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REMARKS MADE BY WILLIAM MCC. MARTIN, JR. CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON BEFORE THE HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE Gentlemen, in view of the testimony which you have already heard, I w i l l limit my remarks to stating in broadest o u t l i n e the reasons why I am unequivocally in favor of the British loan, The loan is, I f e e l , basic in a realization of the full p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent to the Bretton Woods program Ever since the Bretton Woods meeting, I have been of the opinion that the achievement of the international economic objectives of t h i s Government as embodied in the Bretton Woods l e g i s l a t i o n hinged upon whether or not a satis- factory solution was obtained to the British postwar balance of payments problem. Inasmuch as I did not participate in any of the negotiations with the British, I welcome an opportunity to express my conviction that the Agreement as drawn up represents a constructive effort to solve t h i s crucial British problem in a manner fully consistent with broad U. S. obejectives. without assistance in the form of t h i s loan, I do not see how the British can hope to meet their prospective deficits in the 1946-50 period except by continuing their wartime exchange and trade r e s t r i c t i o n s , further stengthening the sterling area t i e s and l a general resorting to any means at t h e i r disposal to push their exports and obtain essential imports* Such trade and financial measures would certainly run the risk of undermining the entire Bretton Woods program at i t s inception and they would also s e t up numerous points of friction la the trade relations between t h i s country and the British Empire at a most inopportune time. The export-import Bank has a direct and immediate interest in the success of the whole broad effort to re-create a healthy world economy. Our statutes require us to have reasonablea s s u r a n c eof repayment. If the effort to revive trade succeeds, the countries to whom we have granted emergency reconstruction loans out of the funds granted by Congress to the Bank for this purpose should have no d i f f i c u l t y in repaying the loans. If, however, the British loan f a l l s through and the Bretton Woods program there- by f a l l s of i t s own weight, the prospect of repayment of loans already made w i l l be substantially lessened and it w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t for us t o see our way clear to making any future reconstruction loans. In conclusion, 1 do not believe that you can separate the British loan from the Bretton Woods program and the expanded lending authority granted to the Export-Import Bank l a s t year. The whole effort w i l l , I believe, stand or f a l l together.