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Seventeenth Annual Report

Federal Reserve Bank
of New York
For the Year Ended December 31,1931

Federal Reserve Agent
Second Federal Reserve District




Seventeenth Annual Report

Federal Reserve Bank
of New York
For the Year Ended December 31, 1931

Federal Reserve Agent
Second Federal Reserve District







Contents
Page
Letter of Transmittal

4

The Course of Depression in the United States

5

The World Crisis of Confidence

9

New Financing through the Security Markets

14

Credit Policy

15

The Reconstruction Program

18

Gold Movements

20

Foreign Relations

22

Membership Changes in 1931

25

Operating Statistics

26

Statement of Condition

26

Income and Disbursements

27

Volume of Operations

29

Changes in Directors and Officers

30

Member of Federal Advisory Council

30

Changes in Officers

30

List of Directors and Officers




31

F E D E R A L
OF

R E S E R V E
N E W Y O R K

B A N K

New York, April 26, 1932

SIRS:

I have the honor to submit herewith the seventeenth annual report of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
covering the year 1931.
Respectfully yours,
J. HERBERT CASE,

Chairman and Federal Reserve Agent.

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,

Washington, D. C.




S eventeenth Annual Report
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
The Course of Depression in the United States
In the early months of 1931 there was, in the United States,
encouraging evidence of recovery from the low levels of business
activity which, in the autumn of 1930, had emphasized the severity
of the present business depression. A greater than seasonal expansion in commerce and industry was recorded, security prices rose,
bank failures diminished in number, and currency which had been
withdrawn in unusual amounts during December 1930, began to
return to the banks. There was, however, a continuance of the
world-wide decline in commodity prices, which then had been in
progress for nearly two and a half years, and a widening of the circle
of financial difficulties at home and abroad which soon terminated
the brief period of recovery. Domestic confidence, in the face of
increasingly disturbing developments in other parts of the world,
never attained a vigorous growth, and diminished greatly when a
banking crisis in Austria during May 1931 gave substance to widely
held fears concerning conditions in central Europe. In the following
months, business was unable to hold its earlier gains, profits were
progressively reduced or disappeared, unemployment increased,
there were renewed declines in security prices, and finally there was
a revival of banking difficulties and of currency hoarding which
quickly became the dominant elements in the domestic situation.
The progress of the effects of depression through agriculture,
industry, and transport, to banking was the most striking feature of
the year's economic history. Financial conditions everywhere reflected the long continued and drastic decline in money values of all
types of assets—commodities, real estate, securities—which had
characterized the period since the autumn of 1929. The consequent
severe reductions in business profits retarded payment of many
bank loans already extended and made doubtful the prompt retirement of new loans which might be made. Foreign credits at short
term often became, in effect, long term obligations. Declining
security prices brought equivalent depreciation in the market value
of bank investments. And a recognition of these facts almost inevitably awakened apprehension concerning the soundness of the banking position.
Such a diminution of confidence impairs the working of the whole
credit system. In the modern business world the great bulk of
transactions between governments, corporations, and individuals is




6

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

based on documents representing promises to pay given amounts of
money on demand or after stated intervals. When security holders
begin to doubt the ability of borrowers to pay the principal and
interest due on their bonds, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not
impossible, for such borrowers to obtain further credits and the
money value of their outstanding obligations is partially destroyed.
When depositors question the ability of banks to repay their deposits
in cash on demand, they may demand cash in such volume as
seriously to weaken the banking position, even to the extent of
forcing the closing of many banks whose assets may be perfectly
sound. And if the banks, in turn, lose confidence in the stability of
their depositors, they give primary attention to liquidity rather than
to the credit needs of the business community. Under these circumstances the normal functioning of the credit mechanism becomes
impossible, and the prevailing lack of confidence may assume aggravated forms. These tendencies were well illustrated by the
events of the latter half of the year 1931.
Both the public and the banks adopted or had forced upon them
a course of action which, whatever its merits when pursued by a
small number of individuals or banks, is likely to benefit no one when
pursued by many individuals and many banks. The fears of the
public found expression in currency hoarding. Beginning in August
1931, there was a rapid increase in the reported figures of the
amount of currency in circulation, a large part of which bore little
or no relation to the course of business and prices during this period.
Toward the close of the year the volume of currency outstanding was
larger than at any time since the autumn of 1920, and while it is not
possible to state exactly how much of the increase in this total represented hoarding by the public and how much represented a growth
in public requirements due to the closing of many banks, it is clear
that a large amount of currency was temporarily being withheld
from useful circulation.
Such a development works a threefold harm. It deprives the
owners of the currency of any return upon their funds. It diminishes
the ability of the banks to meet the credit needs of the communities
which they serve and, in some instances, it forces the closing of banks
which otherwise would remain open. It locks up unnecessarily a
certain part of the gold reserves of the Federal Reserve System
wherein resides the country's ultimate credit supply.
The added strain placed upon the individual banks of the country
by deposit withdrawals growing out of currency hoarding is reflected
in the year's record of bank failures. The total number of banks



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

7

closed in the United States during 1931 was 2,298 (although 276
closed banks reopened), a failure record surpassing even the figures
of the previous year. The following table shows the figures of bank
closings in this country during the past 11 years.
BANK FAILURES IN RELATION TO BANKS IN OPERATION
(Suspensions less banks reopened during each year)
Per cent Relationship of Failed
Banks to Banks in Operation

Number of Banks
Year

Member Banks Nonmember Banks
In Operation*

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
Average

Fail-

ingt

In Operation*

Failingf

9,745
9,892
9,856
9,650
9,538
9,375
9,099
8,929
8,707
8,315
7,782

60
33
110
139
132
146
113
68
76
180
486

21,067
20,497
20,322
19,698
19,303
18,771
17,962
17,284
16,623
15,764
14,289

381
256
501
543
418
661
454
384
508

9,172

140

18,325

*At middle of year.

Number

Total Deposits

NonNonMember member Member member

1,018
1,536

0.62
0.33
1.11
1.44
1.38
1.56
1.24
0.76
0.87
2.16
6.25

1.81
1.25
2.47
2.76
2.17
3.52
2.53
2.22
3.06
6.46
10.75

0.17
0.05
0.17
0.23
0.19
0.18
0.16
0.10
0.15
0.99
1.87

0.91
0.40
0.76
0.68
0.49
0.75
0.47
0.39
0.70
1.96
4.14

605

1.53

3.30

0.42

1.09

fFor calendar year.

The general banking reaction to the prevailing situation was the
conscious or unconscious adoption of credit standards which tended
to restrict the amount of credit in use. There were indications at the
beginning of the year that, before new loans or investments were
made, credit risks were being considered more critically than had
been the case for some years past. This was perhaps natural and
inevitable in view of the general state of business enterprise. As the
year progressed, however, this tendency became more pronounced,
and, while rates for preferred credit risks declined during the summer
to the lowest levels in many years, to an increasing number of borrowers credit became difficult to obtain at any price.
From the peak of credit expansion in 1929 to the end of 1931
there was a reduction of approximately $8,750,000,000 in the loans
and investments of all banks of this country (no allowance is made
for the elimination of figures of closed banks) and, in addition, an
almost complete elimination of stock exchange loans made for other
than bank account which, at one time in 1929, amounted to about



SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
$5,400,000,000. The decline in the amount of bank credit in use
during 1930 and the early part of 1931 had been at the rate of
approximately 4 per cent per annum. During the last three months
of 1931, however, this liquidation proceeded at a rate which approached 25 per cent per annum.
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
50

\

40

o—<
30

20

10

1923

1924

1925 1926

1927

1928 1929 1930 1931

Loans and Investments of All Banks in the United States, exclusive of Mutual Savings
Banks, as of the end of June and December of each year

Just prior to and during the period when this accelerated reduction in the volume of bank credit was taking place, an unusually large
number of member banks found it necessary to borrow at the Reserve Banks, and the aggregate amount of their borrowings rose
to the highest levels since the autumn of 1929. This Federal
Reserve credit was called into use primarily because of currency
hoarding and the export of gold. Increased borrowing at the
Federal Reserve Banks was not the result of a growing commercial
demand for funds; on the contrary, the existence of the debt
brought with it attempts at its retirement by means of calling loans
and selling securities in a market in which there was no compensating investment demand.
During most of the year the large New York City banks were in
a comparatively easy position, and during the first nine months of



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

9

the year funds received through gold imports not only enabled them
largely to keep free of debt at the Reserve Bank but, during much of
the period, gave them moderate amounts of excess reserves. Their
loans showed a reduction during this period which, in the case of
security loans, was substantial, but their investments in United
States Government securities and in acceptances were considerably
increased, so that the total of loans and investments showed only a
gradual decline. The sudden outflow of $725,000,000 in gold, which
followed the suspension of gold payments by Great Britain in late
September, quickly eliminated the existing excess reserves of the
New York banks, and they were forced to sell a large volume of
acceptances to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and materially to increase their discounts. They then began to reduce their
security holdings and by this means, and as a result of an inflow of
funds from other parts of the country and some import of gold, they
were able to repay their indebtedness at the Reserve Bank. Reduction in their loans and investments, however, with corresponding
declines in their deposits, proceeded at a rapid rate until the end of
the year.
The year 1931 closed with the volume of bank credit and bank
deposits in the United States shrinking at a more rapid rate than in
any other recent year, with the large banks in an unusually liquid
condition and disinclined to extend credits which might diminish
that liquidity, and with smaller banks in most parts of the country
unable to extend their usual lines of credit because of deposit losses
and the cumulative effect of severe business depression upon their
own operations and those of their customers.

The World Crisis of Confidence
For a better understanding of the course of the depression in the
United States during 1931, it is desirable to summarize certain of the
year's developments abroad. On the whole the record is one of progressive decline in confidence and of an attendant increase in the
obstacles to the normal functioning of the international credit
system.
Economic relationships between nations are primarily reflected
in movements of goods, exchange of services, theflowof international
investments at long and short term, and movements of gold. Under
more nearly normal conditions than have prevailed since the war the
bulk of the permanent burden of preserving the necessary economic
adjustment between countries has fallen upon transactions involving
goods, services, and long term capital, leaving as temporary balanc-




10

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

ing factors the movement of relatively small amounts of short term
funds and of gold. During the past decade, however, there has been
increasing pressure upon these balancing items, not only to perform
their normal function of making prompt but temporary compensation for excesses or deficits created by varying movements of goods,
services, and long term capital, but also to substitute for these items
more or less continuously in correcting recurring maladjustments in
the international balance of payments. This has resulted in the
building up of large foreign short term balances in various markets
which, combined with a growing tendency toward wide fluctuations
in international security holdings, have been a constant threat to
exchange stability.
The impermanence of this situation was intensified by the distortion of the international debt position which was one of the more
serious results of the decline in commodity prices. There was a
rapid increase in the volume of international indebtedness during the
war and post war years, and the amount of such debts reached a
larger total than ever before. So long as business continued good,
prices steady, and new loans easy to obtain, service on the accumulating debt was effected, and the large revolving supply of short term
funds in the international money market was maintained. With the
decline in world trade accompanied as it was by rapidly falling
commodity prices, however, these money debts became proportionately more burdensome and, coincidentally, as the security of
loans already made became less certain, the supply of new foreign
long term loans practically ceased. Temporarily, a semblance of
balance was preserved by international sales of securities and by
further movements of short term funds and of gold, but it gradually
became clear that, for a time at least, there might have to be a
cessation of service payments upon a substantial amount of long
term foreign debts and a freezing of a considerable volume of foreign
short term loans.
The crisis which developed reached the acute stage in May 1931,
when it became generally known that the largest bank in Austria,
and one of the most important banking institutions in central
Europe, was in serious difficulty. In supporting this situation, and
in meeting the foreign demand for repayment of funds which grew
out of it, the National Bank of Austria weakened its own position and
soon found it necessary to ask, through the Bank for International
Settlements, for the assistance of banks of issue in other countries.
The importance of this request transcended the economic crisis in
Austria; it represented rather overt evidence of an international
crisis. Not only was there the threat of loss on investments in




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

11

Austria; there was also the almost inevitable effect which a collapse
in Austria would be bound to have upon weak positions in other
European countries, and through them upon the whole system of
world trade and finance. On May 30,1931, a credit of approximately
$14,070,000 was granted by the Bank for International Settlements
and the banks of issue of eleven countries in favor of the National
Bank of Austria.
Notwithstanding the efforts made to meet the situation in
Austria, the credit crisis soon spread to Hungary and Germany,
bringing the larger part of central Europe into the affected area and
endangering the financial existence of one of the leading commercial
and industrial countries of the world. The chief vulnerability of the
German position was found in the large volume of foreign short term
funds which that country, over a period of years, had come to use as
working capital. Some of these credits had been quietly withdrawn
in the months preceding the summer of 1931 and capital had been
fleeing the country, in some measure, since the autumn of 1930. In
early June 1931, this movement was accelerated so that in the three
weeks ended June 23, 1931, the Reichsbank lost over $250,000,000
of its gold and foreign exchange reserves or about 42 per cent of the
total.
The announcement, on June 20, 1931, of the Hoover moratorium
year on certain international government debts resulted in a temporary cessation of the outward flow of funds from Germany. The
position of the Reichsbank had been so weakened by the previous
large losses of gold and foreign exchange, however, that it was
deemed necessary for it temporarily to seek the aid of foreign banks
in order that it might meet the ordinary demands of the mid-year
settlement period. On June 26, 1931, approximately $100,000,000
was made available to the Reichsbank for a period of twenty days,
the funds being supplied in equal shares and on substantially the
same terms by the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of
England, the Bank of France, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York acting for all of the Federal Reserve Banks. Neither the debt
moratorium nor these credits served to maintain confidence in the
German position. The movement of funds out of the country was
soon resumed, with the result that not only did the Reichsbank
credits have to be renewed, but negotiations had to be entered into
for the voluntary freezing of practically all foreign short term credits
in Germany.
The immobilizing of a large volume of foreign short term funds in
Germany imparted new uncertainties to the movement of such




12

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

funds from market to market, both because international lenders
were obliged, in some measure, to recall their funds in order to fortify
their positions at home, and because confidence in the prompt availability of funds held abroad was severely disturbed. In particular,
fears were raised concerning balances held in London, partly in view
of the large amount of these balances, but also because it was known
that a substantial volume of British funds would be affected by the
credit collapse in central Europe. In these circumstances, and
despite the absence of domestic banking difficulties, there was a run
on the London money market. In the latter half of July 1931, the
Bank of England lost $160,000,000 in gold, which lowered its gold
reserves from $810,000,000 to $650,000,000, and caused it to seek
and, on August 1, to obtain a three months credit of $125,000,000
from the Bank of France and similar aid from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, acting for all of the Federal Reserve Banks. The
progressive use of these credits failing, however, to restore strength
to sterling exchange, the British Government on August 28 obtained
credits abroad aggregating $400,000,000, one-half from a syndicate
of American bankers and one-half in the Paris market.
Maintenance of the gold standard by Great Britain was an important factor in the economic life of both France and the United
States and, in fact, of the world as a whole. So many of the world's
banking and currency systems have been based partly on reserves
held in sterling, so many countries are, in a measure, dependent for
their welfare upon the sale of their goods in the British market, so
large a part of the world's trade has been financed by the use of the
sterling bill, and so many international staples find their most important center of trade and quotation in Great Britain, that the
suspension of gold payments by that country was bound to have the
widest repercussions. Large as they were, these special credits failed
to save the situation. With confidence gravely impaired and funds
seeking safety above all else, the drain of funds from Great Britain
continued in such volume that on September 20, 1931, the British
Government found it necessary to announce that it had relieved the
Bank of England of its obligation to sell gold at the statutory price,
as from September 21, 1931.
The final manifestation of the international crisis of confidence
was the so-called "run on the dollar" which followed upon the suspension of gold payments by Great Britain. The central banks of
several countries found it advisable to strengthen their own domestic
position by withdrawing, in gold, a considerable part of their funds
which had previously been placed on deposit or invested in the
United States. Dollar exchange declined below the gold export point




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

13

vis-a-vis the exchanges of Belgium, France, Holland, and Switzerland, and gold moved to these countries on commercial account.
There even arose a demand for United States gold coin, in relatively
small amounts, reflecting the hoarding proclivities of nationals of
those countries where gold coin is not obtainable and where the
paper currencies have been revalued in recent years at levels which
involved a loss of a large part of their previous gold value.
The result of all of these movements was the most rapid outflow
of gold ever experienced by this country and probably by any
country. In slightly more than a month approximately $725,000,000
of gold was purchased here and earmarked for foreign account or exported. So large were the banking resources of the United States,
however, that these heavy withdrawals of foreign funds were met
readily, and this country emerged with its indebtedness to foreign
holders of dollars at short term greatly reduced and with its gold
reserves still far in excess of current requirements. After this
demonstration of the strength of the gold position of the United
States, the withdrawal of foreign funds practically ceased; in fact,
in November 1931, the gold inflow of earlier months was resumed so
that the net reduction for the year in the monetary gold stock of
the country was only $133,000,000.
The course of the credit crisis in other countries need not be rehearsed in detail. Briefly, only a few countries were able to remain
on the full and unrestricted gold standard. Taking different forms
in various countries, the situation was characterized by suspension
of gold convertibility of the currency, embargoes on gold exports,
restrictions upon free trading in foreign exchange, non-withdrawal
agreements in respect of foreign credits, national support and control
of commercial banking enterprises, and in general by measures pointing to a feeling of uncertainty concerning the immediate future.
Nor do the consequences of this situation require detailed exposition here. Credit has been partially destroyed and funds have
sought only the most liquid investment or have lain idle for want of
responsible borrowers, or because lenders were unwilling to lend.
Purchasing power in the international markets has been severely
curtailed, the industrial countries have ceased buying their usual
quantities of raw materials and foodstuffs, and the raw material
producing countries have been unable to satisfy any but their most
necessary requirements for manufactured products. There has been
a widespread breakdown of the international exchange of goods and
services.




SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

New Financing Through the Security Markets
Notwithstanding the difficulty which had attended the flotation
of new securities in the latter part of 1930, chiefly because of declining prices of stocks and the lower grade bonds, conditions precedent
to the domesticfinancingof new projects and to refunding operations
were moderately favorable during the early months of 1931. Short
term money rates were unusually low and there appeared to be
substantial amounts of funds available for long term investment.
Consequently, the volume of domestic bond issues, while considerably smaller than in the corresponding period of preceding years,
attained substantial proportions between January and April. States
and municipalities, public utilities, and a few railroads were able to
obtain fairly large amounts of new capital during this period. As
many workmen were without employment, and prices of materials
were lower than in some years, a nunjber of large construction projects were initiated or carried forward with funds thus obtained.
During the remainder of the year, however, conditions adverse
to the flotation of new securities multiplied. The renewed decline in
industrial activity and in trade, and the continued downward movement of commodity prices, were accompanied by a further severe
7826

FOREIGN
STATE &
MUNICIPAL

DOMESTIC
CORPORATE

1925

1926 1927

1928

1929

1930

1931

In millions of dollars
New Security Flotations during 1931 Compared with the Volume in Six Previous Years
(Commercial and Financial Chronicle figures for domestic issues, and Federal Reserve
Bank of New York figures for foreign notations; Investment Trust and United States
Government securities are excluded)



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

15

shrinkage in business profits, and the dividends of industrial and
mercantile corporations were progressively reduced. The volume
of railroad traffic diminished and railroad earnings fell so low that
the ability of many railroad securities to meet existing requirements
for the legal investment of savings bank, life insurance, and trust
funds became doubtful. Many banks, actuated by the necessity or
the desire for increased liquidity, reduced their investment portfolios, and securities offered for sale on account of closed banks
pressed upon the market. As a result of these developments, the
prices of stocks and of lower grade bonds declined to successive new
low levels, and the flotation of any but the highest grade securities
was virtually suspended. The borrowers who most needed new
capital were unable to obtain it, at least in the security markets.
In the late months of 1931 the stoppage of theflowof new capital
was made practically complete when the credit of many municipalities came into question, due chiefly to budgetary difficulties, and
when a rise in short term money rates and the threat of a large
Treasury deficit caused the prices of even the highest grade bonds to
decline abruptly and substantially. Consequently, those undertakings requiring new long term financing came almost to a standstill
in the latter part of the year.
During the whole of the year 1931 new foreign bond issues were
practically without a market in this country.

Credit Policy
Throughout the past two years the open market and discount
rate policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been
directed to the end that, so far as lay within its power, there should
be no lack of available credit at reasonable cost to encourage business recovery. The continued shrinkage in business volume and in
employment and the continued decline in commodity prices during
1931 indicated the need for maintenance of such a policy.
Pursuant to this policy, the discount rate of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, which had been 6 per cent at the close of October
1929, and which was reduced to 2 per cent by the end of 1930, was
further reduced to V/% per cent, effective May 8, 1931. This was the
lowest discount rate ever fixed by a Federal Reserve Bank. Buying
rates for bills at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were kept
close to open market rates, so that banks and bill dealers could
readily obtain funds through the sale of bills to the Reserve Bank.
In cooperation with other Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal



SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

16

Reserve Bank of New York participated in the purchase of $80,000,000 of United States Government securities during June and July,
and an additional $50,000,000 in August 1931. Gold movements also
operated toward ease in the money market, as there was an almost
uninterrupted inflow of the metal until the latter part of September
1931. Consequently, the commercial banks, in general, were under
no particular pressure of indebtedness at the Reserve Bank for almost nine months of the year and, in July, total borrowings of member banks in this district declined to the lowest level since 1917.
During October the situation changed abruptly. The suspension of
the gold standard in Great Britain was followed, not only by a huge
foreign demand for gold held in this country as noted above, but also
by an accelerated movement of currency into hoarding and some
withdrawal of funds from New York by banks in other parts of the
country. All three of these factors converged on the member banks
of New York and, through them, upon the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York which met the demands made upon it without restriction
of any kind. In view of the changed situation, however, the discount
rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was increased to 2 ^
per cent effective October 9 and 33^ per cent effective October 16,
1931. These advances were accompanied by roughly corresponding
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

y

\

2000
/

A,

1931/
30

1000

500

0
M

M

Total Volume of Reserve Bank Credit Outstanding



N

D

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

17

advances in the Reserve Bank's buying rates for bills, but this latter
action was not taken until after member banks had sold to the Reserve Bank a large volume of bills which they had acquired when the
lower rates were in effect; on two occasions, on September 24 and
again on October 9, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York bought
for its own account and for other Reserve Banks more than $100,000,000 of bills in a single day.
The combined effect of the extraordinary foreign demand for
gold during this brief period and the equally unusual domestic
demand for currency was reflected in a large increase in the demand
for Reserve Bank credit, the total of which reached the highest
level since 1921. The volume of this increased demand and the
forms in which Federal Reserve credit was supplied are shown in
the following table.
Change Between Week
Ended Sept. 19 and
Week Ended Oct. 31,
1931
Factors Increasing Demand for Reserve Bank Credit
Decrease in monetary gold stock
Increase in money in circulation
Total
Factors Decreasing Demand for Reserve Bank Credit
Decrease in member bank reserve balances
All other.
Total
Net Increase in Demand for Reserve Bank Credit
Changes in Reserve Bank Credit Outstanding
Increase in bills bought
Increase in bills discounted
Decrease in other forms of Reserve Bank credit
Net Increase in Reserve Bank Credit Outstanding

(millions of dollars)
725
404
1,129
169
13
182
947
514
444
11
947

The outwardflowof gold, which took approximately $725,000,000
from the monetary gold stock of the United States between September 19 and October 31, 1931, subsided as quickly as it had arisen and
was followed by a renewed inflow of gold into this country and by
renewed strength in dollar exchange. The effect of this latter gold
movement upon the money market was partly offset by a decrease,
through maturities, of Reserve Bank holdings of bills, but there was,
nevertheless, a moderate decline in open market rates for money
during November 1931.



18

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

By the middle of December, prior to the peak of the Christmas
holiday and year-end demand for currency and credit, member banks
in New York City were again practically out of debt to the Reserve
Bank, but member banks outside New York City were still indebted
in larger amounts than at any time since 1929. To avoid the development of a credit stringency during this period, so far as was possible
under these circumstances, $42,000,000 of United States Government securities were purchased by the Federal Reserve Banks in the
New York market, and the buying rate for acceptances offered under
repurchase agreement to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was
reduced to the level of the market offering rate for unendorsed bills,
so that funds were readily obtainable by the banks through temporary sales of bills to the Reserve Bank. Discounts by Federal
Reserve Banks for all member banks increased by approximately
$150,000,000 during December, a not unusual development.
The credit policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the year 1931 kept funds freely available to its member banks at
rates which were never above 33^ per cent and which, during most of
the year, were under that figure. That, despite this liberal program,
a severe contraction of bank credit should have taken place, bears
witness to the inferior ability of a low rate schedule to bring credit
into use when confidence is lacking.

The Reconstruction Program
In the closing months of 1931 several measures of an extraordinary nature were formulated to prevent further impairment of the
country's credit facilities. All of these measures recognized that no
substantial and widespread improvement of business could be
anticipated unless such action were taken and there was once more a
free flow of capital and credit into productive enterprise. The principal elements in the national program which gradually evolved from
a realization of this situation were the following:
The organization of the National Credit Corporation for the purpose of
mobilizing banking assistance in behalf of banks which had temporarily
exhausted their liquid assets.
The creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to supplement
and extend the work of the National Credit Corporation, and to bring
public credit to the support of private financial enterprises and of the railroads.
An enlargement of the rediscount facilities of the Federal Reserve
Banks, to permit of their extending a maximum amount of assistance to
their member banks.
An increase in the capital of Federal Land Banks in order to improve
the long term credit facilities available to agriculture.



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

19

The creation of a system of home loan discount banks to make mortgage funds more freely available, to encourage home ownership, and thus to
stimulate the building industry.
The improvement of existing methods of liquidating the assets of closed
banks, to the end that depositors might receive a more prompt distribution
of whatever funds are available to satisfy their claims.
Financial assistance for the railroads and sympathetic treatment of requests for increased freight rates, in recognition of the fact that railroad
securities are quite largely held by banks, insurance companies, and trust
funds.
Economy in Government expenditure and increased taxation so that
the Federal budget might again be brought into balance.

Most of these projects required Congressional action and, therefore, had to await consideration and legislation by Congress which
did not convene until the first week of December. Meanwhile, however, the establishment of the National Credit Corporation by the
banks of the country, late in October, helped to restore public confidence in the banking situation and thus to check currency hoarding
and bank failures. The number of bank suspensions, after rising to
the record total of 522 in October, declined to 175 in November, and
the amount of currency outstanding showed less than the usual
seasonal increase during the latter month. Thefiguresfor December
were less satisfactory than those for November, but still represented
an improvement as compared with the October record.
As soon as it convened in December, Congress proceeded to
hasten the establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Government planned to endow this organization with
broad powers and to finance it with capital supplied by the Treasury.
By contrast with the National Credit Corporation, which derived
all of its funds from its constituent banks, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, using Government funds, would be able to
extend aid to financial institutions without, of necessity, diminishing
the liquid assets of the banking system. In effect the public, through
its Government, was preparing to extend to the financial institutions
of the country the confidence and support which the people individually had partially withdrawn from them.




SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

Gold Movements
The most striking of the year's gold movements, as they affected
the United States, have been commented upon in the previous text,
and only a brief summary of the statistical record will be presented
here. There are four periods to be considered, the year as a whole,
the eight and a half months preceding the British suspension of the
gold standard on September 21, the period of slightly more than a
month from September 21 to October 30, during which the heavy
outward movement of gold from the United States took place, and
the final two months of the year.
The United States monetary gold stock increased from $4,593,000,000 at the end of the year 1930 to the highest figure of record,
$5,015,000,000, on September 16, 1931. During these eight and
one-half months, imports of gold from Argentina, Canada, China,
Colombia, France, Germany, Japan, and Mexico were particularly
large and were supplemented by heavy releases from gold earmarked
at this bank for foreign account. In the main, this gold movement
represented the continuing attempt of debtor countries to redress
their unfavorable balances of payments by shipments of gold.
Following the suspension of gold payments by Great Britain on
September 21, 1931, there was an efflux of gold from this country
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
5

r **•
/

/
f

1919 20 '21 22 23 '24 25 26 27 28 29 '30 31
The Monetary Gold Stock of the United States



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

21

which, in the six weeks ended October 30, brought the monetary
gold stock down to $4,268,000,000, a figure which approximated that
of December 1929. The loss of gold during this period may be said
to have taken two forms. First, a number of foreign central banks
used their dollar balances to buy gold in this market, in order to
strengthen their reserve positions, and left a larger part of their
purchases under earmark at this bank; thus there was a net increase
in gold held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under earmark for foreign account from $78,737,000 on September 16 to
$490,738,000 on October 30, 1931. Second, in addition to the gold
repatriated by foreign central banks, there was a loss through export
on commercial account which reflected chiefly withdrawals of funds
from New York by other European holders of dollar balances, as a
result of which certain of the leading European exchanges rose to
levels at which gold exports were profitable on an arbitrage basis.
Gross figures for this period show that the bulk of the gold lost to the
United States went to Belgium ($141,000,000), France ($422,000,000), the Netherlands ($87,000,000), and Switzerland ($92,000,000).
By the end of October the outflow of gold had subsided, movements during November were small in amount, and a resumption of
foreign withdrawals of gold during December attained only moderate
proportions. Imports of gold, chiefly from the Far East, Canada,
and Latin America, which continued throughout the year, caused a
net inward movement during November and December, and the
monetary gold stock of the country increased from $4,268,000,000
to $4,460,000,000 during these two months.
For the year as a whole, there was a net reduction in the monetary
gold stock of the United States amounting to $133,000,000. Both
actually and relatively, this country's proportion of the total monetary gold holdings of the world was reduced during the year, and all
of the gold which was sent to this country, plus a part of the stocks
previously held, in effect, was re-exported, chiefly to Belgium,
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
There is submitted on page 22 a table showing, by countries,
principal exports and imports of gold from and into the United States
during 1931. Subtracting the net gain of $145,300,000, shown in the
table, from the increase of $320,800,000 in gold held here under earmark for foreign account during 1931, and omitting figures of
domestically produced gold retained in the United States, there
results a net loss of $175,500,000 on foreign account as an outcome of
the year's gold movements.




SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
GOLD MOVEMENT TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES DURING 1931
(Changes in the gold stock through earmarking transactions not included)
Imports from
Japan
Argentina
Canada
Germany
China and Hongkong
Mexico
France
Colombia
India
Peru
England
Uruguay
Cuba
Sweden
Australia
All Other
TOTAL

Exports to
$199,300,000
141,300,000
81,300,000
37,100,000
34,300,000
25,300,000
19,400,000
15,100,000
8,100,000
7,500,000
7,000,000
6,100,000
5,600,000
5,600,000
2,600,000
16,500,000

France
Holland
Switzerland
Belgium
Italy
Mexico
Turkey
Portugal
All Other

$363,900,000
50,300,000
19,800,000
15,600,000
5,300,000
3,100,000
3,000,000
2,100,000
3,700,000

$612,100,000

TOTAL

$466,800,000

Foreign Relations
During 1931 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on behalf of
itself and the other Federal Reserve Banks, maintained relations
with thirty foreign banks of issue and with the Bank for International Settlements. Included in this number are the new accounts
which were opened during the year, with the approval of the Federal
Reserve Board, for the banks of issue in Chile, Danzig, Lithuania,
Peru, Portugal, and Uruguay. As in the past, the opening of these
accounts resulted from steps initially taken by the foreign banks
involved.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting in behalf of all
of the Federal Reserve Banks, also extended special credit facilities
to a number of foreign banks of issue during the year 1931. Without
exception this assistance took the form of an agreement to purchase
prime commercial bills endorsed or guaranteed by the respective
foreign banks of issue, and all such agreements provided for ultimate repayment in gold, if necessary.
The first of these agreements was concluded, with the Bank for
International Settlements acting for itself and as intermediary for
eleven other banks of issue, in favor of the National Bank of Austria,
on May 30, 1931. It amounted to approximately $14,070,000, matured on August 30,1931, and the commitment of the twelve Federal




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

23

Reserve Banks aggregated approximately $1,083,000, the balance
being taken by ten European banks of issue and the Bank for International Settlements. This agreement was renewed on August 30 to
a maturity date of October 16, and during the period of this renewal
about 10 per cent of the outstanding amount was repaid by the
borrower, the commitment of the Federal Reserve Banks thus being
reduced to approximately $975,000. The agreement was again renewed on October 16 to a maturity date of January 16, 1932.
Under the terms of an agreement dated June 18, 1931, with the
Bank for International Settlements again acting as intermediary,
credit facilities for the approximate equivalent of $10,000,000, to
mature on September 18, 1931, were arranged in favor of the National Bank of Hungary by the Federal Reserve Banks, nine
European banks of issue, and the Bank for International Settlements, the commitment of the Reserve Banks approximating
$2,000,000. A second credit to the National Bank of Hungary was
granted by the Bank for International Settlements and the banks of
issue of five countries on July 8, 1931, the amount thereof being
$11,000,000, and the commitment of the Federal Reserve Banks,
$3,000,000. It was arranged that funds obtained under this agreement would be repayable in seventy-two days so that funds advanced
under both agreements would mature simultaneously on September
18, 1931. On the latter date 20 per cent of these funds were repaid
and the remainder renewed, in the total amount of $16,800,000, to
mature December 18, 1931, at which time there was a further renewal of approximately the same amount for one month to January
18,1932. The outstanding commitment of all of the Federal Reserve
Banks under these agreements at the close of the year was $4,000,000.
Effective June 26, for a period of twenty days to July 16, 1931,
the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England, the
Bank of France, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York placed
approximately $100,000,000 at the disposal of the German Reichsbank. This agreement, including the participation of the Federal
Reserve Banks which was effected through the purchase of approximately $25,000,000 of reichsmark acceptances, was renewed from
July 16 to August 6 and again to November 4, 1931, when it was
extended to mature on February 4, 1932.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and other Federal Reserve Banks joined in an agreement to purchase up to the equivalent
of $125,000,000 of prime sterling bills from the Bank of England for a
period of three months from August 1, 1931. When this agreement
matured on October 31, drawings thereunder were fully repaid by




24

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

the Bank of England and the agreement was renewed in the reduced
amount of $75,000,000 to mature on January 31, 1932. When this
agreement was originally consummated, the Bank of England received from the Bank of France a credit in like amount and for a
like period, which credit also was renewed in the reduced amount of
$75,000,000 to January 31, 1932.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting in behalf of all of
the Federal Reserve Banks, has for several years past maintained
nominal balances with the Bank of England in London and with the
Bank of France in Paris. Last year there was added to these two
foreign accounts a temporary sight deposit with the Bank for International Settlements at Basle.
On November 20, 1931, the President of the Bank for International Settlements requested the Governor of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to nominate an American member of the Special
Advisory Committee which was convened at Basle on December 7,
1931, under the terms of the New Plan, known generally as the
Young Plan, to make an investigation of Germany's position in
regard to her obligations under that plan. The Governor of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York nominated as the American
member of this committee Mr. Walter W. Stewart, Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Messrs. Case, Pomeroy and Company, Inc.,
New York.
Upon invitation from the Banco Central de Bolivia, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York sent representatives to a conference of
the five central banks of the West Coast countries of South America
which was held at the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, in Lima,
Peru, from December 2 to 12, 1931. The Federal Reserve representatives were Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University,
Mr. Allan Sproul, Assistant Deputy Governor of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and Mr. Eric F. Lamb of the Foreign Department of this bank.




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

Membership Changes in 1931
In 1931, membership of the Federal Reserve System in this
district decreased more than in any previous year because of a large
number of mergers, consolidations, and suspensions. State bank
and Trust company admissions to membership exceeded withdrawals
from membership, but the loss due to mergers, consolidations, and
suspensions more than offset this gain. While the reduction in the
actual number of member banks exceeded the reduction in nonmember banks, the proportionate reduction in member banks was
considerably less. During the year over 9 per cent of the nonmember
banks suspended operations, as compared with less than 5 per cent
of the member banks.
NUMBER OF MEMBER* AND NONMEMBER BANKS IN SECOND
FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT AT END OF YEAR
DECEMBER 31,1931

DECEMBER 31,

1930

TYPE OP BANK

NonNonPer Cent
Per Cent
Members* Members Members Members* Members Members
National Banks
State Banks**
Trust Companies
Total

699
37
105

0
166
174

100
18
38

759
39
116

0
194
201

100
17
37

841

340

71

914

395

70

*In actual operation at end of year.
••Exclusive of savings banks.
CHANGES IN FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBERSHIP IN SECOND
DISTRICT DURING 1931
Total membership beginning of year.

914

Increases:!
National banks organized
Admission of State banks and Trust companies.
Total increases.
Decreases:
Member banks combined with other members.
Members absorbed by nonmembers
Withdrawals
Insolvencies
Total decreases.
Net decrease.
Total membership end of year.

10

32
4
3
44
83
73

841
fin addition to figures shown in this table, 11 nonmember banks were absorbed by
members during the year.




26

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

Operating Statistics
As complete statistics of the operations of each Reserve Bank are
published in the annual report of the Federal Reserve Board, detailed figures of the operation of this bank are omitted from this
report with the exception of the following statement of condition, the
statement of income and disbursements, and a table showing the
volume of operations in the principal departments, including the
Buffalo Branch.
STATEMENT OF CONDITION
RESOURCES

CASH RESERVES held by this bank against its
deposits and note circulation:
Gold held by the Federal Reserve Agent as
part of the collateral deposited by the bank
when it obtains Federal Reserve notes.
This gold is lodged partly in the vaults of
the bank and partly with the Treasurer of
the United States
Gold redemption fund in the hands of the
Treasurer of the United States to be used
to redeem such Federal Reserve notes as
are presented to the Treasury for redemption
Gold in the gold settlement fund lodged with
the Treasurer of the United States for the
purpose of settling current transactions
between Federal Reserve districts
Gold and gold certificates in vault
Legal tender notes, silver, and silver certificates in the vaults of the bank (available
as reserve only against deposits)
Total cash reserves
Non-reserve cash consisting largely of National bank notes, and minor coin

Dec. 31, 1931

Dec. 31, 1930

$450,336,457.22

$420,729,395.98

11,542,824.20

14,032,365.61

81,379,878.67
300,478,183.81

135,357,795.77
437,002,717.26

37,739,315.00

39,878,345.00

$881,476,658.90

$1,047,000,619.62

$19,234,621.23

$22,285,136.09

$112,476,320.00

$24,441,400.00

37,474,318.93
163,392,844.14

37,456,625.51
158,273,425.84

309,355,850.00
14,315,212.50

283,331,150.00
2,850,000.00

$637,014,545.57

$506,352,601.35

$14,816,793.01

$15,240,285.33

164,866,941.19
20,499,027.40

183,282,756.71*
16,019,358.85*

LOANS AND INVESTMENTS:

Loans to member banks:
On the security of obligations of the United
States
On the security of, or by the discount of,
commercial or agricultural paper or acceptances
Acceptances bought in the open market
United States Government bonds, notes,
bills, and certificates of indebtedness
Other securities
Total loans and investments
MISCELLANEOUS RESOURCES:

Bank premises
:
Checks and other items in process of collection
All other miscellaneous resources
Total miscellaneous resources
Total resources
*Revised.



$200,182,761.60

$214,542,400.89

$1,737,908,587.30

$1,790,180,757.95

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
Dec. 31, 1931

Dec. 31, 1930

Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation,
payable on demand. These notes are secured in full by gold, and discounted and
purchased paper

$574,185,857.40

$384,976,316.50

Federal Reserve notes in circulation

$574,185,857.40

$384,976,316.50

$795,014,893.86

$1,062,275,925.90

25,740,077.78

4,113,369.64

LIABILITIES
CUBBENCY IN ClBCULATION:

DEPOSITS:

Reserve deposits maintained by member
banks as legal reserves against the deposits of their customers
United States Government deposits carried at
the Reserve Bank for current requirements
of the Treasury
Other deposits including foreign deposits,
deposits of nonmember banks, etc

41,313,401.35

11,457,835.85

$862,068,372.99

Total deposits

$1,077,847,131.39

$158,125,864.59
6,812,787.98

$178,876,833.55
2,327,407.16

$164,938,652.57

$181,204,240.71

$61,638,550.00

$65,577,650.00

MISCELLANEOUS LIABILITIES:

Deferred items, composed mostly of uncollected checks on banks in all parts of the
country. Such items are credited as deposits after the periods specified in this
bank's time schedules, which periods range
from 1 to 7 days after receipt by this bank
and are based on the average time required
for collection
All other miscellaneous liabilities
Total miscellaneous liabilities
CAPITAL AND SURPLUS:

Capital paid in, equal to 3 per cent of the
capital and surplus of member banks
Surplus—That portion of accumulated net
earnings which the bank is legally required
to retain
Total liabilities

75,077,154.34

80,575,419.35

$136,715,704.34

$146,153,069.35

$1,737,908,587.30

Total capital and surplus

$1,790,180,757.95

INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS

The table on page 28 shows income and disbursements for the
year 1931 compared with 1930. Total earnings in 1931 were about
$2,800,000 less than in 1930, reflecting a decrease in income from all
principal types of earning assets. The amount of loans to member
banks and also of holdings of acceptances and of United States Government securities was smaller than in 1930 during the first seven
months of the year, but increased substantially in the subsequent
months, and for the year as a whole averaged slightly higher in 1931
than in 1930. The expenses of current bank operation were reduced
slightly in 1931, while the cost of new currency and deductions for
depreciation, self-insurance, etc., were materially less than in 1930.



28

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

As the net income for the year of $1,532,080 was not sufficient to
pay the 6 per cent dividend of $3,891,598 on the capital stock, it was
necessary to draw on surplus for $2,359,518 to meet dividend requirements. A depreciation reserve on United States Government
securities of $3,138,746 was set up, making the total charges to
surplus account $5,498,265, leaving a balance of $75,077,154.
1931

1930

EARNINGS:

From loans to member banks and paper discounted for them
From bankers acceptances
From United States Government obligations.
Other earnings

$1,910,378.30
1,917,936.89
5,895,424.92
669,448.33

$7,555,213.32

Total earnings

$1,661,804.55
1,638,210.41
3,613,854.20
641,344.16

$10,393,188.44

$1,107,406.45

$1,647,494.18

$6,298,732.43

$6,383,786.46

348,371.41

442,777.54

ADDITIONS TO EARNINGS:

For sundry additions to earnings, including
income from Annex Building
DEDUCTIONS FROM EARNINGS:

For current bank operation. (These figures
include most of the expenses incurred as
fiscal agent of the United States)
For Federal Reserve currency, mainly the
cost of printing new notes to replace worn
notes in circulation, and to maintain supplies unissued and on hand, and the cost of
redemption
For depreciation, self-insurance, other reserves, losses, etc
Total deductions from earnings
Net income available for dividends, additions
to surplus, and franchise tax to the United
States Government
Dividends paid to member banks, at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum on paid-in capital.
Excess of dividends over net income
Additions to surplus—The bank is required
by law to accumulate out of net earnings,
after payment of dividends, a surplus
amounting to 100 per cent of the subscribed
capital; and after such surplus has been accumulated to pay into surplus each year
10 per cent of the net income remaining
after paying dividends
Franchise tax—Any balance of net income
remaining after paying dividends and making additions to surplus (as above) is required to be paid to the United States
Government as a franchise tax. No balance
remained for such payments in 1931 or 1930

483,435.21

625,734.79

$7,130,539.05

$7,452,298.79

$1,532,080.72

$4,588,383.83

$3,891,598.91
2,359,518.19

$4,013,778.77

574,605.06

CHARGES TO SURPLUS ACCOUNT:

Excess of dividends over net income
Depreciation reserve on United
Government securities
Total charged to surplus account




States

$2,359,518.19
3,138,746.82
$5,498,265.01

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

29

VOLUME OF OPERATIONS

The following table shows the volume of transactions in the
principal operating departments of the bank in 1931 compared with
1930. The decrease in the banking activities in this district in 1931
is reflected in the decrease in the volume of work in several departments of this bank. In the Loan and Discount Department, however, the number of notes handled was larger than in 1930, due to
the greater number of banks which borrowed, and the Government
Bond and Safekeeping Department also showed a considerable
increase in volume of work, reflecting the increased security flotations
of the United States Treasury.
1931
Number of Pieces Handled
Bills discounted:
Applications
Notes discounted
Bills purchased in open market for own account
Currency received and counted
Coin received and counted
Checks handled
Collection items handled:
United States Government coupons p a i d . . . .
All other
United States securities—issues, redemptions,
and exchanges by fiscal agency department. .
Transfers of funds
Amounts Handled
Bills discounted
Bills purchased in open market for own account
Currency received and counted
Coin received and counted
Checks handled
Collection items handled:
United States Government coupons p a i d . . . .
All other
United States securities—issues, redemptions,
and exchanges by fiscal agency department..
Transfers of funds




1930

18,200
57,251
125,908
674,810,000
1,123,503,000
184,402,000

14,002
44,841
96,173
730,751,000
1,520,441,000
187,951,000

4,488,000
2,545,000

5,310,000
2,531,000

1,187,000
375,000

516,000
412,000

$4,200,712,000
1,317,969,000
4,322,295,000
345,060,000
101,014,303,000

$5,713,832,000
2,024,458,000
4,949,160,000
261,586,000
142,165,873,000

233,190,000
2,759,966,000

233,820,000
2,862,311,000

11,434,584,000
62,189,715,000

4,165,601,000
73,520,472,000

30

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

Changes in Directors and Officers
At a regular election in the fall of 1931, Albert H. Wiggin, Chairman, Governing Board, The Chase National Bank of the City of
New York, was elected by the member banks in Group I as a Class A
director for a term of three years, beginning January 1, 1932, to succeed Charles E. Mitchell of New York City, whose term expired
December 31, 1931.
William H. Woodin, President, American Car and Foundry
Company, New York, was reelected by the member banks in Group
I as a Class B director to serve for a term of three years, beginning
January 1, 1932.
The Federal Reserve Board reappointed J. Herbert Case as a
Class C director for a term of three years from January 1, 1932 and
redesignated him as Chairman of the Board of Directors and as
Federal Reserve Agent for the year 1932. The Federal Reserve
Board also reappointed Owen D. Young as Deputy Chairman of the
Board of Directors for the year 1932.
The Federal Reserve Board reappointed George G. Kleindinst,
President, Liberty Bank of Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, as a director
of the Buffalo Branch for a term of three years from January 1,1932.
The Board of Directors of this bank appointed Raymond N. Ball,
President, Lincoln-Alliance Bank and Trust Company, Rochester,
New York, as a director of the Buffalo Branch for a term of three
years from January 1, 1932, to succeed John T. Symes, of Lockport,
New York, whose term as a director expired on December 31,1931.
The Board of Directors of this bank also reappointed Robert
M. O'Hara as Managing Director of the Buffalo Branch for the
year 1932.
MEMBER OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

At its meeting on January 14,1932, the Board of Directors of this
bank redesignated Robert H. Treman, President of The Tompkins
County National Bank, Ithaca, New York, as the member of the
Federal Advisory Council from the Second Federal Reserve District
to serve during the year 1932.
CHANGES IN OFFICERS

On November 30, 1931, Herbert H. Kimball was appointed Assistant Counsel of the bank.
On January 15, 1932, L. Werner Knoke was appointed Assistant
Deputy Governor.



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

31

DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
January 1, 1932
Term
Expires
Dec. SI

DIRECTORS
Class Group
A

1 ALBERT H. WIGGIN, New York City

1934

Chairman, Governing Board, The Chase National Bank of
the City of New York
A

2

THOMAS W. STEPHENS, Montclair, N. J

1932

President, Bank of Montclair
A

3

DAVID C. WARNER, Endicott, N. Y

1933

President, Endicott Trust Company
B

1 WILLIAM H. WOODIN, New York City

1934

President, American Car & Foundry Company
B

2 THEODORE F. WHITMARSH, New York City

1932

Chairman, Francis H. Leggett & Company
B

3

SAMUEL W. REYBURN, New York City

1933

President, Associated Dry Goods Corporation of New York
C

J. HERBERT CASE, New York City, Chairman

1934

C

OWEN D. YOUNG, New York City, Deputy Chairman
Chairman, General Electric Company

1932

C

CLARENCE M. WOOLLEY, Greenwich, Conn

1933

Chairman, American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation

MEMBER OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
ROBERT H. THEM AN

President, The Tompkins County National Bank, Ithaca, N. Y.

OFFICERS OF FEDERAL RESERVE AGENT'S FUNCTION
J. HERBERT CASE, Federal Reserve Agent
WILLIAM H. DILLISTIN, Assistant Federal

Reserve Agent

HAROLD V. ROELSE, Manager, Reports

Department and Assistant Secretary

HERBERT S. DOWNS, Assistant Federal Re-

serve Agent and Manager, Bank RelaHorn Department

CARL SNTDER, General Statistician

EDWARD L. DODGE, General Auditor

GEORGE W. FERGUSON, Assistant General Auditor




32

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL R E P O R T
GENERAL OFFICERS
GEORGE L. HARRISON, Governor

W. RANDOLPH BURGESS, Deputy Governor
JAY E. CRANE, Deputy Governor

EDWIN R. KENZEL, Deputy Governor
WALTER S. LOGAN, Deputy Governor and

ARTHUR W. GILBART, Deputy Governor

LESLIE R. ROUNDS, Deputy Governor

General Counsel
Louis F. SAILER, Deputy Governor

CHARLES H. COE,

L. WERNER KNOKE,

Assistant Deputy Governor

Assistant Deputy Governor

RAY M. GIDNEY,

WALTER B. MATTESON,

Assistant Deputy Governor

Assistant Deputy Governor

J. WILSON JONES,

JAMES M. RICE,

Assistant Deputy Governor

Assistant Deputy Governor

ALLAN SPROUL, Assistant Deputy

Governor and Secretary

JUNIOR OFFICERS
DUDLEY H. BARROWS,

HERBERT H. KIMBALL,

Manager, Administration Department
WESLEY W. BURT,

Assistant Counsel
ROBERT F . MCMURRAY,

Manager, Accounting Department

Manager, Collection Department

THEODORE M. CRISP,

JACQUES A. MITCHELL,

Assistant Counsel

Manager, Loan and Discount Dept.

EDWARD O. DOUGLAS,

ROBERT M. MORGAN,

Manager, Foreign Department

Manager, BUI Department

EDWIN C. FRENCH,

WILLIAM A. SCOTT,

Manager, Cash Department

Manager, Government Bond and Safekeeping Department
I. WARD WATERS,

Manager, Check Department

BUFFALO BRANCH
Term
Expires
Dec. SI

DIRECTORS
RAYMOND N. BALL, Rochester

1934

President, Lincoln-Alliance Bank and Trust Company
FREDERICK B. COOLEY, Buffalo

1932

President, New York Car Wheel Company
LEWIS G. HARRIMAN, Buffalo

1932

President, M. & T Trust Company
GEORGE G. KLEINDINST, Buffalo

1934

President, Liberty Bank of Buffalo
EDWARD G. MINER, Rochester

1933

President, Pfaudler Company
GEORGE F. RAND, Buffalo

y . . . .

1933

President, Marine Trust Company
ROBERT M. O'HARA, Managing Director

1932

OFFICERS
ROBERT M. O'HARA,

Managing Director
R. B. WILTSE,

Assistant Manager




HALSEY W. SNOW, J R . ,

Cashier
CLIFFORD L. BLAKESLEE,

Assistant Cashier