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A G uide to

Labor-Management Relations
in the United States
Supplement No. 2

Bulletin No. 1225-2
July 1959

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
James P. Mitchell, Secretary
BUREAU O F LABOR STA TISTICS
Ewan ClagM , Com m issioner

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing O ffice, Washington 25, D.C.

Price 45 cents

IN T R O D U C T IO N TO S U P P L E M E N T NO. 2

T h e fo u r r e p o r ts w h ic h c o m p r is e t h is s e c o n d s u p p le m e n t to th e G u id e to L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e l a t i o n s in th e U n ite d S t a t e s c o v e r th e f o llo w i n g s u b j e c t s :

U n io n in d u s t r ia l e n g in e e r in g a c t i v i t i e s
U n io n a t t i t u d e s tow ard jo b e v a lu a t i o n
W age s y s te m s
E q u a l jo b o p p o r tu n ity u nder c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a in in g

As in the case of the previous 36 reports in this s e r ie s ,1 these four were orig
inally requested and prepared to furnish a brief guide to aspects of labor-management
relations in the United States of particular interest to trade unionists, management rep
resentatives, and government officials of other countries.

T h e G u id e to L a b o r -M a n a g e m e n t R e l a t i o n s in th e U n ite d S t a t e s , u n der th e d i r e c
tio n o f J o s e p h W. B l o c h , i s a p r o je c t
R e la tio n s .

The

fo u r

r e p o r ts

o f th e

c o m p r is in g

B ureau ’ s
th e

secon d

D i v i s i o n o f W a g e s a n d I n d u s t r ia l
s u p p le m e n t

w e re

p repared

J o s e p h W . B lo c h an d T h e o d o r e W . R e e d y .

(4 reports, 43 pages)

1 All 40 reports in this series are listed in the consolidated table of contents
on the following page.
The basic volume (BLS Bull. 1225, price $2) contained 31 reports. Sup
plement No. 1 (BLS Bull. 1225-1, price 45 cents) contained 5 reports. Both sets, punched
for standard binders, may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov
ernment Printing O ffice, Washington 25, D.C., or from any of the BLS regional offices.

Contents
(consolidated)
1.

Trade union activities:
1:01 Growth of the trade union movement
1:02 Structure of the trade union movement
1:03 Administration of national unions
1:04 Administration of local unions
1:05 The unionization of white-collar workers
1:06 Workers* education
1:07 Trade union uses of economic data
1:08 Union participation in community activities 1
1:09 Union industrial engineering activities 2
1:10 Union attitudes toward job evaluation 2

Collective bargaining:
2:01 The development of collective bargaining
2:02 Grievance procedures
2:03 Voluntary arbitration
2:04 Mediation and conciliation
2:05 Union adjustment to technological change
2:06 Sharing productivity gains through collective bargaining
2:07 Union-management cooperation
2:08 Union participation in safety programs
2:09 Fringe benefits under collective bargaining
2:10 Health, insurance, and pension plans under collective bargaining 1
2:11 Government’ s role in labor-management relations 1
2:12 Labor-management programs in training and retraining workers 1
2:13 Wage systems2
2:14 Equal job opportunity under collective bargaining2

Labor-management relations in selected industries:
3:01 The automobile industry
3:02 The basic steel industry
3:03 Coal mining
3:04 The railroad industry
3:05 The apparel industries
3:06 The textile industries
3:07 The meatpacking industry
3:08 The petroleum industry
3:09 The construction industry
3:10 Electric and gas utilities
3:11 The local transit industry
3:12 The maritime industry
3:13 Nonferrous metals mining
3:14 Agriculture

General:
4:01 Glossary of current industrial relations terms
4:02 Selected bibliography 1

1 Supplement No. 1 (BLS Bull. 1225-1).
2 Supplement No. 2 (BLS Bull. 1225-2).

1:09

Union Industrial Engineering Activities1

Several decades ago, the activities of the American labor
movement relating to industrial engineering, which then bore the
label "scientific management," could be summed up in one word—
opposition. The same word would describe the prevailing attitude
among managements industrial engineers toward dealing with a
union on matters relating to time study, work simplification, the
design and administration of incentive wage systems, job cla s s i
fications, job evaluation, and other work or wage functions of in
dustrial engineering. Although positions of outright rejection still
persist in union and management ranks, opposition in principle has,
on the whole, given way to some degree of accommodation and the in
teraction of viewpoints which collective bargaining relationships
tend to encourage. The degree of mutual accommodation naturally
varies among companies and unions, and is often just enough to
avoid continuous conflict.
Union involvement with industrial engineering functions,
whether through joint participation, negotiation, informal consul
tation, or the exercise of grievance and arbitration procedures,
has become an important and often routine part of day-to-day plant
operations. Instruction of union representatives and shop stewards
in the techniques of industrial engineering and in ways of dealing
with management on these matters are now fairly common features
of union operations in those industries where industrial engineering
methods are widely used. A few unions go so far as to propose
plant reorganizations, product changes, or new production methods,
based on recommendations of their own industrial engineers—
a reversal of traditional roles— to protect jobs or to achieve another
goal of importance to union m em bers.
Background
The sharp conflict between unions and the exponents of
"scientific management, " which persisted at a high pitch through
the first two decades of this century, and widespread union fears
regarding the consequences of scientific management, which had
a longer life, gave way as each side made concessions on princi
ples, and as unions gained the strength to cope with industry's
engineers on the collective bargaining front. Management's em
phasis on industrial engineering was admittedly designed to increase
1 Chapter 2:13, Wage Systems, and chapter 1:10, Union At
titudes Toward Job Evaluation, cover important aspects of union
industrial engineering activities.

(i)

worker output and lower costs through .the use of new methods,
such as time and motion study. These new methods appeared
to unions as means of undermining traditional collective bar
gaining procedures, weakening or destroying skills, increasing
the work p^ce, and creating unemployment,, Their intuitive r e
action was to resist. Abuse of the new methods aroused more
opposition among w orkers. What made matters worse was the
belief widely held among early practitioners of scientific man
agement that the methods devised were truly S c ie n tific , " ap
plicable with the precision of a mathematical formula, hence
allowing no possible role for unions and collective bargaining.
The labor m ovem ents continued opposition is credited
with having stimulated among scientific managers some caution
in the claim s made for their systems and an increased sensi
tivity toward the attitude of workers and the role of unions, but
did not noticeably alter their unwillingness to work with unions.
In turn, union leaders became familiar with the techniques and
reasoning of scientific management, perhaps m ore rapidly than
would have been the case under other circum stances, but their
rejection remained complete until the early 1920fs. Produc
tion requirements during World War I, which forced the indus
trial engineers and union officials into close association for a
common cause, and la b o rfs new interest in production and c o
operation during the war and immediately thereafter, brought
about something of a reconciliation and an abandonment of
extreme positions, at least at the national level. However,
the weakness of the trade union movement during the 1920*s
provided little restraint on managements increasing use ofnew
methods, unilaterally installed and operated. That these pro
grams aroused dissatisfaction at plant and industry levels was
made evident during the 1930*s.
It is not likely that the system of accommodation, or
the lessening of conflict, that now generally prevails was brought
about by wholesale conversions on either side; rather, the par
ties becam e, over time, more evenly matched. On the one hand,
while managements interest in new techniques continued to grow,
the industrial engineer was relegated to a less dominant position
in management ranks, particularly with regard to dealings with
unions. On the other hand, the growth of union membership,
rising wages, and full employment strengthened union confidence
in its ability to strike a bargain which would provide some de
gree of protection to, and might even increase, earnings. Union
representatives may not accept some or all of the precepts upon
which industrial engineering activities are based, and they fr e
quently protest on m oral or ethical grounds and criticize on
technical grounds, but they are not willing to allow management
complete unilateral control of work and wage practices.
1:09

Current union attitudes have been summed up in these words of a
member of the staff of the AFLi-CIO*s Industrial Union Department:
"The current approach of the labor movement is not doctrinaire,
and while there is a basic fundamental trade union objection to
•scientific management1 or industrial engineering, as we know it
today, the attitude of the labor movement, that is, the functioning
operating attitude of the labor movement,is to attempt to prevent
industrial engineering from wreaking the damage that it could un
less it is controlled and regulated by the collective bargaining
p rocess. n
Role of the Union Industrial Engineer
For the most part, unions train their representatives in
industrial engineering techniques and employ industrial engineers
to balance the use of such professionals by management, since the
initiative in the use of these techniques remains with management.
Mr. Solomon Barkin, Director of Research for the Textile Workers
Union of Am erica, defines the role of the union industrial engineers
as follows:

The union employs the industrial engineer on
its own staff not to provide it with a time study with
which to counter those made by the management (un
less the management's time-study man is not truly
competent); his primary purpose is to define the i r
regularities on the job overlooked by the management's
time-study man— the complexities and dimensions
which have been m issed; the judgments and assump
tions which should be questioned; the work which has
been neglected; the attention and personal factors which
must be given more credit; the allowances which should
be added— and to analyze the data collected by the man
agement's staff. His responsibility is to define the al
ternatives which the union may consider in formulating
its counterproposals as to earnings and levels of work
application. His greatest skill expresses itself in
converting the w orkers' insights and demands into
mathematical form for use in negotiations. This
service is of tremendous value in bridging the semantic
differences between workers and management, and
facilitates understanding and negotiations. His duties
are not to find the right answers, since he is in no
better position than the management's time-study man
to provide an objective conclusive finding. M oreover,
there is no such answer in this area of economic

1:09

bargaining. His function is to provide the m a
terials for negotiations which include an evalua
tion of the import of each factor of the job and
the w orker's expectations and judgements. 2
The following clauses, extracted from an agreement cov
ering a large paper m ill, illustrate, but do not necessarily typify
the types of problems which bring a union into industrial engineer
ing activities:
During the period of modernization, the com
pany will have to make changes in equipment, op
erating p rocesses, and personnel that may result
in adding new job s, changing or eliminating others,
consolidating duties and rearranging crew s. The
need for change and the formulation of plans for
changes, and the procedure to be followed in in
stituting any change, will be determined by the
company. The union will be advised of any major
change that has been determined and when it will
be placed into effect.
In order to obtain the facts with respect to
any department, or any portion thereof, or wHh
respect to any job or operation, the company r e
serves the right to use all available means or
methods, such as job analysis, time study of both
machines and em ployees, methods study, motion
study, the suggestions of supervisors, and the
services of industrial engineers and consultants.
The union agrees to cooperate with the company
on these studies and reserves the right to make
suggestions.
In any department or portion thereof, where
the accumulated facts indicate that increased e f
ficiency and lower unit costs to the company may
be effected by an incentive method of pay, the
union agrees to negotiate with the company for
a fair and proper incentive plan for that depart
ment, or portion thereof, and its effective date,

2 Solomon Barkin, New Labor Approaches to Industrial
Engineering, Textile W orkers Union of A m erica, Research De
partment Publication No. T-122, 1955.

1:09

and, in connection with the study and negotiation
of an incentive plan, may use its own consultants
and engineers. Any such plan shall provide a
guaranteed hourly rate to each employee (which
in no case shall be less than the then current
hourly rate paid to the affected employee or em
ployees), increased earnings for increased p ro
duction, and no unreasonable workload.
Any claimed violation of the contract will
be handled through the grievance procedure.
In this example, the union!s technical competence in the
industrial engineering field would be put to the test in (l) evalu
ating the nature of the changes in equipment, etc. , to be made by
the company; (2) making suggestions and working with the company on
job analysis, time and motion studies, e tc.; (3) negotiating on in
centive plans and rates; (4) determining "unreasonable workloads;M
and (5) carrying complaints through the grievance procedure and
possibly preparing cases for arbitration.
A ccess to the plant and to relevant data is often assured
to the union time-study engineer by an agreement clause.
For ex
ample, a contract provides the following:
In any case after a dispute between the
parties involving a piecework rate or standard
is appealed to the next to final step of the
local grievance procedure (or earlier by
mutual agreement), the employer will permit a
time-study engineer approved by the union to
enter the plant for the purpose of making studies
of the rate or standard in dispute in order that
the union may be in a position to properly p re
sent its case. An em ployer^ time-study engi
neer shall be present during such studies or
observations by the union time-study engineer.
Another agreement provides:
All information concerning rates, methods
of establishment, analysis sheet, etc. , shall be
made available to the union at reasonable times.
In some cases, the company is obligated to present relevant
information directly to the employee involved, as in the following
example:

1:09

Upon the release of a production standard
established by a complete new time study, the
employee who was time studied will be given
the following facts in writing:
a.

The exact total period of time over
which the time study took place.

Evaluated cycle time.

The number of pieces that were produced
during the time study.

The leveling factor to be computed by
dividing the allowed time by the aver
age observed time minus strikeouts.

The allowance granted in minutes.

Drafting the clauses cited above, or negotiating with man
agement on the wording of such clauses, illustrates another function
of the union industrial engineer o r, m ore frequently, the union rep
resentative familiar with industrial engineering techniques. In some
cases, critical areas of time study are specifically defined in the
agreement and agreed-upon standards are set forth. The union in
dustrial engineer may also devise new trade union techniques. For
example, the research staff of the Textile Workers Union of Am erica
developed work duty charts, the so-called "benchmark** system of
establishing production standards, and new job rationalization programs.
Union consultation in industrial engineering matters fr e
quently is not defined or limited by a specific agreement clause, but
consultation may be invited on an informal basis by individual fo r e
men, supervisors, and management technicians. In addition to a
desire to gain worker and union cooperation on proposed changes,
and perhaps suggestions, informal consultation may be motivated
by a desire to forestall formal grievances and possibly arbitration,
which can be time-consuming and costly.
A few unions, notably the two major garment unions, have
used their industrial engineers to assist weak or failing companies
that were unable to help themselves. Usually jobs or union wage
scales were at stake. In such instances, the union filled a void
created by ineffectual management, typically small producers. The
garment unions have done much to raise the efficiency of many e s
tablishments in their industries through the application of industrial

ls09

engineering techniques, but expediency, rather than a desire to
take over management functions, accounts for this involvement.
The typical union in m ost industries has all it can do to keep up
with management innovations.
Training Union Technicians
Union needs for people skilled in dealing with industrial
engineering techniques far exceed their ability or their desire to
hire technicians. This means that union m embers or local union
representatives must be trained to carry on this work. As one
union president wrote to participants in a time-study training
institute:
You are undoubtedly aware of the increasing
application of tim e- and motion-study schemes
for a variety of purposes which directly affect us
in collective bargaining. The resulting number
of grievances and arbitration cases is staggering,
and takes up a substantial proportion of the availa
ble time of union representatives at the local and
international level. . . . Your international offi
cers do not expect you to become management en
gineers in a week— this would be neither possible
nor desirable. We do expect you to improve your
abilities along lines of obtaining maximum con
tractual protection for our many local unions
which are faced with problems in this field. And
we expect you to be in a better position, through
increased practical knowledge of technical language
and practices, to penetrate the complexities of
many of the problems which you will face.
In some cases, management agrees to undertake or to
cooperate with the union in such training, as the following agree
ment clause illustrates:

The union may nominate and submit to manage
ment a group of not more than 20 employees as
candidates for employee time-study reviewers • • •
on the basis of ability and aptitude, 6 candidates
will be selected by the company for training; 4 of
the 6 will be designated as employee time-study
reviewers and 2 will be designated as alternate
review ers. A minimum of 2 of the reviewers and

1:09

1 alternate shall be selected from the list of
candidates provided by the union . . . The
company agrees to pay the reviewers at their
established hourly base rate during the period
of training, and for time spent in performing
their duties as review ers.
Another agreement states:
The company shall cooperate with the local
union in the training of local union time-study
engineers and, at the request of the local union,
shall permit practice studies to be taken on any
operation approved by the em ployer.
Many unions are opposed to management-directed training
on industrial engineering m atters, fearing indoctrination in fixed
procedures, presumably management-oriented. Unions lay con
siderable stress on the need for educating members and union rep
resentatives in problems and procedures, but since they are often
mainly interested in ways of upsetting management preconceptions
and form ulas, they feel that they cannot rely upon managementtrained technicians for this purpose. A number of unions have issued
time-study or job-evaluation manuals for representatives and shop
stewards, and the hiring of full-tim e industrial engineers seems to
be increasing. The R esearch Department of the AFL-CIO and the
AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department both, employ an industrial
engineer to provide advisory services on request arid to arrange
training programs and seminars for union representatives.
Selected Union Experiences
An engineering program has been in operation on a formal
basis in the International Ladies* Garment Workers* Union since
July 1941. Its objectives were then defined as follows:

1:09

To assist in improving the manufacturing
techniques and operating methods of all
branches of the ladies* garment industry. . .
This will be done through plant inspections
by department staff m em bers, followed by
specific recommendations.

To serve as a central information agency:
(a) for the determination of the level of fair
piece rates; (b) to record the production

system and manufacturing techniques under which
these rates are paid; (c) to assist in training shop
m embers and comm ittees in distinguishing bad
time-study practice from good time-study practice
in the determination of rates.
After 16 years of operation, the union engineering depart
ment reported that there had been considerable change in emphasis
in its activities. E fforts to improve manufacturing techniques had
become a relatively small part of the department's operations,
largely because of the pressure of other problem s. Similarly, the
plan to serve as a central information agency for determining the
level of fair piece rates had to be severely curtailed. With em
ployers scattered over 40 States, rapidly changing styles, and the
wide variety of equipment used, the possibility of gathering stand
ard data has becom e rem ote.
The II jGWU industrial engineering department reports its
present functions as follows:
1.

It enters piece-rate disputes between employ
ers and w orkers, when rates are set by com
pany engineers. If there are no company en
gineers, the department assists line officers
when they are not equipped to determine the
rate's accuracy.

At the request of union o ffice rs, the depart
ment will lay out new plants for firm s under
contract with the union which cannot afford
the services of consulting engineers and
architects.

Only at the request of union business agents
or managers in the field does the department
advise em ployers about the best manufactur
ing techniques, or attempt to eliminate bottle
necks in production in order to increase the
earning power of the union's membership.

The department assists union negotiators in
writing contract clauses which will protect
the membership where earnings depend on
piece rates.

The industrial engineering department will not set original
piece rates; it insists on remaining advocates of the w orkers, not
impartial consultants. Under actual operating conditions, department

1:09

technicians have found that they cannot act solely as technicians,
but must also assume the role of negotiators in piece-rate dis
putes. Agreement clauses designed to protect earnings levels
are suggested to local union officials. Operating necessities
have forced the staff of the union's engineering department to
becom e, in effect, technically trained business agents. In
studying w orkers' complaints, it has been necessary in many
cases to look beyond the problems of machinery and production
methods and to consider the needs, tensions, aiid responses of
workers in industrial conflicts. As a result, the department's
requirements for new staff members have undergone a gradual ~
change, lessening the dependence on technical training.
The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of A m erica, operat- ;
ing in the men's and b oy s' clothing field, has had comparable ex
perience in industrial engineering problems. As far back as 1924,
the union's General Executive Board reported on what it termed
"ra d ic a l departure's in the methods and policies of a labor
organization:11
Because of this attitude of the union, the
wage negotiations of 1924 /The employers de
manded wage r eductionsjwere rapidly converted
into a survey o f the industry * with a view to d is
covering all possible sources of saving and means
of increasing employment. Prolonged conferences
were had with individual firm s in which labor costs,
overhead, sales methods, and shop organization
were discussed and analyzed. The union made sug
gestions and took under consideration proposals
from the em ployers. The technically trained depu
ties of the union worked with the management in
devising more econom ical methods of production;
whole new shops, with this effective cooperation of the
union, were quickly organized and put into operation
without friction and high expense of promotion. This
process of readjustment was carried on without any
change in the general level of wages. . ... The signifi
cance of theise steps in terms of the power and in
fluence of the union cannot easily be exaggerated.
In the textile industry, work assignment represents one of
the more troublesome industrial engineering problems. In most
occupations the worker tends almost automatic machinery, and thus
has little or no control over his work pace or level of application.
In addition, each worker may tend several machines. Recent

1:09

developments in machines and m aterials, combined with depressed
economic conditions, have led management to press for more rigid
production standards and higher workloads. Bargaining on work
assignments, speed of operations, and pay rates have become in
creasingly complicated.
To meet this engineering challenge, the research depart
ment of the Textile W orkers Union of A m erica, among other educa
tional work in this area, prepared a Textile Worker 's Job P rim er,
This highly technical instruction manual was designed to guide
workers and, m ore specifically, shop stewards and business agents,
in the evaluation of work assignments arrived at by management en
gineers. According to this manual, the worker should be "able to
judge management's proposal to discover what work elements have
been left out or im properly described, and thus to be constructively
critical of the results. More important, he should be able to develop
a sound counter proposal on work assignments, piece rates, and
earnings. Where productivity rise s, he should be in a position to
calculate the extent and proper reward. Finally, he should be able
to estimate the steps required to protect workers when new work
systems are introduced. " The union does not pretend that these are
simple problems.
Another example of a union training manual prepared for
the guidance of workers and shop stewards is a question-andanswer pamphlet called The ABC of Time Study, prepared by the
education department of the United Automobile W orkers. After
warning of the dangers o f "speedup's11 in operations, and the lack
of universal applicability o f time-study results, the pamphlet
makes this point:

Management says it has no other way to deter
mine production rates. Anyhow, a shop steward
must know about time study, whether it is good or
bad, scientific or unscientific, because management
uses it to set production standards, to determine how
hard you work and (under incentive-pay systems) how
much pay you get. By making a time study and its
results subject to collective bargaining discussions,
you help protect workers against inaccurate and un
fair work requirem ents. Actually, an agreement that
com es out of an exchange of ideas will be m ore satis
factory than the result of the individual judgment of
a time-study man. . . A time-study result is no
more final than a pay rate and is equally subject to
bargaining and negotiation.

1 j09

The International Union of Electrical Workers takes the
position that just as there is no one best method of doing a job
in a factory, there is no one best method of dealing with an em
ployer on the tim e- and motion-study question. Union officials
say that "As pragmatic union people/we adopt the method that
seems best calculated, considering the given circum stances, to
produce the best result. ,f
The union believes that the rights, privileges, and r e
sponsibilities of the parties should be spelled out in the contract;
if definite clauses governing industrial engineering activities are
agreed upon, the areas of possible disputes will be substantially
reduced. Clauses in some contracts provide for: (l) notice to
the union when time studies are to be made, so the steward can
become familiar with the operations under question and can ob
serve the study; (2) agreement between the foreman and steward
as to the operator to be studied; (3) rating and recording the study,
and making the results available to the worker and the steward
before leaving the work area; and (4) keeping written data on file
for possible future union analysis. Provisions for union challenge
and rechecking, terms under which a new study can be made, and
clauses establishing time limits for setting standards and c o rr e c t
ing e rro rs , are also frequently sought. Finally, machinery for
handling grievances which arise from time studies is generally
provided.
The AFL-CIO, as a federation, is prim arily concerned
with providing a service to its member organizations rather than
in participating in union-management relationships at the plant or
industry level. The practical problems raised by the application
of industrial engineering techniques compel many unions to look
to the federation for advice. Thus, the AFL.-CIO and its Industrial
Union Department have adopted a many-sided program of assistance
to its member unions, involving education, research, publication,
consultation, and coordination. Although the program is still largely
in a formative stage, the AFL-CIO is working toward the goal of
putting industrial engineering activities in a collective bargaining
context. It believes that skills should be developed in national unions,
and in State, district, and local groups, to enable union represen
tatives to deal with industrial engineering problems as a part of the
normal collective bargaining process and through the processing
of grievances.

1:09

1:10

Union Attitudes Toward Job Evaluation

H istorically, managements introduction of new industrial
engineering techniques has tended to arouse sharp opposition in
union ranks. 1 However, job evaluation, one of the newer tech
niques, first came into prominence during World War II under
relatively favorable circum stances. Wage stabilization policies,
which controlled wage increases rather rigidly, encouraged the
installation of rationalized wage structures and job evaluation
programso Some unionists saw in these processes opportunities
for upward wage adjustments. Despite reservations on principle
in many cases, a number of new systems were put into operation
or set in motion with union acceptance, support, or participation
At present, union attitudes toward job evaluation range
from acceptance and participation (exemplified by the United
Steelworkers of Am erica) to complete opposition (exemplified by
the International Association of Machinists). Generally, the pre
vailing sentiment, as expressed in union literature, appears to be
that of scepticism regarding the claims put forth by the exponents
of job evaluation systems, their underlying principles, and
managements intentions in introducing or maintaining these
systems. Such union expressions are usually accompanied by a
warning to union representatives to be on the alert for the pitfalls
of bargaining under job evaluation systems. The AFL-CIO, in
keeping with its practice of avoiding a fixed position on certain
collective bargaining problem s, has no uniform policy of either
acceptance or rejection, but its publications, in general, reflect
opposition rather than acceptance.
The Development of Job Evaluation
American industry, on the whole, has accommodated its
characteristically high degree of work specialization to the prin
ciple of relating an em ployee^ wage to the type of work he perform s
(rather than to his characteristics and needs) by formalizing wage
structures, 2 That is, workers are assigned to defined jobs which
are then, possibly, classified into job groups, and wage rates are
determined or negotiated for each job or group of jobs so as to
form a reasonable wage progression or ladder from the lowest
skilled (to use one m ajor criterion) to the highest skilled job. A
skilled tool and die maker, for example, will typically be paid
m ore than a production lathe operator; a lathe operator working to
close tolerances who sets up his machine will be paid more than a
lathe operator on routine repetitive work; and so on.

1 See chapter 1:09, Union Industrial Engineering Activities.
2 See chapter 2:13, Wage Systems.
(1 )

A major problem in wage determination, particularly in
large establishments with a multitude of different jobs, is the de
termination of a reasonable wage structure. How is the wage hi
erarchy of unlike jobs in a plant determined? How much of a wage
rate differential between jobs is m erited, will assure a supply of
needed skills, and will keep wage costs competitive? The problem
is complicated by the variety of factors which make up a job and
which virtually set off each job in a plant as somewhat unique. Such
factors include, but are not limited to: Training; education require
ments; manual and mental skill; physical effort; mental effort; r e
sponsibility for tools, equipment, m aterials, and the safety of other
workers; hazards; working conditions (e. g. , heat, noise, dust, wet
ness); and the availability of workers able to perform the job.
These factors obviously do not carry equal weight for wage setting
purposes; furtherm ore, among jobs in a given establishment there
will likely be wide variations in degree within each factor, which are
difficult to assess.
All factors and variations are not always con
sidered in setting wage rates or, when considered, are not always
evaluated in precisely the same manner. On the other hand, no estab
lishment operates in a vacuum; in a rough way, a scale of job values
permeates all labor markets.
The procedures for ranking jobs, establishing wage differen
tials among jobs, adjusting to job changes, or introducing new jobs,
differ widely among industries and establishments. In establishing a
wage structure or adjusting an existing structure, management may
rely on rule-of-thumb or trial-an d -error procedures in which the judg
ment of individual forem en and supervisors carry considerable weight.
The test for this procedure is provided by the volume of grievances,
the amount of discontent, possibly a strike, the labor turnover rate,
the ability to hire suitable workers, and the change in labor costs.
Such a procedure is substantially modified through direct collective
bargaining on individual job rates, which tends to make the process
m ore systematic and to reduce grievances and discontent (often shift
ing a share of the problem of handling real and imagined inequities
among workers from managements to the unions shoulders). Un
willing to rely on a rule-of-thum b procedure, and reluctant to bargain
with the union on each rate (or unable, because of the volume of jobs),
or for other reasons, to handle the problem efficiently in this way,
management technicians devised and developed job evaluation plans.
Although often an expensive investment, the use of job evaluation has
grown at a rapid rate during the past two decades, and is likely to
continue to grow in those industries in which such methods are ap
plicable and acceptable.

1:10

The term, job evaluation, is applied to systematic, m e
thodical procedures for ranking jobs and for establishing relation
ships among jobs or labor grades based on an analysis of job content.
Several basic types of systems have been devised, and each may be
modified by a company to suit its own needs. 3 Probably the most
common system utilizes the point method, under which jobs are
rated by such factors as manual skill, effort, responsibility, etc.
Each factor is defined and graded from low to high. Point values
are assigned to each factor and to the grades within each factor.
The sum of the points credited to each job determines its rank and
grade. The steel industry plan discussed later in this chapter is
of this type. Most form al job evaluation systems require carefully
written descriptions of each job.
A company’ s job evaluation plan may also prescribe a pro
cedure for fixing the wage levels for the entire job structure, fr e
quently on the basis of local labor market surveys. Although partic
ular job evaluation plans may provide a systematic or predetermined
basis for adjusting a company’ s wage structure to prevailing wage
levels, whether local or industrywide, sim ilar procedures can be
employed when jobs are alined and relationships established by
means other than form al job evaluation.
The accompanying table shows the prevalence and some of
the features of job evaluation plans in nonelectrical machinery in
dustries in six m ajor centers in the winter of 1955-56. In Milwaukee,
all but 6 percent of the workers were employed in establishments
with form al programs; in contrast, job evaluation plans were far less
common in Detroit. Formal employee representation in the process
was not a generally accepted procedure. Among the six cities cov
ered, job evaluation plans involved the establishment of labor grades
in most cases and provided a range of rates for tim e-rated workers,
who usually were subject to a periodic m erit review for increases
within the range.4
Union Attitudes
Attitudes toward job evaluation, as toward other manage
ment techniques, vary widely among and within unions, depending
largely upon experiences.
3 Job evaluation systems can be broadly classified into four
types: Point method, factor-com parison method, ranking method,
and classification method. Combinations of point and factorcomparison methods are frequently used.
4 See chapter 2:13, Wage Systems.

1:10

Job evaluation plans in nonelectrical machinery manufacturing in 6 major centers, winter 1955-56 1/
(Percent distribution of production workers)

Item

Workers in establishments with formal
job evaluation procedures •••••.... •••
Ranking m e t h o d ....... •«•••,,,,,«
Classification method ......... ,,,,,
Point method .......................
Factor-comparison method ,«•••......
Combination (point and factor) ••••••
Other ............................ .

Chicago

NewarkJersey City

Detroit

Milwaukee

Cleveland

3
36

3
36
4

94
4
12
58
9
10
-

(2/)

47
(2/)

3
(2/)

21
17
4
-

Los AngelesLong Beach

28
5
(2/)
15
7
-

(2/0

With employee representatives par
ticipating in job evaluation......
With labor grades established in
connection with job evaluation ....
With formal rate ranges for time
rated jobs established in con
nection with job evaluation .......

Workers in establishments with no
formal job evaluation procedures ••••••

Total ............................

100

Workers in establishments with collec
tive bargaining agreements covering
a majority of production workers .....

101,450

75,750

55,942

50,179

42,471

43,727

Estimated number of workers employed •••

1/
2/

Excludes establishments with fewer than 21 workers,
Less than 2,5 percent,

NOTE:
Source:

Because of rounding, figures may not add to 100,
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

For convenience of discussion, four attitudes can be
identified:
1.

Opposition to job evaluation in its entirety (a r e je c
tion of any system which replaces collective bargain
ing on individual job differentials and rates);

Criticism of job evaluation theories and methods on a
technical level;

Indifference to management practices or implied a c
ceptance of job evaluation so long as wage rates are
satisfactory or a smooth functioning grievance and
arbitration machinery is readily available; and,

Acceptance and joint participation.

Among the unions opposed to job evaluation in principle
and practice, the International Association of Machinists has been
the m ost articulate in presenting its case. In a manual entitled
"What^ Wrong With Job Evaluation, " prepared by the union!s r e
search department in 1954, the IAM*s objections, as they related
to collective bargaining, the union, and society at large, were
set forth as follows:

Collective bargaining
Basically, job evaluation tends to limit
collective bargaining.
This reflects itself in
the following ways:
1.

It tends to freeze the wage struc
ture and thereby creates an obstacle
to the correction of inequities. It
restricts the right of negotiating on
a rate of pay for each job year after
year. It usually limits negotiations
to bargaining for a fixed amount or
fixed percentage for all jobs, or
establishing rates of pay through
some predeterm ined form ula” that
usually does not result in equitable
treatment for all.

It fails to consider all forces which
determine wages, such as supply
and demand, other contract or area
rates, etc.
1:10

It tends to create a barrier between
the employee and his understanding
of his own job rate, because his
rate is set in a manner not under
stood by himc

It tends to disregard the ability of
the individual,

It places a ceiling upon wages which
is contrary to a traditional objec
tive of organized labor.

It disregards compensation for loy
alty, i. e. , years of service, etc.

It tends to dilute traditional skills,
creating many new occupations and
many new classifications and there
by reducing wages.

It affects the seniority of employees
by the creation of additional cla ssi
fications*
It makes the promotion of employees
into higher paying jobs considerably
m ore difficult because of the lim it
ing characteristic of job descriptions.

10.

It provides the company with a tool
to downgrade employees during times
of cutbacks.

Our organization
Job evaluation presents a threat to the sta
bility of our organization because of the following:

1:10

It necessitates the constant attention of
additional trained representatives, there
by increasing the cost of representation
to the local, district and Grand Lodge.

It provides management with a tool to play
one group of employees against another.

It creates dissension within a local lodge
(where members are from m ore than one firm )
where all firm s do not have job evaluation. It
tends to hamper the efforts of the lodge in es
tablishing uniform area rates.

It tends to place the responsibility upon the
union for inequities that are not properly c o r
rected since the union accepted the job evalua
tion plan and must, therefore, share in its
shortcomings.

It compels the continuing and almost im possible
task of educating job study committees and shop
stewards in the many ramifications of the job
evaluation plan in effect.

It encourages managements of different plants
to work together and provides them with a
basic method to achieve jointly desired results
in the determination of wages; it strengthens
managements opposition to the wage demands
of the union.

Our society
The effects of job evaluation upon the general w el
fare of our society is discernible as it affects the supply of
skilled workers. It tends to discourage bona fide appren
ticeships and, therefore, reduces the reservoir of overall
skilled workers so that in the event of a future crisis a
serious shortage of skilled manpower would result.
The manual acknowledges that in many cases the local unions
are not in a position to eliminate or to prevent the adoption of job
evaluation, and provides information so that union representatives can
minimize adverse effects and obtain whatever benefits may be possible
for m em bers. A. J. Hayes, president of the IAM, sums up the unionJs
position as follows:

We are opposed, as a matter of policy, to all job
evaluation plans. We know that none of these plans was
engineered or designed for the benefit of the employees.
Employers just do not hire expensive engineers to design
wage systems that result in m ore money for their em
ployees . . . .
The real worth of an employee to his
employer cannot be determined by measuring the par r e
quirements of his job.
1:10

Union representatives and technicians who deal with job
evaluation problems often criticize what they consider to be
the weaknesses and deficiencies of job evaluation in general and in
specific plans.
They deride claims that job evaluation is "scien
tific, 11 nobjective, 11 "accurate, " or ,,equitable.,f They question
whether certain elements of job content (e. g. , hazard) or job
content as a whole can be measured and evaluated. They doubt that
all demands upon the workers can be analyzed; that degrees of appli
cation can be measured. They point to external factors, which,
they claim, ought to be considered in setting rates, e. g. , regular
ity of employment, possibility of advancement, general labor market
situation for particular skills, etc. Criticism of this type often leads
to bargaining with management on the mechanics of job evaluation,
or, if this is not feasible, to outright opposition to job evaluation.
Some unions do not get involved in arguments over manage
ment methods. They seek clauses in the collective bargaining agree
ment safeguarding certain desirable standards, such as barring
downgrading, and restricting the right of management to reevaluate
existing jobs or to introduce new jobs except for new work.
They
also process grievances vigorously.
Union participation in the installation and/or the admin
istration of job evaluation plans may be based on one or more
considerations:

1:10

The union itself may need some method of recon
ciling conflicting groups, of avoiding charges of
favoritism and other form s of dissension within
its own ranks.

Since breaking a job down into its component
elements may be done consciously or uncon
sciously in collective bargaining, it may as
well be done form ally, with the union in the
position to make counterproposals.

In a large establishment with a multitude of
different jobs, it is difficult to counter a
systematic management approach with an
essentially opportunistic plea for bargaining
on every job individually. The union will be
confined inevitably within the framework of
the plan; hence, it is better to lay the ground
work for participation from the beginning.

One outstanding example of a union participating from the
beginning in the establishment and administration of job evalua
tion plans is the United Steelworkers of Am erica, a party to such
plans found throughout most of the basic steel industry. The fo l
lowing section briefly describes the development of job evalua
tion in this industry.
Job evaluation spread through the steel industry under
the stimulation of a November 1944 directive of the National War
Labor Board which directed steel companies and the Steelw orkers1
union to negotiate for the elimination of intraplant inequities and
reduction in the number of job classifications. This directive arose
out of wage stabilization problems created by wage-rate grievances
arising from widespread dissatisfaction with job and employee clasfication, the industry!s tremendously complicated wage structure,
and inequitable rate relationships between plants of the same com
pany and between companies. The Board established a Steel Com
m ission to assist the parties in carrying out the complex rationali
zation program in accordance with certain general guidelines laid
down by the Board. The parties entered into studies and negotiations
with a will to succeed, as evidenced by the fact that the project con
tinued and was brought to fruition about 2 years after Federal wage
controls were terminated. The job evaluation program thus estab
lished has been maintained to the present time, with necessary m odi
fications agreed to by the parties.
One of the first m ajor steps in this undertaking was the
preparation and adoption of a Manual for Job Classification of
Production and Maintenance Jobs, which established the standards
for job classification and evaluation. The companies prepared the
job descriptions and classified the various jobs in accordance with
the procedures set forth in the Manual, which were then presented
to the union for its approval. Disputes were settled by the
Steel Commission.
The Manual for Job Classification designated 12 basic fa c
tors which would be considered for each job:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9-

Preemployment training.
Employment training and experience.
Mental skill.
Manual skill.
Responsibility for m aterials.
Responsibility for tools and equipment.
Responsibility for operations.
Responsibility for safety of others.
Mental effort.

1:10

10. Physical effort.
11. Surroundings.
12. Hazards.
A numerical value (points) was assigned to each factor.
Jobs were graded for each factor in accordance with a scale of
points corresponding to differences in the importance of the par
ticular factor in the job.
s an illustration, the scale of point
values determined for 1 of the 12 factors— manual skill— is shown
below:
MANUAL SKILL
Consider the Physical or Muscular ability and dexterity required in performing a given job in
cluding the use of tools, machines, and equipment.
Code

Job requires ability to;

Numerical
classifi
cation

Use ordinary or heavy tools such as bars, wrenches, shovels, hooks, etc., for per
forming simple or rough tasks, or where dexterity and pace are not of particular
importance.
Operate simple on and off switches, valves, and lever controls.
Handle ordinary material manually.
Use chain or cable slings for simple crane hooking.

Base

Use large wrenches, sledges, handtools, and heavy tools at a normal pace for a
variety of tasks.
Use gauges and small tools in a routine manner.
Use torch to perform rough cutting work.
Operate variable controls, such as rheostats, and levers, to control movement of
machines or passage of material through equipment where jogging, frequent
regulation and precision of adjustment is required.
Make simple adjustment and repairs to machines and equipment.
Make setups to equipment where the use of tools and gauges is simple and routine.

0.5

Use several handtools or tradesman's tools on assembly work, such as ladle
lining, simple carpentry or pipefitting or in making adjustments to machines or
equipment where close tolerances are required.
Perform simple gas or arc welding.
Use hand-cutting torch to bum to precision layout.
Set up and operate machine tools for routine facing, drilling, milling, etc.
Manipulate controls of complex machines at a rapid pace involving a high degree
of coordination.
Perform manual tasks such as positioning, assembling, etc., at a steady pace
where accuracy and dexterity of high degree are required.

1.0

Use tradesman's tools in a wide variety of difficult tasks involving close toler
ances.
Forge complex shapes without resorting to dies or templates.
Finish complex sand molds, cores, etc.

1.5

Perform difficult shaping or forming to close tolerances, where precise muscular
control and delicate touch are involved, such as making and assembling very
small parts, precision instrument repair, etc.

2.0

Source: Agreement on Elimination of Wage Rate Inequities Including Manual for Job
Classification of Production and Maintenance Tobs, Bethlehem Steel Co. and United
Steelworkers of America, April 11, 1947, pp. 18-19*

1:10

The job class to which each job was to be assigned was
determined simply by the sum of the points assigned, rounded to
the nearest whole number. Originally, 30 job classes were estab
lished in the m ajor companies, with a uniform cents-per-hour in
terval between classes which has since been widened. By 1957,
thousands of operations or jobs in the production and maintenance
departments of steel m ills were classified by mutual agreement.
More than 450,000 employees were engaged in these jobs. How
ever, the task of evaluation is a continuous one, as jobs change
and new jobs are introduced. Disputes over classification prob
lems are settled by arbitration.
The objectives of the union in negotiating a job evalua
tion program were described by a union official as follows:
1.

To negotiate a ranking of jobs, which, in the
m ajority opinion of union officers, local and
national, and other union personnel, is the
best possible job relationship that can be
obtained, regardless of historical or other
practices.

Eliminate all rate ranges where possible,
having one standard hourly rate for each job.

Eliminate all substandard rates such as:
women's rates, area rates, geographical
rates, and m erit rates. Rate the job and
not the individual.

Provide for correlation of ail sim ilar jobs,
throughout the company or even industry
with proper procedures for future policing
of the program.

Limit the red-circlin g of jobs 5 to an
absolute minimum. Any program which
results in a red-circlin g of m ore than
10 percent of the man-hours is unacceptable
unless accompanied by a provision for de
creasing their number at a future date not
too long after installing the standard hourly
wage scale.

5 In general, this term applied to payment of out-of-line
(high) wage rates to an employee as long as he holds the job, or
until the excess over the standard rate is absorbed by wage ad
justments which eventually raise the standard rate to the level of
the "r e d -c ir c le " rate.

1:10

As there is nothing sacred or scientific
about job evaluation program s, the union
should insist on some method of keeping
the Manual and its working procedures
up to date with the changing methods of
operating.

One of the m ajor problems faced by the union was educating
union representatives to administer these program s. A committee
of rate adjustors was established in each region and these union rep
resentatives received schooling and other types of training. The
rate adjustors, local union representatives, and representatives of
the national union worked together on the problems that arose.
The attitude of the Steelworkers has remained favorable to
ward the job evaluation program since its establishment. The union
has indicated that it does not care to return to the old system of
fighting for individual rate increases, which, it claimed, disorgan
ized the union m ore than the companies.

1:10

2:13 Wage Systems

The system or procedure by which wages are determined
and paid is a fundamental aspect of employment, particularly
in an industrial society. A key element, seldom challenged in
principle in the United States, is that pay should be related p ri
marily, if not exclusively, to the type of work performed and not
to the differing personal needs of individual workers, such as
family responsibilities, or to individual characteristics, such as
age, sex, or race. In this framework, the method of wage pay
ment used in each establishment becomes significant— are workers
to be compensated on the basis of the amount of time spent on the
job or of the amount of work done? If the amount of time is to
govern, what account, if any, is to be taken of differences among
workers in the amount or quality of work done? If payment by
results is to govern, how are changes in output and wages to be
determined and what account, if any, is to be taken of the amount
of time the worker spends on the job?
This chapter summarizes prevailing practices in the
United States concerning methods of wage payment and some r e
lated aspects of pay determination at the plant level. The role of
the unions in shaping these systems and some current union at
titudes are also outlined. 1 The technicalities and problems in
volved in the complicated field of wage determination, particularly
in systems involving payment by results, are beyond the scope of
this chapter.
Methods of Wage Payment
Methods of wage payment are usually classified under two
broad headings: Payment on a time basis and payment by results
(incentive plans). Payment on a time basis, which is the predom i
nant method in terms of number of employees involved, may take
the form of an hourly rate or a salary calculated on a weekly,
biweekly, monthly, or annual basis. Incentive plans attempt to
relate workers* earnings entirely or in part to the worker* s out
put or accomplishments, either as individuals or as groups.
There are, of course, borderline or overlapping systems— e. g.,
some tim e-based systems involve standards of production below
which workers cannot fall without running the risk of loss of job
or reduction of earnings; some incentive plans are so constructed
that only exceptional workers exceed the standards set for a guaran
teed base (expressed in time units). Annual bonuses or profitsharing plans are normally considered as supplementary wage
devices, not as integral parts of wage systems.
1 See chapter 1:09, Union Industrial Engineering Activities;
and chapter 1:10, Union Attitudes Toward Job Evaluation.

(i)

Tim ework, — Typically, office workers, supervisors, and
professional workers are paid on a salary basis. The salary may
be expressed in a weekly, biweekly, monthly, or annual rate, usu
ally payable in weekly or biweekly pay periods. On the whole,
very little real difference exists among the various salary periods
since no explicit guarantee of employment is involved in the ex
pression of a salary rate in the United States, In some occupa
tions (for example, teaching) annual rates may cover an extended
Slimmer vacation period, but in regular year-round employment the
only difference between a weekly and annual rate may be the e le
ment of prestige and status sometimes attached to the longer period.
Manual or production workers in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing establishments are typically nonsalaried; that is , their
pay is determined by an hourly rate or by an incentive plan. Pay
ment on an hourly basis is the predominant system for production
w orkers. In principle, the compensation that hourly paid workers
receive is determined by the hourly rate times the number of hours
worked, plus whatever premium pay (e, g, , for overtime or nightshift work) the worker is entitled to.
The development of extensive systems of fringe benefits
and related wage practices, accelerated by union demands prin
cipally during the past two decades, has so altered concepts of
"hours worked" that the distinction between salaried and hourly
paid workers has narrowed appreciably. Many hourly paid work
ers now receive annual paid vacations, paid holidays, partial or
full compensation for time lost through sickness or accidents,
daily pay guarantees and, in some instances, weekly guarantees,
and various types of paid leave for personal business (such as
death in the family)— all of which, a generation ago, was v ir
tually confined to salaried w o rk e rs.2
The chief distinction between an hourly paid worker and
a worker paid on an incentive basis lies in the fact that the pay
of the form er does not vary with his output or other measure of
production on a week-to-week or other short-term basis. This
does not necessarily mean that the production of the hourly paid
worker is not measured or controlled—he may, in fact, work on a
machine-paced operation in which the exact number of units to be

2 See chapter 2:09, Fringe Benefits Under Collective
Bargaining.

2:13

completed in an hour is fixedo Nor does it necessarily mean
that individual differences among hourly paid workers on the
same job are not rewarded, in part at least (by m erit increases,
for example)o In large measure, although by no means in all in
stances, the incentive worker controls completely or in part his
rate of earnings from week to week. This degree of control varies
considerably among incentive-rated jobs.
Incentive W ork.— Incentive systems are varied and com
plex.
The simplest form in concept, although not necessarily in
the administrative problems involved, is straight piecework, in
which the rate per piece is set and the worker*s pay is the product
of this rate and the actual number of pieces he produces.
Thus,
earnings vary with and in the same proportion as output. There are
incentive systems in which earnings vary proportionally less than
output (e. g. , Bedaux), more than output (e. g. , high piece-rate
systems), or at different rates at different levels of output (e. g. ,
Gantt). There are group system s, department or plant systems,
and even systems covering indirect workers, such as in mainte
nance work. Most are designed to hold out to workers, as indi
viduals or as groups, a financial incentive to raise or to main
tain output.
The types of operations to which incentive systems have
been applied are remarkably diverse: Sewing machine operators
under a piece-rate system; steelworkers receiving incentive pay
on top of base rates established through job evaluation; truckdrivers paid on a mileage basis; saleswomen paid on a com m is
sion basis; auto repair mechanics receiving a share of the charge
which the customer pays, etc. No statistics are available which
would indicate the proportion of all wage earners paid on an in
centive basis, but some information on the prevalence of incentive
wage systems has been compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor*s
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A comprehensive series of industry wage studies made
by the Bureau in 1945 and 1946 revealed that approximately 30 per
cent of manufacturing plant workers were paid on an incentive basis.
About two-thirds of all apparel workers were on such a basis. In
centive systems were found to a lesser extent in textile industries
(about two-fifths of the workers). About a fourth of the workers in
metalworking plants were paid on an incentive basis, but prevalence
varied widely among the component industries. Variations among
selected industries are shown on the following page.
Among nonmanufacturing industries, about a third of
employees in clothing stores and department stores and nearly

2:13

Incentive Systems, Selected Industries, 1945*46

Industry

Percent of
plants with
incentive
systems

Percent of
plant
workers on
incentive pay

A p p a rel:

Men's and boys* dress shirts and nightwear
Women's and misses* d r e s s e s _____________
Women's and m isses’ suits and coats _____
Work pants, c o t t o n --------------------------------------

88
92
67
89

74
69
44
67

7
4

11
3

15
28
14

16
29
23

18
3

24
2

75
95
19
65

35
68
22
34

1
28

(l )
6

25
43

19
33

C h e m ic a ls:

Drugs and m ed icin e s----------------------------------Industrial chemicals _______________________
M etalw orking:

Communication equipm ent__________________
Foundries, fe r r o u s -------------------------------------M ach in ery------- ---------- -------------------------------Radios, radio equipment (except tubes),
and phonographs _________________________
Tool and die jobbing shops ------- --------- ------T e x tile s:

Cotton t e x t i l e s ____________________________
Hosiery, s e a m le s s -------------------------------------Textile dyeing and finishing ---------------------Woolen and worsted textiles ---------------------O th er manufacturing in d u str ie s:

Bakeries —---------- -------------------------------------C ig a re tte s--------------------------------------------------Footwear (except house slippers and
rubber fo o tw e a r)---------------------------------------Wood furniture, other than
upholstered ______________________________
Wood furniture, upholstered ------------------------

Less than 0.5 percent.

two-fifths of those in auto repair shops were paid on an incen
tive basis. About a fifth of underground bituminous coal miners
were paid incentive rates.
These 1945-46 studies also showed that although incen
tive workers generally received higher earnings than timeworkers in comparable jobs in the same industry, the size of
the average differential was not consistent among industries0
The earnings advantage of incentive w orkers, on the average,
ranged from less than 5 percent to at least 40 percent in the
individual manufacturing industries studied; in many, the aver
age difference was between 15 and 25 percent. Differences in
output were not studied.
2:13

Method of Wage Payment for Plant Workers,
Selected Labor Markets, 1957—58

Labor market

Timeworkers
(as a percentage
of all workers)

Incentive workers
(as a percentage
of all workers)
Piecework Bonus

N o rth ea st:

Boston ,—_________________
Newark-Jersey City ---------New York City ___________
P h ila d elp h ia_____________

64
71
76
66

20
12
18
22

16
17
6
11

77
70
76
85

18
7
21
8

5
22
3
7

67
70
57
80
71

12
17
18
6
15

21
13
25
13
15

80
87
90
93

15
3
7
4

4
10
3
4

South:

Atlanta ---------------------------Baltimore ________________
Memphis -------------------------—
New O r le a n s -------------------M iddle W e s t:

Chicago --------------------------Cleveland ---------- ------------Milwaukee -----------------------Minneapolis-St. Paul -------St. Louis ------------------------Far W e s t:

D enver-----------------------------L os Angeles-Long Beach Portland --------------------------San F rancisco-O akland-----

More recent statistics of this comprehensive nature are
not available, but the Bureau has compiled more current preva
lence information, on a community basis, for manufacturing
plant w orkers. In a survey of 40 labor market areas in 1951-52,
the Bureau found that about 3 0 percent of manufacturing plant
workers were paid on an incentive basis, a proportion which
matches the incidence of incentive pay found in the 1945-46
study. In 1957-58, the percentage distribution of plant workers
by method of wage payment in 17 labor markets is shown in
the tabulation above.
A common feature of incentive plans is provision for a
guaranteed hourly base rate, which is assured to the worker
for the amount of time spent on the job. Such a guarantee pro
tects the worker against a substantial loss of earnings incurred
during the course of a day*s work through reasons beyond his
control, e, gc, a temporary breakdown of machinery or a fail
ure in work scheduling or movement. In some cases, this
guarantee is put into the form of ’’downtime, ” a fixed hourly
rate or a percentage of normal hourly earnings which applies
only in the event of a machine breakdown or in similar
circum stances, A full guarantee of normal earnings may also

2:13

be provided. Lacking any such guarantee, the incentive worker
in low-wage industries is at least assured of the Federal mini
mum wage, if he is in covered employment, for every hour
spent on the job.
Formalization of Wage Structures
Two decades ago, one of the characteristics of wage
determination in a substantial segment of American industry was
the absence of rationalized or ’’form al" wage schedules for tim ew orkers—with jobs defined and workers classified into jobs or
job groups, each with a specific wage rate. Less systematic
procedures generally prevailed. They involved individual rates
for timeworkers set by management on the basis of a variety
of objective and nonobjective criteria. In some cases, there
were as many rates in effect as there were workers employed.
Largely as a consequence of Government wage controls
during World War II and the Korean conflict and the spread of
union organization (or accelerated by these developments), fo r
mal wage structures that provide an established rate or a range
of rates for each job classification have been widely adopted in
industry— to a greater extent in production than in office work,
and in manufacturing and public utilities than in trade and serv
ice industries. In 1957-58, according to Bureau of Labor Sta
tistics studies, less than 1 percent of tim e-rated manufacturing
plant workers in the San Francisco area were employed in plants
without form al wage structures; the proportion was 3 percent in
Chicago, 16 percent in Philadelphia, and 18 percent in New York
City, Among office workers in all industries, the proportions of
workers in offices on individual rate systems were 34 percent in
San Francisco, 26 percent in Chicago, 36 percent in Philadelphia,
and 40 percent in New York City,
Wage formalization involved (l) the determination of a
single rate (e, g«, $1,80 an hour) for each job category (how
ever defined) in the plant or office, with all qualified workers in
the same category receiving the same rate; or (2) a rate range
(e. g , , $ 1, 80-$ 1,90 an hour) for each job category which allows
for some rate differences among workers in the same category
based on merit, length of service, or both. Advancement within
the r a n g e may be automatic, but, typically, advancement b e
yond the upper limit of the range can be achieved only by moving
into a higher rated job.
Under all types of form al systems, some exceptions
may be found; for example, learners may receive less than
the going rate in a single rate system or the minimum in a
2:13

rate range system; some out-of-line or "personalized" rates
may be necessary to accommodate an exceptionally long-service
employee, a worker who has been transferred to a lower rated
job with a guarantee that he would not suffer a loss in earn
ings, a superannuated employee, etc* Indeed, it is difficult
to adhere strictly to form al wage structures without an o c
casional deviation, but management usually strives to keep
such deviations to a minimum*
Among form al systems, rate range systems are by far
the predominant method where office workers are concerned;
among plant workers, variations in practices are more pronounced*
For example, among manufacturing plant workers in San Fran
cisco under formal systems in 1957-58, about 95 percent were
employed in single rate plants; in Chicago and Los Angeles,
a majority was under rate range systems; in New York City
and Philadelphia, a majority was under single rate systems*
Labor Grade Systems*— To simplify wage structures,
many large establishments have consolidated a multitude of
job rates into a fixed number of labor grades, with each grade
commanding a separate single rate or a rate range* For ex
ample, all jobs in basic steel plants have been grouped into
31 classes* Such diverse occupations as locomotive cranemen,
corem akers (foundry), arc-bridge operators (blast furnaces),
and stranders (merchant m ill) are classified in the same job
class and are paid the same standard hourly rate* Labor grade
systems probably represent the highest degree of formalization
practiced, and are often based upon comprehensive job evalua
tion program s*3
Collective Bargaining Problem s
Industry in the United States had reached a relatively
high level of development, and systems of wage payment were
therefore well entrenched, before most unions became effective
forces in collective bargaining* Although worker protest against
a particular system of payment (e. g*, the notorious ’’task" system
in apparel manufacturing) was a moving force in the formation of
some unions, the major reasons stimulating the formation and
growth of unions generally did not include worker rejection of
prevailing systems of wage payment, as such* The trade union
movement as a whole has never held to a single standard r e
garding types of wage systems other than a deep-seated belief
that, whatever procedure is to be used, workers should have a
voice in its determination or modification.

3 See chapter 1:10, Union Attitudes Toward Job Evaluation*
2:13

Individual unions have consistently and strongly opposed
certain practices which other unions have found acceptable or
have learned to control. Differences of approach also arose
within unions, causing the union as an entity either to avoid tak
ing a set position or to resolve the issue in some wayB Union
policy may also change, over time.
Whatever principles they
may adhere to, unions have achieved widely differing degrees of
success in impressing their desires upon management. In some
cases, unions participate in all significant decisions involving
systems of payment; on the other hand, wage administration may
remain, in practice, entirely a management function. A variety
of experiences falls between these two poles.
In the long run, union policies, as expressed in c o l
lective bargaining or in other ways, have had a profound
influence on systems of wage payment, particularly in the area
of wage incentives0 M oreover, the process of collective bar
gaining, in itself, has exercised an influence by stimulating
management in the direction of rationalizing and formalizing
company wage practices. In the following sections, the various
aspects of wage systems previously described are briefly ex
amined as collective bargaining problems.
Hourly Versus Salaried R ates. — Unions have been suc
cessful in achieving for hourly paid workers some of the ad
vantages attached to a salary system. A general demand for
the elimination of the hourly wage system in favor of a salary
system has never been put forth by the labor movement as a
whole, and such an issue does not now arise in any major in
dustry. Perhaps the closest approach to a m erger of hourly
and salary systems is reflected in proposals for guaranteed
annual wages or guaranteed employment for hourly paid workers,
but such plans are as yet uncommon.
Collective bargaining problems bordering on this issue
may arise. For example, where hourly paid and salaried jobs
are found in the same bargaining unit, disputes sometimes arise
as to whether workers in a particular job, or an individual
worker, are to be paid on an hourly or a salaried basis. Nor
mally, such a dispute is handled through the established griev
ance and arbitration procedure. However, a management shift
of hourly paid workers to a salaried basis, r e s u l t i n g in the removal
of these workers from the bargaining unit as defined in the
agreement, is a more serious matter which may or may not be
appropriately handled through grievance procedures. A larger
number of shifts of this type among top-skilled jobs is one of
the problems that unions foresee in the growth of automation.

2:13

Formalization of Wage Structures»— The rapid growth
of form alized wage structures in the United States may be
attributed to the fact that both management and unions consid
ered the establishment of specific job rates a desirable practice.
To unions, Norm alization11 is simply the means for eliminating
the possibility of bias and favoritism among workers doing e s
sentially the same work within the plant and for reducing claims
of inequity among such workers. These reasons, perhaps som e
what differently stated, also appeal to the managers of large
establishments. In addition, the greater efficiency of form alized
structures makes them attractive to management.
P reference for single rates or rate ranges differs among
unions. Many unions are opposed to rate ranges, particularly
if merit (as evaluated by the company) is to determine the
movement of workers within the ranges. Under rate-range sys
tems, unions typically seek to introduce automatic features which
would substitute length of service in the job for m erit reviews as
the determinant of ingrade increases.
Not infrequently, raterange systems incorporate both automatic and merit increases.
Incentive Wage Systems. — On no other issue relating to
wage systems and structures are unions (and workers) so sharply
divided as they are on the acceptance or rejection of incentive
wage system s. Unions have gone on strike to forestall the in
troduction of incentives or to eliminate them; on rare occasions,
strikes have also been precipitated by management decisions to
give up an incentive system. Union and worker attitudes toward
wage incentives are shaped by a number of factors, including
the traditions of the trade, the nature of the industry, favorable
or unfavorable experiences with particular systems, and their
ability to exercise some degree of control over the operation of
the system and the determination of rates and standards. Some
unions— building trades unions, for example—have long, been ada
mant in their opposition to incentive systems; other unions— in
apparel manufacturing, for instance— have contributed much to
the stabilization and spread of incentive systems in their indus
tries, sometimes overcoming centers of opposition within their
own ranks.
Wage incentives are opposed by some unions because of
one or more of the following reasons: Suspicion of management’ s
intentions and methods of determining rates and standards; flu c
tuation in weekly earnings that might result from incentives; fear
of unemployment; dilution of skills resulting from excessive
specialization; increase in the work pace; competition among
workers and the dissension such competition might cause; and the

2:13

com plexities of some systems which leave workers in the dark
as to how their earnings are computed,, These reasons may not
apply, or may be controlled, or workers and unions may see com
pensating advantages in plants and industries where incentive sys
tems operate without difficulties,, S u c h advantages may include:
Opportunity to raise earnings without raising costs (an important
factor where nonunion competition is strong); opportunity to increase
earnings with small changes in techniques, etcG; relative freedom
from close supervision and more flexibility in adapting pace of
work to individual worker*s capabilities; and relative ease of ad
justing to changes in market conditions and type of product,.
Where incentive systems operate, collective bargaining
agreements typically contain detailed provisions designed to e s
tablish safeguards against abuse of the system and to provide for
some measure of union participation* Agreements may provide
for union participation in rate setting; guaranteed minimum rates
and guarantee of earnings in the event of machine breakdown,
faulty flow of material, job transfers, etc*; assurance that
rates will not be cut unless changed conditions warrant such
adjustments; and similar controls.
Unions in industries in which wage incentive systems
are widespread train union representatives and shop stewards
in rate setting and in understanding the uses and limitations of
time-study techniques* In recent years, union industrial en
gineers have challenged some of the concepts underlying in
centive plans and rate determination, particularly prevailing
practices in work or effort measurement. Management attitudes
and procedures with regard to incentive systems, subject to
reevaluations of the purpose, results, and shortcomings of the
systems in effect as well as to union p r e s s u r e s , are modified
through the years* Technological changes in the direction of
automation, which have the effect of diminishing the usefulness
and the applicability of wage incentives, may accelerate m odifi
cations in present wage administration practices.

2:13

2:14

Equal Job Opportunity Under Collective Bargaining

Equal job opportunity— or the elimination of discrim i
natory action or selection— has long been an avowed goal of the
American labor movement. In broad principle, this goal r e
flects the ideal widely shared in the United States and in other
dem ocracies that all men are created equal and have the same
rights to ,rlife, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.ff In trade
union term s, it also reflects the belief that a community of in
terest exists among workers which transcends differences in
age, sex, creed, nationality, color, and political affiliation. uAn
injustice to one is an injury to a ll11 was one of the earliest slogans
of American unions. W orkers have form ed or joined unions for a
variety of reasons, but a desire to attain equality of treatment
and dignity in their places of work undoubtedly ranks among the
major motivations.
Achieving equal job opportunity for all workers is often
a formidable problem. Deep seated prejudices may have to be
overcom e; w orkers' apprehensions concerning increased com
petition for jobs may have to be alleviated; supervisors' in cli
nations to favor some workers over others on arbitrary grounds
may have to be restrained; and misconceptions about the capa
bilities of particular groups may have to be corrected. A union
and a collective bargaining relationship can provide a mechanism
for dealing with such problem s, and notable succeses have been
achieved. The existence of a union and a collective bargaining r e
lationship, however, does not automatically advance and, as has
happened in some cases, may even impede the development of
equal job opportunity for all workers. Both industry and labor
have moved a long way toward putting principles of equality into
practice, but it is widely acknowledged that much remains to
be done.
The AFL.-CIO constitution lists the following among its
objectives and principles: "To encourage all workers without
regard to race, creed, colo r, national origin, or ancestry to
share equally in the full benefits of union organization. " To help
accomplish this aim, the constitution established a committee
on civil rights, vested Mwith the duty and responsibility to assist
the Executive Council to bring about at the earliest possible date
the effective implementation of the principle stated in this con
stitution of nondiscrimination in accordance with the provisions
of this constitution. 11 Subsequently, a subcommittee was estab
lished to expedite complaints involving discrimination by any
AFL-CIO affiliate.

(i)

The position of the AFL.-CIO has not gone unheeded by
its affiliates or by unions seeking affiliation. It should be em
phasized, however, that before the AFL-CIO m erger many
unions had taken positive steps to eliminate discrimination. For
example, the United Automobile Workers established a Fair
Practices and Anti-Discrim ination Committee, making it manda
tory for each of its locals to set up a similar committee. A similar
committee in the United Packinghouse Workers made notable gains
in stamping out discrim ination within the industry and within its
own locals, Other unions also established machinery within their
organizations to administer a nondiscrimination policy. State
and local bodies also moved into this area.
This chapter deals with aspects of inequality in job op
portunities which may a rise , or have been encountered, within
unions, and the ways in which collective bargaining agreements
assure fair and equal treatment to the workers covered by the
agreements. The wider ram ifications of equal job opportunity,
which may extend deep into a nation*s social and economic life,
are beyond the scope of this chapter.
The principle of equal job opportunity has three major
aspects: (l) The right to get a job on the basis of one *s ability,
without discrimination; (2) the right to fair and equal treatment
on the job in accordance with objective and reasonable standards;
and (3) protection against discharge without just cause. These a s
pects are discussed separately below.
The Hiring Aspect
One of the major obstacles faced by some unions early in
this century was discrimination directed against active or poten
tial union m em bers, who found job opportunities limited by socalled "blacklists” and "yellow -dog" contracts. The first device
was a list circulated among employers identifying union leaders
and m em bers; the second was a pledge not to join a union which a
worker was required to sign as a condition of hire. Federal leg
islation during the early 1930,s outlawed these practices.
Concern with management hiring policies in a number of
unions tended to center on acquiring exclusive or preferential em
ployment rights for union m em bers, a type of security assured by
a closed shop agreement. Although management may retain the
right to choose among applicants referred by the union under such
agreements, the possibility of discrim inatory selection is inevi
tably curtailed. Selection based on criteria unrelated to job per
formance or otherwise at variance with union policy would be
difficult to justify.

2:14

In 1946, a year before the enactment of the Labor Man
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) A ct, about 1 out of 3 collective
bargaining agreements provided for a closed shop0 In principle,
this type of union security provision can restrain any employer
tendency to discriminate in hiring. However, when the closed
shop was coupled with a closed union— that is , one which barred
new members or made membership difficult in order to protect
job opportunities for members or for other reasons— another ave
nue of discrimination was opened up.
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley A ct banned the closed shop in
covered industries, a ban which, in conjunction with other pro
visions in the act, also eliminated the closed union in these in
dustries. Thus, in the greater part of American industry during
the past decade, the selection of new employees has been essen
tially a management prerogative. Employers may agree to r e
strict the free exercise of their hiring prerogatives—to pledge
them selves, for example, to an objective or nondiscriminatory
hiring policy, subject to the normal channels of compliance typi
cally provided by agreements— if (a Taft-Hartley requirement)
they do not give preferential treatment to applicants for reasons
of union membership or nonmembership.
With relatively few exceptions, managements right to
establish hiring policies has not been significantly abridged by
provisions of current union contracts. Although the employer
has yielded his previous decisionmaking authority to joint ne
gotiations in many matters affecting the employed worker, he
has not, in general, yielded the right to choose and hire new
em ployees. This management right is frequently written into
collective bargaining agreements, as in the following example:

The right to hire, promote, transfer,
discharge, or discipline, and to maintain dis
cipline and efficiency of employees and the
orderly operations of its plants is the sole r e
sponsibility of the company, subject to provi
sions of this agreement. In addition, the proucts to be manufactured, the schedules of
production, the methods and processes or
means of manufacture, the direction of the
working force, including its composition and
number, are solely and exclusively the r e
sponsibility of the company.

2:14

However, on union insistence a relatively small number of
contracts attempts to assure equal employment opportunities by
means of clauses which ban discrimination in hiring on grounds
of sex, age, color, etc. The discrim inatory hiring bans may be
phrased as follows:
There shall be no discrimination in the
hiring of any union worker because of union a c
tivity, age, sex, or prior employment with the
firm . Any dispute arising hereunder shall be
subject to the decision of the Impartial Chairman.
* * *
The company will not discriminate against
any . . . applicant for employment . . . by reason
of his membership in the union . . . or because of
race, creed, color, sex, national origin or m em
bership in any lawful organization.
Some agreements require that a certain ratio of the work
force must consist of workers past middle age, or stipulate that
certain jobs be set aside for such workers:
On all jobs, employing 5 or m ore jour
neymen, if available, every fifth journeyman
shall be 50 years of age or older.
* * *
Men over 50 years of age may be pre
ferred in obtaining jobs of fire watchmen.
Although agreements that bind the employer to a specific
hiring policy are not common, unions and union members may in
directly exercise considerable influence over management policies.
For example, if an employer feels that efforts on his part to widen
job opportunities to all applicants would be supported by the local
union and the work force, he might be encouraged to undertake such
a policy. In the long run, the labor movement, through the various
ways it influences public opinion, has undoubtedly done much to
lower discrim inatory hiring bars. On the other hand, an unfavora
ble attitude in a particular local union can discourage or even pre
vent any liberalization in hiring policies.

2:14

The On-the-Job Aspect
The most noticeable advance in assuring equal job oppor
tunity has been achieved in the security against supervisors* a r
bitrary or discrim inatory actions which workers enjoy under the
terms of collective bargaining agreements. Once the worker is
hired, or has served a probationary period, some form of job
and wage rate security based on equitable standards is usually
provided under the agreement. Protection against discrim ina
tory treatment is frequently, but by no means always, assured
in connection with promotion and opportunities for advancement
into higher skilled work.
Probably the m ost effective measure unions have devel
oped to protect a worker*s job security against possible d iscrim i
nation on the part of supervisors is the rule of seniority. Seniority
means rtlength of serv ice" and, in principle, measures a worker *s
position relative to other workers in his unit in terms of his length
of service only. It has particular importance in reductions in force
or layoffs and in subsequent rehiring, but it is also frequently ap
plicable in such matters as promotions, transfers, choice of shift,
and choice of vacation period.
Employers tend also to favor the principle that the worker
with the longer service in the firm m erits the greater reward and
job protection, but generally not to the exclusion of, or even ahead
of, other considerations, particularly where promotions are in
volved. The other considerations most often mentioned, and which
find their way into collective bargaining clauses, are relative skill,
ability, and physical fitness. Although it may be difficult, in some
cases, to determine relative ability, etc. , it is important to em
phasize that these are standards which, when fairly and equitably
applied, bind supervisors to objective choices and^therefore^also
help to assure equal job opportunity.
Collective bargaining agreements do not restrict the em
ployer *s right to lay off w orkers when business conditions so r e
quire. The typical agreement, however, does spell out the pro
cedures which govern such reductions in the work force, in order
to avoid the possibility of discrim inatory action. Under many
agreements, layoff and reca ll are on a "straight" seniority basis,
that is, length of service is the only factor considered. However,
clauses which introduce factors such as skill, efficiency, or physi
cal fitness are also common in collective bargaining agreements.
For example:

In all cases of reca ll, increase, or de
crease of fo r c e s , the following factors shall be
2:14

considered, and where factors (2) and (3) are
relatively equal, length of adjusted seniority
shall govern:
(1) Length of adjusted seniority as
hereinbefore defined.
(2) Knowledge, skill, and efficiency
on the job.
(3) Physical fitness for the job.
The recall of la id -off employees is generally scheduled in
the reverse order of separation. Typically, those qualifications
which determine the order of layoff also apply in reemployment.
As mentioned earlier, seniority is also a factor in prom o
tions, but, to a greater extent than in layoffs, it is usually qualified
by ability, skill, and other requirements. Many contracts stipulate
that vacancies be publicized in the plant, with employees who con
sider themselves qualified being given a chance to bid for the job.
A procedure which depends on evaluations of relative ability
obviously establishes a large area for judgment. Many unions fear
that bias or favoritism might influence a supervisor’ s judgment, and
they argue strongly for procedures which limit or eliminate choices.
A nstraight,r seniority rule is one method. Another is the use of griev
ance and arbitration procedures to enforce adherence to the standards
established by the agreement. In this manner, management is com
pelled to justify its actions to the union, or to a third party if the
union is not satisfied, and the rules established by the agreement are
thereby strengthened. 1
It is worth mentioning that a substantial proportion of agree
ments provide so-called " super senior ityn to union representatives
employed in the plant, that is, a place at the top of the retention list.
In this way, the role of the union in policing the layoff procedure is
recognized, and workers are assured that the people who are empow
ered to defend their interests are not laid off before the layoff has
run its course. This special protection to union representatives stands
in sharp contrast to early days of union development, when union rep
resentatives were frequently subjected to discrim inatory layoffs.
Since a collective bargaining agreement applies equally to all
workers covered by it, few clauses refer specifically to older work
ers, women, or minority groups. Even then, they are usually of an
all inclusive type, designed to give special emphasis to union and
1 See chapter 2:02, Grievance Procedures, and chapter 2:03,
Voluntary Arbitration.
2:14

management responsibility to such workers in all aspects of the
employment relationship. For example:
The company and the union agree that
the provisions of this agreement shall be applied
as in the past, to all employees within the bar
gaining unit without discrimination on account of
sex, race, color, creed, national origin, or age.
* * *

There shall be no discrimination by the
company or the union in prom otions, transfers,
layoffs, and rehiring because of race, color, r e
ligion, nationality, or political affiliation.
A number of agreements specifically ban wage differen
tials for women workers. 2 Such clauses may be found in indus
tries which regularly employ a large number of women, such as
textiles, food, or rubber products. The ban in some agreements
is expressed in general terms such as: "Women employees shall
receive the same rates as men employees when they perform the
same work as is performed by men. " Some agreements, however,
define the equal-pay principle in considerable detail and specify
various qualifications.
Special clauses designed to keep aged or disabled worker s
gainfully employed are also occasionally written into agreements.
Generally, such clauses may stipulate a transfer to lighter or more
suitable work, or permit special rate-setting procedures:
Employees who have grown old in the
service of the company and employees partially
disabled as a result of compensable injury who
are not physically able to perform the full job
content of their classification may be assigned
to lighter work that they are able to do. The
assignment will only be made after approval of
the union.
#

>!<

Employees who are incapacitated through
age or physical infirmity or other causes beyond
their control may be assigned to work which they
can do safely and efficiently, provided such work
2 See chapter 2:13, Wage Systems, for a discussion of the
role of form alized systems in eliminating wage discrimination.

2:14

is available. Special rates will be applied in all
such cases, taking into account the circumstances
in each case.
The absence in an agreement of specific provisions dealing
with the various aspects of possible discrimination discussed above
does not necessarily mean a lack of policy. Such om issions may be
due to the existence of satisfactory informal arrangements. M ore
over, as a general rule, custom, accepted practice, and broader
considerations of company and union policy may be more important
than specific agreement provisions in determining the treatment of
minority groups on the job. Usually, unions tend to seek specific
agreement provisions after trouble develops, not in anticipation of
possible trouble.
The Discharge Aspect
As the management prerogative clause cited on page 3 illu s
trates, the company generally retains the right to discharge employ
ees. However, such action must conform with the agreement rules
governing discharge. Typically, contracts provide that an employee
can only be discharged for "just and reasonable cause, " or for "good
and substantial re a so n s." Where the reasons are further elaborated,
matters such as incompetence, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness,
or insubordination are frequently mentioned. For example:
The company will not discharge any em
ployee except for good and substantial cause.
* * *

An employer shall have the right to dis
charge employees for just cause, such as, but not
limited to, slowdown in production,, inefficiency,
dishonesty, falsifying time cards, insubordination,
intoxication, lateness, or absence without reasona
ble excuse in excess of 3 times in any 1 month; hav
ing salary garnisheed or wages assigned m ore than
3 tim es, smoking on the em ployer's prem ises, or
for any violation of the em ployer's reasonable work
ing rules. If the union shall dispute such discharge,
the same shall be handled as provided for in the a r
bitration provisions of this agreement, and if arbi
trated, then the arbitrator shall determine whether
or not such discharged employee shall be reinstated,
and whether with or without back pay.
* * *

2:14

The company and the union recognize the
principle of a fair day*s work for a fair dayfs pay.
Employees who repeatedly fail to meet normally
expected production requirements shall be advised
of such failure. The departmental committee shall
also be informed. If this employee still fails to
meet such requirements, except for reasons be
yond his control, he shall be subject to discipli
nary action, including discharge.
Such clauses are designed to prevent arbitrary and dis
criminatory action on the part of the employer. In fact, unions
regard the widespread prevalence o f clauses banning arbitrary
discharge as one of their major achievements. These clauses,
however, might have little effect if there were no provisions for
appealing discharges— to an arbitrator, if necessary. Conse
quently, virtually all agreements establish procedures through
which grievances in this area may be resolved. Thus, any
worker facing discharge, or the union acting for the worker,
may invoke the general grievance and arbitration machinery of
the agreement or, perhaps, special procedures which may have
been set up to settle discharge cases. In proceedings of this
kind, the burden of proof tends to rest with the employer; that
is, he must convince union representatives or the arbitrator
that the termination was proper under terms of the agreement.
Since agreements do not permit discharge for reasons of age,
sex, race, creed, etc. , any attempt to remove a worker on
such grounds would presumably fail under an established griev
ance procedure. Under extreme provocation, or where satis
factory grievance and arbitration procedures were not available,
some unions have gone on strike to enforce adherence to a
nondiscrimination policy.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1959 0 — 51489 I

2:14

Full text of A Guide to Labour-Management Relations in the United States : A Guide to Labor-Management Relations in the United States. Supp. 2 : Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 1225-2

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