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For Release Evening Papers
November 12, 1946




Remarks byHonorable Wm. McC, Martin, Jr.,
Chairman, Export-Import Bank of Washington
at the International Finance Session
of the
33rd National Foreign Trade Convention
New York City
November 12, 1946

THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AND AMERICAN POST-WAR FOREIGN TRADE
The year just completed has seen the United States actively
participating in rehabilitating a war-torn world. And certainly
no group in our country is more aware than the National Foreign Trade
Council of just how admirably U. S. foreign trade has met its heavy
responsibilities in this field or just how formidable is the task
still remaining if the success of the great post-war effort to
restore the world's economy to proper working order is to be assured.
Our country, for reasons familiar to all of you, is bearing the
greater part of the initial burden of this gigantic rehabilitation
endeavor. Three aspects of the effort stand out. In the first
place, the United States is the chief source of the relief and reconstruction goods which the world requires. In the second place,
foreign countries are not in a position to make immediate payment for
these vitally needed supplies, and an enormous dollar financing problem
arises. And in the third place, the necessity for financing the bulk
of the reconstruction requirements forces the United States, as the
great creditor nation, to face a major repayment problem.
As for the first point, the ability of the United States to produce the goods required in the rehabilitation effort is undoubted.
Thus, despite the tremendous task of domestic reconversion, this
country exported $8-3/4 billion of commodities between July 1945 and
July 1946. Exports are steadily increasing and are now running at
the annual rate of about $10 billion, not including some $3.8 billion




- 2 of transfers of Lend-Lease and surplus war materials.
As for the second point, the nature and approximate magnitude of
the dollar financing problem was anticipated by the U. S. Government
well in advance of V-J Day. Three distinct types of dollar financing
were foreseen -- the financing of relief, the financing of longerrange reconstruction and developmental needs, and the financing of the
crucial British balance of payments deficit.
It was recognized that the urgent relief needs of the most impoverished countries would have to be met on a straight charity basis.
An international agency, UNRRA, was the mechanism decided upon for the
purpose and the United States contributed 2.7 billion dollars, or more
than 70 per cent of UNRRA's total resources, to it.
The Bretton Woods Agreements of July 1944 provided for the
establishment of an International Bank as the principal post-war agency
to make foreign loans for long-term reconstruction and development;
because of delays in ratification, however, the International Bank is
just now in a position to begin operations. Private capital could not
be expected to meet any substantial part of the emergency post-war needs.
It was therefore essential for the United States to provide the dollar
credits required to finance the most urgent reconstruction needs of the
war-devastated areas until such time as the International Bank could
take over, if a drastic fall in exports disastrous to economic and social
rehabilitation abroad were to be avoided. To meet this situation
Congress, in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, increased the lending




- 3 authority of the Bank from $700 million to$3-1/2billion, removed the
prohibition on loans by the Bank to countries in default on their
obligations to the U. S. Government, and transferred the management
of the Bank from an ex-officio part-time Board of Trustees to a fulltime bi-partisan Board of Directors.
As for the British problems, it was recognized that the crucial
position of Britain in world trade made it imperative to find some
means of meeting the prospective British balance of payments deficit
if our post-war international economic objectives were to be fully
realized. For this purpose Congress in July 1946 authorized the
extension of a $3.75 billion line of credit to Britain as part of the
Anglo-American Financial Agreement.
The third aspect of the rehabilitation effort, the necessity for
repayment of the long-term dollar credits, poses one of the most
challenging problems this country has been called upon to face.
If we are ever to be repaid for these credits it will be essential for
the American people sooner or later to accept a commodity import surplus
as normal and proper. The discussions here attest to the full recognition by the National Foreign Trade Council of the crucial character
of the import problem. I am sure, however, that no one would minimize
the practical obstacles in the way of bringing about an appropriate
increase in the volume of imports into this country and the development
of a regular surplus of commodity imports over exports.
In carrying out its role under the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945, the Export-Import Bank has entered into commitments for general




- 4 ~
reconstruction purposes totalling 2,065 million dollars. These
credits comprise 655 million dollars for the purchase of goods which
had originally been included in the lend-lease program, $1,277 million
extended for emergency reconstruction needs, and $133 million made
available for the purchase of raw cotton. In the first category
France received $550 million, Belgium $55 million, and The Netherlands
$50 million on the same terms as lend-lease 3(c), i.e,, 2-3/8% for 30
years. In the second group were loans to Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, The Netherlands, The Netherlands East Indies, Norway, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, China, and Ethiopia. These credits range in amount from
$3 million to Ethiopia to $650 million to France, while the maturities
range from 2 years in the case of the second general credit to The
Netherlands, intended as a tide-over credit, to 25-30 years for the great
majority of the credits. The long-term credits with several minor
exceptions carry an effective rate of interest of 3% per annum. The
cotton credits are largely to European countries and include $33 million
to China. They are short-term credits, 15 months to 24 months, and
bear an interest rate of 2-1/2%.
Since the demands on it have been far in excess of its available
resources the Bank has had to follow the policy of limiting its emergency
reconstruction loans to the immediate minimum needs of the borrower.
This has involved a very careful screening of all loan applications
from the point of view of urgency of need of the borrower, the borrower's
own resources, the possibility of obtaining the loan from other sources,
the ability of the borrower to make effective use of the funds, the capacity
of the borrower to repay, and the impact of the loan on our domestic economy.




- 5The assistance rendered by the National Advisory Council to the
Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank in connection with its emergency
reconstruction credit program has been invaluable. Before the Bank actively
considers any loan application from a foreign government the application is
referred to the National Advisory Council for its consideration from the
standpoint of policy and coordination. Once a given application or class of
applications have been "approved for consideration", as the action of the
Council is now worded, the Export-Import Bank assumes full responsibility
for the final decision as to whether or not the loan should be made and on
what terms and conditions. This use of the Council mechanism attunes ExportImport Bank lending to U. S. foreign policy while retaining in the Board of
the Bank, as it was obvious Congress intended, the veto power over indiscriminate or unsound loans. In view of the extreme complexity of the
foreign lending problems, and the close inter-relationship between the
foreign loan applications to the Bank and to other Federal agencies, the
Export-Import Bank would have been faced with a well-nigh insuperable task
in attempting to carry out its emergency reconstruction program expeditiously
without the assistance of this machinery. Although the Bank has been able
to meet only a portion of the total reconstruction demands of the wardevastated countries, I am confident that the essential minimum needs
of most of these countries have been met with promptness and efficiency.
The Long-Term Role of The Export-Import Bank, With the International
Bank scheduled to begin its loan operations in the near future, the emergency
reconstruction credit phase of the Export-Import Bank's activity is now
drawing to a close. At this point, therefore, I should like to comment
briefly on the subject of the future plans of the Bank.




-6~
The fundamental purpose of the Bank as laid down by Congress is
to aid in "the financing and facilitating of exports and imports and the
exchange of commodities between the United States . . . . and any foreign
country or the agencies or nationals thereof"• The Bank has been given
broad powers to do a general banking business and to make practically
any type of loan, without limitation as to the amount of loans to any one
borrower, in so far as the exercise of these powers is necessary to carry
out its fundamental purpose.
The broad powers and fundamental purpose of the Bank lend themselves
well to assisting American foreign trade in fulfilling both its immediate
and long-range post-war responsibilities.
Throughout its existence, the Bank has been prepared to extend
assistance to American exporters and importers under appropriate conditions.
Assistance to exporters has generally taken the form of credits for the
benefit of individual United States exporters to facilitate the sale
abroad of specific materials and equipment. Since the end of the war,
American exporters have been applying to the Bank in increasing numbers
for credit assistance not obtainable from private banks. The progressive
relaxation of export controls in the United States, combined with the
accumulated foreign demand for United States products, have opened the
way for a greatly expanded export business on a commercial basis. As before
the war, however, exporters are obliged to sell on terms appropriate to the
type of commodity involved, the ability of the foreign buyer to pay, and
the competition offered by other suppliers. Since credit terms required
are often longer than commercial banks are in a position to accommodate,
it is necessary for the exporter to seek the assistance of the Export-Import




-7Bank. The Bank has met, and will continue to meet, all legitimate demands
of this character.
The Bank is prepared to extend similar assistance to American importers.
Hitherto the Bank has made few importer credits; this, however, has been due,
not to any reluctance on the part of the Bank to grant such credits, but to
the fact that the American importer is normally able to obtain adequate
financing for imports from private American banking institutions. As a rule,
commercial banks are in a position to obtain a pledge covering the imported
products at the time of making their advances, so that the transactions
have all the attributes of a domestic credit and there is little need for
the intervention of the Export-Import Bank.
The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shares the opinion
that an increased volume of imports is one of the essentials of a healthy,
thriving United States post-war foreign trade. The Bank has a very special
interest in this matter by reason of the specific requirement in our statute
that we have reasonable assurance of repayment before making a loan. It is
the opinion of the Board of the Bank that, if the broad effort to revive
world trade and reestablish an effective multilateral trading system
succeeds, all the countries to whom we have made emergency reconstruction
loans should have no difficulty repaying the loans. It is our further view
that the greatest hope for a revival of world trade and successful solution
of the repayment problem lies in an appropriate expansion of imports into
this country; indeed, in the absence of an indefinite continuation of U. S.
foreign lending, this is the only way in which the borrowing countries
will be able to meet the service charges on their obligations and continue
to buy the products of this country essential to their welfare.




-8In this connection we have welcomed the enlightened discussion of the
import problem in recent months by such informed private bodies as the
National Foreign Trade Council, the Twentieth Century Fund, the Committee
for Economic Development, the Aldrich Committee and others. We all realize
that the task of educating American public opinion to the necessity of an
expansion of imports, if U. S. foreign trade is to be put on a permanently
sound footing, is a formidable one; in my opinion it is probably an impossible one without the continued enlightened leadership of such groups
as yours.
For its part, the Bank has devoted, and will continue to devote, a
great deal of attention to the import aspects of all the loan applications
before it. In the case of all the Bank's general developmental and reconstruction loans the direct connection of the proposed loan with the creation
of additional foreign exchange has always been studied. The contribution
of any loan to the solution at least of its own foreign exchange problem
has always been a factor present in its consideration. In its appraisal
of loans the Bank regards financing of the production of commodities suitable
for exports from the foreign country to the United States as a consideration
as important as the promotion of exports from the United States.
Future Reconstruction and Developmental Credits. The pending early
operation of the International Bank has brought the problem of future reconstruction and developmental credits by the Export-Import Bank into sharp
focus. From the time of the initial formulation of the U. S. foreign
lending program it has been envisaged within the U. S. Government that, as
soon as the International Bank could take over, the Export-Import Bank
would largely withdraw from the field of long-term reconstruction and
developmental credits. It has always been intended that the International



-9Bank, rather than the Export-Import Bank, should be the principal agency
to make foreign loans for reconstruction and development which private
capital could not furnish on reasonable terms. It is the policy of the
Export-Import Bank not to compete in any sense with, but instead to cooperate
fully, with the International Bank; it recognizes that the long-term reconstruction and developmental loan field from now on is the special province
of the International Bank. This does not mean, however, that the ExportImport Bank will no longer consider shorter-term developmental loan
applications from Latin American and other countries nor that any further
emergency reconstruction credits by the Export-Import Bank are ruled out.
The Export-Import Bank recognises that in special circumstances, such
as the case of certain war-devastated countries which are not members of
the International Bank and hence not eligible for loans from that institution,
some emergency financial assistance from the Bank may still be necessary.
The limited resources of the Bank, however, preclude the possibility of anything but limited assistance as a stop gap measure to tide the situation in
these countries over until their basic problems can be tackled comprehensively through other instrumentalities.
The Export-Import Bank has endeavored to live up studiously to the
policy Congress gave it of supplementing and encouraging and not competing
with private capital. There is inherent, furthermore, in such an injunction the implication that the assistance which the Bank gives must have
in it the element of pioneering. I am convinced there is a real and
continuing need for the services of the Export-Import Bank as an organiser
and trail blazer in financing foreign trade. But our whole purpose will be
defeated if private capital is not better organized than it is at present
to supplement and further our activities.




-10The Export-Import Bank is pursuing as diligently as possible a policy
designed to return trade to private channels and to this end is avoiding
wherever possible the government-to-government credit in favor of so-called
exporter credits in which domestic suppliers participate. The Bank
created early in 1946 a Private Capital Participation Division which
maintains close contact with financial markets and provides information
regarding our current portfolio in order that its commercially bankable
paper may be made available to private investors within limitations of
the regulations of the Securities Exchange Commission. Ultimately, perhaps,
we may have private Export-Import Banks, and then the Export-Import Bank
of Washington can act as a sort of central bank for these banks of foreign
trade. There is much pioneering work to do in this field and I know we
can depend on the National Foreign Trade Council to be a leader in seeing
that a sound course is developed.