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Administrative mghlights
of the WRA Program

United States Department of the Interior
J. A. KRUG, Secretary
v. -_,, War Relocation Authority
D. S. MYER,

Director

FOi' ule by the Saperiateadent of ~ u
U.S. GoYsament Printing Olice. Watbiqton 25. D. C.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER-

!.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION.

.... . . ... . .. . . . . . . .

'rnE PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN
THE PROGRAM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF 'IHE ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT FUNCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS THAT AFFECTED

ADMINISTRATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
V.
VI.

vn.
VIII.
IX.

• • •

• • • • • • • •

THE WRA MANUAL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

THE BUDGET MA KING PROCESS

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

FISCAL MANAGEMENT

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN •••••

•••• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • •

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• • • •

XII.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

XIII.

O'llfER ruNCTIOWS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT • • • •

OPERATIONS • • • • • • • • • • •

XI.

XIV.
IV.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS • • • • • • • • • • • •
MESS

OPERATIONS

•• • • • • • • • • • •

MASS TRANSFORTATION

• •

CENTER CWSURE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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CHAPS I
IN 'IRODUC '?ION
'lbe major goal in the administration of the War Relocation
Authority was twofold: (1) the adequate nanagement of tempora17 living
facilities for persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from the Pacific
Coast, and (2) the complete relocation of these people into normal
private life. 'lbe Authority was responsible for the nanagement of the
relocation centers · as tempora17 homes, and for returning these people to
civilian life with a maximum of speed and individual consideration, yet
with a minimum of social disruption and economic dislocation. 'lbe
administration of the Authority set its policies and goals, and attained
them within time limits calculated as necessary. Probabl.¥ no governmental agency bas ever before worked as hard as did WRA to get itself
liquidated and out of business.
'lhere were five basic characteristics of the administrative
-.nagement of the War Relocation Authority which were in some respects
uniques

Note:

From the very beginning of the program, the Agency
attempted to recruit people w1 th Govemll8nt experience
for its princ:lpaJ. positions.

Admi.n:latrati.Te anagement was always recognized as an
equal to all of the operational pv1ses of the program,
and was adequate]¥ represented at the top of the organization. Nearly all planning activities were a joint
function, with administrative J181\&gement partic:lpating
to an equal extent w1 th the operating di visions.

Procedures and organization were kept nexible and
current. This meant coopera ti.on among the several
divisions of the Agency at all levels, and a persistent
effort to keep all units advised as to what was going
on in the various divisions and at various locations.

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Administrative nanagement was constantly growing. It
did mre than the nornal "housekeeping" functions. In

'lhis report prepared by llalcolm E. Pitts, Assistant Director,
in charge of adJlini.strative nanagement.

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some respects, it waa as much an operational division
as an;y other in the Authority.
5.

'lhere •s a constant necessity on the port of all in
the Authority to act decisively, and not quibble at
every tum of events. 'lhere •s the ever present
problem of thousands of persons who 11118t be fed,
housed, and taken care or in all respects 24 hours
•
day, and 365 days a year.

Some or the functions and operations which came under the ,...,,,.,rflil:JW
of administrativl3 management in the War Relocation Authority were unusual or possibl¥ unique. Other administrative management functions
and operations of the Authority have not been appreciably different
from those same functions in other Government agencies or large organizations. No attempt, will be mde here to chronicle in detail the minute
operations of the administration of the War Relocation Authority, or to
describe extensively its routine procedures. Rather, the intent here
will be to g1 ve o~ such background as appears essential to understanding the administratl ve -.nagement problems of the Authority, and to
present examples of some unusual, unique, or extremely difficult adaninistrative nanagement iroblems encountered.

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CHAP'IER II

'DIE PLACE OF AIIIINIS'.IRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN 'DIE PROGRAM

'!he story of the administration of the 'War Relocation Authority
is a story ot pressures; and the policies, functions, techniques and
organization developed to handle these pressures. '!here were pressures
from without-piblic, governmental and private; there were pressures
from the evacuees from within; there were pressures from top levels
within the Authority and also from levels in the field. Frequently,
pressures came from several different directions at once on the same
issue, but each demanding different solutions. '!here were pressures
to get the War Relocation Authority established and receive 112,000
people in the newly created, isolated cities; pressures of a warhysterical public to maintain these people in self-naintained establishments in complete isolation and continued detention; pressures from
labor-short, wa~producing agricultural and industrial groups for cheap
labo~or just labor at any price-from this apparent labor pool;
pressures on center management to establish and set in JIX)tion an adequat.e
administration of center facilities and functions along lines enunciated
nationally to care for the needs of the 112,000 center residents, from
the cradle to the grave, for living, eating, education, recreation,
Mdical and hospital care, tire protection, internal security, fuel,
essential maintenuce and sanitation; pressures to set in 1110tion an
order]¥ program of relocation-places to go from the centers with jobs
and housing; pressures regarding loyalty determinations and mass segregation; pressures of resistance b;y the evacuees to relocation, and
objections to curtailing center facilities; pressures against the closing of relocation centers and relocation offices; and even pressures to
stop the War Relocation Authority from liquidating its functions and
going out of business.
As a counterpart to these sundry pressures, there were developed
policies and procedures to handle each major problem, and all of the
details attendan"'t to tbat problem. 1laJ\Y of these had to grow, initial'.cy, from emergency situations; and then, as rapidly as possible,
they were made uniform on a national basis. Policies were worked out
on agency organization, seasonal leave for evacuees, and center management operations. The latter included a gamut of operations equivalent
to all of the functions and duties which a large city and all of its
residents perform together as a group, or as indivi.duals, with the
additional requirements of governmental regulations and "red tape"
added on. Policies were developed in line w1 th wartime requirements
along security lines, and the segregation of those who believed the
United States was not the place in which they desired to live.

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For a time it •as contemplated within WRA that the entire group
evacuated from the Pacific Coast ffli.e,ht have to remain in WRA centers
for the major pLrt of· the war period. On this basis, a policy for an
extensi,re center work program was developed. Later, the policy was
changed to one of individual relocation to any point within the United
States where the individual was eligible to travel. 'Ibis relocation
policy necessitated the adjustment of the center work program to a
narked degree, leaving only a program of those functions which materially contributed to center living and naintenance operations.
With the revocation of the Exclusion Orders, when the termination
of the war was in prospect, policies were developed regarding the final
relocation of all persons still I'esident in the centers, and the orderly
liquidation and closing of the relocation centers, relocation offices,
and the entire work of the Authority.
Because of foresight and extensive previous experience, WRA
offid.als very early developed a method of advance planning which was
a "ality, conditioned against possible future changes in the program,
or possible emergencies which would require quick changes or modifications in existing policies and procedures, or the expeditious- enactment
of new ones.
For all policies on whatever subject, carefully worked out
procedures had to be developed. In nearly sJ.l of these procedures,
administrative management principles and practices were involved, since
every operation in some way or another involved compliance with legal
and governmental requirements in regard to d. 'Vil-service appointive
personnel, evacuee employment, finances, Government property, meas
operations, or transportation. Administrative management officials of
the WR.A at all times shared an equal position With others in the
Authority in advance planning, and in the enactment of policies and
procedures, or al\Y changes nade thereto.
A var, important aspect of the adm1nistration of the ifar Relocation Authority was the excellent esprit de corps which was developed in
the staff at all levels. 'Iha very implications raised by the fact of
J)h7sical evacuation of the persona of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific
Coast immediately created an impression among the public at large that
the evacuees were a dangerous, ~trustwortey people, un-American in
thought and desire. 'lhe appointive staff of the Au thori ey very soon
learned that such was not the case; in fact, quite the opposite was
true. 'lheae were peace.:loving people, two-thirds of them American by'
birthright, and they thought in American ways and wanted to live
American lives. And although these implications, which were a part of
the evacuation, continued to be prevalent in nany areas for a considerable period of time, they were eventual.ly dispelled in almost every area
through public relations work.
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One normu.ly thinks of publl.c relations as being a f\mction of a
specified division or section of an organization, but in the War Relocation Authority the entire staff was engaged in public relations in its
true sense. Every staff member who traveled from his official station
on business or pleasure, who paid a bill or tried to buy something, or
who attended a business, recreational or church gathering was inmediate~ besieged with questions which represented the rumors, most~
false, that were rife. 'lhe procurement officers, the teachers, the
accountants and the stewards were engaged in public relations work of
a construct1. ve sort-even though tnis was not a part of their prescribed
functions-Just as truly as were the project directors, the reports
officers and the relocation officers whose duties explicitly included
public relations activity. Thia situation, together with the tact that
the channels of communicat1.on for gett1.ng factual infor•t1.on regarding
the program. to the field had been qui ta well established, brought about
in each employee's mind a better 'understanding of what had happened,
and what the true facts were. Each employee had an understanding of the
program, and believed in it, or he would not stay with it. The raison
d'etre in the War Relocation Authority was probabl.¥ better understood
b,- its employees than in nearl.¥ any other Government agency. 'lhe
objectives of the program tended to attract high-type personnel for
employment am this again contributed to the good woltking rel.a t1.onshipa
and excellent .spirit.

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CHAP'lER I II

GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF 'lHE ADMINIS'IRATIVE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION

'lhe War Relocation Authority was created by Executive order on
March 18, 1942. It will complete all of its work, with the exception
of a small amount of fiscal and record liquidation, by June 30, 1946.
'lbe headquarters of11ce was located in 'Washington, D. C. However, the
major portion of the Agency's work initia~ was at the opposite side
of the country, extending first from all of California, western parts
of Oregon and Washington, and the southern p1rt of Arizona, where the
evacuation took place, into the States of C&lifornia, Idaho, Utah,
Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas where the 10 relocation
centers, to which the evacuees were taken, were located.
In order to provide adequate field supervision in the establishment of the centers and provide for the staffing and · supplying functions at these centers in a very quick uanner, regional offices were
established during 1942 in San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rocle. 'Illa
regional offices, although onzy short-lived, performed very essential
and useful functions in the initial stages of the program in expediting
the establishment of centers and handling piblic relations activities.
Since the War Relocation Authority was considered a war agency, it was
originally arranged to have its service functions performed almost
entirely by the Office for &lergency Management, or as it was known
later, Central Administrative Services. Initially, then, the scope of
the administrative management activities at the Washington, regional,
and center levels in the War Relocation Authority was to be that of
control primarizy, with Central Acministrative Services keeping all of
the accounts, effecting nearzy all procurement upon requisition (except
subsistence), handling all personnel transactions and payrolls, and
discharging the other multitudinous details usualzy considered as
management "housekeeping" functions.
'Ille 10 relocation centers were located in isolated lo call ties
where all transactions had to be handled by mail through second and
third intennediaries, the regional offices and the Central Administrative Services. '!he tempo of operations necessary at the centers at
that time could not be maintained on the basis of the slowness with
which mil deliveries took place. Further, the scope and experience of
the procurement officers of CAS was not extensive enough to handle the
very large variety of supplies necessary for all the evacuees in the
situation given. 'Iha problem of breaking the bottleneck in these operations was just becoming acute, when, in the fall of 1942, as the relocation centers were really just getting established, the Authority for
a number of reasons decided to discontinue the operation of regional
offices. 'Ille Authority at that time established its own administrative

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functions at the centers for the centers themselves. CAS continued to
handle onq the functions for the central office and the few IRA offices
and warehouses that were located in metropolitan areas. 1his led to a
complete ·decentralization of nanagement functions to the centers with
the exception of controls which were 18.intained at the Washington level.
'lhe elim1n&tion of the regional office operation was certai~ a mileatone in WRA•a administrative job., and made a JDC?re clean-cut operation
for the rest of the program, although the regional offices had defini te:cy
been a help during the initial stages.
As a part of the heritage of the program of evacuation., the

war

Relocation Authority had turned over u, it, for custoey and handling,
a large amount of personal property belonging to the evacuees which had
been deposited with the Government for safekeeping by the evacuees at
the time of de},Jlrture from their homes. 'lhis property was original]¥
received by the Federal Reserve Bank which had that responsibility as a
participating agency in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the
over-all agency charged with the responsibility of conducting the
evacuation. 'lhe property was located in warehouses at various points
up and down the West Coast. After the property was turned over to the
War Relocation Authority by the Federal Reserve Bani<., it was consolidated into 10 large warehouses. 'Dle Authority continued a service
function for the evacuees upon requests in regard to natters pertaining
to their personal property during its entire existence.

Aa time went on, up to the closing of the Authority in 1946, the
relocation program developed, and offices were opened and operated as
an assistance to the evacuees with their relocation plans, problems and
travel. At the peak, 58 such .o ffices were in operation in major cities
throughout the country. 'Dlese offices are contrasted to the 10 relocation centers in respect to administrative management services, in that
a highly centralized administration proc.ess was used for these offices
as compired with the decentralization mathod of organization used at
the relocation centers.
'lhree field procurement offices were established at Chicago,
Denver and Los Angeles, under the direction of the national office,
but to act in a service capacity to the centers and later to the
relocation offices. The material and supp:cy requirements of the 10
relocation centers were at all times very large, and a major portion of
the bud~t requirem9nts of the Authority 11ere for materials and supplies
for carrying on center operations. Probably a much larger portion of
WRA money and energy went into procurement requirements and supplies
than any other governmental agency outside of the armed forces. Certain
t;ypes of naterials and supplies seemed to have a greater concentration
at some points than others. Because of the isolation of the centers,
it proved expedient and efficient to establish these field procurement
offices at these strategic locations. By law, the Authority was exempt

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from some requirements applicable to Govemment pirchasing. By agreement, nearly all of the procurement facilities ot the AnrI:, were available to the Authority, and very extensive uae was made of these facilities, i:articularly for items of subsistence. The field procurement
offices performed a very useful liaison function for the centers with
the Anq,y Quartermaster facilities, which were usuall.¥ located at the
same places as the procurement offices.
Central Administrative Services continued to handle, through its
appropriate office for a given district, the administrative manace•nt
functions for all offices of the Authori t7, with the exception of the
centers, until June 30, 1944. On July 1, 1944, the Authority took over
the complete responsibilit7 for handling all of its own anage•nt
functions for these offices. 'lhis change followed the placing ot the
War Relocation Authority in the Department of the Interior in Februar;y
1944. 'll'le operation of CAS was liquidated shortly after July l, 1944.
In the sunmer of 1944, the War Relocation Authority acquired
another operation at Fort Ontario, Oswego, N. Y., where an emergenc;r
shelter was established for nearly 1,000 refugees from war-torn Europe.
Frcm a management point ot view, this operation was handled by a
combination of the methods used for other p-MLses of the prognm. 'lhe
accounting was handled on a centralized basis at the Washington office,
whereas all other administrative -.nagement processes and responsibility
were . handled on a decentralized basis at the refugee shelter. Because
of the nature of the problems itlvolved and the fact that a different
source of funds was used, the policies and administration at the shelter
differed in many respects from those at the relocation centers.
Although nearl7 all of the relocation cente~s had a s1ml.larit7
appearance, there was no typical center, as each differed in local
.respects brought about b,y Jm1'Sical lay-out, climate, availabilit7 of
and and water for agricultural purposes, and sind.lar considerations •
.dut for a better understanding of the facilities that were being operated, a brief description is given ot one ot the relocation centers.
in

'll'le Gila River Relocation Center was located approximtely 45
miles southeast of Phoenix, Ariz., on desert land leased from the Pilla
Indian Mbe. At its peak in residence, the Gila center had over lt,000
evacuees. 'lhe center area covered approxl.mtely 17,000 acres. 1he
the aise
comnunit7 was divided into two cupe, one approxinate~
ot the other. 'lhe total of the two camps approxinated 67 blodcs of
buildings for evacuee residence with 20 buildings in each block. Each
blodc had a messhall where all persons in that block ate. In addition,
there were areas fa, adml.nistrative personnel houaing, military guard
barracks, warehous41e, administration buildings, and buildings for
various operations.

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_
In all, there were _approxinately 1,400 buildings in the center.
Water was provided by deep wells with storage tanks and standpipes. A
sewage system and disposal beds were in operation. 'Ihe system was
connected with the latrines and wash-houses located in the center of
each block of evacuee residence, and with other appropriate buildings,
but not W1 th each ba1Tack or evacuee living quarters. All buildings
were serviced with electricity. '!here were no individual water connections or cooking facilities in the rooms and apartments in the evacuee
block area. The fuel used at Gila Fiver, Colorado River and Manzanar
for heating purposes was oil, whereas at the other centers coal was
used. The buildings at all centers were one story, frame, theatre-ofoperations-type of construction, built by the Arrqy Engineers. lhe Gila
River Relocation Center used plaster board as outside sheathing, whereas
most other centers used wood sheathing covered with tarpaper. The Gila
and Colorado River centers were distinctive in that they had double
roots as a protection from the hot sun in summer time. The barracks in
the northern centers were lined on the inside. 'lhere were approximate]¥
4,100 individual stoves in the barracks at Gila for heating purposes.
'!he estimated cost of the Gila River Relocation Center for its fixed
plant was $7,300,000.
At the peak of center operations, the Gila center farmed approxinateq 7,000 acres, with almost 5,000 of this 1n intensive cultivation
of vegetable crops. Because of the ear]¥ and long growing season,
several crops a year were raised, and vegetables were shipped from Gila
to o1her relocation centers to reduce feeding costs and reduce pirchaaing requirements from an alread¥ overburdened narket. There were over
2,000 head of cattle at Gila, raised for beef purposes and center consumption. Between 2,500 and 3,000 head of hogs were constantly in the
pens, fed principllly from the garbage disposal from the messhalls.
lhis added aterially to the meat supply. A total ot 25,000 chickens
and 110 dairy cows completed the livestock program at Gila. Although
none of the other centers had quite as extensive an agricultural program
as Gila, all of the centers had as adequate a fanning and livestock
program as local circumstances and clinate would permit.
'lhe relative size ot these cities, the relocation centei-s, in
respect to other coDIIIWlities in the region, is interesting. The
Colorado River center, with a peak populatJ.on of over 18,000, was the
third largest city in the si.te of Arizona; and the Gila River Relocation Center, w1 th a peak population of over 14,000, was the fourth
largest city in that State.. lhe Heart Mountain Relocation Center, with
over ll,000 evacuees, was the third largest cito' in the State of
Wyoming. The Central Utah Relocation Center, with 8,600 evacuees, was
fifth in the State of Utah; and the Minidoka Center, with over 9,000
evacuees, was seventh in the State of Idaho.

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Although each of the centers differed in nany respects, all of
them had in common the fact that they were isolated. In many instances,
evacuees, personnel, mail, materials and supplies would arrive at railheads some distance away from the installation. In the case of the
Colorado River and the Central Utah centers, all mail, people, equipment, materials and supplies had to be transported nearly 20 miles from
railhead to the installation, or the reverse. At the Gila center, there
were about 350 vehicles of all kinds, over 225 of them trucks.
1he entire fixed plant of the Authority in the 10 relocation
centers was valued at approxinately 865,ooo,ooo. 1he major portion of
all the construction of the installations was done by the Ar'flff Engineers
under contract, from funds made available from the President's Emergency
Fund of 1942. 1he centers had movable property in the form of equipment, materials and supplies to the amount of approximate!¥ $55,000,000.
1his represented approximately 10,000 different kinds of items at each
center.

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CHAPTER IV

PROGRAM IEVELOPMENl'S THAT AFFECTED ADMINISTRATION
'!here were aenn major events which ver7 definitel7 affected the
main policies, procedures and organization of the War Relocation
Authorit7. These eftllta made thauelves en.dent in all branches ot the
organization, and colored much ot the planning and operations attar
each took place. 'lhese event■ were:
1. Within 10 daJ'B after the creation ot the War Relocation Authorit7 by Executive order on March 18, 1942,
the .Eureau or the llldget requested a detailed budget
tor the next year's operations. Although prepared in
a short time, a great amount ot thought and good planning went into it. There were set forth in that budget
the basic policies and goals of the Authorit7, and it
was sc:ae time before adequate polic7 statements and
procedure• could be developed that covered the sue
scope aa that budget. '!he material. contained in the
budget served aa the criteria upon which WRA relatio&ahipa with the Congress, the 8.ldget aireau and the
public took form, and the functions and operations at
·the centers took place. The budget tor the War Relocation Authority henceforth was an active device tor
advance planning, and a strong tool tor administration,
operation and_control.
2. '!he change in the policy or relocation in the
■Wllll8r ot 1942 decidedly changed the objective ot
relocation center operation and materiall.7 changed
the organizational structure ot the Authorit7 at all
levels. Thia change in policy eliad.nated plane and
programs already underway tor large tacto17-type
operations at the center ■• It radicallT changed the
emphasis and type or aupplJr progrua required, and
altered completely the problem of encuee employment
at the centers. It toreehadowed the dq that some
time in the future there would be a labor scarcity
in the center a, and the centers ·would be closed.

3. In the sumer ot 1943, there was instituted a
program of segregation ot those persona believed to
be disloyal to the United States, or who had expressed
a desire to repatriate to Japan. '!he Tule Lake Center 1n Cali.tornia was designated aa the center where
the aegregeea would be in residence. First there wu
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a large program or interviews and screening and then,
with the cooperation ot the Arrq tor guarding tacllitiea and equipnent, a rather extensive program ot
transportation in and out ot 'l'ule Lake to and trom
all centers took place. Approxiaately 23,000 persona
were moved in a month. 'Dua waa tht\ tirst in a aerie•
ot War Relocation Authority- experiences in the transportation ot maaaea ot people and their houaehold
ettecta; and experience which proved v9r7 helpful in
the closing dqa ot the program. The aegregation
work also taught the Authority, particularly at the
centers, how to organise and mobilise it• resource•
and personnel to get a given job done that bad .111&111'
details and ramiticationa, and do it on a time schedule.

4. In January ot 1944, Sele~tive Service tor persona
ot JapaneN anceatry waa reinstituted. Although tbia
event did not change the material aapecta or the
program, except to reduce the available aupply ot able
workers, it detin1tel7 changed the pa7Chological aepecta and removed one ot the biggest blocka trom the
path ot eventual liquidatio~ ot the centera. Tbe
relationahipa ot the eftcueea and the at.art at the
center•, and th• relationabipa ot the efteueea and th•
Authority- with the public, were very definitely
strengthened b7 tbia action.

5. In the spring ot 1944, the gradual process ot
relocation tor a year and a bal.t had reduced the populations ot the relocation cent.era whereby it appeared
desirable and etticient to close one ot the center•
and tranater the ranaining residents at that center to
others. 'Die action ot Selective Service, and the
tact that it was the younger group trom the ages ot 18
to 40 that had taken advantage ot the relocation
opportunities and lett the centers, had actually er...
ated a shortage ot capable tull-tiae workers at the
various centers. Accordingly, the Jerome Relocation
Center in Arkansas was scheduled tor closing by June
30, 1944. Although the great majority ot the residents at Jerome tranaterred to other centers, the
closing ot the Jerme center gave the Authority- a
preview ot the activity that it waa to accaaapliab a
year and a halt later at all ot the centers. Individual plans had to be made with each tamil7, and
detailed arrangements as to their transportation,
bouaehold good• and baggage, problems ot medical
care, and other intimate family problema. Tb•
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Authority also had its tirst experience in actual.17
shutting down an installation and in the disposal ot
Government property that was surplus to its needs,
through the appropriate channels. 'flle lessons learned
here were utilized to great advantage at a later date.

6. The revocation ot the Exclusion Orders on January2, 1945, by the War Department removed all cause tor
the continued maintenance and operation ot relocation
centers, atter a reasonable time had been allowed tor
each evacuee to tormulate and complete his tinal relocation plans. This reasonable time wae determined to
be not more than a year, and possibly leas. Aa a
result ot this announcement, center facilities and
operations were reduced to a bare minimum. All work
other than that absolutely necessary tor day to day
living, such as eating, care or the utilities and
protective .maintenance, was stopped. Since it was
during the ott-crop season, the farm programs were
quickly stopped {except at the Arizona centera), and
the purchasing ot tood was handled in such a way
that virtually all livestock and stocks ot tood on
band were consumed graduall7. Purchasing ot all
kinds wae virtuall7 discontinued. Advance announcements were made regarding the closing ot the schools,
and drastic reductions were made in such facilities
aa medical care and hospitalization. The relocation
program was expanded at the centers and throughout
the Nation, and the emphasis ot administration was
shifted to finding locations auitable to the evacuees
&01' place in the United Statea, going through the
mechanics ot checking the evacuees out ot the centers,
~anging tor transportation ot evacuees and their
household gooda troll. the centers and the warehouses
on the West Coast, and the adjustment of the evacuees
in noral civilian lite in their old homes or a new
C0111111WU.tf•

7. As of July 1, 1945, an announc.ement was made
definitely establishing the dates that all relocation centers would close tor evacuee residence.
Al.though met with some resistance at first, the
program went ahead, and all centers closed on or
before schedule. The decision to close the centers
by given dates posed a very important administrative problem in coordinating the activities ot the
relocation centers in sending the evacuees out of
the centers, and the activities or the relocation
7tHl5U7 0 - 4 6 - 3

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ottices on the receiving end in the areas where the
evacuees had decided the7 wanted to go. 'ftle principal problems tor the relocation workers were adequate housing, weltare situations, and medical
assistance. 'ftle closing or the centers developed
an administrative management program or transportation, propert.7 account.abillt7, closing ot account.a
and records, surplusing or propert7, and, as the
work became complete, aid to appointive persomel
tor other employment. All ot these proceeded at
an accelerated rate. All ot the lessons and techniques learned in previoua operations were utilized,
and some
situations were 8Ul'lll0unt.ed eatistactoriq. 'lbe greater portion ot the evacuees did not
leave the centers when the Exclusion Orders were
revoked. 'ftle7 waited tor the school ter.ma to be
completed, and, tor a number or other reasons, did
not reall7 st.art to move out of the centers in
large numbers until Auguat 1945. Between that time
and November 30, over 45,000 evacuees lett the
centers. Aa high as 1,200 lett one center in one
week; and nearq 4,000 lett all center• in an equal
period. Because ot the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the persona at the Fort Ontario &aergenc7
Retugee Shelt.er, and the Tule Lake Center, liquidation ot these two establishments had to be banclled
quite apart tram the relocation centers. 'ftle, did
not close until a later date--the retugee shelter on
February 6, 194h, and the 'lule Lake Center on
March 20, 1946. In all, about 60,000 persona lett
the instal.lationa operated b7 the War Relocation
Authorit7 in a period ot approximateq 9 months,
and approximatel7 50,000,000 pounds ot personal
ertects ot the residents at the installations were
shipped to them at their chosen destinations •

n•

•

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CHAP'IER V

'lHE ORGANIZA 'I'IOOAL PA T'JERN

In any organization, the structure of the organizational plan is
a very important tool in administration. Frequently, minor shifts of
function and responsibility will iron out many problems, both large and
snall, which at first do not appear to be connected with organization
pattern at all. 'lhe War Relocation .Authority, like all organizations
starting out anew, had its growing i;ains. Although initially the operations of the regional offices and cooperation of Central Administrative
Services figured prominently in the organizational pattern and the work
to be done, it must be acknowledged that the detailed breakdown and size
of the organization planned was too modest. 'lhe general structure and
pointing of the organization remained very much the same during the
Authority's lifetime, but many minor shifts of function were effected
from time to time, and provision was made for handling additional detail
before the organization was shaped into its final form. As the pattern
of organization was shaped in the final 2 years of operation, it was
found to be very workable from the top and at all levels.
There are set out below sUJ1111&ries of organization of the War
Pelocation Authority.for the Washington office and for the relocation
centers. A comparison is given for the organizations for the years
1942-43 and 1945-46. A casual review of the comparisons will show some
of the organization adjustments found necessary. It should be pointed
out, of course, that circumstances at the Washington level were considerably different in 1945-46 than they were in 1942-45. For this reason,
the number of positions occupied in the Washington office have been
given.
·
Sunmacy of Organization and Personnel Requirements
Washington Office

1942-43

Unit of Organization
Office of Director
Office of Solicitor

1945-46

No. of
Positions
5

Unit.of Organization

No. of
Positions

Office of Director
Office of Solicitor

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1942-45
Unit of Organization

1945-46

No. of
Positions Unit of Organization

No. ot
Positions

Office of Information
Publication & Reports Section
Press & Radio Section
Visual Infornation Section

Reports Division
Publications Section
Cu1Tent Intonation Section
Photograp'lic Section
Intra-Agency Liaison Section

Office of Felocation Planning

P~location Planning Division 40
Alien Liaison Section
Statistics Section
Operating Statistics Unit
Analysis Unit
Master File Unit
l!.'vacuee Records Unit

Office of Finance & Personnel 17
Budget & Finance Section.
Accounts Unit
Procedures Unit
Personnel Management Section
Office Services Section

Administrative Management
Division
156
Finance & Supply Section
Finance Branch
Accounts Unit
Cost Accounting Unit
Audit&. Scheduling
Unit
Supply Branch
Property & Claims
Unit
Procurement Unit
Priori ties Unit
Office Services Unit
Budget Branch
•
Personnel Management Section
Classification & Organization Planning Unit
Placement Unit
Personnel Operations Unit
Evacuee Employment Unit
Records Management Section
Distribution Unit
Mail & Files Unit
Procedures and Administrative Analysis Section
Mess Operations Section

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1945-46

1942-43

No. of

Unit of Organization

Positions

Positions Unit of Organization

Administrative Management
Division (contd)
Field Examinations & Investigations Section
Clearance Review Section
(Discontinued 2/1/45)
Comnunity ~nagement Division 12
Education Section
Health Section
Conmuni ty Enterprises Section
Project Government Organization Section
Women's Affairs Section

Conmunity Management Division 40
F.ducation Section
Health Section
Business Enterprises Section
Conmunity Organization &
Activities Section
Welfare Section
Internal Security Section
Conmuni ty Analysis Section

Reemployment Division

Relocation Division
Field Supervision Section
Center Liaison Section
Evacuee Property Section

Manufacturing Division

Agricultural Division

Operations Division
Engineering Section
Agriculture Section
~otor Transport & Maintenance Section
Fire Protection Section
War Refugee Division

.
*

319

In the sunmary of organization for the relocation centers which
is set forth below, no indication is given of the personnel requirements,
since they varied from center to center depending upon the population
and the peculiarities of that center, such as size of schools, size of
agricultural program, maintenance problems, and other details. 'lhe size
of the appointive staffs at the regular relocation centers varied from
135 to 275, with the Tule Lake Center employing at peak about 350. 'lhe
average total number of appointive personnel at the centers except during
the closing period was about 1,750.

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Swmary of Organization
Relocation Centers
1945-46

1942-43

Office o! Project Director

Office of Project Director
Project Reports Division

Reports Division

Project Attorney

Legal Division
Relocation Division
Evacuee Property Section

Comnunity Service Division
Cormnmity Welfare Section
Education Section
Health Section

Coumunity Management Division
(Assistant Project Director)
Welfare Section
Evacuee Quarters Unit
Education Section
Internal Security Section
Business Enterprises Section
Conmunity Anal¥si• Section
Conmunity Government Section

Public Woncs Division
Construction Section
Design Section
Highway Section
Irrigation & Conservation
Section

Operations Division
(Assistant Project Director)
Engineering Section
Irrigation, Drainage, &
Roads Unit
Construction & Maintenance
Unit
Agricultural Section
Motor Trans port & Maintenance
Section
.
Fire Protection Section •
Industry Section

War Works DivisiQn
Agriculture Production Section
Manufacturing Section
Processing & Marketing Section
Office of Assistant Project Director
Administrative Division
Budget & Finance Section
Cost Accounting Unit
Fiscal Accounting Unit
Audit Unit
Personnel Records Section
Office Services Section
Procurement Section

Administrative Managensnt Division
(Assistant Project Director)
Budget & Finance Section
Expenditure Analysis Unit
Accounts Unit
Examination Unit
Personnel Management Section
Appointive Personnel Unit
Evacuee Employment Unit

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1945-46

1942-45

Office of Assistant Project Director
Administrative Division ( contd)
Propercy Control Section
'transportation & Supply Division
Mess Management Section
Warehousing Section
Motor Pool Section
Maintenance & Operations Division
Buildings & Grounds Maintenance and Repair Section
Garage Section

Administrative Management Division ( contd)
Office Services Section
Supply Section
Procurement Unit
Property Control & Warehousing Unit
Postal Service Unit
Mess Operations Section
Statistics Section

Employment & Housing Division
Occupational Coding & Records
Section
Placement Section
Quarters Section

As an item of historical interest, there is given below a sumnar;y
of organization and personnel.requirements for the San Francisco regional
office when it was in operation in 1942. 'Ihis was the largest of the
three regional offices, but the plttern used in Denver and Little Rode
· was the same except for a smaller number of personnel. In the early
stages of the program of the Authority, the San Francisco regional office
served as the location for many of the operations nationally, and many
of the officials of the Washington office conducted operations from the
San Francisco office for some period of time.

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Sumnary or Organization San Francisco Regional Office, 1942
No. or Positions

Unit of Organization

Office of Regional Director ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Office of Regional Attorney ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Infonnation Division •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Administrative Division ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Service or Supply Division •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Reemployment Division ••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Office of Assistant Regional Director ••••••••••••••••••••••
Lands Division •••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Public Works Division •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Agricultural Production & Marketing Division ••••••••••••
Industrial llanagemant Division ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

5
7

Office or Assistant Regional Director ••••••••••••••••••••••
Education & Recreation Division •••••••••••••••••••••••••
Comnunity Organization Division •••••••••••••••••••••••••
Health Di~aion ••.•••••••.••••..•.•.••••••.•••.•••••••••
Community Enterprise Division••·•·••••••••·•••••••••••••

5
5
5
5
2

10
9

165

After the closing of the regional offices in the late fall of
1942, a skeleton organization was maintained at San Francisco, Denver
and Little Rock under a Field Assistant Director and a small staff,
which acted as field arms of the Director's staff taking action princiJally in public relations and liaison activities with public and private
agencies. 'lhe San Francisco office took over the administration of the
warehouses where the property of the evacuees was stored which were
transferred from the Federal Reserve Bank. 'lhe Denver and Little Rock
offices concentrated on supply activities and prelind.na:ry work on relocation possibilities. 'lhe Ienver and Little Rock offices ot the Field
Assistant Director were abolished in the sunmer of 1944.
· As has been pointed out, as the need grew for assistance at
points away from the centers for evacuees who were relocating, relocation offices were established at various points throughout the country.
'lhe initial relocation program had been set in motion in the fall of
1942 to provide seasonal workers for agricultural work. At first this
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was principal~ for the sugar-beet work in the Rocky Mountain area. 'lhe
sa• pattern that had been used in the rest of the country outside ot
the exclusion zone was adopted for the former exclusion zone when the
Exclusion Orders were rescinded, with the added responsibility of shipping to the evacuees, upon request, the property belonging to them that
was in the warehouses of the Authority on th4 West Coast. In total there
were 58 relocation offices and 10 large warehouses in operation at the
same time, al though many other offices that had foi,ner~ been opened for
seasonal agri.cultural work in prior years had been closed.· '!he pattern
of administration of the relocation work• •was a division of the country •
into nine areas with principal ·offices at New York, Cleveland, Chicago,
New Orleans, Denver, Salt Lake City, Seattle, San Francisco and. Los
Angeles, and vanous district offices in other cities under the administration of the area offices. 'lhese offices varied in personnel from 2
in small district offices, to 75 in a large area which had considerable
property under its jurisdiction. In total, approximately 600 persons
were employed in the relocation offices. A large part of these, however,
worked only during the last year of operation.
'lbe organizational structure at the relocation centers provided
only for a supervisory staff of appointive persomel, anployed under
civil-service war service regulations. By far the greatest number of
workers at the centers came f'rom the ranks ot the evacuees. '!he largest
number of appointive persomel on WR.A rolls was about 3,300, in December
of 1945 after the evacuees had left all centers. Nearly 800 of this
total were laborers to assist in the handling of property to be declared
surplus. Whereas at the peak of the center operations there were a
total of approximately 2,300 appointive·employees on the WRA rolls, 1,750
of them at the centers, the total nunber of employees of the War Relocation Authority at that time approxinated 33,000. Over 30,000 evacuees
were employ-ed at. the centers ii;i all namer of work. '!hey were not paid
civil-service rates; rather, the scale of wages w,as set in money return
at $12, $16, and $19 per m:>nth, plus a clothing allowance tba t averaged
$3.50 per person per month for each menber of the fami~ of the worker.
'!he wages were initially set at these rates to make some differentiation
between the skills of an employee and the type of work to be performed,
and also to be below what was then the prevailing rate of entrance
salary in the armed forcee-1.e. $21 a month. Of course, all living
facilities, food, medical care, nearly all items for recreation, education, and other needs to normal lite were· furnished to center resid:ente
by the Govemment. At a center such as Gila River, .there were approxinately 210 appointive employees, and about 4,000 evacuee employees.
Ne:arly half of the appointive employees were engaged in educational work,
tor nearly 25 percent of the population was of school age and attended
the accredi tad schools provided from the first through the twelfth
grades. Mesa operations kept.from 1,500 to 1,800 employees occupied,
and during the farming seasons, a large number _of workers were engaged
1n agricultural work. Until the final stages of the closing, nearl,y all

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of the routine clerical, stenograpnc, aeml.auperviso17 and laboring work
was done by the eftcuees. A system ot hours of empla.,ment, sick and
annual leave, and other requisites to anpl.OJ1119nt was devised for the
evacuees that ve?)" closely paralleled the rules, regulations, rights and
privileges of the appointive employees under Federal civil-service rules.
By and large, the arrangements worked very well but involved a tremendous amount of record-keeping. 'lhe initial concept of relocation center
organization involving key appointive staff menbers with good Government
experience for the directional and supervisory positions, with the bulk
of the work perf'onned by the evacuees after receiving training on the
job, proved to be efficient and workable. From this work at the centers,
there were developed a rather large nWllber of employees aJll)ng the evacuees who were later employed by the Authority in its offices outside the ·
centers in stenographic, clerical, and semiprofessional jobs under civilservice regulations. At the centers, a large pi.rt of the pl"of'essional
work, .such as medical and dental services, some legal services, and
translation and interpretation work, was carried on by the evacuees •

'lhe same general pLttern of organization and appl"oach to the
problem of employment was used at the Fort Ontario &nergency Refugee
Shelter. It was not as successful, however, due principally to the
older average age of the group, a nore difficult linguistic pl"Oblem,
and a lack of general familiarity with the American methods of doing
things.
'!here was some unorthodox structure in the final organizational
plan used by the Authority, but it functioned and was effective. Because of the particular background and experience of certain personnel,
the direction of the finance activities and the suppl.3 activities was
combined into the Finance and Supply Section at the 'Washington level,
whereas, at the centers, the finance section and the sup~ section were
separate and parallel. 'lhe activities in each case, however, were under
the direction of the Administrative lla.nagenant Division.
In the Washington office, the Relocation Planning Division had
the responsibility for all statistical work of the AuthoritJ', as well aa
nany other planning Jiulses of work peculiar to the operation of a central
office. The Relocation Planning Division bad no need for a field arm,
except for the current gathering of statistics. So the statistics section ~t the centers was placed under the direction ot the assistant project director in charge of administrative management. By careful advance
clearance at the Washington level between the Qrl.et of the Relocation
Planning Di.vision and the Assistant Director in charge of Administrative
Management on all matters of importance, this particular crossing ot
organization lines between the Washington and center levels did not
generate any difficulties. In tact, it worked quite well.

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CHAPTEI VI
THE WBA

KARUAL

'Ill• proceaa ot coaunication of &dm1niatrative procedure• and
repl.atione in a large organisation ie alwqs ditticul t. It is neceeNf'7 t.bat coaunicatione, rules and regulations be unitorm and interpreted, wherner poeaible, in exactly the same aanner. The technique
ued by' the War lelocation Authority tor this requirement etarted out
initiaJJ7 ae a •vi•• of n\abered adllliniatrative inatructione. The
tiret adllinietratiw instruction wae issued trca the San Francisco
Nlional oftic• within the tiret week art.- the creation ot the Authorit.7, and within a 6--weeka' pwiocl the Washington ottice bad taken oYer
tbe reeponaibllity of eftluating and ieeu.ing policies and procedure•
on a atioml. scale. '!be neceeeity tor grouping inatructiona according
to nbject rendered th• initial etforte of th• nuabered adainiatrat,~~
imt.ructione aviN obsolete. A unual e79t• 1f&8 dmeed .tc, replace
the D'Ullbered· 1.nat.ra.ctiona, and waa •et ·iJl operation. 'Ill• manual waa a
ccaprehenaiw etateaent ot all policies and procedure• or th4' .Aut,h.ority.
Bowewr, tor ext.Nlllel.7 detail~ _in_
etru~Uona regarding the··operationa
ot g1nn pbaa.es or functions of the Authorit7, a aeries ot handbook•,
1et.t.1Dg forth the policiN and procedure• in ainute detail, were developed tor tho•• tunctiona aa eupplaente to the manual ot inatructione.

AdllinietratiYe mat.erial waa prepared in thNe wa79 tor cOlllllUllication to the field:
1. •Adlliniatratiff notice•• and •-ergenq inatruotiou, • !or th• diaeeaination ot •ergenq aterial or
epot UIDl)UDC•ente. Frequently, theae continled
Mterial already intormal.17 eent out by teletype.
'lllq were prepared by miaeograph proc•••, and advance
copies distributed by air mall. The material conta1nec:l in th••• notices was later incorporated into
th• WRA unul at the proper place.
•111.nual ot adlliniatratiYe inatructione,• which
eet torth in a caaprehensive aanner the el•ente ot
poli07 and procedure tor all activitiN ot the Agency.
It wu prepared in aultillth lol'II and .maintained in
looee-leat binder••
2.

3. A qat• ot detailed "handbook••" Each handbook
related to a epecitic eubject which tacilit.ated ite
distribution to the workers engaged in that specific
activity. The policy and inetructiona tor that
epecitic subject were .coYered in minute detail.
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'ftle scope ot the manual ot instruction• 1• shown in ita table ot
contents gi'ftll below. It ie to be noted that the design ot the manual
tollowa the organiu.tion&l pattern ot the Authorit7.
WAR BEU>CATION AU'l'HOR!TI
Adm1n1stratift lfanual

Table -ot Content.a
Chapter 10

Organiu.tion
Basic Legialation and Ord.-e • •
Statement of Poliq • • • • •
Organisation ot the WR.A. • • •
Function ot Adm1n1•trative Unit•.
Linea ot Ad■1n1•tration. • • •
Ad■1n1atrative

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
•
•

•

• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •

Qiapter 20

Policiea (Authority.-wide)

Personnel lfanagement. • •
&idget • • • • • • •
Accounting • • • • • •
Propert7 Control • • • •
Travel
• • • • • • •
Procurement. • • • • •
Prioritiea • • • • • •
Ottice Service• • • • •
Procedure• • • • • • •
Information and Report•. •
Bonding ot &nplo79ea. • •
SUppl.y • • • • • • •
Operation ot Motor Vehicles
Identitication Carda. • •
Damage Claims against WRA •
Purchase ot War Bonda • •

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • •, •
• • • •
•
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •

• •

• •
• •

• •
• •
•

•

• •
• •

• •
• • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
•

•

20.1
20.2
20.3
20.4
20.5
20.6
20.7
20.8
20.9
20.10
20.11
20.12
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23

Qiapter 30

Colllauw.t.7 Management on Relocation Centers

Internal Securit7. •
Health • • • • •
F,ducation • • • •
Welfare • • • • •
Comunit7 Activities•
Coamnit7 Governnent •
&lainess Enterprises.
Communi t,7 Anal.7•1•
•

10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • •

.•

• • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •

• • • •
• • • •

•
•
•
•

• • •
• • •
• • •

• • •

30.130.2
30.3
30.4
30.5
30.6
30.7
30.s

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~pter 40

Operationa on Relocation Center•
Agriculture • • • • • • • •

• •
•
•
lngineving • • • • • • • • • •
Fire Protection
• • • ••• • •
Motor Tl"anaport and lf&intenance • • •
Induatl'7 •

•

•
•
•
•
•

• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •

• • •

Chapter 50

lalocation Center lf&na&•ent
General Adm1n.i•tration • • • • • • • • •
, legulationa Attecting Ad•1!11.•tratin Peraonnel •
legulationa Affecting IYacu•• • • • • • •
Legal S.nicee. • • • • • • • • • • •
Project Bapl.oJllent • • • • • • • • • •
••• Operationa • • • • • • • • • • •
Poatal S.nice • • • • • • • • • • • •
Statistic• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Intonaation U.etul to 1Yacuee1
• •••••
Rationing

•

40.1
40.2
40.3
40.4
40.5

•

•. •

•

•
•

50.1
50.2
50.3
50.4
50.5
50.6

•
•

50.a
50.9
50.10

•

..•• so.1
•

Ianance ot LeaYe

~pter 60

Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Short-Tera Lean • • • • • • • • • • • •
S.aaonal Work Lean
Indefinite Lean •

•
•

Student lalocation • • • • • • • • • • •
LeaTe Clearance • .• • • • • • • • • • •
Application b7 IYacueea on Seasonal Work LeaYe tor
other l.e&Te • • • • • • • • • • • • •
J.eaye Records • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Fol'll8

•

Appeal.a Procedure (trca Tule Lake) • • •
Indefinite Lean (Trial Period) • • • •
Lea.,. Aaaiatance Orante • • • • • • •
Leaw tor Peraona Hoepitallsed in Encuated

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

Inftatigation tor Leaff Clearance in Doubttul. Caaea.
•

60.7
60.8

60.9
60.10
60.ll
60.12
60.13
60.14

•

Ar•. .

Qiapter 70

International lelationabipa
lepatriation and Expatriation • • • •
Genna Colff9Dtion
• • • • • • •
Protecting Power tor JapaneH Interest•

• • • •
• • • •
• • • •

70.1
70.2
10.3

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Jt.lationa with Internment Ceape
• r Departaent • •
Juetic• Departaent

Qiapter 80

• • • •
••••

• • • • • • •
• • • • • • •

Indirldual Exclwdon

80.1
80.2

Chapter 90

Provieiona ot kcluaion Prograa • •
• •
WRA Aeaistanc• to Excludees • • •
Other .Agenci•• Part in hcluaion • •

WR! Organiation tor Exclusion

• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
Qiapter 100

EYacu•• Propert7 (at all lewls)
WRA Organizatiou tor Evacuee Property •

•

Management and Disposition ot Property • • •
Storage and Transportation ot Propert.7 • • •

•
•
•

• 100.1
• 100.2
• 100.3

Segregation

Qiapt.er

Segregatioa Policy • • • • • • • • • • •
Segregation Cent.- • • • • • • • • • • •
Persona to be Pl.aced in Tule Lake Center • • • •
Priorities ot Moffllent to Tula Lake Center • • •
Preparation tor Transtera to Tule Lake Center • •
Preparation tor Tranatera tram Tula Lake C.nter • •
Transportation ot Property ot Tranetereee • • • •
Reeponaibllitie• in Connection with lfoffMnt • • •
Departure• trca Tule Lake Cent.er • • • • • • •

• • • •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • •

110.l.
110.2
110.3
110.4
110.5
110.6
110.7
110.8
110.9
Qiapter 120

Persona Inatitutionallzed in th• l"Y&Cuatecl Area
Introduction • • • • •
Payment tor Hospital care •
Mental Patient• • • • •
Grant• tor Heceea&r7 Expenees
&rials • • • • • • •
Tranaf'era to Centers. • •

110

• • • • 120.1

• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •

•

120.2

• 120.3

• 120.4

• 120.5
• 120.6
Chapter 130

Relocation

Relocation Program • • • • • • • • • • •
Relocation Division• • • • • • • • • • • •
Group Relocation • • • • • • • • • • • •
Relocation Intormation Procedures • • • • • •
Communit7 Adjuataent • • • • • • • • • • •
Relocation Coaaittees • • • • • • • • • •

130.1

130.2
130.3
130.4
130.5
130.6

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Chapter 140

Closing ot Relocation Cent.era
Polic7 on Closing Center• • • • • • • • • •
Beaponaibilities in Connection •1th the Moftllellt
ot Tranater•s • • • • • • • • • • • •
Plane and Arrangaenta tor Closing a Center • • •
Transfer ot Bvacueea • • • • • • • • • • •
Monaent ot ITacuee Propert,7 • • • • • • • •
Curtailaent ot Center Activities • • • • • • •
Designation ot B-n.cuee Poat-Contingent • • • • •
Di.apod.tion ot Equipaent and Supplie■ • • • • •
Diapoaition ot Appointed Personnel. • • • • • •
Pinal Report ot a Closing Center • • • • • • •

140.l
140.2

140.3

140.4

140.s
140.6
140.7
140.8

140.9

140.10

'lbe detailed handbooks prepared and in use were aa tollowsz

Accounting
Personnel Managaent
Propert.7 Control

Procureaent

AgricultUN
Fire Protection
Motor Transport and
Maintenance

Suppl.T

Procedures
Welfare
Education
Co1111Unit7 Goverment
Health

Project :&nployaent
Statistics
Mees Operations
Relocation
Leave
Center Closure and Traneter Operations

The procedure material was a l"efiection ot an attitude throughout the entire Authol"it7 and not just a unagwnt aid. All parts ot
the organization had a hand in its dewlopment. Aa a l"eeult, the
adminietl"ative and procedural material iaaued was genel"al.17 accepted
throughout the Authority as being accurate and wise, and was followed
l"ather closely.
An active procedure program was developed. No procedure was
released unless it had been reviewed b7 representatiwe ot all divisions. Yet procedures were not delqed, and were circulated throughout the Agenq ae rapidly ae poeeible. Onl.7 b7 advance planning, cc:aplete follow-up, and timing was the procedural material kept accurate,
current and usable. 'lb ere was ever present in the thinking ot both the
persona planning and the persona on the operating end, the neceaeit7 ot
getting the work done, 7et having a war of doing it that was aa nearl7
unitom as possible, and having adequate documentation tor the propel"
.method ot operation.

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'lb• dissemination ot adminiatratiw material other tban procedures-particularly tacte, tigurea and intonation relating to acae
particular eituation that waa making newspaper beadl1nea in scae other
part ot the countey-waa handled tram the natiCD&l lnel in auch the
aue way. Accurate current intor.mational material prowd to be the
moat important public relations tool ot the Authority-. Although the
relatiwl.y 8lll&l.l aize ot the organization helped to make the distribution ot thia intorniation in a quick and accurate u.nner a little
easier than it llight haw been in acme other organizations, all personnel in the A&ency, regardless ot location or job, were alert to the
need tor accurate intorm.tion to be tran811itted through cbamela
quickly to the national headquarters where it was made a't'&i.l.able to
all •ployeee and encueee at the centers throughout the country.
An additional probl• aroee at the center level, that ot l ~
guage ditterence. 'l'he problem ot language ditterence waa handled
principally by- two techniqueaa (l) the preparation ot 1N11111&ries ot
intor.mation or other aaterial in written tora in the Japan••• or other
language, and distributing thia .u.terial in aiaeographed torm; and (2)
the extenaiw uae ot group aeetinga where diacuaaion was held in En&llah
interpreted by- qualitied interpret.era in one or aore
languages. At the ...rgency refugee shelter, all intormation waa at
tiret put out in aix languages, and later in tour.

and••

A concerted ettort was made by the Authority- whereby appropriate key- ■ember• ot the start ot the Washington ottice at -.arious
tiaes ll&de frequent trips to the relocation cent.era and other tield
ottices. Likniae, key- Hmbera ot the tield and center atatte
traTelled to Washington or other locations tor conterencea or special
aseignaente. 'Dua action dewloped a aore unitora interpretation ot
policies and inatr.uctiona, and kept, all diTisions and leftls ot the
organization more alert to the progress ot the Agency •• a whole. It
aided iwaaurabl.y in planning tor future actiTities. Opinions and
points ot Tiew ot the peraonnel outside ot Washington were alwa79
given a great deal ot weight and consideration in the probl- and
planning ot the Authority-.

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CHAP'lER VII
'lHE BUDGE~MAKING PROCESS

'llle budget presentations of the war Relocation Authority to the
Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress were constantly used by the
Authority as a device for advance planning, and later, after approval,
as a guide for operation. A great deal of time and energy were spent
by the Authority in developing applicable and correct appropriation
language, and in preparing the budget as briefiy as possible, at the
same time making it a tactual presentation of the intended scope of
operations for the coming year. Every attempt PQSSible was made to
prepare the budget documents with clarity ( considering the wide
diversity of operations to be covered), and to indicate the plans for
the furore that were later to become operations.
1he War Relocation Authority enjoyed a good reputation,
general]Jr, with the Budget Bureau and the Congress tor accurate, honest
and well prepared requests tor appropriations. '!he Authority believes
this was due prinarily to the frank, clear and earnest manner in which
the proposals set forth in the budget requests were described and cH.s-cussed by the Director, and occasionalq his assistants, with the
officials of the Bureau of the Budget, and the members of the House and
Senate Appropriations Ccanittees. 'lhe explanations and hearings before
the committees of Congress and the Bureau of the Budget were not always
easy nor was all the material readily accepted until a thorough undei-standing of the proposals and the intended operations was reached.
However, the Authority experienced very little "tailoring" in its
budgets. As a result, when the appropriation was approved, the plan
of action of the Authority was not in question.
When the budget was final.q approved for the coming fiscal year
and the appropriation nade available, copies of the budget doument
were distributed to the nain offices of the Authority to serve as a
basis of administrative guidance for the program and a copy of the
plan of the operations the current appropriations· was to cover.
1he War Relocation Authority attempted to expend its appropriation conservatively and wisely, and to effect savings wherever possible.
Appropriated funds were not spent merely because they were available.
'!hey were spent only as needed. As a result, some savings in appropriations were effected each year. As the savings became apparent,
the Authority readiq cooperated with the Budget Bureau or the Congress,
as the case might be, in the impourxiing of the savings, or a rescission
in a part of the approF1,ation.
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'!here is set forth below a resume of the funds made available
to the War Pelocation Authority in its 4 1/3 years of operation:

FUNDS FOR THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Original
Year Appropriation

1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

Transfer By
Warrant
Rescissions

ss,000,000*
10,000,000
48,170,000
39,000,000 $225,000

2s,ooo,ooo

...

1.400,000

'10'.m.L $190,170,000 $1,625,000

Savings

Net Amount Of
Appropriation
fdg>ended

$6,300,000
54,727,853
42,592,858
34,711,704

$1,700,000

$15,272,147
5,577,142
1,soo,000 2,ss3,296
2.,soo..a.99.2 1,020,ssa...,..

$5,700,000 $24,432,97Q

2Q,079,61~

$158,412,050

""From the President's F.mergency Fund of 1942, $4,500,000 of which was
transferred to the War Department, for equipoant and materials for
WR.A centers bought by the Army, and therefore is included in the
expenditures. $525,000 of this amount was returned and was pa.rt of
the .667 1 075 used in fiscal year 1945 for the emergency refugee
shelter, the remaining $142,075 was the WRA.unencumbered balance
of this source of funds.
-H'Iransferred to Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, far
temporary aid to eneiey- aliens. These funds were used to take care
of welfare situations of evacuees \1hich occurred after leaving
relocation centers. They were administered by local, State, and
county welfare boards, as needed, through regular~ established
channels of the Social Security Board.
*HEstimated.

At times representatives of the Authority appeared before various
appropriation subcommittees to assist cooperating Federal agencies with
part of their appropriation hearings that related to work in which the
War Relocation Authority was interested. Appearances were made several
times, for example, in behalf of the Federal Security Agency.
The relationships between the War Relocation Authority and the
Bureau of the Budget were at all times excellent. Bee.a.use of the frankness with which each agency dealt with the other, the Budget Bureau was
kept informed at interim periods between budget hearings and reviews as

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to the progress of the work of ·the Authority, and in turn the Budget
Bureau offered many valuable and acceptable suggestions regarding WRA•s
work.
'!he War Relocation Authority required five budget presentations
a year from each of its offi ces-cne annual estimate 6 months in advance
of a fiscal year, and four quarterly budgets for immediate operations,
due 30 days before each quarter began. 'Ihe annual budgets helped in
the preIJlration of the national budget presentation. '!be quarterly
budgets were carefully reviewed by operating and budget officials, and
allotments of funds for the quarter's operation were made upon the
basis of the final approvals of these quarterly budgets. 'lhe proposals
contained therein were carefully checked against over-all plans,
progress reports of work under way, cost reports and fiscal inforuation
gleaned from representatives recently returned from field trips,
personnel ceilings for appointive employees and for evacuee employment,
mileage and vehicular operation reports, contracts of one kind or another
that were in force, and other sources. At the close of a quarter, all
unencumbered funds were wi. thdrawn, so that only the funds approved for
the current quarter were available for expenditure. Periodically, all
encumbered allotments not disbursed were reviewed, and the obligations
reduced to actual outstanding commitments. Detailed reports of these
reviews were submitted to the Washington office.
In the budget reviews for the operation of the relocation centers,
the war Relocation Authority found the cost of $1.20 per day per evacuee
to be the approxim1te over-all average for all center operations including food, medical care, nominal welfare and grants, wages to evacuees
for essential center functions and administrative costs. While this
average could not be applied to all centers at all stages of operation
due to varying size of P9pulation, status of the relocation program,
size of center agricultural and construction operations, and similar
factors, the average did serve as a rule-of-thumb check on budget
requests. Further, it is believed that the figure provided a good
index of a conservative policy for operation of the centers.

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CHAPTER VIII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Some ot the problems ot personnel management encountered b:, the
War Relocation Authorit:, were unique, it is believed, in the histor:, ot
Federal service. Never before have so DBn:, persons been paid tor work
by the Federal Government arxl :,et had no real employment status. The
greatest part ot the work at the relecation centers was performed b:, the
evacuees at wage rates of $12, $16 and $19 a month, plus cash clothing
allowances r or the worker and his tamil:,. 'lbe low wages paid the evacuees were believed to be adequate when it was considered that all ex-•
penses tor eating, medical care, and everything except incidentals, were
provided without charge b:, the Government.
'lbe organization tor handling the requirements tor evacuee labor
was initially established under the Employment Division, which was to
have the dual function or hand.ling employment ot the evacuees at the
centers, and the relocation of evacuees to employment in normal civilian
lite outside the centers. At aver:, early date, a reorganization ot
these responsibilities was necessary. The problems or evacuee emplo:,.ment at the centers were made a part of the regular personnel management
program, and the relocation operations were taken over b:, the Relocation
Division.
'lbe evacuee employment program was launched under the usually
approved management principles for employment. '!here were interviews
tor the determination of skills and availability or assignment. Requisitions tor workers were submitted and assignments made. As time
progressed, the Authority established a sick and annual leave arrangement in a manner which was roughly comparable to that enjoyed by the
appointive personnel under civil-service regulations. An attempt was
made to establish at each center an evacuee employees• fair practice&
colllllittee to arbitrate disputes or other problems among the evacuees,
or between the evacuees and the appointed start.
With the employment ot 2,500 to 3,000 evacuees at each center,
and more at the larger centers, there soon developed aver:, large problem of record keeping. After assignment& were made, there was the daily
ti.me reporting of all evacuee workers, made by evacuee timekeepers, as
to whether the workers were on the job or on official leave; and if absent and not on leave, appropriate deductions had to be made from the
very small amount of pay.
In the early period or center operations, there was a great deal
of construction work to do, and every attempt was made to keep as many
~vacuees employed as possible. or necessity, it was believed that many
ot the evacuees could assume positions of responsibility and direction.

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With a amall appointiYe .administrative atatt or 160 people, tor example,
'which was the number ot appointive personnel at the Granada Relocation
Center, it was impossible to give complete appointive supervision to all
activities and work done. lforeover, about one half or the members or
the appointive start were school teachers, and were not available for
directional or supervisory work to a117 great extent. '!be small differentivi between the rates or wages paid to wecuees was believed to be
ad.equate to form a basis tor compensation to beginners, average workers,
and exceptional workers. And it was surprising h01t mch competition was
developed between the groups paid the three different wages and how Dllch
prestige was attached to the higher wages. Yet, in spite of the compe,tition, it was extremely difficult in many divisions of labor to get the
evacuees to assume the responsibility ot foremanship or directional work.
'l'he answer to this problem seemed to lie in the lack of a sufficiently
wide spread in the wages paid to attract leadership that could withstand
the pressures of center lite if it were necessary to criticize fellow
residents. Many- wanted the $19 per month but not the responsibilities
that went with it.
It should be pointed -out that even though there was no difference
1n the approach ot laying out any of the work at the centers, 1n the
minds ot many ot the evacuees there was a definite distinction between
the work which could be easily seen was of direct benefit to the evacuees, and that work 1n which the administration was interested. For the
work t.hat was ot direct benefit to the evacuees, there was little problem in getting it done rather quickly and well. Nearly all of the workcompletion labor problems that arose at the centers came on work projects in which the administration was interested directly, and the evacuees only indirectly or not at all. For instance, there was little
ditticulty 1n getting the messhalle staffed and .meals served or building
facilities erected tor evacuee recreation. But there was considerable
ditticulty at times 1n getting work done on lining a big irrigation
canal eo that farming activities might start, or on the building of
etatt personnel living quarters, or on clearing and leveling or raw land,
the benefit or which would go to someone else after the center •as
closed. Yet from the over-all operation of the center, it was necessary
that the items that the administration was interested in be completed.
Personalities or many of the appointed staff, and their previous
experience in handling people, made a great deal or difference as to
whether the evacuees assumed responsibility tor work. At one center, a
farm superintendent could get all of the. workers he could use, and
organize them effectively under evacuee fore.men. And at the same time
he was not lax with the evacuees in their work. At another center, the
tarm superintendent would have a very hard time in completing his farm
program because of insufficient help and no one to whom he could delegate responsibility, no matter how tacttully he tried to approach his
employment problem.
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An attempt was made to classify all the jobs performed by the
evacuees at the $12, $16 and $19 rates. 'Ibis was an arduous task and
taithtully completed. It was thought that by classifying the jobs, the
problems of evacuee employment and the press tor payment at the higher
rates would be eliminated by clarifying the job status. Of necessity,
the duties of each job at the beginning were fuzzy and indefinite.·
Evacuees relocated or changed center jobs frequently, and made the labor
force in any given division unsteady. Freouently, personalities of the
supervisors or conditions of work were sufficient to induce job changes.
Actually, the classification work did help a great deal in clarifying
organization lines and outlining tjle specific job. It stabilised some
workers. But in other· instances, it made the malcontents a little more
unruly in that they could point to a specific job sheet and advise that
they were hired for that job, and would not willingly cooperate in a
shift of work, or perform special duties in an emergency.

One receives in most instances just about what one pays for; and
although 7 or 8 hours may have been spent on the job by each evacuee,
and reported as such, it is fair to say that in the majority of instances,
only a good 2 or 3 hours of work per day wre actually derived from the
average evacuee.
Should. the problem arise again of handling a large number of
people under similar circumstances, it is not recommended that the employment of the people be handled exactly as it was at the relocation
centers. Detailed planning and job classification should have been
instituted at an earlier date. In some areas, additional appointed statr
would have been desirable. Kore adequate procedures and supervision
should have been provided at the national level early in the program.
'lbe scope of the problem, as it was, was too large for the resources of
the appointed personnel at the relocation centers to handle. And although all the larger objectives of center management were accomplished,
the detailed results were far from gratifying when viewed from an administrative point of view.
With the resources available, it was not possible to administer
a program of employment of such proportions at the low wages paid and
still accord the workers all the possible privileges and considerations
due workers, when tull value in work was not obtained. 'lbe proTisions
regarding annual and sick leave were highly desirable, in principle, but
the requirements for record keeping tar outbalanced the benefits. In
the case of the arbitration committees, the principle involved was very
democratic and commendable, but the final issue would always have to be
settled in the project director's office, and whatever his ruling was,
it had to be accepted by all parties concerned. Evacuees, ot course,
could not leave the premises except under certain conditions, on the
one hand, and appointive personnel could not force the evacuee to work,
on the other.
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'ftlere were many workers, however, among the evacuees who performd in an outstanding manner. It made little difference whether the7
were paid &l'l7 wages whatsoever, except tor the need ot an occasional
tooth brush or pack ot cigarettes; the7 would have perfor•d their work
in the same creditable manner under any circW111tances because the7were
interested in helping the evacuees, as a group, and the administration,
and viewed their particular job as a mane to that end.
On the basis ot a broad outline prepared at the national level,
several of the relocation centers, at the behest ot the national office,
inaugurated general training programs tor the evacuees. 'lhe appointive
personnel responsible for inaugurating these training programs worked
hard and diligently. Different approaches to the problem were tried,
some through the schools, some through the personnel manage•nt section,
some through the project director's office, and other adminietratift
channels. Yet, generall.7 speaking, the training program was not auccesstul among the evacuees.
On an ind,ividual basis, however, the War Relocation Authorit.7
probably has done more training ot emploJNe tor the Federal Goffrnment
than any other Federal agency in the same period ot time. 'lbe younger
generation ot the evacuees were particularly adaptable to stenographic,
typing, clerical, accounting, mirse•s aide, mechanical and other types
ot positions which were badly needed by each of the centers. On the
basis ot the individual training that these young people receiftd at the
centers, many qualified tor civil-service employment by the War Relocation Authority in its other ottices as time went on. At one time,
nearly 20 percent of the Washington office stat! were evacuees who had
received their original training at the centers. Now hundreds ot them
are employed by a large number of Federal agencies throughout the Nation.
Just as the relocation centers contributed an outstanding unit to the
United States ArmT in the 442nd Combat Team, so also the relocation centers have contributed a good group of well-trained civilian workers tor
work in the Federal service. Upon leaving the relocation centers, the
evacuees were employed under regular civil-service regulations and at
standard rates ot pay.
Although most of the unusual situations in employment at the centers were connected with the evacuees, the appointive personnel statt
presented some important problems also. One of the most important ot
these was in keeping the relocation centers started. 'lbe Authorit7 pursued the policy of attempting to recruit for its key positions, in so
tar as possible, personnel with good Government experience. 'ftle recruiting ot teachers, nurses, doctors and some classes ot administrative
personnel became jncreasingly difficult as the war went on. Initiall7
the Civil Service district offices assisted a great deal in helping recruit staff tor the centers. 'lbe recruiting situation, however, went
from this pleasant arrangement to the opposite extreme. 'lhe tightest
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emploJ1119nt situation encountered by the Authority- waa in the Salt Lake
area where there were a great many large and important war activities.
The Central Utah Relocation Center, which would normally draw a number
ot its personnel from this area, was informed by the War llanpo,,er Commission ottice controlling employment quotas that, due to the shortage
ot workers in the area, no allotment of workers or personnel ot any ki.m
was available to the War Relocation Authority- trom that area. 'ftle Civil
Service district otfice, under the direction of the War Manpower Commiseion, would refer no eligibles even 'When requested to do eo.
Some persons who were qualified and available to 1'0rk at the centers refused to go to the "Jap camps" because they did not like the
evacuees, or rather the idea ot working with the evacuees. Others were
unwilling to put up with some ot the deprivations and lack ot facilities
in the isolated areas where the centers were located. Because of gas
rationing, travel to and from the centers wae somewhat limited. Movies
were available at times at the centers, but many other advantages ot
urban life were lacking; and probably aost important, one 'Worked with,
played with, and lived next door to the same people 24 hours a day.
Several ot the centers were located where it was ·extremely- hot in the
8WIIDler, and several were where the climate was quite cold in the winter.
The GoTernment quarters in which the staff lived at the centers were
rented at reasonable rates and were somewhat better than the accommodations provided tor the evacuees, but not outstandingly- so. '!be main
difference was that cooking and sanitary- facilities were available in
each apartment. Because of the inconveniences and for other reasons, a
person who was not directly- connected with the War Relocation Authority
· and interested in it had a hard time in carrying on a conscientious and
eucceeetul recruiting job tor it.
So, very early in the operation ot the centers, the War Relocation
Authority bad to take on virtually allot the recruiting of teachers,
doctors, nurses and many other jobs as they- became harder to till.
Representatives of the Authority made recruiting trips throughout the
country trom time to time, and it is surprising h011 many people trom
Pennsylvania, New York, New England, and the north central part ot the
United States were interested, and did go to the deserts ot C&lifornia,
Arizona, Utah and Wyoming. Some of these people went because they wished
to participate in a war agency program; others were attracted by the
possibility of traveling west tor the first time. Others were were attracted by the simple lite at the centers which provided an excellent
chance to save some money. 'lbere were quite a large number, moreover,
who were genuinely interested in the WRA program and in helping to
alleviate the hardships to which the Japanese Americans had been subllitted because of evacuation. '!he Authority followed the policy of employing men and their wives, it both were qualified for the work that
was to be done. 'Ibis again was an item of attraction to a family.

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There were a few persona who arrived on the job, took one look
and left, or left the next da7. The majorit7 of the recruits, however,
were willing to accept the situation as it was, and after becoming acquainted with the program and the people, stayed and worked with an
interest in seeing the job through to its completion. Occasionall7, the
effects of living too close together in a semi-isolated co1D11W1ity were
as apparent amng the appointive staff as aa>ng the evacuees. But these
were rare instances. By and large, the appointive personnel at the centers enjoyed cordial personal relations and had a very enjoyable time of
it.
.
The recruiting that representatives of the Authority- carried on
was painstaking and diligent. Well qualified personnel was sought and
generally found. Factual representation of the life and work at the
centers was given; prospective employees were not promised a honeymoon
cottage with roses around the door and a retinue of hand maids and
doemstics, nor a job that was easy. ~ite the contrary was the case.
Living facilities were explained truthfully, and in almost every case
th-e job described was a challenge to the abilities of the individual who
was to cope with it. The mst appealing recruitment argument was that
it was work tor and with people, and for people who should be helped.
The recruiting job was a tough one, but one which provided satisfaction
when successfully- carried out.
The Authority pursued a progressive policy in regard to the
classification of the positions of the appointive staff. At the inception or the organization, the policy decided upon for the establishment
of the grades and salaries of the Authority at all levels was to follow
the Classification Act as closely as possible. The jobs at all levels,
both departmental and field, were classified at rates which, after careful study by technicians in position-classification work, were believed
to be equitable and fair for the work done. Some sources believed that
the salary rates tor some positions in the Authority were too high. For
example, based on a 12-roonths' period of empl'Oyment for teachers, Ule
Authority did not believe that the rate of CAF-3, $1620 per annum, was
out of line for good qualified teachers. Some sources did. Although
not required by law or regulation to do so for the field, the War Relocation Authority conscientiously checked all of its position classifications for field positions as well as for departmental positions with the
Civil Service Comission, and obtained their informal concurrence in the
grades and rates established ror all positions in the field. Events
during the postwar period would seem to indicate that the progressive
policy ·wt;iich the Authority followed in position classification was correct and in harmony with the current trend in wages and salaries.
When the closing of the centers and other offices ot the Authority came into prospect, the War Reloca.tion Authority felt a certain
amunt of responsibility for trying to assist loyal employees to obtain
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other employment. Center employees were isolated and without chance ot
employment contacts. Further,· the Authority needed personnel to finish
its work. A program of delayed placement with other agencies and a.ployers was instituted. Under a plan worked out with the Civil SerYice
Commission, tour representatives of the Conmlasi~n were detailed to work
with the persoMel representatives of the Authority. 'lhe representatives
of the Commission were given abstracts of the employment histories ot all
employees who indicated a desire for help in locating other employment
when the work of 11'RA was complete. 'lhe country was divided into four
areas, and one Commission representative made contacts with the Civil
Service offices and the regional offices of the various Federal agencies
in that territory. The facts were made lmown to the agencies that the
War Relocation Authority would be liquidating; the work of the Authority
was described; and the availability ot its persoMel at different times
as different parts of the Agency closed was indicated. Some direct
placements were made as a result of these visits, but these visits served
to be more important in gathering information as to where possible expansion might take place, what jobs would be available, the type of work
done and the proper person and location for contact. '1'1is information
was sent to the Washington office of the Authority, and at least once a
week, it was conslidated and forwarded to allot the offices of the
Agency where it was made available to all employees in order that they
might make direct contacts if they were interested •
•Uong with the work of the Civil Service representatives away
trom the centers and offices, personnel representatives of the War
Relocation Authority interviewed each employee at each WRA office and
provided them all with counsel in mald.ng plans for the future. Additional contacts were made by these personnel representatives with field
offices of agencies that were lmown to be expanding and in need of
qualified personnel. Quite a large number of placements in Federal and
other governmental agencies, and some private employment as well, were
effected in this manner. But the most succeesful means found was to
provide the individual employee with as much information as possible
about employment opportunities, and then have him make his contacts direct. The end of the war and the sudden easing of the manpower situation, together with the quick curtailment of many Federal and war--connected activities, changed the employment picture drastically almost
overnight. Employing officials al.met i.Jlmediately reasserted their
for.mer practices of preemployment personal interviews, and the consideration of a multiple number ot candidates for each available position.
Between October 1, 1945, and June 1, 1946, approximately 3,000
employees left the War Relocation Authority rolls. Of this group, information available as this report is written indicates that over 2,200
had definitely secured other employment, about 60 percent of which was
with other Federal agencies. On many of the remaining individuals,

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there is a lack ot definite information as to place•nt rather than a
definite indication that no·job was secured.
Although it is impossible in .nost instances to determine the
source ot the contact that led to the placement of these employees, it
is fair to state that the program initiated and carried forward jointl7
between WRA personnel and the representatives or the Civil Service Commission contributed greatly to the euccess or post-WRA placements.
'lbe cooperation or the Department of the Interior personnel oftice was
also very helpful. Frequently, the early contacts were made by the
Commission representatives, and the WRA personnel paved the way for consideration of applications and later employment at a date long atter the
initial contact.
'lbe program bolstered the morale of the WRA employees, and
assisted the Authorit7 in keeping competent personnel on the job to
complete the work of the Agency. From various points ot view, the
placement program is considered a success, and a possible contribution
to future eJ!lPloyment policies of the Federal Government.
'lbe War Relocation Authority, like every other Federal agenc7
under current regulations, had management problems with personnel ceilings. It ia a paradoxical situation under which an agency 1111st operate.
Each year a great deal of careful thought and planning goes into the
preparation ot a detailed budget which is presented to the Bureau ot
the Budget and the Appropriation Co.lllllittees of the Congress. In that
budget is a very detailed statement or positions needed by the agency
to perform the work proposed in the budget, and the period of time each
position is expected to be occupied., 'lbe man-years of occupancy is
always less than the number of positions because of expected personnel
turn-over or completion of work. 'lbe budget in due course is approved
and an appropriation made available. But the number or positions and
the man-years in the approved budget can not be used to govern the number of persons that may be employed with the total money approved and
appropriated.
A separate request must be made to the Bureau of the Budget for
an agency personnel ceiling. Detailed juetifications are prepared and
hearings held regarding the number of personnel needed. 'lbe personnel
ceiling for total employees granted to an agency by the Budget Bureau is
nearly always less than that approved in the budget and for which an
appropriation has already been made. 'lbe experience of the War Relocation Authority, until its final period of liquidation, was that the
budget would be approyed for from 3,300 to 3,600 positions, yet the
Agency personnel ceilings granted ranged from 2,000 to 2,350.
'lben, in the management of a mltiple nuni>er of offices, any one
of which might have an emergency and need immediately additional
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emploJNs, a small reserve or positions 1111st be withheld as a contingenc7.
So the net result when the personnel ceiling is apportioned to
all activities and offices, is that the number ot actual employees is
only from 50 to 75 percent of those approved·in the budget.
Such a •ituation makes it extremel7 hard to carr7 out a conscientious perscnnel management or administrative program. It creates
a tri-pronged .personnel ceiling ot different length-the approved budget, the approved agenc7 ceiling from ·t he Bureau ot the Budget, and the
individual office ceilings administrativel7 determined b7 the agenc7.
To insure sufficient operating personnel, there is a tendency
to do one of two things: (1) balloon the requests tor personnel in the
budget and to the Budget Bureau beyond the honest needs of the agency,
to cushion the expected percentage cut, or (2) over-allot ceilings to
individual offices beyond the agenc7 1 s approved ceiling, depending on
the fact that normal personnel tum-over will always keep so~ positions
vacant, and the JDB.Yinum agency ceiling allowed will, consequently,
always be full. Both ways are poor administration and a serious gamble.
'!be War Relocation Authority did neither o.f' these, and always presented
as honest and tactual a budget as possible. Aa a consequence, however,
it suttered severely at times because o.f' lack of sufficient appointive
pereonnel. Employment and the carrying out ot operations take time and
require stability of organization. Personnel ceilings can not be
shifted about indiscriminately and without proper notice, and still
attain the work objective.

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CHAPTER IX
FISCAL MANAGEMENT
In fiscal operations, the War Relocation Authority enjoyed a
smooth-working system that functioned efficiently tor its allotments,
obligations, expenditures, budget control and financial reports. All
financial operations were in accordance with established Government regulations. But the experience was not enjo,-ed at tirst in respect to the
cost accounting work attempted.
In the original establishment or the cost accounting system tor
the Authority, it was envisioned that enntually the Authorit7 would
attempt to render a cost accounting report on an individual tamil7 basis.
With this as a basis, the many diverse operations ot the ,Authorit7 were
woven into a very intricate system that was theoreticall7correct, but
was too complex to administer under the conditions present in the centers.
There was a need for considering absolutely eTery function and activit7
that went on at the centers-aintenance and sanitation, recreation,
center-produced agricultural products and livestock that were conSWDlld
.in center feeding operations, construction ot some things and demolition
ot others, the handling ot losses, breakage, and deterioration ot equip•nt and supplies~ oft-project hospital costs, welfare assistance, grants
for relocation, and many others. '!here was almost no end to the CODplexity of account• it was found necessary to establish to renect the
coast data believed essential tor gauges of given operations, on the one
hand, and the combinations ot the data from the various accounts tor
statistical purposes on a population or tamil.t basis, on the other.

A good cost accounting.system presupposes that every transaction
of purchase, material issuance, usage or return, and all labor and other
items will be promptly and completely reported exactly as used, prorating
and coding to the various accounts. It preeupposes reliable inventor,reports as a source to check against, and to reconcile differences.
Above all, it presupposes that all data required will arrive currentl7.
The coat accounting system initially 1.netalled at the relocation
centers tailed tor a munber ot reasons. It was too complex to adminieter. Because ot the large number ot personnel, appointive and evacuee,
connected with the various operations, the necessary reports ot tim,
material and labor were not subllitted promptly, or were not accuratel7
prepared to give the extremely detailed breakdown required. The turnover in evacuee wprkers, upon whom most of this reporting depended, was
such that in very few instances was there a continuity ot handling ot
the reporting tor any great period or time. An additional important
reason for the failure of the cost accounting system was the inadequate
warehousing system that was initiall7 in ettect at the centers. '!be
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receiving and inspection reports and the material issuance tickets were
chronically prepared late, and their tardy arrival constantly changed
the cost data for periods several months back.
So, until the last year and a halt of operation or the war Relocation Authority, the cost data used by the Authority were really obtained from analyses made or the allotment and .ti.seal accounts, and coordinated with the monthly progress reports of the dirlsions and sections, as the occasion for particular cost information arose.
Arter the warehousing system had been thorougbl.y· revamped, the
cost accounting system was revised, eliminating approximately 75 pel'cent or the detail required by the first system. Thereafter the system
functioned in a satisfactory manner, and, tor the period •intained,
the expenditure analysis was good. a.it it was rather like locking the
barn door after the horse was stolen, because the data or earlier periods could not be recaptured. 'lbanka to a very good system ot allotJDlnt
and fiscal accounte, and a good syatem ot statistical progrese reports,
nearly any necessary information could be reconstructed-but it had to
be done the bard •Y.
It cannot be too etrongly emphasized that in the eetabliatu.nt
ot any new organisation, a clear, easy, workable system J111St be developed so that there is a coordinated and established now of docWD8nts
for requieition, adminiatr,tive approval, purchasing, receiving and
inspection, warehousing, iseuance for uise, and vouchering tor payment.
Otherwiee, hours and hours of truitleJs labor and eearch will be u,pended which result in trustration, lf1d the expenditure or J111ch 1111Dre
work to accomplish the result than it\_ the original •thod devised is
simple, direct, understandable to eveJyone, and workable.
·
'lbe War Relocation Authority ueed the services or agent cashier•
very extenainly'_ in ite work. At each or the centers, and at so• ot
the other offices, there were trom one to six agent cashiers, with a
total or cash available from 12,500 to $150,000. '!hey were usual.ly
etatt members who pertorad as agent cashiers as a secondary function.
'lbe use or agent cashiers was nainly tor emergency grants and relocation aseietance, although at some stages•of operation at all or the
centers, evacuee p&JJ'OllS were also handled by the agent cashiers.
During the closing mnths at the relocation centers, the agent
cashiers were extre•ly busy with relocation grants. Each encuee
relocating and in need of aesistance was provided with a $25 cash relocation grant plus subsiatence tor the period en route to his destination at the rate ot $3 per day, and, Government transportation requeet
tor the purchase of bis railroad or bus ticket. During the heavy periods or relocation, this took a lot of cash. '!he availability of cash
was dependent upon the amount of the bond of the agent cashier, and the

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nblliaeion ot reillbursemnt 'YOUchers to the regional diebarsing
ottice ot the TNuuz7 Department b7 111111, the retum ot checks b7 mail,
and arrangement■ •de with local bank• to ban eutticient cash on hand
to handle the checke. '!be availabilit7 ot cash in the isolated. areas
~h•~ •the centers were located brought about so• peculiar situation■
occaeionall7 when the &lll)Ullt ot fund• needed tor the operations ot a
giTen period was 1-itticient. Several time it was necessar7 tor
pereonnel at the center, to go on a S&turday afternoon to the neareet
town or towna and borrow temporarily as 1111ch cash as each ot the local
Mrahante could ll&lm available. '!'hie, ot course, was retumed. at the
'beginning ot the toll.owing week llben the reilllbursement voucher had been
FC)Ce1eed and the tunde were •de available to the agent cashier. Frequentl7 per1onnel droTe hun~ed• ~tail•• owr night to submit the reiabureeant voucher, direct 1Dthe · d11bursing ottice tor payment, and drow
back again over the same road ·1n the aa111 hurry, to repay the merchants,
or take care ot another 1everal hundred people waiting to depart trom
the center.
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'!be uee ot the agent cashier, to disburse evacuee payrolls••
diecontinued in all centers as a regular auure because ot ditficultiee
ot Jmeping enough cash on hand, and the tact that a payroll document had
t.o be coapl.etely prepared ae well. On p&1day, payment in ca1h necessitated long queue■ ot people and tedious waiting. And it wae tound
that the regular submission ot the payrolls to the regional disbursing
office ot the Treasury where the checke were mde out and miled indiviaual17 to the evacuees was the DK>st satisfacto17 method of handling such
a large volume ot workers. It also spread the demand tor cash within
the center, a1 the checke were not all cashed at once.
Th• procese at the end ot each a:>nth ot preparing payrolls tor
allot the eva<:uee1 who bad worked that month was quite a chore. Because ot the rapid tm-n-ov.- of evacuees in the various jobs, and the
large number ot ffacueea who were employed, there were ditticulties at
tirst in obtaining currently accurate timekeeping data. At the peak ot
operation there were 2,500 and 110re names on the first payroll each
month tor service■ performed, ·based upon computations from the time report,, leave records, . and similar documents. Then a second payroll was
prepared each month for clothing allowances which included the tamily
members ot a worker as well as the worker himself. and made it larger
1n nunaber ot names than the first payroll. 'l'he AD>unt or money due each
individual was small, but it was just as nuch work as it the amounts
were considerably larger. And until one had worked with this particular
1ituation for some time, the spelling Gt Japanese names was a sl°" and
tedious process. 'lbe typist~ at the regional disbursing offices of the
Treaeury Department Jlllat have been re11eved when the relocation centers
closed, and the last payroll of Japanese names was completed. Nevertheleee, the cooperation and service which the regional disbursing oftices
gave to the Authority throup,hout its entire operation was outstanding.
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Because of the isolation of the centers, the cashing of so many
small checks created a problem for a time. Different arrangements tor
this service were worked out at each or the centers at different times,
but the best arrangement finally reached at each center was for the
business enterprises (the cooperative stores operated by the evacuees at
the centers for notions, drugs and incidentals) to cash the checks for a
,mall charge, or at a time when purchases were being made.
'lhe fiscal requirements for tjie relocation offices throughout the
country were operated on a centralized basis, as was the emergency refugee shelter, with only mem:>randum accounts maintained at the operating
offices, and all official accounts and payment of bills being done at
t.he Washington office. On the other hand, until the closing of the
relocation centers, their fiscal and finance functions were completely
decentralized.
With the liquidation of the Authority, the handling of the
accounts and obligations from the relocation and other field offices was
no particular problem. At the centers, however, there had to be a carefully executed plan to cut off fiscal operations at the centers, including the notification to vendors on unpaid bills, the balancing of accounts with the regional disbursing offices, a closing of the center
books, and then a complete transfer of al1 books of account, records,
md other items to the Washington office tor consolidation into the
Washington accounts and records.
The method used for this consolidation was simple. A transfer
unit was established in the \Vashington office which received the material
as it was sent in. At the same time, one or two of the center's finance
section employees went to Washington-and checked in each obligation and
record. Since the timing of center closures was spaced over a period,
the first center was about completed by the time the second was ready to
check in. And so each center, in order, was checked into the transfer
unit, and one set of accounts for all of the centers was com.piled. At
that point, the complete set of accounts for all centers were checked
into the accounts and records of the Washington office, appropriately
subdivided by center and obligation piase, and the complete accounting
activity of the Authority was made into one set of accounts that might
be handled by a fiscal liquidating ageney.
The War Relocation Authority JrObably used -,re Government transportation requests and Government bills of lading than any other agency
of its size in the same period of time. To effect the relocation of the
evacuees from the centers, approximately 100,000 Government transportation requests and 50,000 Government bills of lading were issued, 60,000
of the transportation requests in a period of 4 months, am 35,000 bills
of lading in a period of 6 months. Hence, the number of individual items
requiring financial handling for obligation and payment was extremely
heavy during the closing period of the centers and the Authority.
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CBAP'lER X
SUPPLY O.PmA TIONS

'ntn large citiea houaing a tot.al ot 100,000 persona require a lot
of auppliea, •terlala and equipaent to aarry on their day-to-day operations. The center• were constructed by the United States .Anv Engineers,
and the •Jor tacilitiea were installed at that time with the except.ion
ot achoola and st.aft housing. At the requeat ot the war Relocation
Authori v, the Anq also ordered tor deliver., the initial atodc ot
aasential equipaent, such aa cote, blanlcets, •ttresses, kitchen equi~
•nt, beating atowa, hospital equipaent and supplies, and a 10-day
suppq ot Anq B rations. Moat of the supplies and equipnent arrived at
about the eame time aa the evacuee• began to come to the centers in
trainload• ot 500 per da7. It wu a rather acute pl"Obl• to take care
ot all the •terial and at the aams time to get the evacuees quartered
when the at.aft wu saall and inadequate. lfal\Y times the staff at the
centers in the early weeks ot operation worked as much as 18 to 20 hours
a day to handle the ahipm9nts of people and materials. But within a
rather brief ti•, the p-oblems of housing eucuees, receiving the
initial equtpmant, and diatributing it to the barradca and other buildings were overco•.

Fn, if any of the personnel, realized in the ·beginning the· ,
quantitiea ot aupplies, particularly food, that would be required to
take care ot the needa of the evacuees. '!hey had a great deal to learn
about the u.aual diet of Japanese Americana. There were JIID;Y conmmit7
proble1118 that bad to be handled quick~, such as schools for the children, eatabllsbment ot hog farms to take care of the garbage, and getting
work programs under 118.7 to keep the evacuee• occupied. All of these
activities req,uired t.hat som •terlal items be bought so that the
activity could go forward. The procure11Bnt ot neoessar,y auppliea and
equipment bec&ll8 and remained a -veey important function in the operation
of the centers.

B7 1111911lorandum ot understanding with the War Depar'taent, the
procuremmt facill ties ot the Ar,q were -.de available to the war Relocation Authority ver,y early in the program. 'lhe Arrq sources of suppq
or food and other quartermuter items, such as cots and blankets, tor
medical itema, and tor such ordnance items as autos, trucks and auto
parts and accessories, were a big factor in the auccesatul administration
of the relocation centers. '!he tacili ties of the Arrq Engineers as a
procurement a-venue were not found to be as adequate or as expeditious ae
thoae of the Authority-, however, tor building -.terial, constniction
item or miscellaneous articles. At ti.rat the Authority tried the
qstem of having .Anv otticera detailed to the Authori
to work on its
supply problems, but this was abandoned because it waa found that

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civilian relationships between the IIRA employees and the war Departalnt.
worked lll'>re SJ110othly. 'lhe Anq handled the requisitions ot the AuthoritJ'
just as it they were Anq requisitions. One important difference w.a
present in regard to tood itemss the Authority- followed a rationing
program comparable to the civilian rationing program, and it delivered
ration points for all purchases where required; and it did not participate 1n the "•et aside" program of the Anq for overseas shipaents.
Requisitions were placed 50 day-s in advance. 1f.l.thin certain adm1niatrati ve limitations •de by the Authority, the Anq wu at libertJ to make
substi. tu ti one it the i tema requisitioned were not available.
At the beginning, a concerted effort wu •de to gather up
surplua Oovemment property' from Federal agenciea th& t were cloaing, and
from other Federal agencies. 'lhrough the Arlly, truck•, autos and other
equipment were acquired that bad been in uae in the Civilian 0,neervati.on Corpe. A large amount of other equipment waa obtained from the
National Youth Administration and the Work Projects Administration at
their closing. Because of a "take it all or none" baaia on which thia
surplus waa obtained, some items ot equipnent, such aa wheelbarrows and
land tools, were acquired in numbers tar greater than needed.
But in spite ot theae sources of equip19nt and supplies, there
were many- thousands of items to be bought before achools could be built
and equipped, recreation and leiaure tim8 could be organised and appropriate]¥ directed, care given to the nn born, the sick and the aged,
and a very extens1ve tarm program could be put into gear. There were
two steps involved in b¢ng arvthing during the war periods (1) obtain
the necessary priority with which to b\17 the item needed, and (2) tind
a dealer with the item to sell after the priority- wu obtained.
'lhe War Production Board and the Office ot Price Admlnistration
were responsible for the wartime control, use, sale and price ot important •terials and equipaent for war and civilian use. It a vendor
wished to replace bis stock of a strategic item, he required a priorit7
ot a certain clasa before he would effect a sale. Before any extensive
procurement program could be undertaken by- the Authority-, its poaition
had to be nade clear to the two controlling agenciea. 'lhe initial
reception at the War Production Board •s a hearing for prioritiea for
the building of schools and administrative -staff housing at the center•.
It was quite unfavorable; and it took a good deal ot careM explaining
before the program •s thoroughly' umeretood. However, once the genesis
and scope of the WRA program were understood, and its plans nade clear,
the relationships with the War Production Board were quite satiatacto1'7.
It was necessary, of course, for the Authority- to juetif.y adequate13' any
requests for priori ties, but they were granted if proper]¥ preaanted and
the need justifiable. 'lhe Authori exercised a great deal ot administrative control in screening priority- request• from the tield before
submitting them to the WPB for consideration. 'lhe rapid disaemination

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to the field of infornation relating to priorities became an important
operation.

Based upon experience with the War Production Board, the origl.nal
approach to the Office of Price Administration waa made in quite another
manner, but the point at iseue wae quite different. 'lb• OPA and the 1IRA
beliewd that the program or t.be Authority ebould be under civilian
ration rules as an institutional user, and ration banking followed. 'Jbe
ArllV objected tD thiS procedure and -set forth the theaie that the e-vacuees came under the provieions or the Geneva Convention u irisonere ot
war. The legal point was final.11' established that the evacuees wre not
prisoners ot war, and tba t the aen-.-va Convention was not therefore
applicable in this sit'Uf,tion. So the liar Relocation Authorit7 became an
institutional user under the civilian rationing program.
Because of the wartime situation surrounding the operation of the
centers, the liar Relocai4on Authority wae exempt from certain regulation• and requirements which n o ~ relate to Federal irocurement.
'lbe Agency was exempt by appropriation language from Statute No. 5709,
and b;y permit from the "pn.eon-made and blind-l&de industriee" requirements. To a certain extent, these exemptions led to a modest owrato_c king of er!. ti.cal items at the centers. But the volume ot this t1'p8 ot
•ten.al was not great, in coapa.r1.aon with t.be total pircbaaes, and the
•terials were care.tully stored and cared for, and have been nade available throufll aurplue action tor postwar use in a time When the it.au are
posaibq more. critical and more needed than they were during the war.
'lbeae exemptions were essential, nevertheleea, to carey on a supply
program of the necessary proportions.
'lhe problem ot pirchasing large quanti tie• of goods and suppliee
for a large nud>er of people in isolated areas at any time are diffic::ult,
and under wartime restrictions they were frustrating and disappointing,
but all the more challenging for those reasons to the suppq or procurement officer. Where to find enough lumber to blJ1' to buUd boxes so that
12,000 persons could pa.ck their personal belongl.nga in th• for relocation? Whei:e to find tractors, farm equiJ119nt, feed, seed, and linstock?
How to arrange for regular and sure deliveriee ot 50,000 tons of coal,
and have it unlQ&ded and distributed before demu.rrage started? Haw to
handle ice deliveries from railroad care at railheads 20 miles awq When
it was 120 degrees in the shade? 'lhese were t;ypical suppq problema
which the Authority faced at various centers during the program.
Occasionally, when a small plumbing store, tin shop, or lumber
yard was going out of business, the entire stock was purchased. Strained
foods for babies were hard to get, and nan;y of the Agency's procurement
officers searched long and bard before they found a sufficient quantiv
of disposable diapers which were needed whenever there was a -■ s shifting of the eftcuees from center to center b;y train.
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Not all the problems ot procurement and 8'UPJ>q la7 in finding the
desired items and in securing the necesaaey- p-iority it required. 1here
were administrative problems aa well. Many of the empl.07ees at the
centers, particularly in the profesaional field■, had never worked tor
the Goftmment or tor large organisations, and were "brand" or "male•"
consciou•~ As 91\1 of the new doctors, dentists, nurees, teachers and
motor maintenance men, in particular, CUl8 to asll\al their dutiea at the
centers, they :immediate]¥ wanted to. order an entirely n• ■et ot equipment and auppliea of their favorite 11brand", and no other kind, whether
as good, or even better, would do. ait by painstaking diligence on the
part ot procurement and supply personnel, and their cooperation with the
principal administrative officials, the merits ot each case were carefully considered and discusaed with the peraon deairing to order tb•
naterial or equipnent, and a great a1110unt of duplication ot equipaent
•and pyramiding of supplies was avoided.
'Dle procurelllll!rDt functiona performed both at the centers and bJ'
the tield procurement offices for the centers ware one ot the outstanding planks in the foundation of planning and parfo1'1111Jlce by which the
Au thori moved ahead with i ta w.ried prop,aa. 'lbe pertoraanoe ot tbe
procurement and auppq personnel was conaistentl,y good.

'Die War Relocation Authori went throv.ch a period of adjuat.aant
in its procur-nt and suPJ)l¥ problems as practicalq &DJ" other larp
agency starting out anew must do. 'Die mat.hods uaed at ti.rat tor propal'tJ'
control and receiving of property pircbaaed were baaed up,n a d1Yia1onal
ayatem. Each •jor division maintained it■ on propert7 oontrol, and
received and warehoused the Mterials and aupplies parchu,ci tor it.
1his divisional B79tem ot warehousing did not lend itself to centraUsed
controlJ under the system it was not possible at 81\Y one t1al to know
Juat what waa available on the center, and what waa not. 1he a;rstea
alao tended, wi tb persona who had never before worked tor the Oowrnamt
or a large organisation, to encourage the practice ot division he&da or
peraon• at their direction aking purchase■ locally, Without going
throu"1 the dlannela to establish a proper financial obliption tor ~ ment and requisition for purchase. One section would be looking tor a
couple of pounds of nails which were desperately needed and lacking in
its warehouse, while other sections had Nveral kegs ot the required
size of nails awilable and not 1n uae. And the section with the ianediate need would &ffntual.q buy a few pounds of the nail.l!I. ·

1his situation was cleared up promptly and satietactoriq in two
ways: (1) a central system of warehousing was establiahed and pit under
the direction ot one unit, the supply section, where all incoming dell'Yeries were check(ld against copies of requisitions, and a central set ot
records of matertala on hand and property accountability records were
kept; and ( 2) the quarterly budget requests from the centers were used
as a planning and control device as to what was to be done, what•• on
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hand, and what nee<1ed to be bought. Detailed lists of materials n"eded
and on hand accompanied the budgets. 'lhe organization very soon learned
to anticipate its requirements by as 1111ch as S months, and the estimates
proved to be quite accurate. A system ot reserves, or earmarking tor
specific work to be done,. was tried, but the most satisfactory •thod
developed was to have the supply officer oonaolidate all ot the anticipated requiremnts, gauge them against stocks on hand and on order, and
determine the amounts that should be purchased, after going over his
results with appropriate administrative officials. It was found that
supply requirements could be anticipated fairly closely, and advance
beying in large quantities without waste, with sufficient delivery time
allowed, could be accomplished. The full extent of all o.p erations
planned must, however, be known.
1he aterials and supplies purchased by the war Relocation
represented nearly 45 percent of its total expenditures. In
Authori
th• 4 1/S years of operation, a total ot $69,845,788 wu expended for
supplies and equipaant, out of total expenditures ot $158,412,030.

One interesting adjunct to the supply program was the necessi t;r
to. supervise the operation of po1;tt offices and ..U. distribution to all
the persona in the centers. With the cooperation of the Post Office
Depart.ment and the nearest sizable post office, branch poet offices were
established at the centers. 'lhe volume of ail and parcel post was
heav. The problems ot mintaining CU1Tent center addressee tor the
7 to 18 thousand evacuees at a given center ware constant, and the
handling of so ~ unusual names at first was eolll9Wbat difficult. Once
the postal unit was organized, and evacuees, who were taailiar with
Japanese names, were employed to hancD.e the routine work, it functioned
,m:x,thly.
Based on the experience of receiving considerable quantities ot
surplus property in bad or very poor condition, the Authority nade
attempts to keep its stock of equipment and materials in good condition,
and to eliminate from its records, by approved survey action, the loss,
destruction, deterioration, or wearing out of items of equip19nt or
supplies. 11&1\f interesting problems were solved as a result of this
action. Some might think that, wit.b so Jl8n1" people around, loss ot
minor articles might ~ch a high figure. 'lhis was not the case; the
loss figure for 1IRA equipment is veey low. ~ items, however, did
disappear and did not reappear until the evacuees and other personnel
were leaving the centers to relocate, and their property accountability
was checked.
'lhe Authority participated in all drives tor wartime conservation,
particularly those for scrap iron, waste paper, tin cans and used tats,
although the results were somewhat disappointing. <Al some of these,
orpnizations wi.t hin the centers, such as the Boy Scouts with the paper

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drives, assumed the responsibility for the work connected with the
activity. In the case· of the scrap iron and tin can drives, the materials were caref~ saved and large volumes accumulated, but the experience with these was much the same as with the waste paper. 'Ihe distances
between the centers and the localities where these items oould be irocessed made dealers reluctant to take the articles after they had been
assembled. 'Ihe salvage of used fats was the most successful of any of
these conservation campaigns at the centers.
In the sunmer and fall of 1944, the Authority bad a veey satisfactory experience in a "trial run" in surplus work in closing out the
Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas. It was found at that time that it
was a tremendous task to oollect all the property from all over the
center which the evacuees had been using, warehouse it correctly with
all like items together, inventory it carefully, and prepare the paper
work necessary to dacl.are the property as surplus to the appropriate
disposal agency in accordance with existing regulations relating to
surplus property. Yet it was a small operation compared with the one
that was to come in 1945 and 1946.
When the closing of the cen t.ers was defini. tely anno\D'lced, stepe
were taken inmediate4" leading toward the disposal of equipment and
supplies surplus to the needs of then current center operations. All
farming equipment and agricultural supplies were declared surplus 1n
January and February of 1945, and were disposed of almost immediately by
the Procurement Division of the 'Ireasury Depirtment and made available
for private use in the coming crop season. Treasury Procurement, as the
disposal agency at that time for that equipment, held "spot sales" at
each of the centers to dispose of the equipment and supplies then
declared surplus. It is interesting to note that at the Rohwer Relocation Center in Arkansas, when 14 farm and general purpose tractors had
been declared surplus, and put up for sale, 150 dealers from 12 states
came to the center to bid on the 14 tractors.
'Ihroughout 1945 up to the time when the last evacuee left each
center, the centers individual4" tried currently to declare surplus such
materials and equipment as were no longer needed. Although this procedure is coJTect in theory, and was motivated by a genuine desire to get
the surpluses available to the general public as soon as possible, the
same practice would not be followed by the Authori"tir if it had its whole
job to do over again. 'Ihis procedure led to a comingllng of property
that was declared as surplus and that which was not declared, when more
property or the same item became available as surplus. Ad41 tional confusion was added when, because or limited warehouse space, it was necessary to warehouse the declared and nondeclared items to gather. By far
the better method from an operations point of view would be to collect
all of the items and proper~ warehouse them w1 th like 1 tems together,
and then make the count and inventories and prepare the surplus
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documenw. An anxious bu11,ng piblic, however, D8kes sum a procedure
extremely difficult to follow.
When the last e'facuee had left each center, the supply program of
surplueing property really went into high gear. Many of the items could
not be touched until all operations for the evacuees were entirely co•
plete. 'lhere were approximately 10,000 different kinds of items in each
or the relocation centers, varying in quantity in accordance with the
population that had been there at the peak of residence and the types of
work or other programs which had been in action.
All declarations ot surplus property were made in accordance with
the regulations established by the Surplus Property Board and its
successors under the Surplus Property Act of 1944. A thick catalog gave
a list of almost all known CODUodi ties, and placed them into various
comnodity classifications. All declarations of surplus movable p-operty
had to be prepared on appropriate forms in accordance with the conmodity
classif'ications, one classification to a declaration. 'Dle paper work to
declare 10,000 different kinds of items--with some partial declarations,
some corrections of classification, and soma rewrites .for condition,
grade or quantity-is a tremendous job. 'lhe nunt>er of copies of eadl
declaration required for administrative and distribution purposes nade
it necessary, in almost every case, to use a duplication process, after
the first typing, to obtain enough copies.
An additional problem whidl slowed the declaration pi-ocese at
first was that all agencies within a given Department of the Government
have first pi-iori ty on the property surplus in an agency in that Department. Since the War Relocation Authori. ty was a }'.8rt of the Dei:artoent
of the Interior, this meant that before the Authority could declare its
property surplus to the appropri.a te disposal agency, all of the bureaus
of the Department of the Interior had to be advised of the availability
of the property before it could be declared to the disposal agency. At
first the attempt was made to physically circulate copies of the proposed declarations to all of the bureaus of the Dei:artment, but this was
soon abandoned in favor of a general announcement that the War Relocation
Authority was liquidating and representatives of all bureaus and their
offices were invited, up to a given date, to visit all of the centers
and eannark the property they wanted and could p:1.y for, with the assurance that the Authority would ship it to them as soon as it became
available.
'lhe constant changing of organization of the disposal agencies
was also a confusing factor in declaring property as surplus. '!here are
generally three classes of property: (1) real estate and buildings, (2)
consumer goods, and (S) capital goods. The general distinction between
class 2 and class 3 is that conswner goods are i tams ready to use, and
capital goods are items which are used to nake sonsthing. When the

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Authority first started declaring property surplus, cl.as• 1 went to the
Surplus Property Board, class 2 went to 'lreasury Procurement, and class
3 went to the Reoonstruction Finance Corporation. Later, class 2 went to
the Consulll9rs Division ot the Conmerce Department, and class S went t.o
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Still later, class 1 went to the
Surplus Property Administration; class 2 went t.o the Conaumara Branch of
the Reoonstruction Finance Corporation; and class 3 went to the Capital
Goods Branch ot the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Still l&ter,
class 2 went to the Consumer Goods Division of the War Assets Corporation and class 3 went to the capital Goods Division of the War Assets
Corporation. And, Anal}¥, class l went to the Real Property Disposal
Division o! the War Assets AdministrationJ class 2 and class 3 to the
Acquisition and Inspection Division of the War Assets Administration.
All ot these changes were within a year and a balt. All real propertJ'
declarations were at the Washington level, and all movable property
declarations were at the field level. 'lbe regiona.l boundaries nre in
no case quite the same tor any ot the organizational arrangements
pointed out above.
Yet in spite of nany obstacles both within tbe Authority and
outside, it took OIU1' an average of 90 days at each ot the centers to
handle all of the surplus property problems and declare eurplue to the
disposal agencies approximate}¥ 135,000,000 worth ot movable property.
It is believed that all the property was handled in accordance with
appropr1.ate laws and regulations. 1he Authority found it difficult to
accomplish the rapid disposal of large quantities of property under the
surplus property regulations; but the job was rapidl¥ done.

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CHA.P'D

MESS ·oPERA 'II~S
In the field of mess operations, the War Relocation Authority had
experiences which will probably never be duplicaied. It 1s certain that
there were no protot7P9s to follow. 'lhe largest single expense to the
Authority for any item was for food; and the largest number of evacuee
woricers engaged in any single activity at the centers were employed in
mess operations. 'lhe feeding of a large number of people is always a
problem. But, when wartime restrictions such as rationing and short
supplies are present, isolation and' long-distance transportation of
large quantities ot food and fuel are added, and it is all topped off
with administrative restrictions, the problem of feeding a large group
of people takes on a very daric outlook. Yet, when the organizational
aspects of operating the large number of blodc messhalls were completed,
the public relations problems regarding the amounts and kinds of foods
needed at the centers were taken care .of, and the now of supplies to
handle nornal operations had been correctly regulated, the feeding
operations at the centers which were of tremendous dimensions slipped
into the badcground and functioned smoothly throughout the remainder of
the program.
'lhe feeding &1Tangements in the centers were based upon one messhall for each block. Each block normally housed from 250 to 500 people,
and all pereons resident in that block ate at the messhall in that block.
'lhe number of blocks per center varied from about 55 to almst 100,
depending upon the size of the center. 'lhe chef and his crew of messhall workers were evacuees, • ~ from the blodc that the messhall
served. llost of the workers had not had any pu-ticular experience in
feeding operations outside of the cooking that one normally does in his
own home. Because of this tact, the efficiency ot the mess workers and
the quality ot the meals, which improved as time went on, often differed
radically between messhalls. Yet the basic instructions and supplies
uade available to eadl messhall were exactly the same. 'Dlere were
nornally five appointed employees in the mess section, a project steward,
assist.ant steward, clerk, storekeeper and head warehousenan. 'Dle total
number of evacuee mass workers varied with the size ot the center from
about 1,200 to 4,000, at the peak of center operations.
'lhe initial stock of food for the relocation centers was a 1~
days' supply of ArJI\Y B rations. 'lhe War Relocation Authority leamed
its first lesson regarding t.be feeding of persons of Japanese ancestry
at that point. A very important part of the planned menu of Anq B
ration• is navy or pinto beans which the majority of evacuees did not
like, and would not eat.

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In the course ot t.he tirst tn weeks ot ~tar operatione, a
great deal was leamed about the diet desired by the nacuees. It ie
not the same diet that one would nornally set forth on menus in large
institutions for the rank and tile of people in the United States. Although nany of the basic ingredients used by the evacuees were the same
as those used by all other people in the United States, the quantitiee
and the way they were used were quite ditferent. 'lhe eeasonings and
conbinations of spices and i'lavoringa ditter; muv vegetable• ueed
extenBively by the evacuees were rarely used by others; and of couree
there was a desire for large amounts of rice and certain kinde of fieh.
At one time, the Authority was buying and consuming nearly 40 percent of
the rice• crop of the United States.
After some experimentation in organization, it was tound that 35
to 40 people were necessary for the operation ot each maeshall for three
meals a day, 7 daJ13 a week. '.Ibis number was reduced as relocation
progressed. 'lbe pantry stocks of the meashalls were kept to a bare
minimwn, and all food was received, stored and issued from central warehouses. Large refrigerated warehouses permtted the swrage of sizable
shipnents of meat, milk and- vegetables. Accurate population record.a by
blod< were naintained, and the issuance of all foods was baeed upon the
weekly population figure for each blod<. Several e'V&cuees who had
extensive experience in feeding operations were re1ponsible at each
center for preparing menus 60 day• in advance. On the basis of these
menus, requisitions for staples. were placed with the Army Quartermaster
depots 50 days in advance; and requisitions tor perishables were placed
with the Aruv Quarternaster Marketa Cehters 15 to 50 dqs in advance.
An attempt was made to maintain a warehouse stock of staples for api:roxinately 60 to 90 dqs usage. Deliveries on many comoditie1 were eometimes slow. '!he issuance of food at the warehouses was worked out from
the menus, the proper quantitles placed in containers marked for the
appropriate messhalls, and deliveries were made to the meashal.l.e tJYfrl7
day or every other day. lleats were cut in a central butcher shop betore
deliver:,, and milk 11as apportioned according to administrative determinations. F.ach messhall had a copy of the menu for the dq, but was not
required to cook the material exactly as the menu had it listed. 'lhe
basic ingredients, however, were exact}¥ the same for all me1shall1. It
a chef was issued loins of pork and raw potatoes, he ml.ght eerve pork
chops and nashed potatoes or roast pork and boiled potatoes. Or he might
nalce sukiyaki. It was entirely his decision.
Although the Authority obtained from Anq 10urces nearly all or
the subsistence supplies it purchased, it elected tD follow civilian
rationing, and succeeded in complying rather fully with the rationing
requirements. Tile armed forces were not required to comply with rationing requirements. ~ere were JIIIU'J1' times when it was necessa17 to .ice
careful and detaileci explanations to the evacuees Wl\Y such and sum
foods could not be purchased or served. But by and large, the evacuee,

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accepted t.he rationing prograiu jU.::1t. aa did the cJ.vilian piD.Lic, even
though the war seemed very remote from the relocation centers.
As an inst.1. t;ut.ional user under ra tioniQg, WRA was issued by the
Office of Price Administration, in a period of about 4 years, a total of
124,138,987 points for irocessed food, 270,900,951 points for meat, fats,
and oils, and 8,870,596 pounds of sugar. In total, over the same period,
the Authority was able to save_ from these allotments a total ot
58,6S0,153 point• for processed foods, 43,955,991 points for meats, f•ta
and oils, and 1,948,764 pounds ot sugar. The Authority and the evacuees
took considerable pride in the saving in the ration allotments, and
thereby contributed directly to the conservation program, and indirectly
to the needs of the armed services. At each center there were two
meatless days a week; yet full and nourishing merms were irovided at all
times.
nir1.ng most of the period of the feeding operations at the centers, a very tight control was mintained at the Washington level over
stocks of food on hand, and over the use of ration points. Detailed
inventories of stocks on hand were required mnthly; copies of all merms
and all pirchase orders for subsistence items were also submitted.
'lhese were checked very closely each month, and frequently directions
were giYen to cancel somB orders, or to effect substitutions. On the
basis of these rechecks, ration checlcs for the coming month' a operations
:were issued to the centers by the Washington office from the ••ter
ration banking account.
Planning SO days in advance under a system of rationing is not an
easy thing to do. Frequently when purchases ot foodstuffs were made,
the value of the rationed 1 tems was one f1 gure, and when they were
actually read;y to be consumed, their value was greater. In effect, the
Authority had to carry on two sets of ration computations, one for
purchase in advance, and one for consumption. The ration values were
recomputed each week for the menus to be served that week, and if out
of line, the menus were revised to come within the current ration quotas.
'lhis sometimes meant that some items like canned fruits, catsup and
juices could not be used imsdiately after they had been purchased,
because of the change in ration values. And it took a lot of careful
planning and some time to tit those items into the already' ration-tight

menus.

'lhe messhall at the hospital ( the hospital was nonnall3' one of
250 beds) had, of necessity, to be operated on a different basis from
the other messhalls. All types of dietary problems were encountered
and handled according to competent medical direction.
'lhe problem of handling infant feeding, with block messhall
eating for the other people was at first perplexing. 'lhe final arrange(55)
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ment was an organization known as "block mthers" who operated block
feeding stations. The station was a corner in the block messhall
equipped with a refrigerator where milk and perishables were kept.
Besides, there was a small stock of other necessities. Upon written
orders from the doctors, the station issued strained vegetables, milk,
Pablum, oranges, dextri maltose, and other baby foods to parents with
small children. 'Ihese .feeding stations were under the joint direction
of the hospital and the mess operations st~ff.
A very important part of the work at the centers was directed
toward food production. At several of the centers there were herds of
cattle raised for center consumption. One center might raise some beef
for several centers and ship it to other centers after slaughtering.
All centers maintained hog farms, first as a means of disposal of wet
garbage, and second as a source of meat. Yet a careful accountine. was
kept of all center-grown and slaughtered meat, and ration point were
surrendered for this meat in accordance with regulations. All of the
centers had vegetable farms of considerable extent, and were quite
successful. in vegetable production. Centers with surpluses of certain
vegetables would ship to other centers that did not have a full supply
ot that particular vegetable. Storage houses and root cellars were
constructed to store vegetables that would keep until they were consumed.
A careful accounting was kept of the consumption of all center-grown
foods and figured into the computations of food costs. The basis of
85 percent of market cost was used to determine the value of the food
produced.

All of the centers established one or mre processing plants
tor preserving cente:r-grown foods, or preparing foods that the evacuees
particularly liked. Tofu processing plants •ere established at all
centers. Tofu is a sponge-like white cake made .from soy beans and was
a particular favorite with the evacuees. There were pickling plants for
daikon (a long, large, white radish), rutabagas and turnips, and other
vegetables. At the Tule Lake center, all bread and pastry used at the
center was baked in a cente:r-operated bakery. The lfanzanar center made
all the shoyu sauce it usttd.
.
The total amount of mney expended for the purchase of food was
slightly over $48,000,000. The basis of the budget presentation for
funds in tQe appropriation requests to the Congress for feeding operations was 45 eents per person per day. Over the approximate 4-year
period, the average cost of feeding operations at all centers was
43.2 cen~ per day per per59n. 'Ibis included center-produced food.
At the height of the center agricultural operations, cash eJCpenditures
tor food were about 31 cents per person per day, and the .farms produced
approximately 14 cents per person per day. This may be compared with
a reputed cost of roughly 55 cents per person per day for members of
the armed services.

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When most of us think in terms of food, we think tn tel'JIII of the
amount of food needed for our own families, and what we have in our own
kitchens. Few of us realize offhand the tremendous quantities of food
required to feed several thousands of people. It was out of this
peychological fact, plus the implications raised regarding the loyalties
of the evacuees by the mere fact of the Jt\ysical evacuation of these
people, that some of the sharpest public criticism of the Authority
arose. A rumor which resulted in a public relations problem relating.
to food might start somewhat as follows. A billing cleric for a meat
vendor might be w:1. th a circle of acquaintances and mention that he had
billed a carload of beef that day for shipnent to the 11 Jap camp•; or a
freight sw1. tchnan would make an offband renark that he m.tched a car
that day that had beef in it for the •Jap camp." And then the ball
would begin to roll. It made little difference at fl.rat whether it was
beet or bacon or what it •s; there •s much talk about 1 t. 'lhe
reverberations might reach Congressmen and Senators, and lead J,o newspaper headlines S inches tall, and a group of reporters would rush out
to a relocation center to get more of the story. Ot course, carloads
of beef and other meats were shipped to the centers, but f• if al'.\T of
those who raised their -TOi ces had stopped to think just how long a
carload of 35 1 000 pounds of beef would teed 71 500 to 181 000 persons.
'lhis might well be a 2-week or a aonth•s suppq ot meat tor the center.
One year, the Granada Relocation Center in Colorado aernd turk97 tor
one aal on Christnas Da.7. N.-rq all of the turk878 served were produced on· the centerJ and the area where the center was located as a
turke;y producing area. 'Jhat one _meal served Christ. . ~ at Granada
-.de the newspapers in New York and San Francisco, and the adm1niatrative
officer received several hundred critical letters regarding it.
·
Problems of this nature led to a number of administrative
restrictions, unreasonable as they •Y seem, being placed by- the
Authority on its feeding operations. No ham, bacon, butter or select
tooda could be bought, even for special occasions. 'lhe centers never
did use butter; margarine or jams and jellies were used as spreads -for
bread. Special permission from the Washington office was necess&17 in
order to sern ice cream, because of the public relations· aspects of
the sugar and butterfat shortages in spl te ot the fact that vendors had
the ice cream to sell, and were anxious to sell 1 t. Kllk was adminietrati veq limited to 1 plnt per day tor children 12 years and under,
and adults over 65. Infants and pregnant or nursing mothers were
allotted milk in accordance w:1. th doctors• directions. All of these
restrictions were self-imposed by the Agency to avoid continual public
repercussions.
It took a great deal of caretul public relations work to bring
before the public the fact that relocation centers were normal civilian
cOIIIIIIUnities, and that the residents in the centers were entitled to the
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same consideration and treat.ment as the rest ol the ai.villan population,
no mo~, no less.
Because ot frequent change• 1n ·Ar1Q' personnel at the various
depots and narlcet centers, it became necessary at intervals to reiterate
the civilian ration polic,- of the Authorit7, aDd get them to accept
ration points tor goods p,irchaaed. Because 'IRA centers were listed
with the Anq as equal to regular !rJQ' inst.allations tor pm-poses of
pu-cbasing, the Al'lll7 started to uee IRA center warehouses as temporary
storage places for seasonal surplus stocks ot tood. 1 just as it did w1 t.h
Aff1¥ installationa. It was necessary to stop this practice. In one
instance, such action in part conµ-1.buted •ter:1al.l¥ to t.he bans tor
a week-long tirade by a western newspaper about "hoardin& food f'or the
Jape." 'lhe Arr,q cooperated, of course, verr quickq in helpl.ng disperse
the tood stored, but the public had little opportunit,T to know the real
sto17 in the case.
In electing to follow civillan rationin&, the Authorit7 aleo
elected to use more freeh vegetables, as against processed food.a, with
the thought in ml.nd that it would be able to retrain from the pu-chase
ot toode that were rationed, and thus avoid cutting into the suppl.y
available to the public. lrith the exception ot the seasons and times
when the Authori was producing most ot its own vegetable•, this
pollc,- was probabq incorrect. Should a similar Bi tuation occur again,
it is believed that processed toods mould be purchased, rather than
purchasing freah vegetablea whenever posaible. 'Dlis is the o~
posaible •nner in which the feeding operations ot the .lut.horit7 1111.ght
have overburdened u;y .arketJ yet, ironical.q, no one objected to it.

'lbe relocation centers and the people within them did not change
the national population nor the ove~ll rationing picture. However,
where the relocation centers were established in isolated sections,
and in States with a-.ll populations, the first prorationing ot goods
and commodities •de by the 0ttice of .Price Administration did not take
into consideration the sbitts in the population distribution that had
been •de b,Y the aovell8llts ·o f this large &rOUP ot people into these
spareeq settled areu. '.lheae adjustments were, however, •de later.
At the tiJDa of closin& the centers, the •ss operations were veey
caret\llq atched and gauged so as to have on hand as small an amount
ot food as possible. At the close ot all the centers, there was a total .
ot app-oxi.•teq $80 1 000 worth ot staples in stock at all ot the 10
center• together. 1hie represented approx:Lmateq 0.2 percent ot all
the food purchased, and is considered extremeq low. llost ot the renai.r).
ing food consisted ot broken lots collected from the ••shall pantries,
•o• formerly high-ration-value iteJDB whose value changed alter purchue
and could not be worked into the ration allowance tor the mnu, and SOM

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i t - peculiar to t.he preparation of Japaneae-t7J)8 tooda. · At one center,
some ot the nav,y beana origl.nall.7 aent in b7 the Anq at opening were
atill on band. Under the direction ot the appropriate disposal agenq,
then surplus food.a were placed in t.he handa ot the public w1 thin 45
dqs attar the centers cloaed.
A.a the mui>er ot nacuees in the centers dwindled, •asballa
were closed according to a p. ttern laid out tor each center. '!be
ff&cueea continued to take care ot their own feeding arrangements up to
the last meal tor the last nacuees on the last dq. In spite ot the
111&1\Y trials and tribulations present in the ear~ dqs of the centers
before the organisation waa set and the now ot supplies was regulated,
the •ss operations ot the War Relocation Authority were, on the whole,
. satistactoriq hancD.ed. There could have been man,y -more problems than
there were.

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CHAP'IER III
RECOP.DS MANAGEMENT

P.ecords nanagement is believed by some to be a rather unimportant
i:art of the activities of an organization. Yet in some types ot operations, the performance and efficiency of the agency is grea~ infiuenced by the perfornance of the files and records organization upon which
the operation must depend. Records and files were very important in the
War Relocation Authority program.
1he files and records or the War Relocation Authority divided
roughly into two groups: (1) general tiles nornaU¥ found in any governmental agencys and (2) the individual evacuee files.
'llle general files of the Authority, like those ot most governmental agencies, included correspondence, agreements, intonational
material, procedural documents, and other similar papers naintained
mostly in central tile locat,ions at each office. Material peculiar to
a particular operation, such as personnel records or obligation documents and vouchers, were neintained in the divisions or sections
primarily concerned. Moreover, copies of many documents which should
have been maintained in central files were also retained by the di visions and sections, thus complicating the records nanagement problem.
'Ihe evacuee files were made up of all material pertaining to a
particular evacuee-information regarding property that he had asked the
WRA to store or handle, welfare and family intorna tion, health and school
records, material on interviews about relocation, loyalty hearings or
other intelligence information. This infonnation in various forms on
the same individual was frequently located in various of.fices throughout
the country either at the point of relocation or at the place where the
evacuee had property' that the Author! ty handled for him. At the centers,
durin~ their period of operation, the elemBnts ot the individual evacuee
file were sprea~ over several di visions-the hospital having the health
records; the schools having the education records; the welfare and relocation sections having some family informationJ the statistics section
having other family inforna tion; and so on.
1he files in the 'War Relocation Authority grew rapidq. Because
of certain persoMel changes early in the life of the Authority, no set
and rigid classification outline for the naintenance of central files
was established for all offices and centers. Later, an advisor;y outline
was sent out, but it was not made mandator;y. 1he onq change that might
be made in a similar opera ti on in the tu ture, should it occur, would be
to inaugurate a good classification outline for general oorrespondence
filing at the very bednni.ng of operations.
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Nevertheless, th, records operations functioned quite well for
all locations during the period of 0perations. It was onJ.T when it
came to the closing of the centers and the offices that aey real
problems arose. 1he prinai.pal problems at that time went the consolidation of the naterial, pu-ticularly on the individual evacuees, and the
transportation of it to one central place.
Crews of workers trained at the llashington ottlce went to each
of the centers and area relocation offices as each was closing, and
assisted the persomel at those locations in consolidating and packing
of essential records, and in the disposal of nonrecord naterial.
With careful planning in advance, and the close cooperation of
the National Archives and each division in the 'Washington office,
detailed schedules ot all forms, correspondence types, memoranda, and
other records were carefully listed in detail as to just what was to be
preserved and what was not. 'Ibis in.fornation was issued generally to
all locations before the tremendous job was startec;i.
At the centers, the statistics section •s made the local assembly point tor all-the individual evacuee files. Manila envelopes were
prepared for each individual evacuee who had ever lived in that particular center. 'lhe name was placed on the front of' the envelope and then
the hundreds and thousands ot envelopes started tne t.rek from one
division to another until the rounds of the center had been completed.
'Iha material from each di vision for each evacuee was put into the
envelope with his name on it. 'lhe filing in different sections differed.
'!he welfare section at one center had·the •terial tiled numerioal.q
under the family number; the hospital at one center had the records
broken down into seven alphabetical arrangementa according to seven
hospital fuµctions of in-patient, out-patient, dental, surgical,
piarnac,y, obstetrical, and I-ray (there might have been a record tor
the same person in one or more of these); the school records at one
center were filed alphabetical:q' by school gN.des and classes; and so on.
Su.f'fice it to say that it was a large job to gather together all

ot the naterial on the individual evacuees at each of the centers in
less than 5 months, along with all the other work that was necessary
in the closing operation. 1here were individual records ot some
1201 000 evacuees, some of whom had lived at as many- as four different
centers.
'lhe central file uaterial was also consolidated, and prepu-ed
tor shipment, but presented little difficulty comi:art.J with the evacuee
individual records.
When the files and records at all the centers and offices had
been reliPVed of all nonrecord naterial and consolidated, they were
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~eked and shipped to the Washington office tor further consolidation.
Arrangements were made with the United States Office of F.duoation
to handle the transcripts of official credits of all persons attending
the schools at the relocation centers. The transcript records were sent
to the Washington office sepe.ra teq, consolidated by the staff members
of the Education Section, and then transferred to the Office of Education
where they will be maintained.
In the Washington office, the individual evacuee files had
originally been developed by the Clearance Review Section in pi-ocessing
requests for leave clearance in the early days of the Authority, and
contained principally naterial relating to leave requests, loyalty
hearings, fami1y infornation, and intelligence information. When the
Exclusion Orders were revoked, the Clearance Review Section • s disb&nded, and the individual evacuee files (about 120,000) were transferred to the Statistics Section of the Relocation Planning Division.
When the boxes of files shipped tro11 all offices arrived 1n
'Washington, the individual evacuee file material was turned over to the
Statistics Section to be filed in the individual evacuee folders.
Again, a review for duplication of •terial was •de, and some material
dis posed of •

In all, a total of approximatei, 1,000 boxes an-ived in Washingtcn
trom the centers and field offices containing indi vi.dual evacuee file
•terial. 'lbe boxes varied in size from what would be in one file
cabinet drawer to the equivalent of four drawers. When the consoUda tiori
job was completed-and it required S roonths tim......approximateq 450
filing cases of four drawers each were needed to store the individual
evacuee file naterial. When the liquidating agency for the War Relocation Authority has no further requirement for this naterial, it will be
pi-ape.red in accordance with specifications, and transmitted to the
·
National Archives.
'lhe individual evacuee file work was done under the general
direction of the Records Management Section, but performed by the
Statistics Section. However, the general files from all centers and
offices were handled by repi-esentatives of the Records Management
Section, and represented approximateq 90 file cabinets, 60 from the
field, and 50 in the Washington office. In addition, there were 10
cabinets of appointive.personnel material, and approximateq 100 cabinets of finance naterial, most]¥ plid vouchers, 75 of which came from
the centers. Much of the relocation center naterial has alreadi)r been
transferred to the National Archives, and the balance will be sent there
when it is no longer needed by the War Relocation Authority or its
fiscal liquidating agency.

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'Die war Relocation Authority had considerably more record
naterial than most governantal agencies, primariq because of the
individual evacuee records and a large supl)l¥ program. It was a task
ot large proportions tor a small staff to handle in such a brief time.
'Die key to the success of the operation in the field was the snail staff
of speciall,Y trained employees who went to each najor office and worked
with the employees of that office on its record problems. 'Ibis staff
was in the field al.moat continuousq for 9 months, and tackled the job
with diligence, interest, and lack of personal consideration.
Responsible center and other office personnel connected w1 th the record
work cooperated and worked in a very creditable anner, and the Statistics Section in the Washington office completed a gruelling and monotonous taak 1n a surprisingly short time with a very moderate force.
'lhe business ot closing out the tiles of a liquidating agency is truq
a nightmare for tile clerks or record anaqsts.

•

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CHAP'IER XIII

O'IHER FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISffiA'lIVE Mk~AGEMENT
It has been pointed out earlier that the responsibilities of the
Administrative Management Division in the War Relocation Authority were
constantly gr01'i.ng during the life of the Authority. Ini t ~ , the
Division was called the Office of Finance and Personnel, and handled
only those two functions. Additional responsibilities were added later,
one by ones supply, mess operations, evacuee employment, and records
management. Still later the division undertook the responsibilities
for examination and investigation of routine and official operations,
the clearance review of leave applications by evacuees, and, for a
period of time, the handling of evacuee property. In addition, certain
special assignments were performed from t.ime to time.
·
'lhe experiences of the Examination and Investigation Section
were not unlike those that a similar unit would have in any other
government agency. Its duties were principally the naking of periodic
examinations of the centers and offices to determine whether official
procedures were being .followed, and if not, why not. Copies of the
examinations and findings were returned to the head of the office after
a close administrative review in the national office, along with some
administrative recomnenda.tions. ln this way these field audits served
as a very important tool to help check the workability of procedures,
and provided a bastR for change of the procedures where necessary.
Because of the good caliber of many of the men in this unit, they were
used as temporary or permanent replacements in key operating positions
at the centers from time to time. 'Ihe most interesting investigational
problems came in connection with evacuee property, checking facts and
ru:roors, such ·a s reports of improper sales, loss vandalism, and similar
situations. '!he.agents of the section nade no investigations or
reconunendations regarding the personnel of the Authority unless express:W,
directed to do so by the proper administrative officials.
'Ihe Clearance Review Section, as a part of the Administrative
Management Division, was responsible for the preliminary examination
of all requests by the evacuees for leave clearance, and the gathering
together of all pertinent material from every possible source about the
individual evacuees. 'Ihe Clearance Review Section was originally a
pa.rt of the Employm?nt Division, and was transferred in the fall of 1945
when the Employment Division was reorganized into the Relocation Division, which, thereafter, was to deal only with evacuees free to leave
the centers and with their problems of resettlement.

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In other final reports of WRA, the genesis and thesis for
granting leave to evacuees, the problems and legal complications
relating to loyalty, the loyalty hearings of evacuees, rehearings and
reviews, relationships with the War and Justice Depart•nts regarding
the evacuees, the functions ot the Joint Board, and the basis for
determinations for segregation are all rather fully presented. No
attempt will be made here to reiterate &I\Y of fflat material. For,
although the policy determinations and directions of the items mentionai
above did directly influence the operations of the Clearance Review
Section, the section was al100st entirely a servic~ organization for
handling details to a point where administrative and legal determinations could be made.
'Ille operations of the section represented the amassing and
handling· o:r a very large amowit of confidential material, and handling
it with the utllK)st discretion and objectivity. It required the develoJ>ment of a very broad backgrowid on the culture of persons of Japanese
ancestry, both in this country and abroad. A rather intimate knowledge
of social, economic and religious customs, organizations, operations
and holdings of people of Japinese ancestry was developed. Considerable
research had to be done. An exceptional alertness in interpretation of
hearings, both in the questiontJ and the answers, had to be developed.
An organization system to set up and maintain individual files of
confidential material on 1201 000 people had to be devised and ~afeguarded. A very difficult problem was the handling of files with macy
names that are unusual, since near~ all Japanese names are difficult
for the average American. Complications would sometimes arise from an
Americanized version of a Jaµmese given name appearing, instead of the
correct name.
·
'Ihe Clearance Review Section was discontinued in February 1945
as soon as its operations could be liquidated after the revocation of
the Exclusion Orders. By the revocation action, the reason for the
existence and operation of the section was removed, as no further WRA
clearances were required for the evacuees to leave the centers. With
the closing of the section, the individual files and records were transferred to the Statistics Section to form the nucleus for the consolidation of all the individual evacuee records and files at the time of
the liquidation of the Agency.
From the time that the regi.onal offices were discontinued and the
Employnent !ll.vision was reorganized into the Relocation Division, the
Administrative Management Division was charged with the general responsibility for the f3vacuee property stored in warehouses on the Pacific
Coast and the evacuee property operations at the centers. 'Ille imnediate
work in connection with the warehouses and other evacuee property on the
Pacific Coast was wider the direction of the field assistant director
in San Francisco. 'Dlat office also acted in an advisory capacity to the
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centers on evacuee problems, and acted as agent for the evacuees in
problems relating oo their property located in the evacuated zone.
'!here were a great number of problems in connection with the
consolidation of evacuee property into the 10 large warehouses after
the property was turned over to the War Relocation Authority by the
Federal Reserve Bank. Many clues had to be traced to properzy identify
property that was not adequatezy narked or had become detached from the
main group of property of a fami:13 in the hurry and bustle of leaving
houi at the time of evacuation. 'Dlere were 111111V cases of vandalism,
theft and usurpation of the property of the evacuees after they left
which had nll.UW3rous legal implications. 'lhese are covered in a separate
docuuint and will not be elaborated on here.
At the time of the revocation of the Exclusion Orders and the
announcement tba t the centers would be closed, the evacuee property
problem became not one of continual warehousing or servicing of property,
but but one of disposal and return of property to the evacuees as they
reloca·ted. It was a i:art of the whole relocation process. And as
such, the responsibility for evacuee property was transferred at that
time to the Relocation Division.

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CHAPTER XIV

MASS TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
Until the summer of 1943, the War Relocation Authority had had no
appreciable experience in the transportation of people; certainly it had
no experience in mass mvements of men, women and children. The Army
had assumed all responsibility for transporting the evacuees when the
relocation centers were being occupied. The War Relocation Authority
received them at the gates of the centers; the Army had done all the rest.
A policy had been determined in the spring of 1943 which required
the establishment of one of the relocation centers as a segregation center, and the consolidation of all people of questionalbe loyalty, together with their families at that center. The Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California was selected for the segregation center be
because it was one ·of the largest centers, and for a number of other
administrative reasons. As a special assignment, administrative officials were requested to prepare a plan of operation for the movement of
the evacuees. such a plan was completed and put into operation. The
elements of the plan were used a good many times thereafter by all of
the centers, until the last evacuee had left the last center, because
transportation arrangements were just as essential to relocation as they
were to segregation.
Not all of the people at the Tule Lake Relocation Center were to
remain at the segregation center. So the basis of the transfer movements
from the relocation centers to the segregation center was, insofar as
possible, a shuttle movement back and forth between Tule Lake and the
other centers. Because of the great distances involved and the large
number of people to be transported, rail transportation was naturally
best suited for accomplishing the transfers. A set of schedules for
special trains was developed with the Tule Lake Center as the focal
point. A train would leave one center with a load of approximately 500
evacuees and proceed to the Tula Lake Center. After its passeng~rs had
detrained, the train would load up with approximately 500 persons from
the Tule Lake Center who were not to remain there, and the train would
proceed to the original or to another relocation center. After discharging the persons whom it had carried from Tule Lake to the other
center, it would reload at that center and return to Tule Lake. In
these mvement-s, during September and October of 1943, 8 trains made a
total of 34 trips and carried approximately 6,000 people from the Tule
Lake Center, and took nearly 9,000 people to it.
A manual of detailed instructions was prepared that covered all
phases of the pretranster work at the centers before departure, operations en route, and what had to be done after a train reached its destination. 'lbe manual also provided the instructions for the screening of
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the evacuees and the basis for determining which evacuees were to be
segregated. The detailed plans and schedules were carefully reviewed at
a Meting of project directors in Denver, and copies of the manual ot
instructions were made available at all centers tor their guidance in
preparing tor the transfer operations.
There was a great deal of preliminary work necessary in the
segregation determination process. This consisted of a series of inte!'view and hearings, based on certain repatriation requ~ts and answers to
questionnaires. Many of the evacuees had to have new interviews, or
rechecks needed to be made tor one reason or another, before the exact
persons to be included in the segregation mvements were known. A great
deal of very caretul record compilation was necessary so that the documentation in each case was complete. This activity at all centers required a great deal of work and planning. Each center finally ascertained those evacuees who were to be transferred and informed them of
that tact. It should be pointed out that the operations at Tule Lake
were the reverse of those at the other centers in plans for transfer.
At Tule Lake, the persons not to be segregated were to be transferred;
at all other centers, the segregees were to be transferred.
When one is changing his place of residence, every last detail
must be taken care of before he leaves. This was the principle upon
which the transfer operations were based. Household and personal effects
had to be divided into groups for these transfer operations, just the
same as for any other change of residence made by train. The personal
effects were packed and loaded as luggage or checkable baggage on the
train that the traveler was riding. The household and other effects
were crated ahead or time and shipped as freight in carload lots to the
point ot destination. Because of the large nuni>er or persons coming to
Tule Lake, and the fact that the rail siding was limited in size, the
shipment of freight to the Tule Lake Center had to be scheduled in
exactly the same manner as the passenger traffic.
Detailed arrangements were worked out in advance with each departing evacuee covering the proper time and proper train of departure.
Provision had to be made tor packing containers, and assistance some-

times had to be given in packing. Schedules l'lere worked out for the
pick up of household freight, checkable baggage, arxi finally of the
people themselves. At each center all ol these operations were organized and carried out with a mechanical efficiency, once the basic principles had been perfected.
Provision had to be made on the trains for m::>thers with infants,
pregnant women, invalids and bed eases. Detailed instructions for use
by the train doctor had to be prepared for each patient on the train.
In fact, the medical records of all persons on a given train went with
.that particular train. Emergency medical supplies, strained baby foods,
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bab7 fonmlas, disposable diapers, and numerous other special item had
to be provided. Jlan7 ot these items were the same in general character
tor each trip, but they had to be especially assembled to fit the specific needs tor that trip.
The War Relocation Authority obtained the assistance of the Arrq
in these transfer operations. 'l'hrough the Army Transportation Corps,
representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the Army met with
representatives of the Association of American Railroads and made arrang&ments for the special trains, and set up the schedules in accordance
with the WRA plan. 'lhese special trains had the same priority as troop
a>vements. 'lhe Army provided military personnel to perform the guarding
and to direct the mess operations while en route. From the time the
segregation trains left a center and until they arrived at the center of
destination, the military co.111D&nder of the train was in charge. The Army
provided one doctor and two nurses for each train.
The acco.lllDOdations on the train were coach, except for sick, aged,
infirm, a>thers with small infants, or pregnancy cases. Pregnancies
beyond the seventh a>nth were not permitted to travel until after con.f1nem.a't. 'lbe exceptions noted above were provided with tourist sleeper
accoJ1111K>dations. Usuall7 there was only one tourist sleeper needed for
each train a>ve.ment. Normally there were 18 cars to each train: two
baggage cars for checkable baggage, one a~l1ary dining car for the
preparation ot special diets or Want formulas, one tourist sleeper for
evacuees, seven coaches for evacuees, two tourist sleepers for military
personnel, two baggage cars converted to be used as diners, and two baggage cars comerted to be used as ld.tchen cars. The tllo kitchen cars were
located in the middle of the train with a diner on either end of the
ld.tchen cars; the coaches were divided equally in front and behind the
kitchens and diners; the two baggage cars, the auxiliary diner and the
evacuee tourist sleeper were arranged in that order behind the engine;
and the two tourist sleepers for the military and WRA personnel were
placed at the end of the train. Evacuee volunteers from the group being
transported assisted the mess sergeants in the preparation of the food
en route. By careful arrangements ahead of time, enough food was on
hand at the point of departure to cover the entire trip. The longest
trips, from Tule Lake to one of the two Arkansas centers., or the reverse
run, required 5 days and 4 nights to complete. A War Relocation Authority employee from the center of departure accomP&{lied each trip. 'lbe
Authority reimbursed the War Department for all Army funds expended.
The planning and execution of these transfers took in every division and section, and all the· employees at the centers. If the particular job of an individual did not happen to be in a division or section
where there was mch activity at the moment, the person was often detailed to some work in connection with the transfers. Many of the school
teachers, for example, were used for interviewing or for the highly
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important function of getting information to the evacuees. Motor maintenance personnel had to have trucks and autos ready according to the
schedule and provided with competent drivers. Meals had to be eaten and
the tables cleared, with the people and their hand luggage ready to go
when the vehicles came for the loading process. At first the loadings
were rather ineptly handled, but as experience was gained in the operation the techniques were improved and the whole process greatly speeded
up. 'llle 'l'ule Lake Center developed the mechanical operation to the
point where it was possible to load -a 500-passenger train in 21 minutes,
and unload a train of eoual size in 17 minutes.
'lllere were many details, such as casual medical inspections for
definitely apparent conmmicable diseases such as chicken pox and measles, that had to be carried out both on departure and arrival at the
different centers. Rosters of the persons who travelled on each trip
had t.o be carefully prepared, the people name-checked against the rosters after boarding the train, and then name-checked again on detraining.
All such operations cost money. Careful estimates of the cost of each
operation had to be made, and proper ot;>ligations established to pay for
it.
'lbe Tule Lake transfer movements, the first \'IRA experience in
the movement of masses of people, were a rather sizable operation. All
of the movements anticipated, however, to complete the segregation were
not made in the fall of 1943 due to the necessity of constructing additional barracks and facilities at the Tule Lake Center.
In February of 1944, five additional train trips including
approximately 2,400 people were made from the Manzanar center to Tille
Lake. In May of 1944, prior to the closing of the Jerome center, two
train trips were made from the Arkansas centers to the 'l\lle Lake Center,
involving approximately 800 people.

Iumediately after the completion of the two trips to Tule Lake in
the spring of 1944, the Jerome center was closed by transferring the remaining evacuees to the other relocation centers in the nonth of June.
Approximately 2,500 of the evacuees remaining at Jerome were transported
by 15 trips of a notor caravan 35 miles north to the Rohwer Relocation
Center, and the other 3,100 or so were transferred by rail to four of
the other centers in six train trips.
Like the first movements in and out of Tille Lake, the assistance
of the Arm:, was obtained for all of these movements. The schedules
used were similar, and the mechanics of operation at the centers nearly
the same as before.
In the transfers of all these people, no person died on any train
en route, and no births took place en route. It was necessary to stop
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trains onl1 five times in all or the transfer operations to place persons who had become seriousl7 ill in hospitals, and three or these were
on one train trip.
In all of the transfer operations, the evacuees assisted a great
deal at all times. The largest share of the 1,ork l!as done by them with
interest and expedition.

For all of these movements, a liaison representative was assigned
by the War Relocation Authority to work very closely ~ith the military
personnel at the appropriate headquarters involved, with the Association
of American Railroads representatives and with the appropriate railroad
carriers involved in the particular movement. All plans and schedules
were made available to all concerned well in advance of any movements,
and details were checked very carefully at all levels fro~ headquarters
office to the local station and the centers, even including pretrip
inspections of all rail equipment and necessary supplies.
The War Relocation Authority, including the personnel at relocation centers particularly, gained a great deal from these transfer trips
that was beyond the immediate objective at hand. Centers learned how to
nx>bilize all of their personnel and equipment; how to make plans with
the evacuees; how to receive a plan of operation of major size and cut
it up into small parts and assign responsibility tor the completion ot
each part; how to set up a ti.ming schedule that would put the parts all
together again and in order, with the work done and no details left undone. Time schedules and deadlines were respected and maintained;
observance of them from this time on became almost automatic. The centers learned how to make transportation arrangements for people, and
arrange departures. The packing, handling and shipping of evacuee personal and household effects was an excellent trial experience tor what
was to come. llethods of checking Government property in and out were
developed that were to be very helpful later on. Although it was not
realized at the time, the centers were having a large-scale dress rehearsal in these early transfer operations of the main sho~ of relocation to come in 1945 when the centers closed.

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CHAP'lER XV

CEN'lER CLOSURE

When the War Department announced that the revocation ot the
Exclusion Orders would take effect on JanUB.J:"7 2, 1945, the war Relocation Authority announced that the relocation centers would be closed
within a period not exceeding a year. There was no basis for continued
operation of the centers after the revocation. Center operations and
facilities were curtailed to an essential-operation basis, and all
efforts were directed toward assisting the remaining evacuees with their
relocation plans. The ending of the school term in June was to be the
conclusion of educational operations at the centers.
·
In March and April of 1945, the Authority i:resented to the Bur•u
of the Budget and the Congress a budget proposal tbat outlined the liquidation of the Authority, stating that all relocation centers would be
closed before December 51, 1945, and that the attaira of the Authority
. 1110uld be 1110und up by June SO, 1946, the end ot the fiscal year. At the
time of the budget submission and the appropriations hearings on it, the
war was still going on both in the European and Pam.tic theatres; V-E
Day or V-J lay were still in the future. 'lhe budget set torth an estim te of the remining population, what would be required to cl•r the
centers of evacuee residents, what assistance the evacuees would require
on the outside, and what the Autharit)r must do to abut down the centers,
surplus its property, and completel.T close down the business ot the
Authority.
On July 15, 1945, the Authority announced a definite t i • schedule
for the closing of the centers, when all evacuees were to be gone from
each center.

'lhe relocation volWDB from January to Juq had been very 81all,
due largely to the fact that families with children tended to postpone
departure until the school term was ended. And it was real.q not until
August that the volume of people relocating started to reach trul.7 large
proportions.

In the meant1me, however, V-E Day had arrived, and the work ot
redeployment of the armed forces from the European theatre to the
Pacific theatre was going ah~ at full swing during the swmner of 1945.
1ransportation facilities were strained to the utmost and 1IRA laced the
possibility of not having available transportation with which to move
45,000 people before the middle ot December. The mjor portion of the
military traffic during the swmer of 1945 was from east to west just as
the relocation travel tended to be. Space was hard to get. '!hen V-J
~ ca.me, ending the war, and the movement of military forces back from
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the Pacific started. Although for a while the traffic both east to west
and west to east across the Nation was at full capicity, the trend very
soon turned toward west to east in greater· volume. 'Dle Office of Defense
'lransportation had placed a great many llmi tations on civilian travel in
order to uake equipment a-vailable for military transportation.
A possible bottleneck in transportation at this point could have
disrupted the time schedule established for closing the centers. 'lhe
Congress, it should be added, had appropriated only the money requested
for liquidation on this time sdledule. In fact, shortly after V-J Day,
the Congress had resc:lnded 10 percent of the appropriation nade available to the Authority on the liquidating budget presented, yet the
volume of persons to move, and the time schedule, remained the same. If
transportation could not be obtained for relocation, the ability of the
Authority to do its job in accordance with the schedule set out to the
Congress was somewhat in question; and there were definitely insufficient
funds available to carry on, for any extended period, the operation of
the relocation centers for a large number of people.
Representatives of the War Relocation Authority met with the
Office of Defense Transportation and carefully outlined the problem as
well as the need for transportation both by rail and by bus for evacuee
passengers, and for freight transportation of evacuee properties by rail
and by trudc. 'Dlrough the efforts of the ODT, a meeting was held by
representatives of WRA with ODT and the National Association -of Bus
Operators. As a result of this meeting, arrangements were made whereby
representatives of bus lines that served the local areas in which the
various centers were located called at the centers and determined the
situation at each spec:lfic center, both for tie-in transportation to the
nearest rail junction for traffic both. east and west, and for arrangements believed necessary to provide special busses for trips direct from
the centers to the points of destination. 1hese situations were reported
back through the National Association, and at another meeting of the
'WRA, ODT, and the Assoc:lation•s representatives, arrangements were made
whereby bus facilities for oenter-to-railhead travel would be increased,
and chartered busses for center-to-destination transportation could be
made available. In the following months, the Gila River, Colorado F.iver
and llanzanar centers used the chartered bus service to a very great
extent for westward travel, particularly to Los Angeles. 'Ihe bus
companies within the Association worked out among themselves the interchange and loan of equipnent so that all of these arrangements could be
effective. 'lhe facilities and service provided by the bus oompa.nies
were entirely adequate.
After the revocation of the Exclusion Orders, the Arnv was no
longer concerned with the movements of evacuees, so the requirements for
rail transportation were taken up directly with the Association of
American Railroads, an organization which was very familiar by this time

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with the WR.A program and its operations. It should be pointed out that
the acute transportation needs of the war Relocation Authority came at a
time when the railroads and their equipment were greatly overburdened,
and they were carrying the greatest volumes in their history. Yet very
satisfactory arrangements were worked out with the Association and its
member railroads for two types of transportation facilitiess (1) special
cars, and (2) special trains. '!he governing factors in each case were
sufficient advance notice by the Authority as to when the equipment
would be needed, and what type of equipment would be required. Arrangements for epecial cars were to be d.de locally, between the centers and
the rail carrier. Arrangements for special trains were to be made with
the Association at the·.c•tional level.
Since the relocation mvements out of all of the centers went in
all directions of the compass., it was necessary .fbr the centers to do a
very close and accurate planning of departures with the individual
evacuees, and lay their plans sot:W? period in advance, so that proper
equipment could be requested. Special cars were used mostly for travel
east and to the northwest, or to centrally located points for a group of
people fanning out to different destinations, and then at that point,
the group broke up and proceeded to destinations by regular carrier
service. 'Ihe travel west to California, which was about 65 percent of
the travel, from the Rohwer, Granada, Heart l4o'Wltain, and Central Utah
centers, was by special train. 'Iha facilities on these special trains
were about the same as used for the earlier transfer operations, except
that regular diner service was used, and there were no military personnel
involved in the movements. WRA furnished such personnel on the trains
as appeared necessary.
'Ihe Association of' American' Railroads did an excellent job 1n
providing the necessary rail equipment, under the then present cirew1r
stances. 'Ihere was one thing in the favor of these special train movements in that the major military movement by that time was from west to
east, and a great deal of equipment was being deadheaded from the F.a~t
to the West to bring military personnel to installations in the Middle
West and East. With sufficient advance notice, the Association diverted
equipment, which otherwise would have gone to the West Coast empty, to
the relocation centers and caITied a load both ways, with only a slight
additional time required for the trip because of the diversion.
Transportation tickets were purchased by means of Government
transportation requests. Some group ticketing was done, but the vast
najority of the tickets were p.irchased on an individual basis with an
individual transportation request. A special train, for instance,
although it ran on a charted course would make various stops en route
to discharge passengers. A train from the Rohwer center in Arkansas
would be routed.to Los Angeles by way of' Pueblo, Denver, Salt Lake City,
Reno, Sacramento, and then cbwn the San Joaquin Valley to Los Angeles.

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Passengers 'WOUld detrain at Pueblo, Denver, Salt Lake City, Sacramento,
Lodi, Stockton, Merced, Fre.sno, Bakersfield, and finally, Los Angeles.
'lhe train would start out with about 12 or 14 cars, and then drop cars
en route, so that only 5 or 4 cars would actually arrive with passengers
in the Los Angeles tenninal. Over 50,000 transportation requests were
issued between August and Novenber of 1945 on an individual basis. And
this, of course, meant an individual authorization for travel and an
estimate of the funds to be used on an individual -basis .
Between August and the end of November, approximately 45,000
evacuees left the centers and returned to their own homes or went to new
ooumunities. When the closing of the refugee shelter and the 'fule Lake
Center had been completed by March of 1946, over 60,000 persons had left
the WRA-operated installations.
Given below are the dates upon which the centers were scheduled
for closing in the announcement by the Authority on July 1, 1945, and
the actual date when the last evacuee left each center in 1945 and 1946.
Center
Granada (Colo.)
Minidoka (Idaho)
Central Utah (Utah)
Gila River (Ariz.)
canal camp
Butte Camp
Heart Mountain (Wyo.)
Manzanar (calif.)
Colorado River (Ariz.)
Unit I
Unit II
Unit Ill
Rohwer (Ark.)
Refugee Shelter (N. Y.)
Me Lake Center ( C&lif.)

Scheduled
Closing Date

Actual
Closing Date

October 15
November l
November l

October 15
October 23
October 31

October 1
Noveni>er 15
November 15
December 1

September 28
November 10
November 10
November 25

December 1
October 1
October l
December 15

November 25
September 29
September 29
November 50
February 6, 1946
March 21, 1946

Besides transportation facilitiep and relocation arrangements,
there were many other things that had to be done before the work of the
War Relocation Authori. ty was complete at the centers and the land and
buildings could be turned over to appropriate agencies for disposition.
Many of these operations· had to be worked along concurrently with the
relocation work while the evacuees were leaving.
Very extensive preparations had to be ma.de in order to transfer
the household effects and other property which the evacuees had at the
centers. 'lhe problem was exactly the same as in the transfer operation;

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except on a much larger scale. Individual i:acking and crating, with
careful malicing of the owner's name and desti~ation, had to be done for
each family. Since some families were not sure what their actual street
address or nail station would be, some of the goods had to be i:&cked
and cr6.ted, and then stored until the evacuee wrote back from his destination where to send the goods. Then shipment was effected. Supplies
of lumber and boxes for crating naterials were scarce, and extensive
ei'fort had to be made to locate such material. Boxes for shipnent
purposes had to be fabricated. It took, on the average, from three to
five boxes per persons, plus the crating of unusual items. One family
had 127 boxe~, i:arcels and crates, but this, of course, was exceptional.
At some centers, all of the .freight had to be hauled as much as 20 miles
before it could be turned over to the carrier at the railhead. 'nlere
were papers to make out in each individual case to show what the transaction had been. Bills of lading for each shipment had to be prepared,
and the funds encumbered to pay the freight charges. nie amount of
detail in the whole operation was prodigl.ous.
Some grouping of freight shipments was carried out. For the
San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, group freight shipments would be
nade in carload lots from the centers to the WR.A warehouses on the West
Coast. Since the WRA warehouses were, at the same time, making shiprmnts of property belonging to evacuees from those warehouses, the
operations were combined in tbat way, and the carloads received at the
warehouses were broken down and reshipped on an individual basis to the
evacuees.
A large part of the freight shipnents were carried on through
commercial freight and trucking companies. 'Dus usua.11¥ meant door-todoor delivery. '!he pick-up was at the center and not at a railhead some
distance from the center. Shipnent of freight by truck was by far the
most satisfactory method used.
·
All through the final period of relocation, as much work as
possible was done at ·each center toward the closing down of that center.
Yet most · of i. t could not be done until the last evacuee was gone. As
blocks became spirsel,y occupied or vacant, the mess~alls would be shut
down and the remaining people grouped for eating at a messhall ss
centrall,y located as possible. All the cots, mattresses, blankets,
buckets, tools and similar i terns that had been in use by the evacuees
in the block areas had to be picked up and trucked to warehouses where
they were sorted and stored. Only then could the process of inventorying and declaration for surplus begin.
1he process of closing down a center after the evacuees had left
was r0ughly fourfold: (1) the physical clean-up on the center and the
p.itting of the physical plant in standby condition; (2) the detailed
process of declaring as surplus all the movable equipment at the centers
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as well as the p}:zysical plant; (5) the cutting off of all operational
activity, consolidation of records, and effecting their shipnent to the
Washington office; and, (4) the disbanding of the organization of
persomel at the centers.
Between August and December, two specia~ trained crews of
engineers, . accountants and supply men went to each center and made a
detailed inventory of all of the physical plant at each installation.
1he inventory covered all items at the centers relating to lands and
fencing, buildings, utilities systems, roads and bridges, drainage and
irrigation, and other investments such as water stock, hog and poultry
plants, processing plants, and miscellaneous items of physical plant
not otherwise covered. It was a very strenuous task. F.ach item was
identified, appraised, and recorded by number and check, and reconc1led
against the books of account at the centers. Tracings giving all
details of buildings, utilities, roads and bridges, and drainage and
irrigation l~outs were essential and were prepared.
lhese detailed inventories of physical plant and fixed assets
were used at the Washington level to prepare the declarations of surplus
to the Surplus Property Board and its successors. In all, the nine
installations declared surplus had J:hysical plant and fixed assets
valued at approximately $65,000,000. The refugee shelter at Fort
Ontario, Oswego, N. Y., was used on a permit basis from the Aney, and
was returned to the Arau upon the completion of the work of the Authority
at that location.
As the movable property was picked up from the barracks and
returned to the warehouses, organized crews at each center went systematically about cleaning up the center and putting·it in a standby condition. F.ach barrack was cleaned of any refuse or paper and swept out,
and t.he outside area was also cleared of litter. The amount of trash
that had to be carted away and burned or buried was astonishing. One
center took as many as 70 truckloads of trash out of one single block.
Yet when the evacuees were in residence, by and large, the centers were
quite tidy. All the swves from the · barracks were moved to central
locations for storage. Windows were shut, and doors nailed tight. All
water oonnections in the water and sewage systems and the electric ByStems in the vacated areas had to be turned off. In the case of two or
three centers which closed early in the fall of the year, the weed
problem was such as ~o make it necessary to run a bulldozer or motor
ratrol around each of the buildings in order to avoid a dangerous fire
hazard. The closing down process of the centers was as difficult, if
not more so, than the problems of getting them opened and ready for
operation.
lhe problem of maintaining an adequate personnel and labor force
during the final closing period at the centers was a difficult one.

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Since the evacuee working force had left, labor employed from the outside was f!ssential to get all the peysical work done. Because of the
isolation of the centers, and the fact that many of them had to do
their closing work during harvest season, labor was very scarce in uany
of the areas where the centers were located. Much of what labor was
obtained was of an itinerant type and did not stay long, which nade
the labor force all the more unstable. By constant recruiting, sufficient labor was finally obtained to complete the job satisfactori.]¥,
but not as well as it mi.ght have been.
Appointive personnel all du.ring this period were getting uneasy
concerning future anployment. However, in the main, the personnel
essential to complete the work stayed with the job until the last
declaration of surplus was nade, and the plant and property turned over
to the disposal agencies. A personnel placement program was in operation all during this period and contributed considerably to the
steadiness of the appointive personnel.
All financial and procurement activity had to be brought to a
close, and appropriate measures taken t.o transfer the responsibilit,."
for accounts and payment of outstanding bills and current salaries
to the Washington office. '!he tedious process of gathering together
all of the records throughout the center had to be pushed, and their
consolidation and shipment t.o the Washington office effected. Spec~
trained crews of workers from the Washington office, or from other
centers that had completed their closure process, were detailed to the
larger centers to assist w1 th these problems. Plans had to be made
w1 th each member of the appointive staff regarding his termination, and
provision made for materials for packine and shipping his household
goods to his chosen point of destination. Considerable paper work was
necessary with a dwindling staff to arrange transfers, terminations,
and transcripts of leave; to complete the center's final official
report of its lifetime of operation; and to prepare time reports and
payrolls.
By far the biggest single job connected with the closing of the
centers was the collection of movable property., warehousing it., inventorying it, checking it against property accountability records, and
preparing the declarations of surplus. It takes a large group of well
trained people who are familiar with the nomenclature of all types of
supplies and equipment to do this job. A perfect group of such people
would not be available in any agency; although WRA probably had a
larger number of personnel familiar with this type of work than most
agencies, due to its extensive suppq program. Mistakes were nade in
the nomenclature ~f conunodities, the classification of certain commodities, and in the appraisal of condition and usability. But consideri~
the scope of the job done, such mistakes were few in comi:e,rison
to the total. The sheer mechanical process of typing the large number of

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declarations that WRA centers had to make was extensive and timeconsuming. 'Ihe preparation of many thousands of declaration forms was
necessary at each center where there were over 10 1 000 items of different
kinds. Many of the declarations covered only p:i.rt of the supplies on
hand, and others for the same conmodity had to be made later. Then,
of course, ·there were the corrections to be nade for mistakes of one
kind or another.
Special crews of workers experienced and trained in property and
supply work were fonned and detailed from one center to another as the
closing progressed, to help with this difficult and big problem. Such
an arrangement was a help, but had its disadvantages in that the members
of the crews were not on home ground and familiar with the storage plan,
the plant layout, and other local circumstances.
A very important pa.rt of an agency's declaration of its property
surplus consists of cooperation With the disposal agency designated
to receive the property. From J1.1l3 1945 on to the closing of the last
center, very intensive liaison activities were carried on by representatives of WRA with the various disposal agencies. The nature of
the WRA program was described, and its program of liquidation caref~
explained. Regional and district offices of the disposal agencies were
v.i.si ted by way of follow-up on the contacts nade at the national level.
Every possible effort was exerted to get the representatives of the
disposal ~gencies to cooperate with the Authority on the job at the
centers, and to have their representatives work along side of the WRA
personnel so that each agency would be of assistance to the other in
handling the surplusing of the property. But such cooperation was not
obtained from the disposal agencies to the extent that 1 t was of any
actual assistance to either agency. Usually., when the disposal agency's
inspectors final~ did arrive on the job, it was so late and they were
so few in nUll'.ber., that their activities never caught up with the work
of the personnel of the Authority and never accomplished very much in
~lirninating misunderstandings. At one center, one regional office of a
disposal agency agreed that it would let the WR.A personnel use the
disposal agency procedure and would accept the results of the work.
That center, Heart Mountain, is the only place where any appreciable
arount of work and time were saved for the Government, although efforts
were ire.de to effect the same sort of arrangement at every other center.
'Ihe regional offices of the disposal agencies are not entire~ to
blame for their noncooperation at that time. During the period of surplus
declaration by the War Relocation Authority., particularly during the
intensive period from October 1945 to March 1946, the disposal agencies
were reorganized in form and direction, and had their territories
changed five different times. It was difficult for the disposal agencies
to know, and for the Authority as a declaring agency to know, just what .
agency and what regional office should receive the declarations of

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consumer items, on the one hand, and capital goods, on the other.
Because of more effective liaison activity on the part of the War Relocation Authority at the national level and the Agency's system of
filtering infonnation down through channels to the centers, the relocation cente1-s were constantly better and more currently informed
regarding changes in disposal agency organization than were the regional
offices of the organizations directly concerned.
Another important factor in the reluctance of the disposal
agencies to assume responsibill ty in taking over the property that the
Authority was declaring surplus, was that the Surplus .Property Board I s
regulations provided that an owning agency would be required to retain
custoey and as8WDB responsibility for aey property declared surplus
to a disposal agency, until the disposal agency had actually disposed
of it. And then it was the owning agency's responsibility to pack and
ship the items after they bad been sold ~ the disposal agency. 1his.
meant that there was no need for hurry to assume custod;y of the property.
'!be fact which the regional and national offices of the disposal agE11cim
could not seem to realize was that the 'War Relocation Authority was
going out of business. It was not like an established bur.,eau that had
one or roore pieces of property which it had declared surplus at a
location which would continue in operation for an indefinite time to
come.
It took a great deal of liaison work With the disposal agencies
and other places before the fact was recognized that the Authority was
actua~ going out of business, and that the Congress and the Bureau
of the Budget and others knew about it and agreed to it. Congress had
appropriated only sufficient funds for operation on the assumption that
the Authority would go out of business in accordance with the tim
schedule it bad established. After these facts were established,
directives- went out to the regional offices of the disposal agencies
regarding the necessity for them to take _over the custody of the
}ilysica.l plant and the rovable · property. 'Iha agencies designated as the
disposal agencies for buildings and land, if &nT, were in every instance
different from the agencies designated for the disposal of the movable
property.
'!here were a lot or public relations problems connected with the
closing of the centers. Announcements, of course, appeared in the newspapers that a center was closing by a given date. Hundreds of people
would col!J:! to the centers for a wide variety of purposes. Some desired
to scavenge through the buildings and area, or appropriate items which
they believed had no value. Others thought that everything was immedia tely for sale, •and were dis_gusted when they could b'IJ1' nothing.
Veterans came to the centers in large nwli:>ers with proper credentials
for purchase from a disposal agency, but, as owning agency, the WRA had
no authority to sell to them, and the reJ;reaentatives of the disposal

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agencies were usually so far behind the WR.A work in their inspections
and appraisals that the items were not ready tor sale. ~ came interested in trying to ~ buildings for the naterial ba~ needed tor construction work in the vicin1.ty. Fire protection. and guarding work became
even mre difficult than when the centers were f ~ occupied. Action
b7 the Federal Public Housing Administration under Public Law 292, which
gave the FFHA authority to transfer to it any surplus items which would
help the veterans' hOU81ng program, frequently caused confusion because
it was initiated •1'V' timss after declarations ha~ been nade and the
item had been advertised for sale. Congressional inquiries in the
interest of some person desiring to buy property at the centers came
into the national office in great volume. 'll'l.e public found it hard to
understand that the WRA, as the owning agency, had no authority to sell,
· and that the dispoeal agencies had not finished their work and were not
reac:t,- · to proceed- with a sale in accordance with the Surplus Property Law
of 1944 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. A great deal o~
time of a large number of people was consumed in this closing_period at
all centers in answering questions, attempting to be courteous, but
turning people away from the centers without aqything being accomplished
to the satisfaction of either party.
Based upon the amount of time required to declare the property at
the Jerome center as surplus in 1944, the amount of money available tor
the surplusing op,rations and certain other factors, a period of approxinately' 90 days from the time tpe last evacuee left each center was
established as the time necessary to perform the closing operations, and
turn the custoct, of the propert,. over to the designa~d disposal agencies. Thia calendar proved to be suffi c:ient, but activities had to go
forward at a rapid pace in the final closing operations to meet it.
Listed below are the dates in 1946 when the various centers were turned
over to the appropriate disposal agencies, and the-agencies designated
for this purpose. The War Assets Adm:1nistration (the successor to all
of the previous disposal agencies b&ndling consumer and capi. tal goods)
assumed custody of all movable property at all locations.
Liquidation
Date

Designated
Disposal Agency:

Granada (Colo.)

January 27

Kinidoka (Idaho)*

February 10

Central Utah (Utah)

i'ebruary 10

Heart Mountain {Wyo.)*

February 24

Gila River (Ariz.)

February 24

Farm Credit Administration,
U.S. Dept. ot Agriculture
General Land Otfi ce,
U. s. Dept. ot the Interior
Farm Credit Administration,
U. s. Dept. of Agriculture
General Land Office,
u. S. Dept. of the Interior
General Land Office,
U. S. Dept. ot the Interior

Center

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General Land Office,
U. s. Dept. of the Interior
General Land Office,
u. S. Dept. of the Interior
General Land Office,
U. S. Dept. of the Interior

Colorado River (Ariz.)N- ¥arch 10
Rohwer (Ark.)

March 10

Manzanar ( Calit. )

March 10

Refugee Shelter (N.Y.)

)larch

Me Lake (Calif.)*

liq 5

* Bureau

u. s.

Array,

War Department ·
General Land Office,
U. S. Dept. of the Interior

ot Reclanation is acting as agent and custodian for the General

Land Of fl ce.
"'Office of Indian Affairs is acting as agent and custodian for the
General Land Office.

'lhe closing of the relocation offices was relatively easy compared with that of the centers, even though there were a much larger
nwd:>er of individual establishments to be closed. Since ioost of the
property at the relocation offices consisted of office equ1JJ118nt, and
the offices were located in la:rge metropolitan areas where there were
offices of other Federal agencies, ioost of the equipment and supplies
remaining at these offices were taken over by other bureaus of the
Department of the Interior. Whatever was not taken over by these
bureaus was declared as surplus to the War Assets Administration which
had little difficulty in disposing of it imnediately to expanding organizations such as the Federal Public Housing Administration and the
Veterans Administration.
'lhe problem of records consolidation and shipnent to the Washington office was present in the relocation offices just aa it was at the
centers, although, except in those offices that had operated large warehouses and had a large number of records relating to the evacuee property that had been in the warehouses, the operation was not .nearly so
large as it was at the centers. District relocation offices closed
their records and reports into the area offices where they were consolidated with the area records and reports and forwarded to WUhington. At
the Washington level, the area records and reports were consolidated
with other material, and transmitted to the National Archives for
presenation.

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Full text of Administrative Highlights of the WRA Program

FRASER