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Preparing for the 21st Century Economy
Based on a speech given by President Santomero at the National Commission for Cooperative Education Corporate
Symposium, Drexel University, Philadelphia, June 22, 2004
BY ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO

A

fter 30 years of university teaching and
almost five years as a Reserve Bank president,
Anthony Santomero knows the importance
of education to a well-functioning economy.
In recent years, he has seen several broad, long-term
trends emerge—trends that will undoubtedly shape our
environment and our economic fortunes. Here he talks
about two trends he deems to be of particular importance.
First is the steady increase in international trade that
has spilled over from the second half of the 20th century
into the new millennium. Second is the revolution in
information and communications technology that has
spurred productivity and spawned a need for knowledge
workers.

After three decades of university
teaching, it should come as no surprise
that I think education is critically important to our nation’s future. But in
light of my current position, I would
like to offer some perspective on the
economic context for education in
the 21st century. I also want to stress
the importance of education and cooperative education for our nation’s
students, their futures, and the very
future of our nation in the world order.
This may sound like hyperbole, but I
will suggest that it is not. Rather, it is
a reasonable reading of the challenges
we face as a nation and the stake we
all have in our success in educating the
next generation.
www.philadelphiafed.org

How do I come to this conclusion,
and why the strong assertions? Let
me explain. Although my university
career centered mostly on economics
and business as academic disciplines,
serving as the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and a
member of the Federal Open Market
Committee has given me a broader
perspective on the current trends
and future direction of our nation’s
economy.
My colleagues and I focus most of
our discussion on economic growth,
inflation, and employment. In turn,
much of that discussion focuses on
what will happen over the coming year
or two at a very aggregate level.

We also consider longer term
trends and how they will shape the
economic conditions facing our society
in the future. A wide range of issues
comes up during these discussions.
How will geopolitical trends affect the
U.S. economy? How will demographics here and abroad affect aggregate
savings and labor supply? How will the
ongoing changes in the use of technology affect productivity and wealth?
How many jobs can our economy create each year based on these trends
in labor productivity? Some of these
questions are global in focus; some
are local. Some are social; some are
technical; and some are political. But
all of these broad long-term trends will
shape our economic fortunes in the
future, as they alter our environment.
Two broad trends are unfolding
in our economy as this 21st century
opens, and we should consider their

Anthony M. Santomero, President,
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Business Review Q1 2005 1

implications for our society, for our
educational institutions, and for cooperative education.
TWO OVERARCHING FORCES
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
The first noteworthy trend is the
steady increase in international trade
over the second half of the 20th century and into this new millennium.
Trade increased steadily between major
developed nations over the past several
decades and now accounts for a sizable
portion of economic activity on both
sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific.
We now live in a globally interconnected economy. With increased trade,
markets have expanded and new nations have joined the international
party. Developed nations turned their
neighbors into economic dynamos,
with the rapid development of nations
such as Mexico, Korea, and Ireland
demonstrating that “a rising tide raises
all boats,” or at least all those tied together by trade and finance.
In addition, many more of the
world’s economies moved to adopt
market-based economic systems, replacing less effective centrally planned
economic models. This shift was most
obvious in the breakup of the Soviet
Union, but it also became increasingly
evident in Asia, with China a notable
example. Although changes in these
countries may not have resulted in
strictly laissez faire economic systems
— the market is less than free in many
of the nations that have emerged in
the wake of these changes — market
competition is much more important
now than during the previous 50
years or more. These changes were yet
another contributor to the increased
globalization of world markets.
As we entered this century, the
increase in cross-border trade has
opened opportunities and linked
economies around the globe. Globalization also has been an enormous

2 Q1 2005 Business Review

force of change to our societies, to our
economies, and to our daily lives. This
globalization is a good thing. It fosters
greater specialization and gains from
trade, affording everyone higher living
standards.
Yet, it has not been the only
force shaping this century’s economic
environment. In fact, the revolution

The technology
revolution interacted
with and has been an
important contributor
to the first force of
change driving the
evolution of our
economic structure,
namely, globalization.
in information and communications
technology would undoubtedly be high
on any list of the fundamental drivers of the economy’s evolution over
the last decade, including the most
recent business cycle. Cheap hardware,
sophisticated software, and extensive
networking capabilities began transforming business processes in earnest
in the latter half of the 1990s.
History tells us that such technological revolutions do not produce
smooth economic evolutions, and this
case has been no exception. Nonetheless, the application of new information technologies brought real economic benefits. As these technologies
were introduced into organizations and
infused into business processes, productivity accelerated measurably.
At the same time, however, these
technologies spawned unrealistic expectations that were manifested in a
stock market bubble and overinvestment in new capital. When the bubble
burst and the investment boom de-

flated, aggregate demand decelerated
rapidly, ultimately driving the economy
into recession.
But in the end, the technology
is still there. As a result, productivity
continues to rise rapidly in the U.S.
Output growth is robust, and we are
embarked on a new period of sustained
expansion.
Even more noteworthy is the fact
that the growing deployment of nextgeneration technology has transformed
the way we do work, not only its speed.
The technology revolution interacted
with and has been an important contributor to the first force of change
driving the evolution of our economic
structure, namely, globalization. By
slashing communication costs, new
technologies have made markets more
globally integrated.
These new technologies continue
to yield strong productivity and profit
growth in all types of businesses, as
processes for producing and delivering
goods and services continue to evolve
and improve. Plus, globalization has
created an ever more flexible international financial system.
As this current economic expansion continues, many economists believe that these trends are fundamentally changing the nature of competition for firms in the U.S. and around
the world. These two factors have
placed enormous pressure on firms to
cut costs and to improve efficiency in
the interests of self-preservation. This
is helping to generate a virtuous cycle
in which further investment in innovation and technological advances are
leading to further gains in productivity,
generating higher standards of living
than ever before.
THE IMPACT OF AN
EVOLVING ECONOMY ON
THE U.S. WORKFORCE
The U.S. worker is not a passive
observer in this process. Technological

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advances are continually altering the
shape, nature, and complexity of our
economic processes. The innovations
that have accelerated productivity and
contributed to higher levels of growth
also require the development of our
human capital. The changing nature of
our economy means that workers must
be smarter, more adaptable. They will
have to continually gain new skills.
At the same time, technology and
competition from abroad have risen
to a point where demand growth is
declining for the lowest skilled workers
and increasing for higher skilled, more
educated workers in the U.S. workforce. This is demonstrated by increasing wage differentials between higher
skill and lower skill workers. In other
words, while highly skilled workers
enjoy increasing incomes, real wages
for less skilled workers generally have
remained flat.
In this new world, the income
earned by a worker depends on his or
her skills and education. The fact that
over the years more than 94 percent of
the U.S. workforce has been employed
indicates that U.S. workers apparently have been sufficiently skilled and
motivated to learn the new tasks that
enable them to earn, on average, an
ever-rising real wage. Yet, even now, it
is becoming increasingly difficult for
some members of our workforce to satisfy the ever-changing demands of the
knowledge economy.
Many of those currently unemployed and even some currently
holding paying positions need to be
equipped with the skills and knowledge to compete effectively for the new
jobs our economy will create in the 21st
century. This is a long-term process,
but it will address a long-term need.
The development of people’s capabilities in mathematics, writing, and verbal skills is key to their ability to learn
and apply additional skills and, thus,
to earn higher real wages over time. In

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short, education is a critical need in
this world of high-tech manufacturing
and services.
The proportion of our labor force
with some college education has continued to grow. Yet, we are still graduating too few skilled workers to address
the imbalance that has developed, and
will continue to develop, between the
supply of knowledge workers and the
growing demand for them. This situation suggests a looming shortage of
highly skilled workers and a potential
surplus of less skilled workers. We have
already seen evidence of its effects.

and the U.S. economy as a whole.
The recent trend in the international outsourcing of jobs — also
known as “offshoring” — is just one
manifestation of this new global sourcing paradigm, and this has underscored the importance of cultivating a
more highly skilled and trained workforce in the U.S. Offshoring has been
the trend in manufacturing for a long
time. But now it seems to be intensifying in manufacturing, particularly with
the opening of the Chinese economy.
It has also been spreading to the service sector. Lower skill, call-center,

As the restructuring of U.S. product and labor
markets is unfolding in a global context, many
firms are finding themselves under constant
pressure to invest in, and maintain, highly
efficient workplaces.
We all know of the ongoing controversy surrounding H visas and the
importing of workers in technical fields
over the last decade. We all lament
the shortages of U.S.-trained engineers
for the demand already evident in our
economy. Those in the health-care
fields recognize the shortages of doctors and nurses as a sign of the times
when skills, training, and higher education are highly valued in the U.S.
economy.
At the same time, as the restructuring of U.S. product and labor markets is unfolding in a global context,
many firms are finding themselves under constant pressure to invest in, and
maintain, highly efficient workplaces.
They have responded by deploying new
product and labor market strategies
to access goods and services globally,
both here in the U.S. and elsewhere
around the world. Their ongoing challenge is to learn to transform their
organizations to reap the benefits of
comparative advantages for their firms

and other service jobs have been migrating to India and elsewhere in the
Far East for several years. We have
also seen these jobs migrate to Ireland,
Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
More recently, the process has been
moving across industries to some that
are usually insulated from such pressure — higher level professional service jobs, such as accountants, financial analysts, and software engineers.
At this point, we have yet to accurately quantify the impact of the offshoring phenomenon on the aggregate
U.S. labor market, in part because it is
difficult to measure with any accuracy.
In any case, this may be less important
than acknowledging that the tech
revolution is creating an increasingly
integrated global market for services as
well as goods.
In essence, the introduction of
new and lower cost information and
communication technologies is expanding the size of virtually every market. Information can be disseminated
Business Review Q1 2005 3

and transactions effected between
individuals and organizations located
essentially anywhere in the world at
lower cost than ever before. The bigger
the market, the greater the opportunities for specialization and gains from
trade.
In addition, new technologies reduce the cost of coordinating activities
between firms regardless of location.
This allows for even greater specialization by firms, a more segmented value
chain, and even more efficient ways of
delivering goods and services virtually
anywhere in the world. Even within
firms, technology reduces the cost of
coordinating activities across sites. So
internal processes, such as research
and development, production, distribution, and service functions, can be
further segmented, and each segment
can be located at the site of greatest
comparative advantage.
In short, as a result of the technology revolution, the demand for labor in
the U.S. has become more sensitive to
international labor-market and other
economic considerations.
As an economist, I recognize that
the free international flow of capital,
labor, goods, and services helps keep
our economy healthy and strong.
Jobs are constantly being created and
destroyed, as the economist Joseph
Schumpeter noted almost a century
ago.
When services can be sourced
more cheaply overseas than at home,
American firms naturally have an
incentive to pursue that opportunity.
Economists will note that such transactions raise real incomes on both
sides, as resources are advantageously
redeployed. These labor market changes will position our economy to take
full advantage of the international
gains from trade created by the revolution in information technology.
At the same time, it is worth remembering that the U.S. economy has

4 Q1 2005 Business Review

been experiencing insourcing as well
as outsourcing. Insourcing to the U.S.
includes jobs of all categories, but it
tends to be weighted more heavily toward higher skill and higher paid jobs
in professional services, research, and
science. In fact, some business associations argue that over the last 15 years,
the number of insourced jobs in the
U.S. has been growing faster than the
number of outsourced jobs.
Yet, some firms or employees affected by outsourcing will not reap any

Many of our students
languish at too low a
level of skill and leave
school inadequately
prepared.
benefit from insourcing to the U.S. For
them, the movement of jobs inevitably
and permanently alters the pattern of
employment.
In any case, as competition induces companies to move certain jobs
abroad, we must create new jobs in
their place and prepare our workforce
to fill them. In short, outsourcing developments and their impact on labor
markets need to be addressed to allow
the U.S. economy and its workforce to
continue to flourish. Most likely, the
result will be better, higher-paying jobs,
as long as we ensure that our workers
and students are well prepared for the
changing job market.
This process has consequences for real people that
need to be addressed. The
short-run effect of outsourcing of U.S. jobs is structural
dislocation and unemployment. Workers who become
unemployed as a result of
these types of economic
changes must be given aid

and assistance to help them adjust to
the new marketplace. This type of
empathy and compassion for those suffering from job losses is a characteristic
of our society.
But such heartfelt expressions
of empathy and compassion are not
the long-term answer to these broad
trends. Education, not just empathy,
is the long-term answer for improving
our workers’ ability to adjust to the realities of the 21st century’s marketplace.
Adequate private and public investment in skills and lifelong education
and training are paramount, so that
workers can take positions in other
industries in this new world. Education and training are the key long-term
solutions.
EDUCATION AS THE ANSWER
To address the ongoing and increasing demand for knowledge and
knowledgeable workers, our first recourse as a nation must be to look to
our education system. In some dimensions, our educational institutions are
up to the task. Our universities are the
envy of the world, and higher education has been an export industry for
some time in the U.S.
Unfortunately, the same cannot
be said about our primary and secondary educational system. Many of our
students languish at too low a level of
skill and leave school inadequately prepared. The more technical knowledge
our students acquire in our education
system does not stand up well to inter-

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national comparisons. The result has
been an excess supply of labor into the
slower growing or declining areas of
our economy. Accordingly, we apparently have quite a distance to go before
we catch up to other countries in
technical training, including math and
science, and our level of literacy needs
considerable work.
This is not just an assertion or
a sense of the market; evidence supports this conclusion. A study by the
Education Trust,1 a Washington-based
research group, found that less than
half of America’s schoolchildren read
proficiently at their grade level. This
may be part of the reason our high
school seniors score well below their
counterparts in math and science in
almost every other developed country
in the world. Indeed, after decades of
leading the world in the number of
students who complete high school,
the U.S. currently ranks only 17th.
Further, according to a report released by the Educational Testing Service,2 literacy among American adults
ranks 12th among 20 industrialized
countries. The report presented some
alarming conclusions. A staggering
45 percent of Americans exhibited an
inability to read or write at the highschool-graduate level. Almost half of
those, 20 percent, scored at a literacy
level below that of a high-school dropout.
Our future prospects seem troubling as well, considering 16 to 25 year
olds not only underperformed their
foreign counterparts but also did so

to a greater degree than Americans
over 40. Moreover, the U.S. has the
largest gap between highly and poorly
educated adults. With poorly educated
immigrants and minorities becoming
an increasingly prevalent force in U.S.
labor markets, the nation would do
well to ensure improvements in adult
training and education. Lack of im-

The U.S. has the
largest gap between
highly and poorly
educated adults.
provement in this area not only could,
but will, constrain the growth of U.S.
job opportunities in the future.
It seems clear that our school
system needs to better respond to the
changing economy. We succeeded in
responding to this type of challenge in
the past. In the early 20th century — a
time in which the nation was fostering
a rapidly developing manufacturing
sector — the educational system took
on the responsibility of broadening the
skills of students to meet the needs
of a growing economy. High-school
enrollment rose rapidly, and graduates
entered the workforce better skilled
and prepared with the training necessary for success in many occupations of
the day.3
Today, as in the past, we need to
be forward looking to adapt our educational system to the evolving needs
of the economy and the realities of our
changing society. Those efforts will
require the collaboration of policymakers, educators, and businesses.

Education Trust, “Youth at the Crossroads:
Facing High School and Beyond,” Thinking
K-16, Winter 2001.
1

Andrew Sum, Irwin Kirsch, and Robert Taggart, “The Twin Challenges of Mediocrity and
Inequality: Literacy in the U.S. from an International Perspective,” Policy Information Center,
Educational Testing Service, 2002.
2

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“The Critical Role of Education in the
Nation’s Economy,” remarks by Alan Greenspan
at the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce
2004 Annual Meeting, Omaha, Nebraska,
February 20, 2004.
3

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
This increase in the knowledge
and skills that are needed in the labor force is not likely to result from
more investment in education alone.
Research on the development of the
knowledge economy suggests there is
an important role for hands-on training in addition to traditional classroom
learning.
Our students need grounding in
not only what needs to be done on the
job but also the whys and hows that
can be more easily explained by those
steeped in the process. The structure
and culture within our nation’s firms
are critical components of the work
experience, and adding this to the
educational experience is a vital part
of businesses’ ability to absorb and effectively use the nation’s labor force.
Too often, students graduate
without experiencing hands-on or
on-the-job training. They lack experiences integrating theory and practice.
This puts them at a disadvantage when
searching for a job and will leave them
less than adequately prepared for the
changes taking place in the current
and future marketplace.
Market-driven, career-integrated
education can and must play an important role in our nation’s future
economic health. Many institutions
already offer cooperative education
and internship programs through
which students mix employment experience with academic study. These
institutions are geared to providing
graduates with the kinds of education
the marketplace demands and matching them up with local companies that
can make the most of their skills.
In our region, Drexel University
and other institutions of higher learning understand the importance of a
workforce that can support the trends
in the economy — a workforce that
will have the technical know-how to
cater to growth clusters in their region
Business Review Q1 2005 5

and will learn to contribute early and
often to the firms and industries that
make up their local economy. Here
in the Delaware Valley these areas of
concentration include such clustered
activities as biotechnology, health sciences, and many of the information
and communications technologies. Let
me cite just a few other ways in which
experiential learning is being used to
great effect in and around the Philadelphia area.
Health science students are conducting genetic research at the worldrenowned Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, the oldest children’s hospital
in the country. Arts students showcase
their work on the big screen at the Festival of World Cinema, on the catwalk
at Saks Fifth Avenue fashion shows,
and on the stage at the Kimmel Center
for the Performing Arts.
Technology students design microscopic robots as part of an initiative to
turn the Delaware Valley into “Nanotech Valley.” The Nanotechnology
Institute strives to build partnerships
throughout the mid-Atlantic region.
Through participating educational
institutions, these programs prepare
graduates for positions in the pharmaceutical and life sciences sectors.
Another example is Lockheed
Martin. One of the largest employers
in the region, it offers an internship
program that allows students to experience first-hand what it takes to launch
a great career. Many interns are hired
full time after graduation.
Lack of such valuable hands-on
training nationwide could delay our
country’s progress toward ensuring
that we have a vibrant knowledge
economy. Policymakers, academic institutions, and hiring firms alike need
to focus on how to increase hands-on

6 Q1 2005 Business Review

training as a component of students’
formal education to ensure an adequate supply of knowledge workers in
this century.
Cooperative education is more
than an investment in training or in
education; it is the cultivation of an
environment of learning. Employers
find college cooperative education
a vital resource for human resource
management. Combining classroom
studies with learning through productive work experiences provides progressive integration of both theory and
practice. It is also a mutually beneficial
process through which all parties

CONCLUSION
To sum up, several broad trends
are affecting the economic environment that our workforce will face in
the 21st century. The growing interdependence of the world economy is one.
Innovations and technological change
fueling rapid productivity growth as
well as supporting an increased pace of
globalization in almost all industries,
both manufacturing and services, are
clearly another.
These trends will lead to continuing changes in the labor markets facing
U.S. workers in this century. We will
continue to see outsourcing of jobs

The process of reallocating employment and
employment opportunities around the world is
ultimately beneficial, but it is not painless.
involved gain advantages. Students
benefit through increased learning and
improved job opportunities. Academic
institutions benefit by being able to expand the range of opportunities offered
to students and by accessing real-time
industry feedback to keep their curricula current. Firms benefit through
access to a pool of well-prepared employees and a facilitated recruitment
process. Most important, society as a
whole benefits, as we increase the effectiveness and relevance of education
and build a more skilled, competitive,
and robust workforce.
Through the partnerships developed in cooperative education, we can
connect with the realities of today’s
workplace. In this way, we cultivate a
more productive, highly skilled, technically trained workforce that will encourage insourcing of jobs from abroad
to offset those that are outsourced.

to other countries by U.S. firms, and
we will continue to see insourcing of
jobs as the skills of U.S. workers are
sought by foreign companies. The process of reallocating employment and
employment opportunities around the
world is ultimately beneficial, but it
is not painless. There will be winners
and losers in the job markets in both
developed and less developed nations.
We must have empathy and compassion for those workers who become
unemployed in the process and should
provide them with transitional aid and
assistance.
But this is not enough. Education,
including cooperative education and
training, is the long-term answer for
improving our workers’ ability to adjust
to the realities of the 21st century’s
marketplace. BR

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Ores and Scores:
Two Cases of How Competition Led to Productivity “Miracles”
BY SATYAJIT CHATTERJEE

M

acroeconomists have devoted a great deal
of effort to understanding the determinants
of labor productivity. They’ve generally
emphasized variables such as capital stock per
worker, technology, the quality of the workforce, and laws
and regulations that govern production. Recent research
has shown, however, that this conventional view may
leave something out: the degree of competitive pressure
faced by a production unit. In “Ores and Scores,” Satyajit
Chatterjee examines two cases in which increased
competition in the product market caused dramatic
improvements in labor productivity: iron mines in the
Midwest and public schools in Milwaukee.

The standard of living enjoyed by
a nation’s residents derives from the
productivity of those residents. Given
the large differences in the standard of
living across countries (and over time
for many countries), macroeconomists
have devoted a great deal of effort to
understanding the determinants of
labor productivity. In doing so, they
have generally emphasized the positive
role of the capital stock per worker (or

Satyajit
Chatterjee is a
senior economic
advisor and
economist in
the Research
Department of
the Philadelphia
Fed.
www.philadelphiafed.org

the stock of material means of production per worker), the sophistication of
the technology embodied in that stock,
the quality of a country’s workforce,
and laws and regulations that govern
production.
Recent research has shown that
this conventional view of the determinants of labor productivity may be incomplete. Aside from the determinants
listed above, the degree of competitive
pressure faced by a production unit can
also importantly influence the unit’s
labor productivity. Specifically, this
research has brought to light two examples of increased competition in the
product market that caused dramatic
improvements in labor productivity.
The two cases concern ore production
at midwestern iron mines and student
achievement in the Milwaukee public

schools — hence, the title of the
article.1
The findings of this research
are indeed noteworthy. As we are all
aware, falling trade barriers, declining
communication costs, and economic
development elsewhere in the world
are exposing increasing numbers of
U.S. businesses to competition from
low-cost rivals, both foreign and
domestic. This increased competitive
pressure was most intense during the
years 2001 to 2003, when the U.S.
manufacturing and high-technology
sectors encountered a three-year slump
in demand and the U.S. labor market
did poorly in general. Remarkably,
during these difficult years, output
per hour in the U.S. nonfarm business
sector rose at an average annual rate of
3.8 percent per year — well above the
2.2 percent rate recorded during the
“boom” years of 1995 to 2000.2 One
cannot help but wonder if there is a
causal link between increasing competitive pressure and the faster pace of
productivity growth.
However, national (or macrolevel) labor productivity can grow for
many reasons, not the least of which
is the fact that during a downturn,
average labor productivity of businesses could rise simply because the
businesses that fail (and exit) tend to
be the ones with below-average labor
productivity. This Darwinian selection is a well-known channel through

These cases have been described in the article
by Jose Galdon-Sanchez and James Schmitz and
the article by Caroline Hoxby.
1

The data on which this calculation is based
are those available on the BLS web site
(www.bls.gov) as of January 8, 2005.
2

Business Review Q1 2005 7

which competition affects national, or
industry-level, productivity.
But the noteworthy aspect of the
two studies reviewed here is that each
examined the impact of increased
competition on labor productivity at
the micro level, that is, at the level of
production units that were in operation both before and after the change
in competitive pressure. Thus, each
study establishes the existence of a
causal link running from increased
competitive pressure to higher labor
productivity that is distinct from the
effect of Darwinian selection.
Furthermore, the studies shed
new light on the determinants of labor
productivity. In principle, increased
competitive pressure could increase
labor productivity via changes in the
conventionally recognized determinants of labor productivity. In both
cases, however, the increase in productivity was accomplished without any
change in technology, worker quality,
or regulation. Capital stock per worker
(more generally, inputs per worker) did
change, but the effect of this change
was too small to plausibly account for
the large change in labor productivity.
In fact, the increase in productivity
resulted from a change in how work
was organized within the production
unit. Thus, this research reveals that
the organization of work, or work rules,
is an important determinant of labor
productivity as well. More crucially,
the research shows that work rules respond to competition: When competitive pressure is high, production units
choose work rules that enhance labor
productivity.
The fact that more productive
work rules are adopted under pressure
suggests that workers might view such
rules with disfavor. After reviewing the
two studies, I will discuss some reasons
why workers might resist more productive work practices. One reason could
be job security if workers fear that jobs

8 Q1 2005 Business Review

would be lost with the adoption of
more productive work rules. This possibility probably explains why midwestern mines did not adopt more productive work rules prior to the steel crises.
Another reason could be the higher
work intensity – and the attendant
costs of stress and fatigue — associated
with more productive work rules. This
possibility probably explains why work
practices in poorly performing Milwaukee public schools changed only after

footprints of the competitive-pressure
effect documented so clearly by the
studies reviewed here.
A PRIMER ON LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY
For a business enterprise, labor
productivity is the ratio of the valueadded by the production unit over a
given period of time — say, a year
— to the total number of full-time
equivalent workers employed by the

This research reveals that the organization
of work, or work rules, is an important
determinant of labor productivity.
the voucher program was instituted.
This discussion is useful also
because it identifies the types of
industries (or occupations) in which
resistance to productive work practices can be effective and for which,
therefore, an increase in competitive
pressure might be expected to raise
labor productivity significantly.3 I
use this identification to suggest that
the ongoing (indeed, accelerating)
diffusion of cutting-edge technologies
outside of the industrialized world may
be wearing down workers’ resistance
to more productive work practices in
many occupations and sectors of the
U.S. economy. Indeed, recent productivity and compensation trends in
the U.S. may be starting to show the

production unit over that same period.4
The value-added by a production unit
is simply the total value of goods and
services produced by the production
unit over a given period less the value
of all goods and services purchased by
the production unit from other firms
and used up in production in that period. It’s a measure of the value of work
done by the production unit over the
given period. The number of full-time
equivalent workers is simply the total
of all full-time workers employed by
the production unit over the same period of time plus the full-time equivalent of all part-time workers.5 Thus,
the labor productivity of a business

An example of material used up in production
is the iron ore used in the production of steel.
When we calculate value-added by a steel
company over a month, the cost of the iron
ore used up during the month is subtracted
from the dollar value of the steel produced that
month. The cost of other inputs purchased from
firms and used up in production is similarly
subtracted from the dollar value of production.
4

Unfortunately, micro-level studies of labor
productivity that exploit differences in the
degree of competitive pressure (on production
units) resulting from an outside event
are relatively rare. Consequently, it is not
possible to directly measure the scope of the
competitive pressure effect seen in the case of
the midwestern iron mines and the Milwaukee
public schools. One other micro-level study
that also documents the positive effect of
competition on labor productivity is by Harry
Bloch and James McDonald for a group of
Australian firms.
3

For instance, a firm that has 50 full-time
employees working 40 hours per week and
six part-time employees working 20 hours per
week will have a total of 53 full-time equivalent
employees.
5

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the degree of competition can also
influence productivity through the
choice of work rules.

enterprise is a measure of the average
value contributed by workers over a
given period.6
For the purposes of this article,
it is important to know the kinds of
things that can affect labor productivity. In this regard, the most important
point to grasp is that labor productivity is a flow measure; that is, it has a
unit of time associated with it (such as
a year). Therefore, one way in which
labor productivity can vary is simply
through the volume of work a worker
can perform in a given amount of time.
A production unit in which workers
can handle a greater volume of work
in a given amount of time will have
higher labor productivity.
The volume of work a worker
can perform depends, in turn, on
several factors. A very important one
is the technology and capital stock a
worker has access to in the production
unit. For instance, a large and highly
automated manufacturing plant makes
it possible for workers to handle a very

Labor productivity can also be measured as
output generated per hour of work. Indeed, a
commonly used statistic on labor productivity
in the U.S. (available from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics) is output per hour of work in the
nonfarm business sector.
6

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high volume of work. Similarly, office
workers are able to handle a higher
volume of work if they are aided in
their tasks by computers and software.
Thus, the capital stock per worker is
an important determinant of labor
productivity.
In addition, there are intangible
(but no less important) factors. Workers with high cognitive ability and
longer work experience accomplish
more in a given period, and labor
productivity will be higher in a production unit with better educated and
more experienced workers. Also, every
production unit operates under a legal
and regulatory framework specific to
its location of operation. For instance,
a manufacturing plant must abide by
national or state pollution control laws
that might constrain how much output
it can produce in any given period.
Thus, laws and regulations are also
another determinant of labor productivity.
Broadly speaking, these four factors (the capital stock per worker, the
level of technology, worker quality, and
laws and regulations) have garnered
the most attention from economists
seeking to understand the determinants of labor productivity. Now let’s
turn to the evidence that suggests that

COMPETITIVE PRESSURE
AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF
IRON ORE PRODUCERS
The U.S. iron ore industry is located in the Midwest. Because iron
ore is heavy and costly to transport,
U.S. ore producers supply ore only
to U.S. steel producers located in
the Great Lakes region. Between
1979 and 1982, the U.S. economy
experienced two recessions, almost
back-to-back.7 This was also a period
of depressed economic conditions
in most of the industrialized world.
As a result, world demand for steel fell
sharply, and this decline hit the U.S.
steel industry hard. The production
of steel declined almost 50 percent
between 1979 and 1982.
Since iron ore is used almost exclusively as an input in the production
of steel, the shrinkage in the demand
for steel led to a corresponding decline
in the demand for iron ore. Indeed,
the demand for iron ore fell about 50
percent as well. Furthermore, the decline in the world market for steel led
to a scramble by ore producers all over
the world to find new customers. In
the process, despite the huge distances
involved, Brazilian mines began shipping iron ore to steel producers in the
Chicago area. Thus, both the shrinkage in the demand for iron ore and
the appearance of a competitor led to
increased competitive pressure on U.S.
iron ore producers.8
The increase in competitive
pressure coincided with a remarkable

In terms of the unemployment rate and loss of
GDP, the recession in 1982 was the worst U.S.
recession since World War II.
7

Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz define increased
competitive pressure as an increased likelihood
of business failure.
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change in the labor productivity of
iron ore mines. As José Galdon-Sanchez and James Schmitz document,
between 1965 and 1978, there was
essentially no change in the labor
productivity of U.S. iron ore producers.
After 1982, labor productivity began to
increase rapidly, and by the late 1980s,
the productivity of U.S. iron ore producers had doubled.9 But coincidence
does not imply causality. Perhaps labor
productivity would have risen even
without the increase in competitive
pressure. To be sure that the increase
in labor productivity resulted from
increased competitive pressure, Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz compared
how the collapse of the world steel
market affected ore producers in other
countries. This comparison is informative because the collapse affected
ore producers differently in different
countries.
Excluding the United States
(which was the third largest producer
of ore in 1980 among non-Communist countries), iron ore is produced
in significant quantities in seven
other countries. In order of volume of
production in 1980, these countries
are Brazil, Australia, Canada, India,
France, Sweden, and South Africa.
Based on the average cost of ore
production in each country and the
location of a country’s mines relative to its centers of steel production,
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz sorted
countries according to the degree of
competitive pressure experienced as a
result of the steel collapse. According
to the authors’ calculations, mines in
Australia, Brazil, and India faced the

It’s worth pointing out that there was no such
dramatic shift in productivity growth at the
national level. Output per hour in the nonfarm
business sector rose at an annual rate of 2.2
percent between 1965 and 1978 and at an
annual rate of 1.97 percent between 1983 and
1990.
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smallest increase in competitive pressure, while mines in the U.S., Canada,
France, South Africa, and Sweden
faced the highest increase.10 When
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz looked
at how labor productivity evolved in
each of these countries, they found
that countries that faced the smallest increase in competitive pressure
— namely, Australia, Brazil, and India
— experienced the smallest increases
in labor productivity after the steel
collapse. All of the other countries

determinants of labor productivity.12
There were no improvements in
technology or worker quality and no
changes in regulations governing ore
production. Capital stock per worker
did rise, but the rise was not large
enough to account for any significant
proportion of the remarkable increase
in labor productivity.
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz also
investigated if mines were shifting into
the production of higher quality ore
(which would presumably fetch more

After 1982, labor productivity began to
increase rapidly, and by the late 1980s, the
productivity of U.S. iron ore producers had
doubled. But coincidence does not imply
causality.
experienced much higher increases in
labor productivity.11
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz
present persuasive evidence that
the increase in the labor productivity of U.S. mines was a consequence
of increased competitive pressure.
The next important question is how
this increase was achieved. Remarkably, Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz
argue that the increase in the labor
productivity of U.S. mines cannot be
accounted for by changes in traditional

These calculations are based on cost,
including freight of ores from various countries.
For instance, mines whose basic cost of ore
production is relatively low and whose distance
from the closest center of steel production
is small will face the smallest increase in
competitive pressure. These mines will, in
effect, be the mines of choice for some steel
producers. Thus, shrinkage in the world
demand for steel will affect low-cost, close-in
producers the least while affecting the highcost, far-out mines the most.
10

in the marketplace, thus boosting
value-added and labor productivity),
but they found no evidence of such a
shift. They also determined that labor
productivity did not go up because ore
producers were shutting down low-productivity mines.13 In their words, the
increase in labor productivity occurred
in “continuing mines, producing the
same products and using the same
technology as they had before the
1980s.”
This, of course, raises the question
as to what exactly happened in these
mines. In a recent article, Schmitz
investigated this issue in detail. It
turns out that the increase in labor
productivity resulted mostly from
changes in work rules. In most cases,
these changes involved an expan-

This point is made in more depth in the
recent article by Schmitz.
12

If an ore producer shuts down mines with
low labor productivity, the producer’s labor
productivity will rise simply because there are
fewer low-productivity mines pulling down the
average labor productivity of the ore producer.
13

The only exception to this pattern is France,
where labor productivity declined steeply during
the 1990s. Iron ore production is nonexistent in
France at present.
11

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sion in the set of tasks a worker was
required to perform. For example, the
changes required equipment handlers
to perform routine maintenance on
their equipment. Before, this maintenance was the responsibility of repairmen. In addition, the new work rules
insisted on a flexible assignment of
work; that is, a worker was required to
occasionally do tasks assigned primarily to another worker. In both cases,
the new work rules led to better use of
a worker’s time.
To summarize, the evolution of
the labor productivity of U.S. iron ore
mines during the 1980s shows that
labor productivity depends on more
than just the stock of material means
of production, worker quality, and
regulations. It also depends on the
work rules in place. Furthermore, work
rules appear to be a choice variable.
When competitive pressure is high,
the production units choose work rules
that enhance labor productivity.14
SCHOOL CHOICE,
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE,
AND SCHOOL PRODUCTIVITY
Let’s turn now to another example
of increased competitive pressure
leading to higher productivity: public
schools in Milwaukee. Since schools
don’t sell their “output” in the marketplace, the notion of labor productivity
defined earlier is not directly applicable. In this context, we can take
productivity to mean what taxpayers
get for their money: average student
achievement of a school divided by per
pupil school expenditures.15

The Milwaukee school district
introduced school vouchers for poor
students in the 1991-1992 school year.
With a voucher, an eligible student
could go to a private school and have
about $5000 of tuition costs reimbursed. The public school district
that lost the student would lose about
29 percent of its per pupil revenue.
Although many students were eligible
for vouchers, the number of vouchers
given was capped at 1 percent of public
school enrollment. After a long legal
dispute, however, this cap was raised
to 15 percent, starting with the 19981999 school year.16
As in the iron ore case, it’s possible to classify Milwaukee public
schools according to the degree of
competitive pressure faced as a result
of the voucher program. This classification is based on the fraction of students eligible for vouchers in a school
district. Because eligibility depends on
household income, this fraction varies
widely. Some school districts had more
than 90 percent of students eligible for
vouchers and others as few as 25 percent. Caroline Hoxby classified school
districts with at least 67 percent of
students eligible for vouchers as being
under the most competitive pressure,
while those with less than 67 percent
as being under moderate competitive
pressure.
Hoxby compared school productivity (the percentile score of a school’s
fourth-grade class in different subjects
per $1000 of per pupil spending) for
1996-1997 (the last year before the

cap was raised to 15 percent) with
school productivity in 1999-2000. She
finds that school productivity rose 46
percent and 56 percent for math and
science and 23 percent and 11 percent
for social studies and language in the
schools under the most competitive
pressure. In contrast, schools under
moderate competitive pressure showed
increases of 10 percent, 45 percent, 10
percent, and 4 percent, respectively.
To be confident that the increase
in school productivity was the result of
increased competitive pressure,
Hoxby compared the performance
of Milwaukee schools with that of
other Wisconsin schools that were not
part of the voucher program. For this
comparison, she selected Wisconsin
schools outside of Milwaukee that resembled Milwaukee schools as much as
possible. For this comparison group she
found increases in school productivity
— in math, science, social studies, and
language — of 18 percent, 9 percent,
and 4 percent, and a decline of 10 percent, respectively, between 1996-1997
and 1999-2000.
Thus, for every subject, the ranking by percentage increase in school
productivity was identical. Schools
under the most competitive pressure
showed the greatest increase, schools
under moderate competitive pressure
showed the second largest increase,
and schools under no competitive pres-

Hoxby studies the impact of this reform
in detail because it satisfies three critical
requirements: “(1) there is a realistic possibility
that at least 5 percent of regular public school
enrollment could go to choice schools, (2) the
regular public schools lose at least some money
when a student goes to a choice school, and (3)
the reform has been in place for a few years.”
Clearly, (1) and (2) are necessary conditions for
a reform to generate competitive pressure on a
public school.
16

The reasons competitive pressure and labor
productivity are linked are discussed later on in
the article.
14

See Caroline Hoxby’s article for a more
detailed discussion of this measure and
Theodore Crone’s article for a discussion
of student scores as a measure of school
achievement.
15

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Business Review Q1 2005 11

sure showed the smallest increase.17
What factors contributed to this
increase in productivity? In her discussion, Hoxby notes some of the ways
a school superintendent could raise
the performance of his or her school.
These include re-allocation of teacher
effort toward basic skill-building classes
such as reading and math and rewarding teachers whose students showed
improvement in scores while letting
unproductive staff go (i.e., moving to
more performance-based compensation). Thus, it would appear that these
increases in productivity were also the
result of changes in work rules.18
Hoxby’s findings have attracted a lot of
attention. In a somewhat related study, Cecilia
Rouse found that Milwaukee students who
took advantage of the voucher program and
transferred to private/parochial schools did
only somewhat better in math and not at
all in reading. Although students who left
Milwaukee public schools are not Hoxby’s focus,
Rouse’s findings have led some to question
the usefulness of school choice as a way of
raising student achievement. In a more recent
study, Rajashri Chakrabarti has analyzed the
impact of the Florida voucher program and
re-affirmed the importance of voucher programs
in providing incentives to improve school
productivity.
17

However, the nature of the voucher program
complicates this inference for the following reason. When a student uses the voucher program,
the school that loses the student loses only 29
percent of per pupil revenue. Consequently,
schools that lose students to the voucher program see an increase in the resources available
per (remaining) pupil (provided, of course, the
overall school budget does not change for some
other reason). Increase in per pupil spending is
akin to an increase in inputs, and that could be
a factor in the improved performance of schools.
Schools under the most competitive pressure
did see an increase in average spending per pupil. This increase was about 6 percent. Over the
same period, the comparison schools outside of
Milwaukee saw an increase of 2 percent in per
pupil spending. This suggests that spending per
pupil in the schools under the most competitive pressure probably rose about 4 percent as
a result of the voucher program. Of course, the
price of education inputs probably rose over this
period as well, so that the actual real increase in
spending per pupil was less than 4 percent. Unless an increase of 4 percent or less in spending
per pupil had a huge effect on school productivity, most of the increase in school productivity
probably resulted from changes unrelated to the
quantity of inputs.
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WHY DOES COMPETITION
AFFECT THE CHOICE OF
WORK RULES?
The main lessons to be drawn
from these two studies are that work
rules are an important determinant of
labor productivity and that work rules
respond to competition. Why might
this be so? Although the connection
between competition and productivity
may seem obvious, there is something
to be gained from thinking carefully
about it.
Thinking generally about the fact
that more productive work rules are
adopted under pressure suggests one of
two things. First, it may be that more
productive work rules are invented
only when the need for such rules
becomes acute. In other words, necessity may be the mother of invention in
the case of work rules (as in so much
else). Alternatively, the knowledge of
more productive work rules may exist,
but such rules are adopted only under
pressure because workers view such
rules with disfavor. In what follows, I
will leave aside the issue of organizational innovation and consider only
the second alternative in more detail.
Therefore, I will focus on the case of
relatively simple changes in work rules
that raise labor productivity.
Why might workers view more
productive work rules with disfavor?
One possibility is that workers experience increased job insecurity as a
result of such rules; that is, workers
associate more productive work rules
with a higher likelihood of job loss.19
Certainly, more productive work rules
mean that any given level of output
can be produced with fewer work-

This discussion draws heavily on the 2004
paper by James Schmitz and on the book by
Stephen Parente and Edward Prescott. Parente
and Prescott discuss barriers to the adoption of
new technology (as opposed to work rules), but
much of what they say is relevant for the choice
of work rules as well.
19

ers. With no change in a firm’s sales,
adopting more productive work rules
will result in some workers being laid
off. Workers as a group may then resist
adopting the rules until a crisis threatens business failure and the loss of all
jobs. Then, the more productive work
rules will be adopted because doing so
saves some jobs that would otherwise
be lost.
But one must ask under what
circumstances workers can actually
resist more productive work rules.
Three conditions must be satisfied.
First, if owners (or their representatives, the managers) can unilaterally
dictate work practices, they can insist
that more productive work rules be
adopted. Because such rules increase
profits — at a minimum, the firm
can produce the same output with
fewer workers and hence at lower cost
— owners obviously have an incentive to do so. Thus, for there to be any
resistance at all, the right to dictate
work practices must reside partially
with workers.
Second, a new firm does not have
to face established employees worried
about job security and can therefore
adopt the more productive work rules.
If workers in established firms do not
have the right to dictate work rules in
new firms, and if the threat of competition from new entrants is sufficiently
real, workers in established firms will
feel compelled to adopt more productive work rules as soon as these rules
become known.20 Thus, the threat of
a new entrant with more productive
work rules must be low or nonexistent.
Finally, it must be in workers’
interest to resist more productive work
rules. That depends on whether the
firm can sell the additional output
— delivered by an unchanged number
Entry by a more efficient competitor is like a
crisis: It threatens business failure and the loss
of all jobs.
20

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of workers using more productive work
rules — without precipitating a large
drop in price. If the firm is a small
player in a big market, the increased
production may cause little or no drop
in price. In this case, the firm’s revenue will go up without any increase
in costs. By passing on some of the
additional revenue to workers, the firm
can induce workers to accept the more
productive work rule. Thus, for job
security to be an issue, the firm must
be large relative to the market it serves.
These three conditions — the
worker’s right to partially dictate work
rules, barriers to entry by new firms,
and large firm-size relative to market
— are features of monopolistic industries.21 Thus, workers in monopolistic
industries may have the ability and
the incentive to resist productive work
rules for job security reasons. The mining example certainly fits this pattern.
Work practices in the midwestern
mines were partially under the control
of labor unions, so managers could not
unilaterally dictate work practices. The
high cost of shipping iron ore over long
distances kept the threat of entry by
new firms low. Finally, the midwestern
mines were big relative to their market
— there being only a handful of mines
serving the Great Lakes steel producers. Thus, loss of job security could
explain why miners resisted more productive work rules until the steel crisis
broke that resistance down. Indeed,
when these rules were adopted, the
mines eliminated a significant number
of jobs.

Strictly speaking, a fourth condition must also
be met. One must ask why a firm with too many
workers doesn’t buy its excess workers out –
paying for the buyout from future reductions in
operating costs. Schmitz observes that a firm’s
ability to finance the buyout will depend on its
borrowing capacity. But because a firm has the
option to default on its debt, the amount it can
credibly borrow may not be sufficient to cover
the cost of a full buyout. Consequently, it may
not be possible to buy out all excess workers.
21

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But loss of job security cannot
be the reason some Milwaukee public
schools had poor student achievement prior to the voucher program.
Better student scores would have led
to teachers being lauded rather than
being laid off! To understand this
example, we must consider the possibility that workers may view more
productive work rules with disfavor
because such rules demand more effort
and therefore feel more onerous. This
possibility seems natural if we recall

that owners can pay is less than the
minimum workers will accept, the rule
would not be adopted. The additional
compensation demanded by workers
will depend importantly on what happens if the rule is not adopted. If the
refusal to adopt results in both workers’
and owners’ carrying on as before,
there will be less urgency on the part
of workers to adopt the rule. In such
circumstances, workers will be aggressive in their demand for additional
compensation, and the rule may not be

Workers in monopolistic industries may have
the ability and the incentive to resist productive
work rules for job security reasons.
that labor productivity is determined
by the volume of work handled by a
worker. Since a higher volume of work
— with no change in technology or
capital stock per worker — is likely
to be associated with a higher level of
work intensity, work rules that promote
higher labor productivity may well feel
more onerous to workers.
But, again, we must ask under
what circumstances would workers
have the ability to resist more onerous
but more productive work rules and
whether they would have an incentive
to do so. Let’s assume that workers
have the right to at least partially
dictate work practices and that the
threat of entry by new firms with more
productive work rules is low or nonexistent. Then workers would certainly
be able to resist changes in work rules.
Further, let’s assume that workers do
not fear the possibility of job loss from
adopting the work rule — the firm is a
small player in a big market.
Because work rules are onerous, workers would want additional
compensation to offset the costs associated with adopting the rule. If the
maximum additional compensation

adopted. On the other hand, if the refusal to adopt results in an impairment
of the firm’s ability to compete and
thereby raises the likelihood of layoffs
or business failure, workers would be
less aggressive in their demand, and
the rule is more likely to be adopted.22
This logic can make sense of the
voucher program’s effect on Milwaukee
public schools. Since teachers unions
partially dictate work practices, one
of the preconditions for resistance to
changes in work rules is certainly met.
By its nature, entry into the “market
for public schools” is restricted, so the

For readers familiar with the theory of
bargaining, I should point out that (Nash)
bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome.
That is, all work rule changes that are
sufficiently productive would be adopted, and
workers would be adequately compensated
for putting up with the rules. But the
requirement of efficiency does not pin down the
compensation work rule package because there
are many efficient packages. Which efficient
package is picked will depend on the outside
options of workers and owners. When workers’
outside options deteriorate, the bargaining will
move the compensation work rule package in
the direction that makes workers worse off and
owners better off; that is, compensation will fall
and work rules will become more onerous.
22

Business Review Q1 2005 13

second pre-condition is also met. Before the voucher program was set up,
the incentive to adopt work practices
that improved school performance was
weak because failure to adopt meant
the status quo. But by giving a significant fraction of students the option
to withdraw from poorly performing
schools, the voucher program linked
a school’s nonperformance to loss of
resources and, possibly, jobs.23 Since
improvement in school performance
would presumably obviate the need for
parents to switch schools, there was
now a stronger incentive to adopt work
rules that enhanced school performance.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RECENT
PRODUCTIVITY AND
COMPENSATION TRENDS
So far the discussion has emphasized workers’ right to partially dictate
work practices and the low threat of
entry by new firms as two important
pre-conditions for workers to successfully resist more productive work rules
when they have an incentive to do so.
But the workers’ “right” to dictate work
practices and barriers to entry by new
firms are, to some degree, features of
every U.S. industry. Although the bulk
of the U.S. workforce is not unionized,
workers exert considerable influence
on the choice of work rules because a
business can ignore worker preferences
concerning work practices only at the
cost of (excessive) employee turnover.
Similarly, while most U.S. industry is
generally open to competition, established firms in any industry wield considerable advantage over new entrants,
an advantage that constrains how well
new entrants can compete with established firms. Thus, the choice of work

Withdrawal of a sufficiently large number of
students would result in the loss of teaching
positions and, therefore, in the loss of jobs for
some teachers.

rules will be influenced by the “bargaining strength” of workers to some
degree in every industry. When that
bargaining strength is weakened, there
will be a tendency for more productive
work rules to be adopted.
Competitive pressure and the
choice of work rules may be relevant
in understanding recent productivity
and compensation trends in the U.S.
As noted earlier, the U.S. economy has
experienced significantly faster growth

By giving a significant
fraction of students
the option to
withdraw from poorly
performing schools,
the voucher program
linked a school’s
nonperformance to
loss of resources and,
possibly, jobs.
in labor productivity since 1995. Interestingly, between 1995 and 2000, the
growth rate of output per hour in the
nonfarm business sector was roughly
matched by the growth rate of hourly
compensation, adjusted for inflation,
in this sector.24 Economic theory predicts that productivity growth that is
due to the diffusion of new technology
should result in a comparable increase
in the growth rate of compensation
per hour. Since this is what happened,
neither the pickup in productivity
growth nor the pickup in compensation per hour is mysterious. Both are
generally attributed to the diffusion of
new technologies.

Over these three years, output per hour in the
nonfarm business sector rose at an annual rate
of 3.8 percent, while hourly compensation rose
at an annual rate of only 1.5 percent.
25

23

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Since 2001, however, the situation
has been quite different. The growth
rate of worker compensation per hour
has not kept pace with the growth rate
of labor productivity.25 Why has this
happened? One possibility is that the
recession, by raising the likelihood of
business failure, weakened workers’
resistance to more productive work
practices. This would explain why productivity has risen without a comparable increase in labor compensation.
But a more important force working
in the same direction is the ongoing
diffusion of modern technology to
countries outside the developed world.
This diffusion is gradually increasing
the threat of entry by new low-cost
producers in many lines of business, a
trend that has become particularly noticeable since the late 1990s. Perhaps
this development is also contributing
to a weakening of worker resistance to
more productive work practices.
It’s worth noting that regardless
of the reasons for worker resistance
to more productive work practices,
some workers are made worse off by
the adoption of such rules. Thus, the
benefits stemming from improved labor
productivity must be set against the
loss experienced by some workers. It’s
natural, then, to wonder whether this
offset completely swamps the benefits.
Historically, improvements in labor
productivity have served as the foundation for a general improvement in
the standard of living, even when the
improvements initially affected some
portion of the population adversely.
There is no reason yet to think that
the same will not be true of the ongoing improvements in labor productivity.

Output per hour grew at an annual rate of 2.2
percent, while hourly compensation grew at an
annual rate of 2.0 percent.
24

www.philadelphiafed.org

CONCLUSION
The concept of labor productivity
is an important one in macroeconomics. Economists who study the determinants of labor productivity generally
focus on the positive role of the capital
stock (the material means of production), the level of technology embedded in that stock, worker education,
and laws and regulations. Two recent
research studies suggest that this list
ought to be amended to include the
choice of work rules as well. These
two studies — one dealing with the
productivity of iron ore mines and
the other with that of public schools
— clearly demonstrated that an increase in competitive pressure can lead
to adoption of work rules that enhance
labor productivity.
The studies used a very similar
methodology to make their case. The
first step was to identify an event that
led to increased competitive pressure
on production units. In the case of
the midwestern iron mines, it was the
collapse of steel production in the early
1980s; in the case of the Milwaukee

public schools, it was the introduction
of a voucher program. The next step
was to sort production units (mines
and public schools) by the degree of increased competitive pressure faced as a
result of that event. Then, in the final
step, the change in pre- and post-event
labor productivity of the production
units that faced the most increase in
competitive pressure was compared
with the change in pre- and post-event
productivity of units that faced the
least increase in competitive pressure.
Both studies found that labor productivity grew most in the units that
faced the most increase in competitive
pressure.
If adopting more productive work
rules had no adverse consequences for
workers, it would be hard to understand why a more productive work
rule would not be adopted as soon as
workers or owners think of it. The fact
that such rules are adopted under pressure suggests that workers lose something from adopting such rules. More
productive work rules may result in loss
of jobs, and workers, understandably,

resist such rules. Alternatively, more
productive work rules may require
workers to handle a greater volume of
work, a situation that may make such
rules seem onerous. These reasons
could explain why productive work
rules are not adopted until increased
competitive pressure forces workers to
relent.
Competitive pressure on a business goes up when it experiences a
decline in demand for its product.
Such declines can happen during a
downturn or when the firm encounters
new low-cost rivals vying for customers. Since 2000, we have seen both.
There was a recession and increased
competition from firms in the developing world. Arguably, these developments may account for why the pace of
productivity growth has risen and why
the pace of labor compensation growth
has slowed since 2000. For this reason,
the evidence on the role of competitive
pressure in labor productivity reviewed
in this article is noteworthy and
relevant. BR

Crone, Theodore M. “What Test Scores
Can and Cannot Tell Us About the Quality of Our Schools,” Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia Business Review, Third
Quarter, 2004.

Rouse, Cecilia E. “Private School Vouchers
and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
May 1998, pp. 553-602.

Hoxby, Caroline M. “School Choice and
School Productivity (or Could School
Choice be a Tide That Lifts All Boats?),”
Working Paper, Harvard University, 2001.

Schmitz, James A. “What Determines
Labor Productivity? Lessons from the Dramatic Recovery of the U.S. and Canadian
Iron-Ore Industries Since Their Early
1980s Crisis,” Research Department Staff
Report No. 286, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, January 2004.

REFERENCES
Bloch, Harry, and James T. McDonald.
“Import Competition and Labor
Productivity,” Melbourne Institute
Working Paper 9/00, May 2000.
Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E., and James A.
Schmitz. “Competitive Pressure and Labor
Productivity: World Iron Ore Markets
in the 1980s,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Spring
2003, 27, 2, pp. 9-23.
Chakrabarti, Rajashri. “Impact of Voucher
Design on Public School Performance:
Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee
Voucher Programs,” Cornell University,
October 2003.

www.philadelphiafed.org
www.philadelphiafed.org

Parente, Stephen, and Edward C. Prescott.
Barriers to Riches. Cambridge: MA, MIT
Press, 2002.

Business Review Q1 2005 15
Business Review Q1 2005 15

How Do Local Labor Markets in the U.S.
Adjust to Immigration?
BY ETHAN GATEWOOD LEWIS

I

n recent years, more than 1 million people a
year have immigrated to the U.S., a level not
seen since before the Great Depression. This
boom is most apparent in the urban areas
where immigrants tend to cluster. Given their numbers,
these newly arrived residents must have some effect on
local labor markets. Yet economists have been puzzled by
the evidence that immigration has little impact on the
wages and employment of native-born workers. So how
great is immigration’s impact on local labor markets? Is it
limited to markets where immigrants settle, or is it spread
across the country? Ethan Lewis sifts through the theory
and evidence to answer these questions.

Since the 1960s, the number of
foreign-born people living in the U.S.
has risen rapidly. At present, over 1
million people immigrate to the U.S.
each year (both legally and illegally),1
a level not seen since before the Great
Depression.2 This boom is most apparent in the urban areas where immigrants tend to cluster: Foreign-born
residents now make up 60 percent of
the population of Miami and large
pluralities of the population of other

Ethan Lewis is
an economist
in the Research
Department of
the Philadelphia
Fed.
16 Q1 2005 Business Review

major gateway destinations such as
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago
(Table). There are at least some immigrants in all parts of the U.S., however.
In the Third Federal Reserve District,
Philadelphia is the top destination for
the foreign-born, followed by Trenton,
Wilmington, Atlantic City, and Allentown. In addition, immigration to
some cities that had few immigrants
not long ago has been increasing
rapidly in recent years, especially in
the South.
In a recent Business Review article,
Albert Saiz discussed immigration’s
impact on U.S. cities. The evidence
suggests immigrants have surprisingly
little impact on the wages and employment rates of similarly skilled nativeborn workers in the same labor market.
On the other hand, Saiz’s research

shows immigrants bid up the price of
housing, and thus immigration may
still affect the “real” disposable income
of native-born workers, at least in the
short run.3 In one study, Saiz showed
that rents in Miami jumped up and
remained high for up to four years after
a large influx of mostly less-skilled
Cuban refugees to Miami in 1980
(the Mariel boatlift). The impact was
largest for rental units of lower quality
than one would expect the Cuban
refugees to occupy; so the real disposable income of less-skilled workers in
Miami fell. Saiz’s article also discusses
These data come from the 2000 U.S. Census
of Population. To the extent that illegal immigrants are not willing to respond to government surveys asking people where they were
born, this may understate the total number of
immigrants. However, the U.S. Census Bureau
takes great pains to make clear that responses
to their surveys are, by law, confidential (and
cannot be given to other government agencies).
In addition, the Bureau uses statistical methods
to correct for nonresponse. There is also some
evidence that the census captures many illegal
immigrants: the number of self-reported immigrants is much larger than the number of legal
visa holders in the U.S.
1

The last big wave of immigration, at the turn
of the 19th century, occurred at a time when
there were few (legal) restrictions on immigration. Though that wave was almost as large in
numbers as the current wave, the U.S. population was much smaller; therefore, the impact
was proportionately greater. During the current
wave, however, population growth among native-born Americans is much lower than at the
turn of the 19th century. As a result, the foreignborn share of the population is growing faster
now. Another period in which immigration
rapidly transformed the U.S. population was in
the decades before the Civil War, when masses
of Irish and other northern European immigrants settled in the U.S.
2

In the long term, construction of new housing units or out-migration of people unwilling
to pay the higher rents is expected to diminish
the impact of any short-term crunch in housing
availability.
3

www.philadelphiafed.org

TABLE
Top Destinations of Working Age* Immigrants in the 1990s

Metro Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

New York, NY
Los Angeles, CA
Chicago, IL
Houston, TX
Miami-Hialeah, FL
Washington, DC
Dallas, TX
Orange County, CA
San Jose, CA
Atlanta, GA
Top 10 Metro Areas

Number of
Immigrants
in the 1990s
1,016,309
909,483
493,585
317,918
310,981
308,940
261,997
241,899
205,785
205,030
4,271,927

% of Area’s Population
1990s
All
Immigrants
Immigrants
17.2%
15.3%
9.5%
11.8%
22.4%
9.5%
11.1%
13.4%
18.6%
7.5%
13.2%

41.9%
47.8%
22.1%
26.5%
61.4%
21.0%
21.3%
38.2%
42.4%
12.9%
33.1%

Share of
1990s
Immigrants

Share of
Native Born

10.2%
9.1%
4.9%
3.2%
3.1%
3.1%
2.6%
2.4%
2.1%
2.1%
42.8%

2.3%
2.0%
2.7%
1.3%
0.4%
1.7%
1.2%
0.7%
0.4%
1.6%
14.3%

Top Third District Metropolitan Areas
22
73
97
102
121

Philadelphia, PA
Trenton, NJ
Wilmington, DE
Atlantic City, NJ
Allentown, PA
Entire Third District**
Entire U.S.

100,715
17,909
12,969
11,983
8,574

3.5%
8.1%
4.1%
5.5%
2.2%

8.7%
17.6%
8.2%
11.8%
6.4%

1.0%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%

1.7%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.2%

199,636
9,979,417

2.7%
5.7%

6.7%
14.0%

2.0%
100.0%

4.5%
100.0%

Data source: 2000 Census of Population public-use microdata.
*Age 16-65 and completed school, regardless of grade level attained. Calculations include only working age native-born Americans and immigrants.
**Approximate boundaries.

the impact of immigration on government finances and crime.4
In this article, I take a closer look

Immigration may also have other social impacts, some good and some bad. For example,
Harvard professor Samuel Huntington’s recent
book argues that immigration poses a threat to
American culture and national identity. A different view is presented by economists Giovanni
Peri and Gianmarco Ottaviano. They show
that Americans value the cultural diversity that
immigration generates. They find evidence that
Americans are willing to pay more to live in a
city after it receives an unexpected inflow of
immigrants.
4

www.philadelphiafed.org

at how local labor markets in the U.S.
are adjusting to the immigration boom.
The evidence that immigration has
little impact on the wages and employment rates of native-born workers has
puzzled economists, whose theories
suggest there should be a larger impact,
and it has raised a number of questions. Why is immigration’s impact on
the local labor market so small? Has
the impact been limited to the markets
where immigrants settle, or is it spread
across the country (and if so, how)?

THEORY AND EVIDENCE
ON LOCAL LABOR MARKET
COMPETITION
Two Views. A common negative
view of immigration is that immigrants
take jobs from native-born Americans,
often expressed in terms that imply
there is a one-for-one transfer of jobs
from Americans to immigrants. For
example, Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan was asked during
congressional testimony: “If we have

Business Review Q1 2005 17

8.4 million unemployed, according to
our official statistics, and if 6 million
illegal immigrants are working, are
these 6 million taking the jobs that the
8.4 million want? Also, if these 6 million were not here, would we suddenly
have virtually full employment?”5
Another extreme, but more positive, view is that immigrants largely
find employment in jobs that nativeborn Americans would not take. New
York Congressman Emanuel Cellar, a
sponsor of the 1965 immigration reform legislation that is thought to have
contributed to the current wave of
immigration, once said, “You couldn’t
conduct a restaurant in New York…if
you didn’t have rough laborers. We
haven’t got the rough laborers anymore…Where are we going to get the
people to do that rough work?”6
There may be a grain of truth to
the view that immigrants take jobs
natives “don’t want.” For one thing,
immigrants are disproportionately less
skilled: Almost 40 percent of immigrants (and less than 20 percent of native-born Americans) are high-school
dropouts (Figure 1). Related to this,
many immigrants work in jobs that are
rarely taken by native-born workers.
There are, for example, more house-

hold service workers in high-immigration areas, suggesting that immigrants
are more willing to take these jobs
than native-born workers.
An immigration expert at the
University of Texas-Austin, Stephen
Trejo, has shown that minimum
wage immigrants and natives often

there turns out to be sufficient overlap
in the occupations of immigrants and
native-born workers that we would
expect to see substantial labor market
competition between them. For one
thing, many native-born Americans do
take less-skilled jobs. It is also worth
remembering that a substantial frac-

A more general view, and one supported
by economic theory, is that immigrants and
native-born workers who have similar skills
compete with each other.
work in quite distinct occupations
and industries. On the other hand,
the fact that immigrants and natives
hold different types of jobs does not,
by itself, prove that immigration’s
impact on native-born workers is small.
Another possibility is that immigrants
have driven native-born workers out
of certain types of jobs. In addition,

tion of immigrants seek high-skill jobs;
for example, a larger proportion of immigrants have advanced degrees than
do native-born Americans (Figure 1).
Economic Theory. A more
general view, and one supported by
economic theory, is that immigrants
and native-born workers who have
similar skills compete with each other.

FIGURE 1
Skill Distribution of Working Age* Native-Born
and Foreign-Born U.S. Residents, 2000
Percent
45

Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander asked
Greenspan this question in Greenspan’s appearance before the Joint Economic Committee
on April 21, 2004 (quote obtained from the
Congressional Record). The larger question was
how accurate official unemployment figures are.
Greenspan is reported to have replied that getting information about how many illegal aliens
are working in the U.S. has “bedeviled statisticians.” The view that immigrants take jobs was
expressed more explicitly by a labor department
official testifying before Congress in 1973: “I
think it is logical to conclude that if they [immigrants] are actually employed, they are taking
a job away from one of our American citizens.”
(Quote from Public Interest, Winter 1975, and
Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith’s labor
economics textbook, p. 353.)
5

Quote obtained from the Winter 1975 issue of
Public Interest.
6

18 Q1 2005 Business Review

40
Native-Born

35

Foreign-Born

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
High School
Dropout

High School
Degree

Some College
Education

Bachelor’s
Degree

Advanced
Degree

Data source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
*Age 16-65 and completed school, regardless of grade level attained.
www.philadelphiafed.org

In addition, economists expect immigration to have a long-run impact
only if the immigrants have a different
mix of skills than native-born workers. To see why, suppose immigrants
had the same mix of skills as natives.
If so, immigrants could eventually be
employed in a “replica” of the existing
economy: skilled and unskilled workers
would still perform the same tasks
(and, hence, get paid the same wages)
but would work in a proportionately
larger economy.7 If immigrants were
disproportionately unskilled, in
contrast, businesses in high-immigration markets might find it difficult to
find productive tasks for all of them to
do. As a result, they would be willing
to hire immigrants only if wages for
unskilled workers fell.
In reality, immigration tends to
increase the relative number of lessskilled workers (Figure 1). (This is not
true everywhere. Some markets attract
a disproportionate number of high-skill
immigrants.) Thus, in most cases,
we expect immigration to reduce the
wages of less-skilled native-born workers relative to the more skilled. If there
are impediments to the adjustment of
wages, such as minimum wage laws,
we expect immigration to increase
unemployment among less-skilled native-born workers.
Evidence. Returning to the question asked of Chairman Greenspan,
it should be clear that we should not
expect immigrants to displace nativeborn workers one-for-one. Instead, if
economists’ views are correct, labor
market competition from immigrants
will lead to some displacement and
some fall in the relative wage rate

This ignores where the buildings and machinery to employ the immigrants would come from.
In the short run, therefore, even this skill-balanced type of inflow could reduce wages and
employment.

of less-skilled native-born workers.8
To test this view, researchers have
exploited the fact that immigrants
tend to locate in certain labor markets
more than others. For example, of
the 10 million working-age immigrants who came to the U.S. during
the 1990s, over 40 percent settled in
just 10 metropolitan areas (Table). In
contrast, only 14 percent of native-

If economists’ view of immigration’s impact
on the labor market is correct, one might
expect to find that relative wages are lower
and unemployment rates higher for less-skilled
workers in the high-immigration areas.
born Americans live in those same
metro areas. In the average of these
top 10 metro areas, immigration in the
1990s amounted to 13 percent of the
area’s population, and in Miami, recent
inflows amounted to over 20 percent of
the population. In contrast, in other
parts of the U.S., the immigrants who
came during the 1990s made up less
than 6 percent of the local population on average. If economists’ view
of immigration’s impact on the labor
market is correct, one might expect to
find that relative wages are lower and
unemployment rates higher for lessskilled workers in the high immigration areas.
The evidence suggests that local
labor market competition between
immigrants and natives, while present,
is not very strong (see Does Immigration Harm the Labor Market Outcomes
of Native-Born Workers?). Economists
find that wages and employment rates

7

www.philadelphiafed.org

for less-skilled workers in an area do
not fall by much in response to an
immigrant inflow to that area. In a
typical estimate, a 10 percent increase
in the proportion of workers in an area
who are less-skilled reduces the wages
of low-skill workers relative to those of
high-skill workers in the area less than
1 percent.9 Even competition from immigrant workers in the same occupa-

The relative wage means the ratio of the average wage of less-skilled workers over the average
wage of other types of workers.
8

tion seems to have little impact on the
relative wages and employment rates
of native-born workers in that occupation. In one study, economist David
Card of the University of CaliforniaBerkeley, divided all occupations into
six broad skill classes. He found that
in the average metropolitan area, the
wage in a given occupation class relative to the wage in other occupation
classes was diminished only slightly by
an unexpected inflow of immigrants
seeking jobs in that class of occupations. The impact on the local unemployment rate was also small.10

A 10 percent increase in the proportion of
workers who are dropouts is not large in comparison to the variation across U.S. cities. For
example, the proportion of workers in Los Angeles who are dropouts is roughly twice that in
the rest of the nation.
9

In a recent article, economist Madeline
Zavodny examined the impact of high-skill immigrants. She demonstrated that immigrants
admitted to the U.S. to fill positions requiring
skilled workers (those with H1-B visas) have
little impact on the wages and employment rates
of native-born information technology workers
in the states where they work.
10

Business Review Q1 2005 19

Does Immigration Harm the Labor Market Outcomes
of Native-Born Workers?

D

oes labor market competition from immigrants harm native-born workers? Most
estimates indicate that immigration’s
overall impact on the labor market is
positive (but small). This small impact essentially derives
from the fact that immigrants tend to be disproportionately less skilled relative to native-born workers (Figure
1), so immigration tends to make skilled labor relatively
“scarce,” driving up the wage of the typical native-born
worker.a On the other hand, less-skilled native-born
Americans do potentially face labor market competition
from immigrants, and the average impact hides the fact
that immigration may harm less-skilled native-born workers while benefiting skilled workers.
Since many immigrants are relatively unskilled by
U.S. standards, much (though not all) of the research on
immigration’s impact on the labor market has focused
on measuring the impact of immigration on less-skilled
native-born workers. Economists disagree about the size
of this impact.b Harvard economist George Borjas found
that over the past 40 years, periods of high immigration
were associated with somewhat slower growth in the
relative wages of native-born workers who have levels
of education and work experience similar to the immigrants’. Borjas’s argument says that the large influxes of
less-skilled immigrants during the 1980s contributed to
the fall in the wages of less-skilled workers in that decade.
On the other hand, research that exploits the geographic
variation in the volume of immigration (Table) consistently finds little association between changes in the density of immigrants in a locality and changes in the relative
wages of less-skilled Americans in that locality.
A legitimate concern about comparing labor markets

with different amounts of immigration is that job-seeking immigrants might choose to settle in markets where
wages and employment are high or growing. If so, comparing changes in the wages of less-skilled workers (or
unemployment) in areas that experienced high inflows
of immigrants with other areas might understate immigration’s true impact. (Wages might not be lower per se,
but they might be lower than they otherwise would have
been, something not easily observed.)
To get around this problem, economists have relied
on the fact that not all immigrants settle in particular
locations for economic reasons. Some come to settle with
family, for example. When one attempts to study the
impact of immigrants who settle in a particular location
for “noneconomic” reasons, one still tends to find little
local impact. A famous example of this is an investigation by David Card of what happened to the Miami labor
market as a result of the influx of Cuban refugees during
the Mariel boatlift. Miami is a traditional Cuban stronghold because of its closeness to Cuba, and the Mariel
boatlift happened suddenly for reasons that had nothing
to do with labor market conditions in the city.c Thus, the
event provides a reasonable “experiment” to tell us what
immigration does to a local labor market. Card found that
the event had little adverse impact on the labor market
outcomes of Miami’s existing less-skilled workers, even
though the Cuban refugees increased enormously the
availability of less-skilled labor in Miami (and did so in
a short period of time). To reconcile the finding of some
national impact and little local impact, Borjas suggests
that the impact of immigration is dispersed throughout
the U.S., not merely limited to the particular markets
where immigrants settle.

a

An additional impact comes from the fact that the native born are more likely to own “capital” – buildings and machinery – which also become
relatively “scarce” with an influx of labor.
b

More details can be found in the 1994 review by George Borjas and the review by Rachel Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt.

c

A long-running political dispute between Fidel Castro, the Cuban exile community, and the Carter administration culminated in an announcement by Castro in early 1980 that Cubans were free to leave the island. Over 100,000 took him up on the offer.

20 Q1 2005 Business Review

www.philadelphiafed.org

IS IMMIGRATION’S IMPACT
DISPERSED?
One possible reason for immigration’s small impact on the local labor
market is that its effect is dispersed
throughout the country, including
places where very few immigrants settle.
This could happen in a combination
of two different ways. First, competing
native-born workers might move away
from high-immigration areas to avoid
job market competition. If they left,
they would bring employment competition to their new destinations. Second,
because goods and some services are
traded between different locations in
the country, competition between producers in different locations could force
wages to be the same everywhere. If this
were true, immigrants would not lower
wages disproportionately in the particular markets in which they settle. They
could, however, lower wages in the U.S.
as a whole.11 This view says local markets adjust to less-skilled immigrants
by specializing in making goods that
require an abundance of less-skilled
labor (apparel, for example). Similarly,
markets adjust to the arrival of skilled
immigrant workers by specializing in
goods and services that require an
abundance of skilled labor. The result
is that the local impact of immigration
is small.
Native Flight. Native-born workers
may resist local labor market competition from immigrants by moving away.
When they relocate, they bring job
competition to their new locations. In
the extreme, any local wage decline
induced by immigration disappears
because native-born workers relocate
to other areas until the wage paid in
the high-immigration market and other

locations is the same. If natives were
mobile enough, immigration’s impact on
wages or employment would be spread
across the U.S.
Though compelling in theory, in
practice this seems unlikely to be how
local labor markets adapt to immigration. For openers, evidence suggests
that workers are slow to respond to
changes in wages and unemployment
rates in different locations. Two prominent economists, Olivier Blanchard of

Recent debates about
outsourcing make it
clear that workers
need not be physically
located in an area for
job competition
to exist.
MIT and Lawrence Katz of Harvard,
have studied whether workers respond
to unexpected declines in employment
in a state by moving out of the state.
They find that workers are slow to
respond. According to their estimates,
unemployment remains higher and
wages lower for up to eight years after
an unexpected fall in employment in a
state.12
In addition, a number of researchers have investigated the question of
whether native-born workers respond
to immigration in their area by moving away. Some research shows that
natives avoid high-immigration areas.
An article by three Harvard economists
(George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and
Lawrence Katz) provides some support
for this view.13 However, their results

turn out to be very sensitive to the
method of estimation. Other examinations of this question whose results are
less sensitive to the method of estimation tend to find little support. David
Card and University of Michigan professor John DiNardo showed that during
the late 1980s, native-born workers, if
anything, had a slight tendency to relocate to the same metropolitan areas as
the immigrants with whom they would
be expected to compete for jobs.
Local Specialization. Recent
debates about outsourcing make it clear
that workers need not be physically
located in an area for job competition to
exist. Similarly, trade between locations
within the U.S. can spread immigration’s impact across the country without
the need for workers to relocate.
To see how, let us take a theoretical example. Imagine that the arrival
of less-skilled immigrants in some city
lowered the wages of less-skilled workers in that city alone. As a result of
lower wages, that city would be able to
produce all goods more cheaply, giving
it a competitive advantage in trade with
other markets. The advantage would be
strongest for those goods – such as textiles and apparel – for which the wages
paid to less-skilled workers were a large
part of the cost of producing the goods.
The high-immigration city would thus
be able to gain national market share
in sales of such so-called less-skill-intensive goods, provided transportation
costs or other barriers to trade were
not substantial. (See Factor Proportions
Theory.)
According to this theory, in the
long run, immigration of less-skilled
workers to a city brings about two
changes. First, the cheaper goods com-

Support also comes from the work of University
of Michigan demographer William Frey, who has
written extensively on what he calls the demographic “balkanization” of the U.S. or the “new
white flight.”
13

In a more extreme version of this view, world
competition would force wages to be the same
in all countries. In this case, immigration does
not affect wages even at the national level.
11

www.philadelphiafed.org

Employment dynamics are similar in a small
sample of metropolitan areas for which the authors can get data for several years.
12

Business Review Q1 2005 21

Factor Proportions Theory

M

arkets that trade freely with one another will have the same
wages in the long run, according to the factor proportions
theory. This theory states that immigration should not have
any local impact on wages. Instead, immigration to some
location will induce firms in that location to make more of
the goods that require a large proportion of the type of labor that immigrants
disproportionately supply (usually less skilled). The additional goods are sold
on the world market.
This theory has limitations. The first is that it holds only to the extent
that goods and services are traded between markets.* Goods and services
that cannot be sold outside the location in which they are made – house
cleaning, for example, or child care – play no role. Barriers to the free exchange of goods between locations, such as the cost of transporting goods,
make it harder for wages to be equalized by this mechanism. Finally, the
theory may not hold if there are other differences between locations (besides
the number of immigrants). Among other things, the theory requires that the
technology used to produce goods in each location be the same.
As it turns out, there is little evidence that this theory describes how the
world works in practice. It fails to correctly predict the patterns of trade between countries, for example, and its prediction that wages will become equal
in all countries does not appear to be true. Barriers to trade and differences
in technology across countries are held responsible for the failure. This has
not stopped researchers from speculating that the theory should hold within
the U.S., which may not be completely unreasonable: Differences in technology and barriers to the exchange of goods may be smaller within the U.S.
than between countries.
To demonstrate that this theory could hold inside the U.S., two economists who specialize in trade, University of California-San Diego professor
Gordon Hanson and Dartmouth professor Matthew Slaughter, showed that
changes in the technology used by different industries were similar in several
large U.S. states during the 1980s. They reasoned that since technological
changes are similar in different locations, we can credibly infer that the U.S.
economy is integrated enough for the theory to hold.
However, Hanson and Slaughter ignored differences in technological
change across states that occurred equally in all industries before making the
comparisons in their analysis. In her Ph.D. dissertation, Joelle Saad-Lessler
demonstrated that these economy-wide differences in technological change
are related to the changes in the skills of the state’s workforce. My own
research found a similar relationship in U.S. metropolitan areas: When the
skills of workers in a metropolitan area change because of immigration, the
area adapts by choosing a technology that can employ the new mix of workers at similar wages.

* A traded service is one that can be carried out in one location and used in another. For
example, lawyers often work for clients outside their own labor market.

22 Q1 2005 Business Review

ing from the high-immigration city put
downward pressure on the wages of lessskilled workers in other locations. After
adjustment, the difference in wages
between the high-immigration city and
other locations disappears. Second, the
high-immigration city becomes more
specialized in sectors producing goods
that require a lot of unskilled labor.
In theory, these sectors expand just
enough to employ all of the new lessskilled immigrants, and the additional
output is sold to consumers in other locations.14 Another interpretation of how
a city adjusts to unskilled immigration,
then, is that it “exports” the added labor
to other locations in the form of goods
that require a lot of unskilled labor.
Does the world actually work this
way? Does immigration really induce
local markets to produce more of the
goods that use immigrants’ skills intensively? To find out, in a recent paper, I
looked at large metropolitan areas that
were the top destinations for less-skilled
immigrants during the 1980s (Los
Angeles, Orange County, Fresno, Santa
Barbara, Monterey, and Riverside in
California, and Miami, Florida).15 Immigration greatly increased competition
for less-skilled jobs in these cities. The
proportion of workers who were less
skilled, measured by the proportion of

It does not have to be the immigrants themselves who work in these sectors. Unskilled natives may move into these new jobs, while immigrants take other unskilled jobs.
14

This list of cities is different from the “top
10” in the table, in part because it is a different
decade – the 1980s, not the 1990s – and the top
immigrant destinations can change somewhat
from one decade to the next. In addition, many
immigrants are high skilled, as I noted earlier,
and the skill mix of immigrants going to different cities is different. For example, New York
and Chicago received a smaller proportion of
less-skilled immigrants than this list of cities.
Cities on this list also received skilled immigrants
– many Cubans in Miami are highly skilled, for
example – but these cities are distinctive because
they attracted an unusually large proportion of
less-skilled immigrants during the 1980s.
15

www.philadelphiafed.org

During the 1980s, the wages of low-skill workers relative to high-skill workers fell 22 percent
in the high-immigration cities, 20 percent in the
comparison cities, and 26 percent in the U.S. as
a whole. Economists have hotly contested why
wages for less-skilled workers fell in the U.S. during the 1980s. Explanations include technological change, immigration, competition from developing countries, decline in unionization, and a
fall in the real value of the minimum wage.
16

17

We can see how the industry mix
of the high-immigration cities changed
relative to that of the comparison cities during the 1980s (Figure 2). Each
circle in the figure plots the growth in
the employment share of an industry
in the high-immigration cities (vertical
axis) against the growth in the employment share of the same industry in the
comparison cities (horizontal axis). All
of the circles would be plotted on the
diagonal line if each industry grew by
the same amount in both groups of cities. Circles above the line grew by more
in the high-immigration cities than in
the comparison cities; circles below
the line grew by less in the high-im-

migration cities than in the comparison
cities. The size of the circle shows the
proportion of all high-school dropouts
the industry employed in 1980. Large
circles represent industries that employed a large percentage of less-skilled
workers; for example, eating and drinking establishments employed 9 percent
of high-school dropouts in 1980.
Notice that most of the points in
Figure 2 are near the diagonal line,
indicating that the industries grew by
the same amount in both sets of cities.
However, there are some interesting
outliers. Apparel and textiles grew
much more rapidly in the high-immigration cities than in the comparison
cities. This difference was so large that
the apparel and textiles industries grew
in the high-immigration cities, but they
declined 30 percent in the comparison
cities. This seems to fit with the specialization story: Apparel and textiles
both use less-skilled labor intensively.
On the other hand, apparel and textiles
are not, by themselves, large enough to
absorb many less-skilled workers (even

three western cities (Oakland, CA; San Diego,
CA; Portland, OR) five northeastern cities (Bergen-Passaic, NJ; Newark, NJ; Nassau-Suffolk,
NY; Somerset, NJ; Philadelphia, PA), three midwestern cities (Kansas City, MO; St. Louis, MO;
Cincinnati, OH), and one southern city (Nashville, TN). Most of these cities also attracted
substantial numbers of immigrants during the
1980s, but the impact on the skill mix of their
workers was considerably smaller.

FIGURE 2
Not Much Specialization — Industry Growth in
High-Immigration and Comparison Cities, 1980s
0.8

Growth in High-Immigration Cities

workers who were high-school dropouts,
increased in these cities over the 1980s.
This includes both immigrants and the
native born, but the change appears to
have been driven mainly by immigration, since in other parts of the country,
the proportion of workers not holding a
high-school diploma fell dramatically.
Labor market outcomes for lessskilled workers did not worsen disproportionately in these high-immigration
cities. The wages and employment
rates of less-skilled workers relative to
skilled workers fell in these cities during
the 1980s, but this occurred in almost
equal magnitude in other parts of the
country.16 This leaves open the possibility that the impact of immigration in
these cities was dispersed to other parts
of the country.
To find out if the high-immigration cities adjusted to immigration
by specializing in making goods that
require a lot of unskilled labor, we must
first know how the high-immigration
cities’ mix of industries would have
changed had the immigrants not come.
I inferred this by looking at a group of
comparison cities that did not receive
so many less-skilled immigrants during
the decade, but otherwise, the group
was similar to the high-immigration
cities at the beginning of the decade. In
particular, the comparison cities had a
mix of industries similar to that in the
high-immigration cities in 1980. They
also had workers with a similar skill mix
and a similar unemployment rate for
less-skilled workers (around 13 percent
for high-school dropouts) in 1980.17

Manufacturing
Service Industries
Other Industries

45-degree line (same
growth in high immigration,
comparison cities)

0.6

0.4

Agriculture
Business Services

Household Services

Eat/Drink
Estab.

0.2
Apparel/Textiles

-0.6

Transportation
Eq.

-0.4

Entertainment
Construction
Health Care

0

-0.2

0.2 Retail Food

0

0.4

0.6

0.8

Misc. Retail
-0.2
Machinery
Finished Metals

-0.4

Primary Metals
-0.6

Growth in Comparison Cities

Notes: Each circle represents a broad industry and is proportional in size to the share of high-school
dropouts employed in that industry in 1980 (in the high-immigration cities). What is plotted is the
growth in each industry’s employment share. Data source: 1980,1990 Census of Population.

For the curious, the comparison cities include

www.philadelphiafed.org

Business Review Q1 2005 23

when the industries grow a lot). Other
industries that are just as large (note
the circle sizes) as apparel and textiles
– such as machinery or agriculture
– were either not growing or were
declining.
Another interesting outlier is
household services, for example, house
cleaners or nannies. This industry is
a fairly large employer of less-skilled
workers, particularly immigrants, and
just like apparel and textiles, it grew
in the high-immigration cities but declined elsewhere. However, household
services are different from apparel and
textiles in an important way: They can
only be performed locally, but apparel
and textiles can be sold to consumers
in other markets. So although household services may have absorbed a
disproportionate share of less-skilled
immigrants, the expansion of this sector cannot help disperse the impact of
immigration to other locations.
Broader evidence supports the
result illustrated in Figure 2. I also examined adjustment in a larger number
of metropolitan areas (179), and the
adjustment to both high-skill and lowskill immigrants. In a typical metropolitan area I found that specialization
could have absorbed no more than 10
percent of changes in the local skill
mix that immigration generated.
A second investigation confirmed
these results. This study examined
how Miami adapted to a sudden influx
of mostly unskilled Cuban refugees
during the Mariel boatlift of 1980.
Miami’s experience after the boatlift
is an important case study because the
timing of these immigrants’ arrival
had nothing to do with labor market
conditions in Miami. The event led to
a large and unexpected increase in the
proportion of unskilled workers in the
Miami labor market. A study by David
Card demonstrated that the Miami
labor market adapted quickly to the
event. The relative wages of Miami’s

24 Q1 2005 Business Review

existing less-skilled workers did not fall
as a result of the boatlift. (See Does
Immigration Harm the Labor Market
Outcomes of Native-Born Workers?)
Did Miami specialize? Again, the
evidence suggests the answer is no.
Though there were many changes in
Miami’s manufacturing mix after the
boatlift occurred, the changes look
quite similar to those in comparable
cities.
All in all, it appears that specialization is not a big part of how local
labor markets in the U.S. adapt to
immigration. But a puzzle remains – if
not through specialization, or native
flight, how else might local markets be
adapting?
ADAPTING TECHNOLOGY TO
THE SKILL MIX
The theories considered thus far
have been largely unhelpful in explaining how local labor markets in the
U.S. adjust to influxes of immigrants.
One explanation that shows some
promise is that localities change their
production methods or “technology” to
accommodate employment of immigrants.
Usually, several technologies can
be used to produce the same good.
Cars, for example, can be produced
using automated assembly lines with
robots or a more traditional assembly
line with workers trained in particular
tasks. The latter technology requires
more manual labor, and the former
requires skilled workers to design and
operate the automated process.
There is some evidence that firms
adjust to immigration by switching
to a technology that requires more
unskilled labor. For example, in the
high-immigration cities examined
in Figure 2, the ratio of unskilled to
skilled workers rose 10 percent over
the 1980s.18 A wide variety of industries in these cities responded by
raising the unskilled/skilled ratio of

their own workers nearly 10 percent.
This suggests industries in the highimmigration cities made use of a
technology that could make productive
use of more unskilled labor: Unskilled
relative wages hardly fell as a result of
the change.
Computer technology may help
localities adjust to changes in worker
mix. Research by economists at
MIT has shown that skilled workers
use computers to perform repetitive
tasks that used to be carried out by
less-skilled co-workers before the
adoption of computers.19 My own
research shows that during the 1980s,
computers were added more slowly in
workplaces located in areas where the
availability of unskilled labor remained
relatively high. For example, the
Mariel boatlift seems to have slowed
the adoption of computers by skilled
workers in Miami workplaces. Miami
employers apparently chose to hire
workers from the expanded local pool
of less-skilled labor and invest less in
computers. This could be one reason
that wages of less-skilled workers did
not fall in Miami after the boatlift.
The importance of this should not be
overstated; computers are but one of
many technologies firms use.20 However, the idea that flexible technology
choice helps U.S. labor markets adapt
to immigration seems a promising
avenue for further investigation.

During this same period, rising levels of
schooling among younger generations of workers
caused the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers to fall 40 percent in other parts of the U.S.
Thus, by the end of the decade, the cities in
Figure 2 had a vastly different mix of workers
than other U.S. cities.
18

See the article by David Autor, Frank Levy,
and Richard Murnane.
19

Popular usage notwithstanding, economists
use “technology” to mean more than modern
machinery. Technology also includes such
things as how the workplace is organized and
which types of workers are assigned particular
tasks.
20

www.philadelphiafed.org

CONCLUSION
U.S. labor markets are currently
absorbing immigrants at a rate unprecedented in recent history. Despite the
heavy concentration of immigrants
in certain labor markets, whatever
harm immigrant competition does to

the wages and employment rates of
native-born workers in those markets
appears to be small. There is also little
evidence that immigration’s impact has
been dispersed across the U.S. through
either natives moving out of high-immigration areas or indirect downward

pressure on wages transmitted through
the price of goods coming from highimmigration areas. How local labor
markets adjust to immigration is not
yet clear, but preliminary research
suggests that the choice of technology
may have an important role. BR

Abrams, Elliott, and Franklin S. Abrams.
“Immigration Policy – Who Gets in and
Why?” Public Interest, 38(25): Winter
1975.

Card, David, and John DiNardo. “Do Immigrant Inflows Lead to Native Outflows?”
American Economic Review, 90, May 2000,
pp. 360-67.

Lewis, Ethan. “How Did the Miami Labor
Market Absorb the Mariel Immigrants?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Working Paper 04-03, January 2004.

Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard
J. Murnane (2003). “The Skill Content
of Recent Technological Change: An
Empirical Exploration,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 118 (4), November 2003, pp.
1279-1334.

Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2nd
session, 2004. Vol. 150, No. 59. “Calculation of the Employment Rate,” pp. S4736S4737.

Peri, Giovanni, and Gianmarco I.P.
Ottaviano. “The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities,”
CESifo Working Paper 1117, January 2004.

Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Robert S.
Smith. Modern Labor Economics: Theory
and Public Policy. Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1996.

Saad-Lessler, Joelle. “Do Local Relative
Factor Supplies Affect Local Relative Factor Prices?” In Essays in International Trade
and Labor, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
University, 2003.

REFERENCES

Blanchard, Olivier Jean, and Lawrence
F. Katz. “Regional Evolutions,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, (1), 1992, pp.
1-75.
Borjas, George J. “The Economics of Immigration,” Journal of Economic Literature,
32, December 1994, pp 1667-1717.

Friedberg, Rachel M., and Jennifer Hunt.
“The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, Spring
1995, pp. 23-44.

Saiz, Albert. “Room in the Kitchen for
the Melting Pot: Immigration and Rental
Prices,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
85, August 2003, pp. 502-21.

Borjas, George J. “The Labor Demand
Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining
the Impact of Immigration on the Labor
Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
118(4), November 2003, pp. 1335-74.

Frey, William H. “Immigration, Domestic
Migration, and Demographic Balkanization in America: New Evidence for the
1990s,” Population and Development Review,
22, December 1996, pp. 741-63.

Saiz, Albert. “The Impact of Immigration
on American Cities: An Introduction to
the Issues,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, Fourth Quarter
2003.

Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman,
and Lawrence F. Katz. “How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market
Outcomes?” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1997, pp. 1-90.

Hanson, Gordon H., and Matthew J.
Slaughter. “Labor-Market Adjustments
in Open Economies: Evidence from U.S.
States,” Journal of International Economics,
57, June 2002, pp. 3-29.

Trejo, Stephen J. “Immigrant Participation in Low-Wage Labor Markets,” Mimeo,
University of California-Santa Barbara,
December 1998. (Author is now at the
University of Texas-Austin).

Card, David. “The Impact of the Mariel
Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43,
January 1990, pp. 245-57.

Huntington, Samuel. Who Are We: The
Challenges to America’s National Identity.
Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Zavodny, Madeline. “The H-1B Program
and Its Effects on Information Technology Workers,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Economic Review, Third Quarter
2003.

Card, David. “Immigrant Inflows, Native
Outflows, and the Local Labor Market
Impacts of Higher Immigration,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 19, January 2001, pp.
22-64
www.philadelphiafed.org

Lewis, Ethan. “Local Open Economies
Within the U.S.: How Do Industries
Respond to Immigration?” Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 04-1,
December 2003.

Business Review Q1 2005 25

Moving Up: Trends in Homeownership
and Mortgage Indebtedness
BY WENLI LI

S

ince the mid-1980s, important developments
have taken place in the housing finance
system. In the 1990s, the U.S. economy
experienced the longest expansion in its
history, marked by substantial growth in household
income and wealth. In addition, Congress passed the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
two laws favorable to homeowners. Therefore, it’s not
surprising that homeownership rates and the mortgage
indebtedness of American families have also changed
significantly. In this article, Wenli Li uses the University
of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics to
examine the effects of these changes and how they vary
across households.

The U.S. residential housing
market has gone through important
changes since the mid-1980s. Most
noticeably, significant developments
have taken place in the housing
finance system. Continuous improvements in information technology have
improved lenders’ ability to assess risk,
tailor products to different population
segments, and develop new products.
As a result, down payment requirements and transaction costs — e.g.,

Wenli Li is a
senior economist
in the Research
Department of the
Philadelphia Fed.

26 Q1 2005 Business Review

the time, effort, legal costs, and brokerage costs — associated with mortgage
applications have come down substantially, making it easier for families to
qualify for a mortgage or to refinance
their existing mortgages.
At the same time, the U.S. economy experienced the longest expansion
in its history, marked by substantial
growth in household income and
wealth in the 1990s. Monetary policy
was accommodative from 1990 to
1994, and mortgage interest rates fell
to consecutive historical lows between
1990 and 1999.
Finally, on the regulatory front,
Congress passed two laws favorable to
homeowners: the Tax Reform Act of
1986 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997.

Given these developments, it is
not surprising that homeownership
rates and the mortgage indebtedness
of American families have changed
in significant ways. We will see how
significant the changes are by using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), a longitudinal survey from
the University of Michigan that has
followed a nationally representative
random sample of families and their
extensions since 1968.1 First, though,
let us look at why and how households
make decisions about housing and
mortgages.
WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT
OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING?
For most homeowners, their house
is the single most important consumption good2 and, at the same time, the
dominant asset in their portfolios.
For instance, the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances shows that about
two-thirds of U.S. households own
their primary residence. Home value
accounts for 55 percent of total assets
for an average homeowner and more
than 80 percent for over half of homeowners.
Similar to other durable consumption goods, such as cars or televisions,
houses have a minimum size. For
The PSID has been used widely in analyzing,
among other things, household wealth
dynamics, occupational choice, and labor supply
decisions. For a complete reference, see the
PSID web site: http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/
Publications/Bibliography/Biblio.html.
1

Housing belongs to the category of durable
consumption goods defined as those that may
be used repeatedly or continuously over a period
of more than a year, assuming a normal or
average rate of physical usage.
2

www.philadelphiafed.org

most people, their house will be the
most expensive purchase of their lives.
Even the least expensive house typically requires a sizable down payment.
Housing adjustment — that is, buying
or selling a house — is also much
more costly than that of other durable
goods, with sales commissions often
amounting to 6 percent of the house
value.
Despite the sizable down payment
and sales commissions, compared with
other financial assets like stocks or
bonds, housing investment is often
highly leveraged and relatively illiquid.
Many home buyers, especially firsttime buyers, borrow over 80 percent of
the house value. In addition, households borrow over a much longer time
horizon for house purchases than for
other consumer durables, with mortgages often lasting as long as 30 years.
Average tenure in a house — five
to seven years — is small compared
with the remaining life of the house;
thus, like stocks, but unlike short-term
bonds or deposits, the value of a home
matters even when the mortgage has
been paid off. All of these factors suggest that when a household purchases
a home the investment it has made is
not as risk-free as it may think.
HOW DO HOUSEHOLDS
MAKE HOUSING AND
MORTGAGE DECISIONS?
Like the value of any useful asset,
a house’s value fluctuates over time.
Indeed, the record shows that although
house prices are not as volatile as stock
prices, they are perhaps more volatile
than most people have realized. For
instance, real house prices — house
prices adjusted for the rate of inflation
— dropped more than 2 percent in
1990, then rose more than 4 percent
in 2001.3 The fluctuation is much bigThese numbers are calculated using the house
price index constructed by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).

ger if we consider regional changes in
house prices. In San Jose, California,
between 1990 and 1995 house prices
tumbled 29 percent. Between 1996 and
2001, however, house prices skyrocketed 84 percent, largely boosted by the
stock market riches of the high-tech
and dot-com industries. Then from
2001 to 2002, during the Internet bust
and technology slump, house prices in
San Jose dropped almost 2 percent in
one year.

A potential homeowner weighs the economic
benefits and costs when deciding whether to
buy a house and whether and how much to
borrow to finance the purchase.
The risk borne by homeowners
is magnified, since house prices and
salaries and benefits, the major source
of income for most households, are
positively correlated. This means that
changes in house prices and changes
in household income in a given area
often move in the same direction, that
is, one rises as the other rises or falls as
the other falls.4
To see why this is true, remember
that the purchase of a house requires
a large down payment and a commitment to regular mortgage payments for
a lengthy period. Thus, fluctuations
in income can have a big impact on
both the demand for and the supply of
housing. For example, imagine a region
that has experienced mass layoffs due
to the closing of a local plant. As a
result, many homeowners may put
their houses on the market because of
financial distress caused by lost income
or because they are moving their
families to regions with better employment prospects. At the same time,

3

www.philadelphiafed.org

those households that had planned
to purchase homes put their plans on
hold either because they also got laid
off or because they became pessimistic
about their future earnings potential.
The increased supply of and reduced
demand for housing will obviously put
downward pressure on local house
prices and cause them to decline.
The volatility in house prices
means that although houses provide
comfort and shelter, homeownership

4

See, for example, the article by Joao Cocco.

brings with it substantial financial
risks. These financial risks are worse in
bad times when both house prices and
labor income decline, and they will be
felt most painfully by homeowners who
have borrowed heavily to buy their
houses.
A potential homeowner weighs
the economic benefits and costs when
deciding whether to buy a house and
whether and how much to borrow to
finance the purchase. Consider two
households living in the same area.
One is a young commercial artist in his
early to mid-twenties, and the other
is headed by a computer programmer
and a physician both in their early
forties. As is typical for his age group,
the young artist is not married and
has little wealth. Though his income
potential may be higher than his current income, it is also more uncertain.
In contrast, the middle-aged couple
has children, stable jobs, and relatively
more savings.
In this case, the young household
is more likely to rent and the middleaged one is more likely to own a house.
In the event that both households

Business Review Q1 2005 27

become homeowners, the young artist
is likely to borrow more relative to his
house value and his current income.
The reason is threefold. First, since
the young artist’s income is likely to
rise over his lifetime, he will buy a
house that reflects future expected
income. The alternative — purchasing
a series of larger houses as his income
increases — is too expensive because
of the transaction costs of buying and
selling. The middle-aged household
expects that its income is at its peak;
thus, its house primarily reflects current income.
Second, lenders typically require
down payments to reduce the risk of
borrowers’ defaulting on their mortgage loans. In fact, the agencies that
dominate the secondary market for
mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, follow the traditional practice
and require mortgage insurance before
they purchase any loan on a property
whose mortgage exceeds 80 percent of
its value. The limited net worth of the
young artist makes it less likely that he
can meet this down payment requirement. If he does meet the requirement,
he will likely have to borrow more of
the rest of the money for the purchase.
Third, the young artist’s income
is likely to fluctuate more than the
middle-aged household’s, and it may be
necessary for him to access his wealth
to cover expenses when income is low.
Having a large amount of equity relative to his net worth tied up in a house
is risky because of the transaction
costs in accessing home equity through
either refinancing the mortgage or
selling the house. Although taking out
a home equity loan is relatively cheap
compared with selling, home equity
loans that carry an attractive rate
often require payment over a much
shorter time frame — say, two to five
years — and the rate typically floats.
Also, a homeowner with an outstanding home equity loan will find it

28 Q1 2005 Business Review

more difficult to refinance or sell. For
example, if the household refinances
the first mortgage before the home
equity loan is paid off, the new lender
often requires the consent of the home
equity lender. So, if he has wealth over
and above the required down payment,
the artist will hold more of it in liquid
form than in home equity and borrow
more relative to his house value and
his income.
As we can see, the decisions to
buy a house and to take on mortgages
are complex. Family demographics,
lifetime expected income, current
wealth, and house prices all play important roles.
RECENT TRENDS IN
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES
AND MORTGAGE
INDEBTEDNESS OF
AMERICAN FAMILIES
Empirical studies have found that
age and income are two of the most
important factors in house-purchase
and mortgage-finance decisions.5 Using PSID data from 1984 to 2001, I
have charted average homeownership
rates and mortgage indebtedness of
all homeowners (Figures 1 and 2) and
by age and by income (Figures 3 and
4).6 The age of the household is that
of the head, and household income
includes labor earnings, unemployment insurance, and welfare transfers.
Transfers include unemployment and
Social Security income. The degree of
homeowners’ mortgage indebtedness
is captured by two different measures:
mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) ratios

Joseph Gyourko (2001) provides an excellent
overview of the factors that affect housing
decisions.

and debt-service ratios (DSR). The
LTV ratio is defined as the ratio of
mortgage principal outstanding to
the current house value. The DSR is
defined as the ratio of mortgage payment — principal and interest, plus
property tax — to family income.
Mortgage LTV ratios and DSRs
are important because they give an
indication of the potential risks lenders
face should the price of houses fall
or should the borrowers/homeowners
suffer a decline in income. Accordingly, lenders use mortgage LTV ratios
and DSRs to estimate the borrower’s
default risk and to decide whether to
fund the mortgage and what rate to
charge. These ratios also affect the
underwriting standards of the major
purchasers of mortgages. For instance,
as mentioned earlier, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac require mortgage insurance before they purchase any loan on
a property with an LTV ratio greater
than 80 percent.7
Empirical Observations. As
we can see from the figures, homeownership rates were essentially flat
at around 60 percent from 1984 to
the early 1990s, but subsequently rose
sharply. By 2001, more than 65 percent
of households owned their homes.
Mortgage indebtedness for homeowners increased steadily between
1984 and 2001, according to mortgage
LTV ratios. While the average mortgage LTV was 26 percent in 1984, by
2001, it had increased to more than 35
percent. The contrast is more striking
when we look at changes in median
LTV, which increased from 15 percent
in 1984 to over 35 percent in 2001.
The median DSR paints a similar

5

Some readers may worry whether PSID data
are representative. A preliminary comparison
with census data shows that both data sets tell
much the same story.
6

High LTV ratios are associated with greater
risk of the household’s defaulting provided one
is very careful in controlling for borrowers’
creditworthiness, that is, holding fixed other
factors that affect household risk of default, for
example, age or income.
7

www.philadelphiafed.org

FIGURE 1
Recent Trends in Homeownership Rates*
Homeownership rates
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001

*Homeownership rates are measured as percent of households that own their primary
residences.
Note: PSID data were collected annually through 1997, then bi-annually after that.

FIGURE 2
Recent Trends in Mortgage Indebtedness
of Homeowners*
a. Mortgage Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV)
40

40

35
30

30
25

25

20

20

15

15

10

median LTV

mean LTV

35

mean LTV
median LTV

10
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001

b. Mortgage Debt-Service Ratio (DSR)
18

18

14

16
mean DSR
median DSR

14

12

12

10

10

8

median DSR

mean DSR

16

picture. According to the mean DSR,
however, homeowners’ mortgage indebtedness was flat from 1984 to 1992,
then increased appreciably after 1992.
Middle-aged households — those
whose heads of household are between
35 and 54 years of age — are generally
viewed as being at the peak of their
earnings profile and family size. As
a result, middle-aged households are
more likely to own homes than households in other age groups.8 Surprisingly,
the middle-aged group experienced
a slight decline in homeownership rates, while households in the
other age groups all had either modest or substantial gains.9 In particular,
homeownership rates for households
between ages 35 and 44 dropped from
71 percent in 1984 to about 63 percent
in 2001 and homeownership rates for
households between ages 45 and 54
dropped from 77 percent to 75 percent.
The other thing that jumps out
from these figures is that low-income
households have experienced a disproportionately larger increase in both
homeownership rates and mortgage
indebtedness. Specifically, between
1984 and 2001, when average homeownership rates increased 4.6 percentage points, households in the 0 to 20th
percentile of income experienced an
increase of almost 5 percentage points,
and households in the 20th to 39th
percentile experienced an increase of
8.4 percentage points. When looked
at in terms of growth rates, that is,
percent changes, the increases are even
larger.
Furthermore, while households
increased their mean mortgage LTV
ratio 43 percent, on average, between

8

6

6
1984 1985 1986 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001

This is evident in the inverted-U shape of
average homeownership rates over the life-cycle.
8

*Mortgage LTV = Principal Outstanding/Current House Value
*Mortgage DSR = Mortgage Payment/Family Income. Mortgage payment data are not
*available for 1988 and 1989.

A similar result is found using the Survey of
Consumer Finances.
9

Note: PSID data were collected annually through 1997, then bi-annually after that.

www.philadelphiafed.org

Business Review Q1 2005 29

30 Q1 2005 Business Review

Homeownership Rates and Mortgage
Indebtedness by Household Age*
a. Homeownership Rate

homeownership rate

90
80

+
+

60

+

1984

+

50
40

+
+

+

+
+

70

30

+

1990
1995

+

+
+
18-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

2001

65-74

75+

b. Mean LTV
80

mean LTV

FACTORS THAT HELP EXPLAIN
THE TRENDS
As I stressed earlier, the decisions
to own a home and the amount to borrow to finance the purchase are governed by a number of factors, including
household income, the presence of
children, and the cost in obtaining and
financing mortgages. Each of these factors has changed over the past decade
in ways that could help explain the
generally increased rate of homeownership and the increased mortgage
leverage for homeowners. These factors can be grouped into three broad
categories: macroeconomic conditions,
the housing finance system, and the
regulatory environment.
Macroeconomic Conditions.
The most important factor is almost
certainly the favorable economic
climate of the 1990s. Between 1991
and 2001, the U.S. economy had the
longest expansion in postwar history. The huge increase in household
income, the general decline in the unemployment rate, and persistently low
mortgage rates not only made homes
more affordable but also led to more
optimism among households about
their future income streams, making
them more likely to buy big items such
as houses.
Inflation-adjusted average household income rose 37 percent between
1984 and 2001, from $27,552 (in 1984
dollars) to $37,705, for households in
our sample, contributing to the run-

FIGURE 3

60

+
+

40

1984

+
+

+
+
+

1990
1995

+
+

20

+

2001

+
+

+
+

0
18-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65-74

75+

c. Median LTV
80

median LTV

1984 and 2001, households in the
lowest 20 percentiles had the largest
increase of 68 percent. One might
think this is driven by the households
whose heads have retired. They are
typically wealthier than other low-income households and have bought a
house during their economically active
years. But the result remains true even
after we drop from the group families
with heads 65 and older.

60

+
+

40

+
+

1984

+

+

1995

+

20

+

+
+

+

55-64

65-74

0
18-34

35-44

45-54

1990

2001

+
75+

age of household head

*Household age is the age of the head of the household

up in overall homeownership rates.
Income changes, however, are quite
uneven across age groups. In particular, although real household income
went up for all age groups, the middleaged households, especially those between ages 35 and 44, had the smallest
growth in family income. This appears
to be an important factor leading to
the reduction in homeownership rates
of this group of households.

The rise in income occurred
against the backdrop of rising employment. The national unemployment
rate trended down over this period,
from a high of almost 7 percent to
around 5 percent. This should boost
the number of home buyers, especially
low-income households, who cannot
qualify for mortgages without jobs.
Rates on 30-year fixed mortgages,
as reported by Freddie Mac, remained
www.philadelphiafed.org

FIGURE 4
Homeownership Rates and Mortgage
Indebtedness by Income Percentile*
a. Homeownership Rate

homeownership rate

100
80
60
40

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+

+
+

1984

+

1990
1995

+

2001

20
40-59

20-39

<20

60-79

80-89

90-100

b. Mean LTV
60

mean LTV

45
30

1984

+

+

1990

+

1995

+

2001

+

15

+

+
+

+

+
+

+
+

+

0

20-39

<20

40-59

60-79

80-89

90-100

c. Median LTV

median LTV

50
40

1990

30
20
10

+

1984

+

+

+

1995

+

+
+

+
+

2001

+
+

<20

+
20-39

40-59

60-79

80-89

90-100

Income percentile

*Percentile is a value on a scale of 100 that indicates the percent of a distribution
that is equal to or below it. For example, in 2001, the average income of a household
in the 20th to 39th percentile was $27,931 in 2001 current dollars, or $16,221 inflation
adjusted.

below 8 percent for most of the period
between 1996 and 2001. The low
mortgage rates reduce the monthly
payment for a given mortgage and,
therefore, make houses more affordable. This should help drive up the average homeownership rates for all age
and income groups. The other effect of
low mortgage rates is that households
may choose to borrow more, relative
to the house value, without increasing
www.philadelphiafed.org

tion in mortgage markets. As a result,
mortgages have become cheaper and
easier to obtain.
The required down payment for
home purchases is now lower than before the 1990s. Nowadays, homeowners need not have a 20 percent down
payment to qualify for a mortgage, and
in some instances, lenders may not
ask for any down payment at all.10 In
addition, both the financial and nonfinancial transaction costs associated
with obtaining a mortgage have come
down. We’ve seen a continued decline
in average points and fees on conventional loans closed — from 2.5 percent
of the average loan amount in 1983 to
around 1 percent at the end of 1995
and 0.5 percent in 2004.11 Lower down
payments and the decline in fees and
charges associated with mortgages gave
rise to an increasing volume of both
mortgage-purchase and mortgage-refinance applications, especially in the
presence of declining mortgage rates.12
The development of home equity lending also made housing a more liquid
asset. From 1990 to 2001, home equity
loans as a share of total mortgages increased from 10 percent to 14 percent
according to flow of funds data from

their monthly payments. This would
obviously lead to a higher mortgage
LTV ratio among homeowners.
Innovations in Mortgage Markets. In the credit markets, technological developments have automated
many stages of the lending process.
For example, credit scoring is now
commonly used by many lenders,
thus reducing the costs of evaluating
borrowers and increasing competi-

Of course, the borrowers may have to pay
a higher rate or purchase private mortgage
insurance. According to Bruskin, Sanders, and
Sykes’ 2001 article, by 1994, lenders had started
programs that allowed qualified households
to borrow more than the value of a home,
effectively creating a negative down payment
that could be applied to closing costs. These
innovations enabled some previously ineligible
households to purchase a house and provided
many others with increased buying power given
their wealth.
10

These statistics come from a study by Paul
Bennett, Richard Peach, and Stavros Peristiani,
and publications from the Federal Housing
Finance Board.
11

For example, when the 30-year fixed mortgage
interest rate dropped from 8.57 percent to 5.10
percent between May 2000 and January 2003,
the mortgage refinancing index constructed by
the Mortgage Bankers Association surged from
319.3 to 8753.3, a 27-fold increase.
12

Business Review Q1 2005 31

the Board of Governors. Together,
these developments increased households’ access to mortgage credit and
thus increased homeownership among
all families, particularly low-income
families.
Low-income households also got
an extra push from the development of
subprime lending (nonprime or credit
rated below “A”), designed for those
unable to meet the underwriting criteria of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. According to an article by Neal Walters
and Sharon Hermanson, the subprime
mortgage lending industry has grown
significantly in recent years, expanding
from a $35 billion industry in 1994 to a
$140 billion industry in 2000. Additionally, subprime mortgages currently
represent 13 percent of total mortgage originations, an increase from 4
percent in 1994. Consequently, those
households with not-so-perfect credit
records are more likely to own and to
borrow more relative to their house
value and to their income now than in
earlier years.
Changes in Tax Policies. Before
the Tax Relief Act of 1986 (TRA-86),
households could deduct interest paid
on all types of household debt from
their pre-tax income. In 1986, Congress changed the law to phase out
the deductibility of consumer interest
(interest paid on consumer loans not
secured by a residence) over a five-year
period while leaving the deductibility
of mortgage interest intact.
The passage of TRA-86 encouraged mortgage borrowing as households reshuffled their portfolios from
other consumer debt into second
mortgages and home-equity debt.13
As a result, mortgage LTV ratios
took off immediately after 1986. The
effect of TRA-86 on homeownership

See the article by James Poterba and the one
by Dean Maki.
13

32 Q1 2005 Business Review

rates seemed muted. One reason is
that TRA-86 also reduced marginal
tax rates, especially for high-income
households. As a result, the value
of tax-exempt imputed income for
high-income homeowners was also
reduced, offsetting some of the benefits
of homeownership associated with the
mortgage-interest deduction. Another,
perhaps more plausible, reason is that
a significant number of households
may have been unable to put together
the down payment required to buy a
house. Put simply, those households
that do not qualify for a mortgage will
not be helped by the passage of TRA86.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA-97) relaxed the previous requirements for home sellers by exempting more of the profits from the sale
of a house from capital gains taxes.
The new law allows people to deduct a
larger amount of capital gains from the
sale of their houses even if they have
not stayed in the house for two years as
long as the move is due to a job change
or a change in family structure (e.g.,
a death in the family). The passage of
TRA-97 obviously provided additional
benefits for homeownership, especially
for young households. Because young
households are more likely to move
as part of a change in jobs, the risk
of buying and being forced to move
within two years is higher for them.
Stronger Enforcement of Fair
Lending Laws. Although the federal
government has put in place a number
of fair lending laws, both policymakers
and economic researchers have expressed broad concerns about discrimination in credit markets, especially
the mortgage market. Many studies
have documented that minority loan
applicants have significantly higher
rejection rates than majority applicants
with the same observable characteristics.14 Although it is debatable whether
the higher rejection rates necessarily

indicate discrimination, these studies
raised concerns about the enforcement
of these laws.15
In 1990, two prominent fair-lending laws — the Community Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act — were refocused to
better ensure compliance with the law.
The Community Reinvestment Act is
intended to encourage depository institutions, such as banks, to help meet
the credit needs of the communities in
which they operate, including lowand moderate-income neighborhoods.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
provides data that are used to determine whether financial institutions
are serving the housing needs of their
communities and to identify possible
discriminatory lending patterns. The
refocusing of these two laws benefited
minority and low-income households
and helped increase their homeownership rates and mortgage borrowing.16
HOUSING AND THE RECENT
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
Housing wealth fluctuates over
time, and more and more American
families own homes and more and
more of them are holding large mortgages relative to their house value and
income. Under such circumstances, we
would expect such fluctuations to have

See, for example, recent works by Alicia
Munnell, Geoffrey Tootell, Lynn Browne, and
James McEneaney, and by David Blanchflower,
Phillip Levine, and David Zimmerman.
14

See the article by John Walter for a review
of the enforcement of some of the fair lending
laws.
15

Raphael Bostic and Breck Robinison
argue that the effectiveness of CRA
agreements in increasing lending activity
is ultimately determined by the persistence
and sophistication of community groups in
monitoring compliance with CRA agreements.
For discussions on other related housing
policies, see the Business Review article by
Satyajit Chatterjee and the one by N. Edward
Coulson and the papers cited in those articles.
16

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a large impact on consumption. For
example, policymakers and academics
widely believe that the steady increase
in house value was the driving force
behind increases in consumption
expenditures during the economic
softening and downturn between 1999
and 2001, when output growth slowed
and the stock market plummeted.17
Using aggregate data on consumption and wealth, researchers have
found that households’ willingness
to increase consumption when their
wealth permanently increases is about
the same whether the wealth increase
is the result of owning stocks or housing: between 4 and 10 cents for each
dollar of increased wealth.18 Given
the nearly $5000 billion drop in stock
market wealth held by households
and nonprofit organizations and the
nearly $2000 billion increase in hous-

In their recent study, Erik Hurst and
Frank Stafford found that as mortgage rates
plummeted between 1991 and 1994, cash-out
refinancing produced an estimated expenditure
stimulus of at least $28 billion. Speaking at the
2003 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, Frank
Stafford also pointed out that people who
paid premium rates to refinance in the late
1990s often subsequently got into financial
distress and pulled back spending. As a result,
policymakers cannot expect to use the mortgage
refinancing channel recurrently over short
periods. (For a more complete summary of
Stafford’s remarks at the Policy Forum, see
Loretta Mester’s article in the Business Review,
Third Quarter 2004.)
17

See the articles by Morris Davis and Michael
Palumbo; Wenli Li; and Sydney Ludvigson and
Charles Steindel. In a separate paper, however,
Martin Lettau and Sydney Ludvigson argued
that households increase spending by only
60 cents for a $100 increase in wealth, since
individuals view most of the change in wealth as
transitory. See the summary by Loretta Mester.
18

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ing wealth as reported in the Federal
Reserve Board’s flow of funds,19 we
can conclude that increases in housing wealth offset close to half of the
hit to consumption from declining
stock market wealth between 1999
and 2001.20 That is, increased housing
wealth raised consumption by approximately $100 billion during this
period.21
Since one important way for
households to transform higher housing wealth into consumption is to extract home equity through selling the
house, refinancing the mortgage, or
taking out a home equity loan, it is not
surprising that we observed an increase
in mortgage LTV ratios from 1999 to
2001. Having said this, we should note
that the calculations relating changes
in consumption to changes in wealth
refer to long-run effects. In the short
run, one would imagine consumption
may adjust more sluggishly to changes
in wealth, especially to those in housing wealth. The numbers we present
almost surely overestimate the positive
effect of housing wealth on consumption in the short run.

The numbers are inflation adjusted using
chained core PCE, with 2000 as the base year.
19

Here I am treating the house price movement
as independent of stock price changes. There
are obvious reasons to believe that part of the
housing boom is due to households’ redirecting
their investment from the stock market to
housing.
20

This assumes a marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth of 0.05, that is, a $5
increase in consumption for each $100 increase
in wealth.
21

Before concluding, it is worth
pointing out that the investigations
here were conducted on primary
residences only. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that important changes had
also occurred in ownership of second
homes, such as vacation homes, during
the same period.
SUMMARY
During the last decade or so, more
American families have become homeowners, homeowners have become
more leveraged in financing their
purchases, and the changes are uneven
across households of different ages and
incomes. Three primary factors help
explain this observed trend: improvement in housing finance systems, an
accommodating economic climate,
and regulatory changes. Of course,
more formal analyses are needed to
quantify exactly the contribution of
changes in each factor to the observed
trends and to model the exact channel through which housing wealth has
affected consumption.
The importance of these trends is
underscored by looking at the role of
housing in the recent economic slowdown and recovery. The stock market
declines in 2000-2002 might have
suggested a large decline in consumer
spending. But instead of falling as consumer spending usually does during recessions, it continued to rise (albeit at
a slower rate). This no doubt reflected
the effects of stimulative monetary and
fiscal policies, but as we discussed here,
housing wealth may have also played
a role by providing a cushion for many
homeowners. BR

Business Review Q1 2005 33

REFERENCES

Bennett, Paul, Richard Peach, and Stavros
Peristiani. “Structural Change in the
Mortgage Market and the Propensity to
Refinance,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 33, 4, November 2001.

Davis, Morris A., and Michael G. Palumbo. “A Primer on the Economics and
Time Series Econometrics of Wealth Effects,” Federal Reserve Board Finance and
Economic Discussion Series 2001-09.

Blanchflower, David G., Phillip B. Levine,
and David J. Zimmerman. “Discrimination in the Small Business Credit Market,”
NBER Working Paper W6840.

Gyourko, Joseph. “Access to Homeownership in the United States: The Impact of
Changing Perspectives on Constraints to
Tenure Choice,” manuscript, Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, 2001.

Bostic, Raphael, and Breck Robinson. “Do
CRA Agreements Influence Lending Patterns?” Real Estate Economics, (31), 2003,
pp. 23-51.
Bruskin, E., A.B. Sanders and D. Sykes.
“The Nonagency Mortgage Market:
Background and Overview,” in F.J. Fabozzi,
C. Ramsey, F. Ramirez, and M. Marz, eds.,
The Handbook of Nonagency Mortgagebacked Securities. (New York: Wiley), 2001.
Chatterjee, Satyajit. “Taxes, Homeownership and Real Estate Risks,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review,
September/October 1996.
Cocco, Joao F. “Hedging House Price Risk
with Incomplete Markets,” manuscript,
London Business School, 2003.
Coulson, N. Edward. “Housing Policy and
the Social Benefits of Homeownership,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, Second Quarter 2002.

34 Q1 2005 Business Review

Hurst, Erik, and Frank Stafford. “Home Is
Where the Equity Is: Mortgage Refinancing and Household Consumption,” Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking, forthcoming.

Maki, Dean. “Household Debt and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,” American Economic
Review, 91(1), pp. 305-320.
Mester, Loretta J. “Managing the Recovery
in Uncertain Times: A Summary of the
2003 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum,” Business Review, Third Quarter 2004.
Munnell, Alicia H., Georffrey M.B.
Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James
McEneany. “Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data,” American Economic Review, 86(1), 1996, pp. 25-53.
Poterba, James M. “Taxation and Housing:
Old Questions, New Answers,” American
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Lettau, Martin, and Sydney Ludvigson.
“Understanding Trend and Cycle in Asset
Values: Reevaluating the Wealth Effect on
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2004, 94(1), pp. 276-99.

Walter, John R. “The Fair Lending Laws
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Li, Wenli. “An Analysis of the Effects of
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Walters, Neal, and Sharon Hermanson.
“Subprime Mortgage Lending and Older
Borrowers,” AARP Research Center, 2001.

Ludvigson, Sydney, and Charles Stendel.
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www.philadelphiafed.org