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Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
DEF E N S E
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICE O PTH E EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
i
*
F£e 2 7 1942
r
Mr. Winfield Riefler
Board of Economic Warfare
2501 Que Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Riefler:
You will proceed, as soon as practicable, to London, England, to
serve for an indefinite period as special representative of the
Board of Economic Warfare in the United Kingdom.
Upon your arrival in London you will report to the American Ambas
sador, to whose staff you will be attached in order to perform
functions assigned to you as a representative of the Board of Ec
onomic Warfare.
Your duties as outlined below, but not by way of limitation, will
be:
(a) To be the principal representative of the Board of
Economic Warfare on the Blockade Committee of the British
Ministry of Economic Warfare;
(b) To furnish information to the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare regarding the activities of the Board of Economic
Warfare in the United States;
(c
To obtain and report such information as will further the
objectives of the Board of Economic Warfare.
These instructions are subject to the approval of the State Depart
ment and the issuance of appropriate authority for your travel and
status in London.
Executive Director
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BEW 110 (AM)
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Authorization No.
167
Washington, D. C.
March 6, 1942
f 19
AUTHORIZATION— TRAVEL
Name
Winfield Riefler
British Empire 3)1vis ion_______
Title Head Administrative Officer
Official statio n Washing ton t D. C._______ ____
You are authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with law, and
Standardized Government Travel Regulations subject to the following limitations:
Beginning on or about: March 6, 1942
June 30, 1942
Ending on or about:
Washington, D. C. to London, England via Hew York, Hew York and Lisbon,
Portugal and return to Washington, D. C.
itinerary:
Purpose: Official business necessary in the public service*
Per diem allowance:
Hone
The paragraphs applicable under this authority are __ ±_ j L jf__ __________________
(Indicate paragraphs)
1. Travel by common carrier.Washington, D. 0. to Hew York and return to Washington, D. C*
2.
In lieu of travel by common carrier or Government-owned vehicle you are authorized to
travel by privately-owned automobile for which you will be allowed:
(a) __________cents per mile in lieu of all other transportation costs, provided that
such allowance plus per diem shall not exceed cost of travel by common carrier
plus per diem charges that would have been incurred if common carrier had been
(b)
used.
__________ cents per mile in lieu of all other transportation costs; such mode of
transportation has been administratively determined to be more economical and ad
vantageous to the United States.
(c)
(d)
Actual expenses for gasoline and oil.
Actual expenses for gasoline and oil within the corporate limits of your official
station.
3.
Travel by air. Hew York to London, England and return to Hew York, Hew York.
4.
___ ______ cents per mile in lieu of all other expenses.
5.
Incur necessary miscellaneous expenditures in connection with the transaction of official
business, as authorized under Section X of the Government Travel Regulations, Paragraphs
75-79.
^
Administrative Management Division
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(
i *
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
¥)>%i>>:#?<toa>;aisafoaoft:*<»}&^ fr>J<
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 7, 194-2
Mr. Winfield W. Riefler
The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, N. J.
Dear Mr. Riefler:
As agreed during our telephone conversation today there are
attached:
(1) Your authorization to travel from Washington,
D. C. to London, England, via New York and
Lisbon, and return;
(2) The tickets previously discussed with you;
(3) A letter addressed to the Pan American Air
ways requesting them to allow you the max
imum accommodation for baggage consisting
of 55 pounds.
When you arrive in Lisbon go to the American Legation.
The
State Department is perfecting arrangements through that office
for your accommodations while in Lisbon and for priority via the
British Overseas Airways in connection with the trip to London.
If you have any questions let us know.
With best wishes for a successful trip.
Very sincerely,
C.
Acting Fi
Attachments (3)
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WOMDERLAHD
Dramatis
REVISITED
personae?
The Mad Hatter
D. Foot, Esq.,
The March Hare
Dr. Hans Sulzer
The Dormouse
W. RiAfler, Esq.,
The Mock Turtle
Professor G. Heller
Alice
J. Garnett Lomax or
or indeed anyone who was present
only at the end of the party#
There was a long table in the room in which Alice found herself#
It was littered with papers, and the March Hare, the Had Hatter, the Mock
Turtle and the Dormouse were sitting round it#
The Dormouse looked as if
he was asleep, but he w a s n *t .
"Mo fodder I" "Ho dairy products Jw
shouting when Alice entered*
"Ho arms!"
they were all
"Would you like an Agreement I" said the March Hare to Alice.
"Very much" said Alice, "but it doesn't look as If there is one”
"There i s n »t" said the March Hare, rather despondently#
"Then it wasn't very civil of you to ask me if 1 1d like one"
said Alice*
"It wasn't very civil of you” said the March Hare "to ask us
here to make an agreement and then refuse the one we offered you" •
"We didn't ask you" said Alice "You asked yourselves and
we said w e fd be pleased to see you If you brought a nice Agreement with
you"*
The March Hare began to say that it all depended on what a nice
Agreement was, but the Dormouse quickly opened one eye and saidt
"When is a ceiling not a ceilingf" Alice had no Idea, so she
looked round expectantly and said "I don't think 1 shall ever guess that
one"#
The Mjstrch Hare, rather snappily, said "There's nothing for you to
guess because a ceiling is always a ceiling."
At this everybody else looked very depressed, and the Hatter
whispered something to the Dormouse, who said in a sleepy voice "I don't
care what he bays, but a celling isn't always a celling*
It isn't a
ceiling when it's global” •
Alice didn't understand this very well, but she supposed that the
Dormouse meant that a global celling was really a sort of dome, so she
began to thine about Xanadu and Kubla Khan, and to wonder what they had to
do with Switzstrland, while the rest of the party sat silent#
"What calendar
The Hatter was the first to break the silence*
quarter is it to bet" he asked, shuffling the papers in front of him and
producing one labelled Formula Ho, 79#
Svetyone began to speak at once - except the dormouse, who
"Third Quar"
«iked as If he was asleep but w a s n ’t c "Second quarter!"
^St Quartejr I" "Average of four quarters I" they all shouted, unt *
A t e be wil.dered#
'
a
«
3>
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"Current quarter" said the Dormouse sleepily, at which the Mock
Turle, who had not said very muc h until then {though he had echoed every
thing that the March Hare had said, sometimes looking rather strained in
his anxiety not to say something different) mopped his brow and sighed
loudly#
Then there was an awkward pause, until the Hatter said, rather
stiffly, to the March Hare " I ’m afraid your formula w o n ’t work".
"It was the best formula" said the March Hare meeB.y "It gave
us everything we wanted, and you could have had some global ceilings too"
"Yes" said the Hatter, "but it was the wrong quarter and we
d o n ’t want global ceilings"
The March Hare looked at his formula gloomily and turned it upside
and inside outj but all he could find to say was "It was the beat formula
you know".
Alice felt quite sorry for him but before she could speak the
Mock Turtle, with tears running down his cheeks, said "you ma y not know whsl
It Is like to be surrounded by the Axis, and perhaps you never met anyone
from the Reichswlrthschaftsministerium" - ("indeed I h a v e n ’t" said Alice
hastily)" - so you d o n ’t know what a delightful thing it is when you
think y o u ’ve found a formula that fits in with the Axis formula, so that
everything could go on just as before and you w o u l d n ’t have to cut off
your exports after all, and how dreadful it is when you find that it
d o e s n ’t so that you c a n ’t because you hav e n ’t any exports to cut off".
The Mock Turtle looked so sad that Alice thought it would be a
good idea to ask what the formula was so that she could try to make it fit.
But this was the worst thing she could have done, because everyone began
talking again at once.
"You take your exports® said the March Hare.
"And divide them into four groups" said the Hatter.
"Three" said the Hare "At least it was three last time you spoke"
"Well, its four now" said the Hatter very fiercely, and looked
to the Dormouse for confirmation^
but the Dormouse was alseep.
So the
Hatter held the formula under his nose until the Dormouse woke up splutter
ing and said "Of course, of course." Then they all began again.
"And you put a celling on each group" said the March Hare.
"Each item” said the Hatter.
"Each group" said the Hare "At least it was each group last time
you spoke".
"Each item" said the Hatter firmly "and baaed moreover on the
second quarter",
"Fourth quarter" said the Hare, but with less confidence.
"Well, it used to be the fourth quarter" said the
the question of Time came into it - we marked Time quite a
he added, turning to Alicej
"and he didn't like that.
In
been quite the same since, so here we are".
And he began
mournfully ;
Hatter, "but
lot, you know"
fact h e ’s never
to sing rather
"Dingle, dingle, little foot
How X wonder why you put
All your cards upon the table
And d i d n ’t do it all by cable"•
"Ever since then" he added "The quarters have been trying to catch up
but we never seem to reach the current quarter".
’**■ v< each other,
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"is that the reason why you’re all here still, with all three
formulae?" asked Alice*
"Exactly so" said the Hatter
"Every time a new formula is suggested, we talk about current
imports until they aren’t current imports any more but second quarter
ones or third quarter ones, and then it’s always inacceptable to some
body so we have to start all over again".
"Let’s change the subjeot" said the March Hare, yawning*
"Somebody here - I think it was the Dormouse - once started to tell us a
very comforting story about your being able to buy things from us for
twice as much money as the Axis".
"Quite so" said the March Hare "but on tick of course*
Wake up
Dormousel"
"Once upon a time" began the Dormouse "there were three little
Swiss, and their names were Bilhrle, Dixi and Tavaro and they lived in
Switzerland
"What did they live on?" asked Alice*
"They lived on fuses" said the Dormouse after a moment’s pause.
"They couldn’t have done that" said Alice gently* "Are you
sure you don’t mean fusel oil? Though even that would have made them sick"
"They were" said the Dormouse* "Very sick - especially when they
were subjected to pressure".
Alice didn’t quite understand this, but before she could ask for
an explanation "Have a 5* reduction," said the March Hare very earnestly*
"But we haven’t got anything yet, so how can we have less?" asked
Alice*
"you can take 5$ off the ceiling" said the March Hare, though
Alice didn’t quite see what he meant, especially if the ceiling was a dome*
So she turned to the Dormouse and asked: "Why did they live off fuses?"
"To prevent unemployment of course", said the March Hare;" And
so would you if you were Swiss"
But the Dormouse looked sceptical at this and said to the March
Hare in a rather pointed way "is this your story or mine?"
"It all depends how it ends" said the March Hare*
"That’s the whole pointl" said the Dormouse, quite animatedly.
"It’s got to end, and what’s more there’s got to be a ceiling on fuses,
with 5% off every quarter".
"But how could the three little Swiss live on fuses if fuses
had to be kept below a ceiling?" asked the March Hare*
"Well," said the Dormouse, rubbing his eyes - for he was getting
very sleepy or pretending to be "Well, in certain circumstances and if
everything else went right and provided the value was based on the weight
and not on the cost - I mean provided the weight was based on the cost and
not on the value - in the right quarter, you know - and of course it would
not
do for tjhem to give up gas metres, we might be able to give them
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
something else to live on"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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"If you would lend us the money” said the Hatter, hut very
softly because he didn’t really like discussing money matters at all#
”If that’s all” said the March Hare ”We might as well go home”
”just as well” said the Mock Turtle, wiping away a tear.,
in a mournful voice he began to sing this songj
And
"Won't you come a little closer? said the Axis to the Swiss.
”It’s true that we are losing, but the chance you must not miss#
See how eagerly the Belgians, the Dutchmen and the Danes
Are joining our New Order and fixing on their chains
Will you, won't you, will you, won't you come and put on Axis chains?”
”You can really have no notion, how delightful it would be
To have done with pluto-democrats and join the truly free"
But the Swiss replied "Not likely, for I'm not bereft of brains"
Said he thanked the Axis kindly, but he would not put on chains
Would not, could not, would not, could not, would not, put on
Axis chains
"What matters it if you've got brains?" his Axis friend then said
"It's true that at the moment they're still inside your head
But cracking skulls is sport, you know, no tru-blue ftun disdains
Especially when his victim is loaded down with chains
So will you, won't you, will you, won't you, come and put on
Axis chains
Will you, won't you, will you, won't you, won*t you put on Axis
chains?"
The Mock Turtle sang this little song with such feeling that
everyone was quite touched# To Alice's surprise the Hatter and the
Dormouse at once began looking wildly through the papers in front
of them; each of them pulled out one at random and said "If that's
the way you feel, we don't mind signing this"# whereupon everyone
produced a fountain-pen and after carefully cleaning it with a
handful of Tariff Item No# 288, dipped it in the condensed milk
and signed the paper in front of him* Alice wasn't at all sure
what it was they were signing, or why, but they all looked so much
the happier than they had done since she joined the party that
she supposed It was all right. And, even if it wasn't, that was
the end of the longest tri-party on record#
J.W .N #
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decla ssified
Authority £fc|o5Cj
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Telephone* Grosvenor 4961.
Economic Warfare Division,
4 0 f Berkeley Square , Loudon*
March 20, 1942*
Mr* M l l i a a I, Stone, Chief
British t o g S C S S i H
Board of Economic War fere,
WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A.
Deer B U I ,
It wee only e week ego yesterday morning that I left
Hew York* The interval, however, see&s like months, prob
ably beeauee there has been eo much to absorb. X haven9t
say impressions all sorted out as yet, and may be foggy in
some of the developments X report in this letter.
If so,
forgive me.
I will try to olarify them for you as X become
■are eleer myself.
X mm going to wake this letter quite
discursive.
In that way X can glva you a better picture of
the situation here.
Do n ’t hesitate to let me know if you
want a different type of reporting.
We arrived In Bermuda Thursday afternoon, and after a
two-hour layover, proceeded on to Ilorta, where we arrived
Friday morning.
Bad weather held us up there until Saturday
morning, when we took off for Lisbon, arriving la the after
noon. Up to that time the Fan America people had taken care
of us quite adequately. At Lisbon, their responsibility
ceased. They did provide taxi service to a hotel. Also they
had a Portuguese at the wharf to arrange hotel reservations.
Our plane carried several Army people, several Navy people,
and if State Department courier.
At the wharf at Lisbon, the
Embassy messenger met the courier and took him off directly.
The Military and Havel Attaches were present to steer their
people.
Nobody seemed to know about my arrival, but the Navel
Attache undertook the job of giving me advice.
He said that
the hotel situation was extremely difficult , that he had an
extra room reserved at the Tivoli and that I had better take
It, so X did. Then the representative of the British Air Line
to ingland came along. He apparently had a high priority for
me and said he could get me on the plane leaving Lisbon early
the aaxt morning, but that X would have to go to the office
of tiie elr line for registration and tickets immediately, be
fore It closed. Accordingly, I proceeded there directly, end
secured/
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$
assured my tickets, s i t i n g through well after 6 Jr.M*
The Jtftiml H U i l l te d ad vised ns i s « f m | i tr e te p w te *
U o a to the Airport at the hotel so aeon a* possible* there
were eight of us on the Clipper eh© wars staying at the
Tivoli an4 hue to depart early the next morning. We all proseeded ae rapidly as possible to the hotel* and arranged with
the manager to get two large taxis for 6 A*Iff* Sunday morning,
la 1 Indicated In ay oahle* gasoline was extreisaly abort. The
hotel telephoned a list of taxi people* and finally secured
two who had enough gaaoliae to tale us to the Airport, which
wee 25 xilometere out. ftr this time it was fairly lata Sat
urday evening* m 1 did not go to the legation.
V- i'■:'
s
We got up et 5 AteU Had a scanty breakfast.
(Oranges
are* of co«r$e,plentiful ia Portugal* but eoffee ie abort}#
O f the two texts ordered, only one appeared.
I welted for
the second, and when it did not show up, started the hotel
porter teleptealmg for another ear. For a while it looted
ae though we might t U t the plane* which Is pretty serious la
that spot of the world, finally wo got hold of a midget ear
with aaough gasoline. It didn*t see* possible that it eould
take four passengers with all the luggage* white included e
large special maehlna the Savy boys were bringing over by head.
We roped the luggage around the outside of the ear* however* sad
went staying off in the dark la search of tho Airport* The taxi
driver lost the way & couple of times, but mamagod finally to
flad It 1m ample time for our departure.
Oa arrival at :ingi;*M, late guaiay afternoon* we went
through toe debarkation routine. they were very deoeat. fte
only experience mirth reletiag was with tua denser, fte British
e e n s o r s M p ia amasingly.detailed. I had had a© conception of how
ttey rely on it for war purposes until 1 began attending the
W.&.W. eammitteae this west* Censors, apparently, ate under
instruction to copy off everything that is of interest* and
feed it Uto toe intelligence masAite, when It ie routed to
various agencies that use it to piece out a picture.
1 ted*
of courts, only the various a.H.W* doeumente, letters and see©rates which i ted brought along, hut they were filled with
tea topics ate firsWOO on which censors ere supposed to report.
The Ceaeor was obviously at a loss as to what to do* , He rea
lised ay statue* old not reed the materiel, but sugg ested that
it reejiiy should have boas brought tear under weal* I report this trip in detail in order to draw lessons
it fte otters t e a may be sent over. If 1 wars you, I would see
to It teat all xemcraods are brought under seal, possiuiy in
the pouch, in tte future. Also, X think the procedure et Lisbon
should be tightened up. teat travellers teve been held up there
a while* ate possibly have not ted ny experience.
They probably
ted a chance to go to the Legation and get direct orders,
pos
sibly* also* the Legation ie able then to arrange transportation
to/
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to the Airport*
The situation as I experienced it, however,
was definitely loose. We were left in a strange country,
without knowledge of the language, to arrange transportation
to the Airport. Given the gasoline saortege, we were 1m*cy
to find any conveyance at all* 7km one we scoured worked out
all right, hut if the Meals had wanted to pull a kidnapping
or get our papers. It certainly would not have been difficult.
I think the Legation should take responsibility to see thst
officials an route through Lisbon are delivered to the Air*
port by reliable drivers. 1 have talked tha problem over
with Mr. Matthews, who is in charge of the Embassy here la
London, and he agrees with no* 1 believe he Is going to
write Lisbon shout It, and I only report it to you for your
guidance when others from the B.B.W. are sent over.
•*
London.
•*
1
•
'*
.
The Embassy hare was quite surprised at ay early arrival,
they m o w departures from Ilew York, but have no news, appar
ently, of who ie on any particular plane after that,
as
lie ton and M a a s , who left long before I did, had only arrived
two days earlier, they were not looking for m for same time.
Everyone here has been ssost helpful * both the Embassy and the
British at the 2 M U W * have put themselves out to the limit to
do everything they oan for us.
la the five days ^since « y ar»
rival, we have been put through quite a pace, going almost
continuously to meetings of the various coroaitteeg at
I will describe my specific Impressions of these c o m m i t t e d
later In this letter, l i e , I would like to note simply that
our reception at M.I.W. has been extremely cordial.
3o far as
I can see, ell doors are open t o us, end all Information la
available. The attitude is more than that of cordial friend
ship. There seems to be an assumption of common operations they treat ua as informally and freely as thay would If we
were pert of their own staff. We may Lava, I feal, a real op
portunity to wald the B.E.W. and the M.B.W. into a elngla hard
hitting machine of economic warfare. In large part, tala excellant start is due to gomervllla’s personality. m is a
very attractive individual, with wide experience, liberal out
look. already on a basis of cordial familiarity with the whole
fluD*. staff. Be also happens to be e close personal friend
of Lelth-BOS*.
The M.E.W. occupies a large office building on Berkeley
i, about two blocks from the American Embassy* The
basay has taken, for our work, four apartments in sa apartment
bul1 fling at 40 Berkeley Square, right across from L.E.W. While
deaf,a# furniture, etc*, are rather scanty, (as In tfsahlngten),
this means that our physical facilities are really excellent.
A get to eny It.E.W. office In e few minutes, and are alWe can
most acually accessible to our own Embassy.
At
a staff.
the offices at 40 Berkeley Square, we already have quite
Besides Somerville, Easton, M a m s , and myself, there
are,
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nre now three other saaiori, D*B* Calder and J*P* Ulair,
froaa the S&bassy, mid JUT* Leterscn, an American official
of the London Office of the Guaranty Trent who Is plnchhitting for us on e volunteer basis* Be has m lo n g back
ground in Europe, is firjr Keen, and would mete e good permsweat addition to tbs staff if it ooild bs arranged* he here
Just beard that another Peterson, fro* the States, is to Join
us* Somerville has bean busy interviewing stenographers,
clerks, assistants, etc*, to round out the staff* The per*
sonnel situation is London is tight, but it looks to ns as
though the quality is good* Tbs unit is still, howovsr,
somewhat understaffed*
Since arriving, I have made a few contacts* SommrtlXXe
bad ns to lunch on Monday with Lelth-Hosa* Yesterday after*
noon, also, 1 bed tea with Leith-Leas, ana opened up with bln
the question of securing estimates, by commodities, of British
1942 exports to Latin America* Tall Joan Bcushenhush that I
think we will get the figures if they are available* They ere
over at the Board of Trade, if anywhere, but Leitb-Hoss, ae you
know, la leaving M*g.W. to go over to tha Board of Trade. Be
promised to do ell be could to get the data for nc» Monday
night X had dinner with Beary Clay of the Bank of Engl end, who
has been detailed to work on certain problem* at the Board of
Trade* Tuesday X bad dinner with Paul Appleby; Wednesday 1 bad
lunch with Harrises, who seams delighted to have us bars* Wad*
nesday evening we bad a dinner of the whole B*X*W* senior staff
here, at which the new arrivals described the work of the Board
at Washington* Last night X had dinner with LacDougal of *mstrails and tonight, Somerville is having ae out to dinner with
Vickers, the head of intelligence at
At lunch we have
met many of the key members of the M*X*W* staff*
| p j r
The K*>:*w* contrast# with the B*A*W* in several ways* Most
valuable to us, of course, is the fact that it has passed the
st«fs ef staffing and organisation* It is mm experienced, ©par*
atlng organisation* The only point of tha work X have had an ep*
portunlty to glimpse, ss yet, is tbs operation of the © o ^ U t & e a .
Theca dparate pretty much «s our Policy and United Trade commit*
tess,
it ere mush more numerous* Xn each committee the agenda
*c have been circulated well beforehand* The different
itions seme in well prepared* The committees, themselves,
pretty efficiently, item by item, with adequate discus*
It quick decision* Uvea so tbs agenda are sufficiently
to make the meetings long* On first ic^ression, X would
it, if we tcslre to operate with equal vclee and really
ir weight, we ought to have erne mam specialise on each
fee, or sestiem* the single business of preparing himself
on the erends and of attending* the committee meetings would ap
pear to require, at least, one half the tlt&e of a continuous
official/
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official
ive* Hi* remaining tin* should be
available for general non-routine wor*« Tfci* i* mjr
present Impression - I will give * nor* considered opinion
later*
In oomperlftg notts with laston I U » «oniifl«» h* and*
the shrewd o ^ s c m t l o a that la Washington th* ruling ©on* i d * m t i o n on coaalbt** masting*, etc., s**s*d to I t supply,
wl**r*as la th* M*1*W* it was ****** to th* enemy* Th* obser
vation summarise* * differs*!©* I had been trying to put ay
h*nd» on* Supply her* i* organised *ompXat*ly M t*ide th*
The supply services *rs occasloaally represented st
nestings it, for example, when they went to sneak resource*
away from th* ens*sy, but the orientation of ».*!•¥• is economic
ruin of the Axis, the attitude i* pretty tough ead grim* they
*re concerned to m
that no goods get to the enemyf end that
ao one who knows the enemy does any business if they *a* help
it* They r#ly overwhelmingly on th* intelligence services,
particularly the censorship*
It is astounding the way thousands
of little scraps of information ere put together to get * re
sult* the pre-emptive buying, including the work of the H*K*
C o m o d i ty Corporation, (tell Been X will Sieve material for hi a
on this later), gets down to <|uite meticulous ***** in highly
specific local arses*
X Slav* not sesa the intelliieac* pert
of the organisation yet, but this sees* to be a stejor pert of
the whole business*
X should think that S*S*t* sould goer is
t© ******t* with it to greet advantage*
X have been amaned *t th* lech of knowledge over her* with
respect to the wor* end organisetion of the S*E*W*, also of
their eager**** to find out about us* This is as true of the
Imbasey staff es of th* British* Xt reflects, naturally, the
aswadss of cur organisation* The organisation chart of the
B*l*w* which X brought along ha* bacon* an exhibit ©f nsjor
triterest* Xt is th* first Information th*f have had of how
w* a:-s organised, and tom w* oparata* Th* non in m t own
gnbassy organisation were delighted whan 2 showed tha* e copy
of our "Weekly Progress Bepert"* It was the first definite
Ids* they had of th* speolfio problm m w* are working on* X
a* getting * girl assistant tomorrow, and am going to start
her Off indexing the tea Weekly Progress Rsport* whieh 2
tmnsht along# That will furnish the whole dfft** * gold*
w U h retard to the item* to b* watched for particularly hare.
W* aught to b* able to **ad back a lot of Information from hare
on many of then* Pi****# saa to it that we continue to gat the
•Weekly Fregres* Report*. Also we would appreciate tremendously
ssflu* o f all studies turned out in th* Beard, including th*
/ore*.gn Remit regents Reports* This type of materiel ie at a
prod urn here. Please give m aa ionisation of policy with re
gard to making then available to the #»!•*• They would be very
keen to have then and really should, in view of tiu*r freedom
in/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
D E C L A S S IF IE D
Authority £D | o 5 G
6 *
la giving us everything they have* It the decision la to
esks them generally available to SUE.*,, plest-e send extra
/ coplea*
The absence of Ambassador Uses* baa thrown no back on
«y own resources no far as my own work program la concerned*
As row know, my essignmeat was sad* pretty general no that
1 could work It out with the Ambassador on the spot, la the
light of conditions here. After going over the situation
carefully, I have some to the following general conclusions:-
the B»2,W. unit hero la much norm of an operational job
than I had approelated, - At least, to be fully effective, it
should be. The eSMltteeS of
operate alasoet oontiauoualy at a level of considerable detail* The very important
intelligence work la, I judge, equally detailed, zm have an
opportunity. If we choose to sc lx* It, to gear the §,S,9, lot©
tie J M M U at an operational level, this la more than 1 had
hoped for. In consequence, 1 think we ought to place e regu
lar operating organisation for
here, that would be la
continuous contact with the work of h*£*A. in amah a wqy mm to
sake our equal voles effective.
This .Means that a specific
of fleer, such mm tastes and Adaas, a > u l d be assigned to each
phase of M.S.W. He should go to each committee nesting, thor
oughly prepared with respect to the agenda, in e position to
take peart and hold hie own In the committee.
This alone, as
X noted earlier, le a pretty heavy assignment. He should spend
all his tita, not so occupied, in developing the special field
to «ti«b he is assigns*, both tw m the point of view of getting
thoroughly familiar with the decisions of ••2*1* end other oargoal set ions here that arc represented on hie c o m i t i e s , end else
from the point of view of maximising the American contribution
to the work of the committees end of the war organisations
focussed there.
In son* cases, this nay involve too heavy a
work assignment, he operations develop we smy have to assign
assistants. This, 1 think, is along the lines Bmnr *ills has
visualised the job. It May go farther than he visualised, beeauss he was not familiar with the extent of the 3oardfs work
in Washington end was not in a position to judge how effect
ively ]we in Washington would be in a position to feed data
here, end how much data from him could be absorbed* The In
telligence end here, I judge, could presumably grow into soaethlng extraordinarily useful if we so aid staff for it*
Somer
ville is an excellent choice to run the organisation,
Se knows
the 2i tossy, London, tha W,E,9,, and has a good sense for orgsnlxetlon. He should have enough officers assigned so that he
does hot have to cover aay routine Meetings hi self* He ought
to be frzm to supervise the others, keep in touch with their
work *y attending nestings with than when he chooses, end work
on spdt problems, particularly on development of new contacts
and now activities with «£»2*W»
In/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
dec la s si f ie d
Authority £P|Q SO
\
- 7 -
Viaw or the r.ot that I us, hern ror only thra*
, I propose to ,;##p isyaslf entirely free froa oa“r*“ on w J f W i M l l t U
Ineteed. after spending tho
fawlllar . n o the n t M ,
••
the contest* of this letter, I propose to start
s#*t « Mk on a nor* detailed study of th#Ski.*., operation oy operation. 1 think I ahull take a particular
• T * * L ? * * U n « or u £Dt *
(*ith th*
regular offio*r assigned),
try to ror» a good inpraauio*
Its
von :, and then report to you ay recommendations on
the bmais of the experience. It X operate this way 1 should
*
to
“ *» informed Judgment on the
w o m of the whole unit her# before X return. *n& when I re~
ln” a L ? h^ 4 ?* 5 * * pouitla# to euUe u aaxiaua contribution
i?
aelpiog th* work of th* W a r d .
2* addition,
of course* X will extent to werx on njpeolel nrttlil— e of i&«
**[•**.*•
®°*rd or the Tice Xreaioewt, sad elao to handle
special fetaigWMrats tuoh ea the two that oaae up tale seek,
w y tele^re® with reapeot to th* tanker for Portugal *a£.
tae atteapt to get date froa th* hoard of Tr«*a ror th*
iga Siefjui rumnt* work).
ia even nore discursive then I coctesplated
r r U * X*
t0 :i«. however, too only means
the general background here. Please let aw know
kina of reporting le useful to you.
Very sincerely yours,
toe^.-Schedule of K.S.W.
Ceeidttn Meeting*,
kWilHS
Slnf laid V. klefler.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
WWR FILE
)
Telephone:
Grosvenor 4961*
Economic Warfare Division
40 Berkeley Square, 1*1*
March 31, 1942*
S!r* William T. Stone, Chief,
British Empire Division,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, 0.C.
Dear Bill:
I think you will be Interested in the enclosed
organization chart of the Economic Warfare Division
of the American Embassy here in London. This is the
chart on which we are operating at present, except
that Mr. Avery Peterson has not yet shown up. The
ohart gives some Idea of the extensive lists of con
tacts which we are pursuing and the committees which
are being covered continuously.
I believe we may
need somewhat more ample personnel.
The Pre-emptive
Committee, which ware Adams is covering, meets only
once a week but wnen It does meet takes the complete
day, so that he is unavailable for other contacts on
that day*
Xn addition, of course, the subjects coming
up at the meeting are prepared for in numerous private
conferences by Adame, Somerville and myself.
Colonel Vickers, Head of the Intelligence at
is very anxious to arrange for a more extensive exchange
of information with us, particularly with respect to the
Far East where sources on tills side are scanty.
I will
give you sore detailed information next week.
I would
suggest that In the meantime any particularly interest
ing information which we pick up on the Far E*«t would
be much appreciated here.
—
Very truly yours,
Winfield «• Hiefler.
Enclosure
Org&nization chart of
Economic Warfare Division,
American Embassy, London.
WWR:MVS
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
4, CARLTON GARDENS, S.W.l.
FRANCE LIBRE
f
W H IT E H A L L . S444
REF. :
2nd April, 1942.
Dear Mr. Riefler,
Confirming our
telephone conversation of
this morning, I shall he
very pleased if you will
lunch with me on Thursday,
April 9th.
I look forward
to seeing you at "If Escargot",
48 Greek Street, W.l, at about
1.15 p.m.
Yours sincerely,
Economic Warfare Division,
American Embassy,
40 Berkeley Square,
W.l.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
-
fry s w e r e d A p r i l
14 , 1 9 4 2
- W tFR*iViVG-
$rra%nr$ Cfjaralwrs,
$rz&t (ffizargt Stred,
» Winfield Riefler Esq.,
The American Embassy,
1 Grosvenor Square,
S.W. 1.
April 13,1942
Dear Riefler,
There is a small dining club, now
chiefly of officials, which 1 rather
think you have attended before now,
called the Tuesday Club.
Can you dine
with me there on Tuesday, April 21st,
in a private room at the Trocadero,
at 7*30 for 7*45?
I am opening a
discussion on U0ur prospective economic
and financial position in the light of
the Budget.tf
Yours sincerely
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
i
)
)■
WN R P I L E
+*■■ X
Telephone:
Groavenor 4961.
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.l*
April 14, 1942.
J* M. Keynes, Esq.,
Treasury Chamber*,
Great George Street,
London, 5 •W .1«
Dear Keynea:
I shall be very glad to attend the din
ner at the Tuesday Club on Tuesday, 21st.
Very sincerely yours,
Winfield W* Riefler.
WWRsMVG
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
W WR FILE
■Jm:-
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
Telephone?
Grosvenor 4961.
April 21, 1942.
Mr. William T. Stone, Cruel,
British Empire Division,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Bill:
Subject:
Cables
'
It was grand to hear directly from you by mail.
I feel that a liaison more informative than cables
can ever be, has been set up.
I know how busy you
are, but I would appreciate It if you would write as
frequently and as completely as time permits.
With regard to cables, I wonder If the B.E.W.
could afford to send worcTmore frequently and more
verbosely.
What I mean can be Illustrated by our
cables on the question of making dollars arising
out of Lease Lend to Turkey available for pre-emption
purchases in Turkey.
The possibility of getting
pre-emption funds this way and thus of minimizing
the amount of goods to be shipped to Turkey arose in
our first informal conferences here in the Embassy
on the subject of Turkish pre-emption.
We sent a
general ©able back then.
Subsequently, the Harrlman
people came over with further evidence that Turkey
was apparently short of dollars and asking for
credit under Lease Lend so I sent a second cable
suggesting that the possibility receive consideration.
Yesterday, they came forward again with Information
that Turkey was asking Lease Lend to advance dollars
necessary to cover costs of shipment of Lease Lend
materials to Turkey.
They wondered whether both of
us should cable once more.
I said that I had sent
two cables on the subject and had had no reply.
I assumed that the suggestion was receiving adequate
consideration in Washington and hesitated to cable a
third time to my people.
However, I thought It might
be/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
- 2
be valuable If they would cable to their people
In Washington so that they would be directly aware
of the problem and would not sign an agreement In
ignorance of the fact that there was a possibility
that B.E.W. would be Interested in obtaining some
thing for those dollars.
It would have been very helpful to us If you
could have sent us word on receipt of our cables
that the idea was receiving consideration, that It
was good, or that it was bad, together with an
indication of your general reaction.
General back
ground indications of attitude, even by cable, are
very important to us. We gradually get a feeling
of isolation here. At first, I felt able to inter
pret the general atmosphere at home because of my
recent personal contact.
Now I begin to feel more
remote*
M.E,W, is subject to some criticism in some
quarters here over the extent to which it uses the
cable, but I am convinced that the criticism is not
generally justified,
I think that their use of the
cable is one of the big reasons for the manner in
which their operations click.
Periodically, they
send us, for our background information, copies of
their policy cables to and from Washington, Lisbon,
Madrid, Ankara, Stockholm etc,. What has Impressed
me most is the frequency of their cables and their
completeness.
Frequently they tell us more about
Washington than we know from other sources. Each
side tells the other about meetings, points brought
up for consideration, attitudes taken by different
parties, and the state in which negotiations stand
at the moment. This type of liaison Is probably
more extensive than B.E.W. would care to undertake.
I think it might be good, however, if we veered in
that direction. A quick reply to each policy cable
telling us your reaction to our suggestion would be
very helpful.
I am gradually getting into stride on lots of
fronts, those dealing with immediate operating problems
I will try to write about. The longer range problems
make difficult writing.
I think 1*11 hold comment on
them for m y return.
As ever,
WWRiMVG
Winfield W# Riefler
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
WWR FILE
k&j v.%
—
X I
s
Telephone i
Grosvenor 4961,
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
April 22, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. William T. Stone, Chief,
British Empire Division,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D.C.
Subject;
Blockade vs Supply,
Dear Bill;
itsI ore I left, you mentioned that you particularly
wanted me to see whether we could not work out some
means of avoiding the situation where the onus is thrown
on the United States for denying goods to a neutral
for which the British are willing to supply navicerts.
You felt that our presence as full members of the
Blockade Committee should enable us to correlate the
policies of the two countries so that we would present
a united iromt to the neutrals.
Easton and I have had
the problem continually in mind since our arrival and
have just about come to the conclusion that a different
approach will be necessary since this question really
falls outside the scope of the Blockade Committee.
Export control here is handled by the Board of
Trade and not by M.E.W.
This means that all questions
of prohibiting or limiting the export of commodities
from Great Britain are handled at the Board of Trade
and not at M.E.W. This is the big distinction between
the work of M.E.W. and that of B.E.W..
M.E.W. has not
dealt with supply from the point of view of conserving
goods in short supply for our own use. That problem
is the function of the Board of Trade and the Supply
Departments.
M.E.W. deals solely with supply from the
point of view of Blockade, of denying resources to the
enemy.
I thought at first that now that the u.S. were
In the war and were in a position to exert export
control through B.E.W. the Blockade Committee could
also/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
•» 2
also take direct account of our supply position.
I am now convinced, and Easton is In agreement,
that this Is impossible without a fundamental
change in the whole organization here.
The reason
for this goes back to the legal powers under which
M*E.W* operates, powers which constitute the basis
for its organization, the composition of its
committees, and nearly everything it does.
M.E.W. was established to stretch to the utmost
such powers as Great Britain has by virtue of poss
essing a navy.
Because Great Britain had the right
under international law to search ships at sea, or
to direct them into a control port for examination,
M.E.W. was able to introduce the navicert, at first,
on a voluntary basis, later on a compulsory basis.
Legally and basically the navicert is nothing more
than a substitute for detention and search at sea,
a safe conduct for ships and shipments that are
certified in advance by the British to be of a char
acter that would not be subject to confiscation at
sea. The trade agreements with the neutrals, by
which the neutrals agree to limit exports to the
enemy, in turn rest on the navicert, which rests
on the law of Blockade.
Do you see the point? The
whole structure of M.E.W. is really an extension of
Blockade, i.e., naval Blockade. The legality of
pretty much everything that is done rests on the
ultimate sanction of the Prize Court.
If a neutral
breaks its trade agreement, and imports without a
navicert, the penalty would be interception by the
Navy and the carrying of the captured cargo to the
Prize Court.
If the cargo Is one which the Prize
Court will confiscate, the whole structure of M.E.W.
Is strengthened.
Were M.E.W. beaten In the Prize
Court, the results might be far-reaching. Unfortunately
from the point of view of B.E.W., the Prize Court
deals with commodities solely from the point of view
of their value in war to the enemy.
It does not take
into consideration their value to ourselves.
It Is for this reason that M.E.W. works out con
trolled quotas of imports for the European neutrals
without regard to our supply position.
It goes
carefully into the normal needs of the neutrals
themselves, and it takes every precaution to see
that Important materials do not go through the
rneutrals to the enemy.
It then establishes a quota
it Is willing to navicert.
This quota can be
justified/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
justified in international law, on the ground
that it is aimed primarily at depriving the enemy
of resources and not at depriving the neutral-of
commodities.
It is for this reason also, that an
agreement to navicert does not imply in any sense
a willingness on the part of the British to supply.
A navicert, theoretically, constitutes solely a
simpler way of applying Blockade than search at sea.
Incidentally, of course, it is much more effective.
Il l
I . —
—
. ...................
This does not mean that M.E.W. officials never
take supply Into consideration nor that they do not
squeeze the navicert procedure to the limit to
obtain advantages other than Blockade. They do, of
course, but they make every effort to Justify their
actions whenever possible by Blockade reasons rather
than by supply reasons. Until recently, they were
quite content to establish quotas that they doubted
could be filled. Now that we are actually In the
war and that so many South American nations are co
operating the British too are becoming embarrassed
at the conflict between the concepts of Blockade and
supply.
The Chairman of the Contraband Section of
the Blockade Committee the other day asserted that
it was becoming utterly unrealistic for the Committee,
representing the U.S. and the U.K. combined, to
navicert quantities, the shipment of which their two
governments were mutually resolved to prevent.
Just what to do about the problem Is not too
clear. We sent a cable the other day, outlining a
meeting that had been held to discuss the feasibility
of establishing a new kind of over-all agreement with
the neutrals, one that would establish quotas which
were realistic because we would be willing to supply.
I am enclosing a copy of the document d i s c u s s e d a t
that meeting and also of the Minutes of the discussion.
If this procedure should work out, It would handle the
problem.
I find Easton has another suggestion that
might help.
He says that the way things are now
organized, the British never see the commodities we
are letting through our export control to Latin America,
while neither B.E.W. nor we ever see the commodities
the Board of Trade is letting through its export
control for shipment from England.
He suggests that
there could be, at least, coordination of export
olicies from the point of view of supply.
Such
coordination/
')
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
WWR FILE
,el©phone:
4961
Economic warfare Division.
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
Groavenor
Hay IB, 1942.
Lieutenant Colonel the E011. J.J. Astor,
The Times,
London, E.C.4.
Dear Colonel Astor:
I shall be very pleased to come to lunch
at The Times at 1,30 p.m* on Thursday, June
4th.
It Is very kind of you to invite me and
I look forward to seeing you.
Sincerely yours,
Winfield W. Hlefler
WW R jMVG
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
Answered May 12, 1942 - WWR:MV9
-% * *
TH E
W M m
T IM E S
1785
May 11, 1942.
Dear Dr. Riefler,
I wonder if you would give us the
pleasure of your company at lunch at The
Times on Thursday, June 4, at 1*50 p.m.
would be delighted to see you.
It will be
a small informal party.
lours sincerely,
^1
rC
)
t>
7 ■'T
Dr. Winfield Riefler.
We
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
t
— *
9th May, 1942.
M y dear Riefler,
Pleven tells me that he is free
to dine on Tuesday, May 19th, so I will
look forward to seeing you that evening
at 1 Arkwright Road, 7»45 p.m.
Yours sincerely,
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON,
Mr. Winfield Riefler.
E NGLAND
MAY 111942
EC0X0I1C WARFARE DIYISIOI
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
Millbank, S.W.l.
1st April, 1942
My dear Riefler,
Thanks for your letter of the
31st March.
I am glad that you can
come to luncheon on Friday, April 10th.
Could you manage to get there at one
o ’clock sharp, as otherwise I fear we may
not be able to get a tabled
Yours sincerely
Mr. Winfield Riefler.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
9
FILE
Telephone:
Groavenor 4961.
Economic Warfare Dlvleion
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
March 31, 1942.
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross,
Board of Trade,
Millbank,
London, S *W *1 *
Dear Sir Frederick:
I should he very glad to have luncheon
with you on Friday, April 10th, at the Union
Club to meet Arthur Guinness.
Viner has asked me particularly to try
to get In touch with him. I was wondering this
morning how I would go about it. It is very
kind of you to make the contact.
Sincerely yours,
Winfield W. Flefler.
WWRsMVG
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
* Accepted, March 31, 1942 - WWRsMVG
Millbank, S.W.l
31st March, 1942
Dear Riefler,
Would you be free for luncheon on
Friday, 10th April, at the Union Glub,
10, Carlton House Terrace?
I want you to
meet Arthur Guinness, who is Chairman of a
Committee on Post-War Trade set up by the
British Section of the International Chamber of
Commerce.
Viner wrote to him suggesting that
he should contact you.
As he is an old friend
of mine I should be glad to put you in touch.
If the 10th April does not suit you perhaps
you would suggest another day in the week
following.
Mr. Winfield Riefler.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1942.
Dr. Winfield Riefler,
Institute of Advanced Studies,
Princeton, New Jersey.
Dear Win:
In case you fail to look me up while in Washington,
will you please make it your "business, after you get to
London, to look up Arthur Guinness, 53 Cornhill, London,
E. C. 3, England (Phone: Mansion House - 6142, )o He is
one of the authors of the ”War of Ideas” pamphlet and I have
had some interesting and encouraging correspondence with
him about the post-war economic relations of United States
and England. He is intelligent and a nice person. He is,
I take it, an officer of the British National Committee of
the International Chamber of Commerce, I have written him
that you will look him up, but my letter will probably
not reach London until sometime after you have arrived.
Meanwhile,in case you are craven enough not to look
me up, I will pay 4rbad coin wi th good by wishing you
”Bon Voyage” and a successful trip.
Warmly yours,
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
"]^Y box
^
-
7th April, 1942.
Dear Riefler,
I return herewith Loveday's
note to you, which you were good
enough to lend me.
lours sincerely,
Vwvyi^yw'
essor Riefler.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
(&}janxbtr%,
($KatQtSired,
&.WRA.
1 2 t h May,
1 9 *4-2 .
Dear Riefler,
vVe are
delighted to hear
that you are free the weekend
June 6th-7th and we very much
look forward to seeing you.
I
will get into touch with you when
the time comes.
Yours sincerely,
0 , 15.
W.W.
Riefler,
Esq.
Idcdkiy
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
WWR FILE
Telephone:
Grosvenor 4961
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W*l*
May 9, 1942.
S. D. Waley, Esq.,
Treasury Chambers,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.l.
Dear Waley:
You are very good to invite mo down for
a weekend.
The only one I have left that is
free is the weekend of .Tune 6th-7th.
If that
one is acceptable to you T would be most
pleased to join you.
Yours sincerely,
Winfield W. Riefler
WWR:MVG
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
Answered May 9, 1942 - WWRrMVG
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LO NDO N* ENG LAN D
MAY 081942
($xmt
§§>ixni,
EC0I0UC WARFARE MIS10I
foo
.
I
tJ ctA\-
is/t'
.7
,
C**UL
ss.mA,
*
J
txXX'
U*tu
-1
y**
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Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
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Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
^txmznx# Chamfers,
dfixmt(&&ax%i^ixtti,
Winfield Riefler Esq.,
Embassy of the United States of
America
1 Grosvenor Square, W. 1.
June 22,19^2
My dear Riefler,
Most sincere thanks for your congratulations, which
are much appreciated.
I have been very sensible of our
failure to meet to have a proper talk.
But our work does
not seem really to take us in the same direction, and on
the larger issues ,1 am,
as you know, very much inhibited
at the moment by the state of progress of preparations
behind the scenes.
But, all the same, we must not let
this stand in the way.
I am certain we can have a useful
exchange if we can settle down to it comfortably.
So
I very much hope we shall be able to find a time before you
go away.
What about lunch on Friday at the Athenaeum, at 1
o ’clock?
talk.
I look like being free then for a good long
Failing this, perhaps you could ring me up on the
telephone with a view to finding a convenient time.
Every sincerely yours,
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
WW R FILE
CONFIDENTIAL
B Y AIR MAIL POUCH
Mr. William T. Stone,
Assistant Director,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D.C#
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
June 24, 1942
Dear Bill:
I expect to he hack In Washington next week.
I shali
probably arrive, since even air mail Is slow, before this
letter reaches you. At that time I will take up in detail the
points raised in your letter of June 10th. Meanwhile, because
they have been the subject of correspondence, I think it well,
for the sake of the flies, that I Indicate briefly the nature
of our reactions*
1.
Navicerts vs Export Licences
One central purpose of our correspondence has been to
clear up the misconception, which I had when I came and
whloh still crops out in our discussions, between navicerts
and export licences.
It seems to us that you still tend to
identify our Export Licences with Navicerts Instead of with
the Board of Trade export licences.
In spite of your compli
mentary reference to our "able" presentation of the British
view-point to you, it is still apparent that we have not put
the point across. The essence of the point Is that our
position and the British position with respect to Export permits
la essentially the same. No neutral has any right to our
products.
We both license them for export to neutrals in
accordance with our view of our interests.
A real difference arises between us in connection with
navicerts, which you want to consider the equivalent in
practice of domestic export licences while the British insist
that they are different, that they are designed primarily to
prevent the passage of goods to the enemy rather than, as in
the case of an export permit, to conserve supply for us.
2.
The Legalistic Blockade
Hin1 .lHiWil»^« l.linmHI.- - 1 . I.W ill...... WWIM. I I I .....Will* * * * * * * * * * *
I feel that you are missing the point when you say that
the British view of navicerts is "legalistic".
In evaluating
the following considerations, please distinguish between
"legalistic" as an irrational adjective Implying unreality
and "legalistic" as a strongly objective characterisation. The
considerations/
m-v-rr.
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
•*
2
—
considerations are legalistic because the structure of the
blockade is essentially a series of legal devices pains
takingly erected on the old conception ol blockade under
international law* This structure has been so cleverly
erected that it is in significant degree self-enforcing,
under international law and under the domestic law of the
neutrals who have signed War Trade Agreements.
In a sense,
the blockade works through the consent of the neutrals who
are themselves blockaded*
It is enforced to a certain
degree by their governments*
This structure is sufficiently strong to deny directly
our resources to the enemy*
It even aueoeoneu, in doing so
In major degree from Dunkirk to the spring of 1941 when the
British had little force to put behind it and when practically
everyone, including the cooperating and blockaded neutrals,
expected the Axis to win.
Obviously, the British cannot con
sent to a serious undermining of this structure such as might
lead to its collapse* They can use It to help solve our
supply problems but not in the same sense as they use export
licences.
Our refusal to understand the nature of the
problem and our insistence that navicerts be treated as
though they were export licences is becoming distinctly em
barrassing as time goes on*
It is a little akin to insisting
that a'161n naval gun be mounted on a cruiser*
In my personal view, the future vicissitudes of the war
are still much too uncertain to permit a weakening of the
legal basis of the blockade*
It is to our Interest as well
as the British interest that the legal structure remain intact.
This does not mean that we are not concerned with safeguarding
supply. We are, but we feel that adequate machinery should
be worked out to deal with the problem directly*
This long exposition, I hope, prepares the ground for
clearing up certain direct misunderstandings in our corres
pondence to date.
Major Easton made a misstatement in the
paragraph of his letter of May 4, which is quoted in your
letter of June 10, when he said that decisions as to blockade
and quotas should be left to M.E.W. What he meant, of course,
was that they should be left to the Blockade Committee which
meets in M.E.W. and on which we have equal voice.
I wish to
associate myself with the blame that attaches to this misstate
ment because I read and approved the letter before it was sent*
Your letter of June 10 shows that you, on the other hand,
have distinctly misinterpreted other sections of the same
letter* With reference to Major Easton’s statement that
if the Blockade Committee should refuse to navicert fats
and oils/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
m
*
and oils for soap-makings the Swiss would have & "righttt
to ask for a quota on glycerin, you state that you do not
believe (1) that Switzerland has any right to glycerin if
its possession would aid the contribution Switzerland is
making to the Axis, and (2) that you do not concede that
Switzerland has any "rights" to American products or raw
materials at all. With respect to the first point, under
existing blockade procedure, which is designed to deny aid
to the enemy, the Swiss would have a "right” to ask for a
quota on glycerin only if they satisfied the Blockade Com
mittee that the granting of this quota would not aid the
enemy. This is the general basis of the whole procedure
of the Blockade Committee.
With respect to the second point,
the purpose of Major Easton1s letter was to point out that
the granting of a navicert quota had no relation to our ex
port policy and involved no "rights" to Amerioan products.
Equal Voice
There is no real ground for the apprehension recurring
through your letter that your members do not have and do not
exercise equal voice on the Blockade Committee. We do. No
action is taken over our objection, nor has any been suggest
ed. The atmosphere is good and we have never been placed in
the position of having to maintain or even to call attention
to our rights.
We ourselves have had a problem, however, with respect
to equal voice. We came over here under the misapprehension
noted above, that the Blockade Committee had power to fix
quotas for rations primarily on supply grounds, if it wished,
without regard to neutral needs.
In the beginning, conse
quently, we found ourselves constantly raising questions or
objecting in cases where there was no question that the goods
involved would go to the enemy but simply because we wanted
to conserve the United Nations1 supply. The effect of these
objections was simply to stall the works because the Blockade
Committee was without power to act on the considerations by
which we were moved. We have, consequently, discontinued
them in so far as committee action is concerned. We have
continued, however, outside the Committee, in our dealings
with M.E.W. to press the views of B.E.W.
I think we have
made great progress, as exemplified by the Swiss negotiations,
and our current conversations covering supply: programs.
Neutral Trade and Enemy Resources
In the course of these three months we have been exposed
to a great variety of problems, many of which were new, and
our own views and attitude undoubtedly reflect the results of
this exposure.
It Is hard to put one*s finger on the effects,
but/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
$
but I think I o&n summarise It by saying that we are now
Inclined to view as too narrow the concept of economic
warfare with which we arrived#
I think we were guilty,
‘at that time, of the serious offence in matters as important
as this, of overestimating the strength of our hand and
underestimating that of the enemy*
In practice, this means
that we are likely to recommend larger Import supplies to
the neutrals in return for what we are able to get than we
formerly thought would be necessary.
I do not know whether we are getting out of line with
you at home in this respect or not*
It is one of the reasons
why I think it extremely urgent that I get back#
Your refer
ence to the Enemy Resources Department of M.E.W. as being
closest to your view-point disturbs me a little on this point.
. The Enemy Resources Department of M*E*W. has the task of
seeing to It that our decisions on the Blockade Committee and
the other economic warfare activities of M.E.W# do not
result in a net increase In the critical resources of the
enemy or in a failure to deny hi m resources which we are In
a position to deny.
Its views are fundamental on questions
of policy and no action Is taken against views to which it
attaches importance.
At the same time, denial of physical resources to the
enemy is not the sole aim of economic warfare nor are the
policies through which they may be denied limited to refusal
of licences. The sin^plest way to deny outside resources to
the enemy would be to allow no imports into the Continent at
all. This would, however, be unintelligent since it would
at the same time (1) destroy a crucial source of intelligence
on which vital military operations are based, (2) fail to
cripple the economic resources of the enemy to the fullest
extent possible by removing the trading basis on which neutrals
deal with the enemy (even the Swiss last year extracted goods
in much larger quantity and value from the Axis than they
furnished), and (3) impair the basis for political warfare
which must rest perforce primarily on the maintenance of
contact with continental neutrals*
It is the task of those
conducting economic warfare, therefore, to adopt policies
much broader in scope, ingenuity and flexibility than would
be dictated by a consideration of enemy resources in isolation.
Such policies must meet the requirements of an enemy resources
department that goods do not go through to the enemy directly
or indirectly, but they cannot rest on the simple approach of
denial of import facilities to European neutrals. To do so
might be a quick road to further disaster.
As ever,
Winfield W* Riefler
WWR:MVG
\
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED
Authority £ p \ p fjp j
WW R FILE
1
CONFIDENTIAL
B Y AIR MAIL POUCH
Mr* William T. Stone,
Assistant Director,
Board of Economic War fare,
Washington, D.C.
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.l.
June 24, 1942
Dear Bill:
I expect to be back in Washington next week*
I shall
probably arrive, since even air mail is slow, before this
letter reaches you. At that time I will take up in detail the
points raised in your letter of June 10th* Meanwhile, beoause
they have been the subject of correspondence, I think It well,
for the sake of the files, that I indicate briefly the nature
of our reactions.
1*
Navicerts vs Export Licences
One central purpose of our correspondence has been to
clear up the misconception, which I had when I came and
whloh still crops out in our discussions, between navicerts
and export licences.
It seems to us that you still tend to
identify our Export Licences with Navicerts Instead of with
the Board of Trade export licences.
In spite of your compli
mentary reference to our "able" presentation of the British
view-point to you, It is still apparent that we have not put
the point across. The essence of the point is that our
position and the British position with respect to Export permits
Is essentially the same* No neutral has any right to our
products.
We both license them for export to neutrals in
accordance with our view of our interests*
A real difference arises between us in connection with
navlaerts, which you want to consider the equivalent in
practice of domestic export licences while the British insist
that they are different, that they are designed primarily to
prevent the passage of goods to the enemy rather than, as in
the case of an export permit, to conserve supply for us.
2.
The Legalistic Blockade
I feel that you are missing the point when you say that
the British view of navicerts is "legalistic".
In evaluating
the following considerations, please distinguish between
"legalistic’5 as an irrational adjective Implying unreality
and "legalistic” as a strongly objective characterization.
The
considerations/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED
(Authority _£D]
o ^O
j
• 2
considerations are legalistic because the structure of the
blockade is essentially a series of legal devices pains
takingly erected on the old conception of blockade under
international law. This structure has been so cleverly
erected that it is in significant degree self-enforcing,
under international law and under the domestic law of the
neutrals who have signed War Trade Agreements.
In a sense,
the blockade works through the consent of the neutrals who
are themselves blockaded.
It is enforced to a certain
degree by their governments.
This structure is sufficiently strong to deny directly
our resources to the enemy.
It even succeeded in doing so
in major degree from Dunkirk to the spring of 1941 when the
British had little force to put behind it and when practically
everyone, Including the cooperating and blockaded neutrals,
expected the Axis to win.
Obviously, the British cannot con
sent to a serious undermining of this structure such as might
lead to Its collapse. They can use it to help solve our
supply problems but not in the same sense as they use export
licences.
Our refusal to understand the nature of the
problem and our insistence that navicerts be treated as
though they were export licences is becoming distinctly em
barrassing as time goes on.
It is a little akin to insisting
that a 161n naval gun be mounted on a cruiser.
In my personal view, the future vicissitudes of the war
are still much too uncertain to permit a weakening of the
legal basis of the blockade*
It is to our interest as well
as the British interest that the legal structure remain Intact*
This does not mean that we are not concerned with safeguarding
supply. We are, but we feel that adequate machinery should
be worked out to deal with the problem directly.
This long exposition, I hope, prepares the ground for
clearing up certain direct misunderstandings in our corres
pondence to date.
Major Easton made a misstatement In the
paragraph of his letter of May 4, which Is quoted in your
letter of June 10, when he said that decisions as to blockade
and quotas should be left to M.E.W. What he meant, of course,
was that they should be left to the Blockade Committee which
meets in M.E.W. and on which we have equal voice.
I wish to
associate myself with the blame that attaches to this misstate
ment because I read and approved the letter before It was sent*
Your letter of June 10 shows that you, on the other hand,
have distinctly misinterpreted other sections of the same
letter. With reference to Major Easton1s statement that
if th© Blockade Committee should refuse to navicert fats
and oils/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED
Authority £ b | o 5 G |
m 3 m>
and oil a for soap-making,, the Swiss would have a "right"
to ask for a quota on glycerin, you state that you do not
believe (1) that Switzerland has any right to glycerin if
its possession would aid the contribution Switzerland is
making to the Axis, and (2) that you do not concede that
Switzerland has any "rights" to American products or raw
materials at all*
With respect to the first point, under
existing blockade procedure, which is designed to deny aid
to theenemy, the Swiss would have a "right" to ask for a
quota on glycerin only if they satisfied the Blockade Com
mittee that the granting of this quota would not aid the
enemy. This is the general basis of the whole procedure
of the Blockade Committee.
With respect to the second point,
the purpose of Major Easton1s letter was to point out that
the granting of a navicert quota had no relation to our ex
port policy and involved no "rights" to American products.
Equal Voice
There is no real ground for the apprehension recurring
through your letter that your members do not have and do not
exercise equal voice on the Blockade Committee• We do. No
action is taken over our objection, nor has any been suggest
ed. The atmosphere is good and we have never been placed in
the position of having to maintain or even to call attention
to our rights.
We ourselves have had a problem# however, with respect
to equal voice. We came over here under the misapprehension
noted above, that the Blockade Committee had power to fix
quotas for rations primarily on supply grounds, if it wished,
without regard to neutral needs.
In the beginning, conse
quently, we found ourselves constantly raising questions or
objecting in cases where there was no question that the goods
involved would go to the enemy but simply because we wanted
to conserve the United Nations* supply. The effect of these
objections was simply to stall the works because the Blockade
Committee was without power to act on the considerations by
which we were moved. We have, consequently, discontinued
them in so far as committee action is concerned.
We have
continued, however, outside the Committee, in our dealings
with M .E .W . to press the views of B.E.W.
I think we have
made great progress, as exemplified b y the Swiss negotiations,
and our current conversations covering supply programs.
Neutral Trade and Enemy Resources
In the course of these three months we have been exposed
to a great variety of problems, many of which were new, and
our own views and attitude undoubtedly reflect the results of
this exposure.
It is hard to put one*s finger on the effects,
but/
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED
Authority £ C P | o 5 0
1
>
* 4 »
*but I think I oan summarize It by saying that we are now
Inclined to view as too narrow the concept of economic
warfare with which we arrived.
I think we were guilty,
at that time, of the serious offence in matters as important
as this, of overestimating the strength of our hand and
underestimating that of the enemy.
In practice, this means
that we are likely to recommend larger import supplies to
the neutrals in return for what we are able to get than we
formerly thought would be necessary.
I do not know whether we are getting out of line with
you at home in this respect or not.
It Is one of the reasons
why I think it extremely urgent that I get back.
Your refer
ence to the Enemy Resources Department of M.E.W. as being
closest to your view-point disturbs me a little on this point.
The Enemy Resources Department of M.E.W. has the task of
seeing to it that our decisions on the Blockade Committee and
the other economic warfare activities of M.E.W. do not
result In a net increase in the critical resources of the
enemy or in a failure to deny hi m resources which we are in
a position to deny.
Its views are fundamental on questions
of policy and no action Is taken against views to which it
attaches importance.
At the same time, denial of physical resources to the
enemy is not the sole aim of economic warfare nor are the
policies through which they may be denied limited to refusal
of licences. The sloppiest way to deny outside resources to
the enemy would be to allow no imports into the Continent at
all. This would, however, be unintelligent since It would
at the same time (1) destroy a crucial source of intelligence
on which vital military operations are based, (2) fail to
cripple the economic resources of the enemy to the fullest
extent possible by removing the trading basis on which neutrals
deal with the enemy (even the Swiss last year extracted goods
in much larger quantity and value from the Axis than they
furnished), and (3) impair the basis for political warfare
which must rest perforce primarily on the maintenance of
contact with continental neutrals.
It is the task of those
conducting economic warfare, therefore, to adopt policies
much broader in scope, ingenuity and flexibility than would
bq dictated by a consideration of enemy resources In isolation.
Such policies must meet the requirements of an enemy resources
department that goods do not go through to the enemy directly
or indirectly, but they cannot rest on the simple approach of
donial of import facilities to European neutrals. To do so
might be a quick road to further disaster*
As ever,
Winfield W. Riefler
mmiwrn
Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives
d e c l a s s if ie d
Authority £t> \o 5 0 i
J ohn Fo ste r Du lle s
4 8 Wall Street
New Y ork
i August
M y d e a r Dr.
17,
1942
Riefler:
If t h e r e is ayehail^e o f s e e i n g y o u
i n N e w Y o r k b e f o r e y o u go to E n g l a n d I s h o u l d
he v e r y h a p p y .
I, m y s e l f , a m g o i n g a w a y o n
F r i d a y n i g h t , h u t if y o u a r e c o m i n g h e r e
Dr. W i n f i e l d R i e f l e r ,
B o a r d of E c o n o m i c W a r f a r e ,
W a s h i n g t o n , D. C.
I
@FedFRASER