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REMARKS MADE BY WILLIAM MCC. MARTIN, JR.

CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON
BEFORE THE HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE

Gentlemen, in view of the testimony which you have already heard, I
w i l l limit my remarks to stating in broadest o u t l i n e the reasons why I am
unequivocally in favor of the British loan, The loan is, I

f e e l , basic in

a realization of the full p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent to the Bretton Woods program
Ever since the Bretton Woods meeting, I have been of the opinion that the
achievement of the

international

economic objectives of t h i s Government as

embodied in the Bretton Woods l e g i s l a t i o n hinged upon whether or not a

satis-

factory solution was obtained to the British postwar balance of payments
problem. Inasmuch as I did not participate in any of the negotiations with
the British, I welcome an opportunity to express my conviction that the Agreement as drawn up represents a constructive effort to solve t h i s crucial British
problem in a manner fully consistent with broad U. S. obejectives. without
assistance in the form of t h i s loan, I do not see how the British can hope to
meet their prospective

deficits

in the 1946-50 period except by continuing

their wartime exchange and trade r e s t r i c t i o n s , further stengthening the
sterling area t i e s and l a general resorting to any means at t h e i r disposal to
push their exports and obtain essential imports*

Such trade and financial

measures would certainly run the risk of undermining the entire Bretton Woods
program at i t s inception and they would also s e t up numerous points of friction
la the trade relations between t h i s country and the British Empire at a most
inopportune time.




The export-import Bank has a direct and immediate interest in the
success of the whole broad effort to re-create a healthy world economy.
Our statutes require us to have reasonablea s s u r a n c eof repayment.

If

the effort to revive trade succeeds, the countries to whom we have granted
emergency reconstruction loans out of the funds granted by Congress to the
Bank for this purpose should have no d i f f i c u l t y in repaying the loans. If,
however, the British loan f a l l s through and the Bretton Woods program

there-

by f a l l s of i t s own weight, the prospect of repayment of loans already made
w i l l be substantially lessened and it w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t for us t o see
our way clear to making any future reconstruction loans.

In conclusion, 1

do not believe that you can separate the British loan from the Bretton Woods
program and the expanded lending authority granted to the Export-Import Bank
l a s t year. The whole effort w i l l , I believe, stand or f a l l together.