The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
O f O vCW erP tAo^hoy £ ^ /wr^o V "Vb 4n>/w ^ am pn^W^vs a , uff^, \S fACOv A x^ V t ^ I 6 A S / ovte rfP -*W l\rvi ^ g SW«~ p a y v s i ^ 'K ^ o4 of 4 W |A <~k ^ ^ gf \)<>VW, cxep, April 5, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR PETER G . PETERSON Subjects The U.S.Balance of Payments and the International Monetary Systems An Overview of the Policy Issues This memorandum is in response both to Point 4 of the CIEP Study Memorandum #1 and to the reguest to Mr. Houthakker from the Ad Hoc Group for a survey of the major issues relating t ©"abapiereview«?f theAdministration’s approach to the ba|>a®@#ef»f?payments and internationalmonetary problems *** _, -§H£?J| areview is essentialat this time, whenmounting pressures in international economic relations threaten to make us lose f|Lg|^v,o£,i;£iii*d$pental=i.o|^ef^^ should take place as-'^arly a? possible inCIEP'separations, in orderto provide a coherent framework for subsequent policy decisions and before a legacy of past decisions impinges on the broad scope which such a.,: .reviewshould ideallyjhave. ?■ f TheNature o f t h e Problem oeto A thorough and definitive exploration of these problems at I®!?**5is^needfd for at least two reasons. First, concern that a more vigorous domestic economy woulde^large the dej^fit-- further.* through drawing aee^|«r5t|^,',V ,:> .giosfr of iraportsr causes many t o b e reluctantabout vigorojjplfy expansionist monetary and fiscal policies. In fact, there is considerable historical .evidence,-; that economic upswings inr t ^ ifpnitadi^at#s-,are-iasss9c l a t ^ f . i f i t h ' '•\ as deterioration In the balafece on \ current account is more -than offset by capital -account ,1# improvement in response to the investment opportunities offered by a vigorously expanding economy. And the productivity improve ments which must form the basis for any sustained improvement in piur trade balance are more likely to be achieved in a vigorQi^ly growing., economy, than in a stagnating one-,,./’But none' is to deny the possibility of an interim problem of the type %e seem to be experiencing now, as the policies of monetary ease whichshould leadultimately to strong growth and an enlarged % dpmeistic demand for funds temporarily have the opposite V ^|e^.,oaJdcaae!StiC' credit, markets, leading to falling interest | rates and an outflow of funds. Given this present conteaft, if ; we are reluctant to pursue adequately expansionist domestic economic policies during this year, our troublesome balance of payments position will be one reason. REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES K <W * 2 A second reason for concern is that an external payments position widely considered to be ’'weak’* is an international political•liability. At p r e s e n t ■■in •particular, ■European apprehensionabout the stateof the U.S. balance of payments and offi«iaiattitua#s toward it appears t© be mounting for th#«ii r^&SOfisi Firsts ssost of the major European currencies have been &t or near their ceilings vis a vis the dollar for sane time. As a resmlt, several countries have been piling up dollars in support of the exchange rate at a substantial and in come cases accelerating rate, leading to a steady increase in the volume of official dollar holdings which constitute a potential claim on our gold stock. This stock, which as late as year-end 1957 was $23 billion, is now $11 billion. The plleup of dollars in the hands of foreign official holders appears to be due not to the underlying deficit of the United States, which was about the same in iff© as in 196?, but to short-term capital flows resulting from interest-rate differentials which reflect different positions in the economic cycle ift the United States andabroad. In the past f e w d a y s , these capital outflows appear to have Included also a Speculative component. \ | u| "W Second, the Administration's firm commitment to a program of /) economic expansion for 1971 has been a concern of many / Europeans, who fear this will be associated with a deterioration fll in the U.S. balance of payments. Finally, a "passive* or "benign neglect** Approach to the U.S. balance of payments situation has been advoeatedby several academic economists, some with £ai% or present consultative connections* Reeentofficial statements and actions on the part of the United States, however, appear to have gone some way toward alleviating•this1concern. . The real1dangerhere is not the international situation itself, Which Is an annoyance rather than a genuinethreat t o a c o u n t r y as large and powerful as the United states, but rather that it may lead us — and others — to take actions for balance-of-payments reasons which have an undesirable effect on international relationships or on the domestic economy. Balance-of-payments considerations have led us in the past to adopt policies, such as the tytatojjg of foreign aid, which reduce the effectiveness of programs relating to foreign policy. Our basic goal is, of course, an international monetary system which will promote international harmony and encourage\ the maximum freedom for trade and investment across international boundaries. This may mean maintenance of the present systeaal which has been associated with an unprecedented growth of wpr\ld income, trade, and investment during the postwar period* dr ifcjnay • ? ’> \ mean the evolutionary development of an even better system which works more smoothly because it is subject to fewer strains. But it certainly does not mean a system born in an atmosphere of crisis and restriction, developed in response to fears about the U.S. balance of payments situation. Given the importance and magnitude of our economic goals, both at home and internationally, it is essential that our actions on both the foreign and the domestic economic policy fronts be evaluated on their Intrinsic merits, and not primarily in terms of their balance of payments impact. The Dual Role of the United States In the World Economy It is essential to keep in mind here the dual role that the United States plays in the world economy. We are the world's largest trader. In 1970 our imports were more than $40 billion, compared with close to $30 billion for Germany (the next largest) or just over $20 billion for the U.K. The paradox, of course, is that our trade is so large in the world economy and is so small relative to our domestic economy. Our „ occasionally casual actions abodt this small component of " our own economic activity often pertain to matters of urgent importance to others. The United States is also,in effect a banker to the rest of the world. Though other nations understandably dislike admitting it explicitiy, the world at present comes close to being on a de facto dollar standard. The exchange rates for most currencies are"set in terms of the U.S. dollar* Moreover, U,S. dollars are bought or sold by foreign authorities to keep a currency's exchange rate stablfe'in the foreign exchange market making the dollar an "intervention currency.” Finally, dollars are widely held by foreign private holders as working balances for international trade and finance, and by other nations as foreign exchange reserves. - Why the Persisting U.S. Balance of Payments Deficits? This country hag had a deficit in its balance of payments most of the time during the postwar period. For several years, a modest U.S. deficit was welcomed by other nations anxious to rebuild their war-depleted monetary reserves. Since about 1958, however, the deficits have been larger, and some other countries have voiced a growing reluctance to accept the dollars implied by continuing large deficits in our payments situation. This concern has often taken the form of urging the United States to pursue stern fiscal and monetary policies to keep the domestic economy on a tight leash — thereby improving our competitive price position, dampening U.S. demand for imports, and preventing an outflow of funds due to lower domestic interest rates. Why have the deficits been so persistent? An economy with inflationary pressure# of course, will tend to have a deteriorating balance on current account. The demand for imports is then heavy, and higher prices and costs make hard going for exports, From 1967 to 1968, for example, our imports rose 23 percent, as this overload of demands on the domestic economy spilled abroad, and for external as well as domestic reasons it was essential to cool off the long overheated U.S. economy. Clearly, however, the problem is more complex than simply domestic inflation, because we also had a balance of payments "problem” in the early 1960s when there was slack, a: fairly stable price level,and unemployment* The deficits, in short, have persisted through all kinds of domestic economic conditions — in a period of stable prices and unemployment from 1958-1964, and in the inflation of 1965 to 1970. A second diagnosis runs in terms of structural problems that cause some heavy special drains on our balance of payments. Our military forces and installations abroad result in an:’’outflow" j of almost $5 billion per year. The foreign investment activitiesr of U.S. corporations involve capital outflows of $2 t o $3 billipn each year. And our aid programs naturally require substantial balance of payments outflows. This is not to say that any specific item can be identified as the "cause" of the problem. The balance of payments account is a double-entry arraying of our international financial transactions« T h e tw o sides, of course/ "balance." The "deficit^ is simply a collection of those items that are worrisome, and different problems call for differentdefinitions of the deficit* Any one item could be what it is without causing trouble if another item were sufficiently different. And some of the large "leakage" items contain a measure of self-financing. Our loans and grants under the foreign aid program, forexample, are spent primarily on U.S. exports, and the inflow of income from American investment abroad was over §5billion last year. Yet it does remain truethe "leakages"in some areas must be covered by larger surpluses for other itemsiin the balance of payments, if ameasured deficit in our balaac4 ©f payments is to be avoided, A third diagnosis is that the dollar may be overvalued, relative to ©ther leading currencies r owing to the basic nature of the international monetary and financial system itself* Countries~ are 'far more■'reluctant■to revalue ■thetri.exchange rates upward than downward. A weak currency is more likely to be devalued than an overly strong currency is to be appreciated.Thus theretends to be a net bias toward devaluation against the standard and that standard Is the O.S. dollar. Advice from abroad to the United States to strengthen>its balance of payments is,therefore, ad^c(r'%©; .;n»iieuve3r'®ur domestic economy in order to reconcile inconsistent external payments objectives among nations. Should we succeed in strengthening our payments balance, the inevitable weakeningof some other countries* balances would tend to produce a devaluation oftheireurreneies, and the whole cycle might start over again. The same sort ofasyiraftetrical behavior results from countries' attitudes towards international reserves. That is, countries whose reserves are "too low” or decreasing feel much more urgency about taking is^ftion than; 4b -those whose reserves are "toc high” or increasing. The effeet of this Is that a general feelingof "reserve shortage** appears to persist, Judging frcaa countries' behavior, even with the present magnitude of mew SDR allocations. If> l>n balance), c^aiftrleis db ind e ^ %mnt to increase their dollar holdings over the long run, this would imply that the present measures of the U.S. deficit tend to overstateourbalance of payments problem, since non# of them takes into account growth in- foreign demand for U.S. dollars. Impllcations for Policy ■What are the implications of this for policy? There are at least two areas that are directly within the axnbit of U. S. actions. W© do have an external as well as a domestic obliga tion to manage our own economy in order to keep it oft a reasonably stable and orderly path, which is likely to mean a better-than-average price performance compared' to '-other industrialized nation®, We eannot, however, agree to chronic uneraployment or deflation for external reasons, particularly when the objective may com® down to attempting the reconcilia tion of inconsistent bala»c@~of-payments objectives among nations, and this view of the nature ana limits of the American responsibility t© the international system has been made clear to other industrialized nations, both publicly and privately, in recent months. We could, of course, also institute measures to affect certain categories © f o u r balance directly. Indeed we have already taken steps of this sort, such asaid-tying and our various capital-control programs. But;- quite -apart from questions about their effectiveness, measures taken for balance ofpaymehts purposes may not always be in the interest of our broader economicgoals, foreign or domestic* And, finally, no such measure is purely unilateral? at the very least, other countries can counter with similar measures and thus neutralize their impact. In general, then, if there are persistent payments disI equilibria remaining in the international system one© our I cfom eeoncsasy is stabilised, the remedies will lie largely I outside the United States. The rest of the world would then (( have four alternatives from which to choose. First, the surplus, countries- can maintain their -existing exchange-rate parities by^ continuing to accumulateofficial dollar balances. The general1 Indications are that most surplus countries are prepared to see their dollar balances continue to grow, at least in the near future, rather than to face the consequences to their trade of appreciating their'currencies They probably will not, however, want to continue accumulating dollars at the present rate — • although Germany, which has had the largest accumulation of dollar balances in recent months, is explicitly committed to doing So under its 1967 pledge, made in connection with the maintenance of U. Si troops in that country, not to buy U. S. gold. (It is mutually agreed that a future German repurchase of the $500 million in gold which it sold to the United states in 1969 would not be regarded as a departure from this pledge.) The United States could offer surplus countries a variant of this first option, incidentally, fey bprrowjrig Explicitly, either through the IMF or directly, rather than borrowing implicitly through increases in. their dollar balances, Such a "funding" of foreign/ official dollar balances raight be worth consideration, both because it raight ease the situation from a foreign-policy viewpoint and because it would induce a desirable shift in the structure of our international invest ment position, substituting long-term for short-term liabilities. Second, these nations could reduce their official dollar balances by using them to buy gold from the United States at the parity rate .-of $35 per ounce, at leastin the..short run. Although surplus countries, particularly thesraaller Ones.# ■have, isiade occasional purchases in recent years, there has not been large-#eaier- use of the "gold window'' since theestablishwent of the "two-tier" gold price..system in ’Inarch;'. 196 8. This .away to© in part because of a general recognitloriofthe dangers ■to'the stability of the eysteru inherent in any large-scale gold drawings. It laay also,.be because, the ma^cr surplus countries of recent years — particularly Germany and Japan — have made commitments, with different degrees of explicltness, not', to take such actions, while the xaajor gold buyer of the past, frai^c®'>:,-has ,iBot- until recently' been in a balance of payments position which would enable it to take such action. However, there are some indications that the magnitude of these purchases coulfi increase in. the future.’ ’ While we would not object to further modest demands on our gold stock, this alternative is not a satisfactory solution, because of the very real danger that such demands might become cumulative and threaten a serious drain on our gold holdings. (It is the view of the Justice Department that the Gold Reserve Act-o f■1934 ■give© the President discretionary authority to suspend gold payments, partially or totally, without Congressional ■approval..), .. -Depending, on the nature and degree- o£\ suspension^, .'ahel the response of other countries, such a step might alter opr position with respect to our obligations to the International Monetary Fund. Tim IMF accepts (or at least has not challenged,) the present international monetary arrangements, including' the twotier gold system, as, satisfactorily discharing the tjpite# States* convertibility and exchange-rate-stability obligations ui^deJT the Articles of Agreement. Should we suspend gold sales to official foreigners, or restrict them further, we iftight hav^ tosfirsdOther ways of fulfilling these obligations or find ourselves in violation ©f the Articles ©I Agreement,. There is also the awkward question of deciding the point at which the reduction of our gold'Stock warrants invoking a partial or total suspension. : ,v -8~ Third, the surplus nations can revalue their own currencies upward with respect to the dollar. This would moderate the tendency to accumulate dollars further, but it would make their exports higher priced in world markets (and imports cheapen)♦ The Germans did appreciate, 'after a transitional period','of floating rates, in October 3.969 » So, in ©ffeet did Canada lajpt May by going to a floating rate. ,(The exchange rate of the Canadian dollar then rose significantly.) Among the list of other countries for which revaluation seems most probable at some point, Switzerland and Japan are perhaps mentioned most often, although the Swiss Have indicated that they would not uncle^take ..such' a step alone.. The important point here is that the initiative on exchangerate changes must come, if at all, from the surplus countries. The United States is in no position to take unilateral action on. dollar devaluation, since this can be done only by raising the price of gold. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act explicitly requires prior Congressional approval for such a step, and any request for legislation on the price of gold would lead to impossible complications domestically. Such a move would also have a variety of undesirable effects on the international financial system, Including giving windfall gains to goldproducing countries (primarily. South Africa and the USSR) arid those .who hold gold rather than dollar -.reserves, and’the possibility of a widespread loss of, confidence in the dollar as a key currency. Finally, this is.again not really a unilateral option, since it is highly unlikely that most of our major trading partners would permit theresulting change in the dollar-value of their own currencies to stand, an<l it is only.if there were such a change that we would get any adjust ment .effect in our balance of payments. From the point of view of the United states’ own economic interests, it would seem to be a matter of indifference whether surplus countries continue to accumulate dollar balances or reduce them via revaluation. However, financing via continued accumulation does create pressures which could at some point affect undesirably our International relationship and the workings of the international monetary system. Therefore, it is in our. interest to encourage steps which would make revalua tion easier for those who prefer the adjustment alternative. Given the heavy political element inherent in exchange-rate decisions as the international system operates at present, any modifications which would make such action less politically charged would be helpful. This, of course, is the main purpose of the lengthy continuing investigation under IMF auspices of possibilities for limited exchange-rate flexibility within the framework of the Bretton Woods System. -9~ Finally, surplus countries can achieve ”backdoor" revalua tion by measures such as taxes or-Quantitative, restrictions on exports or on inflows of foreign capital. Such measures are not always obviously recognizable as such. ©ie extraordinary reserve requirements against foreign deposits in German banka, and the resulting nonpayment of interest on such deposits, are examples of measures used to discourage capital inflows. Theoretically, surplus countries could achieve effective partial revaluation ecpiaily well by liberalizing or eliminating existing restrictions on imports and/or capital outflows. Ex perience has indicated, however, that this is not the way the problem is resolved, on balance, in practice. Rather, efforts to achieve ^backdoor" changes in parities tend to result in a spreading network of barriers to trade and capital movements, which can only have a negative impact on growth, efficiency, and price-stability in participating countries. For this reason, this last alternative appears to be, for the long run, an undesirable one. The United States, iji short, h^s important responsibilities to the international monetary and financial system, but there are problems beyond our own policies. And we may, indeed,, have, a persistent balance of payments, 'problem beyond the dif ficulties caused by outflows of short-term capital, but it is in ttiiy■case overstated by our:measured balance of p a y m e n t s deficit, whichever measure is used. Failure to make" these distinctions more sharplyraaykeep us unnecessarily on the defensive, arid in practice lead the system in an illiberal direction through a growing array of direct controls and trade restrictions in order to prop up a seemingly weak dollar and to strive to'force an equilibrium which cannot... be achieved as long as balance of payments objectives are Inconsistent. Major policy issues The list of questions attached to your memorandum to the Ad Hoc Group seems to touch on .the major policy issues In this area. In the light of the preceding background analysis, I would suggest that they be phrased for discussion as follows: 1. Balance of Payments Targets The difficulty with balance of payments target© is that there seems to be a natural inclination to define them in "aero" or "balance* terms. A majoir exception is a current account target? we have suggested to the OECD’s Working Party 3 that a current account surplus of between 1/2 and 3/4 of one percent of GNP would seem to be appropriate to our long-run position as a net exporter of capital (for 1975, this would toe a projected current-aecount surplus of $7-$10 billion). A zero overall balance target {whether defined in "basic", "liquidity" or "official aettlenjents” terms*) would be. appro priate if it were felt either that foreign demand for dollar balances will not grow further, or that it would not fee in our interest to satisfy such a demand, ..With respect to the. official coraponentof such demand (corresponding to the official settlements balance), our view depends heavily on what we foresee as the future relationship among dollars, SDR’s a n d other possible reserve assets. I would urge, there fore , that #e avoid?setting balance of payments targets# at l<&a#t for the present, with the possible exception of a current account target. There remains the further question of whether -Wis’^shottM ■'■'Set a trade-surplus target within the current-aifeotot.target? m y initial reaction would be to,■avoid locking ourselves in this fashion, .since this would necessarily imply also a target:, for the remaining items in the current account. 2. Balance of payments Policies Even if we eschew quantitative balance of payments targets, it is quite possible to regard a particular balance of payments situation as satisfactory or unsatisfactory; thus, the question of policy measures directed at the balance of payments could remain valid even in the absence of targets as such. Any policy directed at a particular category of the balance of payments needs to be scrutinized carefully in the light of three criteriat (1) It# relationship to the overall goal of ■ilreedOrasof international trade and investment; ■ > (2) its; probable loiig-run effectiveness, in the light of the tendency , in other market-oriented economies, for offsetting developments to appear in other balance of payments categories? and (3) Its effect on the achievement of domestic economic goals. With respect to the present capital-control programs, we have long argued that they should not become a permanent component of our foreign economic policy. We feel that this particular time would be inausploious for their total abolition, partly for psychological reasons, in view of the European jitteriness mentioned earlier, and partly because the present relationship between domestic and foreign Interest rates is particularly unfavorable. 'There is reason to expect, however, that the second half of this year may see a reconvergence of interest rates here and abroad, at which time abolition could become a viable possibility. In the interim, the liberalization momentum should be maintained, or at least further restrictive ness avoided. REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES -IQ- The question of how to finance deficits, again, should be considered in the light of the desired evolution of the international, monetary system and, if possible, there should be multilateral discussion of a mutually satisfactory solution. 3. The Development of the International Monetary System Within the basic goal of international harmony and freedom of international transactions, our objectives concerning the international monetary system have two major aspects. The first aspect has to do with the evolution of inter national reserves* The main question here is the relative importance of dollars, SDR's , and any new reserve asset in future reserve ‘-increases {we are assuming that accretion of gold to reserves will continue t© be minimal). This Administra tion 1s strong support for SDK's is well known, but we need to d e velopaclearerview on the extent to which future SDR activa tions should sbe tied toreduction or ©liminationof 'the. O.S. . deficit. On this, I Would make two observations. U.S. deficits' are no substitute for the planned creation of unconditional i liquidity represented by SDR's . And, the U.S. official settle- ( ments deficit is highly volatile, and any single-year figure should be viewed in perspective. For the three-year period 1968-70 (or the five-year period 1966-70), for example, the official settlements deficit averaged about $2 billion per year, only slightly above the assumptions made when SDR’s were first approved. The second aspect has to do with the development o f ,a more satisfactory mechanismof adjustment. Here, we have already a expressed our preference for m; system which would expedite timely and appropriate adjustments of exchange rates. This is consistent with the President g affirmation of support for "orderly exchange-rate adjustments" in the report "U,S. Foreign Policy for the 1970*8." A majortactical achievement of the exchange-r&fce-flegibility exercise, mentioned earlier, was to make exchange-rate adjustment, long an unmentionable subject, once again a respectable topic for discussion. 4. European Monetary Integration The implications; for the United States of this projected integration fall into two categories: the implications for the interim period before integration is achieved, which is likely to last for at least a decade and possibly a good deal longer (assuming ultimate achievement of the integration goal); and the implications once such integration has been substantially achieved. The main implication for the interim period is that Common Market countries will be extremely reluctant to take any major steps unless they can take them in common, and. they are still a long way from being able to do the latter. With respect t© exchange-rate revaluation, in particular, their natural reluctance will doubtless be compounded during the interim period by their inability to realfti a common revaluation, combined with the belief that revaluation by one or some members of the group but hot all would be a step away from integration. Should full, int#gratioh,be achieved^ this would be likely to reduce at"least the.official demand for"dollars'as a reserve asset. The private demand for dollar balances might also be reduced, but this is by no. means certain; the dollar would still retain/’isua^^ojC. its traditional advantages as a vehicle Currency for private transactions. There, is no reason why any particular levels og- growthof So^lgli., fpar;do liars is1"jr@|ji3i^d-vby ' interests, as long as any shift is sufficiently gradual to .^ilow time for adjustment/ ..Thus, pur attitude toward European monetary <E>ir^ut^miity;^ atA:’ lWife"'toi,r':’ $he¥:present. ’In, ' ' ' impact of European"monetary integration ’jpni U.s.iWte^sts;::cannot be , e^iuated' separately/from the broader question of the impact of the EEC as a whole. And this, in turn, depends on whether the EEC takes an outwafd-looking liberalizing stance of an inward-looking, protectionist position as it proceeds with the widening and deepening process of expansion. 5. Movements of Short-Term Capital _ ItiS; in this area that the conflict between freedom e>£ ^t^rnatipEia'l transactions oii the one hand and Independence of national economic (particularly monetary) policies on the other is most acute...-/for/tills' reason, the rised for the •'intensive examination" of the techniques of international monetary x cooperation called for by .repoapt /tp same ;time, _> ;t e e h n i t i s # © ' ; : ' i l h l M h / Would minimize interference with private markets and the international allocation of productive capital. In this light, a search for methods of increasing flexibility in the monetary-fiscal policy mix might prove particularly fruitful, since coordination of monetary policies would jfeein to be the qnly alternative to restriction. .Such shijPts.,in the _policy raix would,'fefT effective "if,’ asrseems. likely, international flows of short-term capital induced by interest-rate differentials, while often large and therefore disturbing, are also temporary and self-reversing. Paul W. McCracken