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AID TO RUSSIA
War and the problems of war, in terms of Justice, are perplexing and confusing
to the average man. Even more so to the historian whose research and documents must,
perforce, record the sins of omission and commission which attach in degree more or
less to every nation•
Disputes may arise as to extenuating circumstances and how the intricacies of
International Law may make it possible to condone here where it cannot be justified
there• But the origin of the present world conflict, no less than its precursors, is
shrouded in shades of right and wrong through which only one clear light shines•
German and Japanese aggression, wanton and ruthless attack without adequate warning
or simple declaration of intent, appeal to brute force as the law of life rather than
its servant, subjugation of the mind to the primordial instinct of fear, have made
the current war a just one for the Allies. Whatever the previous merits of the
German-Japanese cause, any doubts or questionings the man of peace and morality may
have had should have been quelled by the invasion of Poland and the onslaught at
Pearl Harbor*

For these acts, in a moral sense at least, there can be no excuse.

To refuse to fight and uphold peace after such a demonstration brands a man as a
moral craven unequal to providing the security necessary to maintain his home and
his family• Self-defense is the prerequisite to both individual and national
integrity•
Pearl Harbor did for the Americans what the air raids on Britain did for
England.

It united them as a nation in self-defense and merged isolationists and

interventionists in a common cause • The Battle of Britain gave a final and conclusive answer to those Britons who wanted peace at any price, while Pearl Harbor
made national honor our own stake in the war and Republican and Democrat alike
voted unanimously for it. Disunity over going to war has given way to disputes over
how efficiently the war is being conducted and what policies shall, prevail when the




war is successfully concluded•
The average man in America is now just as bewildered and perplexed about the
policy he desires his government to pursue* once the longed for peace is attained,
as he was about whether it was necessary to give up peace in order to preserve
something even more valuable*

Once again he stands at the crossroads, as at the

end of World War I when he turned sharply to isolationism, and wonders whether he
may not be biting off more than he can chewj e.g. He is not sure about the implications of the Atlantic Charter and instinctively distrusts its practicality. What
bothers him most is his lack of comprehension of the nation which has gained his
whole-hearted respect, admiration, and gratitude as the impregnable wall against
which Hitler1s might has been hurled in vain. Russia, he instinctively has come to
like, but this liking he also finds puzzling and disturbing. Why this worry?

Will

time prove it unjustified and remove its basis in direct and frank relations between
the Russian and American Governments, or is it well grounded and must it be reckoned
with as another threat to his National security? What part will Russia have in
American Foreign Policy?

Russia, and U.S. relations with her, have become the key-

stone in the arch of whatever American Foreign Policy may now be evolving and
represent the ultimate test of the scope and practicality of the Good Neighbor Policy.
When Russia was invaded by Germany in June of 19iil, the commond bond of defense
against aggression united her with the Allies. The Russo-Finnish War and the RussoGerman pact disappeared from the horizon as so much water over a larger dam. And
this was promptly recognized in the United States. Isolationists and Interventionists
were joined in extending lend-lease aid to Russia, and whatever minor dissatisfaction
there may have been in isolationist quarters still dubious of lend-lease aid itself
as a possible incitement to war, vanished almost completely with our own Pearl Harbor.
The plot had now struggled to its climax and the United States, Britain, and Russia
were indissolubly arrayed in a death conflict against Hitler. And, in the judgement




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of many, around the central point of Russia will be resolved the extent to which
America reverts to isolationism or becomes a permanent collaborator in European
affairs.
Part II
Many reasons have been given why the United States entered into the first
World War*

Americailoans to the Allies and the desire of big business and banking

interests to preserve and protect established connections and property unquestionably
played a part. Then there was the democratic creed and its basic hostility to
authoritarian rule, and finally, the blood and cultural ties of English speaking
peoples. But with due allowance for all these factors, and many more, the real
enthusiasm of America^ for victory and participation was in something far deeper.
America believed it was a war to end wars and soldier and civilian alike faced
hauehip and danger with the faith and courage born of the hope of a new and better
world. Yihen the Armistice was signed in 1918 and the manifold ramifications of
European politics was revealed in clearer perspective, there was a period of bitter
disillusionment and America refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and participate
in the idealistic Mr. Wilson's League of Nations.
This reversion to isolationism was not surprising in the light of traditional
American Foreign Policy. Washington, in his Farewell Address, had warned against
entangling alliances and intervention in European affairs, while Monroe introduced
as a fundamental policy, non-interference in political affairs of the American
continent by any European power. These two doctrines are deeply embedded in
American thought and practice. And Mr. Wilson's fourteen points, particularly those
defining territorial rights and limits, seemed to destroy the Washingtonian aspect
of United States policy and active participation in the League would inevitably
undermine the Monroe Doctrine. America made several efforts to compromise, such as
tentative acceptance of the World Court, but once the issue was clear, the retreat




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was steady and complete until the accession of Hitler to power early in 1933 caused
many thoughtful people to worry once more.
World change was in the air. Time and distance had been reduced steadily.
Lindbergh had flown the ocean and radio became a household accessory.

Newstraveled

almost as rapidly as it was gathered. Monetary theorists questioned the value of
the gold standard and recommendations for goldless currency systems received more
and more attention as orthodox economics received one defeat after another. Depression
and poverty rocked many nations, including the United States, and the perennial debates
on what form of government made possible the highest standard of living and how to
produce more haves and less have nots became more mLolent. Socialism became a bigger
factor in all governments and Communism, Fascism, and Nazism were militant organizations
as well as individual governments.
Suddenly the conscience of many people was troubled. Stories of persecution
and murder, helpless minorities driven hither and thither, justice denied and injustice
glorified, increased slowly but so steadily as to make people realize where there was
so much smoke, there must be some fire. Night invasions of the ghettos and atrocities
of an almost unbelieveable character against the Jews added fuel to the fire of uneasiness. Persons forcibly deprived of property and opportunity came to the United States.
Mass meetings called to stir protest, in America and elsewhere, were quieted by statements such as "It is much exaggerated, perhaps they had it coining to them, and besides
it's none of our business so long as they don!t interfere with us—after all, it's
their government and what they want11. Nevertheless, the march of events was slowly
reversing isolationism of the extreme variety and militant interventionists began to
make headway with the slogan, flAmerica is next11—they soon will want to destroy it
too—Nazism, as well as Communism, wants not only world revolution but world conquest
and domination.

Commencement addresses at universities and the usual meetings to

commemorate historical events began to recall Woodrow Wilson more and more and exalt




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him as a misunderstood man who was far ahead of his time. Only selfishness and
ignorance, they said, had blocked the League of Nations • America must assume its
rightful responsibility and use its power in European affairs if civilization were
not to perish and security vanish from the earth*

Isolationism was now on the

defensive and took the form of attacks on war in the positive sense, and placated its
enemies with platitutes on the use of moral suasion on the negative side.
The great majority of Americans were opposed to war by instinct, as well as
having some remote memories of the previous conflagration which were distinctly unpleasant. Nevertheless, they recognized all too clearly how steadily they were being
thrust into it, despite their best effort to resist. For a long time, they refused
to believe it would come and prior to Pearl Harbor maintained a strong front of
refusal to declare war, no matter what the provocation. Lend-Lease aid to the Allies
was good enough, wasn't it? Ihy should their sons and friends get into it?
Suddenly, it was upon them and their acceptance of it was complete and sincere
but without enthusiasm and merely as an unpleasant duty to be performed at any cost.
Peace they desire earnestly, but their hopes for a lasting one and a better
and new world are not as bright as they were at the corresponding stage of World War I.
And Mr. Wilsons fourteen points were not nearly so idealistic nor so )M|practical as
Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill's Atlantic Charter which was issued just as fortuitously
and without prior consultation or approval of either the American or British people,
in a manner almost the same as the earlier counterpart. The four freedoms are great
ideals, but two of them, freedom from want and freedom from fear belong to the realms
of nature and metaphysics, while the others require political creeds at variance with
authoritarian government and hence advocate indirectly at least, the very World
Revolution to which the democracies have so long objected in Communism.

The only

freedom of importance overlooked in the Atlantic Charter is the freedom to figure out
your own freedom. And that is where Russia, America and Britain's No. 1 ally, and
relations with Russia become the major problem in American Foreign Policy.



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Certainly

the interventionist extreme represented by the Roosevelu-Churchill agreement mast be
tempered if we are to build a solid foundation for including Russia in the new world
structure. Russia has earned our friendship and it needs the best statesmanship
possible to make Russia understand we value this friendship and want to earn hers

in

return. The trend toward isolationism is now in full swing in America, and Russia is
the key to the situation. World peace requires world understanding and in a sense
never before the world needs to understand as well as recognize the importance of
Russia to the World. What a jolt this is to the average Americanl

Communism has

been anathemia to him for years and has represented the crackpot at his worst in
America. It is small wonder he is bewildered and worried*

Is it any surprise he

begins to seek comfort in blind isolationism and wants to.revert, as before, to the
ostrich-like extreme of the World War I aftermath?

Let us make an examination of the

Russo-American relationship and see if it is not possible to guide our ship of state
betweens the shoals into the middle waters where for a time, at least, the Aristotolean
principle of the golden mean and the Platonic conception of the good, the true, and the
beautiful can meet*

Only by honest, fearless analysis, live and let live and the devil

take the hindmost, and comprehension of the evolutionary flow of history can this be
achieved; and at the outset, honor and chivalry in the concrete sense must take their
perspective from the moment and not from the contractual relationship of previous
agreements, or our efforts will be in vain.




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