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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK A N N U A L REPORT 1974 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF N E W Y O R K F e b r u a r y 19, 1975 To th e M e m b e r B a n k s in the Second F ed era l R e se r v e D istrict I a m p l e a s e d to p r e s e n t o u r s i x t i e t h A n n u a l R e p o r t , r e v i e w in g m a j o r e c o n o m i c and fin a n c ia l d e v e l o p m e n t s and th is B a n k 's o p e r a t io n s in 1974. T h is c o u n try e x p e r i e n c e d e c o n o m ic s t r a in s of e x c e p t i o n a l s e v e r i t y d u r i n g th e p a s t y e a r . D e s p i t e a m o d e r a t i o n in a g g r e g a t e d e m a n d , v i r u l e n t i n f l a t i o n p e r s i s t e d , e x a c e r b a t e d by th e f o u r f o l d i n c r e a s e in th e p r i c e o f p e t r o l e u m i m p o s e d b y th e m a j o r o i l - e x p o r t i n g n a tio n s. C o n s u m e r and b u s i n e s s c o n fid en ce s a g g e d a s in fla tio n red u c ed r e a l i n c o m e s , a n d a p e r v a s i v e c o n t r a c t i o n in e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y d e v e l o p e d in t h e f i n a l m o n t h s o f th e y e a r . P r e s s u r e o n th e d o m e s t i c f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m w a s a s o u r c e o f d e e p c o n c e r n a n d , o v e r th e s u m m e r , th e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e w a s c a l l e d u p o n to h e l p p r e v e n t a m a j o r b a n k f a i l u r e f r o m h a v i n g s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s t h r o u g h o u t th e e c o n o m y . L i k e th e U n i t e d S t a t e s , m o s t c o u n t r i e s a b r o a d w e r e b e s e t b y s e r i o u s e c o n o m i c d i f f i c u l t i e s s t e m m i n g in p a r t f r o m th e r i s e in th e p r i c e o f o i l . In a n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s , i n c r e a s e d o i l p a y m e n t s w e r e a d d e d to t r a d e d e f i c i t s t h a t w e r e a l r e a d y l a r g e . W h i l e t h e s e e n l a r g e d d e fic it s w e r e fin a n c ed w ith ou t undue s tr a in , th er e w a s a w o r r i s o m e i n c r e a s e in th e b u r d e n o f e x t e r n a l d e b t f o r s o m e c o u n t r i e s . M o r e o v e r , c o n f i d e n c e in th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a n k i n g s y s t e m w e a k e n e d , f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e t r a n s a c t i o n s w e r e s h a r p l y c u r t a i l e d f o r a t i m e , a nd l e n d i n g b y E u r o - b a n k s s l a c k e n e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n th e s e c o n d h a l f o f th e y e a r . E c o n o m ic p o lic y m a k e r s fa c e a v e r y d ifficu lt en v ir o n m e n t in 1 9 7 5 . A s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n i s c l e a r l y req u ired . T h e i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s m u s t a l s o m a k e m a j o r e f f o r t s to r e d u c e th e p a y m e n t s i m b a l a n c e b y c o n s e r v i n g e n e r g y and d e v e l o p i n g a l t e r n a t i v e e n e r g y s u p p l ie s and by e x p a n d in g e x p o r t s to the o il- p r o d u c in g c o u n t r i e s . In t h i s c o u n t r y , w e m u s t a t t e m p t to a r r e s t th e m a r k e d r i s e in u n e m p l o y m e n t and to l a y t h e g r o u n d w o r k f o r a r e s u m p t i o n o f s u s t a i n e d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , w e m u s t b e c a r e f u l to a v o i d o v e r l y s t i m u l a t i v e p o l i c i e s w h i c h c o u l d add u l t i m a t e l y t o t h e c o s t s o f a c h i e v i n g a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e o f p r i c e s t a b i l i t y . S t r i k i n g th e p r o p e r b a l a n c e in p u r s u in g t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s i s no e a s y ta s k . ---A L F R E D HAYES P r e sid en t Federal Reserve Bank of New York SIXTIETH ANNUAL REPORT For the Year Ended December 31,1974 Second Federal Reserve District C o n t e n t s Page THE ECONOMY IN 1974 .................................................................................................................... 3 Monetary policy in 1974 ................................................................................................................ The international economy under strain ................................................................................... 7 11 Problems for monetary policy ....................................................................................................... 19 THE BANK’S OPERATIONS IN 1974 .............................................................................................. Resolving the Problem of Franklin National Bank ................................................................. 21 21 Discount window assistance ........................................................................................................... The search for a resolution .......................................... ................................................................ Franklin’s foreign exchange contracts ......................................................................................... 22 24 24 The final stages ................................................................................................................................. 25 Operational H ighlights...................................................................................................................... 27 Strengthening planning and budget c o n tr o ls.............................................................................. Book-entry progress ........................................................................................................................ 27 28 Treasury offerings attracted thousands of individuals ............................................................ Foreign account investment activity increased ........................................................................ Monitoring foreign exchange markets ....................................................................................... New building and energy conservation ....................................................................................... Food-coupon-processing facility in Puerto R i c o ........................................................................ 28 29 29 29 30 Financial S ta te m e n ts ........................................................................................................................ 31 Statement of earnings and expenses ........................................................................................... Statement of condition .................................................................................................................... 31 32 Changes in Directors and Senior O fficers.................................................................................. 34 Changes in directors ........................................................................................................................ Changes in senior officers ................................................................................................................ Member of Federal Advisory Council— 1975 ......................................................................... List of Directors and O fficers......................................................................................................... 34 35 36 37 CHARTS Chart 1. Production, Prices, and Unemployment in the United S ta te s ............................. 5 Chart 2. Money, Bank Credit, and Interest Rates ................................................................. 8 Chart 3 . Changes in Consumer Prices and Production for Selected C o u n trie s ............. 14 Chart 4 . Current-Account Balances in 1973 and 1974 ........................................................ 17 S ix tie th A n n u a l R e p o r t F e d e ra l R e s e rv e B a n k o f N e w Y o r k Th e Econom y in 1974 A combination of severe, and in some respects unprecedented, economic strains caused deep concern throughout much of the industrialized world in 1974. In flation of great severity continued during the year. At the same time, economic activity slackened in many industrial countries, and in the United States a reces sion developed. Both inflation and emerging recessionary tendencies were strongly influenced early in the year by the oil embargo, but the fourfold in crease in the price of petroleum imposed by the major oil-exporting nations proved of more enduring importance. This development directly exacerbated inflation and, at the same time, dampened economic expansion both by signifi cantly reducing purchasing power in the industrial countries and by exerting major strains on world financial markets. The United States shared many of the economic woes which beset the rest of the world. The effects of demand pressures dating from the mid-1960’s com bined with special developments, including the rise in oil prices, to generate in 1974 an inflation of unprecedented severity for a peacetime period. A muchneeded cooling of the economy emerged, but was magnified by the strains of inflation on both business and consumer psychology and on financial markets. Liquidity pressures mounted and, in the final months of the year, a very painful contraction of economic activity developed. While there were some encouraging straws in the wind at the year-end, significant progress against inflation was by no means assured. Overall, recent experience confirmed that the longer inflation is allowed to run unchecked, the greater are the distortions built into the econ omy and the more difficult and painful it is to bring inflation under control. In 3 looking ahead to 1975, it was clear that economic policy makers faced an excep tionally difficult set of circumstances. Largely as a result of the energy shortage, weakness had emerged in the domestic economy early in the year. Real gross national product (GNP) de clined sharply in the first quarter and moved down slightly further during the spring and summer months. However, industrial production recovered a bit over this period and employment also increased. It was not until the final months of the year that a classic recessionary pattern, including substantial declines in industrial output and sharply rising unemployment, set in (see Chart 1). The downturn was accompanied by increasing public concern about the economic situation, as evidenced by the depressed state of consumer and business confidence and by the further slump in the stock market. Conditions in the labor market were reasonably stable over the first two thirds of the year, as employment increased modestly and the unemployment rate advanced only slightly from the level established in January. However, the final months of 1974 witnessed a sharp deterioration. Unemployment climbed to 7.1 percent of the civilian labor force in December, primarily as a result of a surge in job layoffs. Some sectors of the economy, notably manufacturing and construction, were particularly affected. While the symptoms of economic contraction began to become pronounced and general only relatively late in 1974, inflation was an acute problem through out the period. Indeed, inflation was far worse than it had been in the preced ing year. It is difficult, however, to provide a wholly adequate explanation for the full extent of price inflation. Certainly, past demand pressures stemming from overly stimulative policies were in part responsible. Over the past ten years or so, the Federal budget was frequently in deficit by a substantial amount, and fiscal policy was overly expansive much of the time. This fiscal policy pos ture added directly to demands for goods and services during a period when the productive capacity of the economy was often strained. Moreover, stimu lative fiscal policy requiring deficit financing put upward pressure on interest rates. To the extent that the Federal Reserve resisted this pressure, the large deficits served to encourage excessive monetary expansion. And, apart from fiscal influences, monetary policy was rather too expansionary in 1972. Other developments, namely, the fuel and food supply shortages and the depreciation of the dollar, also contributed materially to the recent inflation. Experience suggests that the influence of demand pressures tends to work its way through the price system over an extended period, as labor and other 4 C h a rt 1. P R O D U C T IO N , P R IC E S , A N D U N E M P L O Y M E N T IN T H E U N IT ED S T A T E S Ind ex 125 120 115 110 105 100 Percent 10 5 0 -5 -1 0 I II III IV I II III IV Percent 6 5 4 3 All data are seasonally adjusted. Quarterly gross national product (GNP) numbers are at an annual rate. 5 costs as well as price expectations respond only gradually to demand condi tions. This explains, at least in part, why prices can continue to rise rapidly for a time during periods of slack demand, as they did during the 1969-70 recession and in 1974. The tardiness with which inflation has tended to respond to the removal of demand pressures and, more broadly, the severe overall accel eration of inflation over the past decade have focused increasing attention on the ability of aggregate demand policies to lower, by themselves, the long-run average level of unemployment. In light of our recent experience, the notion that unemployment can be permanently reduced below some specified minimum simply by expanding aggregate demand appears to be seriously misleading. To be sure, if unemploy ment is abnormally high, the judicious application of stimulative policies can help to reduce unemployment to more moderate levels with little adverse effect on inflation. Beyond a certain point, however, one that seems to be dictated largely by the structural characteristics of labor markets, attempts to reduce unemployment in this fashion require larger and larger doses of stimulus. Thus, a progressively more rapid inflation is required to achieve given effects on unem ployment. It is quite clear that, if this process is pushed far enough, the results could be disastrous. Much of the longer run unemployment problem in this country appears to be of a structural nature; that is, the problem is rooted in the relative frequency and high incidence of joblessness among particular groups in the work force. Women, young people, and members of minority groups bear a disproportion ately large share of total unemployment, in periods of excessive aggregate de mand as well as in periods of slack overall activity. Workers in these groups have special difficulties in finding jobs and tend to change jobs frequently. To a considerable extent, this experience reflects the unavailability to many of these workers of jobs offering high wages, good working conditions, job security, and opportunities for advancement. Given this situation, the only way permanently to reduce the levels of unem ployment compatible with price stability appears to lie in measures that deal directly with the structural problem. There are several proposals along these lines that merit serious consideration. Expanded government employment ser vices, by publicizing job opportunities, might greatly facilitate the matching of available jobs and workers and thereby reduce the average duration of un employment. Improved and expanded manpower training programs that would give marginal workers the skills needed in our complex economy could play a 6 m ajor role. M odification of the m inim um wage laws that apply to young w orkers could prove beneficial by m aking it m ore econom ical for firms to hire and train such w orkers. These proposals offer at least some prom ise th at the relatively high long-run average unem ploym ent rate that has characterized the U nited States econom y can be reduced. A t the same time, tem porary program s— such as public service em ploym ent and expanded unem ploym ent com pensation— are helpful in cushioning the special hardships associated with abnorm ally high unem ploym ent in the private sector during periods of cyclical weakness. m o n e t a r y p o l i c y i n 1974. As a general strategy over m uch of 1974, the F ederal Reserve sought a further gradual reduction in the rate of grow th of the m onetary aggregates, since a slowing of m onetary expansion is essential in the longer ru n if a reasonable degree of price stability is to be restored. A t the same time, the m onetary authorities were fully aware th at an abrupt slowing in m onetary grow th was not desirable. Indeed, the determ ination of the authori ties to avoid a p rotracted period of little or no growth in m oney should help to prevent the developm ent of severe econom ic difficulties. O pen m arket operations were the prim ary instrum ent used in 1974 to m od erate the rate of m onetary expansion. T he discount rate, which had been raised seven tim es in 1973, was increased to a record 8 percent in A pril but was sub sequently low ered to 73A percent by the end of 1974. M em ber bank borrow ings from the discount w indow surged over the sum m er, but this represented in large p art emergency Federal R eserve B ank of New Y ork lending to the troubled F ranklin N ational Bank. In this m atter, as in the com m ercial paper m arket crisis following the Penn C entral bankruptcy of 1970, credit assistance provided by the Federal Reserve helped to prevent a m ajor failure from having serious im pact on the functioning of the financial system. T he grow th of the m oney and credit aggregates slowed further in 1974. Over the twelve m onths ended in D ecem ber, the narrow money supply rose 4.5 percent, dow n from 6.1 percent in 1973. Similarly, growth in the broad m oney supply dropped 1.5 percentage points in 1974 to 7.3 percent, while total bank credit rose by 8.1 percent, dow n 5.4 percentage points from 1973. H istori cally high interest rates did prevail for a time during the year, but this should not be interpreted as a sign of exceptionally restrictive policy. T he high rates experienced were to a considerable extent one of the effects of the virulent inflation which dom inated the econom ic environm ent, as rapidly rising prices 7 Chart 2. M ONEY, BAN K C R ED IT, AND IN TE R E S T R A TE S The money supply growth rates are computed from daily average levels in the final month o f the preceding period and the final month of the period covered. Changes in bank credit include loan sales to affiliates and are based on levels as of the close of the period covered and the close of the preceding period. Quarterly figures for 1974 are expressed at seasonally adjusted annual rates. Rates for Federal funds, three- to five-year United States Government securities, and seasoned Aaa-rated corporate bonds are m onthly averages of daily figures. 8 increased the interest rates lenders dem anded and borrow ers were willing to pay on obligations fixed in dollar term s. In any case, the Federal Reserve did not seek any p articular level of interest rates as an ultim ate objective of policy; its general strategy of a gradual slowing in the aggregates allowed for a substantial degree of interest rate flexibility, perm itting the System to respond to em erg ing econom ic and financial developm ents. As 1974 began, the F ederal O pen M arket Com m ittee (F O M C ) was con cerned about the curtailm ent of oil supplies and the resultant weakening of econom ic activity. A t the F O M C m eeting of D ecem ber 1973, the C om m ittee m ajority concluded th at the econom ic situation and outlook called for some easing in b ank reserve and m oney m arket conditions, provided that the m one tary aggregates did not appear to be growing excessively. Similarly, at the first m eeting in 1974, a m ajority of the F O M C voted for a further m odest easing in reserve and m oney m ark et conditions. In addition, the m ajority favored rais ing slightly the longer ru n target for grow th in the narrow m oney stock. This B ank’s P resident dissented from the decisions taken at the D ecem ber and January m eetings. A t the D ecem ber m eeting, he favored a continuation of the prevailing degree of m onetary restraint unless signs of w eakening in the econom y becam e m ore apparen t and pervasive. H e pointed out th at the pro b lems of inflation were increasing rath er than abating and th at the m onetary aggregates had grown m ore rapidly in 1973 than the Com m ittee had considered desirable. H e believed that, while there was not m uch that m onetary policy could do to relieve the econom ic problem s arising from the oil shortage, a prem ature easing of policy could exacerbate the problem s of inflation. A t the January m eeting, this B an k ’s P resident expressed opposition to raising the M 1 grow th target and to adopting a range of tolerance for the Federal funds rate which implied fu rth er reductions in th a t rate. H e expressed the view th at strong inflationary pressures rem ained the m ajor econom ic problem . In accordance w ith the C om m ittee’s decisions, some easing in bank reserve and m oney m arket conditions was achieved early in 1974. Short-term interest rates fell appreciably following the January m eeting, in large p art because m oney m arket conditions h ad eased b u t also, apparently, because m arket participants expected them to ease further. A s it turned out, there was alm ost universal m iscalculation of the likely course of interest rates early in the year. W hile the narrow m oney stock contracted in January, substantial grow th resum ed in F eb ruary and continued through the first half of the year (see C hart 2 ) . A t the sam e tim e, bank credit expanded rapidly, led by a very large runup in business 9 loans, and banks bid aggressively for large-denom ination certificates of deposit (C D s) to m eet the loan dem and. Beginning with the M arch F O M C meeting, the C om m ittee resisted these developm ents by seeking bank reserve and money m arket conditions th at would m oderate grow th in the m onetary aggregates over the m onths ahead. This policy stance was essentially m aintained through midSeptem ber. As the System w orked to achieve its aggregates targets, the m odest dow ndrift of the Federal funds rate was reversed, and the rate clim bed steadily through July. In late A pril, the F ederal Reserve discount rate was raised Vi per centage point to a record 8 percent. T he com m ercial bank prim e lending rate, which had declined early in the year, began to advance in M arch and reached 12 percent at m ost m ajor banks in July. T he high and rapidly rising interest rate levels experienced during the spring and sum m er were accom panied from tim e to tim e by the buildup of considerable tension in the financial m arkets. This tension was m anifested in a variety of ways. Y ield spreads betw een high- and low er quality securities widened, in part because of the uneasiness th at developed as a result of the problem s experienced by the F ranklin N ational B ank and of reports that some other institutions might also be encountering difficulties. In some cases, the creditw orthiness of entire industries— such as the real estate investm ent trusts and the electric utilities— was called into question. The renew ed em phasis on high quality in the com m ercial p ap er and capital m arkets m eant th at m any borrow ers had to draw upon long-standing lines of credit at com m ercial banks, thereby transm itting the liquidity strains to the banking system. A t times, pressure in the m oney m arket becam e intense, m aking short-run control of the Federal funds rate difficult and resulting in exceptionally high levels of the funds rate in early July. T he F ederal Reserve was deeply concerned about the em erging liquidity diffi culties and the general fragility of the financial m arkets over this period and, indeed, rem ained so over the balance of the year. G row th of the narrow m oney stock slowed significantly in the third quarter of the year, and signs of m oderation in business borrow ing from com m ercial banks appeared during th at period as well. In early Septem ber, the B oard of G overnors of the F ederal R eserve System announced the rem oval of the 3 p er cent m arginal reserve requirem ent on large-denom ination CDs and related in strum ents m aturing in four m onths or more. Shortly thereafter at the Septem ber F O M C m eeting, a m ajority of the C om m ittee decided to increase m odestly the longer run targets for grow th in the m onetary aggregates and to perm it the F ederal funds rate to decline gradually from the 113A percent level prevailing. 10 T he President of this B ank dissented from these actions. In so doing, he observed that inflation and inflationary expectations continued unabated. A t the O ctober m eeting, the C om m ittee voted to seek a “resum ption of m od erate growth in the m onetary aggregates” . This action was taken because the aggregates had grown less than desired and expected during the sum m er, as they often do over periods of only a few m onths; hence, the basic policy strategy was not changed by this decision. Given the overrun in m onetary expansion that occurred over the first half of the year, the shortfall during the sum m er was not considered too serious at the time, b u t it was im portant to take steps to ensure th at it w ould not persist, especially in view of the m arked w eakening in the econom ic outlook. In any event, in keeping with this objective, pressure on bank reserve positions was m oderated som ewhat. The Federal funds rate, which h ad eased a bit in Septem ber, continued to decline over the balance of the year. O ther short-term interest rates generally followed suit, and long-term rates m oved lower. T hese developm ents were accom panied by some relaxation of tensions in the financial m arkets. O n D ecem ber 6, the B oard of G overnors approved a Va percentage point reduction in the discount rate at this and an other R eserve Bank. T he new 13A percent discount rate becam e effective D e cem ber 9, and the rem aining ten R eserve Banks joined in this action shortly thereafter. T he B oard announced th at this action was taken in view of lower m oney m arket rates and the slackening in the dem and for credit. A lthough there were frequent changes in short-run operating tactics during 1974, the F ederal Reserve for the m ost p art adhered to the basic posture of m oderate grow th of the aggregates. This policy was in m any respects a continu ation of that pursued in 1973. T he rate of expansion of the aggregates did decline in each of these two years, and aggregate dem and pressures in the econom y eased substantially. T he foundation for a gradual slowing in inflation thus appeared to have been established. in te rn a tio n a l e c o n o m y u n d e r s tra in . Like the U nited States, m ost countries suffered serious econom ic strains during 1974. A lm ost every where, the rates of inflation accelerated even as the expansion of real economic activity slowed from the abnorm ally rapid pace of the previous two years. T he task of bringing national econom ies back to a path of sustainable growth w ithout inflation, difficult enough in the best of circum stances, was greatly com plicated by the quadrupling of the price of crude oil. T he oil price increase also resulted th e 11 in an unprecedentedly large and rapid deterioration in the trade balances of oil consum ing countries in favor of the oil exporters. A lthough the oil consum ers’ deficits w ere successfully financed in 1974, the increase in the burden of external debt for some countries was cause for deep concern. By the year-end, a con sensus was developing th at p ro m p t and concerted official efforts w ere required to assure not only th at necessary financing would be available b u t th at the huge international disequilibrium w ould be corrected. Oil developm ents transform ed the international econom y during 1974. D e spite the price increase and the em bargo, the volum e of oil exports by the m em bers of the O rganization of P etroleum E xporting C ountries (O P E C ) rem ained alm ost as high in 1974 as in the year before. Thus, O P E C oil receipts totaled nearly $100 billion in 1974, roughly four tim es that of a year earlier. A substan tial prop o rtio n of these paym ents went to sparsely populated countries whose capacity to absorb im ports was low. Even am ong the oil producers th at had rela tively large populations and potentially great needs for industrial products, re ceipts from oil exports could n o t be quickly translated into increased im port dem and because of the lengthy tim e required to form ulate developm ent and other spending program s, to decide on appropriate suppliers, and to negotiate contracts. A lthough O P E C im ports were rising rapidly in the latter p a rt of 1974, m ore th an half of the total paym ents for oil was returned to the consum ing countries, n ot as dem and for goods and services, but as investm ents in various types of financial assets. Difficulties caused by the oil price increase were superim posed on problem s that the m ajor industrial countries had inherited from previous years. In 1972 and 1973, real G N P h ad grow n at unsustainably rapid rates. Pressures on p ro ductive capacity, especially for scarce raw m aterials, com bined with crop fail ures, strikes, and com m odity speculation had by m id -1973 pushed international com m odity prices far above the levels of a year earlier. In this inflationary en vironm ent, the authorities— som etim es prom ptly, elsewhere with a lag— brought fiscal and m onetary policy into play to curb excess dem and. By the latter p art of 1973 and early 1974, the grow th of m onetary aggregates in the m ain indus trial countries had been reduced substantially from the very high rates th a t had previously prevailed. W ith official policy directed tow ard the elim ination of excess dem and, real grow th am ong the industrial countries was already expected to slow significantly in 1974. T he oil em bargo and price increase w orsened the outlook at the begin ning of the year. E ven so, real G N P continued to grow in 1974 in m ost in 12 dustrial countries abroad, though at a m uch slower rate than during the year before. T rue, in Japan, w here inflation was especially severe, real G N P actually dropped significantly for the first tim e since W orld W ar II (see C hart 3 ) . In B ritain, prolonged strikes and the adoption of a three-day week during the w inter depressed real output, b u t some recovery developed in the spring and summer. A m ong the continental E u ro p ean countries, the perform ance was m ore favor able, with the expansion of real G N P in 1974 ranging from a low of under 1 percent in G erm any to a high of alm ost 5 percent in France. In m ost indus trial countries, however, grow th slackened further as the year progressed and, with unem ploym ent at its highest levels in m any years, some governm ents m oved cautiously to stim ulate spending. Official caution in attem pting to counter the slowing of grow th stem m ed from the continuing virulence of inflation. T rue, prices of industrial m aterials did drop from the astronom ical heights attained in the spring of 1974 b u t rem ained well above their levels at the beginning of the boom in 1972. M oreover, agri cultural prices, boosted by sustained strong dem and and disappointing harvests of some key crops, continued to rise. As high wholesale prices w orked through to the retail level, the increase in consum er prices accelerated alm ost everywhere. In the final m onths of 1974, the rise in consum er prices above a year earlier ranged from 11 percent in the N etherlands to well over 20 percent in Italy and Japan. The m ajor exception was G erm any, w here the advance in consum er prices from a year earlier slowed perceptibly in the final quarter to 6 percent. W hile the strains of shifting to a low er grow th p ath were fam iliar, those that arose from the quadrupling of oil prices were unprecedented. T he oil price increase was the m ore serious b oth because of the widely differing dependency of consum ing countries on im ported oil and because increased oil paym ents were superim posed in several industrial countries on trade balances th at were already heavily in deficit. A lm ost three quarters of the estim ated $75 billion increase in oil im ports from O P E C m em bers in 1974 was concentrated in the countries affiliated with the O rganization for Econom ic C ooperation and Devel opm ent (O E C D ). A m ong these, the hardest hit were B ritain, F rance, Italy, and Jap an , whose aggregate current-account deficits seem ed likely, according to O E C D estim ates, to total about $30 billion in 1974, a deterioration of $23 bil lion from a year earlier. A lthough G erm any’s oil im ports also jum ped sharply, the continued expansion of its exports was even larger. Consequently, G er m any’s current-account surplus in 1974 rose substantially above the record set during the previous year (see C h art 4 ) . 13 C h a rt 3 . C H A N G E S IN C O N S U M E R P R I C E S A N D P R O D U C T I O N FO R S E L E C T E D C O U N TR IES Percent 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 Estim ates of real GNP for 1974 are preliminary. 14 T he U nited States balance of paym ents on current-account w ithstood the shock of the oil price increase fairly well. To be sure, U nited States petroleum im ports increased to alm ost $25 billion in 1974, $17 billion m ore than the year before, but this increase, the largest of any country, was mostly offset by a sustained rise in A m erican exports. Benefiting from earlier devaluations of the dollar, exports of m anufactured goods were especially strong. Rising foreign dem and also pushed U nited States agricultural exports substantially above the peaks attained in 1973. D espite some reduction of incom e from A m erican oil properties transferred to O P E C m em bers, net investm ent income jum ped, ac cording to prelim inary estim ates, to about $9 billion in 1974, some 70 percent above a year earlier. W ith these gains cushioning the effect of higher oil prices, the U nited States current-account balance, including G overnm ent grants, was expected to show a deficit of nearly $5 billion in 1974, com pared with the $0.5 billion surplus of 1973. The financing of large current-account deficits was clearly a m ajor preoccu p ation of the authorities in m ost oil-im porting countries in 1974. Such financing was provided through a m ultitude of channels. O PE C m em bers provided loans not only to m any less developed countries b ut also to industrial countries such as Britain, France, and Japan. Placem ents w ere m ade with various international and regional lending institutions. Substantial sums were also placed in nego tiable securities, m ainly short-term governm ent securities in Britain, Germ any, and the U nited States, as well as in direct investments. How ever, the m ost im portant channel in 1974 was the Euro-currency m arket. B anks operating in this m arket thus played a key role in interm ediating between the surplus and deficit countries. E uro-currency placem ents by O PE C m em bers were estim ated at about one third of these countries’ aggregate investable sur pluses. F o r their p art, oil-im porting countries relied heavily for financing on the E uro-m arkets, borrow ing a reported total of nearly $27 billion in 1974, 39 per cent m ore than in the previous year. C om m ercial banks in the U nited States also participated vigorously in the interm ediation process, increasing their liabili ties to foreigners by about $16 billion in January-N ovem ber and their claims on foreigners by $17 billion. W ith financing available to cover the oil-im porting countries’ current-account deficits, exchange rates fluctuated in response to shifts in official policy and especially to changes in interest rate differentials am ong the m ajor financial centers. Shifts in speculative pressures also played a significant role. Reflecting such influences, the effective value of the dollar ranged during the year from 15 approxim ate parity with the central rates established under the Smithsonian agreem ent of D ecem ber 1971 to an 8 percent depreciation. Fluctuations against the individual currencies in which traders actually operate were of course far wider. T he swing in the dollar-D eutsche m ark rate, for exam ple, was no less than 18 percent against the central rate. T he dollar’s greatest strength was dis played in the early weeks of January, w hen the m arket judged th at the U nited States could cope w ith the effects of O P E C policy better than other countries th at were m ore dependent on im ported oil. The dollar’s largest depreciation was reached in m id-M ay after a 3 Vi -m onth decline which began with the dropping of U nited States capital controls and which also witnessed the relaxa tion of foreign restraints on capital inflows. A fter wire services reported on M ay 14 th at the G erm an, Swiss, and U nited States central banks were prepared to counter excessive speculation against the dollar and, with short-term inter est rates in the U nited States rising relative to those in m ajor centers abroad, the dollar’s effective exchange rate recovered m ost of the losses suffered earlier in the year. A fter early Septem ber, however, m oney rates in the U nited States began to decline relative to those abroad and some foreign countries took fur ther steps to dism antle restrictions on capital inflows. Consequently, the dollar cam e under new pressure. A t the year-end, its effective depreciation from the Sm ithsonian central rates am ounted to 5.6 percent, com pared with 3.4 percent at the beginning of the year. T he strains th at arose from wide exchange rate swings, from the slowing of econom ic growth, and from the im balance betw een the oil-exporting and oil-im porting countries produced severe pressures on the international banking com m unity. W hile m any banks profited from exchange operations, some sus tained losses that, in a few cases, led to insolvency. The closure of a G erm an b ank (B ankhaus I.D . H e rsta tt) tow ard the end of June had especially serious repercussions. Foreign exchange transactions were drastically curtailed im m e diately following the closure, with trading lim ited to nam es regarded in the m arket as having the highest quality. Subsequently, activity recovered, but small- and m edium -size banks continued to experience trading difficulties both in the exchanges and in the E uro-dollar m arket as credit lines were tightened for all b u t the best nam es. M oreover, banks in num erous countries had to cope with rising liquidity needs as business plans, form ulated in an inflationary environm ent, were underm ined by the slowing of real econom ic activity. The banks also encountered difficulties in interm ediating balances betw een the surplus and deficit countries. As the year progressed, the ratio of b anks’ short16 Ch art 4. C U R R E N T -A C C O U N T B A L A N C E S IN 1 9 7 3 A N D 1 9 7 4 Billions of d ollars 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -1 0 -2 0 -3 0 -4 0 -5 0 Current-acco unt balances, estim ated by the International M onetary Fund, include goods, services, and private transfers but exclude governm ent grants. The estim ates are adjusted to take account of various statistical asymmetries in oil trade and, for 1974, are preliminary. * Nonoil prim ary-producing countries outside the com munist bloc. term liabilities to capital rose tow ard the limits set by prudent m anagem ent. A t the sam e time, bankers becam e increasingly concerned to avoid undue loan exposure to countries whose external debt was already large and whose balanceof-paym ents prospects were poor. O ne consequence of these various develop m ents was th at lending by E uro-banks slackened significantly in the second half of 1974 from the very rap id rate of the first half. M oreover, U nited States 17 commercial bank loans to foreigners, which had increased rapidly in FebruaryAugust following the removal of capital controls, actually declined in September and then rose only modestly during the remainder of the year. The need to avoid incipient banking difficulties was of major concern to the monetary authorities in all the industrial countries. In most of them, central bank surveillance over the exchange operations of commercial banks was tight ened. In several countries, leading commercial banks established, with the encouragement and support of the monetary authorities, facilities designed to assist smaller institutions by relieving their liquidity difficulties. In Britain, the Bank of England acted to clarify and make explicit the responsibility that parent banks were customarily assumed to have toward consortium banks as well as toward subsidiaries. As the year progressed, increased efforts were made to maintain orderly conditions in the exchange markets through concerted inter vention by the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank, and several other central banks. These various official efforts, important though they were in assuring the smooth functioning of international banking, could deal with only a part of the world’s economic difficulties in 1974. With all but a few oil-importing coun tries suffering large current-account deficits and with unemployment rising, the pressure to adopt “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies was increasing. The agree ment in May by the OECD countries to refrain, during the ensuing year, from imposing new restraints on trade and other current-account transactions was therefore welcome, as were the steps taken by six countries in September toward agreement to avoid the competitive extension of export credit. Even with the par value system suspended, International Monetary Fund (IMF) members were, of course, bound to refrain from exchange depreciation in order to gain competitive advantage. Beyond this, governments required a framework of reasonably stable exchange rates within which to cope with the formidable eco nomic problems that lay ahead. The other side of the coin was, of course, the need for agreed guidelines by which appropriate changes in exchange rates could be made. Increased recognition was given during 1974 to the need, not only for greater order in the exchange markets, but also for additional official facilities to finance payments imbalances. While the substantial existing facilities available among central banks and from the IMF still served important functions, they had been established to facilitate the financing of disequilibria that could be corrected in the short and medium term, i.e., more quickly than many feared the oil im 18 balance could be reduced to manageable size. To deal with this new situation, a facility was established in June within the IMF to which oil-exporting coun tries, and the Netherlands, committed themselves to lend $3.7 billion equivalent and from which various oil-importing countries borrowed $2.1 billion during 1974. In view of the huge imbalance between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, and of the reduced extent to which private markets could be expected to finance that imbalance, it became clear that, as initially constituted, the IMF oil facility went only a little way toward meeting the growing need for official financing. During the autumn, accordingly, various new proposals were made. The United Kingdom proposed that the existing oil facility within the IMF be modified and enlarged, while the United States advocated the establishment of a $25 billion facility to assure the availability of financing to OECD countries that were unable to meet their needs elsewhere on reasonable terms. Although a strengthening of international financial cooperation was clearly required, the more basic need was to reduce the payments imbalance between the oil-exporting countries and the rest of the world. A further substantial ex pansion of exports to the oil-producing countries was, of course, essential. There was also scope for the placement of OPEC balances in long-term portfolio and direct investment in the industrial countries. Beyond this, major efforts were required in energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sup plies. Already progress was being made in this direction. Stimulated by high oil prices as well as by concern over the whole energy problem, intensive explora tion during 1974 significantly increased proven reserves of oil outside the OPEC. Large coal reserves— particularly in the United States—remain to be exploited. The feasibility of generating energy by various advanced technologies deserves further intensive study. If energy use is reduced and additional sup plies become available, both the volume and price of oil imports could be cut and the imbalances between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries could be reduced to manageable size. At the year-end, the decline in real activity in the domestic economy had accelerated while the rate of inflation re mained intolerably high. It was clear that in 1975 monetary policy would have to avoid adding to the weakness in the economy and to the strains in the credit system. At the same time, pressures for excessively stimulative policies had to be resisted. Such policies might strengthen the economy in the short run, but p ro b le m s f o r m o n e ta ry p o lic y . 19 in the longer run they would rekindle inflationary pressures and increase the ulti mate costs of curbing inflation. Given the deeply entrenched inflation, it seemed fairly clear that monetary policy would have to continue to pursue an underlying objective of maintain ing, over the longer run, growth paths of the monetary aggregates consistent on average with reasonable price stability. Experience has made it quite clear that bringing inflation under control is an indispensable precondition of economic health. High rates of inflation have arbitrarily redistributed income and wealth. There is much evidence from many countries to suggest that, beyond a certain point, this process poses major risks of serious social and political, as well as eco nomic, stress. Already, inflation has imposed significant strains on United States society and on a financial system geared to relatively stable prices. There have been bouts of disintermediation from financial institutions, swollen credit de mands, and a general deterioration in the soundness of balance-sheet conditions. Moreover, variable and unpredictable rates of inflation may prompt borrowers and lenders to avoid long-term commitments, thereby impairing the functioning of the -capital markets. This development, in turn, can tend to discourage in vestment in long-lived capital. In the context of current accounting conventions and tax laws, inflation has also discouraged real investment by causing profits to be overstated in real terms. Taxation of fictitious gains on capital assets and on inventory turnover has inflicted real capital losses on corporations. Curbing inflation is a very important goal, but to achieve it will take time and will inevitably involve painful adjustments. There is need, therefore, for a range of auxiliary policies to facilitate progress toward the restoration of price stability and to relieve some of the strains in particularly sensitive sectors. As indicated earlier, labor market policies are needed, on the one hand, to lower the rate of unemployment compatible in the long run with price stability and, on the other hand, to reduce the hardship associated in the short run with the downturn in aggregate demand. There may be merit, too, in some new form of public institution designed primarily to provide capital to corporations suffering unusual financial stress or corporations engaged in programs of great importance to the solution of major national problems. Finally, policies to encourage price competition throughout the economy should be adopted, so that prices respond more quickly to policies designed to moderate aggregate demand. While these various proposals are in no way substitutes for monetary and fiscal actions, they can contribute significantly to the attainment of urgent national objectives. 20 T H E B A N K ’S O P E R A TIO N S IN 1974 Resolving the Problem of Franklin National Bank For a period of five months beginning in early May, the problems of the Franklin National Bank occupied much of the attention of the senior officers and a number of the operating functions of this Bank. Under a program of credit assistance adopted early in May and continued through the ensuing months, the amounts of this Bank’s advances to Franklin National rose from $125 million on May 9 to $1,723 million on October 8, the day that Franklin National was declared insolvent by the Comptroller of the Currency and this Bank’s advance to Franklin was assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Franklin National Bank, a subsidiary of Franklin New York Corporation, had experienced rapid growth during the 1950’s and 1960’s on Long Island, its principal area of operations. In the mid-1960’s, Franklin National expanded into New York City by branching and merging. By year-end 1973, it had become the twentieth largest bank in the United States in terms of total assets, with total assets of about $5 billion, more than 100 domestic branches, and overseas branches located in London and in Nassau, Bahamas. During this period of rapid growth, Franklin experienced some difficulties in maintaining sufficient capital to support its expansion and suffered a relatively high level of loan losses as a result of its liberal lending policies. In late 1973 and early 1974, Franklin National’s troubles were exacerbated by general conditions in the financial markets and increasingly critical manage ment problems, and adverse rumors and speculation about the bank were circulating in the financial community. In part, Franklin National’s mount ing difficulties stemmed from its heavy reliance on short-term borrowings and large negotiable certificates of deposit to support aggressive lending and investment policies. Early in 1974 the bank’s bond portfolio suffered substantial depreciation, as a decline in interest rates anticipated by the bank failed to materialize. At the same time, it became generally known in the financial com munity that Franklin National was dealing heavily in foreign exchange trans actions and that its earnings, particularly if foreign exchange profits were 21 excluded from reported figures, were declining substantially. By early May 1974, Franklin National’s name faced increasing and serious seller resistance in the Federal funds market as well as in the foreign exchange markets. Franklin National’s problems mounted rapidly during the week of May 6, 1974. The bank found it increasingly difficult to raise short-term funds and faced the prospect of a severe liquidity crisis. At meetings that week with senior officers of this Bank, Franklin National’s officers disclosed the size of Franklin National’s operating losses and the existence of irregularities in its foreign exchange transactions, which had just come to light and which would have serious adverse effects on the bank’s earnings. It was learned that Franklin National’s officers planned to recommend to their directors that they omit the next quarterly dividend. On Friday, May 10, Franklin National issued a statement regarding the omission of the dividend. As a result, the price of the parent holding company’s stock suffered a sharp decline during the remainder of trading on that day. By the close of business on Friday, Franklin National faced the prospect that its own dividend announcement, combined with news of foreign exchange losses and intensified market rumors about the bank’s condition, would result during the next week in a virtual drying-up of money market sources of funds and a very real possibility of a run on the bank. d i s c o u n t w i n d o w a s s i s t a n c e . During the week of May 6, this Bank had agreed to provide Franklin National with credit assistance to help it meet what was hoped would be a temporary liquidity crisis. By late Friday, May 10, and over the following weekend, it became apparent to the senior officers of this Bank that Franklin National was in serious danger of failure in the very near future if substantial Federal Reserve credit were not made available. The weekend of May 11-12 was a time of intense activity at this Bank. Senior officers met with Franklin National’s management and attorneys and repre sentatives of the Comptroller of the Currency and of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They also consulted by telephone with members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., the Comptroller of the Currency, and representatives of a number of New York City commercial banks. By the opening of business on Monday, Franklin National had issued a statement announcing foreign exchange losses, the SEC had suspended trading in the stock of Franklin National’s parent holding com 22 pany, and Vice Chairman Mitchell of the Board of Governors had announced that the Federal Reserve System would “advance funds . . . as needed” to Franklin National through the discount window of this Bank “within the limits of the collateral that can be supplied” and that the Comptroller had furnished assurances that Franklin National was solvent. In this Bank’s view, the failure of Franklin National at that time would have had serious adverse consequences for Franklin National’s depositors and credi tors and the economy of Long Island. More importantly, given the general financial and economic situation at that time, such a failure would have jeop ardized the stability of the United States banking system, with further serious repercussions for domestic and international financial markets in general. The decision to make substantial credit assistance available to Franklin National had two main purposes: first, to prevent the severe deterioration of confidence at home and abroad that would have resulted from an abrupt failure of the bank and, second, to provide time to permit Franklin National itself, or if nec essary the bank regulatory authorities, to achieve a more permanent solution of the bank’s difficulties. Beginning on Friday evening, May 10, this Bank undertook preparations for the anticipated increase in Franklin National’s borrowings at the discount window. The following Saturday and Sunday, about thirty-five members of this Bank’s staff— credit analysts, lawyers, and others— visited three of Franklin National’s offices to identify and review assets available as collateral. Some $500 million of Franklin National’s customer notes were physically moved to this Bank’s vaults as collateral that weekend. In subsequent weeks, as Franklin National’s need for Federal Reserve credit grew, the accumulation of collateral became increasingly complex. Although it was initially estimated that Franklin National had approximately $2 billion in assets that could be used as collateral for advances by this Bank, many of these assets were represented by documents dispersed throughout Franklin National’s branch system, including a substantial amount at its London branch. Since the transfer of some of these documents to this Bank’s vaults was not prac tical, this Bank rented space at some of Franklin National’s branches so as to maintain legal possession and control of as much collateral as possible. To accept as collateral assets of Franklin National’s London branch, arrangements were made by members of this Bank’s Legal Department, with the assistance of British solicitors, for assets of the London branch to be held in London on this Bank’s behalf. 23 s e a r c h f o r a r e s o l u t i o n . In the following months, senior officers of this Bank met daily to review Franklin National’s situation and to consider means of assisting the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and Franklin National itself to find intermediate and longer term solutions to the problem. Constant communication was maintained with the Board of Governors, the other bank supervisory agencies, Franklin National, and other commercial banks as they became involved in various aspects of the problem. A special task force of personnel drawn from the Loans and Credits, Bank Supervision, Foreign, and Legal functions of this Bank was formed to collect, review, and analyze data and to develop possible solutions and contingency plans. During June and July, attrition of Franklin National’s deposits continued at a slow but steady pace and the size of its daily advances from this Bank continued to rise. By the beginning of July, it had become apparent that any long-term reso lution of the problem would require the participation of the FDIC in the form of financial assistance. The Chairman of the FDIC began a series of meetings with individual commercial banks to discuss the possibilities of some form of FDIC-assisted merger or acquisition of Franklin National’s assets. As these meetings progressed, it began to appear likely that the eventual solution would involve the appointment of the FDIC as a receiver for Franklin National, with a sale and assumption of all or a part of Franklin National’s assets and liabili ties by another bank. Such a transaction would involve the receipt of bids from commercial banks interested in entering into such a purchase and assumption transaction. It became clear as discussions continued that, in order to ensure that the FDIC would receive an acceptable number of bids, it would be neces sary to exclude from the liabilities to be assumed the advance of this Bank to Franklin National. During August and September, the FDIC began a series of discussions with interested banks to develop a purchase and assumption arrangement, including provisions for FDIC financial assistance, on which such banks would be will ing to submit bids. At the same time, this Bank and the FDIC developed an agreement under which, in the event of Franklin National’s insolvency and a successful bidding arrangement, the FDIC would assume Franklin National’s indebtedness to this Bank and this Bank would release to the FDIC its security interest in Franklin’s assets. th e f r a n k l i n ’s 24 fo r e ig n e x c h a n g e c o n tra c ts . In the process of develop ing a purchase and assumption arrangement, the FDIC learned that, as a group, banks interested in bidding under the arrangement were not willing to assume responsibility for the performance of Franklin National’s foreign ex change contracts. At the same time, it appeared likely that, if Franklin National were to become insolvent, legal constraints might prevent the FDIC as re ceiver of Franklin National from honoring many of such foreign exchange con tracts. There was thus a real danger that all or a substantial portion of Frank lin National’s foreign exchange contracts would be dishonored in the event of its insolvency, with serious consequences for market confidence. Earlier in the year, the failure of the Herstatt Bank in Germany to honor its current foreign exchange commitments on its closing had resulted in a shock to the foreign exchange markets and a weakening of the German mark. Similar dam aging effects on the dollar could be expected if Franklin National’s contracts were dishonored as a result of its insolvency. Accordingly, it was concluded that the acquisition by this Bank of Franklin National’s foreign exchange position would be in the best interests of the United States and the world economy as well as the foreign exchange markets. In Sep tember, after intensive effort by the Foreign Function of this Bank in evaluat ing Franklin National’s foreign exchange position, this Bank and Franklin Na tional entered into an agreement under which this Bank acquired Franklin National’s foreign exchange position. Under the agreement, Franklin National paid to this Bank an amount estimated to cover the potential losses involved in the acquisition, including the book loss on Franklin National’s total position and the risk that certain counterparties might fail to perform contracts as re quired. A substantial portion of this amount was returned to Franklin National on October 1, after all contracts had been confirmed to this Bank by the other parties to the contracts. The acquisition of Franklin National’s foreign exchange position by this Bank was greeted with relief by market participants in this country and overseas, and Franklin National’s insolvency did not adversely affect the dollar. As September drew to a close, it became clear to the bank regulatory authorities that the appointment of the FDIC as receiver for Frank lin National and the acquisition of its offices by a sound banking institution under an FDIC-assisted purchase and assumption arrangement offered the only practical hope of avoiding substantial losses to Franklin National’s depositors th e f in a l s ta g e s . 25 and current general creditors, and the disruption of the Long Island economy that would result from Franklin National’s failure and liquidation. By the first week in October the purchase and assumption arrangement de veloped by the FDIC was complete. A plan developed by Franklin National’s management for the continued existence of the bank as an independent, Long Island-based institution was evaluated by the Federal bank supervisory agen cies, each of which concluded that the plan had no reasonable prospects of suc cess. Under the circumstances, this Bank determined that it would no longer be in the public interest for this Bank to continue its program of credit assistance to Franklin National, and the Comptroller of the Currency was so informed by letter dated October 7. At 3 p.m. on October 8, the Comptroller of the Currency declared Franklin National insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver of the bank. The FDIC, having received bids from four New York City banks under its purchase and assumption arrangement, identified European-American Bank & Trust Company, a New York state-chartered nonmember insured bank owned by a consortium of six large European banks, as the highest bidder. By 4 p.m., a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had approved the purchase and assumption agreement between the FDIC as receiver for Franklin National and European-American, as well as a similar agreement be tween the FDIC and Bradford Trust Company relating to Franklin National’s trust business. By that time also, this Bank and the FDIC had entered into an agreement providing for the assumption by the FDIC of this Bank’s advance to Franklin National, with payment in full to be made within three years. Upon the Comptroller’s declaration of Franklin National’s insolvency, the Accounting Department and many of the other operating departments of this Bank, following contingency plans developed in the preceding weeks, began the complex process of checking and posting to the Bank’s books all the trans actions between Franklin National and this Bank that had taken place that busi ness day. This process was necessary to determine both the exact amount of Franklin National’s reserve account as of 3 p.m. that day, which was one of the assets being purchased by European-American, and the exact amount of Franklin National’s indebtedness to this Bank, which was being assumed by the FDIC. The calculations were not complete until about 5 a.m. on October 9, long after those involved in the more formal transactions of the day had left the Bank. On the morning of October 9, all of Franklin National’s domestic offices opened under the name of European-American Bank & Trust Company. 26 Operational Highlights STRENGTHENING PLANNING AND BUDGET CONTROLS. In a Continuing effort to establish more effective management controls necessary in an inflation ary environment to deal with the cost of this Bank’s sharply increasing volume of operations and expanded responsibilities, work continued throughout last year on the installation of a new management system. The system more fully integrates the planning, budgeting, and cost control processes of the Bank. As part of this approach, each of the functional areas of the Bank headed by a vice president is recognized as a distinct responsibility center for the purposes of planning, budgeting, and controlling the quality and efficiency of operations. The new system— which involves such techniques as the setting of goals and measurable objectives, budgeting based on productivity targets as well as volume projections, and cost-benefit analysis of all new project proposals— is being installed by specially selected task forces made up of Bank personnel. It is ex pected that all areas of the Bank will be converted to this new system by mid1975. To support the new planning and budget control systems, the Bank is devel oping an enlarged and improved management information system to provide current and historical data on key volume, unit-cost, and productivity measures that will serve as the basis for formulating annual budgets and plans and for tracking progress and results against those budgets and plans. Another important feature of the Bank’s overall efforts to deal with rising operational demands is a program to improve both the productivity and the quality of the Bank’s operations and services. The program, which will become increasingly active in coming months, will utilize the analytical framework pro vided by the newly installed planning and budget control system. Even though these steps to strengthen the management systems of the Bank are not yet fully in place, their beneficial effects are already becoming appar ent. Thus, despite a large increase in the work load of the Bank in 1974 and the rapid rate of inflation in the cost of labor and other resources, the Bank’s total expenses net of reimbursements and recoveries rose less than 9 percent last year, largely because the Bank was able to operate with significantly fewer employees than had been expected. 27 b o o k - e n t r y p r o g r e s s . The joint Federal Reserve-United States Treasury book-entry program was expanded significantly during 1974, focusing mainly on Government and agency securities held by member banks, either as fiduciaries or as custodians for correspondent banks and other customers. By substituting computer bookkeeping entries for definitive securities, the book-entry pro cedure permits the issuance, servicing, custody, and redemption of eligible securities electronically at Federal Reserve Banks without the use of paper certificates. The program also simplifies and expedites transfers through this Bank’s Government Securities Clearing Arrangement, and virtually eliminates the risk of loss or theft involved in the safekeeping and the delivery of physical securities. Second District banks converted into book-entry form increasing amounts of securities held for the account of customers. Two New York City banks, one of which should complete its book-entry conversion early in 1975, added about $3.6 billion of securities to the program, retiring some 77,000 pieces of paper. At the year-end, $201.4 billion, or 71.6 percent of marketable United States public debt, was in book-entry form, compared with $176.6 billion or 65.4 per cent a year earlier. In July, the initial securities of the Federal Financing Bank were marketed and were immediately eligible for book entry. At the year-end, almost $0.9 billion of the $1.5 billion of these securities outstanding was in book-entry form. Substantial progress was made toward qualifying all Federal agency securi ties for book-entry procedures in May, when Federal National Mortgage Asso ciation securities became eligible. Other agencies whose securities have been converted include the Banks for Cooperatives, Farmers Home Administration, Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal Land Banks, and the United States Postal Service. Nationally, about $22.3 billion of agency securities was in book entry at the year-end, or about 32 percent of the estimated $70 billion eligible for conversion. TR EA SU R Y O F F E R IN G S A TTR A C TE D TH O U S A N D S O F IN D IV ID U A L S . Record interest rates on Treasury securities during 1974 attracted thousands of individual investors to the Bank and generated over 100,000 telephone in quiries regarding purchasing procedures. About 60,000 Treasury bill tenders from individuals were processed, more than double the number submitted in 28 1973. Similarly, subscriptions from individuals for Treasury notes and bonds totaled over 14,000, nearly triple 1973’s total of 5,000. f o r e i g n a c c o u n t i n v e s t m e n t a c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e d . Shifts in interna tional flows of funds, resulting partly from increased payments to oil-exporting nations, led to a further increase in investment activity conducted by the New York Reserve Bank for foreign official institutions. The open market Trading Desk bought and sold $85 billion of Government and agency issues outright for foreign accounts in 1974, a gain of about 15 percent over 1973. In addition, this Bank executed a sizable volume of short-term repurchase agreements for foreign accounts beginning in August. m o n it o r in g f o r e ig n e x c h a n g e m a rk e ts . Two new units were es tablished— one in the International Research Department and the other in the Foreign Department— in response to 1973 legislation amending the Par Value Modification Act and requiring United States banks and nonbank concerns and their foreign entities to report to the Treasury their foreign exchange positions. The Federal Reserve collects these reports on behalf of the Treasury. These reports, along with other information, will assist in the evaluation of foreign ex change and Euro-currency market developments. n e w b u i l d i n g a n d e n e r g y c o n s e r v a t i o n . Energy conservation was a prime focus during 1974, in both the Liberty Street facility and in the new building plans, which have progressed through the design development stage. The President’s call for energy conservation in late 1973 was met with a pro gram that reduced the main building’s fuel consumption 20 percent and electricity purchases 10 percent. In addition, plans for the new building were revised to incorporate exterior wall construction and air conditioning systems that will reduce energy consumption substantially. These changes will increase original construction costs, but the savings provided by energy conservation are expected to recover the additional investment in about a decade. All signif icant negotiations with New York City regarding the new building site were completed during the year, and Carl A. Morse, Inc., was engaged as construc 29 tion consultant. The firm will work closely with the Bank’s architects— Kevin Roche John Dinkeloo and Associates— during construction. f o o d - c o u p o n - p r o c e s s i n g f a c i l i t y i n p u e r t o r i c o . Plans for a new food-coupon-processing facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico, were developed in conjunction with the implementation by the Department of Agriculture of the Food Stamp Program in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and in the Virgin Islands in the second half of 1974. This Bank, as fiscal agent of the United States, acting on behalf of the Department of Agriculture, has requested the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico to act as agent of this Bank for the performance of certain services in connection with the Food Stamp Program. These include the receipt and processing of remittances from the sale of food coupons, the receipt of redeemed coupons from commercial banks in Puerto Rico and in the Virgin Islands and the processing of payments to such banks, and the verification and destruction of such coupons in Puerto Rico. Until the San Juan facility is completed in early 1975, the Government De velopment Bank for Puerto Rico will airfreight redeemed food coupons to the Buffalo Branch for verification and destruction. 30 Financial Statements S T A T E M E N T O F EA R N IN G S A N D EX P E N S ES FOR T H E C A LEN D A R Y E A R S 1974 A N D 1973 (In thousands of dollars) 1974 Total current earnings Net expenses 1973 .................................................................... 1,686,670 1,347,807 .................................................................................. 118,227 108,848 1,568,443 1,238,959 1,252 503 Current net earnings Additions to current net e arn in g s.................................................... Deductions from current net earnings: Loss on sales of United States Government securities and Federal agency obligations (net) .......................................... 10,575 9,281 Loss on foreign exchange transactions (net) .................................. 8,661 12,376 All other ........................................................................................... 1,599 60 Total deductions 20,835 21,717 19,583 21,214 1,548,860 1,217,745 ................................................................................. 13,628 12,550 Payments to United States Treasury (interest on Federal Reserve notes) ................................................................ 1,515,543 1,196,836 19,689 8,359 Surplus— beginning of year ............................................................. 214,963 206,604 Transferred from net earnings for year .......................................... 19,689 8,359 234,652 214,963 Net deductions ................................................................................ Net earnings available for distribution Dividends paid Transferred to surplus .................................................................. SURPLUS A C CO U N T Surplus— end of year 31 S T A T E M E N T O F C O N D IT IO N In thousands of dollars Assets d e c . 3 1, 1974 D E C . 3 1 , 1973 Gold certificate account ...................................................................... Special Drawing Rights certificate account ........................................ Federal Reserve notes of other Banks ............................................... 3,413,162 93,000 232,852 3,231,124 93,000 197,838 Other cash ........................................................................................... 14,251 19,012 Total 3,753,265 3,540,974 Advances ............................................................................................... Acceptances: Bought outright .................................................................................. Held under repurchase agreements ..................................................... United States Government securities: Bought outright* ................................................................................ Held under repurchase agreements..................................................... Federal agency obligations: Bought outright .................................................................................. Held under repurchase agreements..................................................... 90,750 485,105 578,949 420,271 68,014 0 17,783,692 443,350 19,313,746 58,000 1,044,519 510,500 476,947 42,000 20,872,031 20,443,812 Total loans and securities Other assets: Cash items in process of collection..................................................... Bank premises .................................................................................... 1,456,276 11,737 2,028,849* 2,575,287 10,067 207,995 Total other assets 3,496,862 2,793,349 Total Assets 28 ,1 2 2,15 8 26,778,135 ★ Includes securities loaned— fully secured by United States Government securities pledged with the Bank ................................................................ 154,600 162,950 All otherf ............................................................................................. t Includes assets denominated in foreign currencies. $ Includes indebtedness of $1,723,472,055 assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in connection with' the closing of the Franklin Na tional Bank. 32 S T A T E M E N T O F C O N D ITIO N In thousands of dollars Liabilities d e c . 3 1 , 197 4 d e c . 3 1 , 1 973 Federal Reserve notes .......................................................................... 17,979,729 16,081,665 Deposits: Member bank reserve accounts ......................................................... United States Treasury— general account .......................................... Foreign* ............................................................................................... Other ................................................................................................... 6,139,480 1,080,151 201,978 812,646 7,780,246 394,348 58,635 673,840 8,234,255 8,907,069 1,157,281 281,589 1,118,004 241,471 1,438,870 1,359,475 Total Liabilities 27,652,854 26,348,209 Capital paid in ..................................................................................... Surplus ................................................................................................. 234,652 234,652 214,963 214,963 Total Capital Accounts 469,304 4 29,926 Total Liabilities and Capital Accounts 28,12 2,158 26,77 8,135 248,632 151,662 Total deposits Other liabilities: Deferred availability cash items ......................................................... All other ............................................................................................... Total other liabilities Capital Accounts Contingent liability on acceptances purchased for foreign correspondents! ................................................................................ ★ After deducting participations of other Federal Reserve Banks amounting to 216,050 192,140 f 732,186 429,433 After deducting participations of other Federal Reserve Banks amounting to 33 Changes in Directors and Senior Officers i n d i r e c t o r s . In December 1974, member banks in Group 2 elected Stuart McCarty a Class A director and reelected William S. Sneath a Class B director, each for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1975. Mr. McCarty is President of First-City National Bank of Binghamton, Binghamton, N.Y. Mr. Sneath, President of Union Carbide Corporation, New York, N.Y., has been a Class B director since August 15, 1973. Also in December, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System reappointed Roswell L. Gilpatric a Class C director for the three-year term beginning January 1, 1975, and redesignated him as Chairman of the board of directors and Federal Reserve Agent for the year 1975. Mr. Gilpatric, a partner in the New York law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, has been serving as a Class C director since January 1969; he served as Deputy Chairman in 1971 and as Chairman and Federal Reserve Agent in 1972, 1973, and 1974. At the same time, the Board of Governors reappointed Frank R. Milliken as Deputy Chairman for the year 1975. Mr. Milliken, President of Kennecott Copper Cor poration, New York, N.Y., has been serving as a Class C director, and as Deputy Chairman, since January 1973. He served as a Class B director in 1972. c h a n g e s Buffalo Branch. In December, the Board of Governors appointed Paul A. Miller a director of the Buffalo Branch for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1975. Dr. Miller is President of the Rochester Institute of Technology, Roch ester, N.Y. On the Branch board, he succeeded Norman F. Beach, Vice Presi dent, Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, N.Y., who had been a director of the Branch since January 1968, serving as Chairman of the Branch board in 1971 and 1974. Also in December, the board of directors of this Bank appointed Stephen T. Christian a director of the Buffalo Branch for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1975. Mr. Christian is President of Marine Midland BankChautauqua, National Association, Jamestown, N.Y. On the Branch board, he succeeded Theodore M. McClure, President of The Citizens National Bank and Trust Company, Wellsville, N.Y., who had been a director of the Branch since January 1972. At the same time, the board of directors of this Bank designated Donald R. Nesbitt as Chairman of the Branch board for the year 1975. Mr. Nesbitt, who is the owner and operator of Silver Creek Farms, Albion, N.Y., has been a director of the Branch since January 1973. 34 The following changes in the official staff, at the level of Vice President and above, have been made since January 1974: The assignment of David E. Bodner, Vice President, to the Foreign Function was terminated, effective February 1, 1974, in view of his resignation, effec tive April 1, 1974, to accept a position as Senior Vice President at Chemical Bank, New York, N.Y. Mr. Bodner joined the Bank’s staff in 1959 and became an officer in 1965. Between February 1 and April 1, 1974, he was assigned responsibility for special studies for the President and First Vice President. Mr. Bodner also resigned as Deputy Special Manager of the System Open Market Account, effective February 1, 1974. H. David Willey, Vice President, was assigned to the Foreign Function, effective February 22, 1974, with supervisory responsibility for the operations of the function under Charles A. Coombs, Senior Vice President. Mr. Willey’s assignment as the officer in charge of the Loans and Credits Function was continued. Scott E. Pardee, formerly Assistant Vice President, was appointed Vice President, effective February 22, 1974, and assigned to the Foreign Function. Thomas O. Waage, Senior Vice President, was assigned senior management responsibility for the Government Bond and Safekeeping of Securities Function on September 6, 1974. Mr. Waage also maintained senior management respon sibility for the Cash and Collection, Check Processing, and Public Information functions. Frederick C. Schadrack, Jr., formerly Adviser, was appointed Vice President on September 6, 1974 and assigned to the Bank Supervision and Relations Function, with supervisory responsibility for the operations of the Banking Studies, Domestic Banking Applications, and Foreign Banking Applications Departments under Fred W. Piderit, Jr., Vice President. In addition, Mr. Schadrack was assigned supervisory responsibility for the operations of the Bank Analysis Department under Mr. Piderit on January 2, 1975. Chester B. Feldberg was appointed Vice President on January 2, 1975 and assigned to the Loans and Credits Function, with supervisory responsibility for the operations of the function under Mr. Willey. Mr. Feldberg had returned to the Bank as Adviser, effective September 1, 1974, following his resignation as Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He had formerly served as Secretary of this Bank from 1969 to 1973. George Garvy, Vice President and Senior Adviser, retired on early retire c h a n g e s in s e n io r o f f ic e r s . 35 ment effective February 1, 1975, after completing thirty-two years of service with the Bank. Mr. Garvy joined the Bank’s staff in 1943 and became an officer in 1953. m e m b e r o f f e d e r a l a d v i s o r y c o u n c i l — 1975. The board of directors of this Bank selected Ellmore C. Patterson, Chairman of the Board of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, New York, N.Y., to serve during 1975 as the member of the Federal Advisory Council representing the Second Federal Re serve District. On the Council, Mr. Patterson succeeded Gabriel Hauge, Chair man of the Board of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, New York, N.Y., who was this District’s member in 1973 and 1974. 36 Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York D IR E C T O R S Term expires Dec. 31 Class Group D avid R o c k e f e l l e r .................................................................................................................................... . . . Chairman of the Board, The Chase M anhattan Bank (National Association), New York, N.Y. 1976 A 1 St u a r t M c C a r t y ......................................................................................................................................... President, First-City National Bank of Binghamton, Binghamton, N.Y. .. 1977 A 2 N e w m a n E . W a it , J r ................................................................................................................................... . . . President, The Adirondack Trust Company, Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 1975 A 3 M a u r ic e F . G r a n v i l l e ............................................................................................................................., . . . Chairman of the Board, Texaco Inc., New York, N.Y. 1976 B 1 W il l ia m S. S n e a t h .................................................................................................................................. President, Union Carbide Corporation, New York, N.Y. 1977 B 2 B 3 J ack B. J a c k s o n ........................................................................................................................................... President, J. C. Penney Company, Inc., New York, N.Y. 1977 C F r a n k R . M i l l i k e n , D eputy C h a irm a n .............................................................................. . . . President, Kennecott Copper Corporation, New York, N.Y. 1975 C A l a n P i f e r .................................................................................................................................................... . . . . President, Carnegie Corporation of New York, New York, N.Y. 1976 C R o s w e l l L. G i l p a t r i c , Chairman , and Federal Reserve A g e n t.................................. Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Attorneys, New York, N.Y. ,, D IR E C T O R S — B U F F A L O B R A N C H D o n a ld R. N e s b it t , Chairman .................................................................................................... Owner and operator, Silver Creek Farms, Albion, N.Y. 1975 C l a u d e F. S h u c h t e r ......................................................................................................................................... Chairman of the Board, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, Buffalo, N.Y. 1975 J. W a l l a c e E l y .................................................................................................................................................... Chairman of the Board, Security New York State Corporation, Rochester, N. Y. 1976 D a n ie l G . R a n s o m ............................................................................................................................................... President, The Wm. Hengerer Co., Buffalo, N.Y. 1976 R u p e r t W a r r e n .................................................................................................................................................... Former President, Trico Products Corporation, Buffalo, N.Y. 1976 P a u l A. M il l e r ................................................................................................................................................. President, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y. 1977 S t e p h e n T. C h r is t ia n ..................................................................................................................................... President, Marine Midland Bank-Chautauqua, National Association, Jamestown, N.Y. 1977 M E M B E R O F F E D E R A L A D V IS O R Y C O U N C I L ------1 9 7 5 E l l m o r e C . P a t t e r s o n .................................................................................................................................. Chairman of the Board, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, New York, N.Y. 1975 37 Officers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York A l f r e d H a y e s , President R i c h a r d A . D e b s , First Vice President C h a r l e s A . C o o m b s , Senior Vice President Foreign T h o m a s M . T i m l e n , J r . , Senior Vice President Accounting Control; Building and Planning; Data Services; Loans and Credits; Personnel; Service A l a n R . H o l m e s , Senior Vice President Open M arket Operations and Treasury Issues T h o m a s O . W a a g e , Senior Vice President Cash and Collection; Check Processing; Government Bond and Safekeeping of Securities; Public Information A C C O U N T IN G C O N TR O L A . M a r s h a l l P u c k e t t , Vice President W a l t e r S. R u s h m o r e , Assistant Vice President J o h n J. S t r i c k , Manager, Accounting Department S t e p h e n G . T h ie k e , Manager, Management Information Department, and Assistant Secretary A U D IT G e o r g e C. S m i t h , General Auditor J o h n E. F l a n a g a n , Assistant General Auditor W . W illia m B a u m g a rd t, Manager, Auditing Department B A N K S U P E R V IS IO N A N D R E L A T IO N S F r e d W . P i d e r i t , J r ., Vice President F r e d e r i c k C. S c h a d r a c k , J r . , Vice President L eo n K orobow , Manager, Banking Studies Department B e n e d i c t R a f a n e l l o , Assistant Vice President E d w a rd F. K ip f s tu h l, Manager, Foreign Banking Applications Department D o n a l d E . S c h m id , Manager, Bank Analysis Department B e n ja m in S ta c k h o u s e , Manager, Domestic Banking Applications Department R o b e r t C. T h o m a n , Assistant Vice President Ja m e s H . B o o th , Manager, Bank Regulations Department F r e d e r i c k L . F r e y , Chief Examiner R o b e r t A . J a c o b s e n , Assistant Chief Examiner F r a n k lin T. L ove, Manager, Bank Relations Department B U IL D IN G A N D P L A N N IN G R o b e r t E . L lo y d , J r . , Vice President L ouis J. B r e n d e l , Assistant Vice President R o n a l d E. L o n g , Manager, Planning Department 38 A . T h o m a s C o m b a d e r , Buildings Administrator M a tth e w C. D r e x le r , Manager, Building Operating Department C A S H A N D C O L L E C T IO N W i l l i a m H . B r a u n , J r . , Vice President Jo h n C h o w an sk y , Manager, Cash Custody Department, and Manager, Collection Department L e o n R . H o lm e s , Manager, Cash Department C H E C K P R O C E S S IN G K a r l L . E g e , Vice President J a m e s O . A s t o n , Assistant Vice President L e o n a r d I. B e n n e t t s , Manager, Check Adjustment and Return Items Department F r e d A . D e n e s e v ic h , Manager, Check Processing Department J o h n C. H o u h o u lis , Manager, Payment Systems Department J o s e p h M . O ’C o n n e l l , Manager, Check Processing Department W h i t n e y R . I r w i n , Assistant Vice President Je ro m e P. P e rlo n g o , Manager, North Jersey Regional Check Processing Center R a l p h A. C a n n III, Operations Analysis Officer D A T A S E R V IC E S P a u l B. H e n d e r s o n , J r . , Vice President H o w a r d F . C r u m b , Adviser E d w in R . P o w e r s , Assistant Vice President D e n is L. C o n w a y , Manager, User Operations Department P e t e r J. F u l l e n , Manager, Telecommunications Department O le g H o ffm a n , Manager, Computer Operations Department A n g u s J. K e n n e d y , Data Services Officer R a l p h C . S c h i n d l e r , Data Services Officer Officers (Continued) L O A N S A N D C R E D IT S W i l l i a m M. W a l s h , Assistant Vice President J e r r y B e rk o w itz , Manager, Systems Specifications Department H . D a v id W i l l e y , Vice President C h e s t e r B. F e l d b e r g , Vice President G e ra ld H ayden, H en ry Manager, Systems Strategy Department H erb ert M. Q u in n , Manager, Custom Systems Department S. F u j a r s k i , J r . , Assistant Vice President E u g e n e P. E m ond, Manager, Credit and Discount Department H e r b e r t H . R u ess, Manager, Credit and Discount Department E Q U A L O P P O R T U N IT Y C e c il A. S h e p h e r d , Equal Opportunity Officer F O R E IG N C h a r l e s A. C o o m b s , Senior Vice President H. D a v id W i l l e y , Vice President S c o t t E . P a r d e e , Vice President R o b e r t J. C r o w l e y , Assistant Vice President M a r g a r e t L. G r e e n e , Assistant Vice President F r e d H. K l o p s t o c k , Adviser B e r n a r d J. J a c k s o n , Manager, Foreign Department R oger M. K u b a r y c h , Foreign Exchange Officer G eo rg e W. R yan, Manager, Foreign Department G O V E R N M E N T B O N D A N D S A F E K E E P IN G O F S E C U R IT IE S THOMAS C . S l o a n e , Vice President M a t t h e w J. H o e y , Assistant Vice President P a u l J. C ie u rz o , Manager, Government Bond and Safekeeping Department R ic h a rd V o l l k o m m e r , Manager, Government Bond and Safekeeping Department W i l l i a m H. W e t e n d o r f , Assistant Vice President A rm o n d J. B r a i g e r , Manager, Savings Bond Department O P E N M A R K E T O P E R A T IO N S A N D T R E A S U R Y IS S U E S A l a n R . H o l m e s , Senior Vice President P e t e r D. S t e r n l i g h t , Vice President P a u l M e e k , Monetary Adviser R o b e r t L. C o o p e r , Assistant Vice President J o s e p h R . C o y l e , Chief Securities Trading Officer I r w i n D. S a n d b e r g , Assistant Vice President E d w a r d J. O z o g , Manager, Acceptance Department, and Manager, Securities Department L. T s c h i n k e l , S h e ila Manager, Securities Department O P E R A T IO N S IM P R O V E M E N T K a re n J. B o p p , Operations Analysis Officer P ERSONNEL J o h n T. K e a n e , Vice President P h i l i p V a n O r m a n , Assistant Vice President B r u c e G. A l e x a n d e r , Manager, Personnel Department T e rre n c e J. C h e c k i, Manager, Personnel Department F ra n c is H. R o h r b a c h , Manager, Personnel Department P U B L IC IN F O R M A T IO N L e o n a r d L a p id u s , Vice President R i c h a r d H . H o e n ig , Assistant Vice President Jo rg e A. B ra th w a ite , Manager, Security Custody Department S t e p h e n P. W e is , Operations Analysis Officer LEG AL E d w a r d G . G u y , Vice President and General Counsel J a m e s H. O l t m a n , Assistant General Counsel R o b e r t Y o u n g , J r . , Assistant General Counsel D o n a l d L. B i t t k e r , Assistant Counsel R i c h a r d D . C o o p e r s m i t h , Assistant Counsel, and Assistant Secretary E r n e s t T. P a t r i k i s , Assistant Counsel L e o p o l d S. R a s s n ic k , Assistant Counsel M a r y J. R o d g e r s , Assistant Counsel R ESEA R CH A N D S T A T IS T IC S R i c h a r d G. D a v is , Vice President P e t e r F o u s e k , Economic Adviser M i c h a e l J. H a m b u r g e r , Adviser A n t o n S. N i s s e n , Assistant Vice President C h a rle s M. L u cas, Manager, Statistics Department R u d o l f T h u n b e r g , Assistant Vice President M a r c e l l e V. A r a k , Senior Economist E d n a E. E h r l i c h , Manager, International Research Department G ary H. S t e r n , Manager, Domestic Research Department 39 Officers (Continued) S E C R E T A R Y ’S O F F IC E S E R V IC E E. G e r a l d C o r r i g a n , Adviser, and Secretary F r e d e r i c k L . S m e d le y , Vice President W i l l i a m M. S c h u l t z , Assistant Vice President Louis J. C o n r o y , R i c h a r d D . C o o p e r s m i t h , Assistant Secretary, and Assistant Counsel S u z a n n e C u t l e r , Assistant Secretary T h e o d o r e N. O p p e n h e im e r , Assistant Secretary S t e p h e n G . T h ie k e , Assistant Secretary, and Manager, Management Information Department Manager, Emergency Planning Department F r a n k W . L u n d b la d , J r . , Manager, Protection Department R u th A n n T y le r, Manager, Service Department OFFICERS—BUFFALO BRANCH A n g u s A . M a c I n n e s , J r . , Vice President RONALD B. G r a y , Assistant Vice President and Cashier A C C O U N T I N G ; C H E C K ; C O M P U T E R S E R V IC E S PETER D . L u ce, Assistant Cashier B U IL D IN G O P E R A T IN G ; C O L L E C T I O N , L O A N S , A N D F IS C A L A G E N C Y ; S E R V IC E G a r y S. W e i n t r a u b , Assistant Cashier B A N K R E L A T IO N S A N D P U B L IC I N F O R M A T IO N ; C A S H ; E M E R G E N C Y P L A N N IN G ; P R O T E C T IO N H a r r y A . C u r t h , J r . , Assistant Cashier 40 M A N A G E M E N T R EP O R TS ; P ER S O N N E L RONALD B. G r a y , Assistant Vice President and Cashier