Full text of Paul A. Volcker Papers : Gold, Box 28, Item c193
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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Collection: Paul A. Volcker Papers Call Number: MC279 Box 28 Preferred Citation: Gold, 1980-1981; Paul A. Volcker Papers, Box 28; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library Find it online: http://findingaids.princeton.edu/collections/MC279/c193 and https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival/5297 The digitization ofthis collection was made possible by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. From the collections of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ These documents can only be used for educational and research purposes ("fair use") as per United States copyright law. By accessing this file, all users agree that their use falls within fair use as defined by the copyright law of the United States. 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Mudd Manuscript Library 65 Olden Street Princeton, NJ 08540 609-258-6345 609-258-3385 (fax) mudd@princeton.edu https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis P 5 Statement by Robert Solomon* Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution before the Gold Commission November 12, 1981 I welcome the opportunity to present my views to this Commission, which is charged with conducting "a study to assess and make recommendations with regard to the policy of the United States Government concerning the role of gold in domestic and international monetary systems . . my credentials as a witness are that T have spent more than thirty years as a professional economist in the fields of domestic and international monetary economics, that I was on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board for twenty-eight years closely involved in the formulation of domestic monetary policy and active in the inter-agency policy process with respect to the international monetary system. I spent two years (1972-74) as a vice-chairman of the Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System (Committee of Twenty) and have written a widely-read book in the field: The International Monetary System, 1945-1976: An Insider's View (Harper & Row, 1977). In this statement I shall first identify what I regard as the major issues raised by the Commission's assignment and then present some observations on each of these issues. *The views expressed are my own and are not necessarily those of the officers, trustees, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2 Issues to be Faced (1) The broadest issue is, what would the United States, and the rest of the world, gain from giving gold a more important official role, up to and including a form of gold standard? (2) What changes, if any, would be made in the exchange-rate system under which the world is now operating? That system is a hybrid one, in which countries have freedom of choice among free floating, pegging to dnother currency or a basket of currencies, or establishing a regional system of par values (as in the European Monetary System) where the regional bloc floats. In practice, a substantial proportion of world trade -- well over half -- is conducted under floating exchange rates. If a change in the role of gold implied a change in existing exchange rate arrangements, a number of major questions would arise. (3) Would the U.S. dollar, and other currencies, be interconvertible with gold domestically? What effects would this have on monetary policy? (4) Is it envisioned that the price of gold would be fixed in terms of dollars? How would the price be chosen and, equally important, how would it be maintained in the face of the sorts of political shocks that have sent the gold price through such wide gyrations in recent years? What are the implications for monetary policy of movements in the market price of gold? (5) What sort of international convertibility would be established? https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 3 In practice, if the answer to the first question under Issue 3 is "yes," it would be virtually impossible to prevent foreign holders of dollars from presenting them for conversion into gold. What are the implications for U.S. monetary policy and for the operation of the international monetary system? (6) What is the significance of the fact that the U.S. Treasury holds more than 260 million ounces of gold? Does this require, as some have suggested, that a choice has to be made between remonetizing gold and selling it off? What is to be Gained from a More Important Role for Gold? The end of inflation once and for all is the promised goal of most advocates of linking the dollar to gold. this objective. There can be no quarrel with What is open to question is whether linking the dollar, and other currencies, to gold will achieve the objective. There are differences among the various proposals and I do not claim to have seen all of them. The most straightforward suggestion is to restore a gold certificate reserve for the Federal Reserve System. 11 The purpose is to impose a monetary rule that would limit growth of the money supply. monetarist approach. 1/ This is the It is designed to assure that the Federal Reserve Robert E. Weintraub, "Restoring the Gold Certificate Reserve" in The Gold Standard: Its History and Record Against Inflation, A Study prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, September 18, 1981. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 4 restrains monetary expansion to a rate consistent with zero inflation. In effect, this approach imposes a discipline on the central bank. The objection to it is that it would deprive the Federal Reserve of all discretion in its operations, including counter-cyclical policy adaptations. Furthermore, the present Federal Reserve policy appears to be quite strongly disciplined. As Jude Wanniski, a gold advocate, has stated (see below), "it is not discipline that Paul A. Volcker . . . needs." Some advocates of a return to gold reject monetarism (as well as Eeynesianism). They believe that the traditional process by which the Federal Reserve tries to regulate the volume of bank reserves and therefore the monetary aggregates is doomed to failure. What they propose is a mechanism by which the supply of money is determined by the demand for money. V They believe that if the Federal Reserve is required to supply neither more nor less cash balances than are demanded, inflation will be banished. into gold. The way they would bring this about is to make the dollar convertible If the public holds more dollars than desired, dollars will be exchanged for gold and the Federal Reserve will respond by reducing bank reserves. If the public wishes to hold additional money, gold will be converted into dollars at the "gold window" and the Federal Reserve will increase the supply of bank reserves. The flaw in this type of proposal, in my view, is that it fails to distinguish between "money to hold" and "money to use." 2/ Those members See Lewis E. Lehrman, Monetary Policy, The Federal Reserve System, and Gold, Morgan Stanley & Co., January 29, 1980; Jude Wanniski, "A Job Only Gold Can Do," The New York Times, August 27, 1981, p. A31. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ...II.. • S of the public who want more money in order to spend it on goods and services will be exercizing a "demand for money" indistinguishable from the demand of those who wish to increase their cash balances held on deposit or in the form of currency. Letting the demand for money determine its supply will not assure a noninflationary economy. It could have just the opposite effect. Another view on ending inflation is that once the dollar is declared to be convertible into gold, the public will be confident of the future value of money. The demand for money -- to hold as a cash balance -- will increas e, thereby reducing the excess supply of money. "The real answer is not to try to manipulate the supply of dollars but to create demand for them. . We are not told how convertibility of the dollar into gold would prevent excess creation of dollars that might be used for excess spendin g. In none of these proposals is the inflation process addressed in a fundamental way. Inflation involves an interaction of wages and prices and occasional external shocks such as large increases in oil prices, how a linkage between the dollar and gold would cope with these aspects of inflati on is a question that the Commission should expect the gold proponents to answer. More generally, the belief that there is a simple solution to the inflation problem, though seductive, is in my opinion misleading. The worsening of inflation in the 1970s can in no way be attributed to the breakin g of the link between the dollar and gold on August 15, 1971. 3/ That interpretation Arthur B. Laffer and Charles W. Kadlec, "The Point of Linking the Dollar to Gold," The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1981, p. 32. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Ni 5 is a gross distortion of history: it is easy to show that for many years before 1971, gold had little if any influence on U.S. monetary policy. Just as there is no simple explanation for the acceleration of inflation , there is no simple way to bring inflation back down. We do not have a magic monetary wand to wave and thereby do away with inflation. Apart from ending inflation, I am aware of no other benefits that are supposed to result from returning to a gold standard. It is significant that most foreign officials and bankers show no interest in a return to gold. A/ Implications for Exchange Rates Most of the recent proposals for a return to gold hardly acknowledge that the United States is part of an international economy. "blueprint" does state: Arthur Laffer's "With the value of the dollar defined in terms of gold, there would no longer exist any reason for the U.S. government to be concerned with the foreign exchange value of the dollar. The official policy of the U.S. should remain that the dollar would be free to seek its own level." This proposal recognizes, if only briefly, that the dollar is linked to other currencies via exchange rates and it foresees the possibility of continued floating of those exchange rates. Whatever judgments the Commission arrives at regarding the role of gold, it is important, I believe, to avoid pushing the world back to the straitjacket of fixed exchange rates. 4/ Ample evidence is available to support the proposition 'Foreigners Doubt U.S. Return to Gold," The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1981, p. 31. 5/ Arthur B. Laffer, "Reinstatement of the Dollar: A. B. Laffer Associates, February 29, 1980. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis The Blueprint," that the dollar and other major currencies (such as the yen) or currency areas (such as the EMS) need scope for variation as is possible at present. The present system is far from perfect but an attempt to restore fixed exchange rates would surely fail. Domestic Convertibility It is possible to imagine the restoration of gold to a significant role in the international monetary system without domestic convertibility, as in the period after 1933. But, given that U.S. citizens may now purchase and hold gold and given the nature of the current proposals for a gold standard, it is not likely that anyone will advocate a system in which only foreign monetary authorities may convert dollars into gold or gold into dollars at the U.S. gold window. Therefore the impact of domestic convertibility needs to be examined. I have pointed out above that there is a flaw in the argument that the decisions of U.S. citizens to purchase or sell gold against dollars is an appropriate guide to monetary policy. Beyond that, domestic convertibility could raise serious problems if it were combined with a fixed official price for gold, as is discussed in the next section. The Dollar Price of Gold Most proposals for a return to gold that I have seen are rather vague on the price at which the dollar would be made inter-convertible with gold. Yet it is clear from the events of recent years that the market price of gold https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 7 can change drastically in response to events that have little to do with the monetary system. Furthermore, the increasing use of gold in industry, together with an inelastic supply, could lead to an upward secular trend in the market price of gold. If the market price rises relative to the official price, gold will be bought from the monetary authority and sold in the market. If the market price falls below the official price, the opposite will happen. In either case, the impact on gold reserves and therefore on monetary policy could be destabilizing. To my knowledge, the Laffer proposal is the only one that recognizes this problem. It provides for the possibility of temporary suspensions of the official dollar price of gold, while the market price moves to a new level under the impact of "conditions beyond the control of the monetary authority." This provision might give greater discretion to "the monetary authority" than some gold advocates would find acceptable. One alternative to this type of flexibility would be an attempt to peg the market price of gold. Quite apart from the questionable feasib lity of such an effort -- as was demonstrated when the gold pool was abandoned in March 1968 -- it would affect monetary policy in an undesirable way. Imagine a political disturbance in the Middle East and a sharp run-up in the market price of gold. Sales of gold by monetary authorities would, under gold standard rules, require a contraction of bank reserves and a general tightening of monetary policy even though that might not be at all appropriate to the condition of the domestic economies. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 8 1 Another option would be to let the official price move with the market price. This would eliminate the potential for arbitrage mentioned above. But it would introduce flexibility into the value of gold reserves. Presumably the Federal Reserve would not be expected to alter its policy in response to pure valuation changes in gold reserves. The guide to monetary policy would have to be changes in the quantity of gold in the reserves. While this option might be technically workable, it would not satisfy those who are seeking to restore the discipline of gold. If the official price moved with the market price, gold buyers and sellers would be indifferent as between using the market and undertaking a transaction with the monetary authority. Thus changes in the quantity of gold reserves would be arbitrary and haphazard. They would not provide the sort of guidance to monetary policy that is being sought by gold advocates. These advocates face a dilemma regarding the official price of gold. If they use the market price, the discipline of gold disappears. But it is not realistic to select an official price that can be maintained indefinitely. They want to introduce an automatic system uninfluenced by human discretion. But the need for policy judgment keeps re-asserting itself. International Convertibility As noted, if official convertibility were established at home, it would be almost impossible to deny it to foreign holders of dollars. And anyone who wanted to restore (or establish) the classical gold standard would not wish to deny convertibility to foreign holders of dollars. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 9 Yet it has to be recognized that foreigners, both official and private, hold substantial amounts of dollars. Banks located in the United States have more than $200 billion of liabilities to foreigners. Branches of American banks abroad have dollar liabilities to foreigners of $275 billion. And non-American banks have very large dollar deposit. Thus potential claims on the U.S. gold stock, which is worth about $110 billion (at a gold price of $425 per ounce), are huge. These claims would be exercized, along with purchases by Americans, if an official gold price were established and The market price rose above it. Concern over potential gold purchases by official holders of dollars under a reformed international monetary system led, during the deliberations of the Committee of Twenty, to the proposal for a substitution account that would exchange outstanding official dollar holdings for SDRs. It is difficult to imagine such an exchange of private dollar holdings. Thus the problems discussed under "The Dollar Price of Gold" above would be compounded under a system of international convertibility. What Should We Do with Our Gold? It is sometimes suggested that since the United States holds such a large amount of gold, a decision must be made about its role: either it should be remonetized or sold off. In my view this is not a pressing problem. The U.S. gold stock should be regarded as part of the national patrimony, worth $110 billion at the current market price. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis There is no reason to dispose of it just because 10 it does not play an important monetary role. And there is no reason to try to invent a monetary role just because we hold the asset. Government owns many non-monetary assets. The U.S. They have different uses. There may be occasions when, as in the past, it will support U.S. objectiv es to sell gold in the market or to buy it in the market. does not have to burn a hole in our pockets. But until then, gold We are not forced to decide to do something with our gold assets just because they exist. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Date 9/4/81 To Chairman Volcker From Henry C. VVallich Oa ••••• •• :.• • t: 1. CTfr. •11. LAJ GO L.L./ • Cr• ) L._ L. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48109 August 26, 1981 Paul W. McCracken Edmund Ezra Day University Professor of Business Administration TO MEMBERS OF THE GOLD COMMISSION The welter of acerbic communications that has characterized a good deal of the Commission's activity since its beginning has already seriously raised questions about whether anything constructive can came out of these deliberations. Perhaps high on the agenda of the next meeting should be a sober discussion of whether we hope to contribute to the course of good economic policy or whether we hope to provide Washington with a good show. Hopefully it is the fanner. There is a congealing conviction that the management of economic policy needs to be placed on a shorter leash. We must also recognize that there is little concensus yet about where to go from here regarding monetary policy. What we can hope for, therefore, is that our efforts will move the management of policy in the direction of operating within a mere explicit framework, recognizing that the report of a diverse group will inevitably not be what any one of us would write. If our effort is to be a serious and constructive one, we obviously must have a reasonable amount of time. My own preference would be to have the meetings themselves closed to the public simply because the group discussion and therefore the final report (which, of course, will be in the public domain) will be better. If, however, there is to be an audience, that will cause me no problems. What is essential is that we start focusing in a problem centered way on the substantive issues themselves. Regards, - Paul W. McCracken PWM:dj https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Office Correspondence Board of Governors To From Dee July 24, 1981 Subject: Joe Coyne Since three Board members are also members of the Gold Commission, I thought it might be useful to alert you to the plethora of correspondence that has plagued the System over the past year on gold. The correspondence comes primarily from Edward Durell, a retired Cleveland businessman who now lives in Virginia. He has had a long history of correspondence with both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury on gold, gold audits, gold certificates and the like. One of his contentions is that there isn't as much gold at Ft. Knox as the government says there is, and he is demanding a complete audit. Over the last six months or so Durell has written letters to directors at the Reserve Banks outlining his contentions and demanding responses. Reserve Bank people say they have been inundated with letters. Most recently Durell wrote to Senator Byrd who transmitted the letter to the Board for response. A copy of the Board's response and other background is attached for your information. Since the Gold Commission has now been established it is possible that Durell could begin directing his fire in that direction but individual members of the Commission may also receive "comments and suggestions" from Mr. Durell. Attachments https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis uL;Ano or • :i0VL;4(1;4 r 14r FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM wA5141p4GION, D. C. P0s,.1 July 9, 1981 he lionuiaDle harry F. Byrd, Jr. United Z,tdtes Senate 'v;ash„ington, D.C. 20510 Dear Senator Byrd: :file correspondence that you forwarded on June 4 from Capitain Ldward Durell of Berr yville, Virginia, suggests that thi: Federal_ Reserve System should order an audit of the Trea sury's gold stoe'rl by outside, inde pendent auditors. Capt ain Dure ll believes that the gold certific ate account gives the Federal Res(.rve a claim to the gold and hence authority to order the audit. Thc Gold Reserve Act of 1934 vested in the United States all right, title, and interest , and every claim of the Fede ral Reserve ;:iystem to gold. Under the terms of that Act the Treasury is aulnoriZed to issue gold certificates to the Federal Rese rve for Lh.! purpose of monetizing the gold. This, however, does not give the Federal Reserve Syst em any claim or interest in the gold. The gold certificate acco unt is merely an asset account un our books that serves to record the amount of dollars that the Feueral kserve Banks have credited to the Treasury in exchange for the certificates. An issuance of certificates is accomplished through increase in the gold certificate acco unt and in the Trea.Aliy'.; general account, the deposit liability representing thc Trea.wly's checking acco unt balance. A reuuction in certifi(:atk:s is ffect.ed through a decrease in Treasuiy's general account All kl;t11,2:, to thc gob u cert ificate account are initiated by 'tiesury, as required by law. statement showing the gold certificate account in the as' L; of the Federal Reserve Bank is given on p(Ige 246 of the , nc:losed 1,nnual Rcpurt of the Board for 1980. Th(‘ gold stock, an t of the Tleasury, is show n on pages 274 thtotwh 276 in cuLt.- cti(g, with a listing of factors supplying funds to bank The gold stock is stored at locations dytermined by This includes Fort Knox, the Philadelphia and Denv er ;L.w York and San Francisc o assay offices, and the Federal leserve Bank of New York . The accounting procedur es Trea:;uly. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 11,e ilon:Jr.lule 1_lrry P. LJ.yLu, Jr. .1%;() 1(.1: undcr the control of Truc:-;uLy, ;:r%d the gold is -y Irea:,wLy undt..:r a continuing progra:L, .L.al)lished by tnc: LA.crcLary of tnc Treasury. 1.11cere1y, (Sigi:ce) Dona141. PT Donald J. nn Assistant to the c;or,:l Lnk.:10:.;Ulc PUk:DJ:pjt (OV-162) occ: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis '• ylnGINIA 0 https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 'ZCnitcb Ziatcz ,)enaLc WASHINGTON, O.C. 20510 June 4, 1981 . s i10.,̀ 10 OF CF 1Ht: i 19131 JUH 15 Al 10: 014 RECEIVED OFFICE OF I iiE CA My dear Mr. Chairman: I am enclosing copies of corresponden ce between my constituent Captain Edward Durell, and Messrs. Timlen, Ring and others relative to the "gold certificate account" and other 'que stions. Captain Durell raises several interesting questions about the physical location of U. S. gold stocks, the accounting procedures used by both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, and the question of "ownership" of the gold as between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. It is my hopc that you will be able to respond to the many. questions rais ed by Captain Durell. Cordially, The Honorable Paul A. Volcker Chairman Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Washington, D. C. 20551 Enclosures: s MILTON VALLEY FARM P. 0. 1OX 586 BERRYVILLE, VIRGINIA 22611 May 29, 1981 'Me Honorable Harry F. Byrd, Jr. U. S. Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Harry: I hive sont Col'. Curtis Dall the material enclosed with my letter of May 8th to the directors of the 12 regional Federa l Reserve Banks (some 108+ in number) and a copy is enclosed for your files. I urge you to at least road my letter of May 8th to these directors. The research which I have done indicates beyond any reasonable doubt that whatever gold is found by an independent invent ory and assay does belong to the Federal Reserve System, and not the U. S. Treasury. This research of over seven years I believe qualif ies me to becune a JitirWr of the Gold Policy Conmission and I vould apprec iate it if you vxDuld send the enclosed material to Dr. Beryl Sprin kel (at Treasury) with your reconm.ndation that he reconni-md me as one of the four miffibers chosen from the private sector to the Gold Polic y Caimission. Edward Durell ED/ks cc: Col. Curtis Dall (w/o enclosures) https://fraser.stlouisfed.org • Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • THE UNION FORK AND HOE COMPANY ' P.O. BOX 1940 500 DUBLIN AVENUE. COLUMBUS, OHIO 43216 IMONE (674) 228-1791 rum: Please address correspondence to: P. 0. Box 586 Berryville, VA 22611 (D*Alkt"OutL CMAIIIMAN Of 10.1 10AA0 ray 8, 1981 , '10: Directors of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks For your ready reference I am 6nclosing a copy of my lette r to the 1-r'ad of your regional bank dated 5/7/81 along with the enclo sures referred to therein. I believe this mlterial will help convince you that in order to protect the Federal Reserve System and yourself, you should insist on an indcp?ndent, indisputable inventory and assay of the alleg ed gold Lelonging to the Federal Reserve System and held in storage by the U. S. Treasury as collateral for the gold certificat es listed on the asset side of your bank's balance sheet. • Basod on over 7 years of research and investigation: I. II. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis It uould appear that the Federal Reserve System and the U. S. Treasury (a) agree that thore is only one horde of gold. stored under the custody of the U. S. Treasury; and (b) agree that the alleged horde of gold is wprth $11.2 billion, figured at the official gold price of $42.22 per Troy ounce of "fine gold." Thri Federal Reserve System and the U. S. Treas ury do not agree on (a) which entity, the Federal Reserve System or the U. S. Treasury, has exclusive title to the alloyed gold horde; and (b) which entity is responsible for the indisputable accuracy of the count, weight and fineness of such .horde. r15. •":"'j4. A. Directors of the 12 regional FL.dczal Rrve Rinks II. -2- Nay 8, 1981 Ibth the F(xleral Resenre System and the U. S. Treasury E....eon to lay claim to the horde (see current balanc e sheets of the regional Fedr.,ral Reserve Banks under the heading "Gold certificate account"). In view of the (-law°, I again suggest that it would be to the best interest of your country, your hank and yourself to find out why (a) the four rest recent Secretaries of the Treasury (Sinun , Blumenthal, Miller and Rogan) and (b) the three nest recent Clviiii ion of the Federal Reserve Systm (Burns, Miller and Volckar) have not taken steps to obtain a cx.Inplete, indisputable physical inventory and assay of the alloyed gold ri..:-;carves by an agency or organization not connected in any way with the goveriinvnt. If this is not done, the dark cloud of conspiracy will contin ue to lover over the Foleral Reserve System, the U. S. Treasury and you; and the credibility of these parties will continue to suffer in the eyes of the public. Sincerely, As ndiiidul ID/ks Ebel. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • •I.1 IIE UNION I=ORK AND I UDE. COMPANY P.0 lir2iX 1S:40 M.IVE: 500 Pm IN VI !WE_ COLUYilt1S. CM0 e;Q16 ..mdence to: Please address corxesp, ri/ONE (CT4) ;s213•; P. O. Rox 586 Berryville, VA 22611 ICA•PD [VFW CHAIPIrni CI 1.1 !CARD May 7, 1981 Thomas,M. Timlen /st Vice President Federal Pei.erve Rank of New York' Post Office Station 10045 New York, New York 'Dear Mr. Timlen: I enclese the following: (1) Copy of a lettor from Mr. P. D. Ring, Assistant Director, Board of Governors, Fe6eral Reserve System to me dated 3/25/81. (2) Cc,py of my letter to Mr. Ring dated 5/5/81. I siw:erely hope that Mr. Ring's response will clear up once and for all ' (a) :old alle:;edly a7dDunting to $11.2 billion (figured Where the ( . at the official gold price of ;42.22 per Troy ounce) is located. (b) 1.;hetly-r the (jold certificates allegedly held by the Federal Reserve Bank of N;!‘‘. York are enfo/ceable certificats uppn the Treasury for tnouyh gold (at F;42.22 per Troy ounce) to cover the total of the sums i. listed as an crset by the 12 regional Federal R,,serve Banks on tneir Lalance sheets under the heading "Gold certificate account." (c) When and by who:n did the Bo:1rd of Goverr,ors check the existence by physical inventory and assay of the gold allegedly held by the Treasury as Lacking for said gold certificates. If you have any correspondence with Ms. Ring, I suygest you ask the following questior.s• J1) Did - the Federal Reserve System give the U. S. Treasury aut!ority to nell, during the operation of the so-called Lon,lon Gold Pool, large sums of the System's gold at $35 per Troy ounce? (2) Did the Federal Reserve System give the U. S. Treasury the authority to sell partoof the System's gold at public auction 1.seginning 1/6/75? (3) In a letter to then Congrel%sman John B. Conlan (R-Az) dated 5/4/76 hen Secretnty of the Treasury William Simon stoted, "...the I had !:% -lie net sales to the pool during its 1.pric.3 of operation totaling'45.2 million ounces." During the same p.eriod, he...aver, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis •. Mr. 71.,_ r.is X. Timlen Xdy 7, 1981 c'.r 200 million - ounces of gold left Fort Y;Jox alone from 1961destin.!d for Lhii.Nient to the Nt!., York Ar.say Office and thl Feeral Pc!', ye Bank of New York for reshipment to the Bank of England acting as wient for the London Gold Pool for sale to private persons and corporations abroad. If Simon's st.at.,21nt is correct that only 45.2 million OUflCCS were used • in the opi!ration of the Lonlon Gold Fool, what 1.,came of the -3 1_.5-+ million ounces of yold? /(,5 Is it Not time for the Federal Reserve System to be full1 audited by outside, int:ei,enc:ent auditors? Is it not tir.1, 2 to verify .he r!xistce of the alle(2ed gold claimcbd by the Federal Reserve Syste.n, by an indeiNdent physical true inventory and essay? 'After you have had time to Consider the enclosed corri-spondence along with this letter, I would appreciate hcaring from you es'to what steps you will reconllend to clarify the many questions raised. Sinr •rely, Arail As an individual ED/smc Encl. cc l All Directors of the 12 regional Federal Reserve nantss https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis r3Y!.; I F:N.1 v.L..,141`.iiittl 4. 0. C.. .'(I!. ¶I eirr ••L el UV( r.arch 25, 1981 Durell rr. P. O. Fox 586 Eeriyville, Virginia 22611 Dear Nr. Durell: for any I appreciate your letter of rarch 20 and apologize icate certif gold series 1931 the of inecnvenience the typewritten.copy ular partic this that r, hoeve m, e.ey have eeused you. I wish to confir gold certificate is the one that you have asked about. By the Lime the Federal Reserve Banks opened their doors for had business un November 16, 1914, eleven series of gold certificates Leen printed, dating from the first issues in 1870 and 1871 to the issue series in 1913. For all of those certificates and for all of the three 1928 1922, the (i.e., years that .ere issued in the following nineteen until trust in gold the and 1A series) the Treasury simply held the gold der,ended by the owner of the certificate. At all tines, then, ry. Treasu the in certifica:es were truly warehouse receipts for gold or ss, busine a ::hc,e‘er had such celtificates -.- whether an individual, g correspondin a Federal reserve Bank -- was the actual owner of a ry. awount of gold stored in the Treasu response. This entire arrangement was changed by the Congress in g Eankin ency Er.erg the h Throug to the naLional criergency of the 1930's. gold redeem to ry Act of rarch 9, 1933, Congress authorized the Treasu certificetes with paper money, and in legislation enaCted on June 5, 1933, give ebrocated in respect to all obligations any provision ruiperting to by the obliqce a right to require payment in gold. This was follc....ed United the Gold rseserve Act on January 30, 1934, which vested in the l Reserve Federa the of claim every and st States all right, title and intere ished establ or theref t paymen in and System to all gold coin and bullion, s credit these s, dollar in s credits in the Treasury in equivalent amount erred transf we Act that of dale being peyable in gold certificates. On the at s credit for ge exchan all of our gold to the United States Treasury in that gold of s a;lount S20.67 an ounce. These credits, includina all other 1934 series gold in us to e payabl made were ry, were due us from Treasu certificates. Gold In addition to eliHnating any claim against gold, the authority the nate elirii to as so Peserve Act a;;:ended the Federal Reserve Act l Federa for eral collat for the use of yold (but not gold certificates) as https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ;;r. Fdt..ald flurell 2 P:sLrve hot .s; to leiuire that the r,d,2mption fund for tWeral Reserve noti,s of f.,-1(..h Rccrrye rank raintained on deposit at the Treasury be in gold :Istcod of in gold; and to make deposits of Federa l scrve r3h;:s and Feral Reserve Agents with the Trcasury of the United States repayable in gold certificates only and not in gold coin. In cum, the Gold Reserve Act completely abolished any and all claims by the . Federal Reserve to gold. ihe 1931 series certificate, a copy of which I sent to you on rarch 4, is the gold certificate that the Treasury printed and issued to the Federal r.cserve ranks under the terms of the Gold Rcserve Act. This is the only series of aold certificates that under the law may be attrib uted to the gold stock. ihe older certificates that we held ceased to have any status and were therefore returned to the Treasury. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Sincerely yours, P. D. Ring Assistant Director • _ TI-1:: UNION l'ORK AND HOE COMPANY P O. ;40X 1:140 1:0TE: C I.•i 1 1 1•( :+00 I•Vi-.NUE. COI UL!SUS. OHIO 4;1216 Please addrc.:-.s correEtondence to: (('4) 2:e.; P. 0. Box 536 Berryville, VA 1: & May 5, 1981 'CERTIFJFD PIOT, RETURN Ri-XEIPT REQUESTED .Mr. P. D. Ring, Assistrint Director Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Washin3ton, DC 20551 Dear Mr. Ring: Thank you for your letter of 3/25/81 in resp onse to letter of 3/20/81. For your inforr.ation, on 12/3/7). then Secr etary of the Treasury William Simon stted in his tcstiony before Congress that the title to the a1lcd gold wi!s in the Federal Reserve System while possession was in . the Trr.:mry. He said the transfer of the gold to the Treasury - constitut7d a "pledi.;e." In addition, the current consolidated statements of condition of the Federal Reserve System publ ished in THE NEW YORK TTMES and Tii; JOURNAL, arleng others, carries as an asset "gol d stock" of $11.2 billion (figured at the offi cial gold price of $)42.22 per Troy ounce). The consolidated balance sheut of the U. S. Trcasury carries as a 1.abililv an equal amount of $11. 2 billion. Each of the l2 regional Federal Reserve Banks lists on he asset side of its current balance sheet a large sum of money unde r tne heading "Gold. • certific?.te account"; and the total of thcs e 12 private banks' "Gold . certifical:e accounts" matches the consolidated balance deet of the Fed,:ral R, .:rerve System as an asset, and further, it T.ILches the balance sheet of the U. S. Treasury as a This conf irrs the stent of Secretary Simon that the transfer of gold to the Treasury constituted a "pledge." In vicw'of the then Treasury Secretary's stat ement, the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 which you cite was only a uret ended 'uransfer of title. You say that on 1/3/14, the date of the -6Ofd —ffeserve Act, the Federal Reserve "transferred" all of its gold to the Trutsury "in exchange for dollar credits at $20.67 per ourice of fine gold." You go on to say that "those credits, including all other amounts of gold that were due us frnm Treasury, were made payable to us in 1934 series gold certificates." What you say is precisely what I contend: The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 only pretended to transfer title to Treasury 'cccause the issuance by Treasury of the 1934. series gold certificates only ratified, confirmed, and condoned the situation as it existed https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis •• • • -e- P. D. Eay . rior to the (Inctont. of the Gold ReL:ovve Act of 1/30/3N. pledge was constituted in place. 5, 1981 Thus, a As I undc-rnt=ind it, the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 does not preclude the Federal Reerve from C.Inding the pledged gold it "transferred" to the fact, Trcsury statements confirm this in addition to what Preasury; s:qd aliout the pledge of the alleged gold. Congress Sinon 7 ecretary (, illegally (because it had no authority or jurisdiction over tha Federal :serve System) gave TI:easurv authority to take dollar payments from .he Federal Reserve -S-yst.em for its gold. However, Congress had no riuthority to bind the Federal Reserve System on this, and you cite lr:hp7c,in_Con.--ress . has Pjw.evated . ths_r:ipht_of_redemoti6n by the to (io is pay over Lhe A4 1_ the -F6deca! v F66c=r2l dollar 1ndRI $11.2 billion for the delivery of the gold, if it exists. 5 of the 1979 Annual Report of the Secretary of the of the Trcasury, Document No. 327A states that held by the Federal Reserve and "payable to the Board of Gov%I.nors of the Federal Reserve System" are oblisations "fully !;ecured by -old n the Treasury." Therefore, the gold is held as sz,curitv or coll::teral for the "bearer gold certificates." How can - 1 of the Federal Reserve go against the financial you as an OS.2C 1 Treasury? Where are those "bearer gold certificates" the of statc:rents today? rn addition, Note 7;seury, If you -do not want another "snlad oil scandal" on your Lands, I would strongly re.:.o:7,;:er!d that you do have the aut.hc,rity to !,o bcThind these gold certificates issued by the Treasury to ve?rilv the existence of . the alleged gold stock. Also, why do you allow the Federal Reserve to be gu(.5d in the news media as owning "gold stock" referred to as an asset in yc.ur weekly stateLents ..-xistence of such when the Federal Reserve itself has not verified the , Banks a:se Rc!..c,rve Federal regional 12 the that seem would It gold? Federal Reserve the certificates gold the that impression under the Reserve Federal the that fact The gold. in System holds are redeemable by a evidenced further is System is the holder of these certificates Federal regional the of letter dated 1/20/81 from one of the presidents Reserve I-Fir,ns in which he states, "These (gold) certificates are held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York..." Further, I believe the gen.eral public is being led to believe that the gold certificates are redek:Triable in gold by the currently published sthte:..ents of the Federal Reserve System and the U. S. Treasury. I repeat, the Fec:e:.al Ro::.erve System carries on its b?laNce sheet an asset of $11.2 billion (figured at the official gold price of $42.22 per Troy ounce). oppesite the heading -"Gold Stock" and the. Treasury carries the https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Mr. P. D. Ring 1.:ay 5, 1981, naine '''11t, on its balance sheet as a liability under the heading "Gold certificate account." Thus, the general.public is led to believe that the Fe(!eral Rec-rve System has an enforceable claim on gold held by the Treasury as cus.todian. Again, I contend that based on the available facts, the Federal Reserve System does have the authority to go behind these "bearer gold certificates" to (:cr.and an indisputable, independent physical inventory of the nation's alleged gold, or.to redr_cm the pledLed cold by paying Tresury $11.2 billion in paper money i'or the alleged gold stock. It is submitted that if you do neither, then you have allowed the Federal Reserve to become a party to the Treasury's possible crime of embezzlement of the alle.sed gold. Treasury cannot now contend that it was Congress which cave it the authority to Lr.%e the gold and give the Federal Reserve System paper money. The Federal Reserve System is an independent, private corporation. To sum this all up: (a) The Fr-(loral Reserve System lists as an aet on its currently published balance sheet $11.2 billion (figured at the official gold price of $42.22 per Troy ounce) under the heading "Gold Stock." The U. S. Treasury lists as a liability on its currently published balance sheet $11.2 billion (figured at the official gold price of $2.22 per Troy ounce) under the heading "Gold certificate account." (b) Then Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, Arthur Burns, stated in his letter to then Congrcr-,f,n ---.n John Rarick (D-La) dated 6/28/7N that "I am confident that. our system of audits and examinations would quickly disclo:3e any unauthorized transactions in System a3seLs, which, I repeat, do not include gold." Yet the Federal Reserve System on its consolidated balance sheet at that time listed an asset of $11.4 billion under the heading "Gold certificate account." (c)* Then Secretary of the Treasury William Simon listed in a letter to Congressman J. Kenneth Robinson (R-Va) dated 11/h/74, 276.0 million Troy ounces of cold as belonging to the United States stored at nine different locations. Figured at the official *gold price of $)12.22 per Troy ounce, this amou4lts to $11.6 billion. (d) Four Secretaries of the Trcasury h;:ve refused to take a complete, independent physical inventory and assay of the nation's.alleged gold reserves (A report to Congress by https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis rt • v,3y 5, Mr. P. D. Ring 198r C. ,,iroller General, YOD 75-10, B876?0 d Lid 2/]0/75, )0 (!ly c.xercise at Fort.Knox becinng 9/23/74 on lcavc.s Nalch to be desired from an accounting point of view). e) The blrince sheets of the 12 regional Federal. Reserve Banks carry large sums of money on the asset side under the heading "Gold certific:ite account," which certainly indicates. to the 6eneral publIc that there is gold behind the gold cl!rigiflcLes. Ciirrent correspondence with the heads of the 12 regional F0(:(,ra1 Reserve Er,ns indicates that they Telieve there is gold held as collateral for the gold certjficatcs. The Bord of Governors of the Federal Rcly:? System have ioLv' the existence of gold coin or bullion by an indendent physical inventory and assay. We believe yroi will do our country a great good turn by corr.nenting on each L!:.,.7J2nts. Please send copies of your response to the heads of LI- e 2 rcc-ioral Federal Reserve Bans and their directors as 9f cac.h I am sc-ndin/st copies of your letter of 3/25/81 and this letter. choir corr:s:ience with me indicates they would welco,e some clarifi;:ati(in C'rcon you. Respectfully (CT-1 As an indivi.acal. ED/ks https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis BOAR1GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM . N Date To From 7/10/81 Chairman Volcker Henry C. Wallich For the meeting at 3 p.m. this afternoon. Attachment https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis bas. Henry C. Wallich July 10, 1981 NOTES ON COLD COMMISSION seems desirable to try to arrive at a few conclusions of practical usefulness, rather than debate the merits of different types of gold standards, which might be the result of closely following the Anna Schwartz' memorandum. 2. Hopefully the report will not convey the impression that the United States plans to return to a gold standard or gold convertibility in any foreseeable future. If some part of the group wants to say something like that, there should be an opportunity for others to express a realistic position. 3. The positive and constructive elements of the report might concern themselves with the disposition to be made of the U.S. gold stock. In my view, policy in this respect should not differ significantly from past policy. Gold should not be sold for the sake of eliminating gold from the world monetary system; it may be sold to defend the dollar in cases of emergency; sales riTTI1 not be made in order to make a budgetary contribution; nor should there be a revaluation of the gold stock to repay public debt; there ;11ould be no attempt to stabilize the price of gold; there should•be no effort to bring back gold into active use among central banks except in emergency situations. 4. The committee's discussions and the final report should aim to avoid increasing speculation in gold markets. 5. Some kind of concessions will have to be made to gold advocates if a united report is to be rendered. Among these might be adoption of an approach that would avoid depressing the price of gold, as a proposal for gold sales might do. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Woo -2- 6. developments. Some consideration will have to be given to possible price Anna Schwartz states that once inflation abates, the price of gold will come down, which may be one reason why the Treasury should sell. This conclusion is far from certain. So long as the price of gold is flexible, it is likely to go to a level from which the price would move gradually so as to produce the rate of return appropriate for a hedge-type asset, conceivably a negative one. 7. In the unlikely event that the price of gold should become fixed, a positive return could occur only through a fall in the price level. Under these conditions, if the price were credible, privately held gold would be sold to the official authorities. If the price is fixed at a level widely regarded as too low, the authorities will lose gold. The obvious difficulty of hitting upon the right price and thereafter keeping it "right" is one of the principal obstacles likely to give pause to the gold advocates. 8. advocates. It may turn out that there is no agreement among the gold Art Laffer apparently wants to fix a price much lower than recently prevailed. urges sales. 9. page Gold producers presumably want a high price. Laffer Producers presumably would be opposed. In several parts of Anna Schwartz' paper, particularly on , references are made to behavior or misbehavior of central banks. On page 12 the Federal Reserve's discretionary powers are mentioned and the alternative of a rule for money growth imposed by Congress is posed. It should be understood that the purpose of the commission is not to reform the Federal Reserve System. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis A Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE 566-2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 22, 1981 Regan Establishes Gold Commission Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan announced today the establishment of a Congressionally mandated "Gold Commission" to assess the role of gold in the domestic and international monetary systems. The Commission will study U.S. policies related to gold and will transmit to the Congress a report containing its findings and recommendations. Secretary Regan will chair the Commission, which will include seven members of Congress, three members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, two members of the Council of Economic Advisors and four distinguished private citizens. The Commission members are: Arthur J. Costamagna, Attorney, Mullen and Philippi, Santa Rosa, Calif. Herbert J. Coyne, Executive Vice President, J. Aron & Company, New York, NY Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Senator Roger W. Jepsen, Vice Chairman, Joint Economic Committee Jerry L. Jordan, Member, Council of Economic Advisors Lewis E. Lehrman, President, Lehrman Corporation, New York, NY Paul W. McCracken, Edmund Ezra Day University Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan, and former Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors Congressman Stephen L. Neal, Member, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs J. Charles Partee, Governor, Federal Reserve Board Congressman Ronald E. Paul, Member, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Chairman, Joint E:onomic Committee Emmett J. Rice, Governor, Federal Reser-.-E, a:Jard Senator Harrison H. Schmitt, Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Henry C. Wallich, Governor, Federal Reserve Board Murray L. Weidenbaum, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors Congressman Chalmers P. Wylie, Member, Joint Economic Committee and is The Commission will hold its first meeting shortly monthly basis. expected to meet subsequently on an approximately Congress authorized the Commission in P.L. 96-389. R-245 https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 0 0 c BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DATE 1/23/80 ro Chairman Volcker FROM TED TRUMAN Here is some more information on the gold market. r) https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF T , FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Office Correspondence To Date January 22, 1980 Governor Wallich Subject: Private Stocks of Gold. From Donald B. Adams I. U.K. Gold Volume and World Sangster's sporadic reports on London turnover at BIS meetings provide no means of assessing trends in the London market and little firm ground for estimating normal volume. Turnover appears to range between perhaps 8 and 20 million ounces a month, depending on the time of the year. It might be reasonable to estimate an average month's volume to be in the range of 12-to-15 million ounces. That would make it about 10 times as large as the monthly average of U.K. imports (and exports) of gold. By comparison, turnover in U.S. futures markets, as shown in my recent note, is running at a daily average of five million ounces; that is about 100 million ounces a month. For the first eleven months of 1979, the normal monthly turnover was closer to 80 million ounces. It is estimated that about two percent of the contracts executed on U.S. futures exchanges eventually involve delivery of gold. II. Observations about the world's private gold stocks are necessarily conjectural. The essence of gold's attraction for some holders is the anonymity they preserve. In addition, any estimating technique is subject to question about how (one's guess about) the substantial stocks of certain royal personages is to be allocated between public and private holdings. Nonetheless, conjectures have been made, and they put private stocks in the range of 500-to-750 million ounces. By comparison, free-world public hoards amount to about 1.1 billion ounces, of which the United States holds 265 million ounces. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis It is estimated that perhaps 40 percent Governor Wallich 2 of private stocks are held in France and some 25 percent is in India. Middle Eastern private holdings are thought to comprise about 10 percent of all private hoards (that is, some 50-to-75 million ounces), but as noted above that estimate is especially questionable. cc: Gold Group, Mr. Smith, Mrs. Brown https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis F3OARD OF GOVERNORS CIF T,If: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Office Correspondence To Governor Wallich Date January 18, 1980 Subject:_ Gold Trading Froni Donald B. Adams Attached is a note about margins and trading in U.S. futures markets. On the question of volume on the London Metal Exchange, no figures are made available by those who organize that market. Attachments https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis BOARD OF GITVERNORS OF TH r: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Office Correspondence To Mae January 17 Governor Wallich 1980 Subject: Margins and Trading in U.S. Froni Donald B. Adams )\1\1 Futures Markets. You inquired about margin requirements and recent trading volume in gold futures markets. The principal markets, of course, are the New York Commodity Exchange (COMEX) and Chicago's International Monetary Market (INN). The current COMEX initial requirement is $5,000 per 100-ounce contract. That amount must be deposited when the transaction is made. A transactor's holdings are then "marked to market" at the close of trading each day; that is, their value is computed at the day's closing price. If the day's close is higher (lower) than the purchase (sale) price for a long (short) position, the notional gain is 1 credited to the transactor's account.—/ is deducted from the initial deposit. If a notional loss is shown, the sum So long as the transactor's remaining deposit is at least $3,750, no replenishment of such deductions is required, but once the remaining deposit falls below $3,750, the transactor must bring the balance back up to the initial margin requirement of $5,000 if he wishes to maintain the position. The $3,750 limit is the COMEX maintenance margin. The IMM, in contrast to COMEX, distinguishes between customers who hedge and those who speculate. For hedgers, the initial margin is $3,000 per 100-ounce contract, and the maintenance margin is $2,000 per contract. For speculators, the initial margin is $5,000 per contract, and the maintenance margin is $3,000 per contract. The volume of trading on the COMEX and INN during 1979 and 1980 is shown in the first three columns of the attached table. It shows that after 1/ Whether such notional gains may be withdrawn from the account depends on the transactor's agreement with his broker. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org L Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Gov. Wallich - 2 averaging about 4 million ounces per day for the first eleven months of 1979, average daily sales rose to about 5 million ounces in December and January. It must be remembered that every transaction is counted in these figures, so a substantial volume of intra-day position taking that washes out by the end of trading is included. Nonetheless, the open interest also increased substantially towards the end of 1979, as shown in the last column of the table. While open interest excludes offsetting intra-day transactions, it does not exclude a transactor's offsetting positions in separate months. Thus a "straddle," involving, for example, a short position in the December contract and a long position in the January contract, will inflate open-interest figures by being included twice. Straddles are popular tax-deferral devices, and they may have been heavily employed in November and December to shift some 1979 capital gains into 1980. Attachment Messrs. Truman, Henry, Gemmill, Shafer, and FM Economists https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 1979 Volume and Open Interest in U.S. Gold Futures Markets (millions of ounces) Daily Average Volume End-of-Month Open Interest COMEX INN TOTAL COMEX Eng TOTAL 2.7 1.7 4.4 16.8 7.3 24.1 Feb. 2.7 2.1 4.8 17.3 7.9 25.2 Mar. 1.7 1.2 2.9 16.0 6.9 22.9 Apr. 1.7 1.3 3.0 16.6 7.2 23.8 May 2.5 1.7 4.2 16.3 7.4 23.7 June 2.5 1.4 3.9 14.2 7.4 21.6 July 2.9 1.5 4.4 17.8 7.5 25.3 Aug. 2.6 1.7 4.3 17.4 6.9 24.3 Sept. 3.1 1.3 4.4 17.2 6.1 23.3 Oct. 2.3 1.0 3.3 17.5 6.3 23.8 Nov. 2.6 0.8 3.4 19.6 7.4 27.0 Dec. 3.8 1.2 5.0 24.8 8.1 32.9 https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis , BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Office Correspondence To Mr. Henry From Donald B. Adams Date Subject: October 4, 1979 How Can One Buy Gold In the United States, the principal way of buying gold is through futures contracts. The New York Commodity Exchange (COMEX) and the International Monetary Market (IMM) are the leading marketplaces, although there are three other gold exchanges in the United States and one in Canada. Contracts on COMEX and the IMM are in 100-troy-ounce units (units about one-third that size can be bought elsewhere). Margin requirements are set by the exchanges and have been changing rapidly in recent days. Representative current requirements are $3,000 on the COMEX or less than ten percent of the value of the contract at today's prices. Brokerage firms, through which the man-in-the-street must deal, however, often impose stricter requirements. Moreover, it is important to note that, unlike in securities markets, there is no leeway in gold futures trading between the current market price and the margin-call price. Every day one's position is revalued at closing prices ("marked to market") and the full difference between that value and the value when the contract was purchased is either returned to (if positive) or called in from the customer. These failing to meet calls may be sold out, with their original margin deposit going to meet any losses suffered by the broker. Still, such burden as the initial margin requirements impose is made somewhat lighter by the provision for margin deposits in the form of interest-bearing securities (for example, Treasury bills), instead of cash. Brokerage firms also inspect prospective customers' net worth, and at least one requires those opening accounts to have wealth of $25,000 if single, $50,000 if married. Contracts are wi-itten for specific months, depending on the exchange. For example, on COMEX one can now trade in contracts maturing this month, in December, and every second month through August 1981. One can also buy an interest in gold through Citibank. For $1,000, one secures a specific, but undivided interest in an amount of gold based on the price at entry. Further increments can be purchased in $100 lots, and Citibank will repurchase in similar amounts. There is a small transactions fee, but free storage at Citibank for a year (unless physical delivery is desired). First National Bank of Chicago also offers a plan for gold buyers, but I do not know the details. As for purchase of physical gold here or abroad, I am not well informed. I understand that gold coins can be bought through coin dealers, and one can of course bid for bullion at IMF and Treasury auctions (300 or 400-ounce minimums). The Treasury is scheduled to begin selling one-ounce and half-ounce gold medallions by mail order about the middle of next year. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis World Supply and Demand for Gold (millions of ounces) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 28 8 24 8 23 9 23 8 23 8 23 8 23 8 36 32 31 31 31 31 31 9 0 7 1 5 0 13 3 13 8 13 12 9 17 9 8 5 16 21 25 26 Total Supply and Demand 45 40 36 47 52 56 57 Jewelry & Fabrication Demand Hoarding & Investment 25 20 14 26 22 13 38 9 39 13 140 16 NA NA Mining Production South Africa Other Free World Total Communist Soles Official Sales Total U.S. Treasury Dept. September 11, 1979