes in
business-sector productivity as a proximate
cause of booms and recessions. The theory succeeds in accounting for a large fraction of the
cyclical fluctuations in postwar U.S. output and
gives a good account of the cyclical behavior of
key macroeconomic variables.
This article has discussed the theory’s implications for existing and prospective
countercyclical policies. The theory suggests that
policy initiatives to buffer the effects of business
cycles may not be necessary; postwar business
cycles are close to what we would ideally expect
as a result of random fluctuations in the growth
rate of business-sector productivity. Unless we
can devise policies that reduce the fluctuations
in business-sector productivity itself, there may
be little to be gained by shaping the U.S.
economy’s response to these fluctuations.
However, the theory’s implications for existing countercyclical policies remains a matter of
debate. One possibility is that the success of realbusiness-cycle theory reflects better post-WWII
countercyclical policies. In particular, federal
deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities, along with superior cyclical control of
the money supply and income-maintenance
programs such as unemployment insurance and
progressive taxation, reduced some of the instabilities that characterized pre-WWII business
cycles. As a result, the volatility of output over
the course of business cycles fell after World War
II, and fluctuations in the growth rate of business-sector productivity (rather than monetary
and financial disturbances) surfaced as the
dominant source of business cycles. In this sense,
real business cycles may be the legacy of
countercyclical policies.

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Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Policies? to Do?
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Business

Loretta J. Mester
Satyajit Chatterjee

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